

**REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE,
ADVOCATE TSHILOLO MICHAEL MASUTHA,
IN THE MATTER OF
DR. VERWOERD'S ASSASSINATION**

By

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INTRODUCTION

At 2.15 p.m. on September 6, 1966, Dimitri Tsafendas stabbed to death, at his desk in the South African House of Assembly, Prime Minister Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the so-called “architect of apartheid.” Some forty days later, in a summary trial before the Cape Town Supreme Court, Tsafendas was declared to be schizophrenic and unfit to stand trial for the assassination. It was stated that he believed a tapeworm lived inside him which controlled his actions, and that he did not have any political motive for assassinating the Prime Minister. A subsequent Commission of Enquiry confirmed the court’s verdict and reaffirmed the largely negative evidence given at the trial as to Tsafendas’s character and behaviour.

This report reveals that both the police and the Commission suppressed and manipulated evidence to provide a distorted picture of Tsafendas. It reveals that Tsafendas was nothing like the hopeless, shambolic person portrayed in Court and by the Commission of Enquiry. It demonstrates conclusively that Tsafendas was not schizophrenic and did not believe he had a tapeworm. That the tapeworm was a myth is shown by the fact that it is never mentioned in the transcripts of his interrogation; what these do show is Tsafendas giving clear political reasons for the assassination. Tsafendas considered Dr. Verwoerd to be not only a “tyrant” and a “dictator” but “the brains behind apartheid.” He reasoned, therefore, that if he was “removed,” the racist political system he had developed would collapse sooner or later and a “change of policy would take place” in South Africa. How the tapeworm came into the case, as well as how Tsafendas was declared to be schizophrenic, will be discussed in detail later. The study also shows the inaccuracy of the diagnosis of schizophrenia given by the doctors who examined Tsafendas before his trial.

The evidence shows that Tsafendas was a modest, thoughtful, if emotional, man; a Communist with a lively social conscience and profound political convictions. We will see that Tsafendas was deeply political from a very young age and remained politically active until the assassination. He was arrested several times in Mozambique and Portugal for promoting Communism and denouncing colonialism. Due to his political activities, the Portuguese security police, PIDE, created a file on him (*Secret Criminal Record no 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*) as early as 1938, when he was just twenty-years old, when he was “suspected of distributing communist propaganda.”

PIDE's very detailed file on Tsafendas totalled some 130 pages at the time of the assassination. Two days after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, the Chief Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon sent a top-secret telegram to the Sub-Director of PIDE in Mozambique, instructing him that any "information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of your country should not be transmitted to the South African authorities, despite the relations that exist between your delegation and the South African Police." PIDE played an important role in the case; this too will be examined here. The background and issues surrounding the assassination also appear in a markedly different light in the study. The study will reveal important and hitherto unknown information about Tsafendas's life and political activities, for example his participation in the Greek Civil War on the side of the Communists.

Work on this research started in 2009. It has examined at least 12,000 pages of documents found in the National Archives of South Africa, Portugal and Britain, the vast majority of which had never previously been consulted.² All the documents found in these archives are in the author's possession in digitalized form. Further research covered all the South African newspapers of the time which were still available, along with the leading contemporaneous newspapers from Australia, Britain, Canada, France, West and East Germany, Greece, Italy, Mozambique, Portugal, the Soviet Union, the United States and Zimbabwe. All the articles found in these newspapers are also in the author's possession in digitalized form.

The author has conducted interviews with 137 people, 69 of whom knew Tsafendas personally. They included persons who met him in the countries where he lived or which he visited, such as Germany, Greece, Mozambique, South Africa, Turkey and Zimbabwe. Some witnesses knew him exceptionally well and here speak formally about him for the first time; five of them had known him since he was a small child. Other interviewees included members of his family, workmates, housemates, fellow prisoners, visitors who talked to him in hospital and prison, clinicians who examined him before his trial, and two of his defence lawyers. All interviews with witnesses were recorded personally by the author. All interviewees are willing to provide a sworn affidavit or testify under oath at any court as to what they said and discussed with the author.

² All the documents found in the archives have been copied in the study exactly as they were found. The many spelling or grammar mistakes are of the original documents, not of the author.

In addition, several experts in fields relevant to this research were consulted on an ongoing basis; for example lawyers, judges, psychologists, psychiatrists, academics, high-ranking police officers and former secret agents. In order to properly examine the diagnosis of schizophrenia in regard to Tsafendas, the process followed, and all the medical aspects of the case, the author of the study collaborated with Professor Tuviah Zabow: forensic psychiatrist, former head of the forensic psychiatry unit at Valkenberg Hospital and former Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Cape Town. Furthermore, the author consulted several renowned psychiatrists and psychologists, including Professor Alban Burke, Head of the Department of Psychology at the University of Johannesburg; Professor Kirk Heilbrun, forensic psychologist and Professor of Psychology at Drexler University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Professor Phillip Resnick, forensic psychiatrist and Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Division of Forensic Psychiatry at Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine in Cleveland, Ohio; and Professor Robert L. Sadoff, clinical Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Center for Studies in Social-Legal Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, and former president of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, as well as of the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry.

In addition, the author collaborated closely and on an on-going basis with several relevant legal experts, including advocate George Bizos; Professor John Dugard, former judge at the International Court of Justice; Krish Govender, former Durban State Attorney and co-chairman of the Law Society of South Africa; and Justice Zak Yacoob, former Constitutional Judge. All of these eminent jurists have read the report, seen the evidence and discussed all aspects of the case with the author. All have agreed with the report's findings.

Advocate George Bizos believes that this report is “of major historical importance for South Africa and as to our understanding of Verwoerd’s assassination.”³ He described the evidence gathered and presented by this report, proving that Tsafendas was not insane but politically motivated in killing Dr. Verwoerd, as “overwhelming and unquestionable.”⁴ He also characterised this report as “monumental,” describing it as “a mammoth enquiry into the steps taken by the government to declare him mad and to cover up his treatment. It’s absolutely amazing what the government did.”⁵

³ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 18 November 2017.

⁴ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 3 September 2016.

⁵ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 6 April 2016.

Professor John Dugard said about the Tsafendas case and this report:

“Many South Africans suspected that there was a political cover-up in the Tsafendas case. The apartheid regime had two reasons for portraying Tsafendas to be insane. First, the regime wished to suggest that no-one in his right mind could kill such a wonderful leader as Hendrik Verwoerd. Secondly, there was the security aspect. The security apparatus, led by the Minister of Justice and Police, John Vorster, wished to avoid accountability for allowing a political revolutionary to be employed in a position close to the Prime Minister. So it was that the media and the legal proceedings were manipulated to present Tsafendas as a mentally deranged person dictated to by a tapeworm.

This research confirms that there was a cover-up. It shows convincingly that Tsafendas was a political revolutionary, whose assassination of Dr. Verwoerd was motivated by a hatred of Dr. Verwoerd and all he stood for. He was not an insane killer but a political assassin determined to rid South Africa of the architect of apartheid. Political assassinations seldom achieve their goal and this was no exception. But at least South African history should know the truth about Tsafendas. Dousemetzis has done South Africa a service by correcting the historical record.”⁶

Justice Zak Yacoob said he agreed “100 per cent” with all of the report’s findings and added:

“The historical record shows that comrade Tsafendas killed Verwoerd, that he pleaded insanity at the trial, his plea was upheld and he was, consequent to his plea, confined at the pleasure of the relevant authority. If he had spoken the truth, he would have been sentenced to death, so the tactic was a very good one in the circumstances. History does not record that he pretended to be insane to save his life. This is well brought out in the research. The research shows conclusively that he did a deliberate courageous anti-apartheid act but pretended insanity at the trial; understandably so. I think the research speaks for itself.”⁷

⁶ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 8 September 2016.

⁷ Justice Zak Yacoob in a personal interview, 18 September 2017.

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OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

Chapter One: Dr. Verwoerd's Life and his Apartheid

As we will see, Tsafendas characterised Dr. Verwoerd as “dictator,” “tyrant,” “fascist,” “racist,” “Nazi” and “Hitler’s best student.” He considered him to be “the brains behind apartheid” and believed that without him, a change of policy would eventually take place in South Africa. In order to judge whether Tsafendas was justified in these assumptions, we must examine Dr. Verwoerd’s character, background and political development. Thus, this chapter consists of a biography of Dr. Verwoerd, dealing with his personal life, his ideology and his political career, but mostly with the development of apartheid during his time as Minister of Native Affairs (from 1950 to 1958) and then as Prime Minister (from 1958 to 1966). It also examines his main “achievements” during this time, especially legislation which he orchestrated and several incidents and decisions that led him to become known as “the architect of apartheid.”

Chapter Two: Dimitris Tsafendas's Biography

This chapter tells the story of Tsafendas from his birth to the assassination. It examines his personal life, his ideology and his political activities. Many of the facts mentioned in this chapter have remained unknown until now.

Chapter Three: The Assassination

Here the study deals with Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination, including the national situation before the event, the act itself, the reaction in South Africa and around the world and the assassination’s immediate aftermath.

Chapter Four: The Police Investigation

This chapter provides a very detailed account of the police investigation that followed the assassination. It sets out all of the important evidence collected by the South African police,

including all statements in full from people who were questioned by the police.⁸ An important issue discussed in this chapter is the role of PIDE in the investigation, something that has not been examined hitherto. All the top-secret documents of the South African police and PIDE found in the National Archives of Portugal and South Africa are included. This chapter also covers events such as the appointment of Tsafendas's defence team, Vorster becoming Prime Minister, certain announcements by Vorster about Tsafendas, and some press reports.

Chapter Five: Tsafendas's Summary Trial

This chapter considers all aspects of Tsafendas's summary trial. We see the preparations of both the defence team and the State ahead of the trial. Each witness's testimony is included, in most cases exactly as it was given, or after the removal of small talk or anything unimportant or not germane. Testimony is analysed in detail by comparing evidence gathered by the police which contradicted the testimony of witnesses, thus exposing inaccuracies. The analysis was much assisted by new evidence collected by the author. Forty-four of the witnesses who knew Tsafendas well were interviewed by the author and had parts of the testimonies heard in the court read to them and then offered their comments.⁹

Chapter Six: The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Circumstances of the Death of the late Dr. the Honourable Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd

This chapter examines the report of the Commission of Enquiry which followed the summary trial of Tsafendas. It starts by explaining what a Commission of Enquiry is and then offers examples of how Commissions operated during apartheid. Some examples have been used, such as the Sharpeville Commission, in order to make clear how both the Commission and

⁸ Evidence found in the archives which was not directly related to the assassination or to Tsafendas or was of no importance has been reduced to summaries or omitted.

⁹ In total sixty-nine witnesses who knew Tsafendas were interviewed by the author. The author refers to forty-four witnesses who were asked specifically about issues which were raised during Tsafendas's summary trial and by the Commission of Enquiry. On several occasions, these witnesses were given extracts to read from the trial transcript and asked to comment on them. Most were people who knew Tsafendas as a free man before the assassination and were best placed to give an opinion on his behaviour and mental state. However, there were also important witnesses, like Liza Key, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis, and Fathers Michalis Visvinis and Minas Constandinou, who came to know Tsafendas well during his time in prison or in hospital, when he confided extensively in them. The remaining twenty-five of the sixty-nine witnesses either did not know Tsafendas well enough to comment on the specific issues raised, or were members of his defence team, or had died before the author had the trial manuscripts in its possession.

the police operated during apartheid. This is an important part of the chapter because of the many similarities between these previous Commissions and the one on Dr. Verwoerd's assassination. All the statements and important evidence collected by the Commission is presented. Several parts of the Commission's Report are examined in detail. The Commission is judged by the evidence it had in its possession at the time and not by evidence collected by the author. There is only one occasion where new evidence is presented.

Chapter Seven: David Pratt

This chapter deals with David Pratt's armed assault on Dr. Verwoerd in 1960, six years before he was assassinated by Tsafendas. It includes a biography and sets out what happened to him after his arrest. Some very important new information about Pratt is presented here for the first time. The study uses a large number of primary sources for this case, such as all the documents found in the National Archives of South Africa and Britain about Pratt and the case, the archives of the National Liberal Club in London, of which Pratt was a member for thirty-three years, his correspondence with some of his friends, his personal notes while in prison and in hospital and interviews with people who knew him. Many secondary sources have been consulted such as published material and reports in South African and foreign newspapers at the time.

Conclusion

This chapter offers a comprehensive but concise conclusion concerning everything discussed in this report.

CHAPTER ONE

DR. VERWOERD'S LIFE AND HIS APARTHEID

EARLY YEARS AND STUDIES

Hendrick Frensch Verwoerd was born near Amsterdam, Netherlands, at 4 p.m. on September 8, 1901. He was the second child of the deeply religious Wilhelmus Johannes Verwoerd, a partner in a grocery business, and Anje Strik. The young couple were strongly attracted to the Boer cause and Wilhelmus was member of a committee which helped South Africans who were coming to Europe for help during the Boer War (1899-1901). The family moved to South Africa in 1903 when Hendrik was eighteen months old.¹⁰ His father opened a grocery store in Wynberg, Cape Town, and spent much of his free time preaching the gospel to Coloureds¹¹ in the city.¹²

As a child he had initially attended an English school and lived in an English neighbourhood, being fully immersed in Afrikaner culture only from the age of sixteen.¹³ He was a strong-willed, intellectual youth, uninterested in sport, whose upbringing was quite different to his Boer peers.¹⁴ Verwoerd's foreign origins imbued him with a fanatical need to be "more Afrikaner" than the Afrikaners.¹⁵¹⁶ He seems always to have felt insecure about his status as an Afrikaner, having been born in Holland to Dutch parents. Many Nationalists referred to him as "die Hollander" and he apparently felt the need to constantly prove his loyalty,¹⁷ while he also felt that he was on a historical mission.¹⁸

In 1912, after nine years in South Africa, the Verwoerd family relocated to Rhodesia.¹⁹ His secondary education took place at Milton Boys' High School in Bulawayo, Rhodesia, and he later described being physically punished for stating his preference for

¹⁰ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 8, 'Hendrik Frensj Verwoerd: A man under a cruel magnifying glass'; Grobbelaar, 1967: 9.

¹¹ Coloured was considered to be someone "who is not a White person or a Bantu" (Dugard, 1978: 61).

¹² Uys, 1959: 4.

¹³ Sparks, 1990: 193.

¹⁴ Troup, 1975: 317.

¹⁵ O'Meara, 1996: 92.

¹⁶ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 7 September 1966, 'A prophet of racism.'; O'Meara, 1996: 92.

¹⁷ O'Meara, 1996: 92; Osada, 2002: 8.

¹⁸ Marx, 2011a: 282.

¹⁹ Now Zimbabwe.

living in Afrikaner South Africa.²⁰ In the words of one former classmate, the young Dr. Verwoerd was “an oddly lonely boy, a gawky, clumsy sort of lad with a strong guttural accent.”²¹

Rhodesia was then a British colony and the students were frequently required to sing the English national anthem, something young Verwoerd hated doing.²² Ironically, he received the best marks in the English Literature exam for the whole of Rhodesia and his name was added to the school's roll of honour. He was then awarded the Beit Scholarship, but had to decline it as his family was returning to South Africa.²³

When South Africa entered World War I and a section of the Boers rebelled, young Verwoerd expressed his desire to return to the country. The Principal was outraged that his student wanted to return to what he described as “the nest of rebels.” He “literally kicked” Verwoerd down the school corridor²⁴ to persuade him to stay because he was such an excellent student. When the Principal asked why he wanted to live in what he described as the “rebel province,” (the Orange Free State), Verwoerd replied, “But that is what we are, sir, we are rebels!”²⁵ Eventually, in 1917, Verwoerd and his family returned to South Africa.²⁶

This was a period when theories of eugenics were popular, and these ideas were seized upon and developed in South Africa, which already had a policy of segregation and where the idea that non-White races were genetically inferior was widespread.²⁷ Although Verwoerd had initially hoped to become a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, he eventually decided to become an academic.²⁸ He studied psychology and philosophy at Stellenbosch University, the seat of Afrikaans intellectual life, and in 1922 wrote his Master's thesis on these subjects.²⁹ The following year, he became a lecturer in psychology at the same university³⁰ and in 1924, aged twenty-three,³¹ he produced the first PhD thesis to be written

²⁰ Uys (*Africa South*), January-March 1959: 4, ‘Dr. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa.’

²¹ Botha, 1967: 34.

²² Kenney, 1980: 23.

²³ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘Hendrik Frensj Verwoerd: A man under a cruel magnifying glass’; Grobbelaar, 1967: 14.

²⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘Hendrik Frensj Verwoerd: A man under a cruel magnifying glass’; Uys, 1959: 4.

²⁵ Botha, 1967: 34.

²⁶ Grobbelaar, 1967: 13-15.

²⁷ Dubow, 2014: 23-26

²⁸ Prinsloo, 1981a: 5.

²⁹ Froneman, 2000: 401; Marx, 2013: 92.

³⁰ Marx, 2013: 92.

³¹ Marx, 2013: 92; Miller, 1993: 637.

in Afrikaans³² entitled “*Die Afstomping van Gemoedsaandoeninge*” (An Experimental Study of the Blunting of Emotions).³³

It was a significant time to be an Afrikaner student, with intellectual life centred in the flourishing Stellenbosch University. Students were exposed to nationalist thinking in a wide range of forms across the arts and humanities and were deeply involved with the National Party and its aims. The Student Representative Council, of which Verwoerd was a member and chairman for a term, believed that race separation was the only option for South Africa. The University and its components were also opposed to the idea of British culture being respected, and Verwoerd asked the conductor of the Cape Town Symphony Orchestra not to play the British national anthem at performances in Stellenbosch. Verwoerd was also a student activist in the area of providing support and access to cultural events with a nationalist angle to poor Afrikaners.³⁴

In 1925, Verwoerd moved to expand his international horizons. Along with 155 South African students of both sexes, he travelled to England for a tour lasting two months. The visit came under the echelon of the National Union of South African Students and it was Verwoerd who made the business arrangements.³⁵ The following year, Oxford University offered Verwoerd a R.1.800 Abe Bailey scholarship,³⁶ but he turned it down in favour of an offer worth half as, to study psychology in Germany.³⁷

During 1926 and 1927, Verwoerd spent one semester each in the psychological institutes of the universities of Leipzig (20 April to 26 July 1926), Hamburg (23 October 1926 to 18 February 1927), and Berlin (28 April to 8 August 1927). Verwoerd chose them because their specific emphasis was his main interest, applied psychology.³⁸ While in Germany, he was offered the editorship of a newspaper in South Africa, but he declined as he wanted to gain experience as a teacher. His ultimate aim at the time was to become a Minister of Education.³⁹

³² Lapping, 1986: 106.

³³ Gilroy 2001: 36; Marx, 2013: 92; Troup, 1975: 318.

³⁴ Froneman, 2000: 400-405.

³⁵ *Western Daily Press*, 29 December 1925: 7, ‘South African students.’

³⁶ Botha, 1967: 34; *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘Hendrik Frensj Verwoerd: A man under a cruel magnifying glass’; Marx, 2013: 93; Uys, 1959: 4; Welsh, 2000: 448.

³⁷ Botha, 1967: 34; Cronje, 1964: 1.

³⁸ Furlong, 1991: 80; Marx, 2013: 93; Meredith, 1988: 70; Sparks, 1990: 163.

³⁹ Grobbelaar, 1967: 23.

Verwoerd's primary interest in studying in Germany was to acquire knowledge of the cutting edge of his subject, especially of applied psychology, there being many leading psychologists in Germany then. A side-effect of his stay was exposure to the ideas inherent in the German nationalism that was then a growing force; in Leipzig in particular, some of the most prominent members of the psychology department were politically right-leaning.⁴⁰ In addition, prevalent within the department was the "ethnopsychological" idea that people from "primitive" ethnicities were essentially child-like psychologically. This was explained with the theory that while African children developed at a similar rate to Europeans until puberty, at this point they diverged; Europeans began to develop their intellect in this phase, whereas Africans became overwhelmed with sexual instincts and remained psychologically stuck in puberty.⁴¹

It cannot escape notice that Verwoerd was in Germany at a time when Hitler was newly released from jail and had just published his life story and political manifesto, *Mein Kampf* (1925). National Socialism was the emerging force in German politics but it had not achieved the dominance it would acquire in the 1930s. That said, it was difficult for any thinking young person not to notice the "cross-currents of political change sweeping Germany."⁴² A report by the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid in 1976, claimed that Dr. Verwoerd had close ties with National Socialist circles. The report said, "Inter alia, he was said to have inherited his anti-Semitism directly from the racist Hitlerian theoreticians."⁴³

Leaving Germany in 1927, Verwoerd travelled back to the United Kingdom, then on to the United States. While there, in December of 1927, he was told that he had been appointed Professor of Applied Psychology and Psychotechnics at Stellenbosch University. He travelled back to South Africa immediately.⁴⁴ On his return to Stellenbosch, Verwoerd brought with him many of the ideas that he had acquired in Germany.⁴⁵ Broadly speaking, the views Verwoerd acquired during his student years remained constant throughout his career.

⁴⁰ Marx, 2013: 92-93, 100-103.

⁴¹ Marx, 2013: 112-115.

⁴² Hepple, 1967: 210.

⁴³ Italiaander, 1960: 175; Mzimela, 1980: 100; United Nations Centre against Apartheid and A. Kum'a N'dumbe, 1976: 7.

⁴⁴ Marx, 2013: 92; Miller, 1993: 637.

⁴⁵ Allighan, 1960: xx.

PERSONAL LIFE

At Stellenbosch, Verwoerd sat on the Students' Council with Elizabeth (Betsie) Schoombee, who was studying Afrikaans Nederlands literature and was a founding member of the Student Women's League. Born on May 17, 1901, Betsie, like Dr. Verwoerd, was a brilliant student, becoming one of the first women in South Africa to obtain an MA when it was rare for women even to go to university. In 1927, Betsie visited Verwoerd in Germany and they were soon married. Upon their return to South Africa, Betsie gave up teaching to and devoted herself to her husband's career while becoming a mother to seven children; five boys and two girls.⁴⁶

The Verwoerds practiced apartheid in their own home and they had no Black employees.⁴⁷ Betsie educated her children at home to prevent them from having too much contact with "inferior negroes."⁴⁸ Gossip that Betsie might actually have some black ancestry was presumably known to the Verwoerds and may have contributed to this overcompensation.⁴⁹ While Betsie's primary occupation was raising their children, she was an articulate and ardent supporter of her husband's work and policies.⁵⁰ Dr. Verwoerd was also a keen sportsman, playing cricket, golf, tennis and rugby, while he also enjoyed swimming and mountaineering.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Froneman, 2000: 406; Grobbelaar, 1967: 20-23; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, 'Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.'

⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, 'Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid'; *TIME*, 29 July 1957: 23, 'South Africa: White man's God.'

⁴⁸ Italiaander, 1961: 105-106.

⁴⁹ O'Meara, 1996: 93.

⁵⁰ Kenney, 1980: 26.

⁵¹ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 8, 'Hendrik Frensj Verwoerd: A man under a cruel magnifying glass.'

EARLY CAREER**ACADEMIC**

Dr. Verwoerd returned to South Africa in 1928 to take up a position as the Chair in Applied Sociology and Social Work at Stellenbosch⁵² where he was well-regarded.⁵³ He taught courses including “Introductory Psychology, Business Psychology, Law and Psychology,” the human personality, a laboratory course, and a course on community work.⁵⁴ In 1928, he published a learned paper in the *South African Journal of Science* on the psychology of newspaper advertisements. He drew attention to an advertisement for a stomach medicine, which showed a dog, with a child gripped safely in its jaws, standing sturdily in the middle of a rushing stream. The caption read “Saved!” A well-known South African journalist, Stanley Uys, saw this as a simple association of ideas: “Dr. Verwoerd has persuaded Afrikanerdom, presumably, that he is its saviour.”⁵⁵

In 1932, the university created the Department of Sociology and Social Work and appointed Dr. Verwoerd to run it. As he had no formal training in the subject, he had to teach himself. He tended to be descriptive, describing social conditions and making extensive use of statistics.⁵⁶ The department was intended to train social workers and social scientists in dealing with white poverty. Dr. Verwoerd’s approach was more pragmatic than theoretical. He was very concerned about welfare during the 1930s, particularly as it pertained to working class Afrikaners, the “poor Whites,” and he became active in this area.⁵⁷

Dr. Verwoerd first came to public attention at a conference in Kimberley in 1934 dealing with the problem of poor Whites. Later he served as chairman of the Voortsettings committee.⁵⁸ He also became a spokesman for education in the field of social work and deeply involved in non-governmental efforts to reduce white poverty.⁵⁹ In 1934 he organised a conference dedicated to the plight of the poor Whites.⁶⁰ In general, Dr. Verwoerd had an

⁵² Burke, 2006: 1.

⁵³ Beyers, 1981: 731; Marx, 2011a: 288; Miller, 1993: 637.

⁵⁴ Miller, 1993, 640-644.

⁵⁵ Uys, 1959: 8.

⁵⁶ Miller, 1993, 640-644.

⁵⁷ Beyers, 1981: 731; Foster, 1991: 205.

⁵⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘Hendrik Frensj Verwoerd: A man under a cruel magnifying glass’; Prinsloo, 1981a: 5.

⁵⁹ Miller, 1993: 644.

⁶⁰ Hepple, 1967: 25-27; Segal, 1961: 275.

important role in Afrikaner initiatives to use social welfare programmes to reduce white poverty.⁶¹

NEWSPAPER EDITOR, ANTI-SEMITE AND "TOOL OF THE NAZIS"

In 1936, a chartered ship, the SS *Stuttgart*, reached Cape Town carrying five hundred Jewish refugees from Nazi rule.⁶² Dr. Verwoerd, then still a professor at Stellenbosch University, campaigned fiercely against their proposed admission, arguing that Jewish immigration would bring about "the downfall" of South Africa.⁶³ With a group of other prominent Stellenbosch professors, including A.C. Cilliers, Con de Villiers, J. Basson and T.E. Donges, Dr. Verwoerd addressed large anti-Semitic protest rallies in the Cape area.⁶⁴ Jan Hofmeyr, a prominent liberal, condemned the professors, declaring that "the scientific spirit no longer lived in them."⁶⁵ Dr. Verwoerd presented a case against the refugees' admission to the then Hertzog⁶⁶-Smuts⁶⁷ government.⁶⁸ He and his fellow academics convinced the government and the refugees were denied permission to land.⁶⁹

Later that year, another seventy-five German Jews arrived aboard the *Giulio Cesare*. Dr. Verwoerd addressed another protest meeting and derided Hofmeyr in sarcastic terms.⁷⁰ It was about this time that Dr. Verwoerd agreed to appear as a "featured speaker" at the annual congress of the *Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond* (ANS). The ANS was an organisation of extreme nationalists founded in 1933 by Piet Meyer. Its president was Hans van Rensburg, a devoted supporter of Hitler who later became chief of the OB. As part of its programme of political propaganda, the ANS sponsored student tours of the Third Reich.⁷¹

⁶¹ Miller, 1993: 636.

⁶² Citino, 1991: 77-78; Hellig, 2009: 124-125.

⁶³ Henkes, 2016: 11.

⁶⁴ Moodie, 1975: 166.

⁶⁵ Paton, 1965: 193-194.

⁶⁶ (1866-1942) James Barry Munnik Hertzog served as a general during the Boer war, and was a determined Boer nationalist. He was South Africa's Prime Minister from 1924 to 1939 (South African History Online).

⁶⁷ (1870-1950) Jan Smuts, a former general who fought in the Boer War and the First World War and supporter of racial segregation. He served as Prime Minister between 1919 and 1924 and 1939 and 1948 (Cameron, 1994).

⁶⁸ Bunting, 1986: 60-61; Furlong, 1991: 61-64; Troup, 1975: 318; Uys (*Africa South*), January-March 1959: 1, 'Dr. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa.'

⁶⁹ Hellig, 2009: 124-138; Weyl, 1970: 112.

⁷⁰ Paton, 1965: 194.

⁷¹ Furlong, 2003: 210-211.

In 1937, Dr. Verwoerd was approached by Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom,⁷² then the Nationalist leader in the Transvaal, and offered the editorship of the newly established newspaper and mouthpiece of the National Party, *Die Transvaler*.⁷³ Although he had no journalistic experience, Dr. Verwoerd accepted, leaving academic life to make his first foray into politics.⁷⁴ According to *TIME* magazine, with Dr. Verwoerd at the helm, *Die Transvaler* was "less of a newspaper than a political broadsheet."⁷⁵

The newspaper was often likened to Nazi propaganda sheets in Germany, "... raucous in tone, distorting news, spewing race hatred and hailing Hitler."⁷⁶ Dr. Verwoerd used the newspaper to promote a hyper-nationalist line, with editorials devoted to presenting non-Whites and Jews in a poor light, stressing the idea of South Africa as a republic.⁷⁷ He regularly used the derogatory term "Kaffirs" to refer to Black Africans,⁷⁸ and he declared that Jews, as a group, stood in the way of the Afrikaners' economic well-being.⁷⁹

Dr. Verwoerd's first editorial on October 1, 1937, was an anti-Semitic tirade.⁸⁰ He wrote a lengthy article entitled "The Jewish Problem Regarded from a Nationalist Point of View: A Possible Solution: Proportional Distribution in Trades and Businesses the First Great Necessity (*Die Joodse Vraagstuk Besien vanuit Die Nasionale Standpunt*)."⁸¹ The article brought the "Jewish problem" to the attention of the Afrikaners, saying that it was not a racial issue, but a question of a conflict of interest. Dr. Verwoerd insisted that the Nationalists "do not hate the Jew," that he was not "anti-Jew" but merely "pro-Afrikaner." He suggested that the involvement of Jews in business harmed Afrikaners economically since most commercial and industrial undertakings were mostly in "foreign" hands, "latterly mostly Jewish." Thus, he proposed a quota system that would bar Jews until they comprised not more than 5% of South Africa's commerce and industry (*ewewigte verspreiding*).⁸²

⁷² (1893-1958) A racist and a fervent supporter of racial segregation who was known as the "Lion of the North" (Pogrand, 1990: 80). He served as Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation before becoming Prime Minister in 1954. He died in 1958 and was succeeded by Dr. Verwoerd.

⁷³ Burger, 1961: 4; Vatcher, 1965: 61.

⁷⁴ Sachs, 1965: 239.

⁷⁵ *TIME*, 26 August 1966: 20, 'South Africa: The great white laager.'

⁷⁶ Sachs, 1965: 239.

⁷⁷ Hepple, 1967: 45; Wood, 1987: 154.

⁷⁸ Hepple, 1967: 45.

⁷⁹ Paton, 1965: 201.

⁸⁰ O'Meara, 1983: 105; Vatcher, 1965: 61.

⁸¹ Bloomberg, 1990: 149; Goodman, 2001: 144; Shain, 1994: 147.

⁸² Goodman, 2001: 144; Higginson, 2014: 325; Shain, 1994: 147; Shimoni, 2003: 14; Uys, 1959: 1; Wyman and Rosenzweig, 1996: 674.

As a result of his articles, Jewish businesses ceased advertising in his paper,⁸³ giving Dr. Verwoerd an excuse to launch a tirade against them.⁸⁴ During October of 1935, he wrote three articles for English-language newspapers focussing on poverty among Whites. He took the opportunity to laud Germany under the Nazis for highlighting the pride that could be found in manual work.⁸⁵ In another editorial, Dr. Verwoerd wrote: "both in Italy and in Germany the systems have done much that is good for these countries, although of course they are not without fault. . . The Nationalists would be very remiss if they did not study the conditions existing in Europe, where new methods of state organization and new objectives are born out of the pressures of nation-building."⁸⁶ That year the Nationalist Party called on the government not to recognise Yiddish as a European language and to restrict Jews from engaging in certain professions.⁸⁷

In his role as editor, Dr. Verwoerd played a key part in developing nationalist ideas about race and apartheid, and he used *Die Transvaler* as a soapbox from which to attack Jews, Blacks and the English.⁸⁸ When the British Royal Family visited South Africa in 1947 Dr. Verwoerd's paper simply did not cover it, to make a nationalist point,⁸⁹ despite the large, enthusiastic crowds greeting them.⁹⁰ On another occasion, combining three of his *betes noires*, he described South Africa's Parliament as the product of "British-Jewish liberalism."⁹¹ In addition, every day he published a local version of Hitler's "master race" ideology in his column, "*Die Sake van die Dag*" (The Affairs of the Day),⁹² leading (together with his extremist views) to his critics describing him as a "tool of the Nazis."⁹³ At times Dr.

⁸³ Uys (*Africa South*), January-March 1959: 1, 'Dr. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa.'

⁸⁴ Hepple, 1967: 46.

⁸⁵ Furlong, 2003: 210.

⁸⁶ Mzimela, 1980: 100; *Die Tranvaler*, 4 October 1937: 4.

⁸⁷ Uys (*Africa South*), January-March 1959: 3, 'Dr. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa.'

⁸⁸ Meredith, 1988: 70.

⁸⁹ Botha, 1967: 12; *The Economist*, 20 September 1958: 948, 'South Africa's new boss'; *The Economist*, 25 March 1961: 1166, 'Forward with Verwoerd'; Lapping, 1986: 107.

⁹⁰ Hepple, 1967: 102.

⁹¹ Botha, 1967: 11.

⁹² Gerhart, 1978: 53.

⁹³ Hughes, 1961: 176.

Verwoerd was too extreme even for Daniel Malan,⁹⁴ the leader of the National Party.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the editorship gave him standing in the National Party.⁹⁶

During the early months of the Second World War when the Nazis were scoring victories in Europe, Verwoerd declared that "Britain has lost the war. That is not only my opinion, it is my wish."⁹⁷ Within weeks of the war beginning, German forces appeared on course to overrun the Netherlands in their dash for France, a possibility Verwoerd's paper derided as "British propaganda." He claimed that Britain was trying to use Afrikaners' fellow feelings for the Dutch to secure support for the Smuts government's anti-German policy. Of course the Nazis did invade the Netherlands, but Verwoerd never admitted he had been wrong.⁹⁸

Throughout the war, Dr. Verwoerd wrote editorials expressing approval of Allied defeats and disappointment over Nazi losses, consistently pressing the Nazi cause and metaphorically waving the swastika flag. In 1941 these increasingly intemperate editorials led to a high-profile court case, *Dr. Verwoerd vs. Paver and Others*. The Johannesburg newspaper *The Star* published an editorial entitled "Speaking Up for Hitler" accusing Dr. Verwoerd of falsifying the news to promote Germany's cause.⁹⁹ *The Star* set out a list of stories published by *Die Transvaler*, all of which carried errors which reflected positively on the Axis powers. It highlighted *Die Transvaler's* version of a report by the South African Information Bureau on how the Nazi regime promised not to interfere with South African affairs but had in fact done so. *Die Transvaler* omitted the main point of a broken promise and reported only the Nazis' reference to non-interference. *The Star* said such dishonesty identified *Die Transvaler* closely with Nazi propaganda, making it "a tool of malignant forces from which this country has everything to fear."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ (1874-1957) Minister in the Dutch Reformed Church, champion of Afrikaner nationalism and white supremacy, editor of the *Die Burger*, leader of the National Party and Prime Minister of South Africa (1948-1954) (Koorts, 2014; Kruger, 1969: 287). For his biography see: Koorts, L. (2014) *DF Malan and the Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism*; Robins, E. (1953) *This Man Malan*.

⁹⁵ Welsh, 2000: 448.

⁹⁶ Segal (*The Spectator*), 3 March 1961: 287, 'Dr. Verwoerd.'

⁹⁷ Botha, 1967: 12.

⁹⁸ Fobi, 2014: 90.

⁹⁹ Burger, 1961: 13; *Gloucestershire Echo*, 14 July 1943: 1, '£15.000 libel claim result'; Hepple, 1967: 215; Kenney, 1980: 64; Paton, 1965: 292-293; *The New York Times*, 25 July 1985: 22, 'Many of South Africa's leaders were pro-Nazi'; Uys, 1959: 5; Vatcher, 1965: 64.

¹⁰⁰ Fobi, 2014: 91-92.

As result of the editorial, Dr. Verwoerd sued for defamation, demanding damages of £15,000. However, *The Star* put up a robust defence, and the case was dismissed, with costs awarded against Dr. Verwoerd. The judge declared that:

“There have been proved two very grave cases of the publication of false news in reckless disregard of whether it was true or false; six cases, on the whole less serious but still clear cases of falsification where news, originally correctly reported, was falsely portrayed for the purpose of editorial comment; and two cases in which news was falsified by means of misleading headlines. On the evidence he, Dr. Verwoerd, is not entitled to complain. He did support Nazi propaganda, he did make his paper a tool of the Nazis in South Africa, and he knew it.”¹⁰¹

Dr. Verwoerd and his supporters attributed the result to the fact that the judge, Phillip Millin, was a Jew.¹⁰² When the United Party won the general election that year, Dr. Verwoerd decried the result as “a Jewish victory.”¹⁰³

In 1941, at a time when the Nazi war machine appeared unstoppable, Dr. Verwoerd, according to the *New York Times*, “triumphantly headlined every Nazi victory and rallied against ‘British-Jewish liberalism.’”¹⁰⁴ On August 8, 1941, he wrote, “The Afrikaner honours Germany’s achievements in many fields.”¹⁰⁵ However, two years later, as German forces began to suffer significant defeats, Dr. Verwoerd demonstrated a more guarded approach, which did not go unnoticed by the Nazis. A German secret agent, Trompke, cabled Berlin on 10 August 1943 that “The party Press is extremely reserved with regard to Germany since the military reverses. O L¹⁰⁶ recommend a frank explanation with the editor-in-chief Dr. Verwoerd.”¹⁰⁷

Dr. Verwoerd was not the only member of his family who supported the Nazis during the war. His wife, Betsie, was a member of the Ossewabrandwag,¹⁰⁸ a pro-Nazi paramilitary

¹⁰¹ Burger, 1961: 13; *Gloucestershire Echo*, 14 July 1943: 1, ‘£15.000 libel claim result’; Hepple, 1967: 215; Kenney, 1980: 64; Paton, 1965: 292-293; *The New York Times*, 25 July 1985: 22, ‘Many of South Africa’s leaders were pro-Nazi’; Uys, 1959: 5; Vatcher, 1965: 64.

¹⁰² Weyl, 1970: 112.

¹⁰³ Furlong, 1991: 66; Hepple, 1966: 146.

¹⁰⁴ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.’

¹⁰⁵ Mzimela, 1980: 101.

¹⁰⁶ The author does not know who the O L is.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Centre Against Apartheid and A. Kum’a N’dumbe, 1976: 17.

¹⁰⁸ Ossewabrandwag (Oxwagon Sentinel) was a pro-Nazi paramilitary organisation formed in February 1939 (Marx, 1994: 195), largely of “true Afrikaner” members from the Broederbond (Adam, 1971: 50; Thompson, 2001: 184). The Ossewabrandwag was inspired by the “Great Trek” celebrations and the Hitler Youth movement (Beningfield, 2006: 35), and it was based on a “commando system” (Marx, 1994: 198), although it

organization which opposed South Africa's participation in the war on the side of the Allies. Her husband did not join the group for fear its activities could compromise his position on *Die Transvaler* and in the National Party. However, he supported his wife in the activities required of her as commandant of a section within the Nazi organization.¹⁰⁹

Many years later, Betsie made the startling claim that the Ossewabrandwag had attempted to kill her husband on October 22, 1941, because he opposed it.¹¹⁰ As we will see later, this was not the last time that Betsie would reveal to a few selected people her claims of an assassination plot against her husband. A second (see in detail in Chapter Seven), according to prominent South African journalists David Beresford of the British *Guardian* and Desmond Blow of the South African *Sunday Times*, and one-time BOSS agent Gordon Winter, was a publicity stunt intended to increase her husband's popularity in the wake of criticism and a drop of his popularity after the Sharpeville massacre.¹¹¹ Thus, it would be unwise to take Mrs. Verwoerd at her word since she was a prominent member of the very organization she claimed tried to take her husband's life while Verwoerd, on his part, was pro-Nazi just like the OB.

claimed to be primarily interested in cultural matters (Barber, 1999: 119). Hitler's radio openly praised the OB, which also received help from German sources (Okoth, 2006: 160).

The OB grew with remarkable speed, attracting up to 30,000 people to its public meetings (Marx, 1994: 195), while by 1942 it claimed to have about 250,000 (or 400,000 according to other accounts) members, including its so-called "Stormjaers" (Storm Troopers) who carried out attacks of intimidation and sabotage (Beck, 2000: 121; Uys, 1989: 211). From February 1941, the OB was led by Hans van Rensburg, a dedicated admirer of Hitler, who was opposed to democracy, parliament and party politics, and hoped for a German victory. Increasingly militant, during the war years, the Ossewabrandwag engaged in sabotage to disrupt South Africa's war effort and help the Nazi cause (Worden, 2000: 104).

During 1940 and 1941, in the Witwatersrand area, the OB was responsible for twenty-five bomb explosions aimed primarily at newspaper premises, cinemas, shops and railway lines (Schonteich and Boshoff, 2003: 14), and state buildings, electrical and telephone lines, electrical substations and pylons (Marx, 2011: 434). Also during the war, OB members were involved in "Operation Weissdorn," which was ordered by Nazi Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, with the primary aim of overthrowing the government of General Jan Smuts, and the secondary aim of sabotaging South African infrastructure, including port installations and industries associated with the war (Visser, 1976: 54-56.) For more about the operation see: Strydom, H. (1982) *For Volk and Fuhrer: Robey Leibbrandt & Operation Weissdorn*; Visser, G.C. (1976) *OB: Traitors or Patriots?*. The *Stormjaers* also carried out a series of attacks against some their own members who they suspected of being traitors and assassinated at least two of them. (Marx, 2011b: 522-523). Because of the above activities, many Ossewabrandwag members were imprisoned during the war, including several who went on to have successful careers within the Nationalist Party (Meredith, 1988: 30-31).

For further reading about the OB see: Bunting, B. (1968) *The Rise of the South African Reich*; Furlong, P. J. (1991) *Between Crown and Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era*; Marx, C. (1994) *The Ossewabrandwag as a Mass Movement, 1939-1941*; Marx, C. (2008) *Oxwagon Sentinel: Radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the History of the Ossewabrandwag*; Moodie, T. D. (1975) *The Rise of Afrikanerdom*; Visser, G.C. (1976) *OB: Patriots or Traitors?*

¹⁰⁹ Prinsloo, 1985b: 74.

¹¹⁰ Verwoerd, 2016: 47.

¹¹¹ David Beresford in a personal interview, 11 April 2014; Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 23 February 2015; Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

Dr. Verwoerd was explicitly described as “a Nazi” by Ezekiel Mphahlele, the renowned South African author and one of the founding figures of modern African literature.¹¹² Many of his actions confirmed Mphahlele’s views including, as we will see later in this chapter, his approach to the infamous influx laws and the tactics used to impose them, which resembled those employed by the SS in Nazi Germany.¹¹³ Although Dr. Verwoerd borrowed much from Nazi ideology, he believed strongly in the autonomy of the Afrikaner state and did not wish to import the fascist idea of a unitary state. In 1940 he had been careful to state that “The Afrikaner... will be as little a tool of Hitler as of Chamberlain.”¹¹⁴

Nonetheless, during the Second World War, Dr. Verwoerd was often harassed over the phone by people who rang to accuse him of being a “Hollander,” a “Nazi” and a “traitor.”¹¹⁵ However, Mary Pos, a close friend of Dr. Verwoerd, who would write his biography,¹¹⁶ claimed that Dr. Verwoerd considered Hitler a psychopath.¹¹⁷ Even so, if this was accurate, it did not stop Dr. Verwoerd from supporting the Nazi leader before and during the war and later copying some of his racial laws and applying them to non-Whites in South Africa.

In 1948, Dr. Verwoerd resigned as editor to launch his full-time career in politics by seeking election with the National Party in Alberton.¹¹⁸ Over the following years, he remained personally involved with the Press, serving as chairman of the Afrikaans-language newspaper *Dagbreek*;¹¹⁹ he even used his position as Prime Minister to advance his business interests. In 1966, at the time of his death, he was the head of two profitable publishing companies in Johannesburg, which produced two daily newspapers, a Sunday paper and a number of magazines. What cannot be overlooked is that over three years, his publishing interests secured government printing orders worth more than £12,000,000.¹²⁰

¹¹² Italiaander, 1961: 115.

¹¹³ Mbeki, 1991: 167.

¹¹⁴ Bloomberg, 1990: 151, 165.

¹¹⁵ Pos, 1967: 47

¹¹⁶ *Wie Was Dr. Verwoerd* (1967).

¹¹⁷ Pos, 1967: 91-92.

¹¹⁸ Grobbelaar, 1967: 39; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.’

¹¹⁹ Crowd and Revo, 1967: 41.

¹²⁰ *The Globe and Mail*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Verwoerd created republic of white ascendancy.’

DR. VERWOERD AND THE BROEDERBOND¹²¹

Dr. Verwoerd had joined the Broederbond in 1937. He had gone on to be elected to the Executive Council in 1940 and remained there until 1950, when he became Minister for Native Affairs. He was an active member who missed just two of fifty-three meetings of the Executive Council during his time on it,¹²² and he had worked quickly on becoming Prime Minister to integrate the Broederbond into every aspect of government.¹²³ In 1943, Dr. Verwoerd, an increasingly important member of the National Party, and the member of a group of Broederbonders that had been drafting a republican constitution,¹²⁴ called on the organisation to “gain control of everything it can lay its hands on in every walk of life in South Africa.”¹²⁵ The following year he disclosed his membership in public, stating that he had “never made a secret of it.”¹²⁶

¹²¹ The Afrikaner Broederbond (Band of Brothers) was founded, ostensibly as a cultural association in 1918 (Gibbs, 1949: 208; O'Meara, 1977; Serfontein, 1977: 29; *TIME*, 21 November 1977: 85, 'Broederbond's big brother act.'). Originally called “Young South Africa” (du Toit, 1991: 630). It was initially dedicated to stressing “ideals and not persons,” to being non-political and to providing “mutual support in the economic field, and further Afrikaner art and culture” (O'Meara, 1977: 158-159). It adopted a formal constitution in 1920, and became a secret society in 1922 (Carter, 1958: 251). Its early aims included the nationalisation of South Africa under Afrikaans leadership and the establishment of schools that taught through Afrikaans (Gibbs, 1949: 209). In 1932 a secret message was circulated to all Broederbonders that called for the group to aim for an independent Afrikaner government (Meredith, 1988: 21). In 1933 the Broederbond created a document outlining their goal of complete segregation, including the forced resettlement of urban Africans. It shared many of the concerns of the Nazi party; the beliefs that Africans were naturally less intelligent, and that the offspring of mixed unions tended to be inherently feeble were widespread, backed up by dubious research (Dubow, 1992: 212, 229). In 1934, the Broederbond issued a statement affirming that its prime aim was for Afrikaners to reach their “ultimate destiny of domination in South Africa” (Mbeki, 1991: 19-20).

By the mid-30s, the Broederbond had become essentially a Christian-national organisation fiercely opposed to the merging of British and Afrikaner South Africans, as was happening in the new United Party. It focused on establishing itself as the ideological centre of the growing hyper-nationalism (Dubow, 1995a: 255). The return of intellectuals such as Dr. Piet J. Meyer and Verwoerd from studies in Germany provided a powerful impetus (de Klerk, 1975: 203). From 1938, the organisation focused attention on the White Workers' Protection Society, which accepted only white Protestants as members and aimed to gain control of white workers' unions, and prevent the growth of African and mixed unions (Hepple, 2011: 62). In 1944, the Broederbond published its deep conviction that Afrikaners had been placed in South Africa by God (Stultz, 1974: 53). When it listed its aims, including the promotion of Afrikaners' language and culture, it stressed that this was done with the understanding that, “the destiny of nations is guided by the hand of God” (Gibbs, 1949: 204). The Broederbond's clear implication was that all other South Africans, the Blacks, the Coloureds, and Whites of origins other than Afrikaans, had a lesser right to be there. Presumably to underline the organisation's religious claims, it was run (under three leaders) by a governing body of twelve men, referred to as the “twelve apostles,” who maintained contact with the small groups of ordinary members around the country (Gibbs, 1949: 212) and who were each responsible for a different sphere, such as “labour, religion, education, politics, the press” (Carter, 1959: 254).

¹²² Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 3.

¹²³ Asmal et al, 1996: 234.

¹²⁴ Moodie, 1975: 215.

¹²⁵ Barber, 1999: 91; Furlong, 1991: 222.

¹²⁶ Bloomberg, 1990: 191-192; Serfontein, 1978: 40.

Under Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister the Broederbond acquired new, extensive powers and influence as he granted it “co-responsibility with the party to prepare the electorate” for nationalist policies.¹²⁷ Dr. Verwoerd’s government sought candidates for top government posts and through the secretive organisation the men running the army, government departments and important state-owned bodies such as the railways, many were Broederbond appointees.¹²⁸

Their chairman during this period was Piet Meyer (Broeder number 787¹²⁹), a fanatical Nazi supporter, who had even named his son “Izan” – “Nazi” spelled backwards,¹³⁰ one of Dr. Verwoerd’s closest and most trusted friends, whom he would later appoint chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Meyer was a highly influential individual, much-criticised by apartheid’s opponents.¹³¹ At the same time, Dr. Verwoerd came under pressure to set up a Commission of Inquiry into the Broederbond.¹³² This background of the case and the Commission will be examined in Chapter Six.

DR. VERWOERD’S IDEOLOGY

As it is impossible to separate Dr. Verwoerd’s actions from his ideology, the latter will be discussed in various contexts, but it is worth laying out some of the background to this topic here. Dr. Verwoerd insisted to no avail that his policies were “*not* based on people being inferior, but being *different*.”¹³³ In addition, according to Dr. Roberta Miller, a Senior Research Scientist at Columbia University, Dr. Verwoerd also seems to believe that there were no significant differences in intelligence between Whites and Blacks. Although Dr. Verwoerd had rejected the idea that Whites were inherently more intelligent, he did ascribe certain qualities, such as a tendency to be emotional, unstable or boring to national groups.¹³⁴

¹²⁷ Asmal et al, 1996: 153-154; Callinicos, 1995: 30.

¹²⁸ Morris, 2004: 160.

¹²⁹ Bell and Ntsebeza, 2003: 28; Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: A159.

¹³⁰ Booth, 1998: 38; Frye, 1970: 100.

¹³¹ Callinicos, 1995: 30.

¹³² Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 321.

¹³³ Cell, 1982: 278; Rhodie, 1969: 76; Verwoerd, 1961a: 8.

¹³⁴ Miller, 1993: 648-651.

However, according to Nelson Mandela,¹³⁵ Dr. Verwoerd considered Africans to be “lower than animals.”¹³⁶ The way Dr. Verwoerd spoke about them and treated them seems to support Mandela’s opinion and contradict his own claim. Dr. Verwoerd regularly used the derogatory term “Kaffirs” to refer to Black Africans¹³⁷ and believed that God made the Black man to be in perpetuity a “hewer of wood and drawer of water” for the White man.¹³⁸ The fact that he held Blacks in contempt is clear from the following incident. Walter Stanford, an M.P. who represented Africans, was in Parliament quoting information he had received in his constituency, when Dr. Verwoerd called out, “and you believe a Native instead of my word?” A letter from a citizen in the *Cape Times* asked, “Could a short sentence reveal more clearly Dr. Verwoerd’s deep-seated contempt for the African people, or give the lie more effectively to his repeated protestations that this policy of apartheid can be reconciled with accepted Christian and human standards?”¹³⁹

Dr. Verwoerd strongly believed that the Afrikaners were South Africa’s master race, destined for supremacy, while other races were “privileged” to share South Africa with them, but in an inferior position;¹⁴⁰ “we whites must rule the blacks,” he declared in 1960.¹⁴¹ He even believed that South Africa’s Blacks should be grateful they were not wiped out by the colonising Afrikaners. In a 20 October 1960 interview with the German magazine, *Die Zeit*, Dr. Verwoerd posed the extraordinary question, “Why should the Afrikaner suffer because our forefathers did not shoot the blacks?” He went on,

“The experiences of our ancestors in this country were rather similar to those of the Americans and the Indians. But while the Americans annihilated the Indians as they advanced through the continent, the Boers allowed the blacks to live. Should we now suffer because

¹³⁵ (1918-2013) The best-known of all anti-apartheid revolutionaries, and a potent symbol of the struggle against apartheid. In 1962 he was arrested and subsequently convicted at the Rivonia Trial of conspiracy to overthrow the apartheid state. He would spend the next twenty-seven years in prison. He served as President of the ANC from 1991 to 1997, and was elected South Africa’s President in the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, holding the position until 1999. In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his enormous contributions to ending apartheid, for which he is considered “father of the nation”. For his autobiography see: Mandela, N. (1994) *Long Walk to Freedom*. For biographies see: Benson, M. (1986) *Nelson Mandela*; Lodge, T. (2006) *Mandela: A Critical Life*; Meer, F. (1991) *Higher than Hope: The Authorized Biography of Nelson Mandela*; Meredith, M. (2010) *Mandela: A Biography*; Sampson, A. (1999) *Mandela: The Authorised Biography*; Smith, D. J. (2010) *Young Mandela*; Stelngel, R. (2012) *Nelson Mandela: Portrait of an Extraordinary Man*.

¹³⁶ Mandela, 2013: 512.

¹³⁷ Hepple, 1967: 45.

¹³⁸ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, ‘The champion of apartheid.’

¹³⁹ Burger, 1961: 24.

¹⁴⁰ Hughes, 1961: 175.

¹⁴¹ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 50, ‘Exploding South Africa.’

our ancestors behaved in such a Christian and humane fashion? No, I tell you, this is a White country and any concessions to the Blacks only means demands for fresh concessions. It would be absurd to turn the blacks into imitations of Europeans and force a Western type democracy upon them. We plan to develop them along their own lines, using their own traditional communities and tribal chieftains.”¹⁴²

Thus, Dr. Verwoerd never gave in on any demands from Black South Africans. For example, he considered the idea of the Natal Provincial Council adopting an entrenched Bill of Rights to be unthinkable, on the grounds that guaranteeing rights would abolish parliamentary sovereignty.¹⁴³

Dr. Verwoerd also seems, just like most colonialists everywhere else in the world, to have believed that the Blacks were not civilized, and that he and the other Whites were going to “civilize” them, “protect” them, “help” them and “teach” them “democracy.” On February 8, 1961, he said, “We have lessons to teach the civilized world. We have services to render to Africa.”¹⁴⁴ On April 14, 1961, during a debate in Parliament, he said that the Progressive Party “must either accept that those 10,000,000 Bantu¹⁴⁵ will never all become civilized or they must accept that at some time or other they will all become civilized.”¹⁴⁶ On another occasion he said, “South Africa remains true to the duty laid up the white man. During past centuries the white man developed and spread Western civilization from Europe throughout the world.”¹⁴⁷

In a speech in the Senate in 1964, Dr. Verwoerd said, “It would have been much easier for all of us [Whites] . . . if we could have continued ... to govern the country as an undisputed White country in our possession . . . and treat the Bantu and the other Non-White groups as protected persons under our guardianship . . .”¹⁴⁸ About a year before his assassination, he said that the Natives “can develop their own areas to any level of independence they are able to achieve, [but they] will still remain under the control of White

¹⁴² Botha, 1967: 63.

¹⁴³ Klug, 2010a: 12; Klug, 2010b: 34-35.

¹⁴⁴ Pelzer, 1966: 494.

¹⁴⁵ Bantu was considered to be a person “who is, or is generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa” (Dugard, 1978: 61). The word “Bantu” correctly refers to the Nguni group of languages such as Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, and others. There are over four hundred ethnic groups in Africa, from South Africa to Cameroon, who speak these languages. Under apartheid, the term was chosen to refer to Bantu-speaking South Africans and was closely associated with apartheid’s policies (Nkabinde, 1997: 5; Wills, 2012: 7).

¹⁴⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 596.

¹⁴⁷ Pelzer, 1966: 321.

¹⁴⁸ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1965: 1.

South Africa for as long as it is still necessary to lead them to civilized self-government on a democratic basis.”¹⁴⁹ A few weeks before his death, Dr. Verwoerd said, “We are prepared to let them [Africans] develop to their full potentialities. The sky is the limit, but for their protections as well as ours, we must exercise a continuing control until they have proved themselves able to handle independence. We are going to set them free, but only at a pace they can handle.”¹⁵⁰

Dr. Verwoerd also often evoked divine authority for his edicts when he felt that this was necessary.¹⁵¹ Recovering in 1960 from the gunshot wounds inflicted on him by David Pratt (see Chapter Seven), he attributed his survival to divine intervention. During a visit to his bedside by opposition leader Sir de Villiers Graaff, Dr. Verwoerd referred to God more than a dozen times, insisting that the deity had chosen him to continue piloting apartheid. In the course of a two-hour conversation, he insisted that his survival was proof of the divine acceptance of his policies.¹⁵² When Major Richter visited him in hospital, Dr. Verwoerd depicted himself as an Afrikaner martyr for the apartheid cause. He said he held no grievances against anyone, adding, “I cannot even feel bitter towards Pratt” and described himself as “just one of the martyrs of the Afrikaner nation.”¹⁵³ At the same time, Dr. Verwoerd told his wife, “I heard the shots and then I realized that I could still think, and I knew that I had been spared to complete my life’s work.”¹⁵⁴

Betsie Verwoerd also saw her husband’s survival as “a sign to us that we are on the right path and God is with us.”¹⁵⁵ In his radio broadcast of May 20, his first public speech after the shooting, Dr. Verwoerd said, “I trust that I will be permitted to testify to my conviction that the protection of Divine Providence was accorded me with a purpose, a purpose which concerns South Africa too. May it be given to me to fulfil that task faithfully.”¹⁵⁶ Dr. Verwoerd later even told Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker that his survival “revealed God’s approval of the cause he had followed.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁴⁹ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1966: 2.

¹⁵⁰ Drury, 1968, 460-466.

¹⁵¹ Schlemmer, 1970: 19.

¹⁵² Vatcher, 1965: 110.

¹⁵³ Scholtz, 1974: 153.

¹⁵⁴ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, ‘South Africa: Death to the architect.’

¹⁵⁵ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 18 April 1960: 1, ‘South Africans said to consider sealing borders.’

¹⁵⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 396; *The New York Times*, 21 May 1960: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd asserts God saved his life’; *The Sphere*, 4 June 1960: 410, ‘The voice of the common.’

¹⁵⁷ *The Globe and Mail*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Canada regrets death but stand still same’; *The Vancouver Sun*, 6 September 1966: 3, ‘Verwoerd assassination shocks world leaders.’

Dr. Verwoerd's followers fully agreed that he had been saved by God in order to fulfil his "duties" and that God had chosen him as his instrument to lead and forge the South African nation.¹⁵⁸ *Die Transvaler* wrote that Dr. Verwoerd was "called by God to a special task." It declared that, "although struck by two bullets, Dr. Verwoerd is still alive and all believing inhabitants of the Union will see the hand of God in this... he who holds the power of life or death has ordained that the attack should fail."¹⁵⁹ *Die Burger* wrote two days after the shooting, "In this miraculous escape all the faithful will see the hand of God and thank him that our country, which is already passing through troubled times, had been spared the greater horror of assassination of its head of state."¹⁶⁰

Even the *TIME* magazine wrote that the Afrikaners regarded his recovery as proof that God had chosen Dr. Verwoerd as his divine instrument to forge the South African nation.¹⁶¹ In the words of his biographer Jan Botha, Dr. Verwoerd "had suffered grievously in the cause of Afrikanerdom; the onslaught on his life was an onslaught on their cause, and the human sympathy that went out to him became, in the case of many, an enduring love for a hero who so miraculously survived the ordeal to lead them on."¹⁶² Dr. Verwoerd saw himself not only as a martyr, but also as a saviour of South Africa's Whites, particularly the Afrikaners, and summarily rejected calls for change after the Sharpeville Massacre. He said, "If I cannot save the country, then I would rather resign. I will never be an accomplice to the destruction of our people by abandoning our policy."¹⁶³

Dr. Verwoerd also believed the Bible gave sanctions for racial separation.¹⁶⁴ He represented his idea of "separate development" as consistent with the Bible's injunction that people should love one another, reasoning that "love" obliged the Afrikaners to grant the Blacks the land that they themselves possessed.¹⁶⁵ He believed that the situation in South Africa was a demonstration of God's will and that apartheid was divinely inspired.¹⁶⁶ On one occasion he stated, "It is the privilege of the leaders to be used by the Ruler of Nations and by

¹⁵⁸ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, 'South Africa: Death to the architect.'

¹⁵⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Premier called by God to a special task.'

¹⁶⁰ Roux, 1972: 411.

¹⁶¹ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, 'South Africa: Death to the architect.'

¹⁶² Botha, 1967: 67.

¹⁶³ Kenney, 1980: 186; Venter, 1999: 428-429.

¹⁶⁴ *The New York Times*, 17 March 1961, 'Symbol of apartheid: Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd'; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, 'Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.'

¹⁶⁵ Waldmeir, 1997: 11.

¹⁶⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 92; *TIME*, 29 July 1957: 23, 'White man's God.'

their people as the vanguard in the fulfilment of His ideal [apartheid].”¹⁶⁷ He believed that establishing “Christian civilisation” in South Africa was the way in which Whites would acquire a permanent basis for reigning there,¹⁶⁸ and that in this way South Africa would shine as “a symbol of anti-Communism.”¹⁶⁹

Dr. Verwoerd believed that the Whites had been living in South Africa before the Blacks arrived. He said, “South Africa is so often misunderstood in the outside world because it is seen as a part of the continent of Africa, which is just like the other parts thereof, whereas this southern point of Africa, at that time vacant land, settled by the white man from Europe, in fact, became different from the rest of the African continent.”¹⁷⁰ In reality, the truth was that Blacks had been living in South Africa for thousands of years before Europeans ever came, and in the early years the latter had often had to beg the former to sell their cattle to them so that they could eat.¹⁷¹

In addition to believing that the Whites lived in South Africa before the Blacks, Dr. Verwoerd also argued that it was the Whites who created everything of value in the country, and generously allowed the Blacks to make use of these creations. In return, he felt, like all colonialists did, that Blacks should view Whites as their protectors against violence, disease and disruption.¹⁷² He said:

“The white man brought civilization to this country and everything that the Bantu is inheriting today with us, was created by the knowledge and the diligence of the white man. It is true that the black man took part in it, mostly as the labourer. We realize the value of that part and wish to see that he is repaid for what he has done for the country. But if we had not been here or cared for them throughout hundreds of years, they would have perished of hunger or murdered one another and might not have been in existence today. The white man of South Africa, the farmer on his farm, the father in his home has taken care of the health of the Bantu servant. The State has also made provision for his health as well as his education. In ever so many ways, the white man has been the guardian of the black.”¹⁷³

¹⁶⁷ Mzimela, 1980: 155; van Jaarsveld, 1977: 25.

¹⁶⁸ Loubser, 1987: 86.

¹⁶⁹ Verwoerd, 1963: 4.

¹⁷⁰ Pelzer, 1966: 426.

¹⁷¹ Khopung, 1972: 20.

¹⁷² Eades, 1999: 36.

¹⁷³ Pelzer, 1966: 377.

Furthermore, Dr. Verwoerd expressed his hope that other white nations, such as Britain, would “never lose their hold, intellectually and otherwise,” because if they did they would be overwhelmed by a “flood of colour.”¹⁷⁴

Dr. Verwoerd always maintained that people outside South Africa were unable to understand his policies because they also misunderstood apartheid. Apartheid, he said, was a “domestic affair” and people who did not live in the country could not understand its nature and its background. He insisted that “a vast number” of non-Whites approved his policies,¹⁷⁵ while the rest simply failed to understand that apartheid was really something good and that he was trying to do what was best for them. “The colour policy within the borders of the Union is still misunderstood,” he stated shortly after he became Prime Minister in 1958.¹⁷⁶ Two years later he insisted, “We in South Africa are trying to do our level best for all portions of our population... we have been misunderstood... we are not the barbarians we are supposed to be, we are Christians ourselves...”¹⁷⁷

Although he claimed he was doing his best for the Africans and that he was not a barbarian, paraphrasing Hitler’s remarks about Jews, Dr. Verwoerd warned that “Africans who disagree with our policy must be constrained, if necessary by force.”¹⁷⁸ He even believed that the Whites should rule over the Blacks because they were the minority and such power made them feel secure.¹⁷⁹ He argued that “The uninitiated in particular do not understand that apartheid or separate development is based on the principle that only in this way can the weak be protected from the strong, and the minority be made to feel safe.”¹⁸⁰

Like Malan, Strijdom and his successor Vorster, Dr. Verwoerd’s approach to ruling Black, Coloured and Asian South Africans was substantially the same as how they had been treated under colonial rule elsewhere in Africa.¹⁸¹ For Dr. Verwoerd, the Afrikaners were a “chosen people” whose appointed mission was to bring justice on the basis of “separate but

¹⁷⁴ Pelzer, 1966: 369.

¹⁷⁵ *The Canberra Times*, 25 May 1957: 6, ‘Dr. Verwoerd, South Africa’s ‘evil genius.’

¹⁷⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 161.

¹⁷⁷ *Corriere Della Sera*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘L’apartheid’; *Daily Mirror*, 12 April: 5, ‘Misunderstood says Dr. Verwoerd’; *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 13 April 1960: 3, ‘South Africa not yielding on race’; *The Star*, 12 April 1960, ‘If people only realised that we are Christians.’

¹⁷⁸ Lapierre, 2009: 95.

¹⁷⁹ Pelzer, 1966: 161; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.’

¹⁸⁰ Pelzer, 1966: 161.

¹⁸¹ Jallow, 2014: 8.

equal.”¹⁸² He believed that the colonization of Africa was a positive development for the Africans as it brought them civilization and Christianity. He said, “The English-speaking people also realised that the Christianising process was necessary for Africa and that the supremacy of the white man was necessary in order to bring and extend civilisation and Christianity here in South Africa.”¹⁸³

Dr. Verwoerd felt that, as the Prime Minister of the only “white” African country, he had a role in providing leadership to other African nations.¹⁸⁴ He said on one occasion: “... (t)here is but one way of saving the white races of the world. And that is for the white and the non-white in Africa each to exercise his rights within his own areas...”¹⁸⁵ We have been planted here, we believe, with a destiny — a destiny not for the sake of the selfishness of a nation, but for the sake of the service of a nation to the world of which it forms a part, and the service of a nation to the Deity in which it believes. We are in South Africa but also of South Africa.”¹⁸⁶

Since his student days, Dr. Verwoerd had been a keen activist in the area of white poverty, a topic that had been the subject of his first student publication. The idea that Whites, particularly Afrikaners, were naturally entitled to a better standard of living than others was central to his ideology; he believed that white poverty was the result of cultural, rather than genetic, factors and that it could therefore be eradicated. He saw racial mixing, particularly prevalent when poor Whites and Blacks lived in the same area, as an enormous social problem that should be eliminated through a combination of the welfare state (for Whites) and segregation.¹⁸⁷

Although, as we will discuss, he would present his “homeland” approach as offering the prospect of a degree of black independence, his priority was invariably securing a comfortable future for Afrikaners. In order for his nationalist policies to work, he had to take every step necessary to avoid integration.¹⁸⁸ He stated that apartheid would give Blacks the

¹⁸² Abulof, 2015: 267.

¹⁸³ Pelzer, 1966: 257.

¹⁸⁴ Jaster, 1985: 44.

¹⁸⁵ Pelzer, 1966: 210.

¹⁸⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 494.

¹⁸⁷ Marx, 2011a: 288-292.

¹⁸⁸ Marx, 2010: 60-67.

opportunity to experience self-esteem and self-respect, rather than having to suffer the experience of being essentially “failed Whites.”¹⁸⁹

Dr. Verwoerd believed that his ideology was science-based, and that the application of science to politics would succeed.¹⁹⁰ In his vision of a successful South Africa there would be no room for a liberal party, as everyone would simply accept the necessity of the colour bar.¹⁹¹ In reality, there was little or no true “science” behind any of Dr. Verwoerd’s cynical approaches,¹⁹² and terrible penalties to pay for anyone who did not conform. One legacy of Dr. Verwoerd’s promotion of science and of himself as a scientist would be a lingering distrust of psychology and the sciences among the victims of apartheid.¹⁹³ Dr. Verwoerd claimed that apartheid was a policy of *goeie buurskap* (good neighbourliness);¹⁹⁴ in other words, apartheid was presented as a policy beneficial to all, while it was really a way to subdue the black majority population and protect the white privilege, status and wealth.¹⁹⁵

Throughout his career, Dr. Verwoerd insisted hypocritically that apartheid offered all the peoples of South Africa the best chance to advance in the context of “separate development,” while ensuring that Whites, about 21% of the population, owned 87% of the land.¹⁹⁶ According to Dr. Verwoerd, his twin policies of separate development and racial segregation provided a way to protect and care for “the Native in the land of the Afrikaner.”¹⁹⁷

On December 6, 1950, Dr. Verwoerd stated in *Die Transvaler*:

“The only possible way out... is that both accept separate development living apart from one another. The present government believes in overlordship (*Baaskap*) of the whites in their own territory, but it also believes in the overlordship of the Bantu in his own area. For the white child (the government) wants to create all the possible opportunities for his own development, prosperity and national service (*Volkstdiens*) in his own area, but for the non-

¹⁸⁹ Burke, 2006: 1.

¹⁹⁰ Marx, 2010: 58.

¹⁹¹ Magubane, 2000: 54.

¹⁹² Burke, 2006: 6.

¹⁹³ Arcot, 2015; Vontress and Naiker, 1995.

¹⁹⁴ Miller: 2016: 8; Smeulers and Grunfeld, 2012: 110; P.W. Botha, South Africa’s Prime Minister from 1978 to 1984 and State President from 1984 to 1989, also called apartheid a ‘policy of good neighbourliness’ (*TIME*, 3 December 1978, ‘South Africa: Putting a pretty face on apartheid’).

¹⁹⁵ Smeulers and Grunfeld, 2012: 110.

¹⁹⁶ February, 1991: 169.

¹⁹⁷ Burke, 2006: 1

white child, he also wants to create the opportunity for the fulfilment of his ambitions and the possibility of giving his service to his own people.”¹⁹⁸

Dr. Verwoerd's stated aim was that Blacks should be systematically segregated from Whites,¹⁹⁹ that “the nationalists must defend their racial policies like walls of granite,”²⁰⁰ and make apartheid “like a granite wall to defend white Christian civilisation.”²⁰¹ His use of these phrases, together with his determination to push through and implement his policies, earned him the nickname “man of granite.”²⁰² On February 5, 1960, Dr. Verwoerd said, “I believe in the supremacy of the White man over his people in his own territory and I am prepared to maintain it by force.” He then hypocritically claimed that the separation between Whites and non-Whites was not “physical” or “territorial”, but “political.” He said “the crux of the policy of separation is political separation. The basic standpoint is that the Bantu and the Whites will have their political future apart from one another . . . The Whites will be in this Parliament...”²⁰³

On January 25, 1963, in a speech in Parliament, Dr. Verwoerd said,

“We want to make South Africa white... Keeping it white can only mean one thing, namely white domination, not leadership. Not guidance, but control, supremacy. If we are agreed that it is the desire of the people that the White man should be able to continue to protect himself by retaining White domination ... we say that it can be achieved by separate development,”²⁰⁴ and, “our major task is to ensure that a white nation shall prevail here. Every nation has the unalienable right to safeguard that which it has built up for itself and for prosperity.”²⁰⁵

As for the voting rights of South Africa's Blacks, Dr. Verwoerd suggested that such people did not need them because “they know nothing of politics” and their living conditions were much better than those in other African states where people had the right to vote. Thus, he implied that a dictatorship was preferable to democracy if people had some basic living standards. The fact is South Africa's Blacks also lived in shacks and received low wages and

¹⁹⁸ February, 1991: 169.

¹⁹⁹ Lipton, 1987: 49.

²⁰⁰ Barber et al, 1990: 90.

²⁰¹ Jabavu, 1982: 154.

²⁰² Marx, 2011a: 283.

²⁰³ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1966: 1.

²⁰⁴ Dubula, 1965: 5; Frye, 1970: 30; United Nations Office of Public Information: 1969: 3-4; van den Berghe, 1966: 413; van den Berghe, 1967: 118.

²⁰⁵ Black, 1965: 151.

experienced frequent unemployment. It was invidious of Dr. Verwoerd to compare South Africa with other African countries, which were then mostly emerging as independent states after years of colonialism. South Africa was by far the richest and most developed of all the African countries, thus its citizens were justified in demanding more than a beggarly life in townships, often without running water or other public services.

Dr. Verwoerd's full statement was the following:

“A member of an African state can scarcely be accounted fortunate if he is in rags, with little to eat, with low wages, little continuous employment and only a shack to live in, if the only compensation for all that he lacks and suffers is that he has the vote. Does the vote satisfy and aid the people, particularly if the masses have to exercise this vote without much personal discretion because they know nothing of politics, or because a Black near-dictator, or politically minded half- educated clique demands blind allegiance to keep them in power? It is this distortion of values in the eyes of the prejudiced or blind critics from afar, judging according to their own privileged experience and advanced state, which makes for the unjust and undeserved condemnation of South Africa.”²⁰⁶

Dr. Verwoerd's vision was of a “grand apartheid”; “while we have a multi-racial population, we have no intention of developing into a multi-racial community.”²⁰⁷ He took inspiration from the work of people such as J. Howard Pim,²⁰⁸ who had expressed similar sentiments in earlier times. Many ordinary Boers were very responsive; a contemporary observer from an educated African background described them as “race-dedicated” and as “destroying the qualities of their own people, filling them with hate and envy.”²⁰⁹ He was adept at plugging into the narrative of victimhood that ran through Afrikaner nationalism; feeling themselves victims of the British, the belief that they were at constant risk of annihilation through being “swamped” was widespread.²¹⁰

Throughout much of history, most Europeans simply assumed that Whites were superior to others. Dr. Verwoerd brought this widely-held presumption, in concert with his

²⁰⁶ Verwoerd, 1961a: 8.

²⁰⁷ Browett, 1982: 20.

²⁰⁸ J. Howard Pim (1874-1934) proposed establishing exclusively black communities in which Blacks could handle their own affairs, and take care of their own ill and disabled, without costing Whites anything. Maurice Evans proposed some basic principles in 1911 saying that “the white man must govern” and that the races should be separated, to give each the chance to “build up and develop their race life” (Dubow, 1995b: 147-151).

²⁰⁹ Jabavu, 1960: 64.

²¹⁰ Terreblanche, 2002: 298.

Calvinistic ideas around predestination, to the extraordinary conclusion that the only way to deal with the reality of different races was to keep them firmly apart.²¹¹ The ideas of nationhood and *volk* that had formed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and reached their apotheosis in Hitler's Germany were also central.²¹²

While Dr. Verwoerd came to power into a system in which the separation of Blacks and Coloureds from Whites was enshrined, he had huge conviction in the feasibility of creating a nation in which there was "separate development" (which he also called "co-existence"²¹³) at every level.²¹⁴ He believed above all in the rights of the Afrikaners as a nation, and stated in recollection of the 1934 Poor White Congress, which had been called to discuss the urgent matter of the many whites living in poverty, that it had "led me to one conclusion: the plight of my people cannot be remedied except by political machinery."²¹⁵

That Dr. Verwoerd's views went beyond nationalism to encapsulate racialism is exemplified in his comment "better poor but White than rich but Black."²¹⁶ Dr. Verwoerd also cracked down on the use of the words "Africans" and "natives," falsely stating that the Whites had arrived in South Africa around the same time as the Blacks, or even earlier. From now on, only "Bantu" was to be used as the correct term (the names of the Ministries of Native Affairs and Native Education were changed).²¹⁷

With respect to Coloureds, Dr. Verwoerd believed that as their numbers were relatively few they did not represent a threat to Whites, as he felt the Blacks did, while also stating that there must be no "intermingling" politically, at municipal or federal level. Attempts were made under Dr. Verwoerd to dismiss the reality that Coloureds were of white as well as black descent, to depict them as a biologically distinct group and to create a sense of ethnic identity.²¹⁸ He believed that they were "a race that has completely different racial characteristics (to the Whites)," and "a subordinate non-European race."²¹⁹

²¹¹ Ventner, 1999: 418.

²¹² Ventner, 1999: 440.

²¹³ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 5.

²¹⁴ Rogers, 1972: 4.

²¹⁵ Bloomberg, 1990: 98.

²¹⁶ Adam, 1971: 156.

²¹⁷ Lapping, 1986: 131; Neame, 1962: 157.

²¹⁸ Bloom, 1967: 142.

²¹⁹ Goldin, 1987: 174-175.

As for giving back the voting rights that his Party had taken away from them²²⁰ and enabling them to elect Coloured MPs to Parliament, that was out of the question for Dr. Verwoerd. Instead, he insisted, the Coloureds should choose a representative from among White candidates to protect their interests in Parliament. He assured them, though, that his Government would try to ensure that the Coloured voters, who elected four Whites to the Assembly, could “send to this Parliament those Whites who they believe will best represent the true and real interests of the Coloureds.”²²¹ Dr. Verwoerd was concerned that if greater rights were extended to Coloureds than Blacks, they could become “the tail that wags the dog.”²²² He stressed his view that the government should never relent and grant Coloureds the right to vote or any other enhanced rights, as he felt that this would lead inevitably to “biological assimilation.”²²³

In 1965, Dr. Verwoerd said of the position of the Coloureds in South Africa that if the “Bantu” were eliminated “from our political life . . . then the position is that we have a White majority in South Africa and two minority groups (Asians and Coloureds).” If granted the vote a minority group had very slight chance of getting into power — unless it held the balance of power between two equally strong parties, which was an undesirable state of affairs “Surely it is much better, then,” he continued, “to give such a minority group limited powers and opportunities. That is the basis of our policy . . . What is being given to them is self-government over matters which are of real importance to them.” He cited the fields of education, welfare, local government, Coloured settlements — even entertainment, expressing the view that if the Coloured and Asian peoples were moulded into communities they would not lose their leaders, and would have far better opportunities of holding responsible positions than would be possible in terms of a policy of integration.²²⁴

Dr. Verwoerd revealed a rare moment of uncertainty on the subject of apartheid when he was asked by a lawyer at The Hague where Coloured people rated in a system of separate destinies. The lawyer, himself an Afrikaner, pointedly added that, “They speak our language and share our culture.” Verwoerd hesitated, then volunteered that “There is no logical reason.” “What then of them?” he was asked. His reply: “Eventually, the Coloured will have

²²⁰ The Coloureds had the right to vote since the days of Colonial Office rule (Grey, 1949: 54) but it was revoked in 1956 (Adhikari, 2005: 4; Bunting, 1964: 144).

²²¹ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1966: 2-3.

²²² Goldin, 1987: 174-175.

²²³ du Pre, 1994: 151.

²²⁴ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1966: 2-3.

to find his political future with the White, but the time is not yet right.²²⁵ As for Coloureds being ever integrated with Whites, Dr. Verwoerd stated flatly a few weeks before his death, “No they won’t be integrated with the Whites. Many of the Coloureds have already mingled with the Blacks. How can you integrate such a group?”²²⁶

Although the general trend around the world was towards increasing internationalism, Dr. Verwoerd remained stridently opposed to this, and advocated a strict Christian Nationalist approach. He often referred to South Africa as a “Christian republic.”²²⁷ He felt that liberalism and communism were influences that would come from overseas.²²⁸ Dr. Verwoerd was also interested in getting Whites together for a common cause. At a republican rally in 1960 he stated that all Whites, Afrikaans- and English-speakers, needed to stand together and work towards what he referred to as “a certain colour policy” and stated that a republic would give Whites the opportunity to come together and heal old wounds.²²⁹

DR. VERWOERD’S POLITICAL CAREER

THE 1943 AND 1948 GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

In 1943 Daniel Francois Malan, the leader of the National Party, offered Dr. Verwoerd a safe seat in that year’s general election, but Strijdom persuaded Verwoerd to stay on as editor of *Die Transvaler*.²³⁰ The elections were of major importance in South African history as it was then that the term “apartheid” entered common parlance, thanks to the National Party’s campaign.²³¹ The term “apartheid,” although it had been used before,²³² had not been in a 1946 dictionary of Afrikaans.²³³

²²⁵ Moodie, 2017: 155.

²²⁶ Drury, 1968, 460-466.

²²⁷ Ngcokavane, 1989: 120.

²²⁸ Hepple, 1966: 218.

²²⁹ Norval, 1996: 184.

²³⁰ Worden, 2000: 104.

²³¹ Dubow, 1992: 211.

²³² The term “apartheid” was first coined in the 1920s (Grundy, 1991: 8). In 1929, Hertzog campaigned for election citing “black peril” as a reason to continue pursuing his plans for racial segregation, and stressed his view that if large numbers of Blacks were allowed to settle in urban areas, “bolshevism” would result (Worden, 2000: 87). The term “apartheid” was coined, predicated around segregation (van den Berghe, 1967: 115, 119). During the 1930s the term “apartheid” was used in discussions held by the Dutch Reformed Church (Dubow, 2014: 7-10), which provided rural Afrikaners with a focal point for ideas of ethnicity and belonging (Dvorin, 1952: 39).

²³³ Landis, 1961b: 1.

The National Party lost the 1943 general elections, but it emerged as the formal opposition party to the government, holding forty-three seats against the coalition (the United and the Labour parties) government's 107.²³⁴ Five years later, however, Dr. Verwoerd's parliamentary career began, campaigning as the National Party's candidate in Alberton in the 1948 general elections. In the elections, the National Party made widespread use of the term "apartheid"²³⁵ and its stated "highest goal" was the "maintenance of white race."²³⁶

Malan suggested that the Whites had a choice: "integration and national suicide," or "apartheid" and the protection of a "pure white race."²³⁷ Afrikaners were depicted as a belaboured ethnicity that had struggled to survive. The idea that they had arrived in South Africa to inhabit a mostly empty interior with almost no indigenous residents was promoted and various historical events were reimagined as displaying the Afrikaners as a noble people that fought against adversity.²³⁸

The National Party, in coalition with the Afrikaner Party (AP) of Nicolaas Havenga, won the election with 41.2% of the vote,²³⁹ though Dr. Verwoerd lost by just 171 votes²⁴⁰ to the United Party candidate.²⁴¹ Alberton being a Johannesburg suburb with a very small Afrikaner population, it was unsurprising that he failed to win there, but Dr. Verwoerd gained more votes than anyone would have expected.²⁴² Nevertheless, with the support of the Broederbond, he entered parliament as a senator instead,²⁴³ appointed by Prime Minister Malan at the insistence of Strijdom.²⁴⁴ His annual salary was £700, much less than he was making as editor of the *Die Transvaler*.²⁴⁵ Dr. Verwoerd subsequently became a member of the Rand Advisory Council of the National Party and Leader of the House.²⁴⁶

²³⁴ Worden, 2000: 104.

²³⁵ van den Berghe, 1967: 115; Apartheid quickly began to give rise to a considerable body of literature, including Dvorin, E.P. (1952) *Racial Separation in South Africa*; Keet, B.B. (1957) *The Ethics of Apartheid*; Peinaar, S. and Sampson, A. (1960) *South Africa: Two Views of Separate Development*; Pistorius, P. (1957) *No Further Trek*; Rhodie, N.J. and Ventner, H.J. (1960) *Apartheid, A Socio-Historical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea*; etc.

²³⁶ Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1990: 34.

²³⁷ Dubow, 2014: 8-17; Louw, 2004: 42; Study Commission on U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa, 1981: 41.

²³⁸ Dubow, 2014: 8-17.

²³⁹ Dubow, 2014: 2.

²⁴⁰ Botha, 1967: 13; Moodie, 1975: 257.

²⁴¹ Uys, 1959: 6.

²⁴² Kenney, 1980: 74.

²⁴³ Legum and Legum, 1964b: 24; Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 197.

²⁴⁴ Troup, 1975: 318.

²⁴⁵ Giliomee, 2012: 52.

²⁴⁶ Italiaander, 1961: 105; *The New York Times*, 18 August 1965: 8, 'Architect of apartheid.'

After their win, Malan went on to form a Government coalition with the Afrikaner Party.²⁴⁷ He believed he was doing God's work and *Die Transvaler*, still edited by Dr. Verwoerd, put the election down to divine providence.²⁴⁸ He had said that "the fortunes of the Afrikaner People are not in the hands of men or of other Peoples but in the hands of God,"²⁴⁹ and identified the "black threat" as their greatest foe.²⁵⁰

The National Party's victory signalled the end of an era of relatively moderate Afrikaner leadership under Jan Smuts²⁵¹ as Malan²⁵² immediately began implementing the policy of "apartheid."²⁵³ Emerging from the hyper-nationalist ideas espoused by the National Party, the Broederbond, the Dutch Reformed Church, and many ordinary Afrikaners, and from the pre-existing ideas around race and segregation, the primary aim of Malan's apartheid was "to safeguard the racial identity and dominance of whites, by development along separate racial lines."²⁵⁴ Malan built on the laws that governed race relations; his new laws were a formalisation of the long-established segregation, which was rarely contested as it was in perfect sync with the economic interests of Whites and overseas investors.²⁵⁵

Malan's version of apartheid gave rise to unease; not only among non-Whites, but also among English-speaking South Africans.²⁵⁶ He introduced measures aimed at promoting Afrikaner unity and to reducing the domination of English speakers in economics and politics;²⁵⁷ for the first time since the Union, South Africa had a government with no Anglophones.²⁵⁸ He set about creating a system that would elevate Afrikaners and enrich

²⁴⁷ Dubow, 2014: 35; Vatcher, 1965: 75, 138.

²⁴⁸ Simons and Simons, 1983: 588.

²⁴⁹ Moodie, 1975: 247.

²⁵⁰ Herbstein, 2004: 10.

²⁵¹ Morris, 2004: 159.

²⁵² Malan is often characterised as being primarily interested in nationalism, but he was also dedicated to segregation and other racialist legislation (Beinart, 2001: 146), and had referred to Jews as "parasites" (Higginson, 2014: 322). He persisted in his anti-Semitism after the war, having described the situation in 1939 as one in which the "Jewish question" "hangs like a dark cloud over South Africa," and suggested that an organised cabal of Jews had "robbed" Afrikaners of their heritage (Vatcher, 1965: 61). However, he had no specific "blueprint" for apartheid, which continued to develop from what had gone before, and to react to current circumstances (Glaser, 2001: 97).

²⁵³ Apartheid quickly began to give rise to a considerable body of literature, including Dvorin, E.P. (1952) *Racial Separation in South Africa*; Peinaar, S. and Sampson, A. (1960) *South Africa: Two Views of Separate Development*; Pistorius, P. (1957) *No Further Trek*; Keet, B.B. (1957) *The Ethics of Apartheid*; Rhoodie, N.J. and Ventner, H.J. (1960) *Apartheid, A Socio-Historical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea* etc.

²⁵⁴ Barber, 1999: 140.

²⁵⁵ Doxey, 1963: 501; Schadeberg, 1990: 33.

²⁵⁶ *The Economist*, 29 September 1951: 753, 'Politics of Afrikanerdom.'

²⁵⁷ Schonteich and Boshoff, 2003: 15.

²⁵⁸ Calpin, 1951: 417; Denoon et al, 1989: 197.

them, while marginalising others, particularly Blacks and Coloureds, from power and from most opportunities of advancement.²⁵⁹ Malan also outraged war veterans by freeing several imprisoned “home front fascists” who had opposed South Africa’s participation in the war and supported the Nazis.²⁶⁰

More importantly, Malan sought to concentrate all national power into fewer and fewer hands.²⁶¹ Africans’ right to national political representation was denied while eligible Coloured voters were put on a separate roll that was abolished in 1956.²⁶² At the same time the National Party was exerting more control over black communities, destroying squatter camps, and creating planned black “townships” where black nuclear families would live and provide cheap labour in the urban areas.²⁶³

Apartheid developed quickly into a very complex system predicated on extremely repressive measures imposed on the Blacks by complete white domination of the political system. Everything Africans did was minutely controlled with the goal and effect of supplying white-owned industry and agriculture with cheap labour, facilitating the rapid development of industrial capitalism.²⁶⁴ Apartheid was a basic policy treated as though it were a serious philosophy on which to base a social system.

Malan insisted, just like Dr. Verwoerd would do later, that apartheid was not a policy of oppression²⁶⁵ and justified it by stating that it was a positive policy; it would allow Blacks to develop their own institutions and to exercise a degree of home rule within their reservations. However, there was never any real intention of granting them any significant freedom at all.²⁶⁶ The reality was that his government sought to ensure that enough Africans went into the cities to provide the requisite labour while not causing any problems for the White farmers who needed cheap labour;²⁶⁷ thus, it embodied a “foundational contradiction”; the very conditions that were essential to white economic well-being also gave rise to the conditions that threatened apartheid.²⁶⁸

²⁵⁹ Shaw, 2007: 1.

²⁶⁰ Dubow, 2014: 45.

²⁶¹ Gibbs 1949: 215.

²⁶² Adhikari, 2005: 4; Bunting, 1964: 144.

²⁶³ Bonner et al, 1993: 24-25.

²⁶⁴ Callinicos, 1992: 12.

²⁶⁵ Le May, 1995: 208.

²⁶⁶ Dubow, 2014: 32.

²⁶⁷ Morris, 1977: 62; Posel, 1993: 413.

²⁶⁸ Posel, 2011: 323.

Malan also suggested that apartheid was necessary to limit the influence of communism in Africa,²⁶⁹ while recognising that complete segregation would never work, as South Africa relied upon “native labour.”²⁷⁰ According to Govan Mbeki,²⁷¹ as the implementation of the National Party programme unfolded, “the hideous face of fascism under the local label of apartheid came into view.”²⁷²

AS SENATOR

As senator, Dr. Verwoerd gave his first speech to the government in 1948, stating that violence and unrest between Whites and non-Whites was stirring all over the country and stressing his view that apartheid was the only way to deal with burgeoning unrest.²⁷³ He defended apartheid and defined it as the realization that Europeans and non-Europeans were living in the same country.²⁷⁴ However, he also declared that South Africa was “a white man’s country and we must remain master here,” while suggesting rather vaguely that Blacks could be masters within their own homelands.²⁷⁵ He stated that apartheid was the only way to dispel the growing tension between the races and that it would get rid of “points of friction,” and he made some suggestions as to how already existing laws around segregation and representation could be extended.²⁷⁶ He described Blacks, Coloureds and Indians as “swarming everywhere, uncounted and uncontrolled” and “taking possession of the theatre and the streets.”²⁷⁷

In September 1948, Dr. Verwoerd stated that the new Nationalist doctrine would create new social relations and that, with time, the National Party would be able to see and fix its mistakes.²⁷⁸ In a speech in Parliament on September 3, 1948, shortly after becoming a member of the Senate, he also condemned a report of a Commission of Inquiry (Fagan

²⁶⁹ Berridge, 1992: 4.

²⁷⁰ Legum and Legum, 1964b: 50-51.

²⁷¹ (1910-2001) South African politician, ANC leader and leader of the Communist Party in South Africa. He was convicted at the Rivonia Trial on charges of terrorism and treason and was therefore imprisoned for twenty-four years in Robben Island. He served in South Africa's post-apartheid Senate from 1994 to 1997 as Deputy President of the Senate. He then served in the Senate's successor, the National Council of Provinces, from 1997 to 1999. Father of former South African President Thabo Mbeki (Gastrow, 1995: 190-192).

²⁷² Mbeki, 1991: 165.

²⁷³ Giliomee, 2011: 497.

²⁷⁴ Grey, 1949: 54.

²⁷⁵ Dubow, 2014: 64.

²⁷⁶ Brookes, 1968: 6-9.

²⁷⁷ Giliomee, 2012: 52.

²⁷⁸ Rich, 1989: 293.

Commission) set up by the Smuts government to consider the future direction of native policy. The report had recommended an incremental approach to economic and political integration, with which Dr. Verwoerd disagreed.²⁷⁹ Although rather unpopular with his peers, he was seen as the most likely to get the flagging apartheid project to succeed.²⁸⁰

The Government quickly set about building barriers between the people of South Africa. The purpose was that all potential opponents should be broken into so many racial or ethnic groups, that no one by itself could mount effective resistance to apartheid measures. This way all non-Whites like Blacks, Coloureds and Indians could not be together in one organization or group.²⁸¹ The National Party tried to propound the idea that ethnic differences and conflicts were just as great between the black tribes as between Blacks and Whites, paving the way for Verwoerd's "separate development" approach some years later.²⁸² When the National Party spoke of the need to deal with "two nations" in South Africa, they referred to the Afrikaners and people of British origins; Blacks and Coloureds were essentially considered "non-people."²⁸³

In 1950 the word "*apartheid*" was added to the Afrikaans dictionary for the first time defined as:

A political tendency or trend in South Africa based on the general principles

a) Of a differentiation corresponding to differences of race and/or colour and/or level of civilisation as opposed to assimilation.

b) Of the maintenance and perpetuation of the individuality (identity) of the different colour groups of which the population was composed, and of the separate development of these groups in accordance with their individual nature, tradition and capabilities, as opposed to integration.²⁸⁴

The dictionary also quoted Dr. Verwoerd's definition of apartheid which he said "means simply that each man should have his own proper place."²⁸⁵ The term was seized upon and used widely by Paul Sauer, who would become known as one of Dr. Verwoerd's

²⁷⁹ Pelzer, 1966: 12-13.

²⁸⁰ Legum and Legum, 1964b: 54-55.

²⁸¹ Bunting, 1986: 198; Mbeki, 1991: 34.

²⁸² Vail, 1989.

²⁸³ Tambo, 1964: 17.

²⁸⁴ Reeves, 1962b: 121.

²⁸⁵ Reeves, 1962b: 121.

“chief lieutenants.”²⁸⁶ Nevertheless, by the 1960s the word had become so “dirty” that Dr. Verwoerd tried to drop it.²⁸⁷

AS MINISTER OF NATIVE AFFAIRS

On October 19, 1950, two years after the National Party won the elections, Malan appointed Dr. Verwoerd Minister of Native Affairs, which was an enormous impetus to the apartheid project,²⁸⁸ although it was then seen as a rather low-status position.²⁸⁹ Dr. Verwoerd, however, was in no doubt as to the potential he could bring to the position and on receiving confirmation of his appointment he commented to his wife, “Yes, dear wife, I am now actually the great Induna!” (“*Induna*” is an African word meaning “boss”).²⁹⁰ Apparently, Malan was prompted to appoint him by the more extreme elements in the National Party.²⁹¹ A “sense of pragmatism [towards apartheid] was replaced by a sustained, ideological approach,”²⁹² as Dr. Verwoerd took to his role “like a giant unchained”²⁹³ and was fired with “Broederbond enthusiasm to save Afrikanerdom from being swamped with blacks in its own country.”²⁹⁴

Through his deep engagement with his new job, and his strident views on race and apartheid, Dr. Verwoerd was able to turn his ministry into one of the government’s most influential roles. He sought to centralise all issues regarding “natives” and was soon proposing and legislating for dramatic changes, intervening directly with labour, settlement, education, and a great deal more. Dr. Verwoerd’s “dynamic drive” speeded up the process of separation along racial lines while failing to provide alternative opportunities to the people discriminated against.²⁹⁵

Dr. Verwoerd recognised that a potential threat to segregation, but also an important tool for him was Whites’ desire to have a constant stream of cheap labour and in a speech to (Black) members of the Native Representative Council he sugar-coated this in a lengthy

²⁸⁶ *The New York Times*, 16 April 1960: 4, ‘Apartheid’s promoter: Paul Oliver Sauer.’

²⁸⁷ Addison, 1981: 3.

²⁸⁸ Badat, 2013: 22; Dubow, 1987: 11; Giliomee, 2012: 52-54.

²⁸⁹ Dubow, 2014: 59.

²⁹⁰ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘Hendrik Frensj Verwoerd: A man under a cruel magnifying glass’; Hepple, 1967: 104.

²⁹¹ Beinart, 2001: 146.

²⁹² Barber, 1999: 141.

²⁹³ Posel, 1997: 64.

²⁹⁴ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 197.

²⁹⁵ Ballinger, 1969: 318-319.

explanation of how separate development would be good for the Blacks, while Blacks would continue to travel to work for Whites.²⁹⁶ The idea of Black workers as mere units of labour was one that would persist throughout the apartheid period.²⁹⁷ While Dr. Verwoerd openly supported Malan in his quest to encourage all Whites to stand together, privately he felt that Malan was too appeasing to the English.²⁹⁸ However, his main concern was racial separation. Jan Morris, a Welsh historian, described him in 1958 as having a “God-like zeal” that was “devoted entirely to dividing black from white from Coloured from Indian.”²⁹⁹

Steadily, apartheid infiltrated and dominated every aspect of life. In 1951, Dr. Verwoerd stated that it was the intention of the Party that all representation of Natives in Parliament should be hastily abolished, while stating that the “natives” were “easy prey to propaganda,” who could be swayed by talk of equality, such as many of them had heard when they were on military service abroad, during the Second World War.³⁰⁰ Dr. Verwoerd’s plan was to embed apartheid so thoroughly that it could never be undone.³⁰¹ Thus his aim was to achieve a complete “divorce” between Whites and Africans, including total territorial separation³⁰² – for the good of both, or so he claimed.³⁰³

Dr. Verwoerd’s vision for apartheid was predicated on grand apartheid, or the creation of separate living spaces or homelands for the different groups, and petty apartheid, or the multitude of ways in which every-day inequality was expressed.³⁰⁴ As many of the actions he took as Minister had a dramatic and profound impact on the development of apartheid in South Africa, these all form “Dr. Verwoerd’s Apartheid” as much as any decisions he took as Prime Minister; where initiatives were started by someone else, Dr. Verwoerd made them happen.

From 1950, Dr. Verwoerd’s department focussed on urban areas, and attacked what was seen as the liberals’ dangerous approach to managing Blacks in towns and cities. The Department of Native Affairs, “developed a brusque management style and an unapologetic racial discourse that transformed bureaucratic coercion into a racial imperative,”³⁰⁵ while

²⁹⁶ Clark and Worger, 2011: 136-141.

²⁹⁷ Asmal et al, 1996: 210.

²⁹⁸ Furlong, 1991: 237.

²⁹⁹ Morris, 1958: 171.

³⁰⁰ Jansen, 1951: 4.

³⁰¹ Sparks, 1990: 273.

³⁰² Rhoodie, 1969: 63.

³⁰³ Worger et al, 2010: 103.

³⁰⁴ Miller, 2014: 120.

³⁰⁵ Evans, 1997: 56-62.

insisting that the new policies were not repressive, but provided Blacks with full respect for their language and traditions while allowing them to develop at their own pace, and stating that Afrikaners could not be oppressors because they had been oppressed.³⁰⁶ The major legislation enacted by Dr. Verwoerd during this period is discussed in detail below.

In 1951, addressing the Native Representative Council about their concerns, Dr. Verwoerd made it very clear that they were there “to listen and keep quiet.”³⁰⁷ The same year, Malan attempted to remove the century-old voting rights from Coloureds, regardless of their level of education.³⁰⁸ This began a long legal battle between the Senate and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court over whether the Appellate Division could strike down as unconstitutional any attempt by Parliament to amend clauses entrenched in the South Africa Act. In 1956, the apartheid government succeeded in its plan,³⁰⁹ but only after it had enlarged both the Senate (in order to give itself the required two-thirds majority), and also the Appellate Division (by appointing judges who supported its cause).³¹⁰ A few years later, the National Party succeeded in passing legislation which lowered the age of voters from twenty-one to eighteen, hoping that this would increase their electoral power.³¹¹

In the 1953 general election Dr. Verwoerd was selected to stand for election in the safe seat of Heidelberg.³¹² Shortly before the election, he had been given the power to ban the ANC in the native reserves; a decision that had put “the racial problem” centre-stage, which was exactly what he wanted. Racial policies were so popular with White voters that the more moderate United Party, led by Sir de Villiers Graaff,³¹³ also campaigned with a racial agenda, stating that his party supported “white leadership with justice,”³¹⁴ although National Party supporters feared that they would eventually accept integration.³¹⁵

³⁰⁶ Neame, 1962: 78, 86.

³⁰⁷ Sachs, 1952: 34.

³⁰⁸ *The Spectator*, 28 March 1952: 188, ‘Dr. Malan’s crisis.’

³⁰⁹ Adhikari, 2005: 4.

³¹⁰ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016; Dugard, 1978: 30-31; Sachs, 1973: 143-145.

³¹¹ *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 1958: 88.

³¹² Uys, 1959: 6.

³¹³ (1913-1999) A lawyer who had fought in the Second World War (Uys (*The Guardian*), 11 October 1999, ‘Sir de Villiers Graaff’), de Villiers Graaff led the United Party during Dr. Verwoerd’s term as Prime Minister. Although he sometimes criticized and condemned some of the National Party’s policies, he supported apartheid and did not threaten the government’s plans for it (Mouton, 2014: 48-69). For his biography see: Graaff, D.V. (1993) *Div Looks Back: The Memoirs of Sir de Villiers Graaff*.

³¹⁴ Hunt, 1958: 5.

³¹⁵ Rydon, 1958: 30.

The National Party won 49% of the votes and 94 out of the 156 seats³¹⁶ on the back of their expanding racial policies and the Whites' dedication to the notion of themselves as eternal bosses of Blacks and other minorities;³¹⁷ they had talked little about South Africa becoming a republic, which Verwoerd was keen on, and had appealed to non-Afrikaner Whites on the grounds of their views on white supremacy, which very popular with most White voters.³¹⁸

In 1954, Malan resigned and was replaced by Johannes Strijdom, who was clearly more than ready to follow in his footsteps. Malan's advanced years were one reason for his resignation; another was his refusal to accept the new, more radical, vision of apartheid that was being promoted by the Broederbond, represented so well by the highly influential Dr. Verwoerd.³¹⁹ Verwoerd remained Minister of Native Affairs, but became even more important and central to governance and the development and application of apartheid.³²⁰ He quickly became known as one of the sharpest minds in politics, and perhaps the most hard-working politician.³²¹ He was generally considered to be second only to the Prime Minister in terms of power and influence,³²² and recognised as the man behind the policy of apartheid.³²³

Dr. Verwoerd was dedicated to his work, spending more than twelve hours at his desk every day and running his Ministry like a private empire.³²⁴ According to Christoph Marx, Professor of History at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, Dr. Verwoerd "proved himself a politician of extraordinary political acumen, shrewdness, and an unbending will" as he transformed his previously rather unimportant ministry to the key department for the development of apartheid.³²⁵

On April 3, 1954, *The Economist* described Dr. Verwoerd as the only Member of Parliament who had a clear vision for what apartheid was.³²⁶ The same year, Dr. Verwoerd explained that "Apartheid comprises a whole multiplicity of phenomena. It comprises the political sphere; it is necessary in the social sphere; it is aimed at in Church matters; it is

³¹⁶ Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: 382; G. M. C. (*The World Today*), July 1958: 316; Rydon, 1958: 30.

³¹⁷ *The Economist*, 26 April 1958: 321, 'Afrikaner triumph.'

³¹⁸ Kruger, 1969: 311.

³¹⁹ Legum and Legum, 1964b: 18.

³²⁰ Kruger, 1969: 289.

³²¹ Italiaander, 1961: 103.

³²² *The Economist*, 19 March 1955: 1005, 'Mr. Strijdom's hundred days.'

³²³ *The Economist*, 21 May 1955: 647, 'South African Union, 1910-1955.'

³²⁴ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, 'The champion of apartheid.'

³²⁵ Marx, 2011a: 282.

³²⁶ *The Economist*, 3 April 1954, 'Notes from South Africa.'

relevant to every sphere of life. Even within the economic sphere it is not just a question of numbers. What is of more importance is whether one maintains the colour bar or not.”³²⁷

On May 18, 1954, Dr. D. L. Smit, former Secretary for Negro Affairs, charged Dr. Verwoerd that with his policies he was attempting to set up a black empire under his dictatorship.³²⁸ By the end of 1954, there were concerns that South Africa was becoming a police state, a charge Strijdom denied, while insisting that he and Dr. Verwoerd had “opened the road” for Black South Africans that would eventually lead to their becoming self-reliant and self-dependent.³²⁹ Shortly after Strijdom came to power, trains and post offices were segregated along racial lines and everywhere moves were taken to exert further control over Black South Africans. In 1955, he said, “Our task in South Africa is to maintain the identity of the white man; in the task we will die fighting.”³³⁰ That year a publication dedicated to the constitution of South Africa wrote of the Native Administration Act of 1927 that it had allowed a “unique system of extra-parliamentary government of one section of the population existing side by side with a democratic form of government for another section”; a system that was necessary because “the vast majority of natives are still so backward.... So easily influenced to mischief and agitation... so lacking in a sense of responsibility, that they may be described as children who require not only guidance but often firm direction in their own affairs.”³³¹

Dr. Verwoerd was at all times the driving force behind the hard line on segregation taken by Strijdom’s government, insisting that if his plans were carried out, most Blacks could eventually reside in “homelands” and take care of the bulk of their own affairs, while providing labour for white business and agriculture.³³² He was being hailed as the “heir apparent” of Strijdom, whose health was failing.³³³

Dr. Verwoerd would remain as Minister of Native Affairs until 1958. Under his leadership, the Ministry grew dramatically in power and scope, and he was criticised by fellow party members for creating “a state within a state” and for how he rammed through his own vision. By 1957, members of the opposition United Party was describing him as an “evil

³²⁷ Davenport, 1991: 339.

³²⁸ *The New York Times*, 29 May 1954: 3, ‘Dictatorial bid laid to an aid of Malan.’

³²⁹ *The New York Times*, 22 December 1954: 10, ‘Strijdom hints go slow policy.’

³³⁰ Dubow, 2014: 33.

³³¹ May, 1955: 301.

³³² Kruger, 1969: 298-299.

³³³ G. M. C. (*The World Today*), July 1958: 320; *The Economist*, 22 March 1958, 1022, ‘Election tactics.’

genius,”³³⁴ while Major P.V. G. Vanderbyl, a United Party member, said he believed that no man in South Africa’s history had done more to endanger white civilization than Dr. Verwoerd.³³⁵ As for some of his National Party followers, they just called him “Oom [Uncle] Henny.”³³⁶

AS PRIME MINISTER

Strijdom died on August 24, 1958, after almost four years in office, and just five months after leading the National Party to another election victory (albeit with fewer votes from the eighteen-twenty-one age group, voting for the first time, than they had hoped³³⁷), winning 103 seats against the United Party’s 53.³³⁸ Dr. Verwoerd, who had developed the reputation under Malan and Strijdom as someone who forged bold politics and enforced them ruthlessly,³³⁹ bid for leadership of the National Party. There was a brief but furious struggle for leadership within the National Party between Dr. Verwoerd, Dr. Eben Donges,³⁴⁰ who would later serve under Dr. Verwoerd as Minister of Finance, and Charles Swart,³⁴¹ who had been Minister of Justice under Strijdom.³⁴²

Dr. Verwoerd was Strijdom’s first choice as his successor, but then fearing there would be a split in the Party because NP leaders in Cape Town planned to put forward Donges, Strijdom chose Swart as a compromise candidate. However, the Transvaal Party leaders rejected Strijdom’s suggestion and the Cape leaders continued to press for Donges. The crisis led to Party elections,³⁴³ which took place on September 2, 1958, only a week after Strijdom’s death. In the first round, the results were Swart 41, Donges 52, Dr. Verwoerd 80,

³³⁴ Callinicos, 1995: 46; *The Canberra Times*, 25 May 1957: 6, ‘Dr. Verwoerd, South Africa’s ‘evil genius.’

³³⁵ *The Canberra Times*, 25 May 1957: 6, ‘Dr. Verwoerd, South Africa’s ‘evil genius.’

³³⁶ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.’

³³⁷ *The Economist*, 24 October 1959: 319, ‘Cold comfort for Dr Verwoerd.’

³³⁸ *The Economist*, 26 April 1958: 321, ‘Afrikaner triumph’; Welsh, 2000: 448.

³³⁹ Neame, 1962: 156.

³⁴⁰ (1898–1968) Minister of Finance from 1958 to 1967, he assumed the role of acting Prime Minister on 6 September 1966, when Dr. Verwoerd was assassinated. He remained in this post until the 13th of September when John Vorster became Prime Minister (Lentz, 1996: 698).

³⁴¹ (1894-1982) A supporter of the Nazis, member of the Broederbond and of the Ossewaybrandwag (Verwey, 1995: 237). As Minister of Justice he introduced the Immorality Act and the Suppression of Communism Act which outlawed the Communist Party (*Lakeland Ledger*, 17 July 1982: 15, ‘Charles Swart: Ex-South African leader.’). He served as acting Prime Minister in 1958, the last Governor-General and the first State President of the Republic of South Africa from 1961 to 1967 (Verwey, 1995: 238-240).

³⁴² Hughes, 1961: 177.

³⁴³ Vatcher, 1965: 125.

and in the run-off Donges 75, Dr. Verwoerd 98.³⁴⁴ Dr. Verwoerd celebrated his win by singing along with his supporters the traditional Dutch anthem, *Let God's Blessing on Him Fall*.³⁴⁵

Thus, Dr. Verwoerd became both Prime Minister and leader of the National Party,³⁴⁶ just months after reports that he was considered by many of his colleagues to be a dangerous extremist.³⁴⁷ On receiving the news of his victory, Dr. Verwoerd made a nationwide radio speech in which he depicted himself as God's choice: "It must be stated at the outset that we as believing rulers of a religious nation will seek our strength and guidance in the future, as in the past, from Him who controls the destinies of nations... in accordance with His will, it was determined who should assume the leadership of the government in this new period of the life of the people of South Africa."³⁴⁸ On another occasion, he said, and "I believe that the will of God was revealed in the ballot."³⁴⁹ The reaction of non-Whites to Dr. Verwoerd's election victory varied from "dismay" to "explosive resentment," while the *Cape Times* characterised it as a "disaster."³⁵⁰ The *New York Times* characterised his victory as "bad news" and reported that:

"there will be no rejoicing anywhere, not even among the majority of the South African people, that Hendrik Verwoerd has been chosen Prime Minister. This is an affliction which the unhappy people of South Africa will have to bear for a while... Dr. Verwoerd is an outstanding example of a gradually disappearing breed – the racist. In Hitler's days he was pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic. His passion and his role in South Africa today is that of the champion of an extremist white supremacy. He is the most fanatical exponent of apartheid."³⁵¹

³⁴⁴ Giliomee, 2012: 48; The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 1958: 88-89; Uys, 1959: 7; van Roouen, 1976: 72.

³⁴⁵ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, 'The champion of apartheid'; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, 'Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid'; *TIME*, 15 September 1958: 26, 'South Africa: God's man.'

³⁴⁶ O'Meara, 1996: 91; *The New York Times*, 3 September 1958: 1, 'Verwoerd becomes South Africa's head.'

³⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 3 September 1958: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd becomes South Africa's head.'

³⁴⁸ Hepple, 1967: 134; *TIME*, 15 September 1958: 26, 'South Africa. God's man.'

³⁴⁹ Lapping, 1986: 130; Uys (*Africa South*), January-March 1959: 8, 'Dr. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa.'

³⁵⁰ *TIME*, 15 September 1958: 26, 'South Africa: God's man.'

³⁵¹ *The New York Times*, 6 September 1958: 16, 'Bad news from South Africa.'

Dr. Verwoerd immediately tried to set a “good example” by having no Black servants in the Prime Minister’s residence;³⁵² the couple liked to boast that their children were never bathed or put to bed by Africans.³⁵³ As the new Prime Minister, he said:

“We cannot govern without taking into account the tendencies in the world and in Africa.... We must have regard to them. We are... taking steps to ensure that we adopt a policy by which we on the one hand can retain for the white man full control in his areas, but by which we are giving the Bantu as our wards every opportunity in their areas to move along a road of development by which they can progress in accordance with their ability.”³⁵⁴

Dr. Verwoerd stated that apartheid was “an ideal to aim at”³⁵⁵ and started to implement his Grand Apartheid plan.³⁵⁶ His era began with the government’s commitment to a measure of independence in native areas, and the “big push” to recreate South Africa as a republic³⁵⁷ and achieve complete segregation. Thus, Dr. Verwoerd quietly removed moderates from the government, replacing them with those who shared his views, members of the more “doctrinaire” or “extremist” group of Nationalists, and often members of the Broederbond.³⁵⁸ Shortly after his appointment he met the Broederbond and stressed his intention to involve the organisation much more closely with the intimate workings of government.³⁵⁹ He quickly put the Broederbond into a leadership position in the area of policy-making as he set about making his ideology of “national salvation” a reality.³⁶⁰

Dr. Verwoerd was quick to clarify that his ideas for apartheid were more complete and far-ranging than what had gone before.³⁶¹ Some loved his plans; one journalist commented that he was a “self-centred and self-satisfied Afrikaner.”³⁶² At an event that year to celebrate the anniversary of the defeat of Zulus by Afrikaners at a battle in Blood River in 1838, he described Whites as fighting for civilisation “with their backs to the wall.”³⁶³ It was

³⁵² Le May, 1995: 219; Sachs, 1961: 38; Serfontein, 1979: 84-85.

³⁵³ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, ‘The champion of apartheid’; *The New York Times*, 10 April 1960: 20, ‘Dr. Verwoerd played leading role in spurring apartheid policies.’

³⁵⁴ Moodie, 1975: 264.

³⁵⁵ Mbeki, 2001: 144.

³⁵⁶ Cachalia, 1990: 10.

³⁵⁷ Davenport, 1991: 353.

³⁵⁸ *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 1958: 90; van den Berghe, 1967: 104.

³⁵⁹ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 3-4.

³⁶⁰ Waldmeir, 1997: 11.

³⁶¹ Buthelezi, 1974: 6.

³⁶² Myers, 1959: 23.

³⁶³ *The Canberra Times*, 18 December 1958: 6, ‘Whites may fail says Dr. Verwoerd.’

soon apparent that Dr. Verwoerd brought apartheid to a whole new level; compared to him, Malan was a “mild and benign old gentleman.”³⁶⁴

While apartheid had been in place since 1948, under Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister the state started to pursue his vision of complete segregation with new vigour,³⁶⁵ and the political atmosphere in the country took a decided “turn for the worse.”³⁶⁶ The pace of change increased dramatically, with a considerable focus on the government’s policies of controlling urban blacks and creating “homelands.”³⁶⁷ Dr. Verwoerd’s apartheid was to involve “the massive restructuring of an entire society” that would involve huge expense, and the movement of enormous numbers of people.³⁶⁸

Dr. Verwoerd also moved away from a hard-line nationalist stance to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards English South Africans, naming two English politicians as cabinet members, and speaking increasingly in terms of more general white supremacy, stressing the need for order in South Africa.³⁶⁹ However, there were no English speakers on the government side in either the House of Assembly or the Senate.³⁷⁰

Already highly influential, the Broederbond became even more so under Dr. Verwoerd, who offered it shared responsibility with the party for his goal of turning South Africa into a republic; the organisation responded with a great deal of support, including spending its own funds on the campaign. It also set up think-tanks to explore every aspect of government policy.³⁷¹ Under Dr. Verwoerd, apartheid was transformed from the segregationist approach of Malan to an extreme system designed to deal with every single aspect of inter-racial relations in South Africa.

Dr. Verwoerd was very sure of himself and believed that he was always right. “I do not have the nagging doubt of ever wondering whether, perhaps, I am wrong,”³⁷² he said once. He was described by Dr. Jamie Miller, a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of History at the University of Pittsburgh, as “eloquent, commanding, and captivating,”³⁷³ but he

³⁶⁴ Kepple-Jones, 1963: 202.

³⁶⁵ Grundy, 1991: 8.

³⁶⁶ du Preez Bezdrob, 2003: 75.

³⁶⁷ Foster, 1987: 19.

³⁶⁸ Furlong, 1991: 257.

³⁶⁹ Brotz, 1977: 42.

³⁷⁰ Uys (*Transition* No. 19), 1965: 16, ‘Opium of the Afrikaner.’

³⁷¹ O’Meara, 1966: 48.

³⁷² Bunting, 1986: 148; Dubow, 2014: 120; Evans, 1997: 56.

³⁷³ Miller, 2014: 114.

was also a difficult, autocratic man who treated even his ministers as though they were schoolboys.³⁷⁴ His Minister and close friend Paul Sauer³⁷⁵ said that “nothing in his Ministers’ Departments escaped Dr. Verwoerd’s attention. At Cabinet meetings he frequently knew more of their own affairs than the Ministers themselves.”³⁷⁶ Dr. Verwoerd was also, according to Lawrence Schlemmer of the South African Institute of Racial Relations, an inspiring and charismatic leader, whom many of his followers saw almost as a prophet.³⁷⁷ On the other hand, Verwoerd believed that he had been chosen by God to lead the Afrikaners and saw himself as a man on a divine mission.³⁷⁸

THE 1961 ELECTION

With three years as Prime Minister behind him and his government’s five-year term of office not due to expire until April 1963, Dr. Verwoerd decided to go for an early general election, in October 1961. He declared that “the basic point for this election is racial policy” and called for “national unity” among the White voters, warning that the outcome would affect not only the present condition of South Africa, but its long-term-future, too.³⁷⁹ In fact, Dr. Verwoerd was facing several problems which he believed an election would solve. He wanted to secure the support of many who were concerned about developments in the North; to eliminate waverers from the ranks of National Party MPs and exclude Progressives from Parliament altogether; and to secure his and his party’s position before the economic repercussions of leaving the Commonwealth became too marked.³⁸⁰

The 1961 general election, the first after South Africa became a Republic, turned out to be a triumph for Dr. Verwoerd and a sign of approval of his policies.³⁸¹ The National Party

³⁷⁴ Osada, 2002: 8.

³⁷⁵ (1898-1976) A member of the National Party, Minister of Lands and Irrigation (Rosenthal, 1966); he also served as governments chief spokesman in 1960 while Verwoerd was recovering from David Pratt’s assassination attempt (Pogrud, 1990: 157). The Paul Sauer Dam named after him was renamed Kouga Dam in 1995 (Water Wheel, 2011: 20-24).

³⁷⁶ O’Meara, 1996: 112.

³⁷⁷ Schlemmer, 1970: 19.

³⁷⁸ Barber, 1999: 161; Bunting, 1986: 147; Sachs, 1965: 7.

³⁷⁹ Dubow, 2014: 85; Standerton (*The Cape Times*), 21 October 1961, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: The basic point of this election is racial policy’; Stultz and Butler, 1963: 107.

³⁸⁰ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 14.

³⁸¹ For a detailed exploration of the election see: McConnachie, A. J. (1999) *The 1961 Election in the Republic of South Africa* and Stultz, N.M. and Butler, J. (1963) *The South African General Election of 1961*.

won 105 of the 156 seats³⁸² with 46% of the votes.³⁸³ Most of the English-speaking Whites responded to his plea for “national unity” and supported his ambitious plans to achieve complete segregation.³⁸⁴ Muriel Horrell of the South African Institute of Race Relations observed at the time that “White right-wing elements (English- as well as Afrikaans-speaking people) are increasingly aligning themselves behind Dr. Verwoerd, who is coming to be looked upon by them as the champion of *White* nationalism rather than of *Afrikaner* nationalism, as in the past. His image, in the minds of many White South Africans, seems to be that of a strong, determined man who will, for the time being at any rate, protect ‘White’ civilization in the southernmost State of Africa against the tide of Pan-Africanism spreading from the north.”³⁸⁵ Other reasons that contributed to the NP’s easy victory included the ban on Coloureds voting, the redrawing of rural voting areas to favour Afrikaans voters, and divisions in the United Party, which was still smarting from its defeat in 1958.³⁸⁶

While conservative elements in the United Party fretted that Dr. Verwoerd’s Bantustan policy would result in South Africa being broken up and losing power,³⁸⁷ from the liberal camp there was growing anxiety about “the Nazi line being taken by the party,” and of the risk that Dr. Verwoerd might take steps to “entrench” the position of the National Party in government.³⁸⁸ The United Party under Sir de Villiers Graaff did essentially nothing to combat apartheid at all and in that respect was an extremely cooperative opposition.³⁸⁹

One of the key issues on which Dr. Verwoerd campaigned was that of votes for Coloured South Africans, which he ardently opposed, regarding his colleagues who supported such measures as traitors to the cause of white supremacy.³⁹⁰ The 1961 election was an occasion of great debate about racial matters³⁹¹ and, when he won, Dr. Verwoerd rightly took this as indication of overwhelming support on the part of White voters for these policies,³⁹² despite anxieties about South Africa’s loss of standing in the international

³⁸² The United Party won 49 seats and the Progressive Party and the National Union Party one each (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 21; Stultz and Butler, 1963: 102.)

³⁸³ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 21; Stultz and Butler, 1963: 102.

³⁸⁴ Dubow, 2014: 85; McConnachie, 1999: 123, 284; Stultz and Butler, 1963: 86-110; *The Economist*, 27 October 1961: 358, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s mandate’; Worden, 2000: 111.

³⁸⁵ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1964: 1.

³⁸⁶ Dubow, 2014: 85; McConnachie, 1999: 123, 284; Stultz and Butler, 1963: 86-110; *The Economist*, 27 October 1961: 358, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s mandate’; Worden, 2000: 111.

³⁸⁷ Debates of the House of Assembly, 2 June 1959: Cols. 7180-2.

³⁸⁸ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 23 October 1961: 20, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s aide scored on speech.’

³⁸⁹ Mouton, 2014: 48.

³⁹⁰ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 22 January 1961: 14, ‘Election seen for South Africa.’

³⁹¹ Heard, 1974: 120.

³⁹² *The New York Times*, 21 October 1961, ‘Dr. Verwoerd pledges unchanged policies.’

community, and the complexities that would be involved in achieving apartheid.³⁹³ Dr. Verwoerd felt that he had a mandate to crack down on any dissenters within the ranks of his own party.³⁹⁴

SOUTH AFRICA BECOMES A REPUBLIC

To “sever the British connection” was a “political catch-phrase” among Afrikaner nationalists at the time³⁹⁵ who had not forgotten their defeat in the Boer Wars.³⁹⁶ In 1944, Eric Louw, Verwoerd’s Foreign Minister, had given another reason for parting from the Commonwealth: “as long as we remain in the British Commonwealth, we shall continually be hindered by British liberalism in our efforts to solve the colour problem and the Jewish question.”³⁹⁷ Verwoerd had stressed his commitment to South Africa becoming a Republic³⁹⁸ and stated his view that the National Party was not just a political party, but a manifestation of the state itself; “A nation on the move.”³⁹⁹

Soon after he became Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd and Piet Meyer, chairman of the Broederbond, discussed the idea of South Africa becoming a republic, thus fulfilling their dream and the desire of many of their Afrikaner compatriots. On December 2, 1959, Dr. Verwoerd related the conversation to the Executive Council of the Broederbond. At this point, it was clear that the Broederbond would have to play a role in preparing the Afrikaner people for the republic to become a reality, but without drawing undue attention to its own role. Meyer and Dr. Verwoerd had agreed that each member of the Broederbond would join the National Party on an individual basis and play an active role in party organization in the event of successful outcome. When Meyer informed the Broederbond Council of this agreement, it instantly came on board with this plan, giving rise to an unprecedented period of enthusiastic Broederbond involvement in the National Party’s aims.⁴⁰⁰

When Dr. Verwoerd announced the referendum, the Broederbond’s Executive Council make a number of key decisions about how it would play a role. Its key members

³⁹³ Stultz and Butler, 1963: 97.

³⁹⁴ GVD, 1961: 540.

³⁹⁵ *The Economist*, 25 March 1961: 1166, ‘Forward with Verwoerd.’

³⁹⁶ Barkon, 1961: 104; *TIME*, 17 October 1960: 36, ‘South Africa. *Ja* for Verwoerd.’

³⁹⁷ *TIME*, 17 October 1960: 36, ‘South Africa. *Ja* for Verwoerd.’

³⁹⁸ Moodie, 1975: 283.

³⁹⁹ De Villiers, 1971: 370.

⁴⁰⁰ Pelzer, 1979: 160-164.

Piet Meyer, S. Pauw, J.F.W. Haak and A.I. Malan would serve as a committee to plan the Broederbond's involvement in the republic project, the Broederbond's management would have the authority to decide on the committee's recommendations, the committee would be funded by the Broederbond and other councils and would have propaganda pieces prepared and distributed and "informed" Broeders and members of the Executive Council would address regional Broederbond meetings on the subject of the referendum and the republican cause. In total, forty-five such meetings were held, and many "information pieces," including a brochure entitled *Last Steps to the Republic*, prepared by the Broederbond for distribution within the party and to the press and radio.⁴⁰¹

In 1960, Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister of Britain, told the South African parliament when he was on an official visit that "the winds of change are blowing through the continent" and that aspects of their policies made it impossible for Britain to support them,⁴⁰² while also referencing the growth in "African consciousness" throughout the continent.⁴⁰³ In his official thanks to Macmillan, Dr. Verwoerd said: "We [Afrikaners] call ourselves European but actually we represent the white man in Africa.... We look upon ourselves as indispensable to the white world... We are the link; we are white, but we are in Africa. We link them both and that lays on us a special duty, and we realised that."⁴⁰⁴ The *Cape Times* ran a cartoon by David Marais showing Macmillan and Dr. Verwoerd walking past a diorama with a dinosaur behind them. Through the glass the caption read, "S.A. Museum – Europeans Only," anticipating Dr. Verwoerd's defence of apartheid against Macmillan's opposition.⁴⁰⁵

Dr. Verwoerd announced a referendum in which all the White voters would get the chance to decide whether or not South Africa should become a republic and leave the Commonwealth. Afterwards Macmillan would say that if Dr. Verwoerd had given some grounds to hope that apartheid would be relaxed, the Commonwealth would have accepted South Africa on the basis that there were possibilities of cooperation in the future. Non-White Commonwealth leaders indicated that they would have no problem with South Africa being a member once it abandoned its race policies.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰¹ Pelzer, 1979: 160-164.

⁴⁰² Barber, 1999: 161-163; Davenport, 1991: 354; Marquard, 1969: 24; Thompson, 2001: 213; Vatcher, 1965: 171; Welsh, 2000: 456.

⁴⁰³ Italiaander, 1961: 109.

⁴⁰⁴ Magubane, 1996: 24.

⁴⁰⁵ Coombes, 2013: 222-224.

⁴⁰⁶ Hughes, 1961: 173.

The referendum was held on October 5, 1960, but only for the country's 3,067,638 Whites. The remainder of South Africa's 15,841,128 population and the vast majority, 12,773,490 non-Whites, were declared ineligible.⁴⁰⁷ The question put to the vote was simple: A Republic, Yes (*Ja*) or No (*Nee*)? The Republic won by a respectable margin,⁴⁰⁸ 850,458 against 775,878⁴⁰⁹ or according to other sources 830.520 against 733.861,⁴¹⁰ thus 52.3% of the votes.⁴¹¹ For Dr. Verwoerd hailed the victory as "the beginning of a new era"⁴¹² and added in immensely racist terms: "The English-speaking and the Afrikaans-speaking sections have become like the new bride and the bridegroom who enter upon the new life in life to create together and to live together as life-mates."⁴¹³ British officials commented later that the outcome could have been very different if South Africa had offered even minor concessions.⁴¹⁴

The passage of the referendum was a great boost to Dr. Verwoerd's standing and a vote of confidence in his policies;⁴¹⁵ it was seen in some quarters as a long-overdue happy ending to the humiliating Boer War.⁴¹⁶ As soon as the results were in, he wrote to the Broederbond, thanking them for the role that they had played in achieving the result that he wanted;⁴¹⁷ it had been considerable.⁴¹⁸ He also said that he saw the hand of God in the referendum results.⁴¹⁹ Addressing the South African Society in London shortly afterwards, Dr. Verwoerd painted a picture of a valiant Afrikaner nation fighting for survival amid hordes of Blacks who wanted the good life that "civilisation" offered while being unable to provide it for themselves.⁴²⁰

Although Dr. Verwoerd had initially applied for South Africa to remain a member of the Commonwealth despite having become a republic, when the Prime Ministers of other Commonwealth countries raised their many objections to apartheid South Africa withdrew its

⁴⁰⁷ Burger, 1961: 11.

⁴⁰⁸ Davenport, 1991: 355; De Villiers, 1971: 383; Guelke, 2005: 102; Lodge, 2011: 175; *TIME*, 17 October 1960: 36, 'South Africa. *Ja* for Verwoerd.'; Welsh, 2000: 456.

⁴⁰⁹ Botha, 1967: 72; Burger, 1961: 11.

⁴¹⁰ Hanf et al, 1981: 99.

⁴¹¹ Stults and Butler, 1963: 87.

⁴¹² *TIME*, 17 October 1960: 36, 'South Africa. *Ja* for Verwoerd.'

⁴¹³ Moodie, 1975: 285-286.

⁴¹⁴ Lodge, 2011: 174.

⁴¹⁵ Giliomee, 2011: 525.

⁴¹⁶ De Klerk, 1999: 35; Landis, 1961a: 4.

⁴¹⁷ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 133.

⁴¹⁸ Harrison, 1981: 161.

⁴¹⁹ Allighan, 1961: x.

⁴²⁰ Redeskie, 2009: 1-15.

application for ongoing membership.⁴²¹ Patronisingly, Dr. Verwoerd declared that these countries' attacks on apartheid and their calls for a boycott of South African goods were the result of their "immaturity."⁴²² He also cited as one reason why this was necessary the spectre of African and Asian countries that were also Commonwealth members trying to interfere in South Africa's private affairs.⁴²³

On his return to South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd was met by a mass of Black protestors, angry because the race issue had precipitated South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth.⁴²⁴ Explaining his position to the parliament of South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd said: "What they sought was not equality through coexistence and non-subordination in countries like South Africa, but domination of superior numbers in the name of full equality and, therefore, eventual victory over the whites by forcing out and swallowing up the whites. It was here we had to draw the line."⁴²⁵

Shortly after the referendum, Nelson Mandela sent Dr. Verwoerd a letter asking him to call a national constitutional convention, and warning that if he did not there would be a massive three-day strike. Mandela described South Africa as a "grim dictatorship" and said that activists were aware of the strict measures Dr. Verwoerd's government was likely to take.⁴²⁶ Dr. Verwoerd responded with a warning to anyone who was advocating a multiracial convention that doing so would be "playing with fire."⁴²⁷ Yusuf Dadoo of the South African Communist Party stated that the new events indicated that the world was "solidly against Dr. Verwoerd's racial policies."⁴²⁸

English-speaking South Africans were torn; some were upset about being separated from a country they still felt very connected to, while others found themselves drawn to the nationalist movement because of their horror at the decolonisation process that Britain was involved in,⁴²⁹ and growing acceptance in Britain that Blacks were no less able to rule

⁴²¹ Jeeves, 1971: 418.

⁴²² Verwoerd, 1961a: 5.

⁴²³ Jaster, 1985: 42; *The Economist*, 27 May 1961: 905, 'The one sane country.'

⁴²⁴ *The New York Times*, 21 March 1961: 3, 'Fight rages on streets.'

⁴²⁵ Devenish, 2012: 4.

⁴²⁶ Mandela, 2013: 305-306.

⁴²⁷ Sisulu, 2003: 182.

⁴²⁸ Bunting, 1981: 267.

⁴²⁹ Davenport, 1991: 362.

themselves than anyone else.⁴³⁰ Dr. Verwoerd hailed a new era and called for a new election.⁴³¹

Initially, after departure from the Commonwealth, the economy of South Africa deteriorated, largely because of uncertainty over the future. Foreign exchange reserves dropped from £96,000,000 to £91,000,000, while the value of shares in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was slashed by £200 million.⁴³² However, the slump turned out to be temporary and soon the economy began to expand again, reaching excessive highs in 1964.⁴³³

DR. VERWOERD WORKS TO ESTABLISH HIS VISION

While Dr. Verwoerd had had much to do with the South African Bureau of Native Affairs (SABRA) he was much more pragmatic than its “visionaries.” He knew that it never be possible to completely eliminate the need for black labour, and that some ingress of Black workers into white areas would always be necessary. Dr. Verwoerd steadily removed members of SABRA from positions of influence,⁴³⁴ after having put them under pressure to remove their progressive members.⁴³⁵

Escalating protest and even an assassination attempt in April 1960 did not deter Dr. Verwoerd from strengthening apartheid in every single aspect of South African life. He believed that protest and radicalism were nothing to do with government policy but resulted from “the subversive doctrines of liberalism,” misinterpretations and misunderstandings.⁴³⁶ Dr. Verwoerd departed somewhat from his nationalist stance to urge Afrikaans and English speakers to unite, saying: “we grant all the nations of the world national pride, and the past from which they have sprung. But besides history there is the present, a present which passes quickly away, and then there is the future. In that future we see the revolution of Africa and the growing problems of South Africa. For the sake of the future we must stand together as whites.”⁴³⁷

⁴³⁰ MacMillan, 1950: 320.

⁴³¹ Barber, 1999: 173.

⁴³² *The Economist*, 22 April 1961: 361, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s hour.’

⁴³³ *The Economist*, 7 March 1964: 905, ‘Boom time in South Africa.’

⁴³⁴ Lazer, 1993: 364-365, 386.

⁴³⁵ Adam, 1971: 176.

⁴³⁶ Barber, 1999: 171.

⁴³⁷ Moodie, 1975: 278.

The economy grew and increasingly Afrikaners had an important part to play in it while their numbers continued to rise in the public sector.⁴³⁸ As South Africa became a more powerful international trading partner, international opposition to apartheid, at state level, tended to become more muted, and the relationship between Afrikaner and English South Africans improved. South Africa participated in the general trend towards the globalisation of multi-national investment, and there was a great expansion in the areas of heavy industry, while traditional sectors, including food and clothing, became less important. Britain was South Africa's most important trading partner, followed by Germany.⁴³⁹

Although apartheid was not a new phenomenon but a continuation and formalisation of age-old policy, it represented a dramatic departure by focusing on what Pierre L. van den Berghe refers to as "Macro-Segregation" or "the segregation of racial groups in discrete territorial units" – the so-called "homelands," discussed below.⁴⁴⁰ This occurred when the non-white elements were continuing to increase while, from 1948, the number of White immigrants into South Africa had dropped off sharply.⁴⁴¹ The Department of Native Affairs, which Dr. Verwoerd had caused to occupy such an important role, became ever more important under his Prime Ministership. It had its own sub-departments of Labour and Housing, and the Department of Economic Affairs became more marginalised in terms of dealing with the "homelands";⁴⁴² the Minister of Economic Affairs now occupied no more than an advisory role in this area.⁴⁴³

On September 18, 1958, just two weeks after he had become Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd set out his plans regarding the *Native Question* and the issue of the Republic:

"Once we can get away from the present struggle over the colour problem and the issue of freedom, by securing the safety of the White man and assuring South Africa's status as a republic, new party orientations will arise of their own accord. Indeed, in such a Republic where our colour policy will be generally accepted there will be no place for a liberal party which strives to establish joint rule by white and non-white."⁴⁴⁴

⁴³⁸ Meredith, 1988: 109.

⁴³⁹ Beinart, 2001: 172-175.

⁴⁴⁰ van den Berghe, 1966: 5.

⁴⁴¹ Fair and Schaffer, 1964: 266.

⁴⁴² Posel, 1997: 7.

⁴⁴³ Posel, 1997: 64.

⁴⁴⁴ Pelzer, 1966: 168.

After South Africa became a republic, Dr. Verwoerd used his growing confidence to press ahead with his vision. Ronald M. Segal, a prominent anti-apartheid activist, writer and editor who founded the Penguin African Library,⁴⁴⁵ wrote about Dr. Verwoerd in 1961:

“Above all, both as Minister and as Prime Minister, he has shown himself utterly ruthless in suppressing all forms of resistance. As Prime Minister he has ruled his party and the country with an undeviating intransigence. He is far from generally popular with the party; but he unquestionably commands the fear of those whose regard he does not enjoy. Those who believe that he is vulnerable to reason are ignorant both of his record and of his character. Like the Hitler he so admired during the last war, his policy is a manifestation of his character. Like Hitler he will not concede; he can only be defeated.”⁴⁴⁶

As apartheid become progressively more entrenched, Dr. Verwoerd continued to insist that separate development offered both Blacks and Whites the fairest way to get ahead and to find fulfilment as part of a nation.⁴⁴⁷ After 1961, his government was primarily concerned with legislation, and laws that either “filled in gaps” that allowed previously passed laws to be evaded, or passed new laws to give the government ever-greater powers, while chipping away at the already meagre rights afforded to non-White South Africans.⁴⁴⁸ All major elements of legislation are discussed in detail below.

In 1962, a propagandist “socio-economic survey” described Africans as “primitive races” and outlined why Dr. Verwoerd’s government believed strongly in separate development. The basis of all policy was the belief in European culture as “superior” and that African nationalism could threaten it. Dr. Verwoerd claimed that he planned to elevate the standards of living of all South Africans,⁴⁴⁹ and in 1963 he criticised other African nations that spoke badly of the apartheid system and referred to them as “bum and beggar” nations unworthy of respect. The same year, he indicated that he was quite prepared to abandon the rule of law to combat communism, if necessary.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁵ Herbstein (The Guardian), 26 February 2008, ‘Ronald Segal.’

⁴⁴⁶ Segal (*The Spectator*), 3 March 1961: 287, ‘Dr. Verwoerd.’

⁴⁴⁷ Verwoerd, 1963: 3.

⁴⁴⁸ Marquard, 1968: 261.

⁴⁴⁹ Andrews et al, 1962: 188-189, 210-211.

⁴⁵⁰ Bunting, 1986: 425, 529.

DR. VERWOERD'S "ACHIEVEMENTS"

LEGISLATION

Apartheid systematically stripped Blacks and, to a lesser extent, Coloureds and Indians of basic civil and human rights. Legislation extended deep into everyday life. In every aspect, Whites had superior facilities and opportunities, and Blacks inferior, when they had any at all.⁴⁵¹ The apartheid regime modelled many of its early laws, including how to define race groups and implement their separation, on legislation in use in the southern American states of Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi, even on occasion lifting the exact words.⁴⁵²

Dr. Verwoerd used this imported legislation as a starting point for a much wider approach to the race question, culminating in total racial segregation. His period as Prime Minister gave him the opportunity to expand and add to legislation with which he had been involved as Minister for Native Affairs, and we will look at the relevant major legislation in both periods below. Between 1948 and 1965, the National Party passed a total of fifty-five major laws that restricted Africans in every single aspect of their everyday lives.⁴⁵³

VOTING RIGHTS

Non-Whites were prevented from parliamentary representation. The Separate Registration of Voters Acts of 1951 and 1956, under Malan and Strijdom, had meant that Coloured voters were removed from the common roll and put on a special roll to elect their four White representatives in Parliament.⁴⁵⁴ The abolishment of the Native Representatives Council, one of Dr. Verwoerd's first acts as Prime Minister, severed ties of communication between African representatives and the parliament of South Africa although Africans would continue to be the parliament's subjects until or unless they reached a position whereby the authorities decided that they were "ready" to self-govern within their territories,⁴⁵⁵ a position that Dr. Verwoerd represented as highly ethical.⁴⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Blacks had no say on matters that did not apply exclusively to "native affairs." Dr. Verwoerd said, "It is not [the African's] task to consult with the white man on

⁴⁵¹ Hopkins, 2015: 242.

⁴⁵² Moodie, 2017: 153.

⁴⁵³ *TIME*, 5 November 1965: 42, 'South Africa: Champagne for whites.'

⁴⁵⁴ Conference Steering Committee, 1964: 97.

⁴⁵⁵ Ballinger, 1969: 358-364.

⁴⁵⁶ Posel, 1987: 433.

matters which also affect the white man." On the matter of what Africans themselves felt about having no representation in parliament, he said, "... we know that the great mass of the Bantu are not able to decide on a matter of this nature... It is... white policy coupled with fairness and justice because basically this point of view is essential for the survival of the whites..."⁴⁵⁷

RACE CLASSIFICATION

The Population Registration Act of 1950 divided South Africans into a range of racial classifications⁴⁵⁸ in a system comparable to the infamous Nazis' Nuremburg laws. This was complex as, after centuries of living side by side, most South African populations were much more genetically diverse than Dr. Verwoerd would have liked to think, and there were no reliable means to make a categorical assessment. In many families, children could look quite different to each other.⁴⁵⁹ Every single resident had to be registered with full details of their racial composition. A Board was created to make determinations in the case of people considered "borderline." It delved into their ancestry and inspected their physical characteristics with criteria including "appearance," "descent" and "social acceptance."⁴⁶⁰ It combed curly hair to see how tough it was to pull a comb through.⁴⁶¹

A designation as "Coloured" rather than "White" or "Native" could have devastating repercussions,⁴⁶² and often siblings from the same family were given different classifications.⁴⁶³ The Act also effectively tried to present "Coloureds" as a distinct ethnic group, a "nation" with a common past, which was not the case.⁴⁶⁴ White and Coloured children could not be educated together, and inspectors decided which children were White and which Coloured in a rather arbitrary way; in one case, twins were separated, with one being sent to a "white" and one a "coloured" school.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁵⁷ Ballinger, 1969: 378-381.

⁴⁵⁸ Beinart, 2001: 148; Brookes, 1968: 19ff; Conference Steering Committee, 1964: 97; International Defence Fund for South Africa, 1983: 15; Hepple, 1966: 153; Marquard, 1969: 71; Neame, 1962: 89; Welsh, 2000: 430.

⁴⁵⁹ Dugard, 1978: 60-63; Landis, 1961b: 6.

⁴⁶⁰ Dubow, 2014: 38.

⁴⁶¹ Giliomee, 2011: 504.

⁴⁶² Tambo, 1964: 27-29.

⁴⁶³ Muller, 1981: 482.

⁴⁶⁴ du Pre, 1994: 3-4.

⁴⁶⁵ St. John, 1954: 38.

Six years after the passage of the Act, 90,000 South Africans still had not been classified. Things were made even more complex by the fact that government had issued differing and even contradictory racial classifications.⁴⁶⁶ To deal with the reality that many Whites also had Black or Coloured ancestors, there were legal loopholes such as, for instance, a law about which children were eligible to attend white schools. Children were to be accepted as European if they “looked” White, but if another family complained that they were actually Coloured they were obliged to provide proof. In one famous case a girl, Sandra Laing, was designated as Coloured although both of her parents had been categorised as White.⁴⁶⁷

Some schools were rigorous in seeking out and expelling students whom they suspected of having “coloured blood.” The case is cited of an adolescent who was called out of class to the principal’s office where his eyes, skin, and hair were examined, after which his parents were informed that he had signs of coloured blood and would therefore have to leave the school. One principal boasted that he had turned away more than twenty “suspects” already this year.⁴⁶⁸

The apartheid government did not know what to do about people such as Chinese, Japanese and Malays, and tended to lump them in with the Coloureds, but Japanese could apply to live as Whites and visiting Japanese tourists could get a visa to be treated as Whites for a period of ninety days, while Chinese patients in hospital were bleached whiter for the purpose of “rehabilitation” and to house them in the same ward as Whites.⁴⁶⁹ Amendments to the original act placed more emphasis on “appearance”; because there were so many mixed-race people in South Africa, there were pale-skinned people who could “pass” as White, despite having some Black or Indian heritage.⁴⁷⁰ The absurdities of the Citizens’ Classification system continued apace under Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister.

It goes without saying that citizen classification impacted seriously on relations between people of different races. Two initiatives by Dr. Verwoerd, the Immorality Acts of 1950 and 1957, were aimed at keeping the European race “pure,” by widening the prohibitions on marriage and sexual relations. They were similar to the Nazis’ Nuremberg

⁴⁶⁶ Landis, 1961b: 6-15.

⁴⁶⁷ Attwell, 1986: 80.

⁴⁶⁸ Dugard, 1978: 60-63; Landis, 1961b: 11.

⁴⁶⁹ du Pre, 1994: 72-73.

⁴⁷⁰ Clark and Worger, 2011: 49.

Laws aimed at keeping the German nation "pure." "I will not be responsible for the bastardization of the Afrikaner people," he told his wife.⁴⁷¹

The first Immorality Act, passed in 1927, prohibited sex between Whites and Blacks. This prohibition was extended to "Europeans" and "non-Europeans" by the Immorality Amendment Act, 1950 (Act No. 21 of 1950), thus banning sexual relations between Whites and Coloureds and Whites and Asians.⁴⁷² Marriages between the races had been outlawed the year before, by the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act.⁴⁷³

Legislation widening the prohibition on sexual acts and increasing the penalties came with the Immorality Act, 1957 (Act No. 23 of 1957; subsequently renamed the Sexual Offences Act, 1957), which repealed the 1927 and 1950 Acts. This Act prohibited not only sexual intercourse but any "immoral or indecent acts" between Whites and non-Whites. Partners in any such act faced an increased maximum penalty of seven years' imprisonment. Also banned under the 1957 Act were the keeping of brothels, procuring, and living off prostitution. Sexual intercourse with anyone under sixteen was also declared against the law.⁴⁷⁴

HOMELAND SYSTEM

When the National Party came to power in 1948 they had applied themselves to what van den Berghe has referred to as "meso-segregation" with their policy of "group areas," reducing contact between Whites and non-Whites in their largely rural society.⁴⁷⁵ Tens of thousands were expelled from their homes and "relocated" according to their pigmentation. The result was economically devastating for many non-Whites, including middle class Indian and Coloureds, but profitable for many Whites. Africans who were judged "redundant" and living in or near white areas were forcibly repatriated to the so-called "homelands,"⁴⁷⁶ where it was

⁴⁷¹ Scholtz, 1974: 171.

⁴⁷² Dugard, 1978: 68-71.

⁴⁷³ The 1949 Act was promulgated by the National Party soon after its ascent to power in 1948, becoming one of the first legislative initiatives of its apartheid policy. Making its implementation easier was the Population Registration Act of 1950, which directed that all South Africans must register as members of one of four race groups (Furlong, 1983; Hyslop, 1995: 57-81). For more about the Act see Furlong, P. J. (1983) *The Mixed Marriages Act: An Historical and Theological Study* and Hyslop, J. (1995) *White Working-class Women and the Invention of Apartheid: 'Purified' Afrikaner Nationalist Agitation for Legislation Against 'Mixed' Marriages, 1934-9*.

⁴⁷⁴ Dugard, 1978: 68-71.

⁴⁷⁵ Beinart, 2001: 201.

⁴⁷⁶ van den Berghe, 1966: 410-411.

harder to form unions and otherwise engage in behaviours that were considered disruptive to Afrikaners.⁴⁷⁷

Redundant Africans often included women and children of men working in the cities, also known as “superfluous appendages.”⁴⁷⁸ Any non-Europeans were to be segregated from the urban areas in which 90% of South Africa’s wealth was concentrated. Dr. Verwoerd was clear in stating that urban Africans could enjoy rights “only in the Bantustans from which they spring,”⁴⁷⁹ while Indians who did not wish to move to “their” new areas had the option of “repatriation” to India.⁴⁸⁰ In fact, Dr. Verwoerd encouraged South African Indians to “return” to India. More than 90% of the Indians in South Africa were born there⁴⁸¹ and were largely descended from people who had been in South Africa since the 1860s.⁴⁸² However, it was only under Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister that special provisions were made for the Indians, who until 1961 were officially seen as “foreigners.”⁴⁸³

In 1950, the government edged closer towards residential segregation when it passed the Group Areas Act,⁴⁸⁴ described by Malan as “the kernel of the apartheid policy,”⁴⁸⁵ based on a series of legislations in the early twentieth century that reserved certain areas for non-Europeans,⁴⁸⁶ which would result (for example) in the displacement of around 100,000 non-European people in the western suburbs of Johannesburg; one of the primary targets of the Act was the Indian community, thought by the National Party to have a “stranglehold” on some areas.⁴⁸⁷ Dr. Verwoerd had stated that the government believed in the principle of “rule or mastery of the European in his area and the rule or mastery of the Bantu in his area.”⁴⁸⁸ He said that the government would withdraw from the Native area “when the Bantu has no further need of him”⁴⁸⁹ and that the new plans would lead “the Natives on the road to self-government in their own areas.”⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁷⁷ Posel, 1997: 203.

⁴⁷⁸ Farah, 1974: 74.

⁴⁷⁹ Okoth, 2006: 168.

⁴⁸⁰ Sachs, 1952: 67.

⁴⁸¹ Huntington, 1958: 43.

⁴⁸² Alden, 1996: 17.

⁴⁸³ Legum and Legum, 1964b: 200.

⁴⁸⁴ Dugard, 1978: 80; International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975b: 10; Marquard, 1969: 162-163; Neame, 1962: 93.

⁴⁸⁵ Harsch, 1980: 59.

⁴⁸⁶ Brookes, 1968: 131, 137.

⁴⁸⁷ Vigne, 1997: 100.

⁴⁸⁸ Benson, 1966: 136; Thompson, 2001: 222.

⁴⁸⁹ Walsh, 1970: 288.

⁴⁹⁰ Davis, 1987: 8.

In 1951, Dr. Verwoerd assured an anxious government minister that although the plan was to give parts of South Africa to Bantus as "homelands," these would remain under state control and would never be granted independence.⁴⁹¹ It was Cecil Rhodes who had pioneered the idea of creating reserves as a method to exploit the labour of Africans. In drawing up the principles of apartheid, Dr. Verwoerd was merely following his example.⁴⁹² To criticism that his plans for the native reserves resembled slavery, Dr. Verwoerd countered that he hoped "those natives who become able to serve their own people actually will migrate to the reserves."⁴⁹³

As well as separating Blacks from Whites in residential areas, the Group Areas Act, more importantly, took away their freehold rights. Dr. Verwoerd said that Blacks would only be entitled to thirty years' leasehold in the urban areas without the option of automatic extension.⁴⁹⁴ In the urban areas, Blacks would live in "locations." Dr. Verwoerd assured Parliament that Blacks would never own the locations, which belonged to Whites. "The natives who reside there reside there just as native farm labourers live on a farm of a European owner."⁴⁹⁵

Also in 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act replaced an earlier system, the Natives Representation Council, with government-approved authorities in the reserves which made no provision for the representation of Blacks living in urban or other non-designated areas.⁴⁹⁶ Dr. Verwoerd himself had demanded the abolition of representation for "natives."⁴⁹⁷ The Act's supposed aim was to "give the Bantu people the opportunity for enlightened administration of their own affairs in accordance with their own heritage and own institutions, adapted to modern conditions."⁴⁹⁸ Dr. Verwoerd announced that the "black spots" (by which he meant areas inhabited by Blacks) in and around Johannesburg had to be moved,⁴⁹⁹ and stated of Blacks that, "It stands to reason that White South Africa must remain their guardian... We cannot mean that we intend to cut large slices out of South Africa and turn them into independent States."⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹¹ van den Berghe, 1967: 118.

⁴⁹² Magubane, 2000: 54.

⁴⁹³ Brookes, 1968: 15.

⁴⁹⁴ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 1952, Vol. 10, Cols. 3449, 3522, 3524; Mzimela, 1980: 193.

⁴⁹⁵ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 1954, Vol. 9, Col. 3204; Mzimela, 1980: 193.

⁴⁹⁶ Sachs, 1965: 91; Worden, 2000: 109.

⁴⁹⁷ Brotz, 1977: 35.

⁴⁹⁸ Tafira, 2017: 57.

⁴⁹⁹ Lapping, 1986: 118.

⁵⁰⁰ van den Berghe, 1962: 605; van den Berghe, 1966: 413.

There was considerable black opposition, and the decision was denounced in the *Bantu World* newspaper, while Black leader Dr. Alfred Bitini Xuma⁵⁰¹ formed a protest movement in response. However, Afrikaans newspapers *Die Transvaler* and *Die Vaderland* welcomed the decision, claimed it as a government victory, and hoped that the people would be moved quickly. Dr. Verwoerd presented the Bantu Authorities Act as a way in which Blacks could obtain more autonomy, by opting for self-government within the reserves.⁵⁰² He stated that, "The fundamental idea throughout is Bantu control over Bantu areas as and when it becomes possible for them to exercise that control efficiently and properly for the benefit of their own people."⁵⁰³ He made it clear that he was speaking of local self-government only.⁵⁰⁴ In the process, he drew on the historical experience of African women, many of whom had remained effectively trapped in rural areas while their husbands migrated to cities to work.⁵⁰⁵

In a move that established a system of "introverted colonialism,"⁵⁰⁶ Dr. Verwoerd's new Bantu Authorities System gave compliant local leaders more power, making them responsible for the forced removals and relocations of families from arable land as well as the continued culling of stock.⁵⁰⁷ This was a period of great uncertainty for South Africans, particularly those who expected to be relocated, and one memoirist recalls the many anxious conversations among people who felt that they could make no plans until a final decision had been made.⁵⁰⁸

In 1953, Dr. Verwoerd told Blacks that they would have more land and better facilities in the "homelands," and the opportunity to buy homes at cost price, rent them, or build their own. However, he had designed the homeland system to maintain white privilege,⁵⁰⁹ and "as a basic principle" no African would be allowed to have "ownership of ground." By the mid-1950s the repercussions were clear, and the proposals were strongly

⁵⁰¹ (1893-1962) The first Black South African to become a doctor, leader and president-general of the ANC from 1940 to 1949 (Gish: 2000). For his biography see: Gish, S.D. (2000) *Alfred B. Xuma: African, American, South African*.

⁵⁰² Davis, 1991: 216.

⁵⁰³ Carter, 1958: 90-92.

⁵⁰⁴ Ballinger, 1969: 321.

⁵⁰⁵ Marks and Trapido, 1987: 53.

⁵⁰⁶ Mbeki, 1991: 167.

⁵⁰⁷ Gevisser, 2007: 112.

⁵⁰⁸ Jabavu, 1982: 29-30.

⁵⁰⁹ Mandela, 2013: 223, 270.

objected to by activists, even while Dr. Verwoerd travelled the country meeting Africans and trying to explain how his approach to racial segregation would be for their own good.⁵¹⁰

In October 1955 and prior to implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act, Dr. Verwoerd set up a series of conferences for tribal chiefs and African leaders from all over South Africa to present them with the Bantu Authorities Act. Hypocritically, he claimed that the purpose of the conferences was to appraise the Act's supposed benefits and seek the chiefs' agreement. They were going to be first Africans to hear of the plans, which were going to happen whether or not they agreed with them. Dr. Verwoerd's hope was that they would endorse the new laws, permitting him to proclaim that the Blacks had accepted the legislation that would rule their lives. The day before the meeting in Zebediela, Transvaal, the ANC distributed leaflets explaining Dr. Verwoerd's plans to the people. At the meeting the following day, the chiefs roundly rejected his plans.⁵¹¹

At the conference with the chiefs of Natal and Nongoma, the Zulu chiefs, led at the time by Chief Buthelezi, requested time for consideration and to see the Act in place elsewhere before deciding whether or not to accept it, before eventually rejecting it.⁵¹² Abram Moilola, the Bafurutse chief, also rejected it and later said, "They just want us chiefs to sign a document which says 'destroy me, baas!' Let them destroy us without our signatures!"⁵¹³

Large numbers of Whites were against granting Africans any independence within their "homelands" while also feeling that the government was spending way too much money on the programme. The Tomlinson Commission, which incorporated several members of SABRA, had been put together in the 1950s⁵¹⁴ to draw up a plan for the homeland system. The Commission could see that homelands could only exist if the white minority injected a lot of cash into the system.⁵¹⁵ The "homelands" were characterised by the government as being where Black Africans had initially settled "after they had moved southwards" (depicting South Africa as a land that had been empty before the Europeans arrived), and described them as "clearly distinguishable from the land settled and converted into permanent white occupation by farmers and pioneers migrating from the South."⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁰ *The Economist*, 29 October 1955: 378, 'Apartheid à la mode.'

⁵¹¹ Sisulu et al, 2001: 120.

⁵¹² Smith, 1982: 48-49; Temkin, 2003: 48-49.

⁵¹³ Desmond, 1971: 160.

⁵¹⁴ Lazar, 1993: 373.

⁵¹⁵ Rogers, 1972: 8.

⁵¹⁶ Rogers, 1972: 2.

Dr. Verwoerd did not agree with the Commission's recommendations⁵¹⁷ and insisted that Blacks had no greater claim to the land than Whites and that the Afrikaners had "settled in a country that was bare."⁵¹⁸ In the mid-1950s, they were nothing more than rural slums,⁵¹⁹ but Dr. Verwoerd objected strongly to the idea that he might deviate from the plan of total segregation.⁵²⁰ "We should live apart, as the lion and the elephant live apart," he said.⁵²¹ By this time, he had pushed through legislation that enabled him to remove Black workers from White-owned land at his discretion⁵²² (although there were times when the law had to be "bent" by the authorities such as, for example, when Whites became irate because the lack of Black milkmen in white areas was driving up the price of milk).⁵²³

In 1958, Dr. Verwoerd introduced the new Bantu Self-Government Bill, marking "the beginning of the demented social engineering of Grand Apartheid."⁵²⁴ He suggested that the British Commonwealth could be a model for how the black homelands and South Africa might one day cooperate,⁵²⁵ and he addressed Africans about his plans, presenting them as a wonderful opportunity and stating: "Separate development is a tree, a fruit tree which this government gave the Bantu of South Africa... Let it grow slowly... do not look at the more developed tree of the white man with jealous eyes because then you will neglect your own small tree which will one day also be big."⁵²⁶

Critics pointed out that this benign representation of apartheid overlooked the despotic ways in which it was enforced.⁵²⁷ The homelands marked an important departure from the "horizontal apartheid" that had prevailed before, to "vertical apartheid" which had as its stated goal the end result of native self-government.⁵²⁸ Dr. Verwoerd said that he had a "new vision," although critics saw a retrograde and "outworn tribalism" with no real democracy.⁵²⁹

⁵¹⁷ Kenney, 1980: 86-87.

⁵¹⁸ Khopung, 1972: 1; Welsh, 2000: 455.

⁵¹⁹ *The Economist*, 21 April 1956: 274, 'Blueprint for apartheid.'

⁵²⁰ Thompson, 1957: 132.

⁵²¹ *TIME*, 15 September 1958: 26, 'South Africa: God's man.'

⁵²² *The New York Times*, 23 February 1954: 3, 'Malan law makes negro homeless.'

⁵²³ *The New York Times*, 19 July 1957: 12, 'African law modified.'

⁵²⁴ Breckenridge, 2014: 159.

⁵²⁵ Brookes, 1968: xxxi; Lapping, 1986: 133; Legum and Legum, 1964b: 67; Moodie, 1975: 264; Neame, 1962: 160; Troup, 1975: 305.

⁵²⁶ Clark and Worger, 2011: 65.

⁵²⁷ van den Berghe, 1962: 599.

⁵²⁸ Bloomberg, 1990: 131.

⁵²⁹ Marquard, 1969: 115.

The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959 (Dr. Verwoerd's first act as Prime Minister)⁵³⁰ promised the "Bantu peoples" that they were "on a road that would lead the homelands to meaningful self-government,"⁵³¹ and was presented in the context of the decolonialization that was occurring throughout Africa.⁵³² Each of the various African communities was to be identified within its own land in the reserves and each area would be allowed to eventually develop self-government. The Act went further than the earlier Bantu Authorities Act, which had had an interest in developing government at local level only.⁵³³ In a speech to the government, MDC de Wet Nel, a former Bantu Commissioner General, posited the homelands as a humane answer to Black Nationalism.⁵³⁴ However, earlier that year the Secretary of Bantu Administration, Dr. Werner Willi Max Eiselen, stated that Blacks would remain "subordinate within their communities,"⁵³⁵ while Dr. Verwoerd clarified that an important function of the homelands was to allow white areas to remove "transient" Blacks.⁵³⁶

The Act abolished any African representation in government, recognising eight "national" units (North Sotho, South Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Swazi, Xhosa, Tonga and Venda) and appointing five commissioners general to oversee and administer them. These units were not discrete blocks of land, but were often composed of scattered tracts, separated by white areas.⁵³⁷ In this way, the ownership of just 13% of the land by the vast majority of the population was formalised: "Dr. Verwoerd was offering 11.000.000 Africans ultimate autonomy in 13% of the country as the price for continued white supremacy for 3.000.000 Whites in the remaining 87%."⁵³⁸ These areas were to be known as Bantustans, and they formed the backbone of Dr. Verwoerd's grand apartheid plans, the idea being that Blacks would be removed as far as possible from white areas (solving the problem of Whites' numerical inferiority), and separated into diverse tribal units so that it would be harder for them to operate, and protest, as a group.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁰ Butler 1998: 22; Lapping, 1986: 132.

⁵³¹ Rogers, 1976: 21.

⁵³² *The Economist*, 13 June 1959: 1026, 'Apartheid in action - and reaction.'

⁵³³ Temkin, 2003: 66-67.

⁵³⁴ Collins, 1990: 218-219.

⁵³⁵ Barber, 1999: 175.

⁵³⁶ van den Berghe: 1967: 145.

⁵³⁷ Hepple, 1966: 115, 255.

⁵³⁸ Hughes, 1961: 198.

⁵³⁹ du Preez Bezdrob, 2003: 81; Pelzer, 1966.

By stressing linguistic and cultural differences, and using them to segregate people, Dr. Verwoerd encouraged intra-black conflict and distracted people from the real enemy of white supremacy.⁵⁴⁰ The promise of eventual independence was presented as a motivator.⁵⁴¹ Essentially, Dr. Verwoerd believed that by dividing Africans into groups and institutions defined by tribal ethnicity, they would cease to threaten the status quo: a case of “conserving the status quo by making it look different.”⁵⁴² Dr. Verwoerd hoped that the various black groups would develop a strong sense of tribal identity, inhibiting the development of a black political consciousness, and maintaining them in their position of servitude to the Whites. The Urban Bantu Councils Act of 1961 set up councils for urban Blacks that were supposed to maintain links between them and their notional homelands.⁵⁴³

The Bantu Investment Corporation Act of 1959 and the Bantu Homelands Development Corporations Act of 1965 enabled the National Party Government to establish Development Corporations in the Bantu homelands, as well as to capitalize individual entrepreneurs. However, because White-owned risk capital was prohibited, in opposition to the Tomlinson Commission recommendation, diversification of the homelands' economies was seriously constrained, as was their capacity to absorb more people.⁵⁴⁴

Africans generally hated the words “Bantu” and “Bantustan” because they were seen as pejorative terms, intimately linked with apartheid.⁵⁴⁵ Africans could easily see what a bad deal the Bantustans were and it became ever harder for them to seriously entertain any “concessions” Dr. Verwoerd seemed to be prepared to make.⁵⁴⁶ Dr. Verwoerd had admitted that “demands will certainly be made [by the people in the Homelands] that will be rejected by us.”⁵⁴⁷

The Bantustans program attracted much criticism from activists. In 1959, Nelson Mandela said, “Behind the self-government talk lies a grim program of mass evictions, political prosecution and police terror. It is the last desperate gamble of a hated and doomed fascist autocracy” and described the Bantustan system as a “sinister design” and a “big swindle both

⁵⁴⁰ Harsch, 1980: 67.

⁵⁴¹ Booth, 1998: 62.

⁵⁴² Booth, 1998: 62; Denoon et al, 1989: 200.

⁵⁴³ Hepple, 1966: 116.

⁵⁴⁴ Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: 426.

⁵⁴⁵ Hain, 1996: 85.

⁵⁴⁶ Lipton, 1987: 37.

⁵⁴⁷ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1966: 2.

politically and economically.”⁵⁴⁸ It was observed that the Bantustans and the Urban Bantu Councils closely resembled the model for Jewish ghettos under Nazi Germany.⁵⁴⁹ As a result of UN policy, none of the homelands were formally recognised by other states.⁵⁵⁰

Dr. Verwoerd referred to his policies as consisting of “good neighbourliness” and a “positive step” that would bring the Bantustans closer to independence. However, he also said, in a speech that he gave to parliament in 1959 that, “I choose an assured white state in South Africa whatever happens to the other areas rather than have my people absorbed in one integrated state in which the Bantu must eventually dominate.”⁵⁵¹ It was clear that the homelands were really a way of excluding Blacks from the political life of South Africa, and preventing them from ever becoming citizens.

Dr. Verwoerd and his government were also deeply involved in a war against the “blackening” of the countryside. He was concerned about both the many Africans who lived on White-owned land in rural areas, and the many small African farming communities on parcels of black-owned land that lay outside the Bantustans, known to the apartheid authorities as “black spots.” Thus, he engaged in a campaign to eliminate black land ownership in white farming areas, and to put an end to African squatting and labour tenancies on white farms. He aimed to do this by converting all farm workers to wage labourers and revising the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936⁵⁵² to make its anti-squatting provisions enforceable.⁵⁵³

Approximately 340,000 farm labourers with tenancies on White owned land, and 656,000 “squatters” (many the family members of the former category) were expelled from White-owned lands.⁵⁵⁴ The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 allowed magistrates to evict squatters from urban areas and to destroy their dwellings.⁵⁵⁵ Black land owners in white areas, mainly descended from better-off Black farmers who had managed to purchase

⁵⁴⁸ Mandela, 1978: 4, 83-85.

⁵⁴⁹ Mbeki, 1991: 9.

⁵⁵⁰ Dugard, 1987: 96-97.

⁵⁵¹ Segal and Court, 2012: 31.

⁵⁵² The Act had expanded the reserves from the 1913 Black Land Act and authorised the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to eliminate what were known as “black spots”, that is, black-owned land surrounded by white-owned land. (Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: 308, 601; Horrell 1978: 203).

⁵⁵³ Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: 390; Harsch, 1986: 17.

⁵⁵⁴ Harsch, 1986: 17.

⁵⁵⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 13.

land before the 1913 Black Land Act,⁵⁵⁶ were forcibly removed and resettled in Bantustans, freeing the "black spots" for Whites.⁵⁵⁷

In the Bantustans it was immensely difficult for these experienced farmers to earn a living because of endemic overcrowding and the fragmented and impoverished quality of the soil. Homelands were often in the middle of nowhere, with no adequate means to earn a living, obtain nourishment, or care for families. Most African men became dependent on the paid work they could find in white areas as migrant workers⁵⁵⁸ and were forced to live under "chiefs" who had been selected by the government to ensure compliance. Chiefs who did not tow the party line, such as 1960 Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Luthuli,⁵⁵⁹ were swiftly removed.⁵⁶⁰

The result of Dr. Verwoerd's homelands policy was that no Black South African could be considered a citizen.⁵⁶¹ He had cleverly manipulated the rhetoric that was being used in the African independence movement at the time, making frequent reference to the "need" for Blacks not to become westernised but to take pride in their tribal origins. However, Dr. Verwoerd had not the slightest interest in seeing Blacks become educated and empowered, even within their own tribal setting; quite the reverse.⁵⁶² Moreover, despite talk about the eventual independence of the black homelands, even at the time statements from government made it clear that this was never really Dr. Verwoerd's intention. His Minister for Native

⁵⁵⁶ The Act prohibited Blacks from owning or renting land outside of designated reserves, representing some seven per cent of land in the country (Chronology of Apartheid Legislation, n.d. Nelson Mandela Foundation, retrieved from <https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/031v02167/041v02264/051v02335/061v02357/071v02359/081v02371.htm>).

⁵⁵⁷ Harsch, 1986: 19-21.

⁵⁵⁸ Harsch, 1986: 19-21.

⁵⁵⁹ Albert Luthuli (1989-1967), President of the ANC, was the first African and first non-European or American person to win the Nobel Peace Prize. He was awarded the Prize "for his efforts to seek equality by non-violent means" (Benson, 1963b: 51). Luthuli spent a year in custody on a treason charge, and was banned basically all the time from 1953 to 1961, for "crimes" such as burning his pass after the Sharpeville Massacre. This meant that he was forced to be confined in his home, banned from receiving visitors, forbidden from making statements and even from going to church (Luthuli, 1961). For his autobiography see (1963) *Let my People go: An Autobiography*. For biographies see: Benson, M. (1963) *Chief Albert Lutuli of South Africa*; Couper, S. (2010) *Albert Luthuli: Bound by Faith*; Pillay, G. (1993) *Albert Lutuli v. I.*

In 1962, South African artist Ronald Harrison presented a painting entitled Black Christ that showed Luthuli as Christ crucified, with two Roman centurions, depicted as Verwoerd and Vorster, on either side. Verwoerd was piercing the side of Christ and Vorster standing with a sponge of vinegar and a gall. The painting was banned and the artist was arrested and tortured by the police. Eventually the painting was smuggled to the United Kingdom and remained there until 1997 when it was brought back to South Africa. It is currently stored at the South African National Gallery (Harrison, 2006; xv; 26; 42). For more about the painting see: Harrison, R. (2006) *The Black Christ: A Journey to Freedom*.

⁵⁶⁰ Attwell, 1986: 81.

⁵⁶¹ Ngcokavane, 1989: 116; Mda, 2000: 158.

⁵⁶² Gevisser, 2007: 143.

Affairs, Michiel Christiaan De Wet Nel,⁵⁶³ stated in Parliament: "Total racial separation was never seriously considered. Apartheid would be implemented under the umbrella of a South African economy."⁵⁶⁴

Dr. Verwoerd made it clear that there would always be many terms and conditions to fulfil before independence would be granted. This would happen only when Africans had developed "sufficient maturity" to assume "the most responsible of functions"⁵⁶⁵ and even then only with the say-so of the white parliament, which of course had only the interests of the Whites in mind;⁵⁶⁶ a sort of "final solution" for the "problem" of Blacks in South Africa.⁵⁶⁷

Dr. Verwoerd hoped also to expand South Africa's territory by incorporating the former British protectorates, Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.⁵⁶⁸ The government seems to have felt that the homeland system would make them less vulnerable to criticism by foreign states, claiming that there could be no discrimination within the homelands.⁵⁶⁹ Dr. Verwoerd hoped that by saying "independence" over and over again, he would deflect criticism from abroad, and channel local nationalism into his project.⁵⁷⁰

In 1960, Dr. Verwoerd said that the government would never accept a policy of integration with Indians, Coloureds, Bantus and Whites and that while one group could not "forever be the servant" of another, policy was to ensure that each group could grow "in its sphere."⁵⁷¹ According to him, Indians had been brought to South Africa in error "for selfish economic reasons" and the only future they could have in the country was in the context of developing their own ethnic homelands.⁵⁷²

In 1962, Dr. Verwoerd stated that Blacks should be given their own states and that "with the exception of a small group of agitators," he believed that most of them would come on board with his plans, including the white administration keeping them safe, "by being

⁵⁶³ (1901-1984) An important member of the National Party who served as Minister of Health and Minister of Education, Arts and Science. In 1958, Dr. Verwoerd appointed him as his successor in the Ministry of Native Affairs (Fleisch, 2002: 41).

⁵⁶⁴ Wilson et al, 1969: 191.

⁵⁶⁵ Tatz, 1962: 179.

⁵⁶⁶ Rogers, 1976: 8; Mbeki, 2001: 144.

⁵⁶⁷ Morris, 2004: 165.

⁵⁶⁸ Hyam, 1972: 219.

⁵⁶⁹ d'Amato, 1966a: 177.

⁵⁷⁰ Harsh, 1980: 64-65.

⁵⁷¹ Edwards et al, 1962: 190; Moodie, 1975: 264.

⁵⁷² *The Canberra Times*, 26 August, 1961: 11, 'Dr. Verwoerd's new ban on Indians.'

prepared to render all kinds of services to them.”⁵⁷³ He also stated that the government’s “great task” was to grant independence to the Blacks “as soon as they can and will accept it,” in a way that would ensure “the retention of friendship and co-operation with the whites.”⁵⁷⁴ Speaking of independence for the Transkei area, he said: “It is... worth a great deal if we can create for ourselves peaceful neighbours... who will not look to us for assistance.”⁵⁷⁵ Transkei was an area with about 1.5 Blacks, mostly uneducated peasants.⁵⁷⁶

The Homelands gave rise to a lot of unhappiness and protest. In 1960, the biggest of the revolts in direct response to the new situation broke out in Pondoland (known as the Mpondo Revolts – see later in this chapter for a detailed account), which was part of the Transkei. The revolt was crushed with massive state repression including wholesale detentions, a state of emergency, and even massacres,⁵⁷⁷ such as the one in Ngquza Hill (discussed below).

By 1961, it was government policy that the Black South Africans were only resident in urban areas temporarily, and that as soon as they were surplus to requirements they would be expected to “return” to their “homeland” where they would “fit in ethnically” even if they had not been born and raised there. If they did not go, they could be forcefully removed.⁵⁷⁸ However, there were many problems in the homelands; the “chiefs” appointed by Dr. Verwoerd’s government were not always accepted by their supposed subjects; different ethnicities had different conventions about how chiefs should be appointed.⁵⁷⁹

Dr. Verwoerd described the homelands as “well-disposed little black neighbouring states”⁵⁸⁰ and brought in top-line public relations experts and expensive lobbyists to promote an “understanding” of the Bantustan scheme both in South Africa and abroad.⁵⁸¹ In 1962, Dr. Verwoerd announced that the Transkei homeland would be given “self-government.” This became law in 1963, and that year elections were held in Transkei; the members elected by a wide margin were opposed to the homeland legislation.⁵⁸² Dr. Verwoerd presented the Transkei elections as an important step towards a multinational South Africa and stated that

⁵⁷³ Rogers, 1972: 4.

⁵⁷⁴ Edwards et al, 1962: 201.

⁵⁷⁵ Rogers, 1972: 5.

⁵⁷⁶ Hepple, 1966: 116-118.

⁵⁷⁷ Harsch, 1986: 34.

⁵⁷⁸ Posel, 1997: 233-234.

⁵⁷⁹ Jabavu, 1982: 153.

⁵⁸⁰ Hain, 1996: 85.

⁵⁸¹ Frye, 1970: 31-32.

⁵⁸² Hepple, 1966: 116-118; Mandela, 2013: 401.

“all nations of the world which seek to protect human dignity and the right to self-determination should give South Africa a fair chance to establish and develop its own Commonwealth of Nations.” In reality, Africans were divided and their rights diminished while Dr. Verwoerd passed off the Transkei as genuine political reform.⁵⁸³

Cynically, “homelands” for Africans were positioned not only on the least productive soil, but in a very scattered pattern such that any notion of African community would be fragmented and easier for the white administration to manage.⁵⁸⁴ Dr. Verwoerd that this fragmentation was necessary for Whites to maintain the “right to maintain domination.”⁵⁸⁵ Limited access to land and cattle, and government efforts to “improve” land by restricting grazing and culling cattle, cut off access to resources that were a source of status as well as livelihoods. This contributed to rivalry and violence and a lack of social stability.⁵⁸⁶

The parallels between the Nazi system of concentration camps for Jews, and black “homelands” was not lost on Blacks. In 1961, J. H. Wheeler reported that many expressed worried that the homelands could be bombed or attacked in the event of civil unrest, while many cited the rumour that members of government had been heard to say that, “If Hitler could destroy six million Jews, what will prevent us from using the same methods and excuses for balancing population rations within the Union.”⁵⁸⁷

Dr. Verwoerd’s government was also attacked by extremist right-wing elements in the government, who believed that the Bantustans might become hostile. Dr. Verwoerd’s rival Sir De Villiers Graaff, leader of the United Party, said that if he came to power he would scrap the Bantustans and that “We reject the idea of one man one vote, and we shall retain White leadership in South Africa and not only in parts, as Dr. Verwoerd would have us do.”⁵⁸⁸ Dr. Verwoerd continued to insist that the homelands provided Blacks with the best opportunity to “move along a road of development by which they can progress in accordance with their ability.”⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸³ Irwin, 2012: 67.

⁵⁸⁴ Vigne, 1969: 7.

⁵⁸⁵ Rogers, 1976: 8.

⁵⁸⁶ Worden, 2000: 115.

⁵⁸⁷ Wheeler, 1961: 248.

⁵⁸⁸ van den Berghe, 1966: 414.

⁵⁸⁹ van den Berghe, 1967: 121.

By the mid-1960s opposition had been largely crushed and Dr. Verwoerd pressed on with his plans to extend the homelands.⁵⁹⁰ Not long after Dr. Verwoerd's death in 1966 the Embassy of South Africa in the UK published a propagandist report claiming that self-determination of the Blacks within their "homelands" was a great success, citing the handover of administrative posts from White to Black officials and describing the system as the "happy marriage" of tradition and modernity and as a "great thrust forward."⁵⁹¹ Rev. Ambrose Reeves, the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg and prominent anti-apartheid activist, characterised Dr. Verwoerd's homeland scheme as "the most fantastic excursion into make-believe in this generation."⁵⁹²

BANTU EDUCATION ACT

Activists fighting against apartheid had long been aware of the role education could play in liberation. In 1943, at the integral conference of the Anti-Coloured Affairs Department (Anti-C.A.D.) Movement, Benjamin Kies, who edited the *Educational Journal of the Teacher's League of South Africa* had given an address discussing how non-Europeans could use education to liberate themselves and join the struggle against injustice.⁵⁹³

Before coming to power, the National Party had clarified its views on the education of non-Whites, stating, "We accept the principle of trusteeship and by name the Afrikaner over the non-whites." In this context, the role of education for non-Whites was to introduce them to Christianity and underline the importance of separation, while ensuring that funding for non-white schools did not detract from white schools; the central purpose of education was to reconcile all South Africans to their place in the pecking order.⁵⁹⁴

Overall, the one of the main purposes of the education system was to propagate the idea of "the nation" as belonging to the Afrikaners, and they to it. While non-Whites were taught about their own inferiority, White children, particularly Afrikaans children, were taught how to love their own ethnic group and language, along with the principles of white supremacy.⁵⁹⁵ This was an approach that Henry Gibbs,⁵⁹⁶ a contemporary observer, likened

⁵⁹⁰ Harsch, 1986: 38.

⁵⁹¹ Embassy of South Africa, 1968: 5.

⁵⁹² *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, 'The champion of apartheid.'

⁵⁹³ Alexander, 1990: 172

⁵⁹⁴ Thompson, 1966: 104.

⁵⁹⁵ Tatz, 1961: 19.

⁵⁹⁶ Author of *Twilight in South Africa*, 1950.

directly to the predominant philosophy in Nazi Germany; Gibbs stated that "Afrikaner children are to be trained as Herrenvolk"⁵⁹⁷ referring to the concept of a particular people with the right to dominate and oppress others.⁵⁹⁸

Elsewhere, Professor Jonathan Hyslop⁵⁹⁹ referred to Dr. Verwoerd's ambitious plans in this area as his desire to establish hegemony over South African schools.⁶⁰⁰ Dr. Verwoerd was extremely aware of the importance of schools and teachers in forming identity and suppressing revolt. He needed to ensure that Africans would receive only the very basic education they needed in order to serve Whites. Dr. Verwoerd's first major speech on apartheid condemned non-Whites who saw education as a means to equip themselves with "European" values. Instead, he promoted a policy which would help "native" Africans to resist this temptation.⁶⁰¹

On January 19, 1949, a few months after the National Party came to power, the government appointed a Commission on Native Education led by anthropologist Dr. Werner Willi Max Eiselen⁶⁰² to investigate native education and make any necessary recommendations. In 1951, the Commission tabled its findings, which responsibility for educating Blacks be removed from religious missionaries and other "unofficial" bodies, and given to the apartheid state. The Commission found that there was a mismatch between the skills children were taught in school and those required of Black workers, and it identified many problems with the current schools, including overcrowding, low attendance, and insufficient textbooks. The Commission recommended that the education of Blacks should take place within the state's broad socio-economic needs and that responsibility for Blacks' education should be transferred from the missions to the Bantu Regional Authorities.⁶⁰³ Those engaged with the Commission saw themselves as progressive reformers, highlighting

⁵⁹⁷ Gibbs, 1949: 230.

⁵⁹⁸ Sachs, 1952: 29.

⁵⁹⁹ Professor of Sociology and Anthropology and author of *'The Classroom Struggle,'* 1999.

⁶⁰⁰ Hyslop, 1989: 203.

⁶⁰¹ Loveland, 1999: 330.

⁶⁰² Werner Willi Max Eiselen (1899–1977) was a South African anthropologist and member of the Broederbond who, like many of his contemporaries, had also studied in Germany. Prior to his appointment as Secretary of Bantu Administration and chairman of the infamous Native Education Commission, he had served for ten years (1936-1946) as the Chief Inspector of Native Education in the Transvaal and in 1941 had authored The Transvaal Education Department (TED) report on native education. He also served as Secretary of Native Affairs from 1949 until 1959. The report of his Native Education Commission formed the basis of the Bantu Education Act of 1953 which moved control of the education of South Africa's blacks from missionary schools to local government. Eiselen supported apartheid and was a close ally of Dr. Verwoerd. He is now sometimes referred to as an "intellectual architect" of apartheid (Evans, 1997: 228-232, Fleisch, 2002: 41; Kros, 2002: 53-73).

⁶⁰³ Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: 388-389; Fleish, 2002: 39-44; Kros, 2002: 53-73; Soudien, 2002: 212-214.

the inadequacies of how Blacks were taught, but their findings led to the creation of an education system that has been remembered for its contribution to the horrors of apartheid.⁶⁰⁴

While debating on the Bantu Education bill in 1953, Dr. Verwoerd had stated:

“... when I have control of Native Education I will reform it so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them ... People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives. When my Department controls Native Education it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance to use his knowledge.”⁶⁰⁵

The Bantu Education Act, drafted by Dr. Verwoerd,⁶⁰⁶ was passed in 1953 and was almost immediately controversial.⁶⁰⁷ Dr. Verwoerd revealed his paternalistic approach when he said, “The fundamental thing about education is not the wish of the parents, often a selfish wish, but the interest of the child.”⁶⁰⁸ Dr. Verwoerd saw the Bantu Education system as a way to prepare the younger generation of Blacks for work in industry and agriculture, stating:

“The Bantu must be guided to serve his community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his community, however, all doors are open. For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its main aim absorption in the European community, where he cannot be absorbed. Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze.”⁶⁰⁹

Dr. Verwoerd also said, “I Just want to remind hon. members that if the Native in South Africa today in any kind of school in existence is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake. The Native who attends school must know that he will be the labourer in the country.”⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰⁴ Kros, 2002: 54.

⁶⁰⁵ Willems et al, 1988: 16.

⁶⁰⁶ Bunting, 1986: 172; Mandela, 2013: 195; Neame, 1962: 94; Welsh, 2000: 446.

⁶⁰⁷ Low, 1958: 21; Marquard, 1969: 201.

⁶⁰⁸ Bunting, 1986: 251.

⁶⁰⁹ Bunting, 1986: 260; Dubow, 2014: 55-56; Lipton, 1985: 24; O'Meara, 1996: 73; Pelzer, 1966: 83; Schadeberg, 1990: 81.

⁶¹⁰ Brookes, 1968: 51; La Guma, 1971: 46.

Dr. Verwoerd's evocation of a pastoral image is revealing of his view of African as "cattle" to be herded and controlled by the state.⁶¹¹ He claimed in 1953 that "good racial relations cannot exist when the education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the Native."⁶¹² He said that teachers who believed in equality were not suitable for teaching natives, and that Bantu teachers should never feel in any way superior to other Bantus such that they wished to be integrated into European society.⁶¹³

The Act aimed to replace the schools that previously had been largely provided by English-speaking missionaries⁶¹⁴ (seen as "the Afrikaner's great enemy," they had provided many Blacks with a relatively good education, up to and including university⁶¹⁵ despite limited resources and the lack of a proper centralised approach⁶¹⁶), although huge numbers of Blacks received effectively no education, or just a few poorly organised years. The Act had four main provisions:

- 1) Schools would be registered and inspected by the Department of Native Affairs instead of provincial authorities;
- 2) New curricula would be drawn up bearing "Bantu culture" in mind;
- 3) Blacks would be given more say in over how schools were run and staff would be Black;
- 4) Four-fifths of school funding would come from taxes raised from Blacks, and the rest from central government.⁶¹⁷ It became illegal to run any school for Africans that was not registered;⁶¹⁸ even if a White employer taught her servants' children basic literacy skills she would be breaking the law.⁶¹⁹

Under this system, Black parents had three times as many direct costs in their children's education as White,⁶²⁰ and teachers were forbidden on pain of dismissal to criticise government policy.⁶²¹ African education cost about 20 million dollars every year, and the

⁶¹¹ Mothata, 2000: 141-142.

⁶¹² Horrell, 1964: 6.

⁶¹³ Walker, 1990: 300-306.

⁶¹⁴ Ballinger, 1969: 348; Brookes, 1968: 41; Hepple, 1966: 34; Luthuli, 1962: 138.

⁶¹⁵ Mothata, 1998: 94; Pampallis, 1991; Parsons, 1993; Thompson, 2001: 156; Welsh, 2000: 446-447.

⁶¹⁶ Reeves, 1962b: 123.

⁶¹⁷ Low, 1958: 24.

⁶¹⁸ Reeves, 1962b: 124.

⁶¹⁹ Luthuli, 1962: 49-50.

⁶²⁰ Rose, 1965: 210.

⁶²¹ Kepple-Jones, 1963: 209.

government contributed around 8.5, with African parents having to make up the shortfall.⁶²² The broader apartheid system also had a negative impact on the quality of education; so many Black principals and teachers were harassed by being picked up for detention and interrogation that many of the best left the system.⁶²³

Dr. Verwoerd claimed in a speech that the new legislation was for the good of the entire Bantu community, and not just of individuals.⁶²⁴ Nothing could have been further from the truth. In reality, the new system was specifically designed to maintain Blacks in a position of subservience and bolster white supremacy, offering no opportunities for growth and stressing only subjects that would prepare students for menial labour.⁶²⁵ Later critics, including Dr. Nhato Moltana, chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten in 1978, and Professor John Dugard, Law Professor at Wits University and Director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, stressed the profoundly inferior quality of Bantu Education.⁶²⁶

In his deep understanding of the role of education (or the lack thereof) in keeping a subservient population down, Dr. Verwoerd was following in the footsteps of a range of despots; Martin Bormann, Hitler's Party Secretary and Deputy Fuhrer, had said "Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to 100 ... every educated person is a future enemy,"⁶²⁷ and Tsar Alexander's Minister of Education, Delyanov, had said that "the children of parents in lowly positions should not be encouraged through education to rise above the position into which they had been born."⁶²⁸

One function of the new system was to inculcate a sense of inferiority in Black students.⁶²⁹ The loss of control over education led to Blacks losing a sense of identity and of their capabilities; it "debased self-image, destroyed confidence and lowered motivation," reducing the intellectual independence that was a prerequisite to self-determination.⁶³⁰ Instead, school boards would play an important role in focusing black attention on tribal loyalties and the so-called homelands. School boards and committees were selected to help

⁶²² Abraham, 1991: 148-149.

⁶²³ Corke, 1978, 97.

⁶²⁴ Pelzer, 1966: 65.

⁶²⁵ du Preez Bezdrob, 2003: 41; Mnguni, 1998: 146-148; Morris, 2004: 164; Nkabinde, 1997: 5.

⁶²⁶ Dugard, 1978: 29; Moltana, 1978: 40.

⁶²⁷ Shirer, 1964: 1118.

⁶²⁸ Wolfe, 2001: 68.

⁶²⁹ Arnold, 1981: 200-201.

⁶³⁰ Nkabinde, 1997: 6-8; Nkomo: 1990: 2.

control black communities by putting them under financial pressure, and under ideological pressure to conform to Dr. Verwoerd's plans for the homelands.⁶³¹

Consistent with his divide-and-conquer approach to the homelands, Dr. Verwoerd's insistence that all Black children should be taught through their native tribal language underlined the idea that they were mutually different, and undermined black unity against oppression, while inhibiting cooperation between Blacks, Coloureds and Indians.⁶³² Local African languages became the only means of instruction in primary school, underlining linguistic and ethnic differences, and making it very hard for African children to progress to secondary.⁶³³ Dr. Verwoerd cynically presented this as respecting all languages equally, rather than eliminating African access to a language of commerce.⁶³⁴

In 1954 the government established diverse categories for the schools: Government Bantu Schools, Bantu Community Schools and Aided Farm Schools. The latter were located on White-owned farms and owned by the farmer himself (Black children were often withdrawn from school when farmers decided that they needed their labour).⁶³⁵ Aided Mine or Factory Schools and Unaided Mission and Registered schools, which were run by missionaries and mostly Catholic, had been established by farmers, mine-owners and so forth and not state funded; only the Catholic church managed to raise enough funds to maintain an independent education system.⁶³⁶ In 1955, the government established new curricula, which were designed, among other things, to restrict the number of Blacks who would graduate from school with the necessary qualifications to attend further education. The sons of local chiefs and headmen were provided with training in "Bantu Administration."⁶³⁷

Although education was free through to the fifth form for Whites, Blacks had to pay five shillings per term, and to cover the cost of educational materials. Black students who failed state exams were expelled and sent to work, whereas failing White students were given extra tuition and support.⁶³⁸ In 1953, the government spent \$180 every year on the education of every White child, and only \$25 on each Black child.⁶³⁹ It should be pointed out that,

⁶³¹ Hyslop, 1999: 59-60, 122.

⁶³² Booth, 1998: 62; Mda, 2000: 158.

⁶³³ Hyslop, 1999: 61-62.

⁶³⁴ D'Amato, 1966b: 63.

⁶³⁵ Italiaander, 1961: 112.

⁶³⁶ Harrison, 1981: 190.

⁶³⁷ Wheeler, 1961: 244.

⁶³⁸ Wheeler, 1961: 246-247.

⁶³⁹ Sparks, 1990: 196.

inadequate as this was, the situation had improved a lot in terms of attendance. Whereas just 4.1% of Black children between the ages of seven and sixteen attended school in 1935, this had risen to 41% by 1953, although vanishingly few obtained more than a primary level education⁶⁴⁰ (It is, however, important not to overestimate the number of children attending schools as the figures were massaged by double sessions and many children were crammed into vastly overcrowded classrooms).⁶⁴¹

Those who attended school were exposed to comprehensive system of education designed to show them the “virtues” of apartheid.⁶⁴² Teachers were rigorously supervised. They were sent copies of the *Bantu Education Journal*, and expected to sign each one to show that they had studied the contents, which were largely about government policy, and they also received free copies of the Department of Native Affairs magazine, *Bantu*, giving Dr. Verwoerd occasion to remark that Blacks could now hear the “other side.”⁶⁴³ Black teachers were also expected to take on aspects of Afrikaans nationalism, and work through Afrikaans, even though most of them were not proficient in that language. They could be dismissed for engaging in any type of political activism.⁶⁴⁴

The lack of investment in Black education showed in many ways, most obviously the poor-quality infrastructure, crowding, large class sizes and unqualified, poorly motivated teachers.⁶⁴⁵ Only five percent of the Black children who started school graduated; sixty percent did not complete even primary school and twenty-five percent of those exited during the first grade.⁶⁴⁶ Within just a few years, critics of the new system noted that African students were achieving far less than before, and in particular that standards in English were lower.⁶⁴⁷

Africans did not all meekly accept the new Act. The ANC planned a student boycott to begin in 1955 in protest. Phyllis Ntantala, an anti-apartheid activist who participated in the campaign against the Bantu Education Act, said, “... it is our children who are, by this Act, condemned to a world of darkness and ignorance, who will never fit in anywhere in the world

⁶⁴⁰ Kenney, 1980: 117.

⁶⁴¹ Reeves, 1962a: 6.

⁶⁴² Kenney, 1980: 122.

⁶⁴³ Mothata, 2000: 142; Robertson and Whitten, 1978: 115.

⁶⁴⁴ Halisi, 1999: 89; Mothata, 2000: 142.

⁶⁴⁵ Nkabinde, 1997: 9.

⁶⁴⁶ Bundy, 1994: 54.

⁶⁴⁷ Reeves, 1962b: 128.

after being shut away from the rest of humanity by Bantu Education.”⁶⁴⁸ With the support of the ANC, a number of Black parents withdrew their children from school in protest when the Bantu Education Act was applied on April 1, 1955. Dr. Verwoerd stated that any children who had not turned up to school by April 25th would be banned from education. He also stated that all “unofficial” schools were illegal, which meant that students engaged in the boycott could not receive any education at all.⁶⁴⁹ 6948 pupils were banned from schools and 116 teachers were dismissed for political reasons, while five teachers were arrested for running an illegal school for banned students.⁶⁵⁰

By 1956, Dr. Verwoerd and his public servants could arbitrarily refuse to register African schools.⁶⁵¹ Educators striving to provide a decent education were devastated when Dr. Verwoerd’s Department closed down institutes of learning it did not approve of. One school principal, Iso Lomuzi, write about the closure of his school stated that, “... there can be no place in Bantu Education for any institution which does not bow its knee before the Apartheid Idol.”⁶⁵²

Further legislation meant that the races were to be segregated at every level of education, including technical colleges and universities (although as Africans were usually desperately poor, and school attendance not compulsory, few Blacks made it to university).⁶⁵³ Although the University of Ford Hare provided third level education for non-Europeans, growing numbers sought entry into the “white” universities; a situation that Dr. Verwoerd found deplorable and that Malan had described in 1948 as “an intolerable state of affairs.”⁶⁵⁴ The Separate University Education Bill was passed in 1957, closing the “white” universities to non-Europeans and providing separate “university colleges” for Coloureds, Indians, and each of the African ethnic groups separately, and passing control of the latter to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.⁶⁵⁵

Dr. Verwoerd named the Act that excluded Africans from English universities (they had always been excluded from Afrikaans ones) the Extension of University Education

⁶⁴⁸ Ntantala, 1993: 159.

⁶⁴⁹ Joseph, 1968: 75.

⁶⁵⁰ *Drum*, April 1955, ‘Parents boycott Bantu Education.’

⁶⁵¹ Carter, 1954: 308.

⁶⁵² Brooks, 1968: 53.

⁶⁵³ Worden, 2000: 108.

⁶⁵⁴ Reeves, 1962b: 132.

⁶⁵⁵ Hain, 1996: 16; Lapping, 1986: 135; Marquard, 1969: 213; Sachs, 1965: 282.

Act;⁶⁵⁶ the British political magazine, *The Economist*, noted that the “new non-European colleges would be completely under the thumb of the minister of native affairs, Dr. Verwoerd,” who would “vet the list of entrants and... appoint the teaching and administrative staff.”⁶⁵⁷ Fort Hare University was effectively dismantled and replaced with a college for the Xhosa ethnicity.⁶⁵⁸ The Minister of Education, J.J. Serfontein, whose professional background was in raising cattle, stated of the Separate University Education Bill that he believed both Europeans and non-Europeans were served well by it, that many at “mixed” universities welcomed it,⁶⁵⁹ and that it was “fatal” to try to turn a non-White into a White or vice versa.⁶⁶⁰

The changes severely restricted the options at third level for Blacks lucky enough to get a higher education; one contemporary memoirist wrote of how her brother had wished to study engineering, which was not available to him under the apartheid system.⁶⁶¹ Moreover, White teaching staff at third level colleges for non-Whites were paid substantially less than their colleagues at white universities, and non-White teaching staff less again, making it very difficult to attract a high calibre of staff.⁶⁶²

Nelson Mandela characterised the Bantu Education Act as “inhuman and barbaric.”⁶⁶³ In England, outspoken anti-apartheid activist and president of the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) Father Canon John Collins said that an analysis of the meaning of Christian freedom have a yardstick by which to assess the “now notorious Bantu Education Act in South Africa. If it be the truth that shall make us free, it is in the realm of education above all other realms of human endeavour that we should aim at giving all men equal opportunity. But according to that bitter racialist, Dr. Verwoerd, ‘education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accordance with the policy of the State. For him, this means in accordance with the policy of segregation and prolonged white supremacy. This is just brutish discrimination. For the African education is now to be utilitarian only, and its usefulness to be primarily reckoned in terms of its benefit to Europeans.’”⁶⁶⁴

⁶⁵⁶ Muller, 1981: 484.

⁶⁵⁷ *The Economist*, 13 April 1957: 119, ‘Apartheid in practice.’

⁶⁵⁸ Ballinger, 1969: 350

⁶⁵⁹ Forman and Sachs, 1957: 164.

⁶⁶⁰ Muller, 1981: 484.

⁶⁶¹ Jabavu, 1960: 92.

⁶⁶² Reeves, 1962a: 11.

⁶⁶³ Mandela, 1991: 29.

⁶⁶⁴ *Belfast News-Letter*, 23 January 1956: 4, ‘South African education.’

By 1958, the Africans' education was controlled by the new Department of Bantu Education.⁶⁶⁵ Among efforts to keep costs low was the restriction of some teaching jobs to women, who were paid at a lower rate, along with the proviso that men teaching at the same level would not be paid anymore.⁶⁶⁶ Dr. Verwoerd continued to validate the importance of indoctrinating the young (of all races) in the ways of apartheid,⁶⁶⁷ and in limiting educational opportunities to Africans to prevent them from ever being able to compete with Europeans for most jobs.⁶⁶⁸ By continuing to insist that students should be taught through African languages, they were effectively prevented from studying subjects like physics and maths.⁶⁶⁹

In 1961, the Education Panel of the South African Institute for Race Relations recommended that the "facts" of the education system should underpin education,⁶⁷⁰ while complaints about the standard of Bantu education, the remuneration of teachers, and access to third level education for non-Whites escalated.⁶⁷¹ Early that year, the *Cape Times* had reported that enrolment in Bantu schools had doubled since the scheme began, quoting the Secretary for Bantu Education, J. E. Villiers, who claimed this as a great success. The article cited that fact that the Bantu themselves provided most of the taxation that supported the system.⁶⁷²

Dr. Xuma, a former president of the ANC, complained that the situation for Black students was appalling, pointing out that the state spent eight times as much on White students as Black and stating his view that "in certain quarters" people felt that "kaffirs" should be grateful for whatever they got.⁶⁷³ By 1962, only seven hundred schools for Blacks were run privately, mostly by the Roman Catholic Church, and not under the state system,⁶⁷⁴ and Luthuli commented that Dr. Verwoerd's educational policies had resulted in doors "slammed shut hard" in the faces of young Blacks, who were now educated in system expressly designed to teach them that they were inferior and render them easier to control.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁶⁵ Evans, 1997: 75; Marquard, 1969: 203.

⁶⁶⁶ Soudien, 2002: 213.

⁶⁶⁷ Bunting, 1986: 244.

⁶⁶⁸ Feit, 1967: 148.

⁶⁶⁹ Lapping, 1986: 109.

⁶⁷⁰ Chisholm, 2002: 99.

⁶⁷¹ *Pretoria News*, 19 January 1961: n.p, 'Apartheid in education attacked.'

⁶⁷² *The Cape Times*, 19 January 1961: n.p, 'Bantu schools' roll has doubled.'

⁶⁷³ *Pretoria News*, 18 January 1961: n.p, 'Bantu education starved of money.'

⁶⁷⁴ Thompson, 1966: 105.

⁶⁷⁵ Luthuli, 1962: 49.

Dr. Verwoerd believed that an uneducated Black population would be easier to control. Moreover, he was very aware of the importance of early childhood education. Black children who grew up hearing that they could only ever reach certain positions in life, and would never be able to enjoy the advantages that Whites had, were less likely to revolt against this cynical, inhumane system. For this reason, too, Black girls generally received an even worse education than boys (as indeed they had since before the days of Bantu Education).⁶⁷⁶

Dr. Verwoerd's idea was that it was pointless providing Blacks with the same or similar educational opportunities as Whites, as this would lead to frustration and disappointment. He felt that there were no circumstances in which any Black should ever work at the same level, or on a superior level, to any White. By maintaining Blacks in a position of educational inferiority, this "unfortunate" situation would never arise. He said:

"Racial relations cannot improve if the wrong type of information is given to Natives. They cannot improve if the result of Native education is the creation of frustrated people who, as a result of the education they received, have expectations of life which circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled immediately, when it creates people who are trained for professions not open to them, when there are people who have received a form of cultural training which strengthens their desire for the white-collar expectations to such an extent that there are more such people than openings available."⁶⁷⁷

Thus, policy was that there was little point in teaching Blacks academic subjects, as they would be menial workers anyway.⁶⁷⁸ Children were not to be taught history or geography, but simply about "their immediate environment and to be able to read messages so... they could deliver those messages to the right places."⁶⁷⁹ Dr. Verwoerd said that, "Bantu education should stand with both feet in the reserves. What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice?"⁶⁸⁰ This policy was wrapped up in language suggesting that this was for the good of the Blacks; by giving them their own schools they could be helped to "respect" their own culture.⁶⁸¹

⁶⁷⁶ Morrell and Moletsane, 2002: 229.

⁶⁷⁷ Bunting 1986: 259; Carter 1958: 103; Sparks, 1990: 196; van den Berghe 1967: 130.

⁶⁷⁸ Clark and Worger, 2011: 55; Duncan, 1963: 39; Furlong, 1991: 259; Mandela, 1994: 195.

⁶⁷⁹ Mokgatle, 1971: 275.

⁶⁸⁰ Brookes, 1968: 57; D'Amato, 1966b: 70.

⁶⁸¹ Ballinger, 1969: 349; Rose, 1965: 208.

Dr. Verwoerd also warned against the dangers of not controlling native education closely, "Good racial relations cannot exist when education is given to under the control of people who create wrong expectations on part of the Native himself, if such people believe in a policy of equality..." He suggested that that there was a risk "if, let me say, for example, a Communist gives this training to the Native," that this could "create expectations in the minds of the Bantu which clash with the possibilities of the country. It is therefore necessary that Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the state."⁶⁸²

Dr. Verwoerd was eloquent on the risks involved if "Bantu" people received a western education: "The Bantu must learn not to feel above his community, with the consequent desire to become integrated into the way of life of the European community. He becomes frustrated and rebellious when this does not take place, and he tries to make his community dissatisfied because of such misdirected ambitions which are alien to this people."⁶⁸³ He also declared that "if the Native in South Africa today ... is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake."⁶⁸⁴

As more Blacks moved to the cities, the skills they needed changed, and their educational requirements moved beyond those provided in rural areas. Government authorities noted that lower rates of education tended to be associated with higher rates of juvenile delinquency.⁶⁸⁵ Possibly Dr. Verwoerd and his colleagues did not foresee that a population of more educated urban Africans would also be in a better situation to understand the levels of discrimination that they were facing and to organise themselves politically.⁶⁸⁶

As for ordinary Whites, it emerged that they were prepared to accept an influx of Black semi-skilled workers into industry so long as this movement was accompanied by a parallel move of White semi-skilled workers into the skilled category.⁶⁸⁷ By the late 1950s, although progress had been made in terms of improving educational outcomes for Blacks at the primary level, a series of measures mitigated against these gains. Now, beyond a low state

⁶⁸² Bunting, 1986: 259.

⁶⁸³ Bunting, 1986: 261; Rose, 1965: 209.

⁶⁸⁴ Elphick, 2012: 191.

⁶⁸⁵ Hyslop, 1993: 393-396.

⁶⁸⁶ Bonner et al, 1993: 26.

⁶⁸⁷ Hyslop, 1993: 398.

input into the cost of education, *all* the necessary funds had to come from taxes paid by Black workers. The resulting funding crisis quickly led to a rapid decline in standards.

Dr. Verwoerd's approach to education was cynical and shrewd. He ensured that black education and advancement at work could only go so far while using education to offer segments of the Black population an incentive to operate within apartheid; Black parents desperately needed schools not just to educate their children but to provide childcare while they themselves worked for tiny salaries; the choice was between having their children in inadequate Bantu Education or on the streets, as Albert Luthuli pointed out.⁶⁸⁸ These factors helped to mitigate against militancy and resistance among Black teachers and parents.⁶⁸⁹ There was also a feeling, as Luthuli said, that a "rotten" education was better than none at all.⁶⁹⁰

In the 1960s, the government spent about \$170 per annum on the education of each White child, and just \$17 on each Black child. Education was not compulsory for Blacks, many of whom did not attend school. The form for White children was to start school at six and leave at sixteen or seventeen, while Black children who did attend school did so between the ages of seven and fourteen only.⁶⁹¹ Dr. Verwoerd's Minister of Bantu Education instructed officials in his department that they should never shake hands with Africans, partly to ensure that they would not start to think that they deserved social equality.⁶⁹²

In 1963, the Coloured Persons' Education Act placed all responsibility for the education of non-Whites on the Department of Coloured Affairs, while in 1965 the education of Indians (the Indian Education Act) became the responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs.⁶⁹³ Efforts were also made to bring English-speaking students into the government fold, notably with the establishment of the University of Port Elizabeth, which taught through both English and Afrikaans but was predominately governed by Afrikaans authorities.⁶⁹⁴

Chief Justice Warren of the US Supreme Court stated in 1954 regarding the segregation of children in the US schools under the "separate but equal" doctrine:

⁶⁸⁸ Feit, 1967: 155.

⁶⁸⁹ Hyslop, 1993: 401-405.

⁶⁹⁰ Luthuli, 1962: 147.

⁶⁹¹ Andrews et al, 1962: 181.

⁶⁹² Beinart, 2001: 163.

⁶⁹³ Hepple, 1966: 32; Soudien, 2002: 212; van der Walt, 2015: 202.

⁶⁹⁴ Bunting, 2006: 40.

“To separate [Black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas cases ... ‘segregation of white and coloured children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the coloured children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.’”⁶⁹⁵

The effects on education in South Africa went beyond the dreadful impact they had on educational outcomes for Blacks; many academics and promising students left South Africa, it became harder to attract overseas talent, and censorship of books and pamphlets in the social sciences had a negative impact.⁶⁹⁶ By 1972, when a full generation of South Africans had been through an education system engineered by Dr. Verwoerd as Minister of Native Affairs and as Prime Minister, UNESCO reported the chronic shortage of people to work in science and engineering, the loss of a “spirit of free enquiry” and of eminent scientists and social scientists. It also noted that the South African education system flouted human rights, as defined by the United Nations, and categorised “separate development” as “a policy of deliberate inequality built into the education system.”⁶⁹⁷

Revolutionary Steve Biko and others identified the Bantu Education Act as denying Blacks the tools they needed to function in a technological world and reach their potential.⁶⁹⁸ Biko was not alone. According to South Africa’s Ministry of Education, Dr. Verwoerd’s harsh experiment created the conditions that led to the conflicts that South Africa suffered for the next twenty years.⁶⁹⁹ According to Albert Luthuli, “Dr. Verwoerd’s Bantu Education Act dealt a crippling blow to African education.”⁷⁰⁰ Ironically, years later Nelson Mandela declared the Bantu Education Act responsible for producing the “angry” generation that “rose with a vehemence.”⁷⁰¹ Ten years after Dr. Verwoerd’s death, his language policy led to the Soweto rebellion of June 16, 1976, prompted by the question of whether Black students

⁶⁹⁵ Dugard, 1978: 57.

⁶⁹⁶ Langer, 1967: 1387-1388.

⁶⁹⁷ UNESCO, 1972: 28-29, 255.

⁶⁹⁸ Herbstein, 1992: 62-65; Wilson, 1991: 34.

⁶⁹⁹ Morris, 2004: 185.

⁷⁰⁰ Luthuli, 1962: 50.

⁷⁰¹ Mandela, 2013: 198.

would be allowed to learn English, an international language, or forced to study in Afrikaans, a language that they associated with white supremacy.⁷⁰²

INFLUX CONTROL

Influx control refers to the control of people's movements from one area to another, and was a key element of apartheid. By 1951, the majority of the population in each city, in contrast to previous years, was non-White, as more and more Blacks arrived from the rural areas in search of work.⁷⁰³ Dr. Verwoerd warned that this could lead to the "death of white civilization in South Africa" and for him, "the survival of white civilization in South Africa" was more important "than expanded industrial development."⁷⁰⁴ He was in favour of restricting Africans' movements away from designated areas, saying, "Emigration control must be established to prevent manpower leaving the (white farming areas) to become loafers in the city."⁷⁰⁵ A third of Blacks lived on farms owned by White farmers, and could be forced to leave in the event of a disagreement with their employer.⁷⁰⁶ "The present system of having an unattached mass of Bantu individuals living in cities not subject to any traditional authority or sanctions has proved to be a dismal failure," Dr. Verwoerd said⁷⁰⁷ and started working on "addressing" the issue.

One function was to extend the labour system, in which all Blacks were for ever to be seen as migrants and "foreigners."⁷⁰⁸ This ensured African labour for industries in urban areas, as regulations about who could leave and enter kept labour costs low by ensuring that there was always a large body of people with time to find work, who could be expelled from the possibility of obtaining work at all should they lose their jobs.⁷⁰⁹ Influx control had a number of primary aims: To restrict the number of Blacks entering white, especially urban, areas; to prevent their permanent settlement in such areas; to control labour, ensuring that there were plenty of workers for white farms; for purposes of social control; and to make residential segregation easier.⁷¹⁰ Dr. Verwoerd got Whites on board with inflammatory

⁷⁰² Halisi, 1999: 89.

⁷⁰³ Giliomee, 2012: 52.

⁷⁰⁴ Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1990: 35-36.

⁷⁰⁵ Lipton, 1985: 25.

⁷⁰⁶ Posel, 1993: 419; Rogers, 1976: 11.

⁷⁰⁷ Pienaar and Sampson, 1960: 36.

⁷⁰⁸ Roskam, 1960: 67.

⁷⁰⁹ Posel, 1997: 11.

⁷¹⁰ Lipton, 1985: 27.

language, stating that "if the stream [of Africans] into the town continues unstemmed, we [Whites] will be drowned in a black sea."⁷¹¹

From 1950, one of Dr. Verwoerd's priorities was the limiting of "permanently urbanized" Blacks to the smallest number possible by means of harsher influx control.⁷¹² In 1951, he created a committee composed of members of the Departments of Justice, Police, Census and Native Affairs to figure out how to integrate the pre-existing pass system and the Population Registration Act to simplify the bureaucracy. From this came the idea of the reference book.⁷¹³

In 1952, the Native Laws Amendment Act introduced a system of labour bureaux that would match African workers over the age of sixteen ("work-seekers") to the needs of White employers in rural and urban areas,⁷¹⁴ essentially introducing a largely artificial division between "rural" and "urban" Black workers.⁷¹⁵ Once urban employers had found the labour they needed, surplus workers could be assigned to rural work and to the mines. No Blacks could enter urban areas looking for work except within the constraints of the law.⁷¹⁶ Under Section 10 of the Act, only three categories of African were permitted to live permanently in the urban areas:

- 1) Those who were born there.
- 2) Those who had lived there without a break for fifteen years.
- 3) Those who had worked there for the same employer for more than ten years.⁷¹⁷

In the same year, Dr. Verwoerd's infamous Pass Laws Act, officially (and ironically) entitled the Natives Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act of 1952, overrode regional laws and introduced what was effectively nationwide control of South Africa's Blacks. The Act mandated that all Black South Africans aged over sixteen must carry a "pass book" when in designated White areas. The "pass book" authorised them to live and work in a specific area, decreed how long a Black could remain in a White area, exactly where and at what times. The compact, ninety-two-page pass book, in effect an internal

⁷¹¹ Hughes, 1961: 176.

⁷¹² Giliomee, 2011: 511.

⁷¹³ Breckenridge, 2005: 87.

⁷¹⁴ Breckenridge 2005: 90; Longford, 1985: 13.

⁷¹⁵ Morris, 1977: 63.

⁷¹⁶ Posel, 1997: 94-95, 103-114.

⁷¹⁷ Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: 390; Dugard 1978: 74; Horrell 1978: 173.

passport, carried identification details of the bearer, including his or her photograph, name and address of the bearer's employer, length of employment and similar information, and was recorded and managed by the Central Reference Bureau in Pretoria. This placed Africans in a highly vulnerable situation whereby their right to travel to work could be revoked at any time, even if they were considered "urbanised" (i.e. to no longer having any particular tribal affiliation or homeland).⁷¹⁸

Initially, the intention was for each pass to incorporate the user's fingerprints, but the practicalities of obtaining the prints of every single Black over the age of sixteen proved unmanageable.⁷¹⁹ Thus, just as Jews in Nazi Germany were forced to wear the yellow Star of David, all Africans were forced to carry the pass book with them at all times. Mary Benson, author and prominent anti-apartheid activist, characterised the pass book accurately as "the badge of slavery."⁷²⁰

It is also worth noting that at the time only 55% of the Africans born in South Africa lived to the age of sixteen. Those "lucky enough" to make it that far, were then forced to obtain the "pass" that they would need to carry for the rest of their lives, as it was required in order to work and travel in their own country.⁷²¹ Failure to produce the "pass" when asked to by a policeman or an authority was a criminal offence, punishable with a fine of up to R20 or a one-month imprisonment.⁷²²

Blacks soon gave the reference book a nickname; the *Dompas*, or Stupid Pass ("Dompas" was a derisive way of referring to the pass, colloquially meaning "dumb pass").⁷²³ Dr. Verwoerd disingenuously claimed that he had abolished passes, but in reality he had simply changed the name, and everyone knew it.⁷²⁴ The new "reference book" passes were distributed en masse from March 1953, simplifying the police's job of monitoring and controlling Blacks' activities. The Central Reference Bureau contained a wide-ranging amount of information about pass holders, including medical history, permission to seek work, details of previous movements, and so forth. As workers were obliged to pay any outstanding taxes before collecting their passes, which they needed in order to do anything,

⁷¹⁸ Breckenridge, 2005: 87-93; Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: 390; Dyzenhaus, 2010: 36; Posel, 1997: 94-95, 103-114.

⁷¹⁹ Breckenridge, 2005: 93-95; Breckenridge, 2014: 151.

⁷²⁰ Benson (1960) *The Badge of Slavery (The Pass Laws of South Africa)*.

⁷²¹ Segal, 1960: 2.

⁷²² Rubin (United Nations Report), 1976: 11.

⁷²³ Breckenridge, 2014: 138.

⁷²⁴ Attwell, 1986: 81-82.

the tax take from Blacks increased dramatically.⁷²⁵ The reference book, which Dr. Verwoerd described as offering a necessary measure of control in a multi-racial society,⁷²⁶ was bitterly hated and resented, and many protests crystallised around this issue. Overall, its implementation was handled badly, and the government had to deal with a wide range of problems, including frequent forgeries.⁷²⁷

The new law applied also to women, who had previously been exempted from the same degree of control as men.⁷²⁸ Women responded furiously and there were many protests; 20,000 women marched to the seat of the government in Pretoria protesting while when a delegation of women tried to discuss the passes issue with the authorities at Lichtenburg, police opened fire and four people were killed.⁷²⁹ The ANC also protested against the pass on various grounds, including their contention that it could be used as an excuse to molest women physically, under the guise of searching for their pass.⁷³⁰ The protests came to no avail, however, and by the late 1950s, four million women had been issued with passes which restricted their movement.⁷³¹ However, over the years, whenever similar attempts had been made to restrict women's movements, the protests had been so fierce that they were abandoned.⁷³² During the women's protest the following slogan emerged:

"Watch out Strijdom.

Now you have touched the women you have struck a rock.

You have dislodged a boulder.

*You will be crushed!"*⁷³³

The Native Areas Amendments Act of 1952 stated that all urban areas were now "proclaimed areas" into which Blacks without permits could only stray for seventy-two hours. However, Dr. Verwoerd accepted that it was unrealistic to expect urban South Africa to manage without African labour, and that it was pointless to aspire to eliminating a settled urban African population. Instead the focus was on limiting the growth of this demographic

⁷²⁵ Breckenridge, 2005: 92, 140-143.

⁷²⁶ Roskam, 1960: 71.

⁷²⁷ Breckenridge, 2014: 139-155.

⁷²⁸ Attwell, 1986: 81; Desmond, 1971: 160; Worden, 2000: 110.

⁷²⁹ Desmond, 1971: 160; Sachs, 1965: 302.

⁷³⁰ Lodge, 1983: 144.

⁷³¹ Dubow, 2014: 54-55.

⁷³² Sachs, 1965: 302.

⁷³³ International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, in co-operation with the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, 1981: 87; O'Meara, 1996: 70.

by striving only to offer employment to Blacks already living in urban areas, rather than encouraging more rural people to move.⁷³⁴

The only Blacks who were allowed to stay in white areas (still with minimal rights) were those who had been born there, who had lived there for continuously for fifteen years, or who had worked for the same employer for ten years. These so-called "section ten" rights applied to very few. As the law applied to both sexes, often only the man of a family was given permission to travel to (or remain in) urban areas, splitting the family up.⁷³⁵ However, even those Africans who were allowed to remain in the cities were forced to stay in their houses after 9.30 p.m. Every evening at 9.00 p.m. a sound, like "an air raid siren," was heard in all major cities; a warning to all Africans that they should be back inside their houses within half an hour, otherwise they would be arrested.⁷³⁶

By the mid-1950s, as many as two thousand people without the requisite passes were arrested every day,⁷³⁷ those who had been forced into reserves did all they could to sneak back into the cities, where there was more and better work.⁷³⁸ Over 350.000 Africans were convicted under the "pass" law each year.⁷³⁹ Dr. Verwoerd said that to facilitate influx control, black townships would have to be far enough away from white residential areas, ideally with open spaces around them and industrial areas between them, and quite far away from major roads.⁷⁴⁰ This desire resulted in an urban landscape in which the racial divide was made very clear; "with sprawling, infrastructurally poor black townships severed from high-rise commercial city centre and salubrious suburban areas."⁷⁴¹

Africans were to be allowed into the city for a period of seventy-two hours, after which they needed to ask for permission to remain.⁷⁴² Influx control was presented as a way of keeping costs down. Dr. Verwoerd's efforts in tightening influx regulations and consolidating pass laws resulted in Africans having no legal right to be in towns and cities, and in being removed from them, although they were at all times living in their own country.

⁷³⁴ Lazer, 1993: 371.

⁷³⁵ Benson, 1963a: 113-114.

⁷³⁶ Dubula, 1965: 13.

⁷³⁷ Sparks, 1990: 194.

⁷³⁸ Jabavu 1982:154.

⁷³⁹ Segal, 1960: 2.

⁷⁴⁰ Lipton, 1985: 27.

⁷⁴¹ Robinson, 1996: 30.

⁷⁴² Brookes, 1968: 92.

Throughout the 1950s, and into the 1960s, the state had gained progressively greater and greater degrees of control over black and coloured communities. However, they proved quite unsuccessful in controlling the ongoing influx of Black workers to urban areas, where they settled, often illegally.⁷⁴³ Proponents of influx control saw it as a way of ensuring that Black workers did not “forget their place” when they travelled to the cities to work.⁷⁴⁴ In 1960, Albert Luthuli complained that that pass laws had been extended and intensified, and identified their application to Black women as adding “insult to injury.”⁷⁴⁵

Government policy was extraordinarily harsh; the moment a Black person became “redundant” in a white area, their temporary (and limited) residence rights could be revoked and they were expected to return to their designated homeland. Many people fell into this category, including the elderly, the unwell or disabled, widows, women with young children, families that did not meet the accommodation requirements, and highly qualified professional non-Whites, such as doctors, lawyers and merchants, who were not regarded as useful in a European labour market.⁷⁴⁶

By the early 1960s, Dr. Verwoerd's government was successfully enforcing the pass with policing, arrests and imprisonment; in early 1960, almost 20,000 Africans were serving prison sentences for pass violations.⁷⁴⁷ The direct effects for Blacks were immense. It was much harder for rural workers to leave their (badly paid) jobs, as they needed their employer to stamp their documentation. White urbanites benefited from an abundance of cheap female labour, as having a pass that indicated the bearer's right to be there was one of the few ways in which Black women could legally enter cities. The Dompas also facilitated the infamous homelands, which are discussed above.⁷⁴⁸ When Helen Suzman, the only Progressive Member of Parliament in 1963, criticised the pass system, she was accused of being unpatriotic, of “smearing” South Africa and inciting non-Whites.⁷⁴⁹

In 1963, the Native Laws Amendment Act was expanded further and made it illegal for Blacks (68% of the population) to reside outside the “Native Reserves” (13% of the land),⁷⁵⁰ and ensured that valuable agricultural land, diamonds and other resources were on

⁷⁴³ Bonner et al, 1993: 33.

⁷⁴⁴ van den Berghe, 1962: 604.

⁷⁴⁵ Benson, 1963a: 42.

⁷⁴⁶ Hain, 1996: 85.

⁷⁴⁷ *Africa Report*, 1 January 1960: 5, ‘South Africa reports nearly 20,000 jailed.’

⁷⁴⁸ Breckenridge, 2014: 157-158.

⁷⁴⁹ Bunting, 1986: 197.

⁷⁵⁰ Duncan, 1963: 39.

European-owned and/or government controlled property.⁷⁵¹ The Act also gave the government authority to remove any Black person from any white area at any time, even if he had been born there and had never been in any trouble with the law.⁷⁵² This destroyed any chance that "migrant" male African workers had to live with their wives and children in the white area where they worked.⁷⁵³

At the same time, Dr. Verwoerd, in an attempt to increase the number of Whites in the country, started a propaganda campaign in Europe, including newspaper advertisements, lecture tours and \$4,200,000 invested into an immigrant assistance programme, with the aim of attracting new citizens (the goal was 40,000 additional Whites per year).⁷⁵⁴ Dr. Verwoerd's policy of white immigration did not please many members of the National Party. The policy encouraged European immigrants to increase the number of Whites. However, most were from the UK rather than areas historically associated with the Afrikaners – Holland, Germany and Flanders – giving rise to the fear that Afrikaners would become a minority among Whites.⁷⁵⁵

FORCED REMOVALS

At its most fundamental, apartheid involved removing anyone who had been classified as non-White from areas that had been classified for the occupation and use of Whites.⁷⁵⁶ While Whites had long enacted policies designed to ensure their hegemony, when the National Party came to power in 1948, their efforts to push Africans off the land and secure even more for themselves accelerated.⁷⁵⁷ Dr. Verwoerd's ambitious plans to locate Blacks in tribal homelands was intimately intertwined with the policies and practices he developed in the area of forcible removal.

The Group Areas Act of 1950 gave the government the authority to forcibly remove people from their homes and seize their property to secure the separation of the races, all as part of Dr. Verwoerd's over-arching plan for separate development.⁷⁵⁸ He stated: "South

⁷⁵¹ d'Amato, 1966a: 182.

⁷⁵² Thompson, 1966: 185-190.

⁷⁵³ Bernstein, 1975: 12; Marquard, 1968: 258.

⁷⁵⁴ *TIME*, 15 June 1962: 33, 'Africa: Whites wanted.'

⁷⁵⁵ van Tonder, 1990: 65.

⁷⁵⁶ Christopher, 1994: 6.

⁷⁵⁷ Harsch, 1986: 32.

⁷⁵⁸ Bunting, 1964: 161-163.

Africa is a white man's country and ... he must remain the master here. In the reserves we are prepared to allow the Native to be masters; we are not the masters there. But within the European areas, we, the whites of South Africa, are and shall remain the masters."⁷⁵⁹

The Natives Resettlement Act of 1954, which did not require the cooperation of local authorities,⁷⁶⁰ legalised the dismantling of established black neighbourhoods like Sophiatown in Johannesburg, a large urban area on land that Black owners had managed to purchase early in the twentieth century, and a vibrant melting pot of ideas and crucible of political activism that was home to important Black leaders and intellectuals including Dr. Xuma and Can Themba.⁷⁶¹ This had been promoted by Dr. Verwoerd as a way of realigning the "white and bantu nations... on their separate and natural evolutionary courses by means of a dynamic programme of reconciliation,"⁷⁶² and as a way of dealing effectively with urban slums,⁷⁶³ and was supported by the Dutch Reformed Church.⁷⁶⁴

African home or property owners were entitled to compensation from the government at purchase price, plus six per cent for each year they had owned the property, but they were not offered any compensation whatsoever for "loss of freehold, amenities, or trade."⁷⁶⁵ Key to these efforts was the establishment of separate, restricted areas for the black population. The residents of Sophiatown mostly ardently resisted efforts to move them, and had to be forcibly removed;⁷⁶⁶ two thousand heavily armed police officers were sent to oversee their removal.⁷⁶⁷ It took the police three days to drag the 60.000 residents out.⁷⁶⁸ After Sophiatown had been emptied in 1955 it was razed to the ground and a new, white suburb, called *Triomf* (Triumph), was built in its place.⁷⁶⁹

Sophiatown in particular had been an area rich with art and intellectual endeavour and, despite widespread poverty, had been a source of pride as a true "African town."⁷⁷⁰ It had also been an area from which much protest writing and journalism had emanated.⁷⁷¹ The

⁷⁵⁹ de Clerk, 1975: 238.

⁷⁶⁰ Carter, 1958: 91; Davenport, 1990: 344; Muller, 1981: 482.

⁷⁶¹ Feit, 1967: 96; Beinart, 2001: 153.

⁷⁶² Barber, 1999: 173; Moodie, 1975: 64.

⁷⁶³ *The New York Times*, 3 March 1954, 'Malan will move huge negro area.'

⁷⁶⁴ Lave, 1994: 509.

⁷⁶⁵ Carter, 1958: 91.

⁷⁶⁶ Worden, 2000: 113.

⁷⁶⁷ Forman and Sacks, 1957: 163.

⁷⁶⁸ Lapierre, 2009: 104.

⁷⁶⁹ Meredith, 1988: 55; Mufson, 1990: 43.

⁷⁷⁰ Lodge, 1983: 95.

⁷⁷¹ Switzer, 1997: 252.

former residents of Sophiatown were removed to a series of tiny houses located four times further away from their workplaces.⁷⁷² Father Huddleston wrote about the destruction of Sophiatown, "Basically, the issue was dead simple. It was just this: that white Johannesburg had encroached on black Johannesburg, and so, naturally, black Johannesburg must move on. MUST MOVE ON... An African freehold township, established for 50 years, can be uprooted and totally destroyed because it is contiguous with a European suburb. The question of right or wrong does not have any relevance."⁷⁷³

There were many similar forced removals of other black neighbourhoods in areas now designated for Whites in a bid to eliminate permanent black residency in cities, and hinder the development of black radicalism.⁷⁷⁴ Organised opposition to the removals was often thwarted at grassroots level by local tensions between landlords and tenants and between older, more settled householders and the young.⁷⁷⁵ Another infamous case was that of District Six in Cape Town, which by the end of the 1950s had also been destroyed,⁷⁷⁶ and 60,000 residents had been forced out.⁷⁷⁷

Dr. Verwoerd used the slum clearance as an excuse to proceed with the forced removals, demanding rhetorically and with unmatched cynicism, "Do not the rights of the masses count more than the rights of a few home owners?"⁷⁷⁸ His ruthlessness in enacting the removals was noted, and the Minister for Negro Affairs from an earlier administration, D. L. Smit, accused him of using them to set up a "black empire" under his own dictatorship.⁷⁷⁹ *The Economist* wrote of: "... the thoroughness of his preparations, the determination to brook no interference, the staggering display of force [and the] provocative and intemperate attacks on all who either gave him friendly advice or threatened to say him nay."⁷⁸⁰ The Resettlement Act impacted on 150,000 Africans, giving Dr. Verwoerd the power to seize their property, move them wherever he wanted, and convert them into tenants.⁷⁸¹

Throughout Dr. Verwoerd's period as Prime Minister, the forcible removal of Africans continued apace in his bid to grand apartheid succeed. The Indians, like the Blacks,

⁷⁷² Schadeberg, 1990: 119.

⁷⁷³ Huddleston, 1987 (originally 1956): 138.

⁷⁷⁴ Dubow, 2014: 57-59; Lapierre, 2009: 105.

⁷⁷⁵ Lodge, 2014: 499.

⁷⁷⁶ An area founded when it was inhabited by freed slaves in 1834.

⁷⁷⁷ Dubow, 2014: 57-59; Lapierre, 2009: 105.

⁷⁷⁸ Goodhew, 2004: 151.

⁷⁷⁹ *The New York Times*, 29 May 1954: 3, 'Dictatorial bid laid to aide of Malan.'

⁷⁸⁰ *The Economist*, March 19, 1955: 1005.

⁷⁸¹ Luthuli, 1962: 150.

were subjected to forced removals during the 1960s when established communities were destroyed and people moved to new townships; in Johannesburg the Indian community was moved to a new "group area" twenty-two miles away, and those who did not comply were forcibly removed from their homes and businesses.⁷⁸² This was greeted with fierce protest, and taken to be "a move which seemed clearly designed to turn them from a trading to a self-sufficient community."⁷⁸³ Between 3.5 and 4 million Africans were forcibly removed between 1960 and 1983 because of Dr. Verwoerd's legislation.⁷⁸⁴

JOB RESERVATIONS

"Job reservation" referred to the closing of many professions to anyone who was not White. Often poverty and a lack of education excluded most Blacks and many Coloureds anyway, but legislation added to this situation. The system was based in pre-apartheid legislation; the Apprenticeship Act of 1922, for instance, made it impossible for non-Whites to become artisans by setting educational levels too high, and many laws ensured that Whites would always take the better jobs.⁷⁸⁵ Dr. Verwoerd extended and enforced these laws with characteristic ruthlessness.

The Native Building Workers Act of 1951 made it illegal for anyone in an urban area to hire a Black builder for skilled building work, or for the Black person in question to carry out skilled work in an urban area.⁷⁸⁶ In 1952, when mining companies asked if they could house Black workers, Dr. Verwoerd explained his intention to make all Black labour essentially migratory saying, "Migratory labour is the best system. Its strengthening and expanding... to most of the other spheres of labour would in the interests of the Bantu..." In 1953, the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act (Black Labour and Settlement of Disputes Act) made it illegal for Africans to strike and banned recognition of their unions,⁷⁸⁷ while making them liable to agreements made with all-white unions.⁷⁸⁸

In February 18, 1954, Dr. Verwoerd informed the Parliament that certain occupations would be reserved for Whites, while Blacks in industrial and urban employment would be

⁷⁸² Randal and Desai, 1967: 2-6.

⁷⁸³ Carter, 1958: 91.

⁷⁸⁴ Hain, 1997: 85; Lapierre, 2009: 104.

⁷⁸⁵ Adikhiri, 2005: 5; Thompson, 2001: 169.

⁷⁸⁶ Dugard, 1978: 87; Trades Union Congress, 1974: 12.

⁷⁸⁷ Clark and Worger, 2011: 52; Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: Horrell, 1978: 281.

⁷⁸⁸ Horrell, 1978: 281; Landis, 1957: 47.

regarded as temporary, even if long term residents.⁷⁸⁹ The Minister of Labour explained that Africans were “primitives and illiterates who have not the faintest conception of the responsibilities of trade unionism”⁷⁹⁰ and in 1955, when amendments were carried out to the act, justified it as follows: “... it will impose a total prohibition throughout the country for any Native to do any skilled work in any European area. This is the sphere of the European and the work should be reserved for him.” Limits were placed on the number of Africans who were allowed learn skills, and those who qualified could only work in black areas.⁷⁹¹ The government did, however, promise that it would continue to ensure a supply of cheap black labour for White employers.⁷⁹²

Job reservation had the effect not just of excluding Blacks from more lucrative jobs but of elevating many poor White workers to the middle classes.⁷⁹³ Many of the laws to do with job reservation had the approval of White labour leaders who represented working class Whites, who typically had no more problem with laws privileging Whites than did the middle or upper classes.⁷⁹⁴

By the time, Dr. Verwoerd became Prime Minister, Africans were not included under the term “employee” which meant that almost all of the legislation that applied in the area of industrial relationships was irrelevant to them. By 1960, racial inequality had grown even greater than before. Whites, then representing about 20% of the population, owned about 70% of the income, and a hugely disproportionate amount of the assets.⁷⁹⁵ It had become more difficult for Blacks to find work; because Coloureds were generally not engaging in protests and boycotts, many Whites were hiring them in preference.⁷⁹⁶

Dr. Verwoerd remained committed to the policy of reserving jobs for Whites, even when it became apparent that it was damaging South Africa's economy. When the Association of Chambers of Commerce urged Dr. Verwoerd to abolish job reservation, he

⁷⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, 19 February 1954: 6, ‘Malan drafting new Negro curbs.’

⁷⁹⁰ Meredith, 1988: 57.

⁷⁹¹ Landis, 1962: 445.

⁷⁹² Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 19 February 1955: 3, ‘Apartheid seen as two-sided policy.’

⁷⁹³ Lewis, 1984: 6.

⁷⁹⁴ Brunner, 1955: 37.

⁷⁹⁵ Lipton, 1987: 36.

⁷⁹⁶ Bigart (*The New York Times*), 14 April 1960: 5, ‘Africans finding jobs hard to get.’

said that they were "traitors paving the way for black domination."⁷⁹⁷ However, most White workers were preferred not to have to deal with black competition.⁷⁹⁸

By 1964, the government was desperately recruiting Whites from overseas to carry out railway work that could have been done by many thousands of non-Whites already in the country. In one case, the railway needed to hire 1000 "shunters" and managed to attract just 250 from overseas, but refused to hire any non-Whites, while the postal service, run by White workers almost exclusively, was sinking into chaos and there were massive shortfalls of labour for industry. While non-White unemployment ran high, Dr. Verwoerd's government continued to insist that job reservation was there to stay.⁷⁹⁹

LABOUR WORKERS, UNIONS AND FORCED EMPLOYMENT⁸⁰⁰

In 1918, African workers formed the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, and by the mid-1940s about 40% had unionised.⁸⁰¹ As early as 1948 legislation effectively made Africans ineligible for unemployment benefit.⁸⁰² The Workmen's Compensation Act excluded most Africans,⁸⁰³ who could not engage in collective bargaining, form trade unions, or strike.⁸⁰⁴ After a month of unemployment an African could be forcibly relocated to a "homeland" where he had never been, with minimal chance of finding work.⁸⁰⁵ The Broederbond succeeded in uniting various Afrikaner organisations with an interest in keeping the best jobs for Whites, while limiting Africans' opportunities to advance or organise. While there had been some tolerance for mixed white and coloured unions, under Dr. Verwoerd these fell dramatically in number; all new unions registering had to be all white and extant "mixed" unions were required to segregate.⁸⁰⁶ Government employed labour officials could

⁷⁹⁷ Uys, 1989: 71.

⁷⁹⁸ Hepple and Ainslie, 1965: 66.

⁷⁹⁹ Lindsay (*The Canberra Times*), 2 December 1964: 2, 'Manpower crisis in South Africa.'

⁸⁰⁰ For more about labour workers and forced employment during apartheid see: Ainslie, R. (1977) *Masters and Serfs: Farm Labour in South Africa*; Hepple, A. (1971) *South Africa: Workers under Apartheid*; Hepple, A., Ainslie, R. (1965) *South Africa's Labour Problems*; Morris, M. (1977) *State Intervention and the Agricultural Labour Supply, Post 1948*; Posel, D. (1993) *Influx Control and Labour Markets in the 1950s*; Wilson, F. (1972) *Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969*; Wilson, F., Kooy, A., Hendrie, D. (eds.) (1977) *Farm Labour in South Africa*.

Wolpe, H. (1995) *Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid*.

⁸⁰¹ Litvak et al, 1978: 15-17.

⁸⁰² Hepple, 1971: 6; Mitson (*Morning Record*), 28 January 1965: 6, 'South Africa's barbarous racial oppression makes Mississippi as mild as a tea party.'

⁸⁰³ Landis, 1962: 444.

⁸⁰⁴ Hepple, 1971: 1.

⁸⁰⁵ Holmes, 1964: 4.

⁸⁰⁶ Landis, 1962: 438-439.

terminate any African's employment at any time, even against their employer's wishes.⁸⁰⁷ As Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. Verwoerd refused to meet racially mixed deputations of trade unions.⁸⁰⁸

In 1956, the government passed the Labour Conciliation Act obliging unions to segregate membership and extending job reservation.⁸⁰⁹ In 1960, Dr. Verwoerd threatened striking workers with banishment to a remote part of the country if they continued.⁸¹⁰ Because of the restrictions on African unionisation, registered unions only represented 10% of the working population in 1961.⁸¹¹ Under Dr. Verwoerd, his Minister of Labour stated that "pick and shovel work is the natural work of the Native ... the Native has a special aptitude for repetitive work."⁸¹²

In 1960, the average white wage was £68 per month while the average African was £13 a month.⁸¹³ Demands by African workers for a minimum wage of £1 per day were rejected by Dr. Verwoerd,⁸¹⁴ whose annual salary in 1957 as Minister of Native Affairs was £4,500.⁸¹⁵ In 1965, middle-level manpower, which included clerks, artisans and supervisors, was only 20% Black,⁸¹⁶ while one third of Blacks lived in white farms (another third lived in the cities and another third in the reserves).⁸¹⁷ In 1970, Whites who made up 17% of the population, earned 72% of the annual paid income, while Africans, 70% of the population, earned 19% of that income.⁸¹⁸

Dr. Verwoerd cynically admitted that apartheid in South Africa would be doomed if it allowed policies that would permit a Black man "to improve his skill, draw better wages and provide a better 'market' within 'white' South Africa." His perception was that the well-being of Whites depended on wages for Blacks remaining as low as possible, and controls on influx provided the means to ensure that this happened.⁸¹⁹ He claimed that Blacks were often

⁸⁰⁷ Rubin and Rubin, 1965: 8.

⁸⁰⁸ van der Horst, 1981: 57.

⁸⁰⁹ Hepple, 2011: 51.

⁸¹⁰ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 17 April 1960: 1, 'Threat to banish strikers is made by South Africa.'

⁸¹¹ Hepple and Ainslie, 1965: 65.

⁸¹² van den Berghe, 1962: 604.

⁸¹³ Segal, 1960: 5.

⁸¹⁴ *The Economist*, 26 April 1958: 321, 'Afrikaner triumph.'

⁸¹⁵ *The Canberra Times*, 25 May 1957: 6, 'Dr. Verwoerd, South Africa's 'evil genius.'

⁸¹⁶ Kane-Berman, 1991: 9.

⁸¹⁷ Venter, 1999: 433.

⁸¹⁸ de Beer, 1984: 32.

⁸¹⁹ Burke, 2006: 89; Posel, 1997: 66.

very happy in circumstances that would have made Whites very unhappy.⁸²⁰ A “socio-economic” survey published in 1962, essentially propaganda for Dr. Verwoerd’s government, maintained that lower salaries to Africans should be seen in the context of what it described as their subsidised lifestyle and pointed out that rents were lower in Bantu areas.⁸²¹

A phenomenon that began during Dr. Verwoerd’s time, but continued afterwards, was that of forced labour. Due to the intensification of the implementation of the pass laws with pass raids taking place every night all over the country,⁸²² a special section of the police was set up to check passes closely, and arrest anyone who broke these laws. This section was known as the “Ghost Squad” and it quickly developed a reputation for springing inspections on Africans at any moment and in any place or time. Thousands of men were apprehended by Ghost Squads, and the Native Commissioner’s Court was not able to manage the volume of arrests, especially in Johannesburg. To manage the numbers, a lot of offenders were pressganged into working on white farms without even going through the corrupt and racist court system. Men were bundled into closed vans and rushed to farms, leaving no trace. They were told that they would be sent to jail for five years if they went through the court system, but that they could get out of trouble by doing some farm work.⁸²³

A number of men who had disappeared in this way were traced and eventually found on potato farms on the Eastern Transvaal area. Some had been killed by foremen and buried in the furrows made when the tractor ploughed the soil. At first, Dr. Verwoerd dismissed reports of workers disappearing as Communist propaganda. When confronted with the evidence, he shifted his ground and blamed “the Jews,” stressing that the farms in question were Jewish-owned. The irony was evident; Verwoerd’s tactics being extremely close to those utilised by the SS in Nazi Germany against the Jews.⁸²⁴ The pass system clearly facilitated White farmers who wished to treat their labourers brutally, up to and including actions that led to deaths.⁸²⁵ One White farmer, Jack Najke, was convicted for whipping a Black labourer to death, and punished by receiving just six strokes.⁸²⁶ In 1953, the United

⁸²⁰ *The Economist*, 25 February 1950: 435, ‘Racial tension in South Africa.’

⁸²¹ Andrews et al, 1962: 178.

⁸²² Pienaar, 1999: 25.

⁸²³ Mbeki, 1991: 5-6, 167; Helen Suzman quoted in Suttner, 1997: 441.

⁸²⁴ Mbeki, 1991: 5-6, 167.

⁸²⁵ Zug, 2007: 154.

⁸²⁶ Helen Suzman quoted in Suttner, 1997: 441.

Nations/I.L.O. Ad Hoc Committee defined South Africa's labour system as "a system of forced labour."⁸²⁷

Apartheid's laws protecting non-Whites at work, both from accidents and conditions, lagged far behind those of Western industrialised countries. Every year more than two thousands of these workers died in industrial accidents, 800 of them in mining, while more than 250,000 were injured. In addition, each year hundreds of thousands of non-White workers were made ill by exposure without significant protection to dangerous chemicals, asbestos, dust, noise and other substances that are harmful over a period of time.⁸²⁸

A major issue for Dr. Verwoerd was the need to satisfy the increasing demand for labourers for the White farms and businesses. On one hand, he wanted to restrict and reduce the number of non-Whites living in the major cities, but on the other he had to satisfy the Whites' need for Black workers. This contradictory situation was very accurately described by Opposition Leader Sir de Villiers Graaff: "Apartheid has become something like Mohammed's coffin suspended between the heaven of total apartheid and the earth of hard facts of the South African situation, with farmers, industrialists and mining interests demanding more labour."⁸²⁹

In 1964, South Africa withdrew from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), stating that the Organization was hostile to its interests.⁸³⁰ In 1965, the International Agency for Employment used the word "slavery" in connection with South Africa. It declared that the "state of African labour forces bound to a South African economy under the principles of white supremacy" could "barely be differentiated from slavery."⁸³¹ Nelson Mandela said that apartheid led to "the creation of a vast market of cheap labour for mine magnates and Farmers."⁸³²

The same year, Dr. Verwoerd reaffirmed government policy of a South Africa for Whites. The large numbers of Black workers in mines and factories had begun to alarm the White work force. Reassuring them, Dr. Verwoerd stated: "the mere presence of large numbers of Bantu in employment does not amount to integration. It is only when there is

⁸²⁷ Ainslie, 1977: 8.

⁸²⁸ de Beer, 1984: 13, 34.

⁸²⁹ *TIME*, 3 February 1958: 22, 'South Africa: Mohammed's coffin.'

⁸³⁰ Hepple, 1966: 251.

⁸³¹ *Neues Deutschland*, 9 September 1966: 7, 'Dr. Verwoerd.'

⁸³² Johns and Hunt Davis, 1991: 30; Levy et al, 2014: 7.

intermingling of those people in social life or in the political or religious spheres that one really gets integration. The mere fact that foreigners are employed in a community or in another country does not constitute integration.”⁸³³ In 1968, G.F. van L. Froneman, Deputy Minister of Justice, Mines and Planning, cynically admitted, “That is in fact the entire basis of our policy as far as the white economy is concerned, namely a system of migratory labour.”⁸³⁴

Marxist commentators such as Harold Wolpe have pointed out that apartheid can be read in terms of capitalism rather than simply in terms of its racist policies. He describes it as “the attempt of the capitalist class to meet the expanding demand for cheap African labour in the era of industrial manufacturing capital,” and “the realisation of the demand of White workers for protection against the resulting increased competition from Black workers.”⁸³⁵ This system led to the creation of a very cheap migrant labour force, and to intense rural poverty and the enablement of extraordinary low wages being paid to Africans in employment in capitalist industries.⁸³⁶

NON-WHITE WOMEN⁸³⁷

Women were often limited in their quest to make a living not just by the segregation and discrimination that all Blacks faced – White women used Black women’s labour to carry out effectively all the domestic work in their suburban homes⁸³⁸ – but also just by being women in a very patriarchal society. Many who settled in urban areas supplemented their income with home-breweries. These “shebeens” were illegal and, under Dr. Verwoerd, police raids increased in an attempt to crack down, threatening women’s ability to live independently and making them more vulnerable to forced removals.⁸³⁹

⁸³³ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), H. F. Dr. Verwoerd, Vol. 14, 1964, Col. 68; Mzimela, 1980: 121;

⁸³⁴ International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, in co-operation with the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, 1981: 7.

⁸³⁵ Wolpe, 1995: 427.

⁸³⁶ Wolpe, 1995: 444.

⁸³⁷ For the situation of non-White women under apartheid see Bernstein, H. (1975) *For their Triumphs and their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa* and International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, in co-operation with the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid (1981) *Women Under Apartheid*.

⁸³⁸ Mkhondo, 1993: 114. In a pamphlet on the correct treatment of Black servants, the city of Johannesburg recommended giving them orders one at a time, as few servants (it claimed) were capable of remembering more than one order, or of carrying them out as requested (Frankel, 1999: 58).

⁸³⁹ Worden, 2000: 114.

Whereas the townships were envisioned as places wherein nuclear families would live, often men left their wives and children behind in "the village" and took up residence with another woman, making it easier for them to obtain a house while keeping a family in their traditional home area. As women's access to urban areas was not controlled, many Black women settled in townships in this way.⁸⁴⁰

Under Dr. Verwoerd's reign as Minister for Native Affairs, these women were considered a significant problem. They were blamed for the decline of traditional patriarchal relationships and, consequently, for moral decay, single motherhood, youth delinquency and high levels of urban crime. Women who were not directly involved in "ministering to white needs," even though they lived in urban areas, were classified as economically redundant. By restricting urban access to women who worked in service or were married to men who had official permission, it was perceived that greater control could be gained over all these issues.⁸⁴¹

However, women were less likely to be treated brutally or imprisoned by the police and, realising this, they became increasingly involved in protest, which was sometimes violent.⁸⁴² Obtaining the requisite passes was an incredible ordeal. Women often waited for hours or even days, and those whose passes were not in order were imprisoned in cold, unfurnished cells. Detailed women were supposed to be overseen by a female "matron" but in practice were generally handled by male officers, who could easily molest them.⁸⁴³ While in theory these laws were in place from the 1950s, many of them were not applied until the 1960s as, in response to a groundswell of protest, Dr. Verwoerd had made a number of concessions earlier.⁸⁴⁴ From 1959, women's protests had acquired a keener focus in rural and urban areas alike.⁸⁴⁵

⁸⁴⁰ Bonner et al, 1993: 24.

⁸⁴¹ Posel, 1997: 8-10.

⁸⁴² Welsh, 2000: 452.

⁸⁴³ *Drum*, November 1955.

⁸⁴⁴ Posel, 1997: 177.

⁸⁴⁵ *The Economist*, 5 September 1959: 746, 'The size of a man's hand.'

HEALTH⁸⁴⁶

Arguably one of the most shocking examples of discrimination under apartheid came in the area of health. Most public hospitals were segregated and the non-Whites did not receive the same level of treatment as the Whites.⁸⁴⁷ Government spending was so tilted towards South Africa's Whites that their care standards were among the highest in the world. The greatest health threat to Whites came from their affluence, with conditions such as coronary artery disease. By contrast, their non-White fellow countrymen died in large numbers from diseases associated with poverty. Often malnourished and lacking easy access to treatment, they fell victim to tuberculosis, pneumonia, typhoid and gastroenteritis.⁸⁴⁸

An aggravating factor was that the underfunded Black hospitals were usually vastly overcrowded and understaffed because educational opportunities for Africans were restricted by the Bantu Education Act. A typical example was a Soweto hospital, whose forty-bed wards often held as many as 125 patients.⁸⁴⁹ Any white hospital, by contrast, would have empty beds and an excess of often underemployed medics. Outside of institutional care, urban areas enjoyed greater access to doctors than did rural areas, where Africans mostly lived. The ratio of doctors to the general population was rated at 1 to 1,970, but in the rural areas, this figure dropped as low as 1 doctor to 40,000 people.⁸⁵⁰

Bad hygiene, poverty, under-nourishment or starvation and lack of funding for Black hospitals seriously affected the health of the non-White population. In 1964, the life expectancy of a White was seventy; for a Black it was forty.⁸⁵¹ In the 1970s, at least 23,000 people died of tuberculosis and only 1% of them were White.⁸⁵² However, it was among children that the killer effects of apartheid were most obvious. In 1952, the infant mortality

⁸⁴⁶ For more regarding health during apartheid see Benatar, S.R. (1987) *Medicine and Health Care in South Africa*; Burke, A. (2006) *Mental Health Care during Apartheid in South Africa: An Illustration of How 'Science' Can Be Abused*; Bush, E. (1987) *The Struggle for Health*; de Beer, C. (1984) *The South African Disease: Apartheid Health and Health Services*; Jeeves, A. (2000) *Health, Surveillance and Community: South Africa's Early Experiment with Medical Reform in the 1940s and 1950s*; Mphahlele, M. (1981) *The Plight of the Homelands Health Services*; Nightingale et al. (1990) *Apartheid Medicine: Health and human Rights in South Africa*; Phatlane, S.N. (2006) *Poverty, Health and Disease in the Era of High Apartheid: South Africa, 1948-1976* (Ph.D thesis); Price, M. (1987) *Health Care as an Instrument of Apartheid policy in South Africa*; Susser, M., Cherry, V.P. (1982) *Health and Health Care under Apartheid*; van Rensburg, H.C.J. and Mans, A. (1982) *Profile of Disease and Health Care in South Africa*.

⁸⁴⁷ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁸⁴⁸ Phatlane, 2006.

⁸⁴⁹ Susser and Cherry, 1982: 470.

⁸⁵⁰ Susser and Cherry, 1982: 469.

⁸⁵¹ Holmes, 1964: 4.

⁸⁵² de Beer, 1984: 1-2.

rate for White babies was 34 in 1,000 live births, while that for Coloureds was 140. No figure was given for Black babies, but it was certainly significantly higher than for the Coloureds.⁸⁵³ In 1960, the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births for Whites was 29.6, for Asians 59.6, for Blacks 95 and for Coloureds 128.6.⁸⁵⁴

Assuming the Black baby survived at birth, it faced a strong possibility of contracting tuberculosis, but its biggest threat was from lack of nourishment. Up to 40% of pre-school children suffered from malnutrition⁸⁵⁵ and between 15,000 and 30,000 died each year from starvation or illnesses related to lack of nutrition.⁸⁵⁶ About 50% of Black children died under five,⁸⁵⁷ while the same figure for White children was just 5%.⁸⁵⁸ In addition, gastroenteritis killed 10% of the infant population,⁸⁵⁹ with thousands of other succumbing to measles and gastroenteritis, conditions which could be cured by timely treatment.⁸⁶⁰ Dr. Verwoerd's reply in 1958 to all this was that his government spent \$8.61 per head per year on the health and education of Africans, while the then Belgian Congo spent \$1.30 and India 3 cents.⁸⁶¹

Of course, Dr. Verwoerd and the Government were not the only ones who supported segregation. In the 1950s, the South African Psychology Association (SAPA) refused to accept Black members; and SAPA president A.B. van den Merwe, along with two other prominent members in La Grange and J.M. du Toit, went personally to Dr. Verwoerd (a psychologist himself), and asked him "to extend the powers of the Group Areas Act (Act No. 7 of 1957) to enable the banning of meetings where blacks and whites were to confer together." They even suggested legislation that would require racial separation in all associations.⁸⁶² When Blacks were finally allowed to join the Association in 1962, several White members resigned and formed their own Whites-only association, PIRSA.⁸⁶³ The same year, Dr. Verwoerd threatened to withdraw subsidies from racially integrated and scientific

⁸⁵³ Christian Action, 1955: 25.

⁸⁵⁴ Nightingale et al, 1990: 2099.

⁸⁵⁵ Susser and Cherry, 1982: 457.

⁸⁵⁶ de Beer, 1984: 12.

⁸⁵⁷ *Kaffir Boy: The True Story of a Black Youth's Coming of Age in Apartheid South Africa* (2006) by Marc Mathabane provides the reader with a painfully accurate account of the author's difficult childhood growing up in apartheid South Africa of the 60s and 70s.

⁸⁵⁸ Holmes, 1964: 4.

⁸⁵⁹ Susser and Cherry, 1982: 457.

⁸⁶⁰ de Beer, 1984: 12.

⁸⁶¹ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, 'Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid'; *TIME*, 15 September 1958: 26, 'South Africa: God's man.'

⁸⁶² Cooper et al, 1990: 5-6.

⁸⁶³ Nicholas, 1990: 51.

associations unless they amended their constitutions to exclude Blacks. However, his threat was met with resistance from most of the associations and did not go through.⁸⁶⁴

Finally, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) argued that “the health sector, through apathy and acceptance of the status quo and acts of omission, allowed the creation of an environment in which the health of millions of South Africans was neglected, even at times actively compromised and in which violations of moral and ethical codes of practice were frequent, facilitating violations of human rights.”⁸⁶⁵

PETTY APARTHEID

The many laws that underlay petty apartheid have also been described as micro-apartheid, distinguishing them from meso-apartheid (the separation of residential zones in urban areas) and macro-apartheid (movements towards future ethnically homogeneous nations).⁸⁶⁶ The “petty apartheid” rules covered by the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act in 1953, when Dr. Verwoerd was Minister for Native Affairs, which legislated for complete segregation in all public amenities where Blacks and Whites might interact, restricting Blacks’ access to beaches, restaurants, hotels, schools, libraries, cinemas, theatres, public transport and sporting facilities.⁸⁶⁷

The Act also legislated that the facilities for non-Whites had to be “adequate,” rather than equivalent in quality.⁸⁶⁸ Soon, there were “whites only” signs all over South Africa,⁸⁶⁹ and Blacks were arrested for such crimes as ordering coffee from a White waitress in a railway waiting room, or stepping across a partition into the “white” side.⁸⁷⁰ Segregation on trains was not new, but the laws associated with it became ever more firmly enforced; in 1955, for example, an African who ran for a departing train and jumped onto a “white” coach was knocked unconscious onto the platform.⁸⁷¹ Special days were set aside for non-Whites to visit leisure destinations such as zoos, museums and agricultural shows.⁸⁷²

⁸⁶⁴ Nicholas, 1990: 54.

⁸⁶⁵ Nicholas, 2014: 19.

⁸⁶⁶ Adam, 1971: 68.

⁸⁶⁷ Beinart, 2001: 152; Clark and Worger, 2011: 52; Guelke, 2005: 27; Le May, 1995: 208; Marquard, 1969: 75; 127; *The New York Times*, 20 June 1990, ‘Apartheid law repealed’; Worden, 2000: 108.

⁸⁶⁸ Carter, 1954: 307.

⁸⁶⁹ Beinart, 2001: 152; Clark and Worger, 2011: 52; Le May, 1995: 208; Marquard, 1969: 75: 127.

⁸⁷⁰ *The New York Times*, 28 March 1953, ‘Ruling on Negroes held Malan again: Decision barring segregation.’

⁸⁷¹ Pirie, 1992: 688.

⁸⁷² International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975b: 11.

In 1957, when the expanded Native Laws Amendment Act was passed, after Dr. Verwoerd had piled "statute after discriminatory statute" on,⁸⁷³ opposition was raised to a clause that stated that "no African shall attend any church or other religious service" if his presence constituted a "nuisance." At this point even the intensely racist Reformed Church objected, stating that the government did not have the right to interfere with the freedom of churches, and Dr. Verwoerd agreed to reword the bill to clarify that it was not "intended to interfere with the freedom of the individual to worship... so long as such freedom was not misused to the disturbance of good order in the community."⁸⁷⁴

Dr. Verwoerd insisted that Blacks should only enter white churches if they had been hired as janitors.⁸⁷⁵ Non-Whites could not attend "white" churches, and in some black areas all denominations except the Dutch Reformed Church (which supported apartheid) were banned.⁸⁷⁶ Dr. Verwoerd pleaded with the Dutch Reformed Church not to unite with any other churches (which mostly fiercely opposed the ruling)⁸⁷⁷ on this matter, fearing that this would provide an "in" to the anti-apartheid activists.⁸⁷⁸

The Native Laws Amendment Act also suggested that the government had the right to prevent or break up any inter-racial gathering that might be constituted by anyone as a "nuisance." This, "might amount to a ban on a particular flat or house where people made a point of holding mixed parties which might be an annoyance to their neighbours or cause the concentration in a White area of numbers of Africans,"⁸⁷⁹ and it gave the government the right to ban Africans from any area it wished.⁸⁸⁰

There was also extensive social segregation. Schools, hospitals and clinics, recreational facilities, and so forth were segregated. In workplaces, where contact across the colour line was unavoidable, canteens, toilets and even elevators were segregated with the goal of keeping contact between Blacks and Whites to an absolute minimum,⁸⁸¹ with segregated residential areas, schools, medical facilities, recreational facilities, transport and

⁸⁷³ *The Economist*, 17 August 1957: 555, 'Signs of change in South Africa.'

⁸⁷⁴ Carter, 1958: 117.

⁸⁷⁵ *The New York Times*, 28 March 1953, 'Ruling on Negroes held Malan again: Decision barring segregation.'

⁸⁷⁶ Landis, 1962: 453.

⁸⁷⁷ Kruger, 1969: 310.

⁸⁷⁸ *The Economist*, 1 June 1957: 795, 'Strydom scorns the doubters.'

⁸⁷⁹ Ballinger, 1969: 356-357.

⁸⁸⁰ *The Economist*, 23 June 1956: 1199, 'Black session in South Africa.'

⁸⁸¹ Lipton, 1987: 36-37.

most other public amenities. The intention - and the effect - was to reduce social contact between Blacks and Whites to the irreducible minimum.

Under Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister, the South African authorities continued to “crack down” on segregation, and the expanding rights given to the police and civil service made these “petty” laws a major disturbance to the lives of uncountable Black and Coloured South Africans. In his efforts to extend apartheid to every single aspect of South African life, Dr. Verwoerd often confronted his people with absurd situations. These manifestations of extreme pettiness were known colloquially as “pinpricks.” They included the government’s refusal to allow Breyten Breytenbach⁸⁸², a noted Afrikaans poet and author, who had married a Vietnamese woman in contravention of the Immorality Act, to visit his wife.⁸⁸³ Among many other absurdities were:

- The banning of a traditional annual performance of Handel’s *Messiah*, because it was performed by a black choir with a White conductor and white orchestra.⁸⁸⁴
- In 1960, he warned South Africans that they would be guilty of disloyalty if they wished to travel to Ghana and obeyed the law there which required them to sign a declaration against racial segregation.⁸⁸⁵
- In 1960, Louis Armstrong was not granted a visa to travel to South Africa, as it was considered dangerous for South African Blacks to see a Black American performer who was as widely respected as a musician.⁸⁸⁶
- In 1960, his Government published regulations “to insure as far as possible that no White would receive a blood transfusion from an African donor and vice versa.”⁸⁸⁷
- In 1965 an Indian baby born to South African parents holidaying in India was forbidden permission to enter South Africa because of the ban on South African immigration. The baby was unwell and there was nobody in India to care for him.⁸⁸⁸

⁸⁸² A world renowned South African writer, poet and painter. While in France in the early 1960s, he got married to a French woman of Vietnamese ancestry. He was not able to return to South Africa and live with her as mixed marriages were prohibited (Brookes, 1968: 187-192). For his anti-apartheid activities, he was convicted of sabotage and jailed for nine years (Abel, 1995: 16). For more about Breytenbach see his 1984 memoir *The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist*.

⁸⁸³ Brookes, 1968: 187-192.

⁸⁸⁴ Brookes, 1968: 187-192.

⁸⁸⁵ *The New York Times*, 15 August 1960: 7, ‘South Africans warned: Dr. Verwoerd hints penalties for any who take Ghana Oath.’

⁸⁸⁶ *Sunday Tribune*, 25 September 1960: 1, ‘Apartheid ban on Louis Armstrong.’

⁸⁸⁷ *The New York Times*, 21 May 1960: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd asserts God saved his life.’

⁸⁸⁸ *The New York Times*, 7 July 1965: 34, ‘South Africa bars Indian baby.’

- When the film *Oceans 11* came out, starring Frank Sinatra, Dean Martin and Sammy Davis Jr., publicity images excised Davis Jr. from the original photograph.⁸⁸⁹
- The law about black ingress to cities had to be bent to accommodate Black milkmen as their inability to deliver milk was driving up costs and infuriating White housewives.⁸⁹⁰
- By 1966, Dr. Verwoerd had succeeded in forcing charitable organisations to exert all their efforts along strict apartheid lines.⁸⁹¹
- Dr. Verwoerd expressed his opposition to the film dramatization of *Othello*, starring Laurence Olivier, being shown, feeling that it was inappropriate for South Africans to see a film featuring individuals of different races acting together.⁸⁹²
- Dr. Verwoerd was outraged when the United States embassy invited guests of all races to its Fourth of July party in 1965,⁸⁹³ when the US government refused to rule out hiring non-Whites to work in its two space-observations stations in South Africa,⁸⁹⁴ and when the decision was taken not to let an aircraft carrier berth in Cape Town rather than observe Dr. Verwoerd's demands about non-White Navy members.⁸⁹⁵

SPORTS⁸⁹⁶

Throughout Verwoerd's tenure in government, White athletes were barred from competing against non-Whites.⁸⁹⁷ An integrated approach to apartheid in sports first formed under Strijdom's government, with Dr. Verwoerd as Minister for Native Affairs, and the official new policy was announced in 1956.⁸⁹⁸ International teams travelling to play in South Africa had to be White, although South African teams would play mixed teams overseas if necessary. Non-White athletes from outside South Africa would play non-white South

⁸⁸⁹ Mitson (*Morning Record*), 28 January 1965: 6, 'South Africa's barbarous racial oppression makes Mississippi as mild as a tea party.'

⁸⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, 19 July 1957: 12. 'African law modified.'

⁸⁹¹ *The Cape Times*, 21 October 1961: n.p. 'Major charities to adopt apartheid.'

⁸⁹² Boshoff, 1974: 228; Kenney, 1980: 263.

⁸⁹³ Hepple, 1967: 201; McKay, 1966b: 42-43; *The New York Times*, 27 June 1965: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd scores US guest lists.'

⁸⁹⁴ Dugard, 1978: 60-61; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 28 June 1965: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd race bar challenges US at space tracking stations'; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 3 July 1965: 2, 'Dispute on negroes is avoided by US and South Africa'; McKay, 1966b: 42-43.

⁸⁹⁵ Hepple, 1967: 201; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 18 August 1965: 9, 'Dr. Verwoerd denies he is goading US.'

⁸⁹⁶ For a detailed account of sports during apartheid see Booth, D. (1998) *The Race Game. Sport and Politics in South Africa*; Brickhill, J. (1976) *Race against Race: South Africa's "Multi-national" Sport Fraud*; de Broglio, C. (1970) *Apartheid in Sport*; Lapchick, R.E. (1979) *South Africa: Sport and Apartheid Politics*; Rademeyer, C. (2014) *Entrenching Apartheid in South African Sport, 1948-1980*.

⁸⁹⁷ *TIME*, 26 August 1966: 20, 'South Africa: The great white laager.'

⁸⁹⁸ Rademeyer, 2014: 121-122.

African teams, non-White sporting bodies in South Africa would have to seek recognition through white channels and white athletes would be denied passports if they intended to challenge these laws.⁸⁹⁹ In 1958 the formation of the South African Sports Association, supposedly to coordinate non-white sporting efforts and represent non-white sports people, entrenched apartheid in this area.⁹⁰⁰

Under Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister, apartheid in sport became more widespread and deeply entrenched. His decision to force a departure from the Commonwealth denied athletes the opportunity to compete in the Commonwealth Games, and his insistence on following apartheid in sport to the letter resulted in rising opposition from foreign teams and nations. Although non-White foreigners were supposed to be able to travel to South Africa to compete against non-White athletes, they were routinely denied visas.⁹⁰¹

Sporting events became a means through which ordinary Blacks could protest, by attending international matches and supporting the visitors.⁹⁰² This led to the barring of non-Whites from most stadiums, formalised in 1965 with an extension of the Group Areas Act.⁹⁰³ Black sports organisations were ordered to segregate their membership. In 1960, Dr. Verwoerd refused permission to the New Zealand rugby team to enter South Africa because it was an integrated team with Maori players; demonstrations in New Zealand soon followed.⁹⁰⁴ He affirmed this position in 1965, also clarifying that he considered it fine for an all-Star South African team to play against teams with Maoris while in New Zealand.⁹⁰⁵ Rugby was considered to be South Africa's national game.⁹⁰⁶

In 1962, Japanese swimmers and athletes were granted honorary white status so that they could compete in South Africa because the government was wooing the Japanese trade.⁹⁰⁷ In 1963, an Indian golfer won the Natal open, beating 113 White players. He had to be awarded his prize outside in the rain, as the clubhouse did not permit entry to non-Whites. The result was not mentioned on any of the shows of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, which had cancelled coverage of the event on learning that one of the

⁸⁹⁹ Rademeyer, 2014: 121-122.

⁹⁰⁰ Brickhill, 1976: 9.

⁹⁰¹ Rademeyer, 2014: 123-124.

⁹⁰² Lapchick, 1979: 158.

⁹⁰³ Brickhill, 1976: 7.

⁹⁰⁴ Beinart, 2001: 230; Giliomee, 2011: 530; Marquard, 1969: 138.

⁹⁰⁵ Brickhill, 1976: 11; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1965: 4, 'Dr. Verwoerd affirms Maori athlete bar.'

⁹⁰⁶ Calpin, 1968: 155.

⁹⁰⁷ de Broglio, 1970: n.p

contestants was not White.⁹⁰⁸ South Africa was banned from the Tokyo Olympics in 1964,⁹⁰⁹ after a number of years of discussions on the part of the Olympic Committee.⁹¹⁰ Dr. Verwoerd responded to the growing international attention with sport by claiming that sport was not a political matter, while arguing that the principles of national sovereignty allowed South Africa to pass laws about domestic affairs without any interference or criticism from overseas.⁹¹¹

PROPAGANDA

Since Malan's government in 1948, the National Party had operated an Information Office designed to broadcast propaganda lauding South Africa and its apartheid efforts, largely for international attention. The Information Office's budget was expanded hugely under Dr. Verwoerd. From 1962 it had its own Cabinet Minister and the number of employees grew from 59 to 378, with offices in South Africa and New York. They produced a monthly magazine, films, booklets and pamphlets that showed South Africa in a very flattering light. A magazine called *Bantu* was aimed mostly at South African readers and dedicated to Bantu affairs (as stated above, it was distributed for free to Bantu schools for the use of teachers and students). The film section of the Office was very successful, even winning numerous international awards for its features.⁹¹²

Dr. Verwoerd himself intensified an extraordinary, almost surreal, propaganda campaign intended to convince native Blacks and the outside world that non-Whites also supported apartheid and that he was seen by the Blacks as the "saviour of the black races." The June 1955 issue of *Bantu* ran a poetic eulogy to Dr. Verwoerd, evidently scripted by a Black admirer. The Department strongly denied that it had been an officially sponsored initiative and maintained that it was simply a Black man's initiative to show his gratitude to Dr. Verwoerd:⁹¹³

⁹⁰⁸ Conley (*The New York Times*), 15 October 1963: 64, 'Apartheid in sports.'

⁹⁰⁹ de Broglio, 1970: 9.

⁹¹⁰ Honey, 2000: 178.

⁹¹¹ Booth, 1998: 88.

⁹¹² Hepple, 1967: 107-108; McKay, 1966: 7.

⁹¹³ Loveland, 1999: 357.

Dr. Verwoerd

Minister of Native Affairs

I

Dr. Verwoerd, thou art the Shepherd of the black races,
Thou art the defender of the Bantu, our rock, our mountain,

Thou art our refuge and our shield.

The mountain that saves us, our refuge,

The Saviour who rescued us at time of need.

II

We the Bantu boast and say: 'Glory unto thee Dr. Verwoerd,'

And to all we are the defenders of the Bantu:

We were amidst the seas of fear,

Fearing the government of the malefactors, trapped in the nets of the

hypocrites. We were in fear.

III

We were cornered and we called the Government- the N.A.D.,

We called to the Government in Pretoria and it hearkened unto us,

Dr. Verwoerd, thou hast answered our prayers,

And saved us when the canning had risen against us,

Thou rescued and helped us because thou loved us.

IV

Thou showed us compassion because we have no guilt,

Thou led us because there was no one to lead us in our works,

We now sit in the glory of thy good works,

We should never forsake thy laws, for they bring

Plenty, wisdom and knowledge.

V

Dr. Verwoerd, though art with us! Glory unto thee our redeemer,
Praises be unto Dr. Verwoerd, the defender of the Bantu,
He that helped the chiefs by giving them good laws,
He that gave schools proper education,
Because he knew what we need and we could not manage.

H. Kharibe.

This poetic rhapsody provoked some derision, and Dr. Verwoerd quickly claimed that he had no hand in its publication.⁹¹⁴ On another occasion, when Dr. Verwoerd was still Minister for Native Affairs, he apparently received a letter from a Black supporter that read, in part: "We, the people of the Reserves, are very happy, because through the government's policy we will be in a position to trade among our own people and practice as doctors and practitioners among our own people under the trusteeship of the Minister of Native Affairs." Naturally the letter was publicized in an effort to show the world that Black South Africans supported Dr. Verwoerd's policies.⁹¹⁵ Although its authenticity has not been debated, it should surely be viewed with scepticism.

It is interesting to note that Dr. Verwoerd had banned television in South Africa, comparing it with "atomic bombs and poison gas," claiming that it was a "corrupting medium" and something "noxious," even while he commissioned high-quality propaganda to be shown on overseas TV stations.⁹¹⁶ In 1960 Dr. Verwoerd warned that "the effect on our cultural life, particularly of the largely American influences which would go hand in hand with television, is not a matter that one can treat lightly."⁹¹⁷ Bernard Cross, lecturer of Communication and Media at Paris West University Nanterre La Défense, has said that

⁹¹⁴ Hepple, 1967: 108-109

⁹¹⁵ Dvorin, 1952: 156.

⁹¹⁶ Hughes, 1961: 171; Leonard, 1983: 164; Nixon, 1994: 43; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, 'Dr. Verwoerd stabbed to death at his desk in Parliament.'

⁹¹⁷ Nixon, 1994: 43.

“under Dr. Verwoerd the television became the arch-enemy of Afrikaner interests and nationalist politics.”⁹¹⁸

Dr. Verwoerd did not want a window through which South Africans could view the rest of the world, and perhaps find their views challenged. The television might have led ordinary people of all colours to question the foundations of apartheid even more. In 1958, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Albert Hertzog, stressed that the government was firmly opposed to television, pointing out that parents had no way to control which shows were aired in their houses, and that there was no effective way for the government to control TV broadcasting. The National Party stated that modern things were not necessarily desirable, and that the government had a responsibility to guard its people from physical and “spiritual” dangers and that TV would “bring chaos to South African life.” As most TV programming would come from overseas, through English, the National Party had long felt that it would pose a threat to the cultural hegemony they strove to establish.⁹¹⁹ Whites felt that television would provide a bad example to Blacks,⁹²⁰ and conservative commentators in the US tended to agree, claiming that without television there would have been no civil rights movement there.⁹²¹

In 1960, Dr. Verwoerd gave a speech in Parliament in which he elucidated the three reasons he considered central to the argument against allowing television in South Africa. He stated that TV should be kept out until enough research had been done into the topic of its potential “evil” impacts, both physical and mental, and on the nation in cultural terms. He felt that it was pointless introducing TV, which was inessential, before the medium had been developed further at the expense of other countries. He also insisted that the costs of creating programmes was too high, and would require a tax on sales, licence fees, and very substantial government subsidies. He could not allow an independent (i.e. not state controlled) station, as this risked South Africans being exposed to low-quality programming from overseas, and excluding some of the South African population (those in remote areas) from watching TV that their taxes were subsidising.⁹²²

⁹¹⁸ Cros, 1996: 117.

⁹¹⁹ Orlik, 1970: 245-246.

⁹²⁰ *TIME*, 10 May 1971, ‘South Africa: Apartheid television.’

⁹²¹ Nixon, 1999.

⁹²² Orlik, 1970: 247; Under pressure from the public, and amid embarrassment that other, less advanced, African nations already had television (Cros, 1996: 124), television was finally introduced in 1976 on the grounds that it would be better for the government to provide it and control its than for people to use satellite dishes and watch unapproved programming from elsewhere, perhaps Russia (Nixon, 1999, n.p.).

Under Piet Meyer, the head of the State Information Broadcasting Corporation, South Africa was presented as a paradise in which all the races lived happily, but separately. This image was projected by Dr. Verwoerd's powerful publicity machine. Press officers worked in international capitals around the world, and the government churned out publications and films.⁹²³ Many people outside South Africa, including opponents of the apartheid system, had minimal access to the reality of how South Africa worked. Apartheid propaganda and the "pro-business Press" in South Africa colluded to prevent the truth coming to light.⁹²⁴

The SABC acted as both sword and shield for apartheid, promoting the ideology as a form of governance that was widely accepted, while blocking the ears of South Africans to criticism of the government. By switching to FM broadcasting, the Corporation ensured that its listeners heard little of the international outcry that arose after the Sharpeville massacre and without competitors, it generally shaped and distorted the news as it pleased. When Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in 1968, there was mourning across the world, not least in the black townships of South Africa. The SABC chose to present his death in blatantly racist terms. Its 7 a.m. news bulletin said, "Widespread rioting has broken out in the United States following the assassination of the Negro civil rights agitator, Martin Luther King."⁹²⁵ Throughout the 1960s and beyond, the International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa provided financial assistance to political prisoners and their lawyers. In 1965, the South African Broadcasting Corporation claimed that the IDAF had links to saboteurs in South Africa. IDAF challenged the government and the SABC to support its smear with evidence. Unsurprisingly, none was provided.⁹²⁶

The South African Department of Information spent a fortune trying to convince the rest of the world that it had misunderstood South Africa and apartheid. Publications such as 1962's *South Africa Speaks* and in 1963 *South African Realities* presented the government's take on apartheid, portraying South Africa as a stable, multi-cultural country full of happy citizens co-existing on a separate-but-equal basis. It consistently portrayed Blacks as "a fortunate people with a higher income and standard of living, and better social and educational services" than Africans elsewhere, while also spreading the false idea, central to Afrikaans folk history, that Whites arrived in South Africa before Blacks. It devoted great

⁹²³ Hughes, 1961: 171.

⁹²⁴ Clark, 1986: 1.

⁹²⁵ Daniel and Vale, 2009: 140.

⁹²⁶ IDAF, Fund under fire, Information Service Manual, n.d: xv-xviii.

effort to stressing the notion that whatever problems South Africa had were attributed to Communism, with apartheid posited as a crucial tool in fighting this menace.⁹²⁷

These efforts were, for a long time, largely successful. Many people outside South Africa, even those who opposed apartheid, had no access to reliable information about what society was really like there. The propagandists and their allies, in the form of the big-business interests and media in powerful countries like the United States, all played a crucial role in preventing the whole truth from becoming better known.⁹²⁸

It should be noted that the South African Department of Information did not limit its campaign to presenting a positive picture of South Africa, but, like the SABC, it sought to smear organizations which contested apartheid. For example, in 1978 it labelled Amnesty International as "Amnesty for Terrorism" after that organization reported widely on the use of torture by the apartheid police and in South African prisons. The implication was that by taking such a stance, Amnesty International was supporting terrorists.⁹²⁹

The South African authorities felt strongly about winning the Americans over to their project, and this was a major thrust of the propaganda effort, which stressed how well American investments could do in the South African economy.⁹³⁰ For this purpose, in September 1966, a powerful \$6,500,000 radio transmitter, *Voice of South Africa*, started broadcasting programmes, reaching audiences as distant as the United States.⁹³¹ Dr. Verwoerd benefited from the "soft" propaganda provided by newspapers sympathetic to apartheid; in 1960, one "housewife's survey" was published in the *Pretoria News* that maintained that Blacks "didn't want equality" anyway, and were generally happy with the reference book system so long as they were free to pursue their own traditions and not restricted "too much" in their movements.⁹³²

Up until his death, Dr. Verwoerd was involved in ramping up the propaganda effort. Eschel Rhodie, the son of a prison director who had joined the Information Service in the 1950s, had worked in propaganda from offices in New York and The Hague, and claimed to have been helped by Americans whom he believed to belong to the CIA. Rhodie stated that

⁹²⁷ McKay, 1966: 13, 16.

⁹²⁸ Clark, 1986: 1.

⁹²⁹ South African Department of Information, 1978.

⁹³⁰ McKay, 1966: 8-9, 41.

⁹³¹ Frye, 1970: 101.

⁹³² *Pretoria News*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Natives do not want equality.'

these helpful Americans had explained the importance of “owning” the media and of infiltrating student groups and political movements to get to know the people at the top and get them onside.⁹³³ After Dr. Verwoerd’s death the propaganda war under Rhoodie continued apace.

TABLE OF DR. VERWOERD’S MAJOR LEGISLATION

- The Group Areas Act (1950)
- The Immorality Amendment Act (1950 and 1957)
- The Population Registration Act (1950)
- The Preventing of Public Squatting Act (1951)
- The Native Building Workers Act (1951)
- The Bantu Authorities Act (1951)
- The Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act (Pass Laws Act) (1952)
- The Native Laws Amendment Bill (1952, 1957 and 1963)
- The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953)
- The Native Labour (settlement of disputes) Act (1953)
- The Bantu Education Act (1953)
- The Natives Resettlement Act (1954)
- The Labour Conciliation Act (1956)
- The Riotous Assemblies Act (1956)
- The Separate University Education Bill (1957)
- The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1958)
- Bantu Investment Corporation Act (1958)
- The Extension of University Education Act (1959)
- The Prisons Act (1959) (Discussed later in this chapter)
- The Unlawful Organisations Act (1960) (Discussed later in this chapter)
- The Urban Bantu Councils Act (1961)
- The Defence Further Amendment Act (1961) (Discussed later in this chapter)
- The Sabotage Act (1962)
- The Coloured Persons Education Act (1963)

⁹³³ Leonard, 1983: 264-265.

- The Publications and Entertainments Act (1963) (Discussed later in this chapter)
- The 90-Days Act (1963)
- The Customs and Excise Act (1964) (Discussed later in this chapter)
- The Indian Education Act (1965)
- The Bantu Homelands Development Corporations Act (1965)
- The 180-Days Act (1965)

RESISTANCE TO DR. VERWOERD'S APARTHEID**INTERNAL RESISTANCE**

According to Dr. Neville Edward Alexander, the period of primary resistance to white supremacy started on the “fateful day in the first week of February 1488 when the first Khoer herder threw the first stone at the Portuguese buccaneers commanded by Bartolomeu Dias⁹³⁴ in Bahia Dos Vequeiros.”⁹³⁵ Resistance to apartheid began shortly after the National Party came to power. On October 16, 1948, 3,000 members of the Garment Workers’ Union, mostly women, gathered at City Hall in Johannesburg to receive a report on their right to work no more than a forty-hour week as a result of union efforts. Several hundred Nationalist members of the White Workers’ Protection Union, mentioned above, arrived on the scene to break up the meeting, with their leader shouting, “Today blood must flow.” They assaulted people with weapons including bicycle chains and knuckle-dusters, prompting comparisons of “Nazi Germany.” When the Union complained to the Minister of Justice, Charles Robberts Swart, he attempted to take down the Union, and not its attackers.⁹³⁶

The South African Congress of Trade Unions strove to decouple race and unionism, while others worked to preserve white privilege.⁹³⁷ Black African nationalists of varying political hues had ramped up their demands, and now sought “an end to segregation and trusteeship, the abolition of racial discrimination in all its forms, political and constitutional equality and a common citizenship which recognized that South Africa belonged to all its people.”⁹³⁸ The following years rioting spread, and became more focussed on anger with apartheid, throughout 1949 and 1950.⁹³⁹ However, it was under Dr. Verwoerd that resistance to apartheid took its modern form.

⁹³⁴ (1451-1500) A Portuguese explorer; the first European to sail to the tip of South Africa when in 1487 sailed from Lisbon to open the route to India. He rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1488, but had to return to Lisbon when his men staged a mutiny (Newitt, 2010: 135).

⁹³⁵ Alexander, 2013: 3-4. Dr. Alexander (1936-2012) a teacher, author, banned person, was a highly educated revolutionary and a promoter of the idea of a multi-lingual South Africa who spent ten years in Robben Island (Magnien, 2012).

⁹³⁶ Forman and Sachs, 1957: 162.

⁹³⁷ Lambert, 1993: 278.

⁹³⁸ Barber, 1999: 132.

⁹³⁹ Troup, 1975: 329-330.

THE ANC

The war years saw the consolidation of black opposition. During the 1940s, the African National Congress, under the leadership of Dr. Alfred Bitini Xuma, had developed a distinct identity, while open to working with other black organisations. In 1943, it had published a new constitution stressing the need for Africans to participate in the affairs of state, and considered opening membership up to people of any race.⁹⁴⁰ The ANC remained essentially pacifist, with the view that it was preferable to become a “martyr” than to kill.⁹⁴¹

Important figures in the ANC during Dr. Verwoerd's reign included Albert Luthuli, Raymond Mahlaba, Nelson Mandela, Joe Matthews, Joe Modise, Walter Sisulu and Joe Slovo (also a member of the Communist Party).⁹⁴² Luthuli retained his anti-violence standpoint, but in the 1950s he wrote: “every so often the yoke becomes unendurable, something explodes, and for a while a blind resentment takes control,” as he wondered why, given the huge burden endured by Blacks, more did not struggle more violently.⁹⁴³

Whereas the South African National Congress had existed since the early twentieth century, it was formally renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923, when it adopted its green, black and gold flag and the slogan “God Bless Africa.”⁹⁴⁴ In its earlier years, the organisation lacked focus and was often less influential than the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa (ICU), with its more radical, labour-centred focus.⁹⁴⁵ The ANC was a direct response to the growing exclusion of Blacks from any political favour, and was initially peopled largely by members of the small, emergent middle class of Africans educated in missionary schools,⁹⁴⁶ whose initial interest was in protecting the rights of chiefs and African professionals.⁹⁴⁷ While the leadership of the ANC was exclusively male, many of its members, generally the “most steadfast,” were women.⁹⁴⁸

Resistance gained a sharper focus in the 1930s when a range of bodies came together to form the All African Convention. Here some future leaders of the struggle against

⁹⁴⁰ Barber, 1999: 126-127.

⁹⁴¹ Seegers, 1996: 119.

⁹⁴² Van den Berghe: 1967: 177.

⁹⁴³ Mufson, 1990: 81.

⁹⁴⁴ Clark and Worger, 2011: 24.

⁹⁴⁵ Beinart, 2001: 103-104.

⁹⁴⁶ Thompson, 2001: 156.

⁹⁴⁷ Marx, 1992: 33.

⁹⁴⁸ Gerhart, 1978: 214.

apartheid, including Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo,⁹⁴⁹ first experienced political activism.⁹⁵⁰ In 1942, the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL),⁹⁵¹ part of the ANC, was founded⁹⁵² under the leadership of Anton Muziwake Lembede.⁹⁵³ It was composed primarily of educated young Black men (including Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo),⁹⁵⁴ and comparisons were made between the ANCYL and the role of the Broederbond to the National Party. The ANCYL quickly became more radical than the ANC, with a strong socialist, but not communist, stance. Its goal was to create a strong African national identity and to reject oppression, with a focus on self-determination. It pushed members of the ANC to adopt a more revolutionary stance.⁹⁵⁵ It published a manifesto stating that “The African regards Civilisation as the common heritage of all Mankind and claims as full a right to make his contribution to its advancement and to live free as any White South African.”⁹⁵⁶

In 1946, some core members of the ANCYL, including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo, led by lawyer Anton Lembede, came together to reform the ANC, which the Youth League described as “a body of gentlemen with clean hands.”⁹⁵⁷ In 1948, they issued their Basic Policy document, stressing that while minorities should have rights, Africans had “a primary inherent and inalienable right to Africa.” The ANC, while not a communist organisation, worked with the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) where their interests coincided. Russia had decreed that South African colonialism was unique, because the White colonists were based within the colony itself, and that the first step towards establishing a socialist state was to found a native republic. On this basis, the CPSA was prepared to work with the ANC and set aside a class struggle for now. They had a

⁹⁴⁹ (1917-1993) A teacher and lawyer, and legal partner to Nelson Mandela. He was one of the most important revolutionaries of the anti-apartheid struggle. He served as President of the ANC from 1967 to 1991 and spent 30 years in exile (1960-1990) gaining international support for the anti-apartheid movement and organising the struggle (Callinicos, 2005). For more about Tambo see: Callinicos, L. (2011) *Oliver Tambo: His Life and Legacy 1917-1993*; Callinicos, L. (2005) *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains*; Johns, S., Hunt Davis, R. Jr. (1991) *Mandela, Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle against Apartheid, 1948-1990: A Documentary Survey*; Pallo Jordan, Z. (2011) *Oliver Tambo Remembered: His Life in Exile*; Tambo, O. (1987) *Oliver Tambo Speaks: Preparing for Power*.

⁹⁵⁰ Worden, 2000: 96-97.

⁹⁵¹ For more about the ANCYL see: Glaser, C. (2013) *The ANC Youth League*.

⁹⁵² Meli, 1988: 108.

⁹⁵³ (1914-1947) Teacher and lawyer. Considered the primary thinker behind the African National Congress Youth League (Lodge, 1883: 21) and described as “the principal architect of South Africa’s first full-fledged ideology of African nationalism” (Gerhart, 1978: 51).

⁹⁵⁴ Eades, 1999: 14; Walshe, 1970: 351.

⁹⁵⁵ Feit, 1967: 59; Marx, 1992: 34.

⁹⁵⁶ Clark and Worger, 2011: 134.

⁹⁵⁷ Beinart, 2001: 134; Meredith, 2010: 45.

common understanding that South Africa should be understood as an imperial state and a colony within a political and economic entity at one and the same time.⁹⁵⁸

On December 15, 1949, the annual national conference of the ANC was held, and about 120 delegates arrived in Bloemfontein. Members of the Congress Youth League demanded that the ANC become more militant. By the end of the day, Xuma had been removed from leadership and replaced with James Moroka, a doctor who was on board with the more radical position the younger activists sought, with “boycotts, stayaways, and civil disobedience.”⁹⁵⁹

In 1951, the ANC wrote to Malan and formally demanded African representation in government.⁹⁶⁰ In 1952, the government celebrated the tercentenary of the “founding” of South Africa by Van Riebeeck. It was an unfocused affair, more notable “because of the anti-apartheid counter-narrative that developed by way of response.” The festival coincided with a legal judgement that disenfranchised Coloured voters.⁹⁶¹ Public boycotts were organised by the United Movement, which published a series of texts querying the official narrative. That same year the ANC launched a Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws. The government ignored all the ANC’s protest letters. When the ANC accused the government of denying Africans basic human rights, the government said that Blacks had no inherent right to the same things as Europeans. From this point on, the ANC adopted a concerted approach to protest through non-violent action. Large numbers of protesters were arrested and jailed in the latter half of 1952 alone.⁹⁶²

In 1952 about 1,500 Blacks gathered in East London in the Cape under the banner of the ANC, with huge support from Blacks and Indians.⁹⁶³ There had already been rioting in other areas of the Cape, and police were on the scene to prevent more. When the crowd would not disperse, the police turned on them with bayonets and opened fire. While the official death tally at the time was nine, recent evidence suggests that it may be as high as 250. In the ensuing chaos some angry groups of Black protestors turned violent, leading to the deaths of two Whites, including a Roman Catholic nun, Elsie Quinn, whose body was burned and mutilated, with pieces of flesh cut off and eaten. The extreme violence was met

⁹⁵⁸ Barber, 1999: 128-131, 145.

⁹⁵⁹ Glaser, 2013: 11-12.

⁹⁶⁰ Hepple, 1966: 154.

⁹⁶¹ Dubow, 2014: 40-43.

⁹⁶² Dubow, 2014: 40-43.

⁹⁶³ van den Berghe, 1967: 177

with a ferocious counter-attack and five youths were convicted of Quinn's murder. The Blacks (mostly between fourteen and twenty-one) who had participated in the violence mostly sprang from the appalling conditions of East London's slums, which had just eighty toilets for 20,000 residents and which was controlled with extensive policing, while there was little or no investment in improving conditions.⁹⁶⁴ Afterwards, the ANC disassociated itself from the violent protests, and the government and police hushed up the real number of deaths.

The Defiance Campaign

The ANC worked throughout the 1950s to create alliances with members of all of South Africa's "national groups," including sympathetic Indians and Whites. At their conference in December 1951 the ANC unveiled its new Defiance Campaign, to be carried out the following year under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, refusing to cooperate with unjust laws.⁹⁶⁵ It would be a national action of non-compliance that would pose a serious threat to the government.⁹⁶⁶

In 1952, the Campaign was launched, although it was largely ignored by the pro-apartheid press at first. A number of White liberals joined the Defiance Campaign for the first time.⁹⁶⁷ Of the campaign, Leo Kuper, a South African sociologist, states: "the campaign... had the negative consequence of increasing the repressive powers of the State and of liquidating many African and Indian leaders. But it attracted international attention and condemnation of apartheid policy: it stimulated a symbolic participation by White resisters, and the founding of two political parties, a radical Congress of Democrats, representing the unit of Whites in a congress alliance of racial organizations and the South African Liberal Party, a multi-racial political party largely under white leadership; and it raised the membership of the ANC to a reputed hundred thousand, the majority being in the Eastern Cape."⁹⁶⁸ The Campaign was cancelled at the beginning of 1953 after over 8,000 people had

⁹⁶⁴ Mager and Minkley, 1993: 230-232.

⁹⁶⁵ World Peace Council, 1972: 12.

⁹⁶⁶ Lodge, 1983: 39.

⁹⁶⁷ Vigne, 1997: 10-11.

⁹⁶⁸ Kuper, 1957: 462.

served prison terms for partaking.⁹⁶⁹ Among those who were arrested and imprisoned was Manilal Gandhi, second son of Mahatma Gandhi.⁹⁷⁰

It had clearly shown how powerful black resistance could be when people displayed a united front. In 1955 it would form the basis of the Congress Alliance, which united the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress and the South African Coloured People's Organisation, and included workers' unions and women's federations, representing a broad collective of interests, and incorporating more women's and workers' interests for the first time.⁹⁷¹ In a tacit acknowledgement of the power that a united black resistance posted, following the 1952 Defiance Campaign Dr. Verwoerd banned all meetings in all "native areas and locations" throughout South Africa.⁹⁷²

Ongoing Activism

Throughout the 1950s, the ANC engaged in protests and demands for the repeal of racist and otherwise unacceptable laws. In general, they remained dedicated to peaceful protest, which was nonetheless treated by the government as a crime. ANC membership grew dramatically, but remained primarily urban, while the most successful protests were actually generally spontaneous, local ones, such as resistance on the part of rural labourers and women.⁹⁷³ In 1954, the ANC called for the boycott of government-controlled schools with little success, as African parents realised that, inadequate as they were, they were their children's only chance of getting an education.⁹⁷⁴

The Freedom Charter

In 1955, the Congress of the People, a loose alliance of anti-apartheid activists, came together, in Kliptown, a town near Johannesburg, and adopted the Freedom Charter. This resulted from widespread consultation among anti-apartheid South Africans of all colours.⁹⁷⁵

⁹⁶⁹ Sisulu, 1990: 6; Among the imprisoned during the Defiance Campaign was Manilal Gandhi, second son of Mahatma Gandhi (Schadeberg, 1987: 38-39).

⁹⁷⁰ Schadeberg, 1987: 38-39.

⁹⁷¹ Naidoo, 2008: 82.

⁹⁷² Hirson, 2005: 149.

⁹⁷³ Barber, 1999: 146.

⁹⁷⁴ Troup, 1976: 22.

⁹⁷⁵ Willems et al, 1988: 22.

It endorsed “the right of the people to govern; freedoms regardless of race, colour or sex; equality before the law; and equal access to education, housing, and medical care,” and stated “All national groups shall have equal rights,” among other declarations.⁹⁷⁶ The Charter’s core elements were:

The people shall govern;

All national groups shall have equal rights;

The people shall share in the country’s wealth;

The land shall be shared among those who work it;

All shall be equal before the law;

All shall enjoy equal human rights;

There shall be work and security;

The doors of learning and culture shall be opened;

There shall be houses, security and comfort;

*There shall be peace and friendship.*⁹⁷⁷

The government saw the Charter as a revolutionary document, and arrested more than 500 people in response in September 1955, as well as making the Charter a central issue in the ensuing Treason Trial,⁹⁷⁸ in which activists, including Nelson Mandela, who had been co-opted onto the National Executive of the ANC in 1950, were accused, and had their freedom severely restricted.⁹⁷⁹ Mandela described the Freedom Charter as the most radical proclamation ever made by the national movement in South Africa.⁹⁸⁰

The ANC under Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd

Resistance took on a more concerted and modern focus under Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister; he dismissed even peaceful resistance as “terrorism.”⁹⁸¹ There was a dramatic

⁹⁷⁶ Clark and Worger, 2011: 148-152; Legum and Legum, 1964b: 191-192; Marx, 1992: 35.

⁹⁷⁷ African National Congress, 1976: 4-9; Anti-apartheid Movement, 1974: 90; Mbeki, 1964: 153-157.

⁹⁷⁸ Barber, 1999: 151-152; *TIME*, 7 April 1961: 30, ‘South Africa: Not guilty.’

⁹⁷⁹ Beinart, 2001: 167; Muller, 1981: 497.

⁹⁸⁰ Mandela, 1994: 164; Mandela, 2001: 49.

⁹⁸¹ Botha, 1979: 109.

increase in Blacks imprisoned and killed.⁹⁸² In 1959, Dr Xuma was removed from leadership of the ANC for being too cautious.⁹⁸³ In 1961, a year after Dr. Verwoerd outlawed the ANC, Mandela wrote to him, asking that he organise a national convention at which all South Africans would be represented to draw-up a “new non-racial and democratic constitution.” Violent protest had some notable successes. In Witwatersrand in October 1961, power pylons were blown up and phone wires cut, and acts of sabotage took place in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban, creating fear and anxiety among Whites.⁹⁸⁴

The ANC's hope was that sabotage would damage the government's standing at home and abroad and repel foreign investors.⁹⁸⁵ Given the levels of black anger, there was a constant threat that violence might be targeted directly at Whites, and there were some outbursts of appalling violence. In 1960, for example, a group of Blacks in the Durban area attacked and killed nine policemen raiding an illegal shebeen when one of them accidentally trod on a woman's foot. Some of the policemen had been stoned to death and some, horrifically, had been disembowelled.⁹⁸⁶ These acts were strongly condemned by Luthuli, the leader of the ANC.⁹⁸⁷ However, as we discuss below, tolerance for violence against Whites grew considerably in the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre in 1961.

The Banning of the ANC

In 1960, the government banned both the ANC and the PAC under the Unlawful Organizations Act.⁹⁸⁸ The following year they were unbanned, and the ANC started to organise more protests. At a conference organised by the ANC and the PAC (the PAC is discussed below) held on March 25-26, 1961, the groups issued a resolution demanding that Dr. Verwoerd call a democratically elected, non-racial national convention, and warning that if this did not happen there would be country-wide demonstrations.⁹⁸⁹ The resolution also called on Indians, Coloureds and “democratic Europeans” to join Africans in opposition to Dr. Verwoerd and his policies.⁹⁹⁰

⁹⁸² Segal, 1961: 275.

⁹⁸³ Eades, 1999: 14.

⁹⁸⁴ Mandela, 2001: 11.

⁹⁸⁵ du Preez Bezdrob, 2003: 116.

⁹⁸⁶ Frankel, 2001: 100.

⁹⁸⁷ Luthuli, 1962, 113-115.

⁹⁸⁸ Matthews, 1972: 69.

⁹⁸⁹ Harsch, 1980: 249.

⁹⁹⁰ Karis et al, 1977: 626-627.

Instead, Dr. Verwoerd issued a warrant for Mandela's arrest. Meanwhile, Mandela and Sisulu travelled in secret to organise a three-day strike intended to place Dr. Verwoerd under pressure to call the national convention. Dr. Verwoerd launched enormous repressive measures and, before the strike was due to start, the police carried out extensive raids, arresting ten thousand Africans.⁹⁹¹ Dr. Verwoerd received moral and practical support from the United States Marines, who visited just before the strike was supposed to occur; the Marines showed the Blacks their flamethrowers and machine guns and flew helicopters low over African townships in what was generally understood to be a show of force.⁹⁹²

Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Shift to Violence

As Dr. Verwoerd applied himself to outlawing more and more organisations and individuals dedicated to peaceful protest, inevitably the anti-apartheid movement went progressively underground and tended towards violence.⁹⁹³ Mandela now believed that the time for violence had come, and together with Sisulu and Slovo, he formed the new armed wing of the movement.⁹⁹⁴ Umkhonto we Sizwe, meaning "Spear of the Nation",⁹⁹⁵ or MK, was formed on December 16, 1961,⁹⁹⁶ with the goal of dedicating itself to sabotage and preparing for guerrilla warfare. Mandela later stated that the primary reason was to focus attention on the resistance movement as, clearly, they would never win against the South African army and police force.⁹⁹⁷

In his court statement at the Rivonia Trial in 1964, discussed above, Mandela referenced his view that the increase in violence among Blacks sprang from living under a government that consistently used force to maintain its rule, teaching the oppressed that this was the only thing it would listen to. On February 10, 1985, Mandela wrote a message from his prison cell in which he stated:

"My colleagues and I wrote in 1952 to Malan asking for a round table conference to find a solution to the problems of our country, but that was ignored. When Strijdom was in

⁹⁹¹ Harsch, 1980: 249-250.

⁹⁹² van den Berge, 1970: 258-259.

⁹⁹³ Shaw, 2007: 42.

⁹⁹⁴ Beinart, 2001: 168.

⁹⁹⁵ Callinicos and Rogers, 1977: 62.

⁹⁹⁶ This date was the anniversary of the Battle of the Blood River in 1838 where Afrikaner settlers defeated a group of Zulu warriors (Sisulu, 2003: 184).

⁹⁹⁷ Sparks, 1995: 26.

power, we made the same offer. Again it was ignored. When Dr. Verwoerd was in power we asked for a national convention for all the people in South Africa to decide on their future. This, too, was in vain. It was only when all other forms of resistance were no longer open to us that we turned to armed struggle.”⁹⁹⁸

In 1964, Mandela placed the blame for the violence squarely at the feet of the government, saying: “... the government itself set the scene for violence by relying exclusively on violence with which to answer our people in their demands. Africans are turning to deliberate acts of violence and of force against the government, in order to persuade the Government, in the only language which the government shows, by its own behaviour, that it understands.”⁹⁹⁹ It was hardest to garner support for the ANC during periods when South Africa was doing economically well, even though Africans were still by far the poorest in the country.¹⁰⁰⁰

THE PAN-AFRICANIST CONGRESS (PAC)¹⁰⁰¹

In 1958, despite the able leadership of the ANC by Albert Luthuli,¹⁰⁰² a group led by Robert Sobukwe broke away from the ANC and on April 1959 founded the PAC,¹⁰⁰³ which was much more aggressive, relying on the growing anger of younger urban Blacks.¹⁰⁰⁴ The founding members of the ANC had become increasingly critical of its policy of forging alliances with non-Blacks. They stated that this was pandering to the influence of other racial groups and that the only true owners of Africa were Blacks. They rejected the Charter and stressed their view that the only way in which to prevail over white domination would be by black force. They also objected to including other groups, such as the Communist Party.¹⁰⁰⁵

⁹⁹⁸ ANC, 1988: 2-3.

⁹⁹⁹ Mufson, 1990: 96.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Feit, 1967: 15.

¹⁰⁰¹ For more about the PAC see: Kondlo, K. (2009) *In the Twilight of the Revolution: The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa) 1959-1994*; Lodge, T. (1994) *The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990*; Maaba, B.B. (2004) *The PAC's War Against the State*; Mathabatha, S. (2004) *The PAC and POQO in Pretoria, 1958-1964*. Nkondo, K. (2009) *In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994*; Plaajie, T.K. (2006) *The PAC's Internal Underground Activities 1960-1980*; Pogrud, B. (1990) *How can a Man Die Better? The Life of Robert Sobukwe*.

¹⁰⁰² Beinart, 2001: 166.

¹⁰⁰³ Davis, 1987: 10-11.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Members included: Potlake Leballo, the Organization's secretary, Patrick Duncan, the only white member of the PAC, Philip Kgosana, Clarence Makwetu, Jeff Kgalabi Masemola, Joe Molefi, ZB Molete, Peter Molotsi, Zephaniah Mothopeng, Michael Ndobongwana, Thabisa Lethala, Cynthia Lichaba, Johnson Mlambo, Nana Mohomo, Matthew Nkoana and John Nyathi Pokela (South Africa History Online, n.d.).

¹⁰⁰⁵ Giliomee, 2011: 512.

They felt that the ANC was soft and old fashioned, and often referred to it as the organisation of their parents.¹⁰⁰⁶ The PAC had considerable appeal for disaffected youths from township areas, offering a more useful channel for channelling their aggression than the alternatives.¹⁰⁰⁷

In his inaugural speech the founder and President of the PAC, Robert Sobukwe, said, “We aim, politically, at government of the Africans by the Africans, for the Africans, with everybody who owes his only loyalty to Africa and who is prepared to accept the democratic rule of an African majority being regarded as an African.”¹⁰⁰⁸ Sobukwe¹⁰⁰⁹ was a highly educated linguist who had been a full-time politician and the chairman of the Orlando (a township near Johannesburg) branch of the ANC since 1954.¹⁰¹⁰ Sobukwe was described in the *Voice of Africa* newspaper as “Christ carrying the cross to Calvary.”¹⁰¹¹

The group was hampered by poor organisational skills and a lack of funds,¹⁰¹² as well as the fact that it limited its membership to Blacks only¹⁰¹³ (although at a later point Liberal Party member Patrick Duncan would play a role as a PAC official).¹⁰¹⁴ In 1960 the PAC was banned, along with the Communist Party.¹⁰¹⁵ In 1960, resistance movements started to segue into more active types of resistance. The government responded by responding aggressively and police brutality became increasingly vicious.¹⁰¹⁶ After 1962, the ANC and the PAC sent members for military training abroad, to other countries on the African continent and

¹⁰⁰⁶ Maaba, 2004: 257.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Glaser, 1993: 297.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *South African History Online*, (n.d.) Robert Sobukwe Inaugural Speech, April 1959.

¹⁰⁰⁹ (1924-1978) On March 21, 1960, the PAC led a nationwide protest against the resented pass laws. Sobukwe led a march to a police station in Orlando, Soweto in a gesture of open defiance. A number of followers joined him and watched him present his pass to a policeman and declaring himself guilty of being in an area to which his papers did not permit him to travel. He was arrested and charged with incitement, convicted and sentenced to serve three years in prison, after which he was interned on Robben Island. A new General Law Amendment Act made it possible for the Minister of Justice to arbitrarily renew his imprisonment every year. This approach came to be known as the “Sobukwe clause” and ran for three years, during which time he was the only person imprisoned under the clause. After years in solitary confinement, Sobukwe was released in 1969 but remained under a banning order (Pogrud, 1990). For further reading see: Pogrud, B. (1990) *How Can Man Die Better: The Life of Robert Sobukwe*.

¹⁰¹⁰ Pogrud, 2012: 83

¹⁰¹¹ Mandela, 2010: 62.

¹⁰¹² Meredith, 1988: 78-80.

¹⁰¹³ Marx, 1992: 37.

¹⁰¹⁴ Legassick and Saunders, 2004: 666.

¹⁰¹⁵ du Toit, 1991: 635.

¹⁰¹⁶ Jaspán, 1961: 97-98

elsewhere. In response the state enacted penalties for those who had engaged in military training.¹⁰¹⁷

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA

Communism was originally imported in South Africa in the early 20th century by East European Jews and British anarchists.¹⁰¹⁸ The Communist Party of South Africa was initially founded in 1921 by a small group of White labourers, but soon began accepting members of all races with a multi-racial executive body.¹⁰¹⁹ In the 1930s, many of its members came from the Jewish community.¹⁰²⁰ After the Second World War, while most of the Jews in South Africa had become more conservative, a few joined the liberation movement, most of whom were linked with the Communist Party.¹⁰²¹ Several prominent members of the Indian community played important roles in the Party,¹⁰²² as did White liberals such as Braam Fischer, Denis Goldberg, Costa Gazidis, Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo.¹⁰²³

Communism had deep links with the trade union movement which had somehow managed, from 1930 to 1947, to maintain a degree of unity among the various unions, notwithstanding racial differences.¹⁰²⁴ It had always supported radical reform, fully supporting Blacks' struggle,¹⁰²⁵ which it understood in the context of economic exploitation.¹⁰²⁶ Oliver Tambo had described the ANC and the SACP as together forming the "twin pillars of the struggle."¹⁰²⁷

During the Second World War, the Communist Party had had considerable success in unionising the Blacks who had moved to urban areas to fill the positions vacated by Whites who had gone to war. By 1948, the Communist Party attracted growing numbers of young people from the ANC and other organisations.¹⁰²⁸ The Party had had a degree of success in the political arena, gaining seats in parliament and on the municipal council of Johannesburg;

¹⁰¹⁷ Fullard, 2004: 346.

¹⁰¹⁸ Belling, 2002: 1.

¹⁰¹⁹ Davis, 1987: 8; Thompson, 1966: 169.

¹⁰²⁰ Rowley Arenstein quoted in Suttner, 1997: 378.

¹⁰²¹ Kasrils, 1997: 269.

¹⁰²² Beinart, 1997: 168.

¹⁰²³ Bernstein, 1965: 23.

¹⁰²⁴ Lewis, 1984: 1.

¹⁰²⁵ Mandela, 2001: 28.

¹⁰²⁶ Goldberg, 2010: 68; Morris, 2004: 163.

¹⁰²⁷ Mufson, 1990: 219.

¹⁰²⁸ Thompson, 1966: 169.

the Communist Party was present on the Johannesburg council right up until it was banned in 1950.¹⁰²⁹

From the early days of the National Party in government, it had a keen interest in suppressing communism, which it defined very broadly and which was made illegal by a series of acts including the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1952, the Public Safety Act of 1953,¹⁰³⁰ the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956 (based on an earlier act) and the Illegal Organisations Act of 1960.¹⁰³¹ Many people and organisations were made illegal; newspapers were banned, thousands of arrests were made, and the government dealt with opposition by wielding a “big stick.”¹⁰³²

On May 1, 1950, the Communist Party and Transvaal Indian Congress organised a one-day work stoppage to protest against apartheid legislation. Eighteen protesters were killed by the police. Malan's government had tried to pass the Unlawful Organization Bill to limit the activities of the Communist Party of South Africa, but it did not mention the Party specifically, so that month the government introduced the seemingly more precise Suppression of Communism Act which was used to target both Communists and non-Communists.¹⁰³³ The ANC organised a day of protest to be held on the 26th of June along with a number of organisations, including the Communist Party. Thereafter June 26th became known as Freedom Day and, while the initial protest had not been a great success, it marked the start of a more concerted approach.¹⁰³⁴

In July 1950, the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act, rendered the Communist Party illegal.¹⁰³⁵ The decision to ban the Communist Party and its demonization by the apartheid authorities bolstered its support from disenfranchised South Africans and their supporters.¹⁰³⁶ It officially dissolved, but became as an underground organisation in 1953, helping the ANC to organise the Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1961.¹⁰³⁷ After the banning, the government tended to equate all liberal organisations with communism. Twenty of the

¹⁰²⁹ Mufson, 1990: 74.

¹⁰³⁰ Foster, 1987: 1; Fullard, 2004: 342; Rudolph, 1984: 3; World Peace Council, 1972: 12.

¹⁰³¹ Barber 1999: 144; Carter, 1962: 65, van den Berghe, 1967: 131.

¹⁰³² Bunting, 1986: 203.

¹⁰³³ Drew, 1996: 39.

¹⁰³⁴ Dubow, 2014: 40-41.

¹⁰³⁵ Benson, 1966: 134.

¹⁰³⁶ Cronin, 1992: 78.

¹⁰³⁷ Mufson, 1990: 224.

leaders of the passive resistance campaign of 1952 were prosecuted under the Act, even though they had never been communists.¹⁰³⁸

Between 1948, when the National Party came to power, and the mid-1960s, the Communist Party was devastated by constant police harassment, and became progressively more alienated. Nonetheless, during the 1950s and early 1960s the party was widely supported by members of the Bantu, Coloured and Indian communities, and by some White liberals and professionals.¹⁰³⁹ In 1962, the Communist Party adopted a policy program that described the relationship between Black and White South Africans as a particular form of colonialism.¹⁰⁴⁰

As Minister of Native Affairs and as Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd railed against Communism, and frequently insisted that apartheid was an essential bulwark against it. He saw any moves towards decolonisation in Africa, and empowerment of Blacks, as a sop to communism and believed that the communist authorities were manipulating the cause of black freedom.¹⁰⁴¹ Communists were arrested and prosecuted in a focussed, organised approach; in November, 1964, for example, fourteen people were tried in court on the charge of being Communist Party officers and planning to overthrow the government.¹⁰⁴²

OTHER GROUPS

The Coloured community also gave rise to number of organisations, notably the South African Coloured People's Organisation, founded in 1953 and affiliated with the Congress Alliance, which was led by the ANC. It was dedicated to fighting the reduction in rights of Coloureds, including their removal from the voters' roll. Indians formed organisations such as the Natal Indian Congress and the Transvaal Indian Congress to represent their interests. Despite sharing some concerns, the African National Congress was not initially open to Indian membership.¹⁰⁴³

¹⁰³⁸ Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, 1986: 52.

¹⁰³⁹ Weyl, 1970: 9, 11.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Kathrada, 2001: 111.

¹⁰⁴¹ Italiaander, 1961: 107-108.

¹⁰⁴² Lukas (*The New York Times*), 7 November 1964: 2, '14 South Africans on trial as Reds.'

¹⁰⁴³ Desai, 2015: 2.

In response to the pass laws that were applied to women from 1953, the Federation of South African Women¹⁰⁴⁴ was formed and coordinated mass burnings of women's passes and massive demonstrations.¹⁰⁴⁵ A women's organisation, The Black Sash, dedicated itself to pro-democracy protests.¹⁰⁴⁶ The Black Sash adopted the UN Declaration of Human Rights and engaged in a range of protests at which the women were often pelted with eggs by White youths. Membership declined in the organisation, which found itself at an impasse between the white regime and the growing radicalisation of many protest movements.¹⁰⁴⁷

A number of organisations were founded after the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960. These included the African Resistance Movement,¹⁰⁴⁸ which united several groups including former members of the ANC Youth League in Soweto and White radicals from the Liberal Party,¹⁰⁴⁹ and started committing acts of violence in 1963, including bombing power lines, railroad tracks and rolling stock, roads and bridges. Attacks were organised to avoid civilian casualties.¹⁰⁵⁰

The group's most famous attack took place on July 24, 1964, and was carried out by John Frederick Harris.¹⁰⁵¹ Harris planted a bomb in the Whites-only waiting room of Johannesburg Park Station. Although he telephoned and warned the police and two newspapers about it, the police did not respond.¹⁰⁵² The explosion resulted in one death and twenty-three injuries. Harris was arrested, convicted of murder and hanged on April 1,

¹⁰⁴⁴ Formed in 1954 by Ray Simons, Amina Cachalia, Helen Joseph, Lillian Ngoyi; on August 9th, 1956, it set up a march of 20,000 women who went to Pretoria's Union Buildings to protest pass laws. To this day, the anniversary of the march is celebrated as South Africa's Women's Day (Rappaport, 2001: 344).

¹⁰⁴⁵ Troup, 1975: 341.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 31 May 1965: 3, 'Women's group in South Africa keeps up protest on apartheid.'

¹⁰⁴⁷ Legassick and Saunders, 2004: 673.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Members included: Myrtle Berman, Alan Brookes, Eddie Daniels, David de Keller, Johannes Dladla, John Harris, Dennis Higgs, Baruch Hirson, Stephanie Kemp, John Lang, Adrian Leftwich, Hugh Lewin, Millie McConkey, Hilary and Ronald Mutch, Samuel Olifant, Neville Rubin, Stephen Segale, Milton Setlhapelo, Willie Tibane, Lynette van der Riet and Rosemary Wentzel (Gunther, 2004: 209-235). For more about the organization see: Gunther, M. (2004) *The National Committee of Liberation (NCL)/ African Resistance Movement*.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Callinicos and Rogers, 1977: 62.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Gunther, 2004: 246-247.

¹⁰⁵¹ (1937-1965) Teacher, member of the executive committee of the Liberal Party in the Transvaal, chairman of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee and member of the ARM. He was arrested after he was betrayed by John Lloyd, another member of the ARM (Gunther, 2004: 379). He was seriously beaten during interrogation and his broken jaw was left without medical treatment for weeks. The only white person executed for crimes carried out in the resistance movement, he went to the gallows singing the famous American Civil Rights anthem 'We Shall Overcome' (Gunther, 2004: 247-249, Lapierre, 2009: 111). For more about Harris see: Driver, C.J. (2015) *The Man with the Suitcase: The Life, Execution and Rehabilitation of John Harris, Liberal Terrorist*.

¹⁰⁵² TRC, 1998: 547.

1965.¹⁰⁵³ Many at the time regarded Harris as a hero and some even said, "Its time whites suffered a bit, as we have suffered so long."¹⁰⁵⁴ In 2001, Mandela said about Harris: "what more can a white man do to identify himself with the Black man's struggle than to buy freedom with his own life? To dismiss such martyrs as oppressors is a crime most South African freedom fighters find difficult to excuse."¹⁰⁵⁵

Poqo¹⁰⁵⁶ ("we go it alone"¹⁰⁵⁷) was the armed wing of the PAC. Its name implied racial purity, in contrast to the tendency of other opposition groups to admit members of diverse races. It was a very violent organisation,¹⁰⁵⁸ described as a terrorist group even by many supporters of the anti-apartheid movement,¹⁰⁵⁹ and had the specific mandate of killing people, including African chiefs and white authorities, to further the cause.¹⁰⁶⁰ Poqo¹⁰⁶¹ was not well-organised but it attracted many members; it published leaflets claiming that it was planning for the violent overthrow of the government in 1963, and that it had 150,000 followers.¹⁰⁶²

It quickly became involved in a range of insurrectionary activities,¹⁰⁶³ while Leballo, the PAC's Secretary General, stated his vision that its young members would become equipped to combat apartheid militarily throughout the country.¹⁰⁶⁴ The government cracked down hard on these more violent groups and by 1964 there were hardly any active revolutionaries left in South Africa.¹⁰⁶⁵ Dr. Verwoerd continued to refuse to offer any concessions in the controversial area of the pass system.¹⁰⁶⁶

¹⁰⁵³ Gunther, 2006: 247-249.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Benson, 1966: 262.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Mandela, 2001: 39-40.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Thompson, 1966: 180-181. For more about POQO see: Mathabatha, S. (2004) *The PAC and POQO in Pretoria, 1958-1964*.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Okoth, 2006: 181.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Marx, 1992: 38; van den Berghe, 1967: 162.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Legum and Legum, 1964b: 75.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Barber, 1999: 167-168; Marquard, 1968: 260; Thompson, 1966: 181.

¹⁰⁶¹ Members included: Madodana Camagu, Isaac Mafatshe, John Magigo, Dingaan Maleka, Moses and Jephtha Masemola, Jacob Matlala, Isaac Mithimunya, Joseph Mogashoa, Fetanang and Nicholas Mohlala, John Nkosi, Simon Rmagole, Ngenisile Siqwebo, Philemon Tefu, Godfrey Yekiso (Mathabatha, 2004: 299-318).

¹⁰⁶² Hepple, 1967: 161.

¹⁰⁶³ Meredith, 1988: 102.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Mathabatha, 2004: 300.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Thomson, 1966: 182.

¹⁰⁶⁶ van der Westhuizen, 2007: 85.

CHURCHES AND SOCIAL ACTIVISTS

Although the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC)¹⁰⁶⁷ supported apartheid, and actively supported many of the racist laws passed during Dr. Verwoerd's service as Minister of Native Affairs and as Prime Minister,¹⁰⁶⁸ many other churches campaigned against it. In 1948, all of the other denominations issued critical statements. Over the years that followed, many clerics and other activists within the church issued statements against apartheid.¹⁰⁶⁹ The Anglican Church became increasingly coherent on its anti-apartheid stance,¹⁰⁷⁰ drawing inspiration from the civil rights movement and Martin Luther King in the US, among other things,¹⁰⁷¹ and there was support from Christian organisations outside South Africa. White Anglican missionaries had protested strongly when apartheid policy insisted that they could no longer live in their premises in a black area.¹⁰⁷² Dr. Verwoerd had threatened to revoke church leases in black areas if the Anglican Church continued to criticise the government,¹⁰⁷³ and, in 1958, accused religious leaders who opposed apartheid as acting in the spirit of communism.¹⁰⁷⁴

Where many in the Dutch Reformed Church cited the Bible in support of racism, other churches, often influenced by liberation theology, quoted passages in support of their views.¹⁰⁷⁵ The Anglican missionary Michael Guthrie Scott¹⁰⁷⁶ was expelled because of his constant criticisms of apartheid on the global stage.¹⁰⁷⁷ In 1960, the Anglican bishop of Cape Town, Joost de Blank,¹⁰⁷⁸ demanded that the Dutch Reformed Church be removed from the

¹⁰⁶⁷ For further reading about the DRC's role in apartheid see: Bax, A. (1979) *A Different Gospel: A Critique of the Theology Behind Apartheid*; Bosch, D J. (1979) *Racism and Revolution: Response of the Churches in South Africa*; Chidester, D. (1992) *Religions of South Africa*; Elphic, R., Davenport, R. (1997) *Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social & Cultural History*; Loubser, J.A. (1987) *The Apartheid Bible: A Critical Review of Racial Rheology in South Africa*; Moodie, T.D. (1975) *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and Afrikaner Civil Religion*; Prozesky, M. (1990) *Christianity Amidst Apartheid: Selected Perspectives on the Church in South Africa*; Dubow, S. (1992) "Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of 'Race.'" "

¹⁰⁶⁸ Lave, 1994: 502.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Thompson, 2001: 204.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Worsnip, 1991: 54; 105.

¹⁰⁷¹ British Council of Churches, 1965: 11.

¹⁰⁷² Hunt, 1957: 67.

¹⁰⁷³ For example, Huddleston et al, (1957) *Four Words on South Africa*.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *The Canberra Times*, 18 December 1958: 6, 'Whites may fail says Dr. Verwoerd.'

¹⁰⁷⁵ Lave, 1994: 5112.

¹⁰⁷⁶ (1907-1983) Anglican priest, apartheid critic and nuclear disarmament activist. In 1946, he became the first white man to be jailed for opposing South Africa's racial laws (Legum and Legum, 1968: 171-181). For further reading see: Yates, A. and Chester, L. (2006) *The Troublemaker: Michael Scott and His Lonely Struggle Against Injustice*; Scott, M. (1958) *A Time to Speak*; Troup, F. (1950) *In Face of Fear: Michael Scott's Challenge to South Africa*.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Italiaander, 1961: 130.

¹⁰⁷⁸ (1908-1968) An Anglican Bishop, the Archbishop of Cape Town from 1957 to 1963 known as "scourge of apartheid" for his stance against it (*The Times*, 26 September 1959: 5).

World Council of Churches; a year before, Blank, who had been born in Holland, had offered to step down from his position if Dr. Verwoerd would do likewise, and would return to the land of his birth.¹⁰⁷⁹

The Reverend James E. Wagner of the World Council of Churches stated that international church bodies would not support the Dutch Reformed Church's position on apartheid, and that their position was "out of step with the clearest Christian convictions."¹⁰⁸⁰ The Dutch Reformed Church stated its great offense, and reiterated its support for apartheid.¹⁰⁸¹ However, the same year the DRC became the origin of some dissent as eleven theologians from within the church published a book critical of the government's position on race relations, stating that there was "no hope" if the government insisted on fighting Black Nationalism with force.¹⁰⁸²

This was not the only dissent within the DRC. Albert Stephanus Geysers,¹⁰⁸³ a cleric, was accused of treason in 1961 by three students for stating his view that apartheid was incompatible with Christ's teachings.¹⁰⁸⁴ In 1963, churchman Beyers Naudé¹⁰⁸⁵ resigned from the DRC, having concluded that apartheid had no biblical justification.¹⁰⁸⁶ He was censored, defrocked, banned for seven years, harassed, and placed under house arrest.¹⁰⁸⁷ Naudé had been the director of the Christian Institute, which Dr. Verwoerd had attempted to ban because of his fear that their support of interracial activities might spread into politics.¹⁰⁸⁸

Predictably, Dr. Verwoerd scoffed at anti-apartheid churches and put pressure on the Dutch Reformed Church to leave the World Council of Churches,¹⁰⁸⁹ which was deeply condemnatory of South African policies,¹⁰⁹⁰ after the largest of the Dutch Reformed Church's

¹⁰⁷⁹ *The New York Times*, 23 July 1959: 8, 'Racist is challenged.'

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Pretoria News*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Apartheid criticised by world Church leader.'

¹⁰⁸¹ *The New York Times*, 10 April 1960: 20, 'Toronto star editor held in South Africa.'

¹⁰⁸² *The New York Times*, 20 November 1960: 23, '11 Theologians decry apartheid.'

¹⁰⁸³ (1918-1985) Cleric, professor of Theology at the University of Pretoria and an anti-apartheid theologian, He was essentially cast out of his community of Afrikaners because of his firm opposition to apartheid. He was one of the first of the Afrikaner nationalists to oppose the Broederbond and apartheid on the basis of religious belief (van Aarde et al, 2014: 1-10).

¹⁰⁸⁴ *The Economist*, 23 December 1961: 1224, 'Apartheid agonistes.'

¹⁰⁸⁵ (1915-2004) Cleric, theologian, founder of the Christian Institute of South Africa, anti-apartheid activist and 'banned' person (Bernstein, 2004: B06). Interestingly, his father was Jozua François Naudé, a Dutch Reformed minister and first chairman of the Broederbond (Soggot (*The Guardian*), 8 September 2004, 'The Rev. Beyers Naudé').

¹⁰⁸⁶ Naudé, 1964: 23.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Lave, 1994: 514.

¹⁰⁸⁸ *The Economist*, 12 October 1963: 128, 'Afrikaners' cross.'

¹⁰⁸⁹ Lave, 1994: 502.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Thompson, 1957: 133.

branches stated that many of the rules of apartheid could not be justified.¹⁰⁹¹ That year, Jewish and Islamic religious leaders and those of most other major faiths in South Africa (Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, Lutherans, Unitarians, Quakers, the Salvation Army and Congregationalists) called on the government to end its policy of detaining political prisoners without trial.¹⁰⁹² Most Black Christians belonged to Methodist, Anglican, Lutheran, Congregational and Presbyterian churches which belonged, in turn, the South African Council of Churches. They were highly critical of racial segregation and active in the areas of black consciousness and black theology.¹⁰⁹³

In 1964, Dr. Verwoerd wrote the Methodist Church in South Africa a furious letter accusing them of “hypocrisy” after they adopted a resolution stating that communication and consultation between all the racial groups were essential.¹⁰⁹⁴ In the Dutch Reformed Church, some of the church ministers had begun to rebel against the Broederbond.¹⁰⁹⁵ The Broederbond held an emergency secret meeting at which it affirmed support for Dr. Verwoerd and pledged to speak to church leaders on the matter.¹⁰⁹⁶ The same year, following the massacre at Sharpeville, the Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, Ambrose Reeves (a member of the Liberal Party), travelled to England with documents showing Dr. Verwoerd’s government in a very bad light.¹⁰⁹⁷

Important Anglican critics also included two bishops of Cape Town, Geoffrey Clayton¹⁰⁹⁸ and the aforementioned Joost de Black,¹⁰⁹⁹ while the Anglican priest Father Trevor Huddleston¹¹⁰⁰ published *Naught for Your Comfort*, an influential anti-apartheid book, in 1956.¹¹⁰¹ Reeves, who had also been involved in gathering funds for the defence in the

¹⁰⁹¹ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 19 December 1960: 6, ‘Church opposes Dr. Verwoerd stand: Largest South African unit asks race leniency.’

¹⁰⁹² *The New York Times*, 21 May 1964: 10, ‘Two faiths urge Dr. Verwoerd to end detention system.’

¹⁰⁹³ Bosch, 1979: 13.

¹⁰⁹⁴ *The New York Times*, 18 October 1964, ‘Methodists answer Dr. Verwoerd’s attack.’

¹⁰⁹⁵ *The New York Times*, 30 April 1963: 10, ‘Ministers oppose secret group.’

¹⁰⁹⁶ Giliomee, 2011: 528.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Italiaander, 1961: 118.

¹⁰⁹⁸ (1884-1957) An Anglican Bishop, Archbishop of Johannesburg (1934-1948), Archbishop of Cape Town (1948-1957) and critic of apartheid (Paton, 1973). For his biography see: Paton, A. (1973) *Apartheid and the Archbishop: The Life and Times of Geoffrey Clayton, Archbishop of Cape Town*.

¹⁰⁹⁹ (1908-1968) Archbishop of Cape Town from 1957 to 1963. Passionate and outspoken anti-apartheid activist, he was known the ‘scourge of apartheid’ (*The Times*, 26 September 1959: 5, ‘Apartheid “crazy” Archbishop says’).

¹¹⁰⁰ (1913-1998) An English Anglican Bishop and anti-apartheid activist, of whom Nelson Mandela said “no white person has done more for South Africa,” and Archbishop Desmond Tutu that he “single-handedly made apartheid a world issue” (Clark, 2012: 210).

¹¹⁰¹ Johns and Hunt Davis, 1991: 30; Thompson, 1966: 172.

Treason Trial,¹¹⁰² was ultimately deported to Britain. What irked the authorities were his general anti-apartheid activities, but more especially his attempts to tell the truth about Sharpeville.¹¹⁰³

Apartheid was also condemned by a number of prominent Afrikaner theologians such as Ben Engelbrecht, Albert S. Geysers, Professor Barend Bartholomew Keet, Ben Marais and Beyers Naudé. Professor Keet wrote in 1956 in his book *Whither South Africa?:*

“What makes colour and race prejudice so unreasonable and so sinful, is that a man is condemned for what he has no control over (as if he had chosen his ancestors) while for what he can change, his character, he receives no recognition. The result is that our greatest concern is to keep our colour ‘pure’ and that ‘race mixture’ is regarded as the greatest of evils. It is punished as a crime by law of our land, while greater transgressions against the moral law, provided they are committed by people of the same colour, are overlooked – and this in spite of the fact that there are already more than a million people of mixed race in South Africa.”¹¹⁰⁴

JOURNALISM

There was an active anti-apartheid media led by newspapers such as *The Guardian*,¹¹⁰⁵ an English-language socialist newspaper with links to the union movement and offices in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Durban. *The Guardian* was suppressed various times, returning each time under a new title, and finally came to an end in 1963. It had been a national, and a resolutely socialist, publication since its inception in 1937 when it was registered in the name of owner/editor Betty Radford. Because of its socialist and racially egalitarian content, the *Guardian* was constantly harassed by the authorities. Nonetheless, those involved with the paper managed to distribute large numbers of copies using grassroots, informal networks.¹¹⁰⁶

Black journalism¹¹⁰⁷ grew in terms of output and political content from the 1930s, at a time of growing levels of literacy among the black population (although these remained low).

¹¹⁰² Hepple, 2011: 76.

¹¹⁰³ *The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 2, ‘Deportation a clumsy way to silence Reeves says British Press’; *The New York Times*, 6 December 1960: 14, ‘Dr. Verwoerd seizes Paton’s passport.’

¹¹⁰⁴ Keet, 1956: 13.

¹¹⁰⁵ For further reading about the *Guardian*’s history see: Zug, J. (2007) *The Guardian: The History of South Africa’s Extraordinary Anti-Apartheid Newspaper*.

¹¹⁰⁶ Switzer, 1997: 274-285.

¹¹⁰⁷ For further reading about Black journalism during apartheid see: Couzens, T. (1984) *History of the Black Press in South Africa, 1836-1960*.

The *Bantu World* newspaper of the 1930s was the most successful. Although hardly radical, it was bombed twice by the Ossewabrandwag in the 1940s. In 1960, it was rebranded *The World* and became a daily, rather than weekly, paper. *The Cape Standard*, *the Sun* and *The Torch* were similar newspapers aimed at the Coloured population while Indians was served by papers including *The Leader*, *The Graphic* and *Indian Views*.¹¹⁰⁸ Other dissenting papers included the *Inululeko*, the printed word of the Communist Party in South Africa, and the Liberal Party's newspaper, *Contact*. The mainstream newspaper *The Cape Times* published articles critical of Dr. Verwoerd, along with political cartoons.¹¹⁰⁹

From 1951, for a period of twelve years,¹¹¹⁰ *Drum Magazine* featured the work of most of South Africa's best Black writers, including Ezekiel Mphahlele and Casey Motsisi. With a focus on literature and entertainment, *Drum* had considerable mass appeal among readers from urban townships, where literacy skills were growing,¹¹¹¹ in part as a result of urbanisation.¹¹¹² While the magazine published some exposés that discussed discrimination and repression, these topics were also covered in its literary offerings,¹¹¹³ which drew on both native African and European traditional, literary and intellectual sources.¹¹¹⁴ White liberal Alan Paton's famous novel *Cry the Beloved Country* was initially published in *Drum* in serial format.¹¹¹⁵ The *Rand Daily Mail*, discussed in some detail below in the context of the Sharpeville massacre, was often targeted by the government for reporting on matters the authorities wished to keep quiet.¹¹¹⁶

WHITE RESISTANCE

Although an overwhelming majority of Whites supported the National Party and its policies, a small but vocal number raised dissenting voices and campaigned against apartheid.¹¹¹⁷

¹¹⁰⁸ Couzens, 1984: 25-33.

¹¹⁰⁹ *The Economist*, 7 August 1965: 1, 'White man's country'; Shaw, 1999.

¹¹¹⁰ Rabkin, 1975: 1.

¹¹¹¹ Couzens, 1984: 30.

¹¹¹² Rabkin, 1975: 4.

¹¹¹³ Choonoo, 1997: 252.

¹¹¹⁴ Rabkin, 1975: 39.

¹¹¹⁵ Choonoo, 1997: 254.

¹¹¹⁶ The *Rand Daily Mail* revealed the truth about the death in custody of anti-Apartheid activist Steve Biko, in 1977. (Pogrud, 2000: 284) In 1985, when the newspaper was finally closed, *The Sowetan*, the leading black newspaper at the time, published the following remarks: "It was the first paper to regard [Blacks] as human beings. It fought for them. Its blend of inspirational and aggressive writing was the talk of the times" (Knight, 2000).

¹¹¹⁷ Buthelezi, 1990: 7.

Several outspoken Whites were prosecuted for their opposition activities, but this was mainly during the 1950s. With the arrival of the increasingly violent sixties, state repression increased and overt white dissent dwindled. It was only in the 1970s, when questions were raised in public about the sustainability of apartheid, that the white anti-government voice was heard again.¹¹¹⁸

Notable White anti-apartheid activists included P.V. Pistorius, a professor of Greek at the University of Pretoria, Edgar Brookes, professor of history and political science at the University of Natal, D.V. Cowen, professor of comparative law at the University of Cape Town, Monica Wilson, professor of anthropology at the University of Cape Town, D.M. Robertson, professor of economics at the University of Cape Town and Philip Tobias, professor of anatomy at the University of Witwatersrand. A number of judges, notably Albert van der Sandt and O.D. Schreiner, had come out as opponents of apartheid.¹¹¹⁹ Alex Hepple of the South African Labour Party was deeply involved. He was eventually forced to flee South Africa with his family, after which he set up the International Defence and Aid Fund,¹¹²⁰ which he and his wife ran from their new home in London.¹¹²¹

Considerable numbers of Whites also went to great effort to support the anti-apartheid struggle. After 1962, thirty-six freedom fighters were given substantial prison sentences for working towards the goals of banned organisations, acts of sabotage, and engaging in what the government had designated as terrorism. In 1965, John Harris, a member of the Liberal Party and of the African Resistance Movement who had planted a bomb in a Johannesburg train station, was executed for sabotage.¹¹²²

Some of the strongest supporters of the anti-apartheid movement were from wealthy backgrounds. For example, Harry Oppenheimer, one of the richest men in South Africa was financially supporting the Progressive Party,¹¹²³ while Helen Suzman, the lone liberal voice in the South African Parliament for much of Dr. Verwoerd's era and the only member of the

¹¹¹⁸ Jaster and Jaster, 1992: x.

¹¹¹⁹ Thompson, 1966: 173.

¹¹²⁰ The International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa was created in Lonon in June 1964 "in order to assist in the development of a non-racial society in South Africa based on a democratic way of life" (IDAF constitution, Information Service Manual, n.d.).

¹¹²¹ Hepple, 2011: 83.

¹¹²² Mandela, 2001: 39-40.

¹¹²³ Hanf et al, 1981: 100.

Progressive Party, voted into government in 1961, represented Houghton, a wealthy Johannesburg suburb.¹¹²⁴

A further anti-apartheid voice was found in politicians who had served in the government under the Representation of Natives Act, such as Margaret Ballinger.¹¹²⁵ Various White authors had published searing criticisms of apartheid, most famously Alan Paton's *Cry, the Beloved Country*.¹¹²⁶ Other authors and journalists who criticised apartheid strongly included Mary Benson,¹¹²⁷ Colin¹¹²⁸ and his wife Margaret Legum¹¹²⁹ and Anthony Delius.¹¹³⁰ Many had been forced to leave and continued their criticisms from overseas.¹¹³¹

Under Dr. Verwoerd, Jewish loyalty was often queried. In fact, there was great variety in Jews' attitudes towards the apartheid state,¹¹³² and the South Jewish Board of Deputies¹¹³³ actually formally congratulated Dr. Verwoerd on his election in person,¹¹³⁴ despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that so many Jews were extremely anxious about what it would mean for them.¹¹³⁵ Although the Jewish community was certainly not united against apartheid, Jews were disproportionately represented in a number of protesting bodies, including the Communist Party.¹¹³⁶

The police were obsessed with Jews, and for them being a Jew was a crime in itself; one of the reasons for this being that they associated Jews with Communism.¹¹³⁷ Jewish

¹¹²⁴ Attwell, 1986: 93.

¹¹²⁵ Thompson, 1966: 174.

¹¹²⁶ Thompson, 2001: 205.

¹¹²⁷ (1919-2000) Author and anti-apartheid campaigner. In 1966, she was 'banned' by the apartheid authorities, forcing her to leave the country and go in exile (Troup and Devenish (*The Guardian*), 21 June 2000, 'Mary Benson').

¹¹²⁸ (1919-2003) Journalist, author and anti-apartheid activist. He and wife Margaret co-authored in 1964, the *South Africa: Crisis for the West*, one of the most important books against apartheid and the first that appealed for sanctions against South Africa in order to bring a peaceful end to apartheid (Vigne, 2000).

¹¹²⁹ (1933-2007) Author, economist, lecturer and anti-apartheid activist; she co-authored in 1964 with her husband the highly influential *South Africa: Crisis for the West* (Herbstein, 2007).

¹¹³⁰ (1916-1989) Author, poet and apartheid critique who lived in exile in England. His 1959 widely acclaimed satiric long poem, *The Last Division*, criticized and attacked apartheid, while it also foretold its collapse (Haywood, 2000: 58).

¹¹³¹ Buthelezi, 1990: 7.

¹¹³² Bernstein, 1966: 452.

¹¹³³ The representative institution of South African Jewry (Shain, 2008: 147).

¹¹³⁴ Hepple, 1966: 30; Stevens, 1971: 128.

¹¹³⁵ Shimoni, 1980: 272.

¹¹³⁶ Belling, 2002: 1.

¹¹³⁷ Suttner, 2001: 28.

activists included Joe Slovo,¹¹³⁸ considered the “Great Satan” by supporters of apartheid,¹¹³⁹ Rowley Arenstein,¹¹⁴⁰ Ruth First,¹¹⁴¹ Braam Fischer,¹¹⁴² Denis Goldberg,¹¹⁴³ Arthur

¹¹³⁸ (1926-1995) Lawyer and one of the leading revolutionaries of the anti-apartheid struggle. One of the most prominent members of the ANC, leader of the South African Communist Party and commander of the Umkhonto we Sizwe. He was repeatedly arrested and banned by the apartheid authorities and lived in exile from 1963 to 1990. A mastermind of South Africa's national reconciliation; he was appointed by Nelson Mandela as Minister of Housing in the first democratically elected government in 1994. He was also Ruth First's husband (Keller, 1995). For further reading see: Slovo, J. (1997) *Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography of ANC Leader Joe Slovo*; Wieder, A. (2013) *Ruth First and Joe Slovo in the War to End Apartheid*.

¹¹³⁹ Mufson, 1990: 220.

¹¹⁴⁰ (1919-1996) Attorney, prominent anti-apartheid activist who was opposed to violence, trade union advisor, member of the South African Communist Party, leader of the Congress of Democrats and an official advisor to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi (South Africa History Online, n.d.). He was banned from 1953 to 1955 and from 1960 to 1986, while he was under house arrest from 1962 to 1980 and disbar from practising law because of a law which made it illegal for those who were listed as communists or Marxists practising law (Arenstein quoted in Suttner, 1997: 386). He was banned in total for thirty-three years, longer than anyone else during apartheid (Adler, 2000: 24). As we will see later, two witnesses testified to the police during the Dr. Verwoerd assassination investigation that Tsafendas was associated with Arenstein.

¹¹⁴¹ (1925-1982) Leading anti-apartheid activist, author, lecturer and wife of Joe Slovo. One of the defendants in the Treason Trial, she was banned, imprisoned and tortured. She was the first White woman to be detained in isolation without charge for 117 days under the Ninety-Day Detention Law. From 1973 to 1978, she worked as a lecturer of *development studies* at Durham University, England. She was assassinated in Maputo in 1988, by the South African Secret Services, with a parcel bomb (Marks, 1983: 123-128). For more about Ruth First see: First, R. (1965) *117 Days: An Account of Confinement and Interrogation Under the South African 90-Day Detention Law*; Gerry, C. (1982) *Ruth First: A Tribute*; Marks, S. (1983) *Ruth First: A Tribute*; Wieder, A. (2013) *Ruth First and Joe Slovo in the War to End Apartheid*.

¹¹⁴² (1908-1975) A lawyer, an important anti-apartheid revolutionary and a prominent members of the South African Communist Party. He defended many anti-apartheid figures, including Nelson Mandela in the Rivonia trial (Mandela, 1995: 202, 305). He was arrested after spending 290 days underground. After being convicted for “furthering the aims of communism and conspiracy to overthrow the government” he was imprisoned from 1966 to 1974 (Sisulu, 2003: 266). He was described by Mandela as one of the “bravest and staunchest friends of the freedom struggle that I have ever known” (Mandela, 1995: 79). For further reading: Clingman, S. (2013) *Bram Fischer: Afrikaner Revolutionary*; Meredith, M. (2002) *Fischer's Choice: A Life of Bram Fischer*.

¹¹⁴³ (1933-) A civil engineer and one of the key figures of the anti-apartheid struggle; member of the Communist Party, of the Umkhonto we Sizwe and leader of the Congress of Democrats. He was convicted at the Rivonia Trial for ‘conspiracy to overthrow the state’ and spent the next twenty-two years in prison (Broder (*Chicago Tribune*), 21 March 1985, ‘Apartheid fight still his passion’). Goldberg was released in 1985 and promptly resumed activities against apartheid within the ANC. In the late 1980s he visited Greece in search of support for the struggle and the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, expressed his willingness to help in any possible way. Subsequently, at Goldberg's request, Papandreou's government provided the ANC with a rent-free office in the centre of Athens and gave it semi-diplomatic status (Denis Goldberg in a personal interview, 12 April 2016). For further reading: Goldberg, D. (2016) *A Life for Freedom: The Mission to End Racial Injustice in South Africa*.

Goldreich,¹¹⁴⁴ Helen Joseph,¹¹⁴⁵ Ronnie Kasrils,¹¹⁴⁶ Harold Wolpe,¹¹⁴⁷ Solly¹¹⁴⁸ and Albie Sachs.¹¹⁴⁹ As a general rule, however, the more orthodox the Jew the less likely he was to oppose apartheid.¹¹⁵⁰

There were also a few brave lawyers such as V.C. Berrange, G. Bizos, A. Chaskalson, W. Cooper (who also defended Tsafendas), G. Duncan, H. Hanson, S.W. Kentridge, D. Kunny, G. Lowen, I.A. Maisels, R.M. Marais, D.B. Molteno, G.B. Muller, I. Mohammed, H. Pitman, N. Philips, D. Soggot, R.S. Welsh, E.M. Wentzel and A.B. Wilson, who demonstrated the courage and dignity, in a hostile and fevered political South African of the time and to defend individuals of all races charged with treason, terrorism, sabotage and other political crimes.¹¹⁵¹ Other notable White anti-apartheid activists of the time included Molly Doyle Anderson, Alan Brooks, Florence Duncan, Dr. Costas Gazidis, Eve Hall, Michael

¹¹⁴⁴ (1929-2011) An abstract painter, an important Umkhonto we Sizwe member and a very significant anti-apartheid revolutionary. In 1961, he and Harold bought the Lilliesleaf Farm in Rivonia with Communist Party money to use it as headquarters for the underground Party and as a safe house for political fugitives. Together with sixteen others he was arrested in the notorious July 11th, 1963 police raid, but later managed to escape from prison. In the 1940s he had fought with the *Palmach*, an elite military wing of the Jewish National Movement, in Palestine (Keable, 2012: 1-20; Martin, 2011: B7).

¹¹⁴⁵ (1905-1992) Teacher, trade union activist and leading anti-apartheid figure who became the symbol of white opposition to apartheid. One of the founding members of both the Congress for Democrats and the Federation of South African Women. She was jailed and banned four times, spending most of her life under house arrest, while she was also declared a "listed person," a punishment intended to prevent her from being quoted in any form. She was one of the defendants in the Treason Trial, where she was eventually acquitted (Cowell, 1992). For further reading: Joseph, H. (1963) *If this be Treason: Helen Joseph's Dramatic Account of the Treason Trial, the Longest in South Africa's History and One of the Strangest Trials of the 20th Century*; Joseph, H. (1966) *Tomorrow's Sun: A Smuggled Journal from South Africa*; Joseph, H. (1986) *Side by Side: The Autobiography of Helen Joseph*.

¹¹⁴⁶ (1938-) One of the most important figures of the anti-apartheid struggle; member of the ANC and of the South African Communist Party. A founding and leading member of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, he recruited and trained several of its fighters. He served as Minister of Intelligence Service from 2004 to 2008 (Jeffries, 2015). For further reading about Kasrils see: Kasrils, R. (1993) *Armed and Dangerous: My Undercover Struggle Against Apartheid*; Kasrils, R. (2012) *The Unlikely Secret Agent*; Keable, K. (ed.) (2012) *London Recruits: The Secret War Against Apartheid*.

¹¹⁴⁷ (1926-1996) A sociologist, attorney, lecturer and a prominent member of the South African Communist Party. He was a leading figure of the leading figures of the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1961, he and Arthur Goldreich purchased the Lilliesleaf Farm (mentioned above). He was also arrested there on July 11th, 1963, but managed to escape from the prison, along with Goldreich and two others. He moved to England where he spent the next thirty years of his life (O'Meara, 1997). For more about Wolpe see: Friedman, S. (2015) *Race, Class and Power: Harold Wolpe and the Radical Critique of Apartheid*.

¹¹⁴⁸ (1900-1976) Leading trade unionist, prominent anti-apartheid author and activist, member of the South African Communist Party and father of the anti-apartheid lawyer and Judge Albie Sachs (Verwey, 1995: 220-222).

¹¹⁴⁹ (1935-) Son of Solly Sachs; anti-apartheid activist, lawyer, Judge and author. In 1988, while in Maputo, Mozambique, he lost an eye and an arm when a bomb, placed by the South African secret Services, exploded in his car (Adler, 2000: 24) For further reading about Sachs see his books: *The Jail Diary of Albie Sachs* (1966); *Running to Maputo* (1990); *The Soft Vengeance of a Freedom Fighter* (2014); *Albie Sachs and Transformation in South Africa: From Revolutionary Activist to Constitutional Court Judge* (2014).

¹¹⁵⁰ Shimoni, 2003: 75-76.

¹¹⁵¹ Dugard, 1978: 243.

Harmel, Dennis Higgs, Percy Jack Hodgson, Samantha Kemp, David Kitson, Adran Leftwich, Hugh Lewin, Ann Nicholson, Sylvia Nyame, Neville Rubin, Jean Strachan, Paul Trehwela, Ben and Mary Turok.¹¹⁵²

OFFICIAL OPPOSITION TO DR. VERWOERD

The South African party system was described in 1966 by Leonard Thompson, Professor of History Emeritus at Yale University, to consist of right wing and centre parties, but none from the left.¹¹⁵³ There were three main opposition parties: the United Party; the Progressive Party and the Liberal Party of South Africa (LPSA).¹¹⁵⁴ While each opposed Dr. Verwoerd's policies to varying degrees, they were largely ineffectual against the march of apartheid in a country where just 2% of Blacks belonged to the "bourgeois" middle class, while most lived in abject poverty.¹¹⁵⁵ The multi-racial Liberal Party suffered such extreme harassment under Dr. Verwoerd that it was "crippled to the point of paralysis."¹¹⁵⁶

THE UNITED PARTY

The United Party was formed when Prime Minister Barry Hertzog's National Party merged with the South African Party of Jan Smuts, together with the small Unionist Party. Hertzog led until 1939, when he refused to allow South Africa to go to war with Britain against Germany. Its full name the United National Party of South Africa,¹¹⁵⁷ it ruled South Africa from 1934 to 1948 and had support from Afrikaner and English-speaking Whites, and from Coloureds, with a core of support coming from English-speaking voters.¹¹⁵⁸

While the United Party fiercely opposed the National Party, it also subscribed to ideas of white supremacy and supported the concept of apartheid.¹¹⁵⁹ The majority of the United Party caucus were of a different mind, and Hertzog resigned. Jan Smuts succeeded him and led the party and the country throughout World War II and the immediate post-war years. The party was led by de Villiers Graaff from 1956 to 1977, who largely supported the harsh

¹¹⁵² Pike, 1985: 338-370, 408-419.

¹¹⁵³ Thompson, L. (1966) *The Republic of South Africa*.

¹¹⁵⁴ Brookes, 1968: 27-40.

¹¹⁵⁵ Feit, 1967: 25.

¹¹⁵⁶ Hepple, 1966: 171.

¹¹⁵⁷ Rosenthal, 1978.

¹¹⁵⁸ Wilson and Thompson, 1969: 421.

¹¹⁵⁹ Muller, 1981: 429.

security legislation of the ruling government and could not provide a constant political image or develop a clear alternative to government policies.¹¹⁶⁰ Ultimately, while de Villiers Graaff has been characterised as essentially an “honest” and “decent” man, his actions as leader of the opposition bolstered apartheid, largely because of his reluctance to deal with confrontation, including with the ruling National Party and despite its many excesses, but also because he was simply not the intellectual equal of the talented Dr. Verwoerd.¹¹⁶¹

THE LIBERAL PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA (LPSA)¹¹⁶²

A liberal party formed by Alan Paton¹¹⁶³ in 1953 and dissolved in 1968, the LPSA arose in response to the belief that the United Party was an ineffective opposition to apartheid and to National Party. The LPSA aimed to bring together whites who were liberals, but not communists.¹¹⁶⁴ Early leaders included Ambrose Reeves,¹¹⁶⁵ an Anglican bishop who was very active in campaigning against apartheid, Margaret Ballinger,¹¹⁶⁶ an influential politician and outspoken critic of apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd, and Alan Paton, author of *Cry, the Beloved Country*.

The LPSA defined its goals as “equal rights for all civilised men and equal opportunities for all men and women to become civilised.” The party has been retrospectively criticised for its naivety and assumption of white leadership,¹¹⁶⁷ but in the context of the time

¹¹⁶⁰ Hanf et al, 1981: 100

¹¹⁶¹ Mouton, 2014: 48-53.

¹¹⁶² For further reading about the LPSA see: Vigne, R. (1997) *Liberals Against Apartheid: A History of the Liberal Party of South Africa, 1953-1968*.

¹¹⁶³ (1903-1988) an Anti-apartheid activist, an important South African writer and the founder of the Liberal Party, the apartheid authorities considered him an enemy and, without giving a reason for it, Dr. Verwoerd confiscated his passport in 1960 on his return from a visit to Britain and the United States. It was generally accepted that this was because of attacks Paton had made on Dr. Verwoerd's policies while he was overseas. (Mitgang, 1988). For more about Paton see his two autobiographies: *Towards the Mountain: An Autobiography* (1980) and *Journey Continued: An Autobiography* (1988). See also: Paton, A. (1992) *Some Sort of a Job: My Life with Alan Paton*.

¹¹⁶⁴ University of KwaZulu-Natal: Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives; Daniels, 2001: 218.

¹¹⁶⁵ (1899-1980) An Anglican priest and fierce anti-apartheid activist who personally witnessed the Sharpeville massacre. He was deported from South Africa a few months after the massacre (*Time*, 26 September 1960, ‘Out goes the Bishop’) and subsequently wrote the ‘*Shooting at Sharpeville: Agony of South Africa*’ which was the first work that documented the atrocity.

¹¹⁶⁶ (1894–1980) An anti-apartheid politician, the author of the 1969 anti-apartheid book *From Union to Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation*, and the first President of the Liberal Party. She served as a member of the Parliament from 1937 to 1960 (African Affairs, 1961), was a Native Representative and described by *TIME* (3 July 1944) as the “Queen of the Blacks” for the work she had carried out for the rights of the Black majority. For further reading see: Mouton, F.A. (1997) *Voices in the Desert: Margaret and William Ballinger-A Biography*.

¹¹⁶⁷ Vigne, 1997: 12-13.

its members were putting themselves in a vulnerable situation. This may be one reason why it never gained mass support.¹¹⁶⁸ The Liberal Party's official newspaper, *Contact*, was the only one to report the atrocities carried out in Robben Island (discussed below) in the early 1960s, referring to the island as "Devil's Island."¹¹⁶⁹ In 1968 legislation under Vorster prohibited multiracial parties, and Liberals disbanded rather than sacrificing their principles.¹¹⁷⁰

THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY¹¹⁷¹

The Progressive Party was founded in 1959 by a liberal break-away element of the United Party that opposed apartheid fiercely.¹¹⁷² It was represented in parliament by just one elected member, Helen Suzman,¹¹⁷³ who took her seat after the General Election of 1961 and became Parliament's most effective champion of civil and human rights.¹¹⁷⁴ Notable members of the time included Dr. Jan Steytler (1910- date of death unknown) who also served as the first leader of the Party and Dr. Bernard Friedman (1896-1984), co-founder of the Party.¹¹⁷⁵ The Party was largely peopled by educated, upper middle class Whites and had considerable support from wealthy Anglophones, including many Jews.¹¹⁷⁶ It also obtained both financial and organizational support from Harry Oppenheimer, one of the wealthiest South Africans, who had joined the Party in 1959.¹¹⁷⁷

¹¹⁶⁸ Bush, 1999: 200.

¹¹⁶⁹ Daniels, 2001: 220.

¹¹⁷⁰ Hanf et al, 1981: 99.

¹¹⁷¹ For further reading about the Progressive Party see: Strangways-Booth, J. (1976) *A Cricket in the Thorn Tree: Helen Suzman and the Progressive Party of South Africa*.

¹¹⁷² Pierce, 1999.

¹¹⁷³ (1917-2009) A strident, active activist against apartheid. She was first elected to the Parliament in 1953 as member of the United Party. One of the founders of the Progressive Party, she was its only member of Parliament for thirteen years (1961-1974). In total, she spent thirty-six years in the South African Parliament (*The Economist*, 18 January 2014, 'Helen Suzman. Liberal light'). *Post* journalist Veruschka Mungroo (2009), said of her that "she possessed the courage of a lioness with the gentleness of a lamb, combined with the compassion of the deer." For further reading about Suzman see: Suzman, H. (1993) *In No Uncertain Terms: A South African Memoir*; Lee, R. (1991) *Values Alive: A Tribute to Helen Suzman*; Lewsen, P. (ed.) (1991) *Helen Suzman's Solo Years*; Renwick, R (2014) *Helen Suzman: Bright Star in a Dark Chamber*; Strangways-Booth, J. (1976) *A Cricket in the Thorn Tree: Helen Suzman and the Progressive Party of South Africa*.

¹¹⁷⁴ Hanf et al, 1981: 100.

¹¹⁷⁵ Strangways-Booth, 1976.

¹¹⁷⁶ Hanf et al, 1981: 100.

¹¹⁷⁷ Pallister et al, 1988: 82, 86.

EXTERNAL RESISTANCE

By the 1960s, external resistance to apartheid was more widespread, and there was an increasingly organised body of South African exiles running offices for the South African United Front in London, Accra, Cairo, Dar-es-Salaam and New York, to mobilise international opinion.¹¹⁷⁸ In November 1962, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting that members exercise economic sanctions¹¹⁷⁹ against South Africa,¹¹⁸⁰ and in 1963 called on South Africa to free prisoners who had been jailed for opposing apartheid.¹¹⁸¹

In 1962, the newsletter *Africa Today* urged opposition to apartheid, noting the lack of external opposition. It urged Americans to boycott South African produce and pressure the government for sanctions.¹¹⁸² Many other newspapers were highly critical of apartheid, and foreign journalists working in South Africa were at risk of arrest.¹¹⁸³ In Africa, the Organisation of Africa United, founded in 1963, campaigned against apartheid and gathered funds while supporting a boycott movement.¹¹⁸⁴ The same year, representatives from various Scandinavian countries rejected Dr. Verwoerd's offer that they should see South Africa for themselves.¹¹⁸⁵

Also in 1963, by 67 votes to 13, with 23 abstentions, the UN voted that member states should break off relations with the country, including forbidding entry of South African ships to their ports, not allowing their own ships to visit South Africa, the boycott of South African goods, and refusing to allow South African planes to land. It called on members not to supply South Africa with weapons, ammunition and military vehicles and for an oil embargo. Only the UK, the US and France, the three largest investors in South Africa, and Spain and Portugal, which were still trying to hold onto their colonies, voted against the embargo.¹¹⁸⁶ The same year, the Addis Ababa Conference of Independent African States called on its members to sever diplomatic relations with South Africa.¹¹⁸⁷

¹¹⁷⁸ van den Berghe, 1967: 254.

¹¹⁷⁹ For a detailed account of the sanctions against South Africa see Rogers, B., Bolton, B. (1981) *Sanctions against South Africa: Exploding the Myths*.

¹¹⁸⁰ Malhotra, 1964: 135.

¹¹⁸¹ Schifter, 1993: 368.

¹¹⁸² *Africa Today*, 1962: 16.

¹¹⁸³ *The New York Times*, 10 April 1960: n.p., 'Toronto Star editor held in South Africa.'

¹¹⁸⁴ Thompson, 1966: 201.

¹¹⁸⁵ de Kiewiet, 1964: 413.

¹¹⁸⁶ *Africa Today*, 1964: 2.

¹¹⁸⁷ Ainslie and Robinson, 1963: 5.

In 1964, a UN Security Council sent up an Expert Committee to explore measures that could be taken against South Africa, and total sanctions against the country were proposed.¹¹⁸⁸ In September 1964, in Moscow, an “International Court of public opinion” was set up as a youth anti-apartheid forum to try Dr. Verwoerd for racist crimes. The “Court” “ordered” Dr. Verwoerd to appear before it and answer for crimes committed against the non-Whites in South Africa. Naturally, Dr. Verwoerd did not attend and was “tried” in absentia. The “Court” concluded that the South African leader was liable to be condemned as a heinous, international criminal and an enemy of mankind.¹¹⁸⁹

On September 21, 1965, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilgard Muller, addressed a largely empty UN chamber, as two thirds of the delegates had left in protest.¹¹⁹⁰ In Britain, shoppers were urged to boycott South African fruit.¹¹⁹¹ The United States’ growing support for the liberation of American Blacks prompted sympathies with South Africans,¹¹⁹² and the government stated its disapproval of apartheid; Dr. Verwoerd expressed outrage when the United States embassy to South Africa invited guests of all races to its Fourth of July party in 1965,¹¹⁹³ when it refused to rule out hiring non-Whites to work in the two space-observation stations it had in South Africa,¹¹⁹⁴ and when an aircraft carrier berth was not allowed to stop in Cape Town rather than observe Dr. Verwoerd’s demands about non-White Navy members aboard.¹¹⁹⁵

In Europe, fifteen countries had signed the European Declaration of Human Rights.¹¹⁹⁶ The Dutch government announced plans in 1965 to contribute to the Christian Defence and Aid Fund; the South African Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr Muller, lodged a formal complaint and the government punished Holland by refusing its national airline, KLM, additional landing slots in Johannesburg.¹¹⁹⁷ The International Defence and Aid Fund

¹¹⁸⁸ Thompson, 1966: 208-209.

¹¹⁸⁹ *The Canberra Times*, 19 September 1964: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd “summoned” to Moscow’; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

¹¹⁹⁰ Dugard, 1965: 52.

¹¹⁹¹ Herbstein, 2004: 40.

¹¹⁹² Thompson, 1966: 199.

¹¹⁹³ Hepple, 1967: 201; *The New York Times*, 27 June 1965: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd scores US guest lists’; McKay, 1966b: 42-43.

¹¹⁹⁴ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 28 June 1965: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd race bar challenges US at space tracking stations’; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 3 July 1965: 2, ‘South Africa raids paper over prison articles: Detectives seize copy.’; McKay, 1966b: 42-43.

¹¹⁹⁵ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 18 August 1965: 9, ‘Dr. Verwoerd denies he is goading US’;

¹¹⁹⁶ Baker, 1965: 552.

¹¹⁹⁷ Hepple, 1967: 201; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 17 June 1965: 2, ‘Dutch assailed by South Africa.’

(set up to defend and pay for the legal expenses of those in the Treason Trial)¹¹⁹⁸ which published widely on South Africa, was a very important tool in getting information to the public overseas,¹¹⁹⁹ and collected money to defend anti-apartheid activists in South Africa,¹²⁰⁰ while activists encouraged Britain to boycott South African goods; the government investigated the feasibility of doing so.¹²⁰¹

At grassroots level there was considerable British opposition, particularly among trade unionists and left wing politicians. Other European countries, including Holland and the Scandinavian countries, had been strongly anti-apartheid from the start, and Denmark in particular provided moral and practical support to the ANC.¹²⁰² In Sweden, the government ordered hospitals and the army not to buy South African products, the state monopoly on alcohol sales ceased buying South African drinks, and cooperative supermarkets no longer stocked South African produce.¹²⁰³ To criticisms from Israel, Dr. Verwoerd furiously stated that the young sovereign state contained within its borders Arabs whom it did not treat as it treated Jewish Israelis.¹²⁰⁴

One of the most severe critics of apartheid was India. A major point of Indian foreign policy had been the emancipation of South Africa from apartheid. It had raised the issue of apartheid with the UN in 1946 and 1952. India was the first country to impose sanctions, and after the Sharpeville Massacre the Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, stated that India was aware that, bad as things were for the Indian South Africans, they were even worse for the Blacks. It joined with African states in calling for a Security Council discussion of apartheid in 1960 and, in 1962, for sanctions.¹²⁰⁵ However, the United States agreed with South Africa that the treatment of South African Indians was an internal affair.¹²⁰⁶ In 1964, when Nehru died, Dr. Verwoerd made a point by ignoring this without making any statement, as India had not been a “friendly state.”¹²⁰⁷

¹¹⁹⁸ Muller, 1981: 498.

¹¹⁹⁹ Herbstein, 2004: xviii.

¹²⁰⁰ Herbstein, 2004: 86.

¹²⁰¹ Fieldhouse, 2005: 10-14.

¹²⁰² Dubow, 2014: 50-53; Herbstein, 2004: 109.

¹²⁰³ Herbstein, 2004: 110-111.

¹²⁰⁴ Stevens, 1971: 134.

¹²⁰⁵ Reddy, 1991: 3-6.

¹²⁰⁶ Minter and Hill, 2008: 749.

¹²⁰⁷ *The New York Times*, 29 May 1964: 6, ‘South Africa silent over Nehru’s death.’

DR. VERWOERD'S POLICE STATE

Dr. Verwoerd was determined to continue his apartheid policy and crush all who opposed it. He had no hesitation in removing basic human rights, even those protected by international law, from his opponents, and turning South Africa into a repressive, totalitarian police state. Some 79% of the population lived as if under martial law. In 1957, a year before becoming Prime Minister, he swore that, "we will use an iron hand against those who undermine the government's apartheid policy."¹²⁰⁸ In the following years up to his death, he did exactly that, and more.

Since 1950, when the Unlawful Organisations Bill was introduced, the government had executive authority to ban the Communist Party and any organisation or person whom the Minister of Justice considered "unlawful."¹²⁰⁹ Legislation which gave the government extensive new powers to restrict the freedom of its citizens was the Public Safety Act introduced in 1953. This made it possible for the ruling regime to impose states of emergency, with all of their draconian powers, as and when they wished, and to strengthen penalties against anyone who opposed or backed the repeal of a particular law.¹²¹⁰

South Africa became ever more a police state under Dr. Verwoerd with the enthusiastic participation of his Minister of Justice, John Vorster.¹²¹¹ While South Africa was certainly not the only repressive country at the time, it was unique insofar as the great bulk of the state's repressive techniques took place within the legal system.¹²¹² Dr. Verwoerd had learned from the Treason Trial that if he wanted to dispatch his critics, he would also have to dispatch the rule of law,¹²¹³ and he arranged for new legislation to allow the most egregious forms of state repression imaginable.¹²¹⁴

Whereas once only murder had carried the death penalty, in the 1950s it was extended to include armed robbery and some cases of housebreaking, and in 1962 the act of sabotage, defined loosely:¹²¹⁵ "... any person who committed any wrong or wilful act whereby he/she injured, obstructed, tampered with or destroyed the health or safety of the public, the

¹²⁰⁸ Cachalia, 1990: 10.

¹²⁰⁹ Ballinger, 1969: 391.

¹²¹⁰ Davenport and Saunders, 2000b: 387; Rudolph, 1984: 3.

¹²¹¹ O'Meara, 1996: 109.

¹²¹² Fullard, 2004: 341.

¹²¹³ "A Distinguished South African Lawyer," 1965: 3.

¹²¹⁴ Fullard, 2004: 342.

¹²¹⁵ Sachs, 1970: 2.

maintenance of law and order, the supply of water, light, power, fuel or foodstuffs, sanitary, medical or fire extinguishing services could be tried for sabotage.”¹²¹⁶

Under the terms of the Sabotage Act, the accused had to prove that he was innocent, rather than vice versa.¹²¹⁷ Dr. Verwoerd admitted that, despite attempts to copper-fasten apartheid, black urban populations continued to increase. He warned Whites that if they wished for segregation they would have to get used to “managing without natives.”¹²¹⁸ Helen Suzman characterised the Sabotage Act as the “most sinister” move in South Africa’s history to build a “camouflaged dictatorship behind the façade of democracy.”¹²¹⁹

Among Verwoerd’s innovations were “machine gun belts,” areas where Blacks could be shot by the police if they appeared to threaten White residential areas during uprisings. According to the *Cape Times* in 1958, “banishments, deportations, shootings, burnings, arson, closing of schools” were the order of the day in what it called “Verwoerd’s Native Empire.”¹²²⁰ The same year, *The Economist* wrote that South Africa was “not quite yet” a police state, but that it was well on its way.¹²²¹

In 1959, a passage of the Prisons Act formalised a system whereby prisoners could be rented out to farmers for the provision of cheap labour.¹²²² By 1961, with strikes prohibited by law, every attempt at civil protest was followed by police raids, when officers served for “subversives” and any pamphlets or other material they might have, and arrested people summarily.¹²²³ At the same time Dr. Verwoerd’s Government encouraged the White population to train in the use of arms to protect themselves and their privileges in case of a Black uprising.¹²²⁴

As apartheid became more and more entrenched, increasingly the tendency was for all Blacks to be treated as assumed criminals until proven otherwise.¹²²⁵ Policemen treated Blacks with appalling violence, and were rarely punished. In 1959, a total of 311 men in the South African police were convicted for assault, and only twenty-nine were discharged. In

¹²¹⁶ Fullard, 2004: 345.

¹²¹⁷ “A Distinguished South African Lawyer,” 1962: 6.

¹²¹⁸ Vatcher, 1965: 162.

¹²¹⁹ Conley (*The New York Times*), 24 May 1962: 13, ‘Police state aim laid to Dr. Verwoerd.’

¹²²⁰ Pienaar, 1999: 25.

¹²²¹ *The Economist*, 18 October 1958: 216, ‘The law’s delay.’

¹²²² Cook, 1974: 12.

¹²²³ *The Economist*, 27 May 1961: 905, ‘The one sane country.’

¹²²⁴ Pillay, 1963: 4.

¹²²⁵ Cole, 1968: 40.

1960, newspaper editor Patrick Duncan stated that he had seen ten policemen armed with whips made from strips of rubber chase and beat three Africans.¹²²⁶ Any policeman had the right to inspect the home residency of a Black person whenever he wanted to and for whatever reason, at any time of the day or night.¹²²⁷ Dr. Verwoerd was determined to use violence to subdue any protest, regardless of how peaceful, and to suppress any organisation that had as its goal the mobilisation of Blacks.¹²²⁸ In 1962, Nelson Mandela said of South Africa that, "it is a country torn from top to bottom by a fierce racial strife and conflict where the blood of African patriots frequently flows... it is a land ruled by the gun."¹²²⁹

The police and the security services came increasingly to resemble the Gestapo in terms of the arrogance with which they carried out extraordinary acts of violence and the levels of terror they inspired among ordinary Africans,¹²³⁰ with their actions, according to Hans Pienaar, a South African writer, being "more reminiscent of that of an occupying army."¹²³¹ In 1964, Suzanne Cronje in *Witness in the Dark: Police Torture and Brutality in South Africa*, commented that South Africa's police state closely resembled Hitler's Germany during the 1930s, saying, "in its most terrifying aspects the new order manifests itself in the attitude and activities of the police; and the professional sadism which emerges from the affidavits and case histories of political and other prisoners."¹²³² At that time, three hundred political prisoners were imprisoned and restricted to solitary confinement with no access to reading material, or to a lawyer, and no possibility of seeking redress.¹²³³

Gradually, the police started recruiting greater numbers of Africans, Asians and Coloureds as regular officers. They also hired paid informants.¹²³⁴ However, policemen of different races were treated differently inside the force. Whites had a monopoly on firearms; Black policemen carried sticks or truncheons. Blacks were not recruited into the army, or given gun licences. White police officers enjoyed a wide range of the most modern, sophisticated weaponry and vehicles available and were highly trained and backed by similarly trained reserves.¹²³⁵

¹²²⁶ Hughes, 1961: 195-197.

¹²²⁷ Rubin, 1961: 10.

¹²²⁸ Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, 1986: 53.

¹²²⁹ Mandela, 1978: 7.

¹²³⁰ Hain, 1996: 84.

¹²³¹ Pienaar, 1999: 25.

¹²³² Cronje, 1964: 1.

¹²³³ "A Distinguished South African Lawyer," 1965: 4-5.

¹²³⁴ Johns and Hunt Davis, 1991: 91.

¹²³⁵ Thompson, 1966: 190-191.

On March 26, 1961, the *New York Times* reported of the growing force of the police and army: "The 25,000 police are equipped with automatic weapons and armoured cars. During last year's state of emergency Mr Verwoerd did not hesitate to use them in Cape Town to drive Africans brutally back to work. The army of about 8,000 men has recently been reorganised to deal mainly with internal uprisings and some of its officers have visited Algeria to study the methods used by the French there. The Air Force is equipped with Sabre jets and helicopters."¹²³⁶

Defence expenditure was quadrupled between 1960-1961 and 1963-1964 while the number men in the regular forces increased from 8,000 to 104,000.¹²³⁷ By 1963, the South African government was spending £78 million a year on the military, exceeding the combined defence expenditure of all the Black independent states of Africa, and even more, another £101 million, on "internal security," that is, the police and the security forces.¹²³⁸ In 1965, the International Commission of Jurists declared on a statement, "Anyone who doubts that South Africa has become a police state should examine its laws. The question is then no longer in doubt."¹²³⁹

TORTURE¹²⁴⁰

According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission "torture was the dominant form of violation by the apartheid police during the 1960s."¹²⁴¹ Dr. Verwoerd said that South Africa's situation was similar to that of Europe's during the Dark Ages, when it had had to struggle to

¹²³⁶ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), March 26: 1961, 'Dr. Verwoerd adamant on policy.'

¹²³⁷ Legum and Legum, 1964a: 38.

¹²³⁸ Pillay, 1963: 2, 6.

¹²³⁹ "A Distinguished South African Lawyer," 1965: 2-3.

¹²⁴⁰ For more about torture during apartheid see: Amnesty International Report (1978) *Political Imprisonment in South Africa*; Bernstein, H. (1972) *South Africa: The Terrorism of Torture*; Catholic Institute for International Relations (1982) *Torture in South Africa: Recent Documents*; Cronje, S. (1964) *Witness in the Dark*; International Defence and Aid Fund (1967) *South African Prisons and the Red Cross Investigation*; International Defence and Aid Fund (1970) *Trial by Torture: The Case of the 22*; Institute for International Relations (1982) *Torture in South Africa: Recent Documents*; Foster, D. and Sandler, D. (1985) *A Study of Detention and Torture in South Africa: A Preliminary Report*; Foster, D. (1987) *Detention and Torture in South Africa*; 'FOCUS on Political Repression in Southern Africa' a series of publication by the International Defence and Aid Fund; Gifford, T. (1981) *South Africa's Record of International Terrorism*; Institute of Commonwealth Studies (1975) *Detention and Détente in Southern Africa*; Harlow, B. (2009) *Tortured Thoughts: From Marshal Square to Guantanamo Bay*; Motala, S. (1987) *Behind Closed Doors*; Rudolph, H. (1984) *Security, Terrorism and Torture: Detainees' Rights in South Africa and Israel: A Comparative Study*; Sachs, A. (1970) *South Africa: The Violence of Apartheid*; Transition (several reports from 1964 to 1975) *Torture in South Africa*; World Peace Council, J. (1972) *Apartheid is Built on Torture*; The reports of the TRC.

¹²⁴¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 3, 1998: 530.

keep the flame of civilisation alight.¹²⁴² One viable comparison of South Africa with medieval Europe was in the glee with which the authorities used torture against its citizens. Anyone seen as a threat to the regime was liable to be seized by the authorities and subjected to hideous torture.¹²⁴³

Although torture and other crimes against humanity had already been in use in the 1950s, the new legislation meant that now “a judiciary that had been substantially reconstituted by politically motivated appointments was willing to rule against legal objections to any ill-treatment of detainees.”¹²⁴⁴ Torture became increasingly vicious from the early 1960s onwards with the widespread use of electric shocks.¹²⁴⁵ A sudden and dramatic increase in torture was ascribed to special training given to a squad of security policemen, including Hendrik van den Bergh, head of South Africa's Secret Police. This group was instructed in torture and interrogation techniques developed during the 1954-1962 Franco-Algerian war.¹²⁴⁶

In their fight against communism and other forms of activism, Dr. Verwoerd's apartheid authorities used indefinite detention without trial, solitary confinement, constant exposure to bright lights, torture, including electrocution, partial suffocation and beatings. These laws were used for various purposes, including removing particular people from political organisations, splitting said organisations, and for intimidating the public, which inevitably heard the stories of torture and death; the creation of a climate of fear.¹²⁴⁷

Torture was not restricted to those who posed a direct threat to the regime, but also to potential informants. For instance, Bram Fischer, who would defend Mandela in the Rivonia trial, was captured after a woman he knew was interrogated for seventy continuous hours, often by three at a time, threatened with placement in mental hospital and forced to endure threats against her children, one of whom was disabled.¹²⁴⁸

Detainees described a wide range of mistreatments, including being beaten, electric shocks, tortured with cold water, suffocation with a bag over the head, forced into uncomfortable positions, told lies and interrogated for hour after hour, and degrading

¹²⁴² Black, 1965: 204.

¹²⁴³ Peires, 2004: 106.

¹²⁴⁴ Lodge, 2011: 178.

¹²⁴⁵ Fullard, 2004: 356.

¹²⁴⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 16, 195.

¹²⁴⁷ Foster, 1987: 5.

¹²⁴⁸ Peires, 2004: 107.

treatment such as being strip-searched.¹²⁴⁹ All of the government's acts in this area flouted the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which were established in 1957.¹²⁵⁰ Many victims developed psychiatric problems and had to be transferred to mental hospitals.¹²⁵¹ By the early 1960s, about sixty four deaths of people being held in detention were reported, and the government did not even bother contesting them.¹²⁵²

In 1963, eleven detainees at Pretoria Central Prison in November made sworn affidavits claiming they were tortured and assaulted by the police while in custody under the 90-day detention law. Only in 1965, at least forty-nine detainees complained of assaults by policemen or warders. Twenty-nine claimed they were beaten up, while twenty claimed they were subjected to electric shocks while sacks were tied over their heads.¹²⁵³ Large numbers of prisoners were believed to have committed suicide rather than allow themselves to be subjected to yet more torture;¹²⁵⁴ or perhaps they were simply murdered and their deaths recorded as suicides, as was so often the case.¹²⁵⁵

Dr. Verwoerd's government maintained that there was no electric shock treatment or any other form of torture in its prisons. Only in 1997, during the TRC hearings, did a government employee (former Security Police Colonel Andrew Taylor) first publicly admit the use of electric shocks by members of the police.¹²⁵⁶ Apart from denying the use of torture, Dr. Verwoerd's government also dedicated itself to punishing warders or former warders who disclosed the reality of the torture of prisoners, and penalising the newspapers that published their reports. On August 19, 1965, the *New York Times* reported that a former warder was jailed for three years after making a "confession" to the *Rand Daily Mail* about the use of electric shocks. The warder claimed that he had been well paid for the statements, which the state insisted were utterly false, but the *New York Times* pointed out that other, similar, statements had been made elsewhere. Among the other revelations about prison life was that in some cases prisoners were expected to use the same toilet bowl for defecating and

¹²⁴⁹ Foster, 1987: 127; 235; Transition, 1976: 53-58; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 532.

¹²⁵⁰ Foster, 1987: 8.

¹²⁵¹ Bunting, 1986: 227-233.

¹²⁵² Foster, 1987: 2.

¹²⁵³ Transition, 1965: 18.

¹²⁵⁴ Transition, 1976: 58.

¹²⁵⁵ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 6 April 2016.

¹²⁵⁶ Suttner, 2001: 29.

brushing their teeth, and that assaults on Black prisoners by White guards were commonplace.¹²⁵⁷

The government and its media machine ramped into gear and launched a savage attack on the *Rand Daily Mail* and other dissenting publications. At the same time, Laurence Gandar, editor of the *Rand Daily Mail*, demanded a judicial inquiry into the conditions in which prisoners were kept.¹²⁵⁸ In 1964, a UN Special Committee on the policies of the apartheid government issued a damning report detailing the extent and ferocity of the torture used by Dr. Verwoerd's government. The following are some typical examples:

- Looksmart Solwandle Ngudle was found dead by hanging on his cell on September 5, 1963; he was the first person to die in detention and his death was attributed to suicide.¹²⁵⁹ The police refused to hand his body to the family and he was buried without an autopsy. On 26 November 1963, the counsel for Mrs. Ngudle's family, Vernon Berrange, stated that "twenty witnesses had told him of being subjected to 'gross brutalities' to make them talk. They were told to undress, made to jump up and down and, when exhausted, manacled in a squatting position with a stick under their knees, blindfolded and given electric shocks until they were, in some cases, unconscious."¹²⁶⁰
- On 28 November 1963, Isaac Tiale, a Johannesburg businessman who had undergone detention with Looksmart Ngudle, testified at the inquest that he "went off his head" after being subjected to electric shocks and "had to be put into a straitjacket." He described how he "had been handcuffed and subjected to electric shocks while a bag had been tied over his head until he had lost consciousness twice."¹²⁶¹ The electric shocks and the suffocation with a bag over the head was standard torture practice at the time.¹²⁶²
- Another victim, Ndovela Nxasana, stated, "I was beaten up in Mkambathi... they had beaten me up and they had broken my joints on my hands... they beat me on my buttocks and my hand was injured. I would scream... I am almost deaf because I was electrocuted..."¹²⁶³
- Ivan Frederick Schermbrucker, a 90-day detainee, described his ordeal as such:

¹²⁵⁷ Cook, 1974: 33-34.

¹²⁵⁸ *The New York Times*, 19 August 1965: 30, 'Reprisals in South Africa'; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*) 27 January 1966: 13, 'South African gound guilty of lying about jails.'

¹²⁵⁹ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1965: 65; Transition, 1965: 18.

¹²⁶⁰ Bernstein, 1972: 31; Transition, 1965: 18.

¹²⁶¹ Transition, 1965: 18.

¹²⁶² Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 532.

¹²⁶³ Fullard, 2004: 357.

“I stood for 28 hours without moving an inch from 12 p.m. yesterday till 4 p.m. this afternoon. I fell twice, had cold water thrown over me and pulled to my feet. It seems that most of the men detainees here have been kept standing on their feet continuously for anything between 12 hours to 36 hours and that most have broken at one stage. I don't think that anyone can stand on their feet for more than 36 continuous hours and not break down. This is torture good and solid. They laugh and almost bump you, about when you complain. They threatened to keep me standing for days and nights or even longer. They are at their most savage, make no mistake about it.”¹²⁶⁴

- Some prisoners reported to lawyer Joel Carlson that they were told to jump up and down, raising their knees high, until they became exhausted. They were beaten if they stopped. Some were manacled and put in a squatting position, their heads placed over their knees and a broomstick inserted behind their knees and above their elbows. A burlap bag was put over their heads with a cord drawn around their necks and electrical wires were attached to different parts of their bodies. They were repeatedly shocked and it was, they said, excruciatingly painful. Many fainted and when they came to, lying on the floor, water was being thrown in their faces. Then the procedure was repeated all over again. Some defecated and were told to clean up their mess before the torture resumed. Others... were driven mad by the torture and some had been transferred to prison hospitals or mental homes.¹²⁶⁵

- Abdulhai Jassat described the following:
“[After prolonged torture]... they took me to the window; they said ‘Go to that window and jump.’ They put two chairs ... they said, ‘You can now jump.’ I said ‘I refuse.’ They dragged me by my shoulders and lifted me physically up and put my head out of the window. They were holding me by my ankles, each policeman holding one ankle. All I could see was a concrete floor at the bottom. We were three floors up and they would continue asking me questions and all of a sudden one would let go of a foot... and as he's about to catch my foot, the one he had released, the other one would let go, and they played it like that...”¹²⁶⁶

Arthur Goldreich said that he had seen twenty Special Branch policemen beating up Jassat until he had collapsed. He added: “They put a wet sack round his head and tied the cords at his neck till he blacked out. After they revived him they made him stand on one leg, holding a

¹²⁶⁴ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1965: 69; Transition, 1965: 19.

¹²⁶⁵ Fullard, 2004: 357, and similar accounts on 358, 359.

¹²⁶⁶ Fullard, 2004: 360.

stone above his head while they tuck pins into his raised leg. The soles of his feet were then beaten with batons, and electrodes were placed on the toes with the current flowing. Finally they held him by the ankles out of a window 40 feet above the street in trying to get a confession.”¹²⁶⁷

- A report published in 1965 revealed similarly shocking circumstances:

“Mr. Bob Hepple, a Johannesburg lawyer and originally one of the accused in the Rivonia trial, said in Dar es Salaam: ‘The evidence is overwhelming that the 90-day detention law provides a cover for protracted mental and physical torture. I personally eye-witnessed the horrifying effects of such detention on a particular detainee. One night during September or October I was awakened in Pretoria prison by screams emanating from the African section, which continued throughout the night. The next morning I heard the screaming man being pushed along the corridor into the hospital yard. Looking out of my cell window I saw an African man, Z. ... a 90-day detainee held by two warders, his arms twisted behind his back. He was frothing at the mouth and his eyes had the wide, vacant stare of the berserk.

A few weeks later he was still in the hospital yard wearing a straitjacket. His screams by then had degenerated into whimpers which were met by blows from the warder in charge of him. In a number of cases African detainees had been subjected to brutal assault and electric shock treatment. I saw a witness in the Rivonia trial, who is being held in custody, still limping three months after he had been assaulted in order to force a statement from him. One of the Rivonia accused still bears bruise marks from an assault on him by the police during August. Electric shock treatment was also applied to the sensitive parts of his body.’”¹²⁶⁸

- On June 10, 1965, Zephaniah Mothapeng alleged that while he was detained under the 90-day law in the Pretoria Central Police Barracks, the police had kicked him, punched him, trussed him in a sitting position, and then had nearly suffocated him with a canvas bag over his head, before finally applying electric shocks to him.¹²⁶⁹

Although White prisoners were also mistreated, they were much less likely to be physically assaulted. Techniques including sleep deprivation and being obliged to stand in a particular position for a prolonged period were more usual. This changed after July 24th, 1964, when John Harris’s bomb exploded at the Johannesburg Railway Station. Harris was

¹²⁶⁷ Transition, 1965: 18.

¹²⁶⁸ Transition, 1965: 18.

¹²⁶⁹ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1965: 69.

beaten so badly that his jaw was broken and remained for weeks without any medical treatment. Samantha Kemp, also arrested in connection with the Johannesburg Railway Station bomb, had her head bashed repeatedly against the floor and her foot dislocated.¹²⁷⁰ Hugh Lewin pressed charges after being assaulted by the police, who testified that his injuries occurred when he accidentally hit himself against the police car door.¹²⁷¹

Torture was not confined to men, women and children were also abused. Ruth First was kept in solitary confinement for 117 days, though she was not physically assaulted.¹²⁷² However, Eleanor Kasrils was attacked by Lieutenant Grobler. He shook her violently, spat into her face, punched her with his fists, yanked her by the air and banged her head on a table shouting, "You bitch, I'll break you or hang you!"¹²⁷³ Stephanie Kemp alleged that she had been interrogated continuously for fifteen hours and subjected to "undue, harsh, physical and mental stress and strain."¹²⁷⁴

As for children, even as young as seven years old were arrested,¹²⁷⁵ while several instances have been reported of children being tortured during apartheid, though none during Dr. Verwoerd's reign as far as the author can establish. Of course this does not guarantee that such things did not happen on his watch.¹²⁷⁶ Throughout Dr. Verwoerd's period as Prime Minister, and afterwards, police methods became ever more brutal. Part of his legacy was a police force highly trained in a wide range of torture methods, and an army with huge expertise in hunting down and assassinating so-called "terrorists" and subversives.¹²⁷⁷

IMPRISONMENT AND DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL

Imprisonment of anti-apartheid opponents for fixed terms was one of the strongest weapons wielded by the regime in its fight for survival. The National Party created laws of extreme severity which enabled the police to sweep activists off the streets and into the nation's jails. The law which truly turned South Africa into a police state was one which set no limits to a

¹²⁷⁰ Gunther, 2004: 247-248.

¹²⁷¹ Bernstein, 1972: 37; Fullard, 2004: 361-362.

¹²⁷² First, 2006: 69.

¹²⁷³ Kasrils, 2012: 6.

¹²⁷⁴ Transition, 1965: 19.

¹²⁷⁵ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986: 77.

¹²⁷⁶ Several books and studies have been written about apartheid's violence against children. For example: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1986) *The War Against Children: South Africa's Youngest Victims*; International Defence and Aid Fund (1988) *Apartheid's Violence Against Children*; McLachlan et al. (1984) *Children in Prison in South Africa*; International Defence and Aid Fund (1980) *Children Under Apartheid*.

¹²⁷⁷ Asmal et al, 1996: 75.

person's detention, allowing him to be held indefinitely, theoretically for ever. The General Law Amendment Act of 1963, widely known as the 90-day law, gave police the power to arrest anyone suspected of a political crime and detain that person without charge and without access to a lawyer for ninety days. At the end of that term, the authorities could re-arrest the suspect and detain him for a further ninety-day term, then if necessary repeat the process every ninety days. Thus, this meant that the authorities had the right to detain anyone effectively indefinitely. In addition, the new legislation permitted the use of solitary confinement¹²⁷⁸ and even empowered postal workers to intercept and investigate letters or parcels or other communications which they suspected may contain anti-government material.¹²⁷⁹

Furthermore, the Act also provided that "if in the opinion of an Attorney-General danger of interference with or intimidation of witnesses exists, or if he deems it to be in the interests of the safety of the State or in the public interest, he may direct that an accused person be tried summarily in a superior court without a preparatory examination. Such a trial may be held at any time determined by the Attorney-General, and at any place he determines within the area of jurisdiction of the division of the Supreme Court concerned. For reasons similar to those given above an Attorney-General may direct that a trial shall take place without a jury. Joint trials may be held when persons are charged under the Suppression of Communism Act."¹²⁸⁰ Nelson Mandela wrote that "the law helped to transform the country into a police state; no dictator could covet more power than the Ninety-Day-Detention Law gave to the authorities."¹²⁸¹

In 1965, the 90 days were doubled. The 180-Day Detention Act (the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, Number 96 of 1965) allowed the police exactly the same "privileges" as the 90-day law, the only difference being arithmetical – 180 days instead of 90. At the same time the public were not entitled to any information, not even the identity or whereabouts of people being detained. Detainees could literally and effectively "disappear."

¹²⁷⁸ Eades, 1999: 16; Herbststein, 2004: 75; Holmes, 1964: 5; Mandela, 2013: 402; World Peace Council, 1972: 14.

¹²⁷⁹ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1964: 27; Thompson, 1966: 190.

¹²⁸⁰ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1964: 27.

¹²⁸¹ Mandela, 2013: 402.

If no charges were laid, Special Branch were required to release detainees after 180 days.¹²⁸² At the time, Vorster boasted that this was repeatable “until this side of eternity.”¹²⁸³

The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act contained a clause which provided that anyone convicted of a political offence could be detained for a further twelve months and after that according to the decision of whoever was minister of justice. It became known as the Sobukwe Clause because it was used to extend significantly the term imposed on PAC leader Robert Sobukwe. Sobukwe was arrested in 1960 and upon conviction for incitement was sentenced to three years in prison. He served his sentence, but then, under the provisions of the new General Law Amendment Act, he was incarcerated without charge on Robben Island. His continued detention was approved annually by the minister of justice and Sobukwe spent a total six years, without charge or trial, on the island.¹²⁸⁴

The Sobukwe case demonstrated how the government could imprison whoever they liked without trial for as long as they liked. Eventually, Sobukwe was the only person imprisoned under this clause.¹²⁸⁵ By 1963, almost all of the leaders of the ANC were under bans, in prison, or in detention without trial.¹²⁸⁶ Political prisoners were held in three main prisons: Black men in Robben Island, White men in Pretoria Local and Black women in Berberton.¹²⁸⁷

Deaths in Detention

The 90-day law and related legislation led inevitably to deaths in detention, both as a result of torture (although such deaths were often officially categorised as suicide) and of natural causes, such as tuberculosis, exacerbated by the appalling conditions and treatment. These deaths were often officially classified as suicides. From June 1963 to September 1966, three detainees under this law, the same law under which Tsafendas was later held, “killed themselves” while in police custody.¹²⁸⁸ In total, between 1960 and 1969, twenty prisoners died in detention. Of these deaths, eleven were labelled suicides and seven the result of

¹²⁸² Nelson Mandela Organization, n.d., 1965. “Criminal Procedure Amendment Act No 96”; Herbstein, 2004: 75; Rudolph, 1984: 12;

¹²⁸³ “A Distinguished South African Lawyer,” 1965: 4; Herbstein, 2004: 75; Mandela, 2013: 402; Vassen, n.d.

¹²⁸⁴ Pogrund, 1990: 184-186, 210.

¹²⁸⁵ Pogrund, 1990: 184-186, 210.

¹²⁸⁶ Thomson, 1966: 193.

¹²⁸⁷ UNESCO, 1974: 81.

¹²⁸⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 January 1967: 2, ‘Three 180-day detainees have killed themselves’; Sachs, 1970: 26.

natural causes, of which two were described as “slipping” accidents and one an accidental fall down stairs.¹²⁸⁹

Looksmart Ngudle (whose torture is discussed briefly above) was the first official death in detention, when he was found hanged in his cell. The coroner carried out a post-mortem and made a finding of no mistreatment or injuries (evidence relating to his torture was considered inadmissible in court) but a subsequent inquest revealed the horrifying torture and he and his fellow detainees had endured. The authorities responded by banning him posthumously, making it illegal for his case to be discussed.¹²⁹⁰ In January 1964, Sipho James Titya was found hanging in his cell; his death was attributed to suicide.¹²⁹¹ David Pratt, the man who shot and wounded Dr. Verwoerd in 1960 (see Chapter Seven), was also found dead in his cell and his death was attributed to suicide.

Another notorious case is that of Suliman Saloojee who “fell to his death” on September 9, 1964 after two months in custody, shortly after his wife had seen signs of serious mistreatment on him. His death was pronounced a suicide but this and other deaths resulting from falling from great heights seem highly questionable given the evidence mentioned above that police sometimes tortured detainees by dangling them from upper-storey windows. Overall, twenty deaths in detention, from “suicide” and from “natural causes” were recorded between 1960 and 1969.¹²⁹²

Ahmed Kathrada wrote about his good friend Saloojee:

“[Saloojee] had been picked up under the ninety-day detention law, brutally interrogated and tortured to death - by the sadistic Rooi Rus Swanepoel - then flung from a window on the seventh floor of Gray’s Building, Johannesburg headquarters of the security police, on Wednesday 9 September 1964... Not surprisingly, the so-called inquest accepted the police version that Babla had committed suicide by jumping to his death. I have never doubted, however, that he died under interrogation, and that his body was then thrown out of the window... The magistrate found that ‘nothing in the evidence suggested that Saloojee had been assaulted or that methods of interrogating him were in any way irregular. He found that no one was to blame for his death.’”¹²⁹³

¹²⁸⁹ Fullard, 2004: 362.

¹²⁹⁰ Fullard, 2004: 363-364; South African Institute of Race Relations, 1965: 65.

¹²⁹¹ Transition, 1965: 17.

¹²⁹² Fullard, 2004: 363-365.

¹²⁹³ Kathrada, 2004: 207.

Killings such as those set out above, persistent claims of abuse by police and prison staff and suspicions that the 90-day solitary confinement process amounted to or involved physical torture, caused growing unease among MPs and many prominent citizens. By early 1964 the government faced growing demands for an impartial inquiry into police methods and prison conditions. Dr. Verwoerd and his Minister of Justice, John Vorster, rejected any such inquiry out of hand. On January 2, 1964, Vorster characterised the reports as “all nonsense.” Brushing aside a claim by sixty medical experts that they had evidence of torture and mistreatment, Vorster said that “not a single incident of torture” had been proven. He added that no-one had complained.¹²⁹⁴

On January 21, Dr. Verwoerd dismissed the sixty experts as political stooges, saying, “They are simply a group of people who are willing to allow themselves to be used to achieve a political object. In other words, it is nothing more or less than an attempt by a certain smaller group, which do belong to certain professions, it is true, to intervene politically but who do not act as experts but as laymen in politics. I say it is political act...” The day after Verwoerd’s contemptuous dismissal of the medical evidence, Vorster rejected an appeal by Sir de Villiers Graaff, the Leader of the Opposition, for a judicial Commission of Inquiry. He declared “We have no facts whatsoever before us; we have no shred of evidence before us about people who were tortured.”¹²⁹⁵

Over the following years, the number of deaths in detention increased; as usual, they were all declared “suicides” or deaths “by natural causes.” Sydney Kentridge, QC wrote about the issue: “In South Africa, one after another inquest into deaths in detention found that ‘no one was to blame’ as the security police, the judiciary and district surgeons conspired to keep torture and murder under wraps.”¹²⁹⁶ Ahmed Kathrada also wrote about the same issue, “In later years, inquest after inquest - in the cases of Imam Haron, Ahmed Timol, Neil Aggett, to name but a few - returned verdicts of suicide. I cannot recall a single case among the scores of deaths under 90-day detention in which an inquest magistrate held the security police responsible.”¹²⁹⁷ Three typical inquests during apartheid which perfectly confirmed all the above are those into the deaths of Steve Biko and Ahmed Timol and the Ngqusa Hill massacre. They are all discussed later in this study.

¹²⁹⁴ Transition, 1965: 22.

¹²⁹⁵ Transition, 1965: 22.

¹²⁹⁶ Quoted in Bizos, 1998: vii.

¹²⁹⁷ Kathrada, 2004: 384.

Robben Island¹²⁹⁸

All the non-White political prisoners were detained on Robben Island, which became a totemic symbol of resistance against apartheid. The island is located in Table Bay, almost seven kilometres west of Cape Town, measuring 4.5 by 1.5 kilometres.¹²⁹⁹ It had previously housed a former lunatic asylum in which the races were segregated,¹³⁰⁰ and it had also done time as a leper colony.¹³⁰¹ It had been used as a place to which opponents of the government were sent from early in the history of the European presence in South Africa, and its modern use accelerated in the early 1960s, under Dr. Verwoerd, as growing numbers of political prisoners were sent there. Robben Island was a prison in which all the warders were White, and all the prisoners were Black or Coloured, while the conditions were extremely harsh.¹³⁰²

By 1963, Robben Island housed hundreds of ANC and PAC members,¹³⁰³ members of other organisations and some non-political prisoners.¹³⁰⁴ Whereas it had had some Coloured warders, these were all withdrawn for fear they would be sympathetic to the prisoners.¹³⁰⁵ The White warders were generally racist and violent, and proud of this; one wore a swastika tattoo on his wrist. Prisoners were brutally punished for even minor moments of defiance. One prisoner serving a twenty-year sentence, Johnson Mlambo, was punished for arguing with a warder by being buried up to his neck in the ground on a hot summer day. When he pleaded for water after several hours, the warder urinated on his head.¹³⁰⁶ Prisoners were

¹²⁹⁸ For more about Robben Island see: Buntman, F.L. (2003) *Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid*; Daniels, E. (1998) *There and Back: Robben Island, 1964-1979*; Deacon, H. (ed.) (1996) *The Island: A History of Robben Island, 1488-1990*; Diamini, M. (1985) *Robben Island, Hell-Hole: Reminiscences of a Political Prisoner in South Africa*; Fleminger, D. (2008) *Robben Island*; Ijah, A. (2012) *Nelson Mandela and the politics of representation in Robben Island Museum, South Africa*; Kathrada, A. (2004) *Memoirs*; Magomola, G. (2009) *Robben Island to Wall Street*; Maharaj, M. (ed.) (2001) *Reflections in Prison: Voices from the South African Liberation Struggle*; Mbeki, G. (1991) *Learning from Robben Island: The Prison Writings of Govan Mbeki*; Mdluli, D.Z. (2013) *Robben Island: The Memoirs of Dan Zwelonke Mdluli*; Naidoo, I. (1982) *Island in Chains: Ten Years on Robben Island*; Schadeberg, J. (1994) *Voices From Robben Island*; Smith, C. (2014) *Robben Island: A Place of Inspiration: Mandela's Prison Island*.

¹²⁹⁹ Hutton, 1994: 8-9.

¹³⁰⁰ Foster, 1993: 68.

¹³⁰¹ Hutton, 1994: 36-37.

¹³⁰² Mandela, 2013: 459.

¹³⁰³ Some of the prisoners were: Lionel Davis, Ahmed Kathrada, Mac Maharaj, Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Wilton Mkwayi, Walter Sisulu and Robert Sobukwe. Jacob Zuma, South Africa's current Prime Minister, also served ten years in Robben Island, convicted of "conspiring to overthrow the apartheid government." He was elected as South Africa's Prime Minister in 2009 and was re-elected in 2014 (Gordin, 2008: 15).

¹³⁰⁴ Buntman, 2003: 3, 5, 19.

¹³⁰⁵ Hutton, 1994: 50.

¹³⁰⁶ Kathrada, 2004: 228, 338.

forced to work long hours in a quarry, finding their only respite in singing protest songs in languages the warders did not understand.¹³⁰⁷

Mandela and his co-prisoners fought tirelessly to improve their conditions in Robben Island, where all the worst atrocities of apartheid were brought to bear; prisoners were subjected to frequent degrading strip-searches and brutality. Political prisoners were allowed to send just two letters and receive two visits a year. Petty apartheid was observed even here; Coloured prisoners received more sugar than Blacks, for example.¹³⁰⁸ This was a result of the 1959 Prisons Act, which stipulated that apartheid should also be observed behind bars.

Visitors to inmates of Robben Island, as with the other South African prisons for political prisoners, had to communicate in either English or Afrikaans; they were not allowed to communicate in any other language. This was so that the guards could understand what was being discussed. Naturally this made visits by some people, such as many prisoners' parents, futile as they could not speak either language and therefore they were not allowed to talk to the prisoners.¹³⁰⁹

Anti-apartheid activist and hero Denis Goldberg, who was one of the Rivonia Trialists, told the author about one such event:

“A mother comes from the far north of the country to Robben Island, it took her ten years to save up the money. She gets to see her son and the prison guard says, ‘You have to speak English or you speak Afrikaans or I stop the visit.’ But she only speaks her native language, so she goes on speaking her language and the prison guard sends her away. She was not allowed to speak to him because of security, maybe she was making plans. But it’s his country, he’s not speaking Russian or Greek, he’s speaking his own language within the country. But the White guards couldn’t allow a Black person to supervise because he might be a traitor.”¹³¹⁰

EXECUTIONS

Under apartheid the “justice” system treated non-Whites and Whites very differently. The goal of prisons was to reform White prisoners but to punish non-Whites. The use of corporal

¹³⁰⁷ Dlamini, 1984: 28-41.

¹³⁰⁸ Solani and Nieftagodien, 2004: 391-397.

¹³⁰⁹ Denis Goldberg in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

¹³¹⁰ Denis Goldberg in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

punishment was primarily indicated according to the race of the convicted and that of their victim, but it was limited almost entirely to non-White offenders. Whites were never executed for the murder of a non-White, while non-Whites were usually executed for the murder of a White.¹³¹¹

As resistance to the apartheid state became increasingly militant, the government responded by extending capital punishment to crimes including sabotage and terrorism (both defined very broadly). Between 1945 and 1970, hangings increased 600% in South Africa from an annual average of 16 to an annual average of 100.¹³¹² Starting in 1961, 101 prisoners were executed. All were men, and only one was White.¹³¹³ By 1966, according to Albie Sachs, South Africa had become the “world’s busiest hangman.” The apartheid authorities at the time were executing about one hundred people per year, thus two a week. To cope with the workload, a special gallows was erected in Pretoria Central Prison¹³¹⁴ which could hold several nooses, thus facilitating multiple hangings.¹³¹⁵

Between July 1963 and June 1965, a total of 281 death sentences were imposed in South Africa and 194 men were executed. This accounted for 47% of the world’s executions. Almost all of those convicted to die by hanging had been selected because of their involvement in anti-government resistance between 1960 and 1964.¹³¹⁶ As for 1966, sixty-six people were hanged in only the second half of that year: forty-six Africans, nineteen Coloureds and one White.¹³¹⁷

BANISHMENT OF PEOPLE

Banning people had been carried out since 1948, and anyone who opposed apartheid could find themselves banished and silenced. Banishment had been used as a strategy throughout the 1940s and 50s, and had been on the books since 1927, but it escalated under Dr. Verwoerd and thousands of families had been left destitute as a result.¹³¹⁸ Between 1954 and

¹³¹¹ Landis, 1962: 466.

¹³¹² Cook, 1974: 10.

¹³¹³ Fullard, 2004: 382.

¹³¹⁴ For the conditions on Death Row and life in Pretoria Central Prison see Breyten Breytenbach’s 1984 memoir *The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist*, Jeremy Cronin’s poem *Death Row*, in his 1983 poetic collection *Inside and Out*, Tim Jenkins’s (1987) *Escape from Pretoria*, Hugh Lewin’s 1976 memoir *Bandiet: Seven Years in a South African Prison*, and Reymond Suttner’s 2001 memoir, *Inside Apartheid’s Prison*.

¹³¹⁵ Sachs, 1970: 1-3.

¹³¹⁶ Fullard, 2004: 382.

¹³¹⁷ Lewin, 1976: 139.

¹³¹⁸ Bunting, 1986: 213.

1962, over 270 were issued with banning orders,¹³¹⁹ which were often renewed each time the period of banishment had elapsed, resulting in people living under banning orders for years.¹³²⁰ Alan Drury¹³²¹ writing in 1967 compared the situation endured by banned people to “torture.”¹³²²

In 1953, Mandela had been banned from addressing anyone, and instead his speech was read by someone else to a branch of the ANC, urging the continuation of the struggle for equal rights and decrying the miserable conditions in which so many Africans lived and worked.¹³²³ Albert Luthuli, who would win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961, spent one year in custody under a treason charge, and was banned more or less continuously from 1953 to 1961, which meant that he was forced to be confined in his home, banned from receiving visitors, forbidden from making statements and even from attending church services.¹³²⁴

One of the more notorious banning orders was that imposed in 1959 on Elizabeth Mafekeng, a prominent trade union leader, after she led a demonstration in Paarl against an attempt to issue passes to African women. The banning meant she had to leave her husband and eleven children and the home where she had lived for thirty-two years and move to an isolated spot called Southey, some 700 miles away. She was the first African woman to be banned. At demonstrations that followed her banning, protestors chanted, “If they come to take Mrs Mafekeng, they will take her over our dead bodies,” and “Kill Verwoerd, Kill De Wet Nel, Kill the police.”¹³²⁵

In response to the unrest that followed Sharpeville, the government embarked on a series of banishments. Ostensibly citing the Suppression of Communism Act, large numbers were banned, including many who had nothing to do with communism at all, although most had been active in working against apartheid.¹³²⁶ Banned people were not allowed to attend any social gatherings, to communicate with any other banned people, were confined to very

¹³¹⁹ Thompson, 1966: 191.

¹³²⁰ Fullard, 2004: 352.

¹³²¹ American author winner of the Pulitzer Prize for fiction for his novel *Advise & Consent*

¹³²² Drury, 1968: 212.

¹³²³ Clark and Worger, 2011: 141-148.

¹³²⁴ Luthuli, 1961.

¹³²⁵ Blumberg, 1960: 39-46.

¹³²⁶ Matthews, 1972: 111.

restricted areas, and obliged to report regularly, and often, to the police.¹³²⁷ It was illegal for any publication to mention anything that a banned person had said.¹³²⁸

In 1962, it became illegal to publish anything that a banned person had said in the past.¹³²⁹ In that year, the General Law Amendment Act enabled the government to ban many more people. Hundreds were tried and found guilty of crimes including murder, sabotage and subversion, and hundreds had fled the country to escape trial.¹³³⁰

The banning legislation was very effective in silencing leaders of the ANC and other anti-apartheid movements. By 1963, almost all these leaders were banned, in prison for various crimes, or in detention without trial.¹³³¹ Many family tragedies resulted; for example, a “banned” person could never visit someone who was “listed”; the *New York Times* cited the example of a banned man who could not visit his sick, elderly mother, listed because she had once briefly been a member of the Communist Party,¹³³² and of a professor of plant physiology whose writings on botany could not be published, disseminated or read.¹³³³ In 1964, Mandela said in a court statement that, “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government, and for us to accept the banning was equivalent to accepting the silencing of the Africans for all time.”¹³³⁴

STATE TERRORISM

Torture, the death penalty, banishment, imprisonment and killings in detention were not the only methods used by Dr. Verwoerd's police state to deal with opponents. In 1951, when Dr. Verwoerd was Minister for Native Affairs, a report revealed that 104 Africans had been killed and 248 had been wounded during police raids on their homes, during a period (1948-1951) in which Blacks were deported from their places of work and residence to provide cheap labour for farmers elsewhere.¹³³⁵ During Dr. Verwoerd's time as Prime Minister, the authorities began a campaign of state terrorism against anti-apartheid activists and opponents of the regime; this included murder, bombings and kidnappings on foreign territory. Although

¹³²⁷ Bunting, 1986: 220; UNESCO, 1972: 27.

¹³²⁸ Zug, 2007: 195.

¹³²⁹ Feit, 1967: 46.

¹³³⁰ Thompson, 1966: 191-192.

¹³³¹ Thomson, 1966: 193.

¹³³² Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 27 June 1965: 22, ‘A family is separated by South Africa.’

¹³³³ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 17 June 1965: 2, ‘Dutch assailed by South Africa.’

¹³³⁴ ANC, 1988: 1.

¹³³⁵ Sachs, 1952: 33.

the phenomenon of state terrorism intensified in the 1980s, it was during Dr. Verwoerd's time that it began.

Kidnappings

As we have seen earlier, a special police unit, the Ghost Squad, hunted down pass offenders, who would then be forced to work as agricultural slave labourers,¹³³⁶ clearly an act of state terrorism. What's more, contraveners of the pass laws were not the only Africans who were terrorised by the State at the time. Between 1961 and 1966, several anti-apartheid activists were kidnapped on foreign territory and were secretly brought to South Africa to be tortured, interrogated and charged with anti-apartheid activities. For example:

- Anderson Ganyile, along with two other anti-apartheid activists, was abducted from Lesotho (then Basutoland and a British colonial territory), on 26 August 1961. The three men were then taken to a prison in Transkei, but they were later released due to pressure from the British Government, since the abductions had taken place on British soil.
- Dr Kenneth Abrahams was abducted in August 1963 from Botswana (then Bechuanaland), along with three other anti-apartheid activists. Dr Abrahams was secretly flown to Cape Town for interrogation, but he was soon released, again due to pressure from the British Government.
- Rosemary Wentzel left South Africa in 1964 and was granted political asylum in Swaziland. She was abducted there and brought back to South Africa, where she was detained under the 90-day law and later appeared as a state witness in a political trial.
- Dennis Higgs fled in 1964 from South Africa to Zambia. He was abducted from there and brought back to South Africa. He was detained on charges of sabotage, but was soon released after international pressure because of his abduction, and was returned to Zambia.
- Michael Dingake was kidnapped by the local police in Rhodesia in 1965, and was handed over to the South African police. He was charged under the Suppression of Communism Act for furthering the aims of the South African Communist Party and the ANC. He was convicted and spent the next fifteen years on Robben Island.

¹³³⁶ Mbeki, 1991: 5-6.

- John Lyati Pokela, acting National Secretary of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), was abducted in 1966 in Lesotho and was taken to South Africa. He was convicted on charges of sabotage and spent the next thirteen years in prison.¹³³⁷

OTHER ACTS OF STATE TERRORISM

Blowing up an airplane

On 12 July 1963, four members of the ANC broke out of a Johannesburg prison. An East African Airways Dakota aircraft was chartered from Tanzania and sent to Francistown to pick them up, but “mysteriously” exploded on the airstrip the night after it landed. (Two of the prisoners, Arthur Goldreich and Harold Wolpe, eventually escaped to Bechuanaland.)¹³³⁸

Blowing up a refugee centre

Oxfam funded the building of a hostel known as the “White House” in Francistown, Bechuanaland, to accommodate refugees from South Africa; but the hostel was blown up on the night of July 25, 1964, only two weeks before it was due to be opened. Two White men, who claimed to be journalists, had allegedly been seen visiting the refugee camp; the refugees had been suspicious and had refused to meet them.¹³³⁹

WHITE TERRORISM

Throughout the period of apartheid, including the Verwoerd era, several white paramilitary groups or simply packs of Whites committed a series of terrorist attacks against non-Whites. Dr. Verwoerd did little or nothing to stop them. For example, the following incidents were reported in 1961 alone, and there were probably many more that did not see the light of day. In Cape Town, a petrol bomb was thrown through the window of the home of an Indian family whose son had been detained by the police the previous week for distributing anti-republican leaflets. Also in Cape Town, bricks were thrown through the windows of the

¹³³⁷ Gifford, 1981: 5-6.

¹³³⁸ Gifford, 1981: 5-6.

¹³³⁹ Gifford, 1981: 5-6.

homes of George Peake, Alex la Guma and Barney Desai, all leaders of the Coloured People's Congress.¹³⁴⁰

Several lawyers known for defending non-Whites were threatened and attacked; notably Rowley Arenstein, a Communist and anti-apartheid activist living in Durban. He had received a threatening letter allegedly from the KKK, and fifteen friends were acting as his "bodyguards." In May 1961, five hooded men with guns appeared at his door. There was a fight, which led to the hooded men fleeing from Arenstein's comrades. One of the "bodyguards" was Ronnie Kasrils who was slightly injured when a bullet grazed his cheek.¹³⁴¹ Ben Turok, National Secretary of the Congress of Democrats and a representative of Africans on the Cape Provincial Council, was also threatened in an anonymous telephone call, but was refused police protection.¹³⁴²

There was also an organization operating in Natal under Raymond Kirch Rudman, veteran Boer Nationalist, racist and fanatical anti-Semite, who also led the racist *Die Boerenasie* (Farmers' Nation).¹³⁴³ These terrorists called themselves the Ku Klux Klan, an obvious homage; they also copied some of the methods of the famous American organization. Terrorists who conducted a series of attacks on non-Whites in Natal in 1961 claimed that they were doing so in the name of the South African KKK and another organization called "Order of the Green Dragon." Rudman insisted that the KKK did not stoop to criminal acts, and accused "certain people" of besmirching its name; but it should be noted that he was not above issuing threats and warnings to communist leaders.¹³⁴⁴

FLOGGING

In 1950, C.R. Swart, the then Minister of Justice who later became President of the Republic, was photographed holding a cat-o'-nine-tails in front of a practice dummy, a clear sign of official approval for whipping as a form of punishment. During the 1950s, there was a rapid increase in the number of persons flogged and a small increase in the number of strokes per person. Initially, a whip was used for the flogging, later replaced by a cane. Between 1955 and 1970, about 200,000 convicted prisoners received approximately one million strokes, or

¹³⁴⁰ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 61.

¹³⁴¹ Kasrils, 1993: 33-35; South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 61.

¹³⁴² South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 61.

¹³⁴³ Shimoni, 2003: 71.

¹³⁴⁴ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 61.

five apiece. Flogging reached its peak in 1955-1956 when 127,523 strokes were inflicted on 24,115 persons, an average of 5.2 strokes per person. In 1965 the number had decreased to 64,905 strokes on 15,757 persons, thus four apiece.¹³⁴⁵

POLITICAL TRIALS AND BANNING OF ORGANIZATIONS

From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, as apartheid became ever more suffocating under Dr. Verwoerd as Minister for Native Affairs and as Prime Minister, increasingly the law courts were used as battlegrounds in which the accused tried to fight off a vastly better equipped enemy.¹³⁴⁶ Anyone who had been deemed “communist” or otherwise unlawful could be put on trial. Walter Sisulu¹³⁴⁷ and Nelson Mandela, among many others, were thus designated, while others were confined to their homes.¹³⁴⁸

A mass trial, the Treason Trial, took place in 1956¹³⁴⁹ where one hundred and fifty-six prominent anti-apartheid activists were tried. Oswald Pirow,¹³⁵⁰ one of the prosecutors, and Justice Frans Rumpff,¹³⁵¹ one of the judges, were known Nazi sympathisers.¹³⁵² The trial, later described by Walter Sisulu as the National Party’s attempt at a “final solution”¹³⁵³ ran for five years, very much in the public eye, while the number of defendants was gradually

¹³⁴⁵ Sachs, 1970, 3-5.

¹³⁴⁶ Maharaj and Kathrada, 2006: 121.

¹³⁴⁷ (1912-2003) A leading figures of the anti-apartheid struggle. He served as Secretary-General and Deputy President of the ANC and was a member of the Communist Party of South Africa. His role in the founding of Umkhonto we Sizwe was pivotal, and he was involved in the planning of the Defiance Campaign in 1952. He spent twenty-six years in prison, mostly in Robben Island (Beresford (*The Guardian*), 7 May 2003, ‘Walter Sisulu.’). For his biography see: Sisulu, W., Houser, G.M., Shore, H. (2001) *I Will Go Singing*; Sisulu, E. (2003) *Walter and Albertina Sisulu: In Our Lifetime*.

¹³⁴⁸ Welsh, 2000: 445.

¹³⁴⁹ For more about the trial see: Foreman, L., Sachs, E.S. (1957) *The South African Treason Trial*; Joseph, H. (1963) *If this be Treason: Helen Joseph's Dramatic Account of the Treason Trial, the Longest in South Africa's History and One of the Strangest Trials of the 20th Century*; Mandela, N. (1994) *Long Walk to Freedom*; Sampson, A. (1958) *The Treason Cage: The Opposition on Trial in South Africa*.

¹³⁵⁰ (1890-1959) A pro-Nazi politician of German origins who would serve as Minister of Justice and Minister of Defence. Founder of the *New Order* group, his vision for Africa was one in which democracy had been abolished, to be replaced with a Christian, White, National Socialist republic predicated on a strong state and public discipline (Hirson, 1990: Rees: 1990: 297). He was very close to a number of important German Nazis, and sent his daughter to a Nazi youth camp (Furlong, 2010: 70). He was one of the public prosecutors on the Treason trial. According to Helen Joseph, Pirow was seen as the Enemy Number One for the accused (Joseph, 1998: 100).

¹³⁵¹ Justice Frans Lourens Herman Rumpff was rumoured to be a member of the Broederbond (Mandela, 2013: 29) and he had defended pro-Nazis during the WW2 (Sachs, 1973: 257). He was a judge at the 1952 Defiance Trial (Buthelezi, 2006: 122), the Treason Trial (1956-1961) (Kahn, 1982: 439), at David Pratt’s trial in 1960 and was the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters. He South Africa’s Chief of Justice from 1974 to 1982 (Kahn, 1982: 440).

¹³⁵² Sachs, 1973: 257.

¹³⁵³ Davenport, 1991: 352; Joseph, 1998.

whittled down to thirty,¹³⁵⁴ who were distinguished by their involvement in the military end of things, and by their skills in rhetoric.¹³⁵⁵

L. J. Blom-Cooper, one of Britain's leading lawyers, member of the Home Secretary's advisory council on the penal system and one of the founders of Amnesty International, commented that, "Not since the burning of the Reichstag in Berlin in 1933—with the notable exception of the special trials at Nuremberg—has a trial attracted such international attention."¹³⁵⁶ In 1961, a year after the Sharpeville Massacre, the accused were found innocent,¹³⁵⁷ as the prosecution was forced to concede that there had been no communist plot.¹³⁵⁸ The same year, Vorster took advantage of the new powers Dr. Verwoerd had granted to the police to consolidate police across the country. From 1962, the police were allowed to torture suspects under the terms of the Sabotage Act.¹³⁵⁹

Following the Sharpeville Massacre, Dr. Verwoerd passed the Unlawful Organisations Act, which allowed the government to ban the ANC, PAC and any group deemed to pose a threat, and setting out a series of punishments for anyone involved in such an organisation, including imprisonment for up to five years, substantial fines, and flogging. The government claimed that such organisations were now working towards the violent overthrow of the government and that extreme measures were necessary.¹³⁶⁰ Francois Erasmus, Verwoerd's Minister of Justice stated, "They want to bring the white government to its knees. The government has decided to bring a halt to the reign of terror."¹³⁶¹

On October 10, 1963, the United Nations voted to call on South Africa to cease trials of government opponents and urged the release of political prisoners. Dr. Verwoerd declined and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jooste, complained that South Africa was the victim of "misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and malice."¹³⁶²

The Rivonia Trial¹³⁶³ in 1964 was the inevitable result of the Sabotage Act and followed the police raid of the secret headquarters of the Umkhonto we Sizwe near Rivonia

¹³⁵⁴ Kaplan, 2014: 64.

¹³⁵⁵ Joseph, 1998: 12.

¹³⁵⁶ L. J. Blom-Cooper, cited in Karis, 1961: 217.

¹³⁵⁷ Sachs, 1970: 29; Welsh, 2000: 453.

¹³⁵⁸ Dubow, 2014: 69-71; *TIME*, 7 April 1961: 30, 'South Africa: Not guilty.'

¹³⁵⁹ Lodge, 2011: 178.

¹³⁶⁰ Ronan (*The New York Times*), 11 October 1963: 4, 'Apartheid trials condemned in UN.'

¹³⁶¹ *TIME*, 11 April 1960: 32, 'South Africa. From mourning to action.'

¹³⁶² Ronan (*The New York Times*), 11 October 1963: 4, 'Apartheid trials condemned in UN.'

¹³⁶³ For a detailed account of the trial see: Allo, A. (ed.) (2015) *The Courtroom as a Space of Resistance: Reflections on the Legacy of the Rivonia Trial*; Bizos, G. (2011) *Odyssey to Freedom*; Broun, K. S. (2012)

in the Johannesburg area. The police found materials indicating that plans were under way for extensive sabotage and guerrilla warfare that would lead to revolution.¹³⁶⁴ The documentation described people being dropped off at certain points on land and on sea, and being helped by guerrilla forces to overthrow the government. The members were accused of planning a foreign military invasion backed up with local saboteurs and guerrilla fighters.¹³⁶⁵ Among the arrestees were Umkhonto leaders Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu.¹³⁶⁶

Winne Mandela, wife of Nelson, was under a banning order that restricted her to Johannesburg, and she had to request special permission to attend. When this was refused, she appealed directly to Dr. Verwoerd who granted her conditional permission, saying that, "Permission will be withdrawn at any time if your presence or action at the court, the manner in which you dress or in any other respect, lead to an incident caused by you or others present."¹³⁶⁷

In his trial, Nelson Mandela outlined why he and many others were struggling so hard against apartheid, directly referencing laws that had been envisioned, devised and implemented by Dr. Verwoerd himself:

"... the complaint of Africans however, is not only that they are poor and the whites are rich, but that the laws are made by the whites are designed to preserve the situation. There are two ways to break out of poverty. The first is by formal education, and the second is by the worker acquiring a greater skill at his work and thus higher wages. As far as Africans are concerned, both these avenues of advancement are deliberately curtailed by legislation ..."
[meaning Dr. Verwoerd's legislation]¹³⁶⁸

Mandela also gave an extraordinary speech lasting almost three hours, in which he proclaimed himself prepared to die for his cause, "During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to the struggle of the African people. I have fought against White domination, and I

Saving Nelson Mandela: The Rivonia Trial and the Fate of South Africa; Frankel, G. (1999) *Rivonia's Children: Three Families and the Cost of Conscience in White South Africa*; Goldberg, D. (2010) *The Mission: A Life for Freedom in South Africa*; Joffe, J. (2009) *The State vs. Nelson Mandela: The Trial that Changed South Africa*; Kathrada, A. (2004) *Memoirs*; Mandela, N. (1994) *Long Walk to Freedom*; Sisulu, E. (2011) *Walter and Albertina Sisulu*.

¹³⁶⁴ Conley (*The New York Times*), 10 October 1963: 8, '11 accused in South Africa of planning revolt'; Mandela, 2013: 367-450; Marquard, 1968: 260.

¹³⁶⁵ Mandela, 2013: 367-450; *The Canberra Times*, 12 February 1964: 18, 'Plan for Dr. Verwoerd overthrow'; Seegers, 1996: 126.

¹³⁶⁶ Kaplan, 2014: 64; Mandela, 2013: 367-450.

¹³⁶⁷ Schadeberg, 1990: 169.

¹³⁶⁸ Buthulezi, 2006: 240,

have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” Mandela also told the story of how he, a lawyer, had gradually come around to the realisation that acts of violence against the apartheid state were all it would understand. “I did not do this in a spirit of recklessness,” he said, “I planned as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after years of tyranny, exploitation and oppression of my people by the whites.”¹³⁶⁹

Percy Yutar,¹³⁷⁰ the prosecutor, claimed that the defendants had been “lying” to the world in saying that Blacks were oppressed. He stated that the reality was that they were in the main “peaceful, law-abiding and loyal.” His critics described him during the trial as “venomous.”¹³⁷¹ Yutar had argued for the death penalty for Mandela and expressed regret that this was not imposed.¹³⁷² The *New York Times* hailed Mandela and his fellow accused as “the new George Washingtons and Benjamin Franklins of South Africa.”¹³⁷³

To international outcry, Dr. Verwoerd stated that the accused were “communist criminals in the same way as any communist spy found in the United States and sentenced to death”¹³⁷⁴ and dismissed the idea that he should consider clemency for the anti-apartheid revolutionaries.¹³⁷⁵ He told the Parliament, “I want to state clearly and unequivocally that in this case we have not got to do with opposition against the South African Government policy or a championship of the freedom and rights of the people. We have to do with a Communist uprising.”¹³⁷⁶

Ultimately, eight of the accused (Denis Goldberg, Bob Hepple, Ahmed Kathrada, Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Andrew Mlangeni and Walter Sisulu)

¹³⁶⁹ Benson, 1974: 8-21; Conley (*The New York Times*), 26 April 1964, E4, ‘Crisis in South Africa’; Mandela, 1984: 1-48.

¹³⁷⁰ (1911-2002) The first Jewish attorney-general in South Africa, he was highly-regarded by the then Minister of Justice, John Vorster, who appreciated the way in which he pursued the various liberation movements, especially the ANC, which he reviled as representing communism. He worked in concert with the security police forces (Shaw (*The Guardian*), 19 July 2002, ‘Percy Yutar’).

¹³⁷¹ Shaw (*The Guardian*), 19 July 2002, ‘Percy Yutar.’

¹³⁷² In November 1995, and while he was President, Mandela invited Yutar for lunch. Yutar accepted, and the two ate together as a gesture of reconciliation (Graybill, 2002: 200). Most of those convicted to serve life imprisonments in the Rivonia Trial were released unconditionally on the 15th of October 1989 (Sarakinski, 1992: 133).

¹³⁷³ Benson, 1986: 252; Bizos, 2011: 283; Broun, 2012: 131.

¹³⁷⁴ Broun, 2012: 134; Frankel, 1999: 268-269; Mandela, 2013: 446-450.

¹³⁷⁵ *The New York Times*, 17 June 1964: 12, ‘Dr. Verwoerd rejects appeals.’

¹³⁷⁶ Broun, 2012: 135.

were sentenced to life imprisonment and two (Lionel Bernstein and James Kantor) were acquitted. The life sentences were greeted joyously by Goldberg and Sisulu who had expected to be sentenced to death. The convicted prisoners were then separated; the non-Whites were sent to Robben Island and Goldberg, the only White, to Pretoria Central Prison.¹³⁷⁷ Dr. Verwoerd boasted in the Parliament that he had “tossed into the waste-basket all the telegrams from socialist nations” calling for clemency.¹³⁷⁸ The Rivonia Trial has now been recognised as a watershed moment, in which the justice system was publically called out as racist and unjust.¹³⁷⁹

SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNISM

The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 was initially intended, and served, to suppress Black workers' attempts to form unions. Under the Act, the Minister of Justice was allowed to pronounce certain people “Communists” and compel them to resign from their unions.¹³⁸⁰ With the excuse of suppressing “communism” the Governor General could prohibit the dissemination of any publication and it was a crime for anyone to say anything that might be interpreted as attempting to foster hostility between the peoples of South Africa.¹³⁸¹ While other countries enacted similar policies,¹³⁸² only in South Africa was there a racial element to the new legislation. The Act would soon become one of the apartheid government's most “devastating weapons” in the fight against its opponents.¹³⁸³

In 1953, the Native Labour Act made all Blacks' strikes illegal, banned black representation in industrial councils and conciliation boards, and made it illegal for black unions to gather funds for sick benefits, among other things.¹³⁸⁴ Further legislation in 1954 prohibited racially mixed unions forming, and obliged already mixed unions to segregate meetings. Moreover, a worker's racial classification had profound implications for his possibilities to advance. Coloured workers were not allowed into certain professions, and were paid less than Whites, while Black workers were treated as inferior in every single

¹³⁷⁷ Broun, 2012: 112-128; Mandela, 2013: 446-450.

¹³⁷⁸ Mandela, 2013: 449.

¹³⁷⁹ Stewart, 2015: 149.

¹³⁸⁰ Lichtenstein, 2005: 296; Longford, 1985: 14; Trades Union Congress, 1974: 12.

¹³⁸¹ Landis, 1962: 486.

¹³⁸² Fisher, 1969: 329.

¹³⁸³ Albertyn, 1991: 264.

¹³⁸⁴ Lichtenstein, 2005: 296; Longford, 1985: 14; Trades Union Congress, 1974: 12.

aspect.¹³⁸⁵ Dr. Yusuf Mohamed Dadoo, President of the S.A. Indian National Congress, was arrested and sentenced under the Suppression of Communism Act in 1953, and was one of thirteen who publically declared their Communism.¹³⁸⁶

THE GENERAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT OF 1962

In 1962, the Minister of Justice, then John Vorster (who would become Dr. Verwoerd's successor after his death in 1966), presented the government with a General Law Amendment Bill that would extend ministerial powers, including excluding court process, a closer control of the press, banning attendance at meetings, and banning certain people from making statements to the press. It was suggested that the Bill was necessary because, globally, the Cold War was becoming more entrenched, and he perceived that the Communist Party in South Africa was getting a second wind and was liable to become a greater threat to the hegemony of Whites.¹³⁸⁷

The General Law Amendment Act (also known as Sabotage Act) No 76 of 1962 became notorious far beyond South Africa's borders for its draconian measures against perceived opponents of apartheid and for the ruthless and comprehensive nature of its intrusion into the domestic lives of citizens. It gave the government legal power to quash any individual or organisation that opposed apartheid. Punishments ranged from prison terms to the death penalty, but among the most painful for many were the deprivation of human contact. For some offences, violators were ordered to be confined to their homes for weekends or for twelve hours every night for a week under police surveillance. In serious cases, people found guilty under the Act were restricted to their residences without visitors for five years. Their homes were thus turned into prisons.¹³⁸⁸

Other provisions allowed the State to ban people from having more than one visitor to their homes at a time and to prevent them from going to parties or other social gatherings. One innovation was to require any defendant protesting his innocence to prove that he had no political motivation. It set out a wide range of actions as henceforth constituting the act of sabotage. These included "any wrongful and wilful act whereby he/she injured, obstructed,

¹³⁸⁵ Hepple, 1971: 5-11.

¹³⁸⁶ Schadeberg, 1987: 40-41.

¹³⁸⁷ Ballinger, 1969: 48.

¹³⁸⁸ Beck, 2000: 142; Fullard, 2004: 345-346.

tampered with or destroyed the health or safety of the public, the maintenance of law and order, the supply of water, light, power, fuel or foodstuffs, sanitary, medical, or fire extinguishing services.”¹³⁸⁹

According to Catherine Albertyn, Professor of Law at University of the Witwatersrand, the Sabotage Act “became a crucial weapon in the State’s campaign against political opposition and the underground organizations.”¹³⁹⁰ The government defended the unprecedented severity of the Act by stating that it was necessary to combat Communism and subversion. However, opposition was widespread. Inside South Africa, the Act was denounced by churches, students, writers, trade unions, lawyers and other organizations. The International Commission of Jurists called it part of “a determined and ruthless attempt” to enforce apartheid, and charged that it would diminish the liberty of the citizen “to a degree not surpassed by the most extreme dictatorship of the left or right.”¹³⁹¹ J. Hamilton Russell of the United Party characterised the Sabotage Act as “one of the most evil, the most cynical, the most sadistic of measures which has ever come before this honourable House.”¹³⁹²

The *New York Times* described as “chilling” the lengths to which the government had gone to crush opposition to apartheid, “a doctrine that seems in one way or another to poison everything and everyone it touches.” While discounting suggestions of UN intervention, the newspaper said, “The totalitarian methods of Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd and his Government are appalling to civilized men everywhere.”¹³⁹³ Other Western newspapers wrote, “The end of the rule of law,” “The flame of freedom has been extinguished,” “The last vestige of individual freedom is being whittled away a police state government.” Justice Minister Vorster defended the Act, and said of those who protested it: “it becomes clear that the people who are opposed to the Bill in the first place – and let me say this, that they have every reason to be opposed to it – are the Communists.”¹³⁹⁴

Under the Sabotage Act of 1962 anyone who was banned, or who had been listed under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 was forbidden to prepare material for publication, to communicate with other such persons, to join organisations, have visitors, or attend social gatherings. Nothing anyone who had been banned under the Sabotage Act said

¹³⁸⁹ Beck, 2000: 142; Fullard, 2004: 345-346.

¹³⁹⁰ Albertyn, 1991: 213.

¹³⁹¹ *The New York Times*, 17 November 1962: 10, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s savage Sabotage Act.’

¹³⁹² Conley (*The New York Times*), 24 May 1962: 13, ‘Police state aim laid to Dr. Verwoerd.’

¹³⁹³ *The New York Times*, 17 November 1962: 10, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s savage Sabotage Act.’

¹³⁹⁴ de Villiers, 1975: 68.

could be published. That year, 103 people were subjected to these laws and the Minister of Justice, John Vorster, listed 437 as Communists, as well as banning the left wing newspaper, *New Age*, and the left wing Congress of Democrats. The government's definition of Communism was so broad that it could be taken to include, for example, anyone in favour of racial tolerance or higher wages.¹³⁹⁵ For the government, liberalism was equated with Communism and some Afrikaner nationalists went as far to suggest that the Jewish community was Communistic because many Jews were members of the anti-apartheid movements.¹³⁹⁶

An expansion of the Act in 1963 allowed the police to arrest anyone suspected of political activities without charging them and hold them initially for twelve days for questioning without access to family or lawyers. It also allowed postal workers to intercept any material critical of apartheid, enabled police to detain anyone suspected of sabotage, or any crimes under the above act, and to hold them in solitary confinement until they were satisfied with the outcome of interrogation.¹³⁹⁷ Further amendments to the law extended twelve days to ninety days, then to infinite periods of detentions.¹³⁹⁸ Then Minister of Justice John Vorster referred to suspects being held in custody during this period under this law until "this side of eternity."¹³⁹⁹

By placing detentions outside the judicial process, the act cleared the way for widespread abuses, including the torture and deaths of many held in police custody.¹⁴⁰⁰ Large numbers were imprisoned, including many associated with the Liberal Party,¹⁴⁰¹ and held without access to reading or writing material, and without permission to see visitors. The police used torture, initially only on Blacks but subsequently on Whites too. Because of the above legislation, by 1964, the Communist Party had effectively been eliminated. Many people were sent to jail and the few activists who were not arrested fled the country.¹⁴⁰²

¹³⁹⁵ Sachs, 1952: 68, 249.

¹³⁹⁶ *The Economist*, 5 December 1964: 1127, 'Liberals sabotaged.'

¹³⁹⁷ Thompson, 1966: 190.

¹³⁹⁸ Beck, 2000: 145.

¹³⁹⁹ "A Distinguished South African Lawyer," 1965: 4; Herstein, 2004: 75; Mandela, 2013: 402; Vassen, n.d.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Beck, 2000: 145.

¹⁴⁰¹ *The Economist*, 5 December 1964: 1127, 'Liberals sabotaged.'

¹⁴⁰² *The New York Times*, 20 October 1963: 183, 'South Africa stands firm on apartheid.'

PRESS AND CENSORSHIP¹⁴⁰³

The National Party had long been aware of the power of the press. In 1949, Malan had described the English-language press as “undisciplined” and proposed that journalists should be registered and struck off for “unethical conduct.”¹⁴⁰⁴ From 1950 onwards, a relentless drip of laws incrementally compromised press freedom.¹⁴⁰⁵ In 1951, the National Party appointed a Press Commission to investigate the South African media, including the way news from the country was reported to the outside world.

Thirteen years later, in 1964, the Commission finally published its findings and recommendations, paving the way for stricter state control of journalism. After studying thousands of press reports, the Commission had concluded that the reports of the *New York Times* and the *TIME* magazine were “inaccurate, frequently dishonest, over-partisan and hostile to South Africa and Whites, particularly the Afrikaner and the Nationalist Party.” *Reuters* was accused of “deliberately hiding the illiteracy and semi-barbarism of the mass of the native people.” The Commission recommended the registration of all foreign correspondents and “absolute government control over all press copy leaving South Africa.”¹⁴⁰⁶

The 1955 Customs Act banned “indecent, objectionable and obscene material” which was taken to include many books with “racial” content such as *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and books that were critical of South Africa and Apartheid.¹⁴⁰⁷ The Board of Censors, appointed in 1956, had the power to prohibit or censor books and films.¹⁴⁰⁸ Banned books also included Brendan Behan's *Borstal Boy* and Norman Russell's *Why I am not a Christian*,¹⁴⁰⁹ while

¹⁴⁰³ For a detailed account of the South African press during apartheid see: Davenport, R., Saunders, C. (2000) *The English-language Press under Apartheid*; Hachten, W.A., Giffard, C.A. (1984) *The Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa*; Hepple, A. (1974) *Press under Apartheid*; Pogrand, B. (2000) *War of Words: Memoir of a South African Journalist*; Pollack, R. (1981) *Up Against Apartheid. The Role and the Plight of Press in South Africa*; Rabkin, D. (1975) *Drum Magazine and the Works of Black South African Writers Associated with it*; Sanders, J. (1999) *South Africa and the International Media, 1972-1979: A Struggle for Representation*; Shaw, G. (1999) *The Cape Times: An Informal History*.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Hepple, 1974: 8.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Davenport and Saunders, 2000a: 268.

¹⁴⁰⁶ *TIME*, 22 May 1964: 93, ‘It's very hard to do, even in South Africa’; *The Canberra Times*, 13 May 1964: 2, ‘Dr. Verwoerd v. the Press.’

¹⁴⁰⁷ Landis, 1962: 489.

¹⁴⁰⁸ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1972: 65; Vatcher, 1965: 167, 7.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Mitson (*Morning Record*), 28 January 1965: 6, ‘South Africa's barbarous racial oppression makes Mississippi as mild as a tea party.’

pictures of leading Black actors were removed from movie posters, such as Sammy Davis in the poster for *Oceans 11*.¹⁴¹⁰

The Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956 made it possible to ban any publication considered to have the potential to inflame sentiments against the white minority.¹⁴¹¹ After the 1958 elections, with Dr. Verwoerd victoriously returned as Prime Minister, the government engaged in a campaign to denigrate the English-language press, with a view to reducing its capacity to criticise it.¹⁴¹² The Broadcasting Corporation, an important source of pro-government propaganda, took to railing against newspapers that published material the government wanted kept quiet.¹⁴¹³

In 1963, the Publications and Entertainments Act allowed for the appointment of a Publications Control Board that would decide what books and other forms of entertainment and information were suitable,¹⁴¹⁴ with huge ramifications for the press and journalism. Dr. Verwoerd's government punished anyone in possession of a banned publication with a fine of €2800 or five years' imprisonment. These publications included *Boxing Life* because it showed images of Blacks fighting Whites, the life story of Harry Belafonte, the UNESCO pamphlet *Behind the Colour Bar*, and the books by authors including Ernest Hemingway, Leon Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Carson McCullers and John Steinbeck. Even a children's book, *Black Beauty*, was banned because of the title, even though it was about a horse.¹⁴¹⁵ Some decisions were hard to explain, like Ian Fleming's *James Bond* books.¹⁴¹⁶

It was also illegal for any publication to mention anything that a banned person had said.¹⁴¹⁷ Ronald Harrison, a South African artist who painted the famous *Black Christ* in 1962, which depicted Luthuli as Christ crucified, and flanked by two Roman centurions, represented by Dr. Verwoerd and his Minister of Justice Vorster was arrested and tortured by the South African police. He consistently characterised Dr. Verwoerd as a monster and a tormentor.¹⁴¹⁸

¹⁴¹⁰ Mitson (*Morning Record*), 28 January 1965: 6, 'South Africa's barbarous racial oppression makes Mississippi as mild as a tea party.'

¹⁴¹¹ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975: 46.

¹⁴¹² Hepple, 1974: 11.

¹⁴¹³ *The New York Times*, 5 December 1965: 4, 'Dr. Verwoerd affirms Maori athlete bar.'

¹⁴¹⁴ Hepple, 1974: 16; International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975b: 45; Laros, 2015: 283.

¹⁴¹⁵ Hughes, 1961: 185.

¹⁴¹⁶ *The New York Times*, 20 June 1965: 7, '007 is banned in South Africa: Objection is to 'spy who loved.'

¹⁴¹⁷ Zug, 2007: 195.

¹⁴¹⁸ Harrison, 2006: 96.

Despite or perhaps because of his background in journalism, Dr. Verwoerd reacted strongly when the English-language press criticised the government. In 1961 he complained of the press that rights were “getting out of hand” and warned that he would fight against opposition from the press with every means at his disposal.¹⁴¹⁹ He suggested that anyone who criticised apartheid was a communist or under their sway.¹⁴²⁰ In 1963, the entire staff of an anti-apartheid newspaper were subjected to house arrest, and mere possession of a copy of the paper, *The Guardian*, was made illegal, with a penalty of imprisonment for three years (the newspaper itself having been banned since 1952).¹⁴²¹

Newspapers that published anything the government wanted kept quiet could be penalised; in 1965, the *Evening Post* in Port Elizabeth was raided. Police searched through filing cabinets and desks, examined letters and reference papers and scoured press clippings and books.¹⁴²² Later that year, the *Rand Daily Mail (RDM)* was raided after a series of articles about the beating and torture of Black inmates and maltreatment of White political prisoners in South African jails.¹⁴²³ The information was given to the newspaper by Harold Strachan, a recently released political prisoner.¹⁴²⁴

The State visited its wrath on Strachan by serving him with a five-year banning order¹⁴²⁵ and it hit the author of the articles, Benjamin Pogrund, even harder. He was put on trial several times, imprisoned once, had his passport removed and was twice investigated by the security police as a threat to the State.¹⁴²⁶ Laurence Gandar, the editor, stated that he had never before heard of a campaign of such savagery.¹⁴²⁷ Distressing as the swoop was, the newspaper staff managed to maintain a gallows humour. Assuming that the police had secreted listening devices around the building, attendees at editorial conferences, when discussing sensitive matters, would look up at the ceiling and say, “Hope you can hear OK,

¹⁴¹⁹ Bunting, 1986: 315.

¹⁴²⁰ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 29 January 1961: 6, ‘Dr. Verwoerd dooms apartheid shift.’

¹⁴²¹ Zug, 2007: 1, 113.

¹⁴²² Hepple, 1974: 13.

¹⁴²³ *The New York Times*, 19 August 1965: 30, ‘Reprisals in South Africa’; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 27 January 1966: 13, ‘South African found guilty of lying about jails’; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 2 July 1965: 3, ‘South Africa raids paper over prison articles: Detectives seize copy’; UNESCO, 1974: 81.

¹⁴²⁴ UNESCO, 1974: 81.

¹⁴²⁵ *The New York Times*, 3 July 1965: 4, ‘Critic of jails restricted for five years in South Africa.’

¹⁴²⁶ Kniht (*TIME*), 12 June 2000, ‘The daily courage.’

¹⁴²⁷ *The New York Times*, 19 August 1965: 30, ‘Reprisals in South Africa.’

General,” referring to police chief General Hendrik van den Bergh, who had ordered the raid.¹⁴²⁸

In 1964, the *Rand Daily Mail*¹⁴²⁹ won an international press award for bringing to light atrocities¹⁴³⁰ in contravention of the 1959 Prisons Act.¹⁴³¹ Dr. Verwoerd, almost certainly referring to the *RDM*, warned that certain newspapers had almost committed treason¹⁴³² and declared that all opposition newspapers, which mostly leaned towards the United or the Progressive opposition parties, “approached treason” in their coverage. The English language press, with daily circulation of 685.000,¹⁴³³ responded with a degree of self-censorship.¹⁴³⁴ The Afrikaner press, with daily circulation of 175.000,¹⁴³⁵ remained essentially an arm of government; Dr. Verwoerd himself was chairman of the board of Voortrekker Press, which published the *Die Transvaler* paper.¹⁴³⁶

In 1964, the Customs and Excise Act was passed, prohibiting the entry to South Africa of materials that might be seen as objectionable in any way.¹⁴³⁷ During 1964-65, Dr. Verwoerd appointed a secret Cabinet committee, assisted by certain Transvaal judges, to prepare a plan for action against the English media. Reporting this in 1971, J.H.P Serfontein of the *Sunday Times* said a law was drafted to make “defamation of the State” a crime. One member of the committee, W.F. Waring, Minister of Information, objected to the proposal and eventually the idea was dropped.¹⁴³⁸ Anti-apartheid opponents responded to censorship with songs, slogans and gestures which evolved and became a crucial part of the anti-apartheid movement.¹⁴³⁹

The following is a classic example of how the apartheid authorities handled not only the South African media, but correspondents from foreign countries. On April 11, 1960,¹⁴⁴⁰

¹⁴²⁸ Pogrud, 1997: 17.

¹⁴²⁹ In 1985, when the *Rand Daily Mail* folded under the state’s constant attacks, South Africa’s leading Black paper, *The Sowetan*, declared in an epitaph that the *RDM* it was “the first paper to regard [Blacks] as human beings. It fought for them. Its blend of inspirational and aggressive writing was the talk of the times” (Knight (*TIME*), 12 June 2000, ‘The daily courage’).

¹⁴³⁰ *The New York Times*, 25 February 1966: 3. ‘Press Achievement award to go to *Rand Daily Mail*.’

¹⁴³¹ Cook, 1974: 30.

¹⁴³² *The Canberra Times*, 13 May 1964: 2, ‘Verwoerd v. the Press.’

¹⁴³³ *TIME*, 24 November 1961: 45, ‘Beginning of the end?’

¹⁴³⁴ van den Berghe, 1967: 98, 85.

¹⁴³⁵ *TIME*, 24 November 1961: 45, ‘Beginning of the end?’

¹⁴³⁶ Thompson, 1966: 124.

¹⁴³⁷ Hepple, 1974: 23.

¹⁴³⁸ Hepple, 1974: 13.

¹⁴³⁹ Cole, 2015: 88.

¹⁴⁴⁰ The same day, 600 policemen backed by 7,000 troops raided Cato Manor in Durban, arresting 300 people (*Philadelphia Tribune*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Farmer’s motive in Dr. Verwoerd shooting remains a mystery.’) while

two days after Dr. Verwoerd was shot by Davit Pratt, the Government organized a Press Conference. This followed complaints by several foreign newspapers and governments over the arrest of Norman Phillips, a Canadian and the foreign editor of the *Toronto Daily Star*, who had been visiting and reporting from South Africa. Present at the conference were three government ministers: Eric Louw (External Affairs), Francois C. Erasmus (Justice) and J.J. Fouché (Defence).¹⁴⁴¹

Louw said that “in this country there is complete freedom of the Press,” and then announced that Phillips would be released as soon as the police had finished questioning him and providing he agreed to leave South Africa immediately. Phillips had arrived in Sharpeville just after the massacre but was prevented from entering the township. He said he had seen police violence in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban.¹⁴⁴² Phillips had been detained two days earlier in Durban after writing critical stories about apartheid. The *Toronto Daily Star* reported that Phillips’s dispatches were “uncompromisingly against the Government’s policy of white supremacy.” Justice Minister Erasmus denounced the reports as “absolutely untrue” and ordered his arrest.¹⁴⁴³ The arrest came shortly after Phillips interviewed Albert Luthuli, who he described as “the only sane man I’ve met since coming here three weeks ago.”¹⁴⁴⁴ The accusation against Phillips was of writing “reports critical of

“scores of Africans” were arrested in the township of Rand, twelve miles from Johannesburg (*Atlanta Daily World*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Native town raid target; many seized’). Minister Erasmus said at the news conference mentioned above that these arrests, along with hundreds of others around the country, were necessary to stop “intimidation” of Black people who wanted to go to work by Blacks who wanted to stay at home (*Atlanta Daily World*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Native town raid target; many seized’; *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 13 April 1960: 3, ‘South Africa not yielding on race.’ At the same time, the government warned African workers that those who went on strike, as urged by the ANC, would be dismissed and banished to the reserves in remote parts of South Africa. This warning was given in the face of a threatened one-week strike by Africans in Johannesburg (*The New York Times*, 17 April 1960: 1, ‘Threat to banish strikers is made by South Africa’). A police officer warned that all necessary measures “including force resulting in death” would be taken to smash the “Negro stay-home strike” (*Atlanta Daily World*, 17 April 1960: 1, ‘Natives threatened with death by police’). Eventually, because of the police warnings, the strike failed and the workers went to their jobs as normal (*The New York Times*, 20 April 1960: 1, ‘Strike calls fail in South Africa’).

¹⁴⁴¹ CBS Archives, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/sharpeville-massacre-sparks-international-condemnation>; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Journalist to be freed-but must leave’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Canada angry over newsman’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest.’

¹⁴⁴² CBS Archives, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/sharpeville-massacre-sparks-international-condemnation>; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Journalist to be freed-but must leave’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Canada angry over newsman’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest.’

¹⁴⁴³ *Daily Express*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Satisfactory’; *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘News girl is seized’; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Journalist to be freed-but must leave’; *The Spectator*, 14 April 1960: 3, ‘Portrait of the week’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 12 April 1960: 12, ‘Dr. Verwoerd still as head of Cabinet.’

¹⁴⁴⁴ *Washington Post*, 10 April 1960: 4, ‘South Africa jails newsman.’

the government” which could have done serious damage to South African-Canadian relations.¹⁴⁴⁵ The Canadian Government protested strongly and demanded Phillips’s immediate release.¹⁴⁴⁶

Only hours after Louw boasted of complete freedom of the Press, the police in Cape Town arrested another foreign journalist, Myrna Mackenzie of the London *Daily Herald* and the *New York Post*, who was writing under the name Myrna Blumberg.¹⁴⁴⁷ Myrna Mackenzie was the wife of Ken Mackenzie, manager of *Drum* and the *Post*, and both were both reporting on the ANC’s strike campaign.¹⁴⁴⁸ At this time, too, the editor of *Africa South* fled the country to avoid arrest.¹⁴⁴⁹

On April 12, the day after Louw hailed the freedom of the Press in South Africa, the police banned the media from publishing anything about David Pratt, including his name and photograph, until at least the end of the state of emergency which Verwoerd had imposed after Sharpeville.¹⁴⁵⁰ A government official said that this was done “to avoid ill-feeling between the white races.”¹⁴⁵¹ After that, the South African newspapers remained dutifully silent about Pratt until July 7, 1960, the day before he appeared at Pretoria Magistrate’s Court.¹⁴⁵²

Why would the authorities bar the Press from reporting about Pratt? “To avoid ill-feeling between the white races” appears today, and perhaps appeared even then, to be a very lame excuse. What seems likelier is that they wanted to prevent the Press and thus the public from discovering the sort of man David Pratt was and the political views he espoused. Although the early reports in South Africa’s newspapers presented Pratt as a person without

¹⁴⁴⁵ CBS Archives, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/sharpeville-massacre-sparks-international-condemnation>; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Journalist to be freed-but must leave’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Canada angry over newsman’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest.’

¹⁴⁴⁶ *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960, ‘Dr. Verwoerd aides expect recovery’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Canada angry over newsman’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest.’

¹⁴⁴⁷ Alamy (n.d.) Correspondent of the ‘Daily Herald’ Myrna Blumberg is arrested. Available at: <http://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-correspondent-of-the-daily-herald-myrna-blumberg-is-arrested-69364057.html>; *Daily Dispatch*, 13 April 1960: 1, ‘Woman detained-Canadian released’; *Daily Express*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Satisfactory’; *News Chronicle*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd men hold woman reporter’; *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 13 April 1960: 3, ‘South Africa not yielding on race’; *The Spectator*, 14 April 1960: 3, ‘Portrait of the week’; *Washington Post*, 12 April 1960: 6, ‘South Africa widens Emergency Rule.’

¹⁴⁴⁸ Vigne, 1997: 120-121; *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘News girl seized.’

¹⁴⁴⁹ *The Spectator*, 14 April 1960: 3, ‘Portrait of the week.’

¹⁴⁵⁰ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘And now he must be called ‘nameless’; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, ‘Press silence on Pratt ordered’; *The New York Times*, 7 July 1960: 3, ‘Rap South Africa for denying 1600 a trial’; *Washington Post*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Africa shields assassin’s fate.’

¹⁴⁵¹ *News Chronicle*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd is whisked away for operation.’

¹⁴⁵² *The New York Times*, 7 July 1960: 3, ‘Rap South Africa for denying 1600 a trial.’

any political interests, even expressing doubts about his sanity, the overseas dispatches were very different, especially those which appeared in the British Press. There, Pratt was portrayed as perfectly sane, a kindly and generous man, with a long record of political activism with the anti-apartheid Liberal Party in Britain, of which he was a financier; most importantly, the foreign newspapers carried interviews with named persons describing Pratt as a serious opponent of Dr. Verwoerd and of apartheid. There was even a picture of Pratt on a number of front pages which showed him knocking on the door of the British Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street while canvassing for the Liberal Party. Reports said he worked actively for the British boycott movement against South African goods and that he was a public speaker at anti-apartheid meetings.¹⁴⁵³ Such reports were obviously unwelcome to the South African Government. By silencing the South African newspapers, the government ensured that none of these overseas reports were picked up and repeated by local newspapers. A detailed account of South African and foreign Press reports about Pratt and their role in the case is given in Chapter Seven.

On July 7, 1960, the *Cape Times* criticised the government for gagging the Press with regard to Pratt's case. Bravely, the paper also attacked the government for actions by the security forces since the imposition of the state of emergency. It pointed out that some 1,600 people arrested under the emergency regulations were still in custody without being charged or brought before a court.¹⁴⁵⁴ The Emergency remained in force until August 31, 1960.¹⁴⁵⁵

THE SHARPEVILLE MASSACRE

In the context of the growing hold of the police over South African society, the iconic massacre at Sharpeville seems, in retrospect, to have been inevitable. On March 21, 1960, Robert Sobukwe and another 150 activists presented themselves for arrest at police stations all over South Africa. Crowds gathered to support them and demand their release.¹⁴⁵⁶ The idea was that the police would never be able to cope with the numbers involved, and that the pass laws would have to be revoked.¹⁴⁵⁷ One of the townships where protestors gathered was

¹⁴⁵³ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, 'The day farmer Pratt called at No. 10'; *Evening Standard*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'Death for gunman?'

¹⁴⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, 7 July 1960: 3, 'Rap South Africa for denying 1600 a trial.'

¹⁴⁵⁵ Burger, 1961: 23.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Marquard, 1969: 24.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Sowden, 1968: 196.

Sharpeville, a suburb of Vereeniging, south of Johannesburg. This was a relatively well-off Black area where many had running water, and some even had sanitation.¹⁴⁵⁸

Sharpeville had been set up by the government as a “model” community to which Blacks living “too close” to white areas could move.¹⁴⁵⁹ The PAC was particularly strong in this area, which had a relatively weak ANC presence.¹⁴⁶⁰ Prior to the march it had sent a letter to the Commissioner of Police, Major General Rademeyer, explaining that the protest would be peaceful.¹⁴⁶¹ Initially the mood at the protest was buoyant, as attending journalists later reported. Benjamin Pogrund of the *Rand Daily Mail* said that “the demonstrators were completely friendly”¹⁴⁶² and Humphrey Tyler of *Drum* that the crowd was “perfectly amiable.”¹⁴⁶³ The Township Superintendent Labuschagne walked through the crowd and found relaxed people with whom he stopped to chat, and no evidence of any hostility.¹⁴⁶⁴

People felt hopeful that the protest might have a positive outcome, and for some the event was also a day out in a township in which little ever happened. An attendee told the TRC years later: “At the police station we sat down, we were singing hymns, you know it was just a jolly atmosphere. We were singing these hymns as Christians because we were just rejoicing. And we didn’t know what will follow thereafter. We were just joyous because we thought that same afternoon we would get a message. Everybody was taking his feelings out.”¹⁴⁶⁵

The mood of the crowd, largely women and children, has been described as an “idle holiday atmosphere” in which these “were not dangerous agitators but for the most part ordinary citizens who had come to see what was going on.”¹⁴⁶⁶ The police refused to arrest the PAC leaders, and the crowd did not disperse. While the government later claimed that there had been about 20,000 protestors, some eyewitnesses put the figure closer to 3000.¹⁴⁶⁷

Many of the policemen were very young and had no training or experience in “soft” forms of crowd control.¹⁴⁶⁸ Some of them, anxious because they did not know the area well,

¹⁴⁵⁸ Meredith, 1988: 81.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Martin, 2007: 7.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Gerhart, 1978: 236.

¹⁴⁶¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 533.

¹⁴⁶² Pogrund, 1990: 133.

¹⁴⁶³ Tyler, 1995: 17.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Lodge, 2011: 99.

¹⁴⁶⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 535.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Reeves, 1960, 34-46.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Tyler and Furie, 1960: 5.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Frankel, 2001: 93-121.

because there had been some minor incidents of violence in the days before,¹⁴⁶⁹ and because they were largely unable to understand anything the Blacks were saying, as they did not speak the local Sesotho language,¹⁴⁷⁰ opened fire on the demonstrators. They killed at the very minimum sixty-nine (the total figure is likely to be much higher)¹⁴⁷¹ and wounded one hundred and eighty-two (including thirty-one women and nineteen children).¹⁴⁷² Most of the victims were shot in the back,¹⁴⁷³ and most of whom were women and children.¹⁴⁷⁴ The fact that so many were shot in the back clearly shows that they were fleeing, rather than rushing towards, the police.

The precise number of deaths at Sharpeville will probably remain a mystery. It has been variously quoted as 67, 69 or 72.¹⁴⁷⁵ However, the Township Superintendent Labuschagne referred to a much higher figure and there is inconsistency between the local "Official Native Register" of people killed by gunshot and memorials in the local cemetery. As few could afford a gravestone, most victims were buried in unmarked graves, while some who had not been living in Sharpeville for long were returned to rural areas for burial. Some families arranged for anonymous burials, fearing police reprisals, while some buried their loved ones according to tribal religious tradition, rather than Christian.¹⁴⁷⁶

None of these deaths are included in the official tally and nor are the many who were seriously wounded and eventually died weeks, months, or even years after the initial onslaught; official statistics cover only immediate victims. Unsubstantiated local reports tell of police arriving at night and removing bodies from graves.¹⁴⁷⁷ The police removed some bodies before the official tally was made, contributing to the reduction of the official death toll.¹⁴⁷⁸ It also seems that some of the victims had turned up without their passes, hoping to be arrested, and it was easy for them to be left uncounted.¹⁴⁷⁹

¹⁴⁶⁹ Martin, 2007: 8.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Lodge, 2001: 92.

¹⁴⁷¹ Frankel, 2001: 151.

¹⁴⁷² Reeves, 1960: 97.

¹⁴⁷³ Davenport, 1991: 358; Holmes, 1964: 4; Marx, 1992: 37; Mufson, 1990: 82; Shaw, 2007: 31, van den Berghe, 1967: 140; Zug, 2007: 186.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Hopkins, 2015: 247.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Pogrund, 1990: 134.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Frankel, 2001: 150-152.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Frankel, 2001: 150-152.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Martin, 2007: 9.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Davenport, 1991: 358.

There had been no warning from the police that they were about to engage in violence; no baton charge, warning shot or instruction that the crowd should disperse because the officers were about to start shooting. The police continued to shoot after the crowd had started to flee and was clearly not a threat, and even after their officers had ordered them to cease.¹⁴⁸⁰ Not all of the victims had even been involved in the demonstration. The terrain was flat and the police used high-velocity bullets, which reached some people who were drinking tea outside their homes or, in the case of one man, distributing invoices by bicycle around the town – his head was blown off. Eye witnesses reported that many police mocked the dying with parodic versions of the slogans used by the protestors, saying things like “Yes, now you are going to return,” and “There you have it, take it, that is your Africa.”¹⁴⁸¹

When the ambulances arrived, the White policemen called on their Black colleagues to deal with the dead and injured, not wishing to have to deal with the spilled intestines and brains. They held back the victims’ friends and relatives, refusing to allow them to tend to the fallen, or even to know if they were alive or dead. Others even killed off some of the injured, having decided that they were in a position to determine who would benefit from a “mercy shot.” Atrocities on the wounded were also carried out by black police.¹⁴⁸² Some eye-witnesses likened the scene to the carnage found on a world war battlefield.¹⁴⁸³

The police claimed that the presence of many women and children among the victims indicated that the protestors had used them as a “human shield,” when in reality women had been very active in the local PAC and many had been employed as stewards in the demonstration, while large numbers of all ages, including children and the aged, had come to watch an event that everyone expected to be peaceful.¹⁴⁸⁴ The police commander said, “My car was struck by a stone. If they do these things, they must learn their lesson the hard way.”¹⁴⁸⁵

Realising that they had miscalculated in their decision to fire on the crowd and that they might get into trouble, the police tried to make it seem that they had been under threat, throwing rocks into the police station to give the impression that the crowd had been stoning

¹⁴⁸⁰ Frankel, 2001: 118, 145.

¹⁴⁸¹ Lodge, 2011, 107; Reeves, 1960: 133.

¹⁴⁸² Frankel, 2001: 137-140.

¹⁴⁸³ *The Sphere*, 29 March 1960: 459, ‘South African riots.’

¹⁴⁸⁴ Frankel, 2001: 142.

¹⁴⁸⁵ *TIME*, 4 April 1960: 19, ‘South Africa: The Sharpeville massacre.’

them.¹⁴⁸⁶ Witnesses described them as “forming groups, kicking stones into rough piles and then intentionally hurling the projectiles over the wire fence.”¹⁴⁸⁷ They also made extensive arrests among survivors, behaving as if the police had been the victims, not dead and wounded.¹⁴⁸⁸

The local hospitals worked tirelessly to save the wounded, without which the death toll would have been even higher, while police officers interrogated them, and even removed some from their beds and took them into custody if they could not answer questions to the officers' satisfaction. Some were left wearing their bloody clothes for months as a way to advertise the perils of protest. The police formed search parties in Sharpeville and the surrounding areas, arresting and harassing locals, with many imprisoned for weeks before being released without charge.¹⁴⁸⁹ A police unit led by Captain Hendrik van den Bergh was sent to the Baragwanath hospital where many victims of the police shootings had been taken. His team of White and Black policemen dragged wounded people from their beds, irrespective of their condition, handcuffed them and transported them to Boksburg Prison. There they were stripped naked, hosed down and ordered to dress again in their bloody clothes, which they were forced to wear unwashed for months afterwards as an example of the price of “agitation.”¹⁴⁹⁰

Police brutality did not stop there. The police insisted that they had used normal bullets and not the banned dum-dum variety. To conceal their use, the police had told the medical staff, who had seen the injuries, that it would not be in the national interest for them to make “exaggerated” disclosures.¹⁴⁹¹ In addition, when the injured victims started to arrive at hospitals for treatment police officers were already in place to inspect those who were dead and remove bodies that had been very badly damaged by explosive dum-dum bullets. An estimated twenty-four dead bodies were spirited away and buried in secret so that no post-mortems could be carried out on them.¹⁴⁹²

¹⁴⁸⁶ Martin, 2007: 10.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Frankel, 2001: 134.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Martin, 2007: 11.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Frankel, 2001: 152-157.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Frankel, 2001: 194-195.

¹⁴⁹¹ Frankel, 2001: 149.

¹⁴⁹² Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal. 1960: pp. 128, par. 209.

The ANC and the PAC called for a day of mourning and work stoppages (a “stay at home”), and there were demonstrations all over the country.¹⁴⁹³ On March 29, Francois Erasmus, Verwoerd’s Minister of Justice, stated that “They want to bring the White government to its knees. The government has decided to bring a halt to the reign of terror.” The next day, Verwoerd announced a state of emergency, which gave him the power to censor the press, close or take over any business, make arrests without warrant, and force workers to return to their jobs or go to jail.¹⁴⁹⁴ On April 8, Dr. Verwoerd outlawed the ANC and the PAC.¹⁴⁹⁵ Within a week, his police had arrested over 12,000 people (mostly Blacks but also some Whites, Indians and Coloureds) under emergency regulations permitted by the Public Safety Act of 1953.¹⁴⁹⁶ They were also beating up Africans and forcing them to return to work.¹⁴⁹⁷

The massacre at Sharpeville quickly acquired iconic status, while Dr. Verwoerd blamed the violence on anti-apartheid “propaganda” that he said had had “an inciting effect on the Bantus.”¹⁴⁹⁸ He suggested that British Prime Minister Macmillan was partly to blame,¹⁴⁹⁹ for having “stirred up” the non-Whites.¹⁵⁰⁰ He claimed that Sharpeville had been the result of a Communist conspiracy,¹⁵⁰¹ that it could never be described as a reaction against apartheid¹⁵⁰² as it was just a “periodic phenomenon.”¹⁵⁰³ He also even claimed that the demonstrators had shot first, although no weapons were found among them¹⁵⁰⁴ and proudly declared that he had “no sleepless nights over the native problem because I know I am right.”¹⁵⁰⁵ Finally, Dr. Verwoerd ignored the Liberal Party’s call for the government to stand down or that he offer the Africans concessions.¹⁵⁰⁶

¹⁴⁹³ Jaster, 1985: 45; Rudolph, 1984: 4; *TIME*, 11 April 1960: 32, ‘South Africa. From mourning to action.’

¹⁴⁹⁴ *TIME*, 11 April 1960: 32, ‘South Africa. From mourning to action.’

¹⁴⁹⁵ Marais, 2001: 25.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Rudolph, 1984: 4.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Fullard, 2004: 344.

¹⁴⁹⁸ Ballinger, 1969: 425.

¹⁴⁹⁹ Italiaander, 1961: 110.

¹⁵⁰⁰ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.’

¹⁵⁰¹ Mandela, 2013: 281.

¹⁵⁰² Loveland, 1999: 383; *The Illustrated London News*, 9 April 1960: 590, ‘South Africa: The issues appraised.’

¹⁵⁰³ *LIFE*, 16 September 1966: 41, ‘A violent end for the apostle of apartheid’; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.’

¹⁵⁰⁴ *TIME*, 4 April 1960: 19, ‘South Africa: The Sharpeville massacre.’

¹⁵⁰⁵ *LIFE*, 16 September 1966: 41, ‘A violent end for the apostle of apartheid’; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.’

¹⁵⁰⁶ *The Canberra Times*, 24 March 1960: 1, ‘Menzies calls for report on S. Africa riots.’

The Economist commented shortly afterwards that it had set off a chain of events without parallel, honing international sympathy for non-Whites.¹⁵⁰⁷ By this stage, the British Press routinely referred to South Africa as a “police state,”¹⁵⁰⁸ and the British authorities began to discuss the idea that South Africa could be expelled from the Commonwealth.¹⁵⁰⁹ The United States expressed “regret”, acknowledging that this was “an intrusion into the domestic affairs of South Africa,” while Macmillan “strongly condemned” the events and the United Nations placed on its agenda the contention of a consortium of Asian and African countries that the government was responsible for the killings.¹⁵¹⁰

In Norway, the flag was flown at half-mast on the day of the funerals,¹⁵¹¹ while protestors gathered outside Africa House in London and about fifty members of the British House of Commons signed a motion calling for the government to protest “in the strongest possible terms” the fact that such an appalling event had taken place within the Commonwealth. The Brazilian government banned a football match in Rio de Janeiro against a South African team and recalled its ambassador from Pretoria. At a conference in New Zealand the Prime Minister, Walter Nash, asked his audience to stand in silent memory of the dead. The Indian House of Representatives also paid this tribute while Prime Minister Nehru in his speech likened the Nationalists to the Nazis. In Holland, the Dutch Parliament adopted a resolution asking the South African Government to look to the welfare of all its citizens and to their human rights. Several other Parliaments around the world adopted similar resolutions.¹⁵¹²

CATO MANOR, LANGA, NYANGA, NGQUSA HILL AND OTHER PROTESTS

The appalling Sharpeville Massacre dominated the headlines, but there had also been massacres that day at the Langa and Nyanga townships. Demonstrations in areas including Langa and Nyanga became violent when protesters started to throw stones at Whites. The police responded brutally. Two were killed at a march against the pass laws, and fifty were injured. Up to 10,000 had gathered, and had been baton-charged and shot at by the police.¹⁵¹³

¹⁵⁰⁷ *The Economist*, 2 April 1960: 15, ‘Urgent Africa.’

¹⁵⁰⁸ Italiaander, 1961: 119; *The Economist*, 9 April 1960: 180, ‘Kaffirs in their place.’

¹⁵⁰⁹ Barber et al, 1990: 81.

¹⁵¹⁰ *The New York Times*, 10 April 1960, ‘Toronto Star editor held in South Africa.’

¹⁵¹¹ Martin, 2007: 11.

¹⁵¹² Calvocoressi, 1961: 3-4.

¹⁵¹³ Truth and Reconciliation, 1998: 533; Dubow, 2014: 77-78.

These incidents were not isolated occurrences since protests against apartheid were frequent at the time. On January 23, 1960, just two months before the Sharpeville Massacre, protestors attacked and killed nine policemen, four White and five Black, at the Cato Manor police station, seven kilometres from Durban.¹⁵¹⁴ Around the same time, protests also took place in the Zecrust area, in Sekukuhniland, at Virginia, at Kroonstad, at Pietermaritzburg and Harding, as well as in several country districts in Natal.¹⁵¹⁵

Without provocation, on June 6, 1960, at Ngqusa Hill, Eastern Pondoland in the Easter Cape, the police opened fire on a peaceful protest against the government's rural policies, killing eleven Africans and seriously wounding another fifteen.¹⁵¹⁶ The protest at Ngqusa Hill was the most prominent of a series of demonstrations in Pondoland that became known as the Mpondo Revolts. Four years later Govan Mbeki described what happened in Ngqusa Hill; a perfect example of how the police operated at the time:

“Africans from a score of kraals had met there to discuss their complaints. Two aircraft and a helicopter dropped tear-gas and smoke bombs on the crowd, and police vehicles approached from two directions. The Africans raised a white flag to show that their meeting was a peaceful one, but police suddenly emerged from the bushes surrounding the meeting-place and fired into the crowd. At first the government refused to disclose how many had been killed, but strong representations were made and finally an inquest was ordered. Relatives found the bodies of 11 men which had been left all day for dogs and other animals to feed on.”¹⁵¹⁷

Subsequently, a pathologist testified at the inquest¹⁵¹⁸ that although the examination was difficult, he found that six of the eleven men had been killed by bullets with three of them with shots to the back of their heads. The magistrate reported that three of the policemen involved in the killing did not fire to an excessive extent and anyway their action was justified because it was self-defence. This, despite the fact that the victims were unarmed and had raised a white flag. The magistrate declared that the use of sten guns was “unjustified

¹⁵¹⁴ The Bishop of Johannesburg, 1960: 2-3; *The Cape Times*, 25 January 1960, ‘Nine police massacred at Durban.’

¹⁵¹⁵ The Bishop of Johannesburg, 1960: 3-4.

¹⁵¹⁶ For more about the case see: Badat, S. (2013) *The Forgotten People: Banishment under Apartheid*; Mbeki, G. (1964) *The Peasants' Revolt*; Muller, L. (2011) *Tangible and Intangible Ngquza Hill: A Study of Landscape and Memory*; Nqakula, C. (2018) *The People's War: Reflections of an ANC Cadre*; Wylie, N. (2011) *The Shock of the New: Ngquza Hill 1960*.

¹⁵¹⁷ Mbeki, 1964: 121.

¹⁵¹⁸ Rowley Arenstein was one of the lawyers who acted for the family's victims at the inquest (Beinart, 2011: 94, 110; Muller, 2011: 224; Wylie, 2011: 204).

and excessive, even reckless.” However, he concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the shots fired by any of the policemen had killed anyone. In the event, no-one was charged or held responsible.¹⁵¹⁹

After the Ngqusa Hill inquest, the Department of Bantu Affairs appointed a three-man Commission of Inquiry,¹⁵²⁰ led by J.A.C. van Heerden, Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner of the Ciskei. Unsurprisingly, the Commission’s report¹⁵²¹ blamed the ANC for the deaths by instigating the protest. The report read, “It is clear that the people of Bizana were the victims of the insidious propaganda of the African National Congress and associated organizations.” The Commission’s findings provoked widespread anger among the families of the victims and those who took part in the protest and they were formally rejected at a public meeting of 5,000 people.¹⁵²² The Ngqusa Hill inquest and Commission of Inquiry are typical examples of how inquests and official inquiries operated during apartheid, invariably finding in favour of the government, absolving the police from any responsibility, and finding “no-one to blame” (or the victims themselves) for any deaths.

Furthermore, between March 21 and April 9, 1960, some eighty-eight non-Whites were killed and 365 injured. During the State of Emergency that followed, 11,729 Africans, 90 Asians, 98 Whites and 36 Coloureds were detained without being charged or put on trial. As late as August 31 that year, only 400 of them had been released.¹⁵²³

In the Aftermath of Sharpeville

Immediately after the massacre, Dr. Verwoerd’s government declared a State of Emergency and prohibited most gatherings,¹⁵²⁴ while giving the authorities more leeway to ban meetings, search people and buildings, and oppress with violence. It became an offense to say anything that could be interpreted as subverting the government’s authority or inciting others to resist.

¹⁵¹⁹ Badat, 2013: 116-117; South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962: 49; Mbeki, 1964: 121; Muller, 2011: 221-225; Nqakula, 2018: 80-81.

¹⁵²⁰ The Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Eastern Pondoland.

¹⁵²¹ For a detailed analysis of the Report and the background of van Heerden’s “investigation” see Wylie, N. (2011) *The Shock of the New: Ngquza Hill 1960*.

¹⁵²² Badat, 2013: 117; Wylie, 2011: 197-201, 206.

¹⁵²³ Reeves, 1962a: 4.

¹⁵²⁴ Reeves, 1960: 101.

Opposition newspapers, afraid of censorship, or that employees would suffer, largely did not publish any photographs of victims.¹⁵²⁵

At the time, the world took the official reports issued by the police about riots and clashes with the activists as accurate and definitive.¹⁵²⁶ This report directly contradicted the first-hand evidence of witnesses; including Benjamin Pogrund, a journalist with the *Rand Daily Mail*,¹⁵²⁷ and Bishop Ambrose Reeves, who described the shootings as “punitive,” and stated that the police had used excessive force, shooting into people’s backs long after any hint of danger had receded. There was no evidence of shots having been fired from the crowd, or of any attempt to charge the police, nor had the fleeing crowd left any weapons in their wake.¹⁵²⁸ Bishop Reeves put together a legal team that would act on his behalf and on that of some of the victims and their dependents. This team included leading anti-apartheid lawyer Sydney Kentridge, who would later be involved in hearings investigating the death of Steve Biko.¹⁵²⁹

Hundreds were arrested on suspicion of having been complicit in organising the protest, while many Whites who lived nearby turned up at police stations offering assistance and proposing that they set up vigilante groups to protect themselves and their property from the black invasion they expected.¹⁵³⁰ Many of these laws became permanent after the State of Emergency was lifted.¹⁵³¹ The government got even tougher on all dissident activities, pronouncing as unlawful and banning groups including the ANC¹⁵³² and the PAC under the new Unlawful Organisations Act,¹⁵³³ and carrying out a range of legal and administrative measures designed to make legal opposition to the government impossible and intimidate the disenfranchised majority.¹⁵³⁴ It set up a new system of “sentinel platoons,” composed of armed commando units and civilian “shock regiments” to quash unrest.¹⁵³⁵ It became illegal for an individual to bring any legal action against the government relating to the massacre or

¹⁵²⁵ van den Berghe, 1967: 85.

¹⁵²⁶ Pogrund, 2000: 10.

¹⁵²⁷ Knight, 2000.

¹⁵²⁸ *The Canberra Times*, 15 June 1960: 7, ‘Sharpeville shooting ‘punitive,’ Bishop tells Inquiry.’

¹⁵²⁹ Frankel, 2001: 191.

¹⁵³⁰ Frankel, 2001: 158, 161.

¹⁵³¹ Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, 1986: 52-53.

¹⁵³² Tower Hamlets International Solidarity, 1985: 6.

¹⁵³³ Gilbert, 2010: 34.

¹⁵³⁴ Slovo et al, 1976: 108.

¹⁵³⁵ *The New York Times*, 5 August 1960: 2, ‘South Africa forms new security force.’

the state of emergency.¹⁵³⁶ Apartheid had become essentially a totalitarian system of racial oppression against which violent struggle increasingly seemed like the only option. Vuyisile Mini, an anti-apartheid activist, song writer and vocal bassist, wrote an angry, inflammatory song, *Beware Dr. Verwoerd*.¹⁵³⁷

The Sharpeville massacre led to panic across society; the stock market plummeted by a third, with investments leaving the gold mining industry in particular, because of its overwhelming dependence on black labour,¹⁵³⁸ foreign companies sold their assets and vast amounts of money left the country.¹⁵³⁹ Whites fearing that a black revolution was imminent stockpiled firearms to protect themselves in the event of an uprising,¹⁵⁴⁰ with some stating that they would to kill all the “kaffirs” if necessary,¹⁵⁴¹ while extremists prepared themselves for what they referred to as the “Third Afrikaner War of Freedom.”¹⁵⁴² The Canadian and Australian embassies were flooded with queries about immigration.¹⁵⁴³ In the Dutch Reformed Church, always a stalwart supporter of apartheid, some voices were raised calling for concessions to Africans.¹⁵⁴⁴ During a parade of White school children in Meyerton, near Johannesburg, one of them said, “Daddies and mummies, please make sure that after you are no longer here, we won’t have to live as slaves.”¹⁵⁴⁵

ANC President Luthuli, who had called for a national stay-at-home action, the first nationwide response to apartheid,¹⁵⁴⁶ and who had publicly burned his own pass was banned and banished to Natal, and Sobukwe was imprisoned at Robben Island.¹⁵⁴⁷ Luthuli described the deaths as “brutal.” Public opinion shifted radically after Sharpeville and the banning of the ANC and the PAC. A pamphlet published on December 16, 1961 for the launch of the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, stated: “the time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. This time has now come to South

¹⁵³⁶ Mitson (*Morning Record*), 28 January 1965: 6, ‘South Africa’s barbarous racial oppression makes Mississippi as mild as a tea party.’

¹⁵³⁷ Curry, 2012: 110.

¹⁵³⁸ *The Canberra Times*, 24 March 1960: 1, ‘Menzies calls for report on S. Africa riots.’

¹⁵³⁹ Davis, 1987: 12; *The Economist*, 23 April 1960: 340, ‘One month after Sharpeville’; *The Economist*, 10 August 1960: 664, ‘African Repercussions.’

¹⁵⁴⁰ Gerhart, 1978: 242.

¹⁵⁴¹ Legum, 1960: 236.

¹⁵⁴² Meierhenrich, 2010: 189.

¹⁵⁴³ Gerhart, 1978: 242.

¹⁵⁴⁴ *The Economist*, 23 April 1960: 340, ‘One month after Sharpeville’

¹⁵⁴⁵ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, ‘The champion of apartheid.’

¹⁵⁴⁶ Lapping, 1986: 139.

¹⁵⁴⁷ Attwell, 1986: 95-99.

Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom.”¹⁵⁴⁸

Luthuli had been more or less continuously banned since 1953, which meant that he could not receive visitors, make statements, or even go to church.¹⁵⁴⁹ This period of imprisonment would last for three years.¹⁵⁵⁰ He remarked that “native disturbances” were simply a “periodic phenomenon” that, if seen in a global context of “poverty and low wages,” had nothing specific to do with government policy.¹⁵⁵¹ He ordered the temporary suspension of the pass laws in a desperate attempt to calm things down but anger was at an all-time high, and thousands continued protesting and shunning work.¹⁵⁵² Largely because of the massacre and the government’s response, Blacks and Whites now understood that unless something dramatic happened, they were heading inexorably towards violent conflict. It was abundantly clear that the National Party would never concede on any point. The opposition to apartheid, including white opposition, moved firmly to the left.¹⁵⁵³

The Sharpeville Massacre became a highly potent symbol of oppression and resistance that resonated with Blacks even a full generation later, when black resistance had become much more violent, and the white government continued to display no intention of ceding any ground.¹⁵⁵⁴ Whereas atrocities had been carried out in South Africa before, the world and South Africa itself responded strongly to the Sharpeville Massacre; thousands of Whites emigrated, and the increasingly politically aware Blacks reacted with great anger.¹⁵⁵⁵ Quietly, in a tacit recognition of the horrors they were implicated in, at least forty of the White police officers who had perpetrated the massacre resigned.¹⁵⁵⁶

After the Sharpeville Massacre, the government set up a one-man Commission of Inquiry, under Judge Wessels, ostensibly to investigate what had happened.¹⁵⁵⁷ The report of the Commission concealed more than it revealed, whitewashing the police and the government and heaping most of the blame on the demonstrators, just as the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Eastern Pondoland had done, and so many other

¹⁵⁴⁸ ANC, 1988: 20. Nelson Mandela also quoted these words in his statement to the court in 1964.

¹⁵⁴⁹ Luthuli, 1961.

¹⁵⁵⁰ Thomson, 1966: 179-180.

¹⁵⁵¹ Kondlo, 2009: 65.

¹⁵⁵² Harsch, 1980: 245.

¹⁵⁵³ Frankel, 2001: 184.

¹⁵⁵⁴ Lodge, 2011: 3.

¹⁵⁵⁵ Sparks, 1990: 242.

¹⁵⁵⁶ Frankel, 2001: 128.

¹⁵⁵⁷ Reeves, 1960: 81.

Commissions would do during apartheid. The Commission and its report would be examined in detail in Chapter Six.

At the same time, 1907 political prisoners were detained without trial, including Sobukwe and most of the organisations' leaders, according to the Public Safety Act legislation, and another 18,111 (sometimes described as 20,000) arrested on grounds of being "idlers." Amid the chaos, and international condemnation, Dr. Verwoerd dismissed talk of reform and advised leaders in the National Party to stand firm to their race policies.¹⁵⁵⁸ Increasingly heavy-handed policing was used to control political opposition¹⁵⁵⁹ and raids were generally violent, including attacks on people and the destruction of property.¹⁵⁶⁰ *The Economist* characterised South Africa "a state of siege."¹⁵⁶¹

Meanwhile, Mr. Elwyn Jones, QC, submitted a report to the International Commission of Jurists on the situation in South Africa during the state of emergency, which he had completed after acting as an investigator for the Commission. His report, compiled after an eleven-day visit to South Africa, said in part that "the Nationalists regard the rule of law, as interpreted by an independent judiciary, as an unfortunate legacy of British colonial rule of the nineteenth century." He criticized the provisions of the state of emergency and outlined what he said would be the result if it continued and Verwoerd succeeded in passing new suppressive legislation, such as censorship of the press. This, he wrote, would mean that "the twelve years of Nationalist rule will have finally deprived all non-whites of almost all the human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the United Nations Declaration of human rights." *The Economist* described Dr. Verwoerd's actions and legislation which he designed as an attempt to "legalize tyranny."¹⁵⁶²

Even so, Dr. Verwoerd warned against concessions, stating that South Africa could "fall from the grasp of the white man together with everything that he has brought to this country which he loves."¹⁵⁶³ Black leaders, including Mandela, were imprisoned.¹⁵⁶⁴ Mandela was convicted of striking and of having left the country without a passport.¹⁵⁶⁵ He would spend most of his sentence on Robben Island, which is discussed below. From the British

¹⁵⁵⁸ Meredith, 1988: 89; Reeves, 1960: 101.

¹⁵⁵⁹ Solani and Nieftagodien, 2004: 391.

¹⁵⁶⁰ van den Berghe, 1967: 138.

¹⁵⁶¹ *The Economist*, 16 April 1960: 230, 'South Africa: A state of siege.'

¹⁵⁶² *The Economist*, 16 April 1960: 1193, 'Legalising tyranny.'

¹⁵⁶³ Moodie, 1975: 277.

¹⁵⁶⁴ Longford, 1985: 22.

¹⁵⁶⁵ Bunting, 1986: 216.

protectorate of Swaziland Archbishop Reeves stated his determination that the full story of the massacre should be heard, and his fears that he would be “silenced” in South Africa. The government-friendly newspaper *Die Transvaler* suggested that he had fled to avoid the inquiry that was shortly to be held.¹⁵⁶⁶

Unrest started to emerge elsewhere. In Johannesburg, all the inhabitants of the black townships went on strike for nearly three weeks, and a new pass-burning campaign began.¹⁵⁶⁷ While most activists had been committed to peaceful protest, after Sharpeville the mood started to change and armed groups began to emerge, to which the government responded brutally; “raids, sabotage, torture, assassinations, imprisonment without trial, killings, informers, emergency laws, dramatic arrests and escapes.”¹⁵⁶⁸

Consistently, Dr. Verwoerd identified communists as the primary villains. He stated that the greatest obstacle to his major goal of separate development was “the unfavourable atmosphere” created by hostile organisations and persons, “some of them white and imbued with communistic aims sowing suspicion and inciting the non-whites.”¹⁵⁶⁹ The passage of the Defence Further Amendment Act in 1961 gave the military authorities war-time powers to repress dissent.¹⁵⁷⁰

Despite international criticism, Dr. Verwoerd was determined to ensure white supremacy, saying, “We will see to it that we remain in power in this white South Africa.”¹⁵⁷¹ Dr. Verwoerd felt confident that Blacks would not resist if they knew that the government would never concede so he ensured that everyone knew that apartheid was a complex, interlocking system that would not permit the change of any of its elements, and that he personally would never accept change but would extend apartheid ever further.¹⁵⁷²

In 1961, Dr. Verwoerd called a general election eighteen months early and it took place on October 18 of that year. The Sharpeville massacre and its aftermath had hardened white feelings towards Blacks and the National Party was returned with a resounding majority.¹⁵⁷³ Three General Law Amendments, in 1962 (the “Sabotage Act” mentioned

¹⁵⁶⁶ *The Canberra Times*, 6 April 1960: 1, ‘Bishop will speak elsewhere.’

¹⁵⁶⁷ Bunting, 1986: 209.

¹⁵⁶⁸ Barber, 1999: 166.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Ballinger, 1969: 442-443.

¹⁵⁷⁰ Hepple, 1966: 166.

¹⁵⁷¹ Rake, 1990: 151.

¹⁵⁷² Booth, 1998: 62; Wentzel, 1995: 3.

¹⁵⁷³ Hepple, 1966: 167.

above),¹⁵⁷⁴ 1963 and 1964, greatly extended the government's reach in the form of widened powers for the police and military including the right to imprison without trial, the refusal of bail, and much more.¹⁵⁷⁵ In 1965, *The Economist* grimly pointed out that such was the injustice and inequality in South Africa that, unless and until non-Whites were treated more fairly, the country more or less "had" to be a police state, as so many were so desperate that high crime rates were unavoidable.¹⁵⁷⁶

By 1963, the Liberal Party had become a serious nuisance and Dr. Verwoerd committed himself to systematically destroying it. The Nationalist Party and its press smeared the Party and many government ministers called for its restriction.¹⁵⁷⁷ By this time racial segregation was built into every single aspect of everyday life and enforced with ruthless, violent means.¹⁵⁷⁸ Anti-apartheid activists, Black and White, who fled or attempted to flee South Africa were often kidnapped and brought back, and the government enacted a range of acts of sabotage, including causing the explosion of a plane supposed to bring political asylum seekers out of Bechuanaland, where they had fled, and destroying a centre for refugees, also in Bechuanaland.¹⁵⁷⁹ The South African authorities wanted vocal critics of the apartheid regime to remain in South Africa where they could be arrested and tried, and went to great lengths to prevent them from leaving as refugees.¹⁵⁸⁰ It also cracked down on entry visas for anyone who seemed to be even slightly critical of apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd's governance.¹⁵⁸¹

The same year, the government increased its budget for military spending by 50% and "reorganised the police force, recruited 'home guards' to guard 'strategic installations,' dotted the country with police posts and set out to fence and police South Africa's borders." Even more worryingly, "Young whites are being trained to handle firearms with targets representing Blacks, even White schoolgirls."¹⁵⁸² Neville Alexander stated that the massacre "removed the blinkers from the eyes" of those providing political leadership to the oppressed as to the impact of their non-violent campaigns.¹⁵⁸³

¹⁵⁷⁴ Cronje, 1964: 3.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Hepple, 1966: 168.

¹⁵⁷⁶ *The Economist*, 7 August 1965: 1, 'White man's country.'

¹⁵⁷⁷ Hain, 1996: 26.

¹⁵⁷⁸ Attwell, 1986: 104.

¹⁵⁷⁹ Gifford, 1981: 6.

¹⁵⁸⁰ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 18 April 1960: 1, 'South Africans said to consider sealing borders.'

¹⁵⁸¹ Stultz, 1969: 6.

¹⁵⁸² Ainslie and Robinson, 1963: 4.

¹⁵⁸³ Alexander: 2013: 7-8.

DR. VERWOERD'S FOREIGN POLICY

Since the National Party's victory in 1948, the primary foreign policy objective had been the protection of apartheid from foreign threat, although it often posited this as a fight against international communism.¹⁵⁸⁴ Dr. Verwoerd's own position on foreign policy since becoming Prime Minister has been characterised as "Stop the world, I want to get off."¹⁵⁸⁵ Certainly, he had no interest in listening to critical views on apartheid from overseas and insisted on making most foreign policy decisions on with the support of his ever-loyal foreign ministers and minimal input from anyone else.¹⁵⁸⁶ This was broadly consistent with the general trend among Afrikaners to be distrustful of all outside influences as having the potential to interfere with the purity and self-determination of the Afrikaner *volk*.¹⁵⁸⁷ Overall, Dr. Verwoerd's intention was to reinforce the relative power of White to non-White South Africans, and to prevent anything that would tend to weaken white power.¹⁵⁸⁸

The United Nations had stated reservations about South Africa from the very start of modern apartheid and consistently issues had been raised, notably the treatment of Indians and the extreme form of racial politics.¹⁵⁸⁹ Although many voices overseas were raised against apartheid, transforming these words into action in the form of actual sanctions was slower, and many argued that sanctions would be illegal.¹⁵⁹⁰ In 1953, a UN Commission report condemned apartheid and stated that it was contrary to the "dignity and worth of the human person."¹⁵⁹¹ Lengthy discussions were held about the feasibility of coercing South Africa to adopt a less discriminatory system, and the UN urged Africans, including those directly affected by apartheid, to press for a peaceful resolution, while comparing racism to a "mental illness."¹⁵⁹²

Dr. Verwoerd was determined to stand firm, stating that the government was prepared to choose between being popular internationally and facing the "destruction of the white Nation in South Africa" or proceeding with their plans for apartheid.¹⁵⁹³ In a statement to the United Nations, he said that UN resolutions calling for sanctions did not bother South Africa,

¹⁵⁸⁴ Price, 1984: 11-32.

¹⁵⁸⁵ Blumenfeld, 1987: 13.

¹⁵⁸⁶ Munger, 1965: 85.

¹⁵⁸⁷ Seiler, 1975: 448.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Lawrie, 1964: 43.

¹⁵⁸⁹ Leiss, 1965: 51.

¹⁵⁹⁰ Higgins, 1964: 92; Holmes, 1964: 6.

¹⁵⁹¹ Dubow, 2014: 48.

¹⁵⁹² Leiss, 1965: 155, 162-168.

¹⁵⁹³ House of Assembly, January 23-27 1961, col. 98.

“since so many of the countries who really do not want themselves in for this kind of foolishness.”¹⁵⁹⁴

The United Kingdom was South Africa's biggest trading partner and had acted as a mediator between South Africa and the UN. In 1950, British authorities argued that it was important to maintain a close relationship with South Africa despite apartheid. Britain was dealing with the steady break-up of its empire, and conservative elements in the government tended to identify with Whites. Powerful lobbies with major investments in South Africa pleaded that sanctions would hurt Britain too and that normal trade relations should continue, with similar lobbies making similar claims in the United States.¹⁵⁹⁵ In Britain, the clout of these investors blunted opposition to apartheid even in the Labour Party, which had stated that it was firmly against it.¹⁵⁹⁶

In both the US and the UK, the interests of foreign investors in lucrative mining and other businesses in South Africa tended to trump human rights interests.¹⁵⁹⁷ The British arms industry was making huge sums of money from the sale of arms and military equipment to the government of South Africa, while anti-apartheid activists implored the government and the people to stop trade with South Africa completely.¹⁵⁹⁸ Foreign investments, especially from the US and the UK, played a huge role in supporting South Africa prosperity and, by extension, the continuation of apartheid.¹⁵⁹⁹

In 1958, as the new Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd appealed to western nations to stand with South Africa, which he represented as the last “toehold” of “western civilisation in Africa.”¹⁶⁰⁰ He did not get the overwhelming support he wanted and, in 1960, a year that saw a record for South African exports¹⁶⁰¹ at the value of \$724 million despite the boycotts, complained that Western nations were kowtowing to African countries because they wanted their support, and were ditching South Africa's interests in the process.¹⁶⁰²

¹⁵⁹⁴ El-Khawas, 1971: 450.

¹⁵⁹⁵ Legum and Legum, 1964b: 247-253.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Ainslie and Robinson, 1963: 8; Darnborough, 1967: 4-5.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Fasulo, 1970: 3.

¹⁵⁹⁸ Ainslie and Robinson, 1963: 22.

¹⁵⁹⁹ Litvak et al, 1978: 38.

¹⁶⁰⁰ *The Economist*, 20 December 1958: 1071, ‘Dr. Verwoerd seeks allies.’

¹⁶⁰¹ South Africa exported a large number of products, mainly to Europe, in particular minerals, but also fruits, vegetables, wine, sugar, wool, gold and diamonds (Rogers and Bolton, 1981).

¹⁶⁰² *The New York Times*, 3 July 1960: 6, ‘Dr. Verwoerd assails West African bid.’

Dr. Verwoerd was angry and disappointed that foreign countries did not see his Bantu Homeland system as the humanitarian approach that he presented it as. Where he felt that South Africa should have been praised for its new system,¹⁶⁰³ it was often criticised. Even countries that did have diplomatic relations with South Africa tended to keep their distance; the relationship between Dr. Verwoerd and the US ambassador, for example, was a chilly one.¹⁶⁰⁴ Dr. Verwoerd was also irritated by American criticism of apartheid, which he considered the height of hypocrisy given that the basics of the system had been culled from race laws in operation in Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi. The only difference was that South Africa had given a name, apartheid, to a policy which already existed in some American states.¹⁶⁰⁵

Dr. Verwoerd became Prime Minister when African colonies of European nations were demanding independence, and a year after Ghana became the first to achieve it.¹⁶⁰⁶ Dr. Verwoerd and his government were horrified by de-colonialization and in 1959 the Foreign Minister Eric Louw¹⁶⁰⁷ had referred to it as “disturbing” and “alarming.”¹⁶⁰⁸ He seems to have felt that the Commonwealth was likely to collapse because of the strains associated with the UK’s attempts to “promote multinationalism” around the world.¹⁶⁰⁹ In international parlance, the year 1960 was known as “the year of Africa” when no fewer than seventeen African nations became independent of their European colonial masters. However, Dr. Verwoerd did not find it necessary to establish diplomatic relations with any of the new black states, despite a recommendation that he should do so from Robert Menzies, Australia’s Prime Minister. As far as Dr. Verwoerd was concerned, diplomatic relations with black Africa were out of the question.¹⁶¹⁰ A later attempt to find “some understanding” in Zambia by sending out “feelers” was ignored by President Kaunda.¹⁶¹¹

While most English South Africans accepted the 1960 referendum result somewhat grudgingly,¹⁶¹² Dr. Verwoerd did enjoy some British support in the person of Second World

¹⁶⁰³ Seeley, 1984: 11.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Munger, 1965: 87.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Moodie, 2017: 153.

¹⁶⁰⁶ Sparks, 1990: 192.

¹⁶⁰⁷ (1890-1968) Nazi and anti-Semite diplomat and politician. He served as Minister of Economic Affairs and Minister of Finance. Close friend and associate of Verwoerd, he served under him as Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bunting, 1986: 63-66).

¹⁶⁰⁸ Pfister, 2005: 31.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Spence, 1968: 4.

¹⁶¹⁰ Osada, 2002: 181.

¹⁶¹¹ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1972: 101.

¹⁶¹² *The Economist*, 15 October 1960: 251, ‘South Africa’s choice.’

War legend Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, who visited South Africa in 1962. Dr. Verwoerd and nine members of his cabinet dined with Montgomery, who, upon returning to the UK, declared that separate development was “a plan worthy of the most sincere examination and study.” He said, “In South Africa there was complete peace and quiet, very different from the rest of the continent, where we see chaos and unrest and nobody seems able to unscramble the racial omelette in a peaceful atmosphere.”¹⁶¹³ Another Briton who supported Dr. Verwoerd and his policies was Oswald Mosley, British fascist leader, who visited South Africa and pronounced it the “healthiest place in the world.”¹⁶¹⁴ Dr. Verwoerd also received support from neo-Nazi groups from Germany, who toured South Africa and preached white supremacy.¹⁶¹⁵

In January 1961, the secretary general of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, visited South Africa to discuss the country’s racial policies, with no happy outcome. In April 1961, a month after South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth, the UN passed a resolution denouncing South African racial policies as “reprehensible and repugnant to human dignity.”¹⁶¹⁶ However, South Africa’s ten highest ranking partners – the UK, the USA, Japan, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, West Germany and Italy – together with Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Luxemburg, New Zealand and Ireland constantly opposed UN Sanctions against South Africa,¹⁶¹⁷ at a time when relations with the US under the new Kennedy administration, were poor.¹⁶¹⁸ Later that year, Dr. Verwoerd wrote a strongly worded letter to one of South Africa’s prominent Jewish lawyers in a move that was interpreted as a threat relating to Israel’s support of sanctions.¹⁶¹⁹ The letter received a lot of publicity overseas,¹⁶²⁰ and Dr. Verwoerd denied any anti-Semitic intent.¹⁶²¹

In April 1961, Dr. Verwoerd made the decision to pass a decree stating that for the purposes of the Group Areas Act, Japanese would be considered Whites, while Chinese would be considered non-White, although they are racially the same.¹⁶²² Japan was economically important to South Africa, as Dr. Verwoerd had agreed a \$250 million

¹⁶¹³ Warwick, 2009: 70-71.

¹⁶¹⁴ Furlong, 1991: 256.

¹⁶¹⁵ Bunting, 1986: 70-72.

¹⁶¹⁶ Osada, 2002: 188; Seeley, 1984: 24.

¹⁶¹⁷ Ampiah, 1997: 150.

¹⁶¹⁸ Seeley, 1984: 11.

¹⁶¹⁹ *The New York Times*, 23 November 1961: 6, ‘Israel sees threat in Dr. Verwoerd letter.’

¹⁶²⁰ Shimoni, 1980: 312.

¹⁶²¹ *The New York Times*, 24 November 1961: 2, ‘Dr. Verwoerd denies Anti-Semitic claims.’

¹⁶²² Weyl, 1970: 25.

industrial contract with the Asian nation, while China was not of great economic importance, and Communist.¹⁶²³ The same year, there was widespread outrage at a British decision to remove non-Whites from a British navy ship before it visited South Africa, having taken political advice from the South African authorities. "It is a situation that cannot be helped and the coloured boys know this," said the admiral. Outrage ensued, particularly from the Labour Party.¹⁶²⁴

In 1962, influenced by the Sharpeville massacre,¹⁶²⁵ a majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution on economic sanctions,¹⁶²⁶ declaring that South Africa's policies were contrary to its obligations; that they had led to international tensions, and that it should urgently end apartheid.¹⁶²⁷ Economic sanctions were proposed by twenty-nine Asian and African states, but they were vetoed by the USA and Britain.¹⁶²⁸ This was a time of crisis in the area of foreign relations.¹⁶²⁹ With poor grace, Dr. Verwoerd invited United Nations representatives to visit South Africa and gave them free rein to travel, presumably hoping that this would stall their criticism.¹⁶³⁰ He also accused those overseas who were attacking him as "the ducktails (young hoodlums) of the political world." He said, "We are not the oppressors ... we are Christians..."¹⁶³¹

Many of the most critical countries were developing ones, with Asian nations leading the charge. Consistently, African and Asian states argued that South Africa flouted the United Nation's charter of human rights and that apartheid fell under its purview. However, they were consistently stymied by western nations with investments in the country.¹⁶³² Because South Africa was an important trading partner for so many countries, although they knew that apartheid was wrong they were reluctant to criticise it. Robert Edgar very successfully compared the situation with a joke from Woody Allen's film, *Annie Hall*. In the film, a fellow consults a psychiatrist, complaining about his brother who thinks he is a chicken. The psychiatrist says that the solution is simple: commit your brother to a mental hospital. And

¹⁶²³ Kawasaki, 2001: 68.

¹⁶²⁴ *Sunday Express*, 29 January 1961: 1, 'Navy apartheid row.'

¹⁶²⁵ Klotz, 1995: 46.

¹⁶²⁶ Haekkerup, 1964: 42.

¹⁶²⁷ Conference Steering Committee, 1964: 95.

¹⁶²⁸ Eades, 1999: 15; El-Khawas, 1971: 446.

¹⁶²⁹ Seeley, 1984: 23.

¹⁶³⁰ *The Economist*, 26 May 1962: 800, 'Dr. Verwoerd fights on.'

¹⁶³¹ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, 'The champion of apartheid.'

¹⁶³² El-Khawas, 1971: 444.

the fellow responds, "That's fine, but I need the eggs."¹⁶³³ Neville Alexander argued that with no alternative to a capitalist government, international imperial and capitalist forces would ensure that the National Party would remain at the helm.¹⁶³⁴

Even when increasing numbers of voices were raised against apartheid, and the number of sanctions grew, South Africa's government appeared more committed than ever to pursuing its policy of racial segregation. It amassed weapons and developed arms locally because most arms-producing countries, such as the United States, which had voted in favour of an arms embargo, would no longer export to South Africa. France and Britain had agreed not to export weapons that could be used in enforcing apartheid¹⁶³⁵ and Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark, were committed to assisting the population to end the status quo and achieve racial equality peacefully.¹⁶³⁶ After the Sharpeville massacre, India and Ghana wanted South Africa to be kicked out of the United Nations, and Canada also condemned the country.¹⁶³⁷ However, Dr. Verwoerd, remained unmoved, telling Parliament, "The government have to choose between international popularity and the destruction of the white nation in South Africa or going forward with apartheid."¹⁶³⁸

In 1963, Dr. Verwoerd railed against Scandinavian countries and Israel for their condemnation of South Africa's racial policies, and in particular against Israel's decision to withdraw its minister to South Africa, embedding his remarks in the context of a discussion of the Jews in South Africa, implying that Israel's policies might have negative implications for them.¹⁶³⁹ He responded to Israel's support for the United Nations stand against South Africa by stating that this was a "tragedy for Jewry in South Africa";¹⁶⁴⁰ a barely veiled threat. Two years earlier, he had noted darkly his disapproval of the fact that few Jews had voted for him in the 1961 elections, with the suggestion that if they continued not to support the government, things might not go well for them.¹⁶⁴¹ Furthermore, after the elections, Dr.

¹⁶³³ Woody Allen was one of the few artists who had prohibited the release and distribution of his films in South Africa (Edgar, 1990: 16; Shore, 1990: 410).

¹⁶³⁴ Alexander, 1990: 13.

¹⁶³⁵ Duncan, 1963: 43.

¹⁶³⁶ Haekkerup, 1964: 45.

¹⁶³⁷ Harrison, 1981: 166.

¹⁶³⁸ House of Assembly, 1961: 98.

¹⁶³⁹ Conley (*The New York Times*), 10 October 1963: 18. "11 accused in South Africa of planning revolt."

¹⁶⁴⁰ Bunting, 1986: 67.

¹⁶⁴¹ *The Canberra Times*, 23 November 1961: 33, 'Dr. Verwoerd accuses 'Jew vote.'

Verwoerd verbally attacked the Jews in Houghton, a wealthy Johannesburg suburb, for electing Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party to the Parliament.¹⁶⁴²

By 1963, South Africa was becoming increasingly isolated within the international community.¹⁶⁴³ The increase of African states as members of the United Nations from nine in 1960 to thirty-two by 1963 added to the pressure.¹⁶⁴⁴ In 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created, with headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to pursue the international and regional interests of independent African nations.¹⁶⁴⁵ The OAU declared open war on all non-representative regimes of Southern Africa, thus excluding white-ruled South Africa from its ranks.¹⁶⁴⁶

At the same time, South Africa's mandate of control over South West Africa was withdrawn by the United Nations and the territory was given by the General Assembly the name "Namibia" while neighbouring Rhodesia, also a racist state, faced international sanctions. South Africa did not have diplomatic relations with black-run African countries, and Dr. Verwoerd did not intend to establish any until they dropped their hostility towards South Africa. The only African country it had diplomatic relations with was Egypt.¹⁶⁴⁷

Throughout the 1960s, as South Africa became economically stronger, and thus a more important trading partner, there was a "slackening in resistance" to apartheid in many countries around the world.¹⁶⁴⁸ Notwithstanding the oil embargo that the United Nations voted for in 1963, anti-apartheid activists tended to grow disillusioned in response to the general ineffectiveness of bodies such as the UN to apply sanctions effectively.¹⁶⁴⁹ Despite UN sanctions and lip-service to disapproval, businesses from many countries around the world continued to invest in South Africa.¹⁶⁵⁰

Dr. Verwoerd had made it clear that it did not matter even if the US and UK introduced sanctions. So far as he was concerned, apartheid was there to stay – and in any case their many investments seemed to make the argument a moot point.¹⁶⁵¹ Around the

¹⁶⁴² Goldberg quoted in Suttner, 1997: 469

¹⁶⁴³ Pfister, 2005: 37.

¹⁶⁴⁴ Stultz, 1969: 4.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Klotz, 1995: 10.

¹⁶⁴⁶ Stultz, 1969: 4.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Seeley, 1984: 12-13; UNESCO, 1974: 127-139.

¹⁶⁴⁸ Vigne, 1969: 3.

¹⁶⁴⁹ Reddy, 1974: 19.

¹⁶⁵⁰ Anti-apartheid Alliance, 1988: 1

¹⁶⁵¹ *The New York Times*, 22 November 1964: 2, 'Apartheid stays, Dr. Verwoerd vows.'

world, however, anti-apartheid movements were growing and, increasingly, left-wing parties articulated their views. In the UK, for example, the Labour Manifesto for the general election of 1964 included a pledge to stop exporting British arms to South Africa.¹⁶⁵²

The UK and the US tried to stay on both sides of the fence, criticising South Africa enough so that they seemed to be doing the right thing, while continuing to invest and do business with it. Dr. Verwoerd said that he was depending on the “common sense” of both nations to protect the Whites of South Africa.¹⁶⁵³ The US paid lip service to eliminating apartheid, while acknowledging the usefulness of access to South Africa’s ports, and of its tracking station in the country. It did little or nothing to dissuade South Africa from apartheid, including refusing to intervene in the case of American investments. Particularly tellingly, the US had no provision for providing official legal status to those seeking asylum on political grounds. Moreover, while Black Americans, especially those involved in civil rights movements, were routinely denied visas to visit South Africa, White South Africans, including extreme racists, had no such problems in obtaining visas to visit the US.¹⁶⁵⁴

In 1964, Dr. Verwoerd said, apropos of foreign policy: “The crux of the problem is whether it is more important to be in the good books of world opinion than it is to make up your own mind as to how best you can ensure your survival as the white race in this country. I do not want to push aside the nations of the world. I should not like to be on hostile terms with them; I should like to seek the friendships of others; but I can seek that friendship only within the limits of the right that South Africa herself must have to formulate her own policy in respect of what is to happen within South Africa.”¹⁶⁵⁵

A visit to South Africa by US Senator Robert Kennedy in June 1966 was a propaganda disaster for Dr. Verwoerd, while for the opposition it was a timely reminder that the world was on its side. It also provided a much needed boost to dissidents’ morale after heavy jail sentences that had recently been imposed on Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders. For more than a year, the pro-government Afrikaans press had been calling on Sen. Kennedy to cancel his proposed visit as the guest of a multi-racial group, accusing him of trying to “cloud relations” between South Africa and the United States. When Kennedy

¹⁶⁵² Darnborough, 1967: 1.

¹⁶⁵³ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 5 April 1966: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd says he won’t yield to pressure of US and Britain.’

¹⁶⁵⁴ Houser, 1966: 4-5, 16.

¹⁶⁵⁵ Hepple, 1967: 192.

eventually visited, Dr. Verwoerd refused to meet him, a decision which many commentators said made him look petty and small-minded. The senator met with Opposition leaders and newspaper editors instead.¹⁶⁵⁶

Just before his death, Dr. Verwoerd met in Pretoria with the leader of Lesotho, Leabua Jonathan.¹⁶⁵⁷ In a joint statement released after the meeting, the two leaders stressed working together, while avoiding interference in each other's internal affairs.¹⁶⁵⁸ It was the first, and as it turned out, the last time he met with a Black African leader. Dr. Verwoerd refused to be seen in public with him, so they talked in a private room in a hotel and Jonathan flew home immediately afterwards. He thus avoided the embarrassment of being refused a room in Pretoria's White-only hotels.¹⁶⁵⁹ He was hoping that the meeting would result in a positive regional atmosphere in which apartheid was tolerated in return for cooperation. He knew that by integrating South Africa more and more into the western capitalist economy other governments would be less likely to join the growing pressure from the third world and the socialist countries to have apartheid abolished.¹⁶⁶⁰

Dr. Verwoerd believed that profit would always win, regardless of how important political principals were supposed to be. For this reason, the government's strategy was always to engage economically with other nations.¹⁶⁶¹ In this way, they hoped that they would be able to broker a peaceful situation in which apartheid was tolerated in return for the advantages of cooperation. If such working relationships did well, South Africa would be able to respond to pressures on its apartheid system by focusing on economic matters.¹⁶⁶²

Dr. Verwoerd was becoming increasingly isolated from diplomatic relations with most countries, but he forged alliances with those leaders whom he felt were most supportive of apartheid. These were the fascist dictator of Portugal, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, who was determined to hold onto Portugal's colonies in Africa, Mozambique and Angola, even if that meant using appalling violence, and the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in which white domination was maintained.¹⁶⁶³ Ian Smith, Rhodesia's Prime Minister, declared

¹⁶⁵⁶ Daniel and Vale, 2009: 141; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 27 October 1965: 18, 'Robert Kennedy's plan assailed in Johannesburg'; *The Illustrated London News*, 11 June 1966: 8, 'Personalities of the week.'

¹⁶⁵⁷ Geldenhuys, 1984: 19.

¹⁶⁵⁸ Scheepers Strydom, 1967: 182.

¹⁶⁵⁹ *TIME*, 9 September 1966: 37, 'South Africa: A summit of sorts.'

¹⁶⁶⁰ Grundy, 1976: 577.

¹⁶⁶¹ Grundy, 1991: 29.

¹⁶⁶² Vale, 1987: 181-182.

¹⁶⁶³ Ainslie, 1962: 5.

confidently in 1964 about his allies Dr. Verwoerd and Salazar that they “will stand by us and have always stood by us.”¹⁶⁶⁴

In 1966, when Rhodesia was facing sanctions, Dr. Verwoerd supported its regime, while trying to hide the fact that the only thing keeping it from crumbling was that it was propped up by South Africa.¹⁶⁶⁵ He was consistent in calling on countries such as the UK and the US to back off and leave Rhodesia to its own affairs, by which he meant white hegemony.¹⁶⁶⁶ Dr. Verwoerd's view was that Rhodesia was a sort of buffer zone between South Africa and “black Africa,” and that if sanctions worked against Rhodesia, they might be employed more systematically against South Africa.¹⁶⁶⁷ Nevertheless, despite the support he was providing to Smith's regime, some members of his Party accused him that this was not enough and that he was letting down the cause of the Whites in Africa. Dr. Verwoerd replied, “We are the foremost white supremacists in the world.”¹⁶⁶⁸

In 1960, a case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia came before the World Court, claiming that South Africa had been mismanaging South West Africa/Namibia.¹⁶⁶⁹ The case was dismissed in 1966,¹⁶⁷⁰ which was claimed by Dr. Verwoerd as “a major victory.”¹⁶⁷¹ A prominent African jurist not named by the press of the time declared that Africa was losing confidence in the World Court, which he called “a white man's court.”¹⁶⁷² After the verdict, a Namibian tribal chief stated of Dr. Verwoerd's plans for the homelands: “my people and other tribes would never submit to such a plan. The Germans killed us like cattle, but this thing which Verwoerd he will do seems, in this age, to be even more merciless.”¹⁶⁷³

However, in October 1966 (just after Dr. Verwoerd's death), the General Assembly of the

¹⁶⁶⁴ Dubula, 1965: 31.

¹⁶⁶⁵ *The Economist*, 23 April 1966: 343, ‘What would make Dr. Verwoerd cry chicken.’

¹⁶⁶⁶ *The New York Times*, 1 November 1964: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd backs Rhodesian stand.’

¹⁶⁶⁷ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 2 January 1966: 136, ‘Dr. Verwoerd on Rhodesia: Go Slow.’

¹⁶⁶⁸ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 7 September 1966, ‘A prophet of racism.’

¹⁶⁶⁹ South West Africa/Namibia was a German colony from 1884 to 1915. South Africa defeated the German forces there during the First World War and kicked them out of the country. Since that time, South Africa had been responsible for the administration of the territory (Dugard, 1973: 15-66; *TIME*, 29 July 1966: 22, ‘South Africa: A vote on apartheid’).

¹⁶⁷⁰ The Judge appointed by Dr. Verwoerd to defend South Africa in the World Court was Justice Jacques Theodore van Wyk. van Wyk was later appointed as the sole member of the one-man Commission of Enquiries into the Circumstances of the Death of Dr. Verwoerd. For more about the case see Dugard, J. (1973) *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute*; van Wyk, J.T. (1968) *The United Nations, South West Africa and the Law*.

¹⁶⁷¹ Daniell (*The New York Times*), 19 July 1966: 1; ‘Verdict angers Africans at UN’; Dugard, 1973: 243-260; *The Canberra Times*, 20 July 1966: 17, ‘Verwoerd happy with decision by ‘white man's court’; *The New York Times*, 19 July 1966: 17, ‘Dr. Verwoerd calls ruling a victory for South Africa;’ *TIME*, 29 July 1966: 22, ‘South Africa: A vote on apartheid.’

¹⁶⁷² *The Canberra Times*, 20 July 1966: 17, ‘Verwoerd happy with decision by ‘white man's court’;

¹⁶⁷³ *TIME*, 29 July 1966: 22, ‘South Africa: A vote on apartheid.’

United Nations voted 102 to 2 to revoke the government of South Africa's right to administer the country.¹⁶⁷⁴

APARTHEID, A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

Apartheid per se, and not just specific acts carried out under the apartheid regime, has been identified as a crime against humanity according to the basic Charter for Human Rights drawn up by the United Nations following the infamous Nuremburg trials.¹⁶⁷⁵ The many egregious crimes against human rights that occurred under apartheid had profound repercussions for the quality of life of the repressed, especially Blacks.

Apartheid conspired to infringe on the rights of Blacks in a myriad of ways, and with devastating consequences. The Bantustan system itself was an abuse of human rights, as it imposed a sort of slavery on the entire black population.¹⁶⁷⁶ In 1966, the United Nations finally declared apartheid per se to be a crime against humanity¹⁶⁷⁷ while a year earlier a United Nations report called the practices of Dr. Verwoerd's government "a provocation of people everywhere."¹⁶⁷⁸

APARTHEID AND NAZISM¹⁶⁷⁹

Since the 1930s the Broederbond and, by extension, the National Party and its members, including Dr. Verwoerd (convicted for being a "tool of the Nazis" as we have already seen), had been deeply influenced by Nazism. While overt praise for Nazism waned after the defeat of Germany, there are certainly many echoes of Nazism in apartheid.¹⁶⁸⁰ Several of Dr. Verwoerd's closest associates and friends, including Eric Louw, Piet Meyer and John Vorster were ardent supporters of Nazi ideals, and Louw, Foreign Minister at the time of South

¹⁶⁷⁴ Herbstein, 2004: 145-146.

¹⁶⁷⁵ Farah, 1974: 72-73.

¹⁶⁷⁶ Farah, 1974: 73.

¹⁶⁷⁷ Guelke, 2005: 1.

¹⁶⁷⁸ Dubula, 1965: 31.

¹⁶⁷⁹ For a detailed discussion of the topic see the PhD thesis of Sipo Elijah Mzimela, former representative of the ANC in the United Nations, (1980) *Nazism and Apartheid: The Role of Christian Churches in Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa*. Also: Asmal, K. et al. (1997) *The Nazis of Africa: Apartheid as Holocaust?*; Bunting, B. (1968) *The Rise of the South African Reich*; Furlong, P. J. (1991) *Between Crown and Swastika: the Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era*; Jemison, E.L. (2003) *The Nazi Influence in the formation of apartheid in South Africa*; Peires, J. (2004) *The Holocaust and Apartheid: Similarities and Differences: A Comparative Study*.

¹⁶⁸⁰ Bernstein, 2004: 6.

Africa's republican referendum, explicitly compared Hitler's plans for the Jews with the South African nationalist plans for Blacks. There are echoes of Nazism in the statement by F.S. Steyn, a National Party MP, that one of the reasons for restrictions on the entry of Black women to urban areas was to limit African fertility.¹⁶⁸¹

Can, apartheid, however, be compared to the Holocaust? The answer is yes, and no. The major difference between apartheid and Nazism was that in the former there had been no concerted attempt at genocide, even though the system's efforts to marginalise and disempower led to an enormous number of deaths. Also, a not insignificant portion of the Black population was persuaded to take part in the apartheid project, with Black police officers collaborating in the oppression of their own peers. Nonetheless it was, and remains, clear that Dr. Verwoerd's legislation, including its racial categorisations and policy of concentrating people in geographical areas according to physical type, had much in common with Nazi ideals. Both Mandela and Desmond Tutu would compare apartheid to the holocaust.¹⁶⁸²

Arthur Chaskalson,¹⁶⁸³ a South African multi-winning awards human rights lawyer and anti-apartheid activist, agreed that the Nuremberg Laws, and the techniques the Nazis used initially to marginalise Jewish communities, were very similar to the techniques used by the Nationalists.¹⁶⁸⁴ Arthur Goldreich, a prominent anti-apartheid activist and a Rivonia trialist, also compared apartheid to Adolf Hitler's racist philosophy and policies, saying that "apartheid smelled like Nazism."¹⁶⁸⁵

Like Nazism, apartheid that attracted large numbers of people, who rallied to the cause, and just as Germans had been encouraged to report on neighbours suspected of being Jews, Whites were allowed, even encouraged, to complain about the classification as White of a neighbour whom they suspected of being Coloured.¹⁶⁸⁶ How far do the comparisons go? Critics of apartheid South Africa have often highlighted the many ways in which the regime

¹⁶⁸¹ Asmal et al, 1996: 32-37.

¹⁶⁸² Suttner, 1997: 330.

¹⁶⁸³ (1931-2012) A barrister; he was in the defence team in the Rivonia Trial. Chosen by Mandela to be the first President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (1994-2001) after the fall of apartheid (Herbstein, 2012). He was also Chief Justice of South Africa from 2001 to 2005. He participated in the writing of South Africa's new Constitution (Martin, 2012: A23).

¹⁶⁸⁴ Arthur Chaskalson quoted in Suttner, 1997: 330.

¹⁶⁸⁵ *TIME*, 30 August 1963: 25, 'South Africa: Escape artists.'

¹⁶⁸⁶ Asmal et al, 1996: 149, 148.

drew inspiration from the Nazis, and in both direct and indirect ways.¹⁶⁸⁷ An examination of the evidence shows that there are both similarities and differences:

Key Similarities

- Both Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa banned sexual relations between individuals who had been classified as belonging to different races, so that the “master” race would remain “pure.”
- Both countries devised complex racial categories into which people had to fit, and according to which they would be compelled to live their lives in a certain way.
- Both Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa prevented those who were considered lesser from holding citizenship. This was manifested in many ways, including banning such people from taking part in national sporting events or representing the country.
- There were parallels between South African “Bantu Education” and the education system the Nazis envisioned for the Poles, both of which were supposed to equip the “master race” with a servant class trained to do its bidding.
- Both regimes operated a strict control of the media, and used censorship and propaganda to ensure that people heard the message that they wanted to deliver.
- In both situations the authorities made no effort to curtail or punish those who engaged in torture; rather, techniques of torture were employed as part of the state apparatus of terror.
- Dr. Verwoerd’s forced removals were similar to the ruthless concentration by the Nazis of Warsaw’s Jews into the Ghetto; precisely the same process operated here.

Key Differences

- The Nazis wished to rid Germany and its territories of Jews completely, whereas South Africa wished to retain its Black population, conveniently located so as to provide cheap labour.
- Whereas the Nazis had a deliberate policy of exterminating Jews and other “undesirables,” most of the deaths of non-Whites during apartheid occurred as a result of poverty, torture, selective assassinations, lack of affordable healthcare, and so forth.

¹⁶⁸⁷ Simson, 1980: 25.

- Because Jews did not necessarily conform to a particular physical type, research was carried out into people's ancestry and relationship with the Jewish faith. In the case of South African non-Whites, no such research was necessary (although it was for Coloureds, of mixed heritage). With the passage of time, the Nazis became increasingly preoccupied with racial classification and difference.
- Whereas the Nazi system was generally hostile to pre-existing churches and Hitler subsumed them into a "National Reich Church" that he had founded himself, the apartheid system in South Africa worked in close collaboration with the Dutch Reformed Church, essentially co-opting it as part of the apartheid project.¹⁶⁸⁸

In brief, there are clear parallels between South Africa and Nazi Germany, particularly if one considers the Nazi regime up to 1941, when the systematic murder of Jews began. However, there was never an attempt, or even the intention, of killing all Blacks in South Africa. After all, every aspect of the South African economy depended on them for cheap labour. Certainly, there can be no doubt that apartheid South Africa can accurately be considered a fascist regime, in which the repression of African (and to a lesser extent Indian and Coloured) labour was a certain aspect of ideology and policy, in a society in which skin colour and ethnicity can be seen as proxies for social class.¹⁶⁸⁹

DR. VERWOERD IN 1966

Although in 1963 Colin Legum described South Africa as a "doomed republic" and predicted that Dr. Verwoerd's apartheid could not last very long, he was quickly disproved.¹⁶⁹⁰ Dr. Verwoerd claimed that the preceding five years, while often difficult (the country had been in recession, and unemployment had been high)¹⁶⁹¹ had been the "golden age of apartheid," in which the Whites had faced difficulties, but had emerged to "ride the wave of prosperity."¹⁶⁹²

In 1965, with the official and unofficial opposition crippled, and following successful provincial elections, Dr. Verwoerd crowed that the National Party, which had "always been a great champion for the maintenance of the white race and its civilisation here at the southern tip of Africa" was becoming progressively stronger, uniting the common goals of English-

¹⁶⁸⁸ Asmal et al, 1996: 164.

¹⁶⁸⁹ Simson, 1980: 33, 135, 158.

¹⁶⁹⁰ Legum, 1963: 4.

¹⁶⁹¹ Bunting, 1959: 1.

¹⁶⁹² Legum and Legum, 1964b: 79.

and Afrikaans-speakers.¹⁶⁹³ Dr. Verwoerd was indignant at the criticism South Africa received from foreign countries; to such South Africans, the rightness of apartheid seemed self-evident.¹⁶⁹⁴

In 1965, Dr. Verwoerd stated, “Our motto is to maintain white supremacy for all time to come over our own people and our own country, by force if necessary.”¹⁶⁹⁵ In just a year, he had managed to turn South Africa effectively into a police state, bound by the tightest security and with most opposition leaders captive on Robben Island or in prison elsewhere.¹⁶⁹⁶ More importantly for Dr. Verwoerd, apartheid appeared to be working. The more the rest of the world insisted that apartheid policies were unacceptable and the more isolated South Africa became, the more Dr. Verwoerd insisted that his country was fighting the good fight for western civilisation, while other developed countries succumbed to “sickly sentimental post-war humanism and liberalism.”¹⁶⁹⁷ The reality was that Africans had consistently lost rights, while the much-vaunted notion of self-government in economically viable homelands was increasingly remote.¹⁶⁹⁸

By 1966, Dr. Verwoerd was at the height of his power and had never been more popular; he had put himself in a situation whereby he could effectively become a dictator at a moment's notice, having the Afrikaner electorate in the palm of his hand,. His most ardent supporters almost venerated him. He was described as having been chosen by God, as the greatest Western leader of the day, and as the saviour of Western civilisation. Streets were named after him in many towns and cities¹⁶⁹⁹ and any internal opposition to apartheid had been largely crushed.¹⁷⁰⁰

At the same time, the economy performed extremely well,¹⁷⁰¹ experiencing the greatest economic boom in the country's history, equalled only by the economic growth in Japan.¹⁷⁰² In 1964, the *Economist's* correspondent in Johannesburg reported, “boycotted by millions of world consumers and by sizable number of governments, South Africa's economy

¹⁶⁹³ Hepple, 1966: 173.

¹⁶⁹⁴ Gailbraith, 1959: 267.

¹⁶⁹⁵ Welsh, 2000: 414.

¹⁶⁹⁶ Hepple, 1967: 198.

¹⁶⁹⁷ Uys (*The Spectator*), 13 December 1963: 781, ‘Old man granite.’

¹⁶⁹⁸ Walshe, 1963: 353.

¹⁶⁹⁹ Hepple, 1967: 198-200; Worrall, 1971: 216.

¹⁷⁰⁰ Jaster, 1985: 47.

¹⁷⁰¹ *The Economist*, 7 March 1964: 905, ‘Boom time in South Africa.’

¹⁷⁰² Odendaal, 1989: 126.

is nevertheless among the fastest growing in the world: in the world of business Sharpeville is forgotten and fresh funds are invested in Dr. Verwoerd's republic."¹⁷⁰³

South Africa had an economic growth rate of 6%, the second highest in the world, while the inflation rate was only 2%,¹⁷⁰⁴ while the country was in no need for foreign loans for normal economic expansion due to the big domestic savings.¹⁷⁰⁵ However these figures concealed the growth in unemployment, which had not been a significant issue twenty years earlier.¹⁷⁰⁶ In addition, the biggest contributing factors for the boom were the large foreign-capital inflows¹⁷⁰⁷ and even more of course the very cheap labour provided by the non-Whites.¹⁷⁰⁸ However, it would have been impossible for South Africa to have had that level of growth if the non-Whites had been paid at the same level as the Whites, rather than being treated as slaves.

Amid all that prosperity was also the reality that only a relatively small group was truly benefitting while those who remained utterly unrepresented were harshly punished for speaking out.¹⁷⁰⁹ American magazine *Fortune* concluded that "South Africa is one of those rare and refreshing places where profits are great and problems are small. Capital is not threatened by political instability or nationalization. Labour is cheap, market booming, the currency hard..."¹⁷¹⁰ Even the *Rand Daily Mail*, that was generally critical of Dr. Verwoerd, pointed out that South Africa was flourishing economically, that the country was stable and the United Nations powerless or reluctant to do anything about apartheid.¹⁷¹¹

In 1966, there was also a large celebration at a monument which had been erected in the 1940s in honour of the centenary of the Great Trek; in the "revised account" of history that had been adopted at the time of the centenary, "... freedom-loving Dutch speakers had battled against the climate, savage attacks, British assaults on their liberties, capitalist oppression and both cultural and commercial imperialism."¹⁷¹² The event was attended by 500,000 Whites including English and Afrikaners, and they were addressed by Dr. Verwoerd,

¹⁷⁰³ *The Economist*, 7 March 1964: 905, 'Boom time in South Africa.'

¹⁷⁰⁴ Giliomee, 2003: 539.

¹⁷⁰⁵ Marais, 1994: 2.

¹⁷⁰⁶ Seekings and Natrass, 2005: 165.

¹⁷⁰⁷ Marais, 2011: 31.

¹⁷⁰⁸ *TIME*, 26 August 1966, 'South Africa: The delusions of apartheid.'

¹⁷⁰⁹ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 17 April 1960: 1, 'Threat to banish strikers is made by South Africa.'

¹⁷¹⁰ Bundy, 1986: 7-12.

¹⁷¹¹ Marais, 1994: 2-3.

¹⁷¹² Welsh, 2000: 414.

who stressed white South Africa's commitment to its republic, and willingness to defend it with aggression.¹⁷¹³

Allen Drury, American winner of the Pulitzer Prize for his novel *Advise & Consent*, interviewed Dr. Verwoerd just twenty-nine days before his assassination. Drury criticised some of Dr. Verwoerd's policies, especially the practice of banning people, which he compared to "torture,"¹⁷¹⁴ but he painted a largely positive picture of the Prime Minister. He found Dr. Verwoerd to be "extremely intelligent, extremely competent, much superior in brains and ability to most of his noisy critics around the world; in his own strange way, in his own strange context, a great man; in South African terms, a liberal; the only man who, because of his years in office and his almost physical hold on Afrikanerdom, could possibly have continued to lead his people and his nation to a gradually more reasonable, and ultimately more humane, accommodation with other races."¹⁷¹⁵

However, Drury's judgment of character might be questioned in view of the pen-picture he drew of Justice and Police Minister John Vorster. Drury found the enforcer of apartheid to be "amiable, easy-going, charming, blunt, pragmatic, practical, tough, direct and no-nonsense." Drury even said he "liked him" and the picture which emerged was that of a kind man who really cared about the children he sent to prison because he too was a father,¹⁷¹⁶ but he could do no other because they were enemies of the State.¹⁷¹⁷

The performance of the National Party in the 1966 general election on March 30, 1966, where the National Party won 126 of 170 seats in the House of Assembly,¹⁷¹⁸ was a stunning vindication that the vast majority of Whites supported Dr. Verwoerd and his apartheid ambitions.¹⁷¹⁹ The Nationalist press had assured voters that a vote for liberalism was a vote for the downfall of the white race.¹⁷²⁰ After the election, a *The New York Times* reporter asked some Black men what they thought of the election. "All we can do is have another drink," one of them said. "Whoever wins, we lose."¹⁷²¹ He was right – and

¹⁷¹³ Meredith, 1988: 120-122.

¹⁷¹⁴ Drury, 1968: 212.

¹⁷¹⁵ Drury, 1968: 459.

¹⁷¹⁶ Infamously, Vorster had also written to Breyten Breytenbach's father after his son was arrested, convicted for "treason" and imprisoned. Vorster suggested he should not feel too bad because another of his sons, Jan, was a successful counter-terrorist officer in the army (Dubow, 2014: 123).

¹⁷¹⁷ Drury, 1968: 467-470.

¹⁷¹⁸ *The New York Times*, 1 April 1966: 9, 'Nationalist victory biggest in South African history.'

¹⁷¹⁹ *The Economist*, 2 April 1966: 33, 'The toughie wins.'

¹⁷²⁰ Heard, 1974: 161.

¹⁷²¹ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 31 March 1966: 13, 'Dr. Verwoerd's Party scores heavy election gains.'

meanwhile, Whites enjoyed one the highest living standards in the world,¹⁷²² while living in a state that was unique in the world in having a political system in which maintaining racial stratification was the primary function of government policy.¹⁷²³

A few months before the assassination, Paul Bureau, editor of the British magazine *The Statist*¹⁷²⁴ wrote, "At the rate at which South Africa is now expanding the term "miracle" is likely to be appropriate to its development over the new few years." He suggested that soon South Africa would be in "a very strong position against any economic or military threat."¹⁷²⁵ On July 30, 1966, thirty-five days before the assassination, even the *Rand Daily Mail*, one of his fiercest critics, praised Dr. Verwoerd for his power and "achievements":

"At the age of nearly 65 Dr Verwoerd has reached the peak of a remarkable career. No other South African prime minister has ever been in such a powerful position in the country. He is at the head of a massive majority after a resounding victory at the polls. The nation is suffering from a surfeit of prosperity and he can command almost unlimited funds for all that he needs at present in the way of military defence. He can claim that South Africa is a shining example of peace in a troubled continent, if only because overwhelming domestic power can always command peace. Finally, as if that were not enough, he can face the session (in the Parliament) with the knowledge that, short of an unthinkable show of force by people whom South Africans are rapidly being taught to regard as their enemies, he can snap his fingers at the United Nations. Thanks to the recent judgment of The Hague Court he can afford to condescend to the world body, graciously remaining a member as long as it suits him. Indeed, the Prime Minister has never had it so good."¹⁷²⁶

University Professor and anti-apartheid activist Dan O'Meara argued about Dr. Verwoerd that "During the last five years of his Premiership *Die Hollander* totally dominated his party, the Cabinet and the South African state. He increasingly came to be regarded as *Die Rots* (The Rock) on which not just nationalist rule but indeed the fate of 'White Civilisation in Africa' rested."¹⁷²⁷ In August 26, 1966, only eleven days before his assassination, the *TIME* magazine wrote: "South Africa is in the midst of a massive boom. Attracted by cheap labour a gold- backed currency and high profits, investors from all over the world have

¹⁷²² McKay, 1966: 3.

¹⁷²³ Thompson, 1966: 2.

¹⁷²⁴ The magazine was closed the following year due to low circulation figures.

¹⁷²⁵ Marais, 1994: 2.

¹⁷²⁶ Scholtz, 1974: 312.

¹⁷²⁷ O'Meara, 1996: 111.

ploughed money into the country, and the new industries that they have started have sent production, consumption – and the demand for labour - soaring. Such are the proportions of prosperity...”¹⁷²⁸

Jan Botha, wrote in his biographical book about Dr. Verwoerd¹⁷²⁹ that by 1966

“Dr. Verwoerd had built his own monument which was there for all to see: the Republic of South Africa. The White people had been forged together in unity, the country was militarily strong and resilient, the police and security forces were effectively dealing with all attempts at subversion and infiltration, the country’s economy was dynamic, expanding and had become largely self-sufficient. In the history of South Africa his name will live for ever as the leader, who, when his country was threatened with internal disorder and with economic sanctions, boycotts and open aggression from overseas, stood as a symbol of defiance, and the will and determination to survive. His physical and mental courage had made him a living legend to those who followed him.”¹⁷³⁰

Even so, despite the economic prosperity, not all White South Africans were happy with Dr. Verwoerd; or not according to an article by Aida Parker of the *Sunday Tribune*. On August 28, 1966, just nine days before his assassination, the *Sunday Tribune*’s front-page headline read, “‘Verwoerd must go’ plan: Cape Nats back Anton Rupert.” Rupert was a prominent South African billionaire businessman and philanthropist who had a “very stormy relationship” with Dr. Verwoerd and objected to some of his policies.¹⁷³¹ Rupert was reported to have allegedly said, after the assassination, that “the fact that Dr. Verwoerd was no longer Prime Minister, was the best thing that could have happened for South Africa.”¹⁷³²

The report alleged that “the knives are out in the National Party,” as there was a “feud” within the Party between southern and northern Nationalists, which threatened to cause a split. The report claimed that “there has been a carefully planned operation to isolate Dr. Verwoerd and force a showdown. Their tactics are to split up the North line-up by creating suspicion and unrest among them and so isolate Dr. Verwoerd.” Piet Cillié, a journalist and editor of the *Die Burger*, was alleged to be the driving force behind this

¹⁷²⁸ *TIME*, 26 August 1966, ‘South Africa: The delusions of apartheid.’

¹⁷²⁹ Botha, J. (1967) *Dr. Verwoerd is Dead*.

¹⁷³⁰ Botha, 1967: 133.

¹⁷³¹ Parker (*Sunday Tribune*), 28 August 1966: 1, “Verwoerd must go’ plan: Cape Nats back Anton Rupert.’; Wood et al, 2014: 1363.

¹⁷³² Marais, 1994: 11.

campaign, which aimed to have Dr. Verwoerd replaced by Rupert. According to the report, Cillié was a member of a “small, but powerful group of Cape ‘Liberal’ Nationalists who were planning to ‘recapture control from the hard-core Nationalists from the North,’” with the backing of the influential Afrikaans-language newspapers *Die Beeld* and *Die Burger*.¹⁷³³

However, this “feud” within the National Party was nothing new; it had always been present, especially since the Party came to power in 1948. Under Malan, the power centre of the Party was in Cape Town, while under Strijdom it was in the North of the country. As we saw earlier, after Strijdom’s death, there was a brief but rather furious power struggle within the Party between Dr. Verwoerd, Dr. Eben Donges and Charles Swart. Dr. Verwoerd was Strijdom’s first choice as his successor, but he had to put forward Swart as a compromise candidate after fearing there would be a split in the Party, because NP leaders in Cape Town were strongly opposed to Verwoerd and were planning to put forward Donges. Eventually, the Transvaal Party leaders rejected Strijdom’s suggestion and the Cape leaders continued to press for Donges. The crisis led to Party elections that Dr. Verwoerd won, becoming leader of the Party and Prime Minister.¹⁷³⁴

DR. VERWOERD’S LEGACY

While he did not invent apartheid, Dr. Verwoerd was noted for administering it with “unique ruthlessness” and for expanding its application far beyond the boundaries of what his constituents expected or even necessarily wanted.¹⁷³⁵ Writing shortly after his death, liberal analyst Alan Paton commented of the massive swing to the extreme right in South Africa had been a massive swing towards Dr. Verwoerd and his views, and that he had gone from being seen by man as an occasion of danger in South Africa to a bulwark against danger.¹⁷³⁶ In April 1966, just a few months before his assassination, Dr. Verwoerd himself was the recipient of the eponymous first Dr. Verwoerd Award, which had been set up as a trust following the assassination attempt on him by David Pratt in April 1960 to recognise “exceptional service” to the state from its citizens. Dr. Verwoerd returned the prize money and asked that it be used to establish a medical scholarship.¹⁷³⁷

¹⁷³³ Parker (*Sunday Tribune*), 28 August 1966: 1, “Verwoerd must go’ plan: Cape Nats back Anton Rupert.’

¹⁷³⁴ Vatcher, 1965: 125; van Roouen, 1976: 72

¹⁷³⁵ Shire, 1996: 13.

¹⁷³⁶ Paton, December 1966: 3.

¹⁷³⁷ Hepple, 1967: 200.

Dr. Verwoerd had claimed that “the National Party was never an ordinary political party, not is it one now. It is a national movement.”¹⁷³⁸ However, after his assassination, the Party entered a period of internal conflict, with much argument between the so-called “enlightened” and “narrow” elements, culminating in the firing of a number of right-wing hard-liners from the party cabinet. They went on to form a splinter group, the Herstigte (Restored) National Party in 1969.¹⁷³⁹

Dr. Verwoerd’s legacy in South Africa was long-ranging. The many awful acts he instigated or facilitated make, said Albert Luthuli, “dreary and exhausting reading” because “There seem to be no end to them, they are so many that the mind loses count of their number and grasp of their effects.”¹⁷⁴⁰ Assessing his contribution to South Africa’s history, Luthuli stated, “of the men who have ruled South Africa, no one has taken to himself such power as Dr. Verwoerd, and no one has been the guiding mind behind so much negative and oppressive legislation. If any one man is remembered as the author of our calamity, it will be he.”¹⁷⁴¹ He further described Dr. Verwoerd as apartheid’s “most ardent and relentless apostle.”¹⁷⁴²

Helen Suzman characterised Dr. Verwoerd as “a dreadful, scary man, who honestly was a maniac - a terrifying man,”¹⁷⁴³ Israel Maisels as “poison,”¹⁷⁴⁴ Albie Sachs as “the high priest and architect of apartheid,”¹⁷⁴⁵ *Newsweek* as the “implacable champion of apartheid,”¹⁷⁴⁶ *TIME* magazine as “unbendingly racist”¹⁷⁴⁷ and “violently racist,”¹⁷⁴⁸ the *New York Times* as “harsh racist ... pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic... relentless advocate of apartheid... (enforcer) of the harshest race laws since Hitler... champion of an extremist white supremacy... the most fanatical exponent of apartheid ... symbol of apartheid ... a prophet of

¹⁷³⁸ Hanf et al, 1981: 97.

¹⁷³⁹ Brotz, 1977: 45; Miller, 2014: 122-123; Murray, 1987: 25; *The Illustrated London News*, 13 December 1969: 17, ‘Revolt in South Africa.’

¹⁷⁴⁰ Luthuli, 1962: 150.

¹⁷⁴¹ Luthuli, 1962: 197.

¹⁷⁴² Harrison, 1986: 63.

¹⁷⁴³ Suzman, 1997: 436.

¹⁷⁴⁴ Maisels, 1997: 321.

¹⁷⁴⁵ Sachs, 2011: vii.

¹⁷⁴⁶ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, ‘The champion of apartheid.’

¹⁷⁴⁷ *TIME*, 3 February 1958: 22, ‘South Africa. Mohammed’s coffin.’

¹⁷⁴⁸ *TIME*, 26 August 1966: 20, ‘South Africa: The great white laager.’

racism,”¹⁷⁴⁹ and Allister Sparks as “the most ruthless implementer of the doctrine that turned South Africa into the world symbol of racial oppression.”¹⁷⁵⁰

Many years after Dr. Verwoerd's death, Jaap Marais, leader of the Herstigte Nasionale Party, and his former leader, Albert Hertzog, stated that Tsafendas had not only killed the doctor, he had also killed the Grand Plan.¹⁷⁵¹ Marais also wrote that Dr. Verwoerd should have built “a powerful Press of his own” “against the totally hostile mass media in South Africa” and “a political organization which shared his philosophy so that when he was killed his ideas would not have perished with him.” Marais suggested that such an act “should act as a warning and a guide for those who today still fight for the white survival everywhere.”¹⁷⁵²

Deborah Posel, Professor of Sociology at the University of Cape Town, wrote in 2009 that Tsafendas “did not merely eliminate the country's Prime Minister. He trounced The Rock himself: the man who had become metonymic of the tenacity and vigour of the volk as a whole, more so than any of his immediate predecessors had done, and who had elevated the power and prowess of the supreme political office to new heights, my mythic indestructibility.”¹⁷⁵³ The *Rhodesia and World Report* wrote a month after his assassination, like it was a compliment, that “the policy of apartheid will forever be associated with Dr. Verwoerd's name.”¹⁷⁵⁴

After democracy, attempts were made to purge South Africa of reminders of Dr. Verwoerd. Towns and streets that had been named after him were renamed. His statue in Bloemfontein was removed from public display,¹⁷⁵⁵ the H.F. Verwoerd Dam was renamed the Garier Dam,¹⁷⁵⁶ while in Johannesburg, the Hendrik Verwoerd Drive was renamed Bram Fischer Drive.¹⁷⁵⁷ In May, 2015, an official ceremony was held at the University of

¹⁷⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, 6 September 1958: 16, ‘Bad news from South Africa’; *The New York Times*, 17 March 1961, ‘Symbol of apartheid: Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd’; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid’; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 7 September 1966, ‘A prophet of racism.’

¹⁷⁵⁰ Sparks, 1995: 250.

¹⁷⁵¹ du Plessis (*Business Day*), 11 October 1999, ‘The grand plan died with the doctor.’

¹⁷⁵² Marais, 1994: i.

¹⁷⁵³ Posel, 2009: 334.

¹⁷⁵⁴ Sheldon (*Rhodesia and World Report*), September/October 1966, Vol. 1, No. 5: 3, ‘The pattern of assassination. The continuing pattern.’

¹⁷⁵⁵ Witz, 2003: 244.

¹⁷⁵⁶ Mungazi, 2006: 114.

¹⁷⁵⁷ Matsinhe, 2013: 181.

Stellenbosch at which a plaque commemorating Dr. Verwoerd was removed.¹⁷⁵⁸ In 1967, a year after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, the Municipality of Lyttelton was renamed Verwoerdburg,¹⁷⁵⁹ only to be renamed Centurion when democracy prevailed.¹⁷⁶⁰ In 1999, in a nationwide poll conducted by South African Media24 to determine who had the greatest influence on South Africa during the twentieth century, Verwoerd took third place, behind only Mandela and de Klerk.¹⁷⁶¹

To this day, some White South Africans maintain that apartheid was a “necessary evil,” saving the country from a Communist fate, and that without it the entire population would have been in a much worse situation.¹⁷⁶² Thus, it is not surprising that in a 2004 nationwide poll conducted by the South African Broadcasting Corporation television channel SABC3, to determine the “100 Greatest South Africans of All Time,” Verwoerd was voted into 19th place with some 50,000 votes.¹⁷⁶³ This placed him higher than Chris Hani (20th), Helen Suzman (24th), Oliver Tambo (31st), Walter Sisulu (33rd), Albert Luthuli (41st), Robert Sobukwe (42nd), Ahmed Kathrada (49th), Alan Paton (59th), Nadine Gordimer (80th), Govan Mbeki (97th), and many other prominent figures of the anti-apartheid struggle and other areas of national life. While Eugène Terre'Blanche, head of the neo-Nazi, White supremacist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, made it onto the list at number 25, several outstanding figures in the national story did not find a place in the top100. They included modern writers Breyten Breytenbach and André Brink, and, reaching back into history, Cetshwayo, the Zulu king who defeated the British at the Battle of Isandhlwana in 1879, and Moshoeshoe, who masterminded the creation of the independent kingdom of Lesotho through negotiation with the Boers and the British.¹⁷⁶⁴

The emotional legacy of his apartheid continues to linger,¹⁷⁶⁵ although the democratic government of South African went to great lengths to work towards reconciliation. In 1995, Mandela invited the wives of former Prime Ministers to lunch, along with presidents and leaders of liberation movement. Tiene Vorster and Eliza Botha, wives of former Prime

¹⁷⁵⁸ Dubow, 2015: 3.

¹⁷⁵⁹ Kalley, 2000: 113.

¹⁷⁶⁰ Christopher, 1994: 232.

¹⁷⁶¹ Human & Rousseau (1999) *They Shaped our Century: The Most Influential South Africans of the Twentieth Century*. Human & Rousseau.

¹⁷⁶² Abulof, 2015: 280.

¹⁷⁶³ Fobi, 2014: 11-14.

¹⁷⁶⁴ Blair (*The Telegraph*), 19 October 2004, ‘Racists on list of ‘Great South Africans.’

¹⁷⁶⁵ Field, 1998: 82.

Ministers John Vorster and P.W. Botha attended, but Betsie Verwoerd, declined the invitation. Later, Mandela visited her to take tea at her home in the all-White community of Orania in the Karoo region.¹⁷⁶⁶ It was an extraordinary gesture of forgiveness towards the man who had dedicated his life to destroying those of countless others.

Although he did not start it himself, Dr. Verwoerd, the evidence shows, was the undisputed architect of the whole rotten edifice that was apartheid.¹⁷⁶⁷ The policy was formally introduced in 1948, but it was only when Dr. Verwoerd Prime Minister that the State began to pursue segregation rigorously. In this, it was aided by the groundwork laid by Dr. Verwoerd when he was Minister of Native Affairs.¹⁷⁶⁸ The South African anti-apartheid writer Colin Legum commented that during Dr. Verwoerd's tenure, the non-White South Africans were "in a sense, the prisoners of Western society..."¹⁷⁶⁹

Professor John Dugard told the author: "Dr. Verwoerd was clearly the architect of apartheid. Before him, no-one quite knew what apartheid was, and after him no-one knew what it was either. But he had a clear vision of a total separation of the races."¹⁷⁷⁰ Ahmed Kathrada stated that "the true legacy of apartheid lies in graveyards and court archives throughout South Africa."¹⁷⁷¹ Douglas Smit, former secretary of Native Affairs, characterised Dr. Verwoerd in 1953 as "a Napoleon in Native Affairs who was trying to set up a great Black empire under his supreme dictatorship."¹⁷⁷²

Helen Suzman stated that "the system of apartheid was a totally heartless system which did not care what the results were. A lot of babies died of malnutrition and a lot of people who were forcibly removed were starving the rural areas."¹⁷⁷³ She added, "the policies that he (Dr. Verwoerd) introduced were so totally unacceptable to anybody who had any understanding of what democracy was about."¹⁷⁷⁴ Suzman also said that shortly after his death, the National Party "used to talk in glowing terms about Verwoerd and how South

¹⁷⁶⁶ Graybill, 2002: 20

¹⁷⁶⁷ Attwell, 1986: 91, 103.

¹⁷⁶⁸ Grundy, 1991: 8.

¹⁷⁶⁹ Legum, 1960: 235.

¹⁷⁷⁰ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

¹⁷⁷¹ Kathrada, 2004: 337.

¹⁷⁷² Dubow, 2014: 60.

¹⁷⁷³ Suzman, 1997: 433.

¹⁷⁷⁴ Helen Suzman in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

Africa would have been so much better a place if Verwoerd had been still the prime minister. The rest of us would have been only glad to forget that he ever existed.”¹⁷⁷⁵

¹⁷⁷⁵ Helen Suzman in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

CHAPTER TWO

DIMITRIS TSAFENDAS'S BIOGRAPHY

BIRTH, 1918

Dimitris Tsafendas was born on January 14, 1918, in Maputo, then Lourenço Marques, capital of the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, to Michalis Tsafantakis, aged twenty-seven,¹⁷⁷⁶ a Cretan marine engineer, and Amelia Williams,¹⁷⁷⁷ his housemaid.¹⁷⁷⁸ Amelia, in her early twenties, was of mixed race, her mother an African Mozambican of the Shangaan tribe and her father a White German.¹⁷⁷⁹ She was born in Namaacha, a town in Southern Mozambique, about eighty kilometres west of Lourenço Marques on the border with Swaziland.¹⁷⁸⁰ According to Hazel Goldstein of the *Rand Daily Mail*, Amelia was “a plump, clean-looking woman with ivory-coloured skin.” She dressed in native clothing – a print blouse, with a white sash around her body.¹⁷⁸¹ It was far from uncommon for White men in Africa to father children by Black women; what was rare was for the child to be acknowledged by the father, indeed, in the case of Dimitris, taken into his home.

According to family accounts, when Amelia's pregnancy became obvious, she left Tsafantakis, assuming he would not accept the child. In fact, when Michalis discovered she was pregnant, he searched the city for her and persuaded her to return to his house, where Dimitris was born.¹⁷⁸² For a year and a half thereafter, Michalis, Amelia and Dimitris lived together as a family.¹⁷⁸³ As a child, Dimitri was fair-skinned and passed as White. The only clue to the one-quarter of his origins that came from Africa was his hair, which was black,

¹⁷⁷⁶ Born on October 21, 1891. Michalis Tsafantakis's birth certificate. Personal collection of Mike Vlachopoulos.

¹⁷⁷⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the circumstances of the death of the late Dr. the honourable Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, (*hereafter cited as K150*), Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. National Archives of South Africa (*hereafter cited as NASA*).

¹⁷⁷⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁷⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁷⁸⁰ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, 'Kleurlingmoeder in haglike omstandighede.'; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁷⁸¹ Goldstein (*Rand Daily Mail*), 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas timid and puny as a boy.'

¹⁷⁸² Antony Michaleto in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

¹⁷⁸³ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

like his father's, but a little crinkly, too. However, since it was always cut very short, it gave no clue to Dimitri's origins.¹⁷⁸⁴ His half-sister, Katerina Pnefma, described him as a boy to the author: "He was very white, peculiar as it is, as white as all the family. But he had different hair. But it wasn't so much like the Blacks; it was like the Coloureds. But he did not look Black at all, he was as white as me."¹⁷⁸⁵

Michalis registered the baby with the local civil administration, naming Amelia and himself as parents. Soon afterwards, he had Dimitri baptised by his very good friend Father Elias Bertolis, a Greek Orthodox priest, in an open ceremony, and with John Michaletos, his best friend, as the child's godfather.¹⁷⁸⁶ The city's tightly-knit Greek community disapproved, and Portuguese friends sought to dissuade Michalis from this public recognition of his mixed son, arguing that he was "ruining his life and would never now find a good Greek wife." Michalis ignored their entreaties.¹⁷⁸⁷

Michalis wanted to keep both Amelia and the child but this was a social impossibility in the climate of the time.¹⁷⁸⁸ Mozambique was Portuguese-ruled and heavily Christian, thus a mixed marriage for a Greek, although legally possible, was seriously problematic. When it came to marriage, Greek men in Africa invariably took Greek brides, usually by arrangement between the families. Michalis knew that his mother would never approve of Amelia and expected him to marry the girl she would find for him, as most Greek mothers did at the time, especially those in Africa. Sometime in 1919, Michalis travelled to Egypt to meet a proposed wife. Her name was Maria (Marika) Sakelis, who came from the Greek community in Port Said, Egypt, though her origins were in the Greek island of Kasos. Michalis did not tell her about his son, reasoning that he would do so after the wedding when they had a child of their own.¹⁷⁸⁹ The wedding ceremony was arranged to take place in Port Said, on December 5, 1920.¹⁷⁹⁰

¹⁷⁸⁴ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁸⁵ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Costas Maroudas in a personal interview, 12 May 2015.

¹⁷⁸⁷ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁸⁸ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁸⁹ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁹⁰ Michalis and Marika Tsafantaki marriage certificate. Private collection of Mike Vlachopoulos.

Returning to Mozambique, Michalis resumed his relationship with Amelia, saying nothing of his bride-to-be. However, midway through 1920, with the wedding preparations well underway, he told Amelia about Marika. He asked her to give up their baby, promising that Dimitri would be raised as a loved and equal member of his family. At first Amelia demurred, but finally persuaded that it would be best for her child's future, she agreed and reluctantly walked away.¹⁷⁹¹ Dimitri was about two years old.¹⁷⁹²

EGYPT, 1920–1925

At some point before December 1920, a Greek family from Lourenço Marques took Dimitris by steamship through the Suez Canal and delivered him in Alexandria to his grandmother, Katerina Tsafantakis, who, with her daughter Artemis, cared for him for the next five years.¹⁷⁹³ Artemis called the boy Mimako, a derivative of Mimis, which comes in turn from Dimitris. For the remainder of his life, Tsafendas would be called Mimis by his family and close friends.¹⁷⁹⁴

Dimitri's grandmother was a strong-willed and independent widow, and though she had not finished school, she was intelligent and cultured. Born in Crete in the 1850s, she would have been aged seventy or thereabouts when she took care of a new baby. Her husband, Antonis Tsafantakis,¹⁷⁹⁵ dead a few years earlier, was a judge in Crete,¹⁷⁹⁶ but in 1895 he moved with his wife and their children, to Alexandria,¹⁷⁹⁷ where they settled in the Al-Atarine¹⁷⁹⁸ suburb.¹⁷⁹⁹ Many of Antonis's and Katerina's families died fighting the

¹⁷⁹¹ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁹² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

¹⁷⁹³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁹⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁹⁵ Michalis Tsafantakis birth certificate. Private collection of Mike Vlachopoulos.

¹⁷⁹⁶ Interview by Mr T.I. Potgieter, Senior Magistrate, with Mr Demetriou Tsafendas at the Pretoria Central Prison on 20 October 1987. Correctional Services. File 80/0043, A123, Dimitrio Tsafendas, Vol. 1. NASA; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁷⁹⁷ PTA telegram to Cape Town, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/7. Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

¹⁷⁹⁸ Al-Atarine is also referred to as Atarine or El Atarine.

¹⁷⁹⁹ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

Ottoman rulers of Greece and Crete and she was a strong supporter of the Greek war of independence.¹⁸⁰⁰

Katerina would speak with pride of her husband's cousin, Captain Michalis Tsafantakis, a Cretan rebel leader, known throughout the island for his bravery and his victories over the occupiers. The Ottomans killed him, aged about fifty, by throwing him off a bridge in Iraklion. The street where he was born in the village of Kitharida now bears his name, *Michalis Tsafantakis Street* while several Cretan songs have been written about him. Dimitri's father, also born in Kitharida in 1891,¹⁸⁰¹ was named Michalis after the great man.¹⁸⁰² The accounts of his great-uncle's exploits fascinated Dimitri and he grew up idolizing him.¹⁸⁰³

Katerina and her daughter Artemis taught their new charge Greek and Arabic, gave him lessons in Greek history and mythology, and coached him in Cretan and Greek folk songs, such as the romantic epic *Eroticritos*, which Tsafendas often sang in later life.¹⁸⁰⁴ Artemis adored little Dimitri, treated him as her son and played with him for hours, while he looked on her as a second mother. In 1966, when she heard that Dimitri had killed Dr. Verwoerd, Artemis was devastated. She went into severe depression for many weeks, fearing what might happen to him.¹⁸⁰⁵

In 1923, Dimitri's first cousin, Mary, (later Eendracht by marriage), was born. Their homes were close to each other and the toddlers often played together. Dimitri, five years older, looked upon Mary as his little sister. They remained close up to Dr. Verwoerd's assassination. During Dimitri's years in Egypt, his father wrote often and sent gifts, though without telling Marika.¹⁸⁰⁶ Michalis's intention was to bring the boy back to Mozambique as soon as he had a child with his new wife. However, he postponed the project time and again for fear of her reaction. Eventually, the secret came out. Marika began to notice a young Mozambican woman lingering outside their Lourenço Marques home, apparently trying to peek through the windows. At other times, she spotted her talking to Michalis and thought

¹⁸⁰⁰ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁰¹ Michalis Tsafantakis birth certificate. Private collection of Mike Vlachopoulos.

¹⁸⁰² All the relatives of Captain Michalis Tsafantakis named their children Michalis after him (Alexandros Tsafantakis in a personal interview, 15 February 2016).

¹⁸⁰³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Antony Michaleto in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁰⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁰⁵ Irene and John Michaleto in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

¹⁸⁰⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

that they were having an affair. Finally, Tsafantakis told the truth: The young woman was Amelia Williams, with whom he had a son now living in Egypt with his mother.¹⁸⁰⁷ Marika had not heard of the scandal from the local Greeks - no-one would tell her out of respect for Michalis – and she was shocked. However, she accepted the situation and agreed with Michalis that the boy should be brought home to live as part of their family.¹⁸⁰⁸

BACK IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1925–1932

Dimitri was seven when his father brought him back to Lourenço Marques to join his new stepmother, who was introduced to him as his mother, and their growing family.¹⁸⁰⁹ It was a loving environment. Marika immediately accepted Michalis's son as her own¹⁸¹⁰ and there were already two playmates for Dimitri, his step-siblings Evangelia (born in 1922), aged three, and one-year-old Victor (born in 1924). A third, Katerina (nicknamed Bushia), joined them in 1928 when Dimitri was ten.¹⁸¹¹

The young arrival from Egypt quickly settled into his new surroundings, a full member of the family, assuming Marika was his natural mother.¹⁸¹² The children did not know about Dimitri's origins and considered themselves all natural brothers and sisters.¹⁸¹³ Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, told the police after the assassination that growing up with Tsafendas “to all intents and purposes it was understood” by “her and her brother and sisters” that “he was a member of the family... his complexion was such – as also his manner – that

¹⁸⁰⁷ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Michael Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

¹⁸⁰⁸ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁰⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁸¹⁰ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸¹¹ Home Affairs Department report regarding Tsafendas, 1 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub file: 1/2. NASA.

¹⁸¹² Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁸¹³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

he passed as a European.”¹⁸¹⁴

Marika told the Commission of Enquiry into Verwoerd's death that Tsafendas “had grown up as one of her children.”¹⁸¹⁵ Costas Michaletos, a very good friend of the family, told the South African police shortly after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination that Tsafendas “grew up with his half brothers and sisters and was always treated as part of the family.”¹⁸¹⁶ A Confidential Report from the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali said shortly after the assassination and after having questioned people who knew Tsafendas: “It is also reliably reported that the Tsafandakis family hold a good reputation among the Greek community and there are suggestions that Michael Tsafandakis made a big mistake in attempting to raise his illegitimate son as a full member of his family.”¹⁸¹⁷

Victor contracted poliomyelitis as a very young child and this left him with a disability affecting one of his legs. The young Tsafendas stepped in and took his little half-brother under his wing, bringing him along wherever he went. Tsafendas thereafter was very sensitive about people with disabilities. Later, one of Dimitri's best friends was a small, Black Mozambican boy who was blind or partly sighted. The boy's mother worked at the house of another Greek and was bringing her son up alone. Tsafendas took the younger boy under his wing, played with him, read books to him and often took him home to join his family around the table. He would also take the boy to the sea, as he did with his siblings, teaching them to swim. Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, told the author: “I was the youngest then, and he was very fond of me, and he was trying to teach me to swim. He used to swim like a fish.” One day, the boy got into difficulties and panicked. Tsafendas tried to help him but found that he, too, was out of his depth and the pair was close to drowning before a group of men nearby saved them. Tsafendas was deeply affected by this incident and for a long time stopped going to the sea. However, the Mozambican boy pleaded with Dimitri and eventually they started going again.¹⁸¹⁸

¹⁸¹⁴ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

¹⁸¹⁵ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

¹⁸¹⁶ Costas Michaletos statement to the police, 10 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁸¹⁷ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

¹⁸¹⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

Among the personal possessions the boy brought from Alexandria was a portrait of his great-uncle which he hung above his bed. A few years later when an earth tremor hit the city, the family fled the house in panic. Ignoring his stepmother's cries, Dimitri ran back inside. When he emerged, he was carrying the portrait of his hero, Captain Michalis Tsafantakis.¹⁸¹⁹

Michalis Tsafantakis' grandmother, Victoria Tsafantakis, also from Crete, was Jewish and he was very proud of this strain of Jewish blood in his family. He named his first child with Marika, Victor, after his beloved grandmother. Michalis would tell Dimitri about the history of the Hebrew people and his son spoke often and proudly of his Jewish origins.¹⁸²⁰ Michalis Tsafantakis was also an educated and well-rounded man, a lover of fine art who studied marine engineering at the University of Padua in Italy. While living in Italy, Michalis had become an active member of the organized anarchist movement. He thrived in the classical milieu and became a devotee of opera and classical music, passions which he passed on to Dimitri. Michalis admired the writers and philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Voltaire, as well as the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, though his unchallenged favourite was Honoré de Balzac. As well as his musical tastes, he communicated his literary preferences to the young Dimitri,¹⁸²¹ and in time, Balzac became one of Tsafendas's favourite authors, too. He quoted him often during his lifetime.¹⁸²²

One of the things that Michalis often told his son was that he should become “a useful member of society,” someone who was concerned not so much for himself as for the public wellbeing. Dimitris remembered his father's words all his life and said he consistently sought to live up to them. Michalis loved his son and spent a lot of time with him, teaching, playing and talking to him. Dimitris, for his part, according to his half-brother Victor, grew up “worshipping his father.”¹⁸²³

¹⁸¹⁹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸²⁰ Mike Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸²¹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

¹⁸²² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁸²³ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

His father was very tolerant of any misbehaviour by his son, while Marika, conscious of the boy's step-son status, made an extra effort to ensure his happiness, acting more leniently towards him than to her own children. It was only when she feared Dimitri might be having a bad influence on her son, Victor, that she treated him more strictly. Dimitri was naughty, though no more than most boys at a young age,¹⁸²⁴ and warmly remembered stories from his childhood years, even when he was old and sick.¹⁸²⁵

Michalis considered himself an anarchist and was strongly anti-racist, anti-royalist, and anti-colonialist, political positions which Dimitri embraced with enthusiasm. Unlike his son, Michalis did not express his opinions in public - not a wise thing to do in colonial Mozambique, as the reckless Dimitri was to discover- although he was as tempted towards political activism as his son. In 1960, Michalis confided to his immediate family his pleasure that David Pratt had shot Dr. Verwoerd and his regret that the prime minister had survived. He said that if he had not been married with a family he would have taken a gun and shot all the fascists and racists in the South African Parliament. Michalis later separated from Marika, though they never divorced, and among the things he repeatedly said was that he should have become a rebel, fighting apartheid and for the independence of African countries, instead of getting married.¹⁸²⁶

Although she was religious and tended to be politically conservative, Marika sympathized discreetly with some of her husband's political views, and though not highly educated, she read the classics for pleasure. She was very well-read, her favourite authors being the Russians Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. She taught Dimitri to read and helped him with his school lessons, and as he grew up, Dostoyevsky, too, became a favourite.¹⁸²⁷ At some point in the 1990s, when Tsafendas was visited by Fathers Minas Constandinou and Ioannis Tsafaridis and they were discussing Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, Tsafendas remarked, "To paraphrase Dostoyevsky in *Demons*, it's easy to condemn the offender, the difficulty is to understand him."¹⁸²⁸

Marika was also a poetry lover and read Greek poems to her stepson. Initially, Tsafendas was not keen, but changed when he discovered odes with revolutionary content.

¹⁸²⁴ Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

¹⁸²⁵ Dimitri Tsafendas in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

¹⁸²⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸²⁷ Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

¹⁸²⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Two of his favourite poets were Dyonisios Solomos, whose poem “Hymn to Liberty” became the Greek national anthem in 1865, and Andreas Kalvos. Both were from the Greek island of Zakynthos (Zante). Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis¹⁸²⁹ who met Tsafendas in Pretoria prison hospital, was also from Zante and was deeply impressed by Tsafendas’s ability to quote so many of the poets’ works. Bishop Ioannis, currently Bishop of the Greek Orthodox Church in Zambia and Malawi, is working on a PhD about Solomos, partly inspired by Tsafendas’s admiration for him. When Tsafendas was asked by Bishop Ioannis about the killing of Dr. Verwoerd, he responded by quoting a verse from Kalvos’s poem, *Eis Samon (To Samos)*:

*“Those who feel fear’s unbending hand weighing on them may bear the yoke of bondage. Freedom demands virtue and courage.”*¹⁸³⁰

The Tsafantakis family was held in high esteem by the Greek community.¹⁸³¹ The children who were playing with him were not aware that Tsafendas was mixed; it was a sort of a secret between adults and if there was some reservation by some of them towards Dimitri, they never showed it in front of him.¹⁸³² In 1927, aged nine, Dimitri began attending classes at the Anglican Mission kindergarten school in Lourenço Marques.¹⁸³³ The following year his father sent him to boarding school in Middleburg, a small town in Eastern Transvaal in the Union of South Africa, because he believed that Portuguese children could get a good education only in white-ruled South Africa or in Swaziland,¹⁸³⁴ a constitutional monarchy within the British Commonwealth. Tsafendas’s father was adamant that Dimitris should go and study as he was his first child and he could not afford to send the others too.¹⁸³⁵ According to the records of Middleburg English Medium Primary School, Dimitrios Tsafantakis arrived in July 1928 and boarded in the Nelson House Hostel. These quarters

¹⁸²⁹ Tsafendas confided at length to Bishop Ioannis about his life and Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination. In November 2015, Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis, at the time Bishop of the Greek Orthodox Church in Mozambique, performed a memorial service for Tsafendas in Maputo. During the ceremony, he characterised him as “a revolutionary and a South African and Mozambican hero, who opened the door to the fall of apartheid.”

¹⁸³⁰ Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

¹⁸³¹ Michelis, 1988: 14-15; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸³² Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

¹⁸³³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁸³⁴ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁸³⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

mostly accommodated Greek and Portuguese boys who were kept together because of their imperfect command of English.¹⁸³⁶

According to a former schoolmate, psychologist William Mare Volbrecht, Tsafendas was “more advanced than many of his contemporaries and received a good grounding at the school” and was “a keen soccer player.”¹⁸³⁷ Volbrecht also testified to the South African police that, “at that stage, Tsafendas was seen as white and there was never anything that pointed to someone regarding or treating him as a non-white or to him being discriminated against. I cannot remember whether he was ever guilty of misconduct; he was never a loner and mingled freely with us.”¹⁸³⁸ Dr. Samuel Schmahmann, another classmate, recalled Dimitri as “a popular boy who was not the least introverted. I particularly remember him singing a Greek song at a school concert. He was very funny and had us all in stitches.”¹⁸³⁹

Every six months, Dimitri would return on holiday to Lourenço Marques, where his relationship with his father flourished. Michalis gave his son books about international revolutionary movements, like the French and the Russian revolutions, as well as tales of the ancient Greeks. For his tenth birthday, he bought Dimitri a multi-volume encyclopaedia, which so entranced the boy that for weeks he scarcely left the house. Michalis also gave him money which Dimitri spent on more books and ice-creams. Although he did not like school work, he spent much of his spare time reading.

As a child, Dimitris sought out classical stories which he read to his young step-siblings. An early favourite, a gift from his father, was *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, Harriet Beecher Stowe's seminal, 19th century novel about slavery in the United States. The book and the conditions of the African-Americans made a tremendous impression on him and he often said later that it played an important role in shaping his political opinions.¹⁸⁴⁰ His father had set a rule that Dimitri followed religiously from childhood: to read at least one book every week. Tsafendas kept on doing this until his arrest for Dr. Verwoerd's assassination.¹⁸⁴¹

¹⁸³⁶ Middelburg primary School report regarding Demitrios Tsafandakis, 17 December 1963. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

¹⁸³⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was of mixed origin.’

¹⁸³⁸ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Verklaring deur Majoor Venter. NASA.

¹⁸³⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, September 8, 1966, ‘Boyhood days of Tsafendas.’

¹⁸⁴⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁴¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

Dimitris's first heroes were the great figures of ancient Greek mythology, Ulysses and Achilles. As he grew older, they were replaced by heroes of the Greek Revolution of 1821 whose exploits were taught to him by his father. Michalis would spend time telling his son of the struggles against the Ottomans by the Greeks and particularly by the Cretans, including Captain Tsafantakis. Michalis said the family's real name was not Tsafantakis but Tsafendas. He explained that the Ottoman rulers had decreed the change a hundred years ago to belittle the Cretans whose rebel activities were causing the empire much trouble.¹⁸⁴² The rule was that "*akis*," a suffix indicating smallness, as in a child, should be added to every Cretan name. It is customary in Greece for a boy named Nicholas to become Nicholakis to his family and friends; Georgios would be Georgakis and Dimitri-Dimitrakis. However, the Ottomans' intention was to humiliate and mock the rebellious Cretans by suggesting they were little people of no account. The Cretans were furious and opposed the change, but the rule of the occupiers prevailed.¹⁸⁴³

Hearing this story, Dimitri asked his father to change the family name back to Tsafendas. Michalis sympathised but said that would be difficult since everyone knew him as Tsafantakis and that was how his name appeared in official documents.¹⁸⁴⁴ A few years later, however, Dimitri went ahead and changed his own surname to Tsafendas. The date of the change is not known to the author. However, Dimitri began using the surname Tsafendas whenever possible; sometimes he varied the spelling so that his past would not be traced, using variations such as Stafendas, Tsascadeskis and Tsafedis.

This was not difficult as he was in possession of a birth certificate written in Greek. Whenever he produced it to someone, he would just replace one or few letters from the certificate but would still make it look like his proper name. For example, the name was written as "*Τσαφαντακης*," so he would keep the Greek letters that are similar to English letter like T, a, t, k but substitute some of the others with false letters, for example, Tcamaftakus etc.¹⁸⁴⁵

A non-Greek hero of Dimitri's boyhood, one he discovered in the encyclopaedia, was Simon Bolivar, the Venezuelan revolutionary who led many Latin American nations to

¹⁸⁴² Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁴³ Apostolakis, 2009.

¹⁸⁴⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁴⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

independence from Spain in the 18th century. Michalis had fashioned a toy sword for his son from a piece of aluminium pipe and when playground fencing bouts began and the children decided which character they would be, most plumped for Robin Hood or the musketeer d'Artagnan. Dimitri always chose Simon Bolivar. When older people asked what he wanted to be when he grew up, he always said he would be "a rebel" and fight in revolutions all over the world.¹⁸⁴⁶

Later while at a school in Lourenço Marques, his loyalty to the South American freedom fighter caused panic. Asked at school, what he would like to do when he grew up, he said, "I would like to liberate Mozambique from the Portuguese as Simon Bolivar liberated Latin America from the Spanish." His terrified teacher promptly informed the family. "Never mind," the boy's father said to her, "he is young, he would mature." Michalis did not really mean it and was proud of his son's 'escapade,' though he never admitted it to him. However "liberation" was always the answer Dimitri gave when he was asked about his adult ambitions, dreaming of becoming a revolutionary like Bolivar and his great uncle, freeing Mozambique and Africa from the colonialists. His step-mother would warn Dimitri to keep such notions to himself since they caused problems for the family if overheard by Portuguese people. When Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd, Marika blamed her late husband for feeding Dimitri as a boy with "all those revolutionary ideas."¹⁸⁴⁷

While he was growing up, he began read adult material such as Shakespeare's plays and his beloved Dostoyevsky and later studied historical and political works. A particular favourite was Charles Dickens, in whose work he apparently saw what later he would consider Communist themes.¹⁸⁴⁸ Tsafendas would sometimes quote from his favourite writers while going about his day-to-day activities. In an uncanny pointer to the life he was to lead, he collected maps and magazines with articles on foreign countries, and told friends he wanted to be an explorer and travel the world.¹⁸⁴⁹

After books, Dimitri's favourite pastime was the cinema and in that he was joined by his stepmother. He liked dashing period films as well as comedies, and Douglas Fairbanks Jr and Buster Keaton were his favourite actors. Marika did not care for sword-fighting

¹⁸⁴⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁴⁷ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁴⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁸⁴⁹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

swashbucklers but would go along for Dimitri's sake. In later life, Tsafendas said his best memories of his stepmother were their visits to the movies.¹⁸⁵⁰ Another area of agreement was their shared concern for animals. Dimitri fed any stray cats and dogs he found in the neighbourhood and when he had a dog of his own, he honoured it with the name of his hero, Bolivar.¹⁸⁵¹

One behavioural pattern during Dimitri's childhood was a propensity for malingering. He would fake illness to escape school or Sunday church attendance. Once when he was supposedly ill, a Greek doctor, a friend of the family, examined him and concluded that he was faking. However, the physician was fond of Dimitri and persuaded Michalis and Marika to go along with the pretence.¹⁸⁵²

Around 1928, Artemis Tsafantakis, Michalis's sister and Dimitri's aunt, who had helped lovingly in his upbringing in Egypt, arrived in Lourenço Marques and settled there for the rest of her life. Young Dimitri was delighted and for some time Artemis lived in her brother's house and spent a great deal of time with the ten-year-old Dimitri. A couple of years later, Artemis moved out of the house but stayed close to the boy. Around 1935, Artemis married George Michaletos, the son of John Michaletos, Dimitri's godfather. Even then, with Dimitri no longer a child, they spent time in each other's company. Dimitri loved Artemis's and often ate at her house.¹⁸⁵³

Back at school in South Africa, Dimitri passed the Standard III examination as a B-group pupil in December 1930. In February, 1931, Michalis submitted an application to the South African Office of the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs, to send his four children to the Transvaal for their education. His wife was to accompany them and one of the children was Demitrios. In the end, this application was not pursued¹⁸⁵⁴ because Michalis was experiencing financial difficulties. He had lost his partnership in the engineering firm Voutselatos, primarily as a consequence of the Great Depression. In 1932, Dimitri was withdrawn from the Middelburg Primary School¹⁸⁵⁵ having reached Standard 6,

¹⁸⁵⁰ Tsafendas in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

¹⁸⁵¹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁵² Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁵³ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

¹⁸⁵⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 11. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁸⁵⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

the first year of high school.¹⁸⁵⁶ He returned to Mozambique where he was enrolled again at the Anglican Mission School in Lourenço Marques and from 1933 to 1935 he attended evening classes at the Portuguese Mission School while also picking up money from various jobs.¹⁸⁵⁷

Tsafendas also enrolled for boxing classes at the Teatro Varieta boxing school. It was owned by Willie Conte, a friend and former business associate of his father, and though no athlete, Dimitri took to boxing.¹⁸⁵⁸ A Greek boy newly arrived in Mozambique from Athens, Anastasios Michaletos, recalled those days. He was eighteen when he met Dimitri, who was thirteen or fourteen. “He did not go to work or to school,” Michaletos said, “he dreamt of becoming a boxing champion. He was not a very good boxer.”¹⁸⁵⁹ However, according to his step-mother, his half-sister Katerina, his cousin Mary Eendracht,¹⁸⁶⁰ and a good friend, Ira Kyriakakis, Dimitri was a formidable opponent and he won prizes at local tournaments.¹⁸⁶¹ Boxing made him very popular with girls and he soon had his first serious relationship. This was with a Mozambican girl named Stella who he saw for more than a year.¹⁸⁶² In 1936, aged eighteen, he had his first sexual experience, presumably with Stella.¹⁸⁶³ Dimitri became good friends with another gym-goer, Reuven Levy, an older Jewish boy, and they spent a lot of time in each other’s house.¹⁸⁶⁴

1932–1939

By now, a growing teenager, Dimitris spoke constantly with his father about politics and history. Dimitris was initiated into anarchism by his father, and enjoyed reading about the movement and its leading figures such as Mikhail Bakunin, Emma Goldman and Peter

¹⁸⁵⁶ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkopery. NASA.

¹⁸⁵⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁸⁵⁸ Goldstein (*Rand Daily Mail*), 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas timid and puny as a boy.’

¹⁸⁵⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 September 1966, ‘Boyhood days of Tsafendas.’

¹⁸⁶⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

¹⁸⁶¹ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demetrio Tsafendas, NASA; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁶² Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁶³ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demetrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁸⁶⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 May 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

Kropotkin. However, Dimitris' favourite was the American-Italian anarchist Luigi Galleani, who advocated the use of violence, including murder, for the removal of tyrants and oppressors.¹⁸⁶⁵

Dimitris also discovered in their house – in his father's private workshop, which was also used by him as a study – an Italian anarchist manual about how to make bombs. Knowing that his father would never translate it for him, Dimitris bought an Italian dictionary and attempted to translate it himself. He then started experimenting with explosives and gunpowder, which led to an explosion that destroyed a large part of the workshop. Dimitris miraculously escaped without a scratch.¹⁸⁶⁶ After Dr Verwoerd's assassination, Marika told the South African police that the explosion “nearly blew up our house.”¹⁸⁶⁷

It was not only Dimitris' experiments with gunpowder and explosives that outraged Marika: his loose tongue also became a cause of constant friction with her. He would often take his younger half-sisters, Evangelia and Katerina, to coffee shops for sweets and cakes, but then would get involved in political arguments. Invariably, he adopted an anti-colonialist and anti-fascist, pro-anarchist stance. His half-sisters were embarrassed and his step-mother angered by these incidents. When the young pair set out with their mother for the café, Marika would demand of Dimitri, “Are you going to keep your mouth shut this time?” She would threaten to cut off money for cinema, ice-cream or pastries, though she never did. Dimitri was growing ever more independent and Marika feared a bad influence on her younger children.¹⁸⁶⁸

Dimitri's antipathy towards Portuguese colonialism was no passing fancy. He said often that Mozambicans should rebel and kick the Portuguese out of the country, adding that he would like to blow up the offices of the Portuguese administration.¹⁸⁶⁹ The United States of America was a particular *bête noire*. Dimitri believed White American settlers had stolen the country from the indigenous Indians, forced them to live in locations and racially oppressed them, as they did Jews, Blacks and other minorities. The “land of the free” was a myth, he said, and the Statue of Liberty a hypocritical symbol because the only people who

¹⁸⁶⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁶⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁶⁷ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁸⁶⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁶⁹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

enjoyed liberty in the USA were White Americans. He said he would like to blow that up, too.¹⁸⁷⁰

Another of Dimitri's political obsessions was the Spanish Civil War, which he determined to join on the side of the International Brigades against General Francisco Franco. Horrified to learn that his son was saving money to travel to Spain, and fearing for his life, Michalis begged Dimitri to promise he would not do so.¹⁸⁷¹ His son agreed, but Michalis seems to have had doubts for when he and his family later migrated to South Africa, he asked Gerry Kyriakakis, a good friend of his to keep an eye on the young man in case he changed his mind.¹⁸⁷²

Dimitri was very intelligent with an IQ of 125.¹⁸⁷³ This is generally rated as "Superior" or "Gifted," one level above that of university students and much higher than the average of 90 to 110. By any standards, the boy's parents were extraordinary linguists. Michalis could speak Afrikaans, Arabic, English, Greek, Portuguese, Italian, and French, and Marika was comfortable in Greek, Portuguese, Arabic and English.¹⁸⁷⁴ He followed their steps easily and by the early 1930s he had a certain fluency in Arabic, English, Greek and Portuguese.

Dimitri was an avid reader and a collector of contemporary and historical articles which he assembled into a personal library. His father bought a newspaper every day, as well as historical and political magazines, which Dimitri read from cover to cover. He would snip out items and paste them into a series of scrapbooks. One volume contained biographies and articles about people he admired; two books covered Greece and Mozambique; a fourth focussed on historical events and a fifth on contemporary political developments worldwide. Each volume was appropriately labelled. Tsafendas also kept any photographs he could find of his personal heroes, including Vladimir Lenin, Charlie Chaplin, rebels of the 1821 Greek revolution, and the Italian-born American anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti. Pictures from the French and Russian revolutions went into his History volume.¹⁸⁷⁵

¹⁸⁷⁰ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁷¹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁷² Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁷³ Reyner van Zyl's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

¹⁸⁷⁴ Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

¹⁸⁷⁵ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

At some point in 1933, Michalis arranged for the fifteen-year-old Dimitri to get his first job. This was at the Vulcan Iron Works as an oxyacetylene welder. Dimitri did not take to the work but his father insisted that he remain and learn the trade, which would be useful in later life. He also hoped that his son might grow to like welding. This never happened but Dimitri remained in the job, off and on, until 1939.¹⁸⁷⁶

Eventually, accepting that his son did not have a bright future as a welder and knowing his love for the printed word, Michalis found him another job, this time at his good friend Dimitris Spanos's bookshop in Lourenço Marques. Spanos was a dedicated and passionate Communist, a prominent member of the International Socialist League and a former miner, who in 1902 had tried unsuccessfully, along with other workers, to form a miners' union in Johannesburg. He was a good friend and associate of William H. Andrews, a pioneer of the trade union movement, first chairman of the South African Labour Party and later General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, as well as editor of the *International*, the newspaper of the International Socialist League. Forced out of South Africa because of his political activities, Spanos relocated to Lourenço Marques in 1903. In addition to his bookshop, he set up a news distribution agency and publishing company, D. Spanos, Sucras., LDA, which marketed foreign newspapers and magazines, as well as pamphlets from his socialist contacts all round the world. They went not only to outlets in Portuguese-speaking Africa but to Southern Africa, too, including South Africa. Among its publications, between 1915 and 1921, was the *International*. Spanos's agency grew swiftly into the biggest of its kind in Mozambique.¹⁸⁷⁷

Surrounded by books and newspapers, Tsafendas was in heaven but Spanos complained that his young employee spent his working hours reading literature and arguing with customers about politics. Dimitri ignored his boss's complaints and continued challenging shoppers who bought what he considered to be fascist or colonialist newspapers, urging them to buy liberal journals. Spanos became a key figure in Tsafendas's life, and he described him as one of the best employers he ever had. This was not only because he paid his wages and was very tolerant with him at work, but, more importantly, because he taught him a lot of things and shaped his political ideology. Spanos's virulent socialism and anti-colonialism found a welcome in Tsafendas's questing young mind and he quickly became the

¹⁸⁷⁶ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

¹⁸⁷⁷ Chaldeos, 2015: 64, 194; Dr. Evangelos Mantzaris in a personal interview, 11 April 2017.

young man's political mentor, playing an important role in shifting Tsafendas's ideology from anarchism to communism.¹⁸⁷⁸

Spanos not only contributed massively to Tsafendas's political ideology, but also broadened his literary education, recommending books, though usually those with a socialist or revolutionary message. Tsafendas would take the books home to read and return them later. The first book Spanos gave his young employee was Emile Zola's masterpiece, *Germinal* (published in 1885), a novel about the brutal conditions coal miners faced in France in the 1860s. It described how the workers were exploited by the mine owners and how they fought to improve their working conditions by organising a union and calling a strike. Spanos told Dimitri that the conditions described in the book were similar to those in mines all round the world. Spanos argued that through Communism, though not anarchism, the workers of the world could improve their conditions. He based his arguments on personal experience in the mines of South Africa, where he had tried and failed to form a labour union. Tsafendas was deeply impressed by *Germinal* and by Spanos's experience of the realities of working class life. The Zola novel became Tsafendas's favourite work of literature, surpassing *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, and played a hugely important role in his turn away from anarchism to Communism.¹⁸⁷⁹

Another major discovery for Tsafendas was the 1916 novel by Rabindranath Tagore, *The Home and the World*. This story of a political awakening highlighted the issue of Western culture in colonial India and foreshadowed the violence of Partition in 1947. The young Tsafendas was quick to embrace Tagore's ideas, especially those represented by one of the book's characters, the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist Sandip. The novel remained one of Tsafendas's life-long favourites and he would often give copies to friends.¹⁸⁸⁰

However, Tsafendas's biggest discovery during his time with Spanos was Paul Robeson, the African-American son of an escaped slave, a famous singer, actor, Communist and activist, who later became a prominent figure in the American civil rights movement. Tsafendas scoured Spanos's magazines for stories about the entertainer and pinned a newspaper photograph of Robeson on his bedroom wall. Tsafendas admired the fact that Robeson risked his popularity by going to battle on behalf of workers and his fellow Blacks.

¹⁸⁷⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁷⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁸⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

In December 1934, Robeson visited the Soviet Union. He said, “Here I am not a Negro but a human being for the first time in my life. I walk in full human dignity,” and explored the possibility of moving along with his family to the USSR.¹⁸⁸¹ That was a major coup in the Communist press which reached Mozambique and Spanos’s publishing company. It was also a statement that confirmed further Tsafendas’s antipathy towards the United States and his admiration for the Soviet Union.

In his many subsequent years of travel, wherever Tsafendas went, he always looked for Robeson’s records. He learned many of his songs and tried to imitate his delivery. The *Song of Freedom* and *Zog Nit Keynmol (Song of the Warsaw Ghetto)* were his two all-time favourites, and he knew them by heart. *Zog Nit Keynmol* is a Jewish song about the Ghetto in Warsaw during the Nazi occupation of Poland. The song was written in Yiddish by Hirsh Glick, a young Jewish poet and partisan and inmate of the Vilna Ghetto during the Second World War, but it also has English lyrics. Despite the fact that Tsafendas did not speak Yiddish, he had managed to learn the lyrics perfectly and sang it throughout his whole life. Later, whenever Tsafendas was imprisoned, he sang these two songs, among others, in order to get strength while in his cell.¹⁸⁸²

Robeson’s album *Songs of Free Men*, which contained revolutionary and anti-Nazi songs, would become Tsafendas’s all-time favourite. He bought the album while in the USA in the mid-1940s, and subsequently bought another two copies in case one of them got scratched. He feared that once he had left the USA and returned to live in South Africa with his family he might have difficulty obtaining Robeson’s record again. When Spanos died in 1935, he left Tsafendas his collection of Robeson’s records and Tsafendas treasured them throughout his life.¹⁸⁸³

For many years, Spanos travelled, mostly at weekends, to villages and rural areas around Lourenço Marques, handing out socialist publications and literary books to native Mozambicans. He wanted to teach them socialism, but also believed that education was the best way for these people to move out of poverty. In the 1930s, by then in his sixties, he

¹⁸⁸¹ *Daily Worker*, 15 January 1935, “I am at home,” says Robeson at reception in Soviet Union.’

¹⁸⁸² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁸³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

started taking Tsafendas with him. It was a life changing experience for Tsafendas when he saw the appalling conditions of the rural dwellers and he became desperate to help them. He told Spanos that he would go every weekend and distribute food to them. Spanos told him he could not feed everyone, not even the government could. He said such conditions would not have existed in a socialist country and that the best way to help these people was by educating them.¹⁸⁸⁴

Tsafendas then offered to give the children free lessons in History and English. Spanos supported him by donating text books and Tsafendas would travel to the countryside each weekend to teach his classes. Spanos sometimes joined him. Tsafendas then thought of doing the same for the city kids in Lourenço Marques, so he approached Father Bertolis for help. The priest arranged with the Anglican vicar to allow Tsafendas to use a room at his church for classes and students flooded in from the capital and some from outlying villages. Tsafendas's father was proud of Dimitris's initiative and occasionally watched him at work.¹⁸⁸⁵ Tsafendas became convinced that education was the best method available to poor people to escape from poverty and to free themselves from authoritarian rule. He expressed this conviction several times in later life by volunteering as an unpaid teacher of underprivileged children.¹⁸⁸⁶

Spanos used to get some of his socialist magazines from ships arriving in Lourenço Marques and Tsafendas would often go to the harbour to pick up the parcels. After Spanos's death, Tsafendas continued his harbour visits to check if there were ships from the USSR. He met several Russian seamen this way and to Marika's dismay, would bring crew members back home for lunch. He plied them exhaustively with questions about life in the Soviet Union and sometimes the seamen gave him pamphlets and magazines about life in Russia. Once, a Soviet mariner gave Dimitri a hat which he said was similar to one that Vladimir Lenin wore.¹⁸⁸⁷ Tsafendas treasured the hat and wore it constantly, proudly proclaiming that

¹⁸⁸⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 April 2015.

¹⁸⁸⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 April 2015.

¹⁸⁸⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 April 2015; Costas Poriassis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

¹⁸⁸⁷ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

it was identical to that worn by the leader of the Russian revolution. His meetings with the Soviet seamen helped Tsafendas to pick up some Russian. He also bought a Russian dictionary to enable him to read the Soviet pamphlets and to communicate with the seamen.¹⁸⁸⁸

After Spanos's death, Tsafendas got work at a coffee shop, the *Chai et Kiosk*, owned by P. Sideris, a good friend of his father. Sideris, a conservative Greek loyal to the Portuguese government, often berated his young employee for arguing about politics with his customers. To make this worse, Tsafendas had turned the kiosk into a virtual distribution centre for Communist literature, often plying customers with books and pamphlets which he got from Spanos's friends and associates. He would introduce politics into his conversations with customers and if he thought someone appeared interested, he would offer him a Communist magazine or pamphlet, some to be paid for, others free. One day, Tsafendas went too far when he argued with a wealthy Portuguese businessman and city councillor. He denounced him as a "fascist" and accused him of exploiting Mozambicans. He said, "One day the Mozambicans will rebel against the Portuguese and take back everything you stole from them." The businessman reported the incident to Sideris and told him he would inform the police because he considered his employee to be a "dangerous Communist." As we will see later, this was by no means the last time Tsafendas was characterised in this way. Although reluctant to do so, but feeling he had no choice, Sideris dismissed Dimitri. He knew he would be in trouble with the colonial authorities if he did not do so.¹⁸⁸⁹

According to the International and State Defence Police's (PIDE- Portugal's security police¹⁸⁹⁰), Tsafendas was dismissed from the the *Chai et Kiosk* for "voicing Communist ideas."¹⁸⁹¹ That he was investigated after this incident by the security authorities in

¹⁸⁸⁸ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁸⁹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁹⁰ The agency that would later become the PIDE was founded in 1933 as PVDE (Surveillance and State Defense Police). It was in 1945, when the PVDE was renamed as PIDE. The PIDE's aim was "to detect, arrest, and neutralize or destroy any political opposition of whatever ideology which might threaten" the Salazar dictatorship. One of the agency's main responsibilities was "to control or neutralize any groups or persons who threatened the status quo as defined by the Dictatorship; not least was the social status quo, the relationship between different classes and between management and labour." The PIDE personnel, like all government employees at that time, had to swear the following oath before assuming their duties: "I declare on my honour that I am devoted to the social order established by the Portuguese Constitution of 1933 and that I actively repudiate communism and all subversive ideas" (Wheeler, 1983: 1-3).

¹⁸⁹¹ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (hereafter cited as ANTT).

Mozambique is clear from a June 29, 1937, letter from the South African Consul-General in Mozambique in response to a request from the Deputy Commissioner of Police in Johannesburg. It described Dimitri as a “half-caste,” who “it is quite possible that he may be engaged in disseminating communistic propaganda, there is, however, not sufficient evidence in substantiation of this belief and the local Authorities are accordingly not in a position to take any steps against him,” and who was dismissed from Sideris’s kiosk “owing to his Communist leanings.”¹⁸⁹²

After his dismissal from the kiosk, Tsafendas applied for work at the Imperial Airways factory in Quilemane. In order to complete his application, he needed his birth certificate. When he got it from the Civil Administration, he was shocked to discover that it gave his mother’s name as Amelia Williams, a native Mozambican woman, and not Marika Tsafantakis. When Dimitri told his father what he had discovered, Michalis took his son aside and finally told him the truth,¹⁸⁹³ and that Amelia had died some ten years earlier. They never spoke of the matter again, but Dimitri was devastated¹⁸⁹⁴ to learn that Marika was not his real mother and that his real mother was dead. He learned from her death certificate that she had died on January 12, 1927,¹⁸⁹⁵ but that he never managed to meet her was something that pained him until the end of his life.¹⁸⁹⁶ Michalis, Marika and Dimitris did not reveal the truth about Dimitri to the other children because they did not want to upset the family ambience and Katerina and Elena were too young to understand.¹⁸⁹⁷

Tsafendas tried desperately to find the location of his mother’s grave,¹⁸⁹⁸ but also to learn more about his ancestry. He spent many evenings sleeping in Shangaan villages and although he found out a lot about her, he was unable to locate her grave the as she had lost touch with members of her tribe in the years before her death. However, Tsafendas developed such a good relationship with several members of the tribe that he began teaching them

¹⁸⁹² Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 16. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁸⁹³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁹⁴ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁸⁹⁵ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA.

¹⁸⁹⁶ Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

¹⁸⁹⁷ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁸⁹⁸ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

English and History. He visited the tribespeople regularly when he was in Mozambique until he was arrested.¹⁸⁹⁹

One of the Shangaan students later became the chief of his tribe and about fifty years later while Tsafendas was held in the Zonderwater Prison outside Pretoria, he visited his old teacher there. However, the prison guards did not allow them to communicate in Portuguese, as they were not able to speak this language themselves and the apartheid law prohibited conversations between prisoners and visitors in a language not known to the guards. He was his only friend who visited him in twenty-eight years of imprisonment and still he was not allowed to speak to him.¹⁹⁰⁰

Tsafendas did not proceed with his application to the airline factory and instead, on August 9, 1935, he sought permission to enter South Africa. The Interior Ministry refused his request. According to the Commission of Enquiry into Verwoerd's death, the "application was refused on 12th December, 1935, and the refusal was confirmed on 24th April, 1936." No explanation was given,¹⁹⁰¹ but the likeliest cause was his mixed-race status and his dismissal from Sideris's kiosk "on account of his communistic leanings," two of the reasons cited for later refusals. Surprised and angry, Tsafendas decided to slip across the porous Mozambican-South African border and in 1936 found him working at the Fountain Café near Pretoria Railway Station. He served and scrubbed tables there for two or three months, then travelled to Johannesburg and worked in three eating places, the City Tea Room, the Elgin Café and the Cosmopolitan Restaurant.¹⁹⁰² Assisted by contacts given to him by Spanos, he joined the South African Communist Party, attended meetings and volunteered for small activities such as distributing leaflets.¹⁹⁰³ Some resident party members were cautious, however, considering Dimitri too young for political activism.¹⁹⁰⁴

¹⁸⁹⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 June 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁹⁰⁰ Jody Kollapen memorandum regarding Dimitrio Tsafendas. 24 November 1994. Tsafendas's file in the Lawyers for Human Rights collection (AL3183). South African History Archive (hereafter cited as SAHA); Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁹⁰¹ Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 13. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁹⁰² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹⁰³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹⁰⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

Returning to Lourenço Marques, Dimitri was pleased to encounter another Tsafantakis – half-sister Eleni (Helen), born in 1936,¹⁹⁰⁵ a girl he adored as a baby and with whom he subsequently maintained a very good relationship; she was the closest of his siblings.¹⁹⁰⁶ He also applied again to work at the Imperial Airways factory at Quilemane; his application was successful and he started working there.¹⁹⁰⁷

During the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, Dimitri became interested in athletics, and acquired a new contemporary hero when the African-American runner, Jesse Owens, won four gold medals, infuriating Hitler and the Games' Nazi hosts. Dimitri cut Owens' photograph from a newspaper and pinned it to his bedroom wall and scoured all the newspapers and magazines he could find to start a file on his new hero.¹⁹⁰⁸

Sometime in 1936, Tsafendas proceeded to what he considered to be his first “revolutionary” act. He, and his two best friends, fellow Greek George Grispos and a Mozambican named Manuel, took forks and scratched the paintwork on cars that belonged to members of the Portuguese local administration and members of the German and Italian embassies. The three friends would observe their targets for some time before they attack. During the attack, one of them would scratch the car, while the other two kept watch. They would also let down the cars' tyres. The attacks went on for a few weeks and only stopped after the incidents were reported in the local press and became of point of discussion in the city. No-one ever found out they were the culprits.¹⁹⁰⁹ Sometime the same year, Tsafendas was ordered to report for military service in the Portuguese army. He attended for interview and medical examination but was rejected because of his mixed race. Sons of European fathers and African mothers were not accepted for the military at that time.¹⁹¹⁰

Meanwhile, with the depression biting, Michalis Tsafantakis came to believe there was no realistic future for him in Mozambique and decided to relocate to South Africa. Not only was this a country which looked better equipped to survive the economic downturn, it

¹⁹⁰⁵ Home Affairs Department report regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 1 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub file: 1/2. NASA.

¹⁹⁰⁶ Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

¹⁹⁰⁷ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

¹⁹⁰⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁹⁰⁹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

¹⁹¹⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

was also familiar territory since Michalis had worked in Pretoria after leaving Alexandria as a young man and before he moved on to Mozambique in 1916. Michalis sought leave to enter South Africa for himself, Marika and their four children, but not for Dimitri. He knew his son had previously been denied entrance to South Africa and feared that to include Dimitri's name on the family's visa application could result in refusal for all of them. His plan was for Dimitri to follow on later when the family was settled. He was not comfortable with this arrangement, but felt it would be best for everyone, including Dimitri himself. He believed his son would "mature" quicker by living on his own for a while.¹⁹¹¹

On July 17, 1937, Michalis applied for permanent residence status in South Africa. The application was accepted, and Michalis and Marika and their children, Evangelia, Victor, Katerina and Eleni, moved to Johannesburg later that year.¹⁹¹² Before Michalis left for South Africa, he asked, Gerry Kyriakakis and his sister Artemis Michaletos, to keep an eye on his son and to inform him immediately if anything untoward happened. One of Dimitri's political obsessions at the time was the Spanish Civil War, which he was eager to join on the side of the International Brigades against General Francisco Franco. Michalis begged Dimitris not to go and there were several arguments between them. Eventually Michalis, with vital help from Artemis, managed to convince Dimitris to stay in Africa. However, now that he was leaving, he was afraid Dimitris would change his mind, so before he left, he made him swear to him that he would not go to Spain.¹⁹¹³

In 1938, while Tsafendas was still working at the Imperial Airways factory in Quilemane, the Portuguese government introduced new rules for cotton cultivation which boosted the Portuguese textile industry at the expense of the Mozambican economy. Tsafendas, like many Mozambicans, was outraged. He distributed among cotton growers, as well as his colleagues at the factory, copies of the Communist Manifesto and spoke publicly against the forced cotton cultivation.¹⁹¹⁴ Soon, rumours about his activities reached PIDE and he came under suspicion of "spreading Communist propaganda."¹⁹¹⁵ However, the rumours

¹⁹¹¹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁹¹² Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 17. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁹¹³ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016.

¹⁹¹⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁹¹⁵ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

were “never proven” as presumably none of those who received Tsafendas’s books confirmed it to the police.¹⁹¹⁶ A PIDE report said it was “quite possible” Dimitri was “engaged in disseminating Communistic propaganda,” but there was “not sufficient evidence in substantiation of this belief.”¹⁹¹⁷ This incident dogged Tsafendas throughout his life as it led to the creation of a file, *Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*, in PIDEs records, which would only get bigger with the passage of time.¹⁹¹⁸

A 1961 PIDE report referred to the above incident, along with the one at *Chai et Kiosk*, stating that while Tsafendas was “residing in that Province (Mozambique), he was twice a suspect of Communist activities, but evidence of such activities was never found.”¹⁹¹⁹ By the late 1930s, Dimitris was widely known in the Greek community as a Communist and anti-colonialist and was often referred to as “The Red.” He frequently pinned a red carnation or a red rose to the lapel of his jacket and sometimes he wrote anti-Portuguese and Communist slogans on public walls. His father was happy about the direction of his son’s political ideas and character.¹⁹²⁰

In 1938 or in 1939, the twenty-year-old Dimitri worked as a waiter at café *Olympia* owned by Gerry Kyriakakis, and became close to the Kyriakakis family, particularly the youngest daughter, Ira. Once again, he argued politics with the guests, despite Kyriakakis’s threats of dismissal. When the political disputes continued, Kyriakakis decided they were jeopardising business and finally dismissed his young waiter. Ira Kyriakakis has clear memories of Tsafendas as being “very passionate about politics.” She said, “He was a Communist and very much against the Portuguese and colonialism generally ... he did not speak about anything else, only politics ...” Tsafendas also showed her maps and talked of his plans “to travel all around the world.” He gave her many books to read, mostly political, and talked to her and her sister Aliko about politics and history. Ira Kyriakakis was one of the students who attended his English classes. She said he was “very popular with the students because he was very funny.” According to Ira Kyriakakis, Tsafendas was “like a lending

¹⁹¹⁶ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

¹⁹¹⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 16. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁹¹⁸ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

¹⁹¹⁹ Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 November 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

¹⁹²⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

library,” distributing books to all of his friends.¹⁹²¹ That Tsafendas was rarely seen without a book was something police were to hear from people who knew him. He always had “a large amount of literature with him,” two witnesses testified to the South African police after Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination.¹⁹²²

Another student at Tsafendas’s English lessons was Helen Kavadias. She was born in 1930 and she met Tsafendas through the friendship between their two families, especially between her mother, Sophia Kavadias, and Marika. Helen became friendly with Dimitri’s half-sisters and she remembered Dimitri taking them all for ice-cream. He was, she recalled, “very polite and funny, playing with us in the street ... he was always with a book in his hand.” She said, “His room was like a library, I had never seen so many books he used to give me books about history, but I did not care for them. I wanted fairy tales about princes and princesses!” Helen Kavadias next saw Tsafendas twenty-five years later when he spent two days in her mother’s house in Mutare, Zimbabwe (then Umtali, Rhodesia), and because of this she was questioned by the South African police. She was then Helen Grispos, having married George Grispos, one of Tsafendas’s best friends from school.¹⁹²³

On January 17, 1938, Tsafendas applied for an entry visa for South Africa. In July, he learned that he was refused. He was given no explanation but it appears clear from police documents that the refusal was based on the South African Consul-General’s description from Lourenço Marques of Dimitri as “a half-caste” with “Communist leanings,” “suspected of dissemination of Communistic propaganda.”¹⁹²⁴ Having entered South Africa illegally once before, young Tsafendas decided to do the same again. Before that, however, his political activities got him banned from his own home country for twelve years. According to a 1953 PIDE report, Tsafendas had “voiced Communist ideas” and “distributed such propaganda in the Portuguese colonies,” actions which led to his being banned from re-entering Mozambique.¹⁹²⁵ He was not allowed to return until 1963, when he received

¹⁹²¹ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

¹⁹²² Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹²³ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

¹⁹²⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 16. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁹²⁵ PIDE report regarding Demitrios Tsafandakis or Demitrio Tsafendas, 15 October 1953. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

amnesty from the Portuguese Government, after he convinced them that he was a little “mad,” but harmless and that his “subversive” and communist ideas belonged to the past.¹⁹²⁶

SOUTH AFRICA, 1939–1942

Tsafendas entered South Africa for the second time in 1939 and joined his family in Johannesburg. Looking to develop his career skills, he signed on for welding classes at Progress College.¹⁹²⁷ Out of college, he worked busily for the Communist Party, delivering leaflets to coffee shops, attending meetings and helping organise demonstrations.¹⁹²⁸ During the war, he not only argued with his party’s opponents but fought them in the streets. More than once, he ended up with his face bruised and his clothes torn after brawling with members of the Ossewabrandwag (OB) and other Fascist and Nazi organizations. He said his side always won. Because of his heavy build, Tsafendas provided security at party meetings and acted as a bodyguard for local Communist leaders.¹⁹²⁹

Tsafendas paid his Communist Party membership dues – two shillings and six pence per month - at a party office at the Trades Hall, and attended meetings on the steps of Johannesburg City Hall, addressed by leaders he named as Wolfson and Joffe.¹⁹³⁰ Michalis supported his son’s activism and once gave him money for paint to daub anti-Nazi slogans on public walls, but his stepmother was far from happy. Dimitri not only stored hundreds of Communist documents at Michalis’s and Marika’s home in Johannesburg, but invited party members to join him there making political placards. Marika often said, “He will send me to my grave before my time.” She was terrified that his activities would get the family into trouble with the South African authorities.¹⁹³¹

Although Tsafendas was deeply preoccupied with politics, there was romance in his life, too. He met a Jewish girl, the sister of a friend of his half-sister Evangelia, and went out

¹⁹²⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

¹⁹²⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹²⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹²⁹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁹³⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹³¹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

with her for a year without her parents knowing. His half-sisters helped to arrange the couple's secret meetings.¹⁹³²

In May 1940, Tsafendas secured a job as a welder with the British Mining Supply Company in Johannesburg,¹⁹³³ a significant move since the company was engaged in crucial war work – the production of armoured vehicles – and this prevented Tsafendas's immediate deportation when it was discovered he had entered South Africa illegally. What happened was that Tsafendas applied for permanent residence in 1941 whereupon investigations revealed that he had crossed into the Union without a residence permit, thus contravening Article 2(a) of the Aliens Act No. 1 of 1937. On August 6, 1941 at "H" Court in Johannesburg, a magistrate fined him £12.10s or one month of hard labour. Tsafendas paid the fine and was released and given a residence permit valid for one year. A letter dated October 13, 1941, from the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs to the Commissioner of Police in Pretoria explained that Tsafendas had been granted temporary residence because his work with the British Mining Supply Company was "regarded as falling under controlled labour," in other words, war work.¹⁹³⁴ However, the letter referred to the refusal of earlier applications by Tsafendas while in Mozambique and the South African Consul-General's report describing him as a "half-caste" who had been dismissed from his kiosk job in Lourenço Marques for "Communist leanings." The letter ended, "The above information is passed to you in order that the activities of Tsafendas may be watched, and I will be glad if you will advise me in due course should anything to his detriment become known."¹⁹³⁵

On October 20, 1941, a week later, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Witwatersrand Division (which covered Johannesburg), wrote to the Police Commissioner in Pretoria that "from a security point of view, nothing detrimental to Tsafentakis (Tsafendas) is known in this division and so far there is no evidence that the man has shown any Communist tendencies since he entered the Union." The letter said Tsafendas had registered under the Aliens Registration Act, that his parents lived in Pretoria, where his father was a fitter and

¹⁹³² Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

¹⁹³³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹³⁴ Report of the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, 14 October 1941. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

¹⁹³⁵ Report of the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, 14 October 1941. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

turner at Iscor Iron and Steel Works, and that Tsafendas was employed by the British Mining Supply Company on “essential war services as a welder on army filter plants.”¹⁹³⁶

In 1941, his half-sister Evangelia married in Pretoria. His gift to the newly-weds was an expensive modern coffee table, which is still used by his nephew, Mike Vlachopoulos.¹⁹³⁷ However, his presence did not go unnoticed. Tsafendas overheard a political conversation at the next table between two Greeks who were unknown to him. His half-sister, Katerina Pnema, and his cousin Mary Eendracht, remember that Dimitris intervened and called them “fascists,” whereupon a huge argument erupted, and Tsafendas’s father had to be called on to calm things down. “He was always doing things like this,” Katerina told the author of her half-brother. “You couldn’t take him anywhere; he would always embarrass us. He couldn’t keep his mouth shut, he would always find someone to fight with. If he overheard a conversation about something he disagreed with, he would enter the conversation and turn it into an argument. He replied that he could not keep his mouth shut if he saw something wrong or an injustice. Fascists, colonialists and racists were like a red flag for him, especially the Nazis. When he saw one, oh my God what could he do. He was like a bull seeing a red flag.” Shortly after the wedding, one of the guests told Evangelia that Dimitris was not her full brother, but a half-brother, and this is how the secret became known.¹⁹³⁸

Sometime during the first half of 1942, Tsafendas was dismissed from his job at the British Mining Supply Company for “irregular attendance and loafing.”¹⁹³⁹ On April 18, 1942, the authorities wrote to Tsafendas requesting that he apply for an extension to his temporary residence permit, due to expire on August 6. There was no reply, presumably because Tsafendas by then had relocated to Cape Town. On June 8, 1942 he applied for a permit to leave South Africa by sea for the United Kingdom. The Deputy Commissioner of the Witwatersrand police informed the Commissioner for Immigration regarding Tsafendas that

¹⁹³⁶ Letter of the Deputy Commissioner of Police to the Police Commissioner regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, 20 October 1941. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

¹⁹³⁷ Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

¹⁹³⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

¹⁹³⁹ Confidential Letter of the Lieutenant for the Deputy Commissioner of Witwatersrand Division to the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs. 12 June 1942. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

“no reports of subversive activities had been received” and that from the police point of view it “had no objection to his being issued with the desired permit.”¹⁹⁴⁰

This was refused by the immigration chief, however, after consultation with the British High Commissioner, Mr. Cockram, who was reported to be “not in favour of a man of this type being granted facilities to go to England.” The refusal was conveyed to the Chief Immigration Officer in Cape Town on June 18 in a letter which reiterated the original description of Tsafendas as a half-caste and added that Tsafendas was “engaged actively in Communistic propaganda.” It said, he had only been allowed to stay because he was engaged on war work. The letter concluded, “As he has now been discharged from his employment, he should be ordered to return to Lourenço Marques forthwith.”¹⁹⁴¹ However, the order came too late. On June 13, 1942, five days before his deportation was requested, Tsafendas left Cape Town aboard the Greek freighter SS *Eugene Livanos*, on which he was employed as a mess boy. He was twenty-four and the ship took him to Canada.¹⁹⁴²

CANADA AND USA, 1942–1947

Tsafendas described the crew of the *Eugene Livanos* as “too rough.” He said, “They were smoking dagga and marijuana and fighting among themselves.”¹⁹⁴³ When the ship docked at St. John, New Brunswick, on September 1, 1942,¹⁹⁴⁴ Tsafendas disembarked. He went to the Canadian Immigration Department and told them he did not want to go back to the *Eugene Livanos* but instead of sending him to another boat he was detained in a detention barracks for seamen in Montreal. From there he was sent to Halifax (Nova Scotia). He was upset that he was considered to be a deserter, insisting that he did not want to desert at St. John, just to change ships.¹⁹⁴⁵

¹⁹⁴⁰ Confidential Letter of the Lieutenant for the Deputy Commissioner of Witwatersrand Division to the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs. 12 June 1942. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

¹⁹⁴¹ Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 26. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁹⁴² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. COE. Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 27. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967.

¹⁹⁴³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹⁴⁴ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁴⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

According to a PIDE report, “As the country was at war, the authorities decided to put him on an explosives carrier on a convoy destined for Allied troops fighting in Europe. Because he was scared that the ship might be torpedoed – which later came to happen – he escaped with four other crew members to the United States.”¹⁹⁴⁶ The escape took place on December 10, 1942.¹⁹⁴⁷ The prisoners tied their bed sheets together and scaled the wall of the Halifax detention centre. Four, including Tsafendas, made it over successfully but the fifth man lost his grip when one of the sheets came loose, and despite their efforts to hold him, fell and broke a leg. While the injured man was lay screaming, Tsafendas and his three companions took flight as the prison guards raced towards them. They got away and the prisoner survived his fall. However, the incident disturbed Tsafendas deeply because he was the one who had made the bedsheet ropes, but also because he had run away, leaving his comrade alone and helpless.¹⁹⁴⁸

The three escapees walked several kilometres to the border with the United States. It was the depths of winter and they crossed the frozen St Croix River on foot. On December 31, 1942, Tsafendas and his friends were arrested by the American Coast Guard in Penobscot County, Maine. They were detained for three months in a prison in Bangor, Maine,¹⁹⁴⁹ on charges of contravening US immigration laws.¹⁹⁵⁰ While in detention, Tsafendas “showed symptoms of mental disorder” and was admitted to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, Massachusetts, from where he was transferred on April 23, 1943 to the Metropolitan State Hospital. He was initially diagnosed as having “psychoneurosis – mixed type” plus “many psychopathic traits.”¹⁹⁵¹ However, psychiatrists in this hospital discovered that Tsafendas was play-acting. According to a report by the Grafton State Hospital, Massachusetts, to which he was admitted in 1946, Tsafendas then confessed that in

¹⁹⁴⁶ Translation of the PIDE report regarding Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafantakis, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

¹⁹⁴⁷ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁴⁸ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

¹⁹⁴⁹ Grafton State Hospital report regarding D. Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁵⁰ Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw, 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 2. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁹⁵¹ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA; Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

1943 “he faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings (sinkings) of ships.”¹⁹⁵²

Tsafendas later explained that he pretended to be mentally disturbed in the Bangor prison because life was tough for someone branded as a deserter and because he feared being shipped out on a weapons-carrying freighter which would be targeted by U-boats. He was terrified of German submarines and of being torpedoed in the middle of the ocean. He admitted that he was a coward at the time and felt ashamed of his behaviour, but he said he did not want to die young. Tsafendas later conceded that while in prison he “pretended to hear voices, like Joan of Arc.” He said it was easy and the guards believed him. He repeated his act several times while in the Metropolitan State Hospital.¹⁹⁵³

Tsafendas later in his life told Father Minas Constandinou who used to visit him in prison (Pretoria Central Prison and Zonderwater Prison) and in hospital (Pretoria Prison Hospital and Sterkfontein Hospital), that in a hospital in the United States he met an Irish-American man named Tom,¹⁹⁵⁴ also a merchant seaman, who was diagnosed as schizophrenic. Tsafendas said he was the skinniest person he ever saw and Tom claimed this was because he harboured a tapeworm which ate his food. Tom regularly asked for extra food portions in order to “feed the worm” and because he was so thin, the hospital staff always gave him more. He never suggested the tapeworm talked to him or had any influence on his, just that it consumed his food.¹⁹⁵⁵

According to Tsafendas, Tom told him that when he was a child, a doctor gave him medicine to expel the worm; part of it emerged but some remained inside, including the head. Further doses had no effect and the boy believed the tapeworm was hiding in his body where purgatives could not reach it. Tsafendas personally believed Tom was pretending to be insane in order not to be drafted into the US military since this was during the Second World War. He asked many times if he was making it all up; he pleaded with him to tell the truth, but Tom held to his story.¹⁹⁵⁶

¹⁹⁵² Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁵³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁹⁵⁴ Father Minas does not remember Tom's surname, or whether Tsafendas even mentioned it. He clearly remember though that the person's name was Tom.

¹⁹⁵⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁹⁵⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

According to Tsafendas, Tom was also a missionary of a Christian sect which did not have a name.¹⁹⁵⁷ Tsafendas referred to it as the Christian Church (also known as the No-Name church or as Two by Twos¹⁹⁵⁸). Tsafendas was impressed by Tom's knowledge of Christian belief and his philosophical take on the world and life, and he questioned his diagnosis as schizophrenic. When Tsafendas was discharged from the hospital, Tom gave him contact details for other members of his sect and Tsafendas used the contacts to meet them.¹⁹⁵⁹ Tsafendas joined the sect and remained in contact with them over the years, including when he returned to South Africa. "We have no church or temple and we hold meetings according to where you stay," he said.¹⁹⁶⁰

According to James Johnston, a South African Minister of the Christian Church, who later briefly met Tsafendas, the Christian Church's mission was two-fold, missionary and evangelical, and it was guided by the Bible. The Church had members all over the world. The Church's financial needs were met by contributions from members. The organization had no church buildings and prayer meetings and scripture studies were held in private homes on Wednesdays and Sundays. "We adhere strictly to the teaching and example of Christ," Johnston said.¹⁹⁶¹

Although instinctively religious, Tsafendas was never comfortable with the established Christian Church. His father had him baptised as Greek Orthodox, but he viewed the Church as a wealthy and conservative power supportive of colonialism and with close ties to repressive governments. Instead of defending the powerless and the oppressed, he believed the Church helped to perpetuate an unjust system of foreign rule, partly in order to protect its own position. It was Tsafendas's belief that Christianity was in essence revolutionary, stemming from its earliest days of persecution under the Roman Empire. Thus for someone who saw the institutional church as part of the establishment, Tom's simple Christian sect held great appeal for Tsafendas. It did not have church buildings or priests or bishops and it had no connection with authority. Its members were simple, independent Christians who

¹⁹⁵⁷ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁵⁸ It was founded in 1897 in Ireland by Scottish evangelist William Irvine.

¹⁹⁵⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

¹⁹⁶⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹⁶¹ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

believed in the same God and gathered together to pray to Him. This was exactly the way Tsafendas viewed Christianity and made the sect attractive to both his religious and political instincts.¹⁹⁶²

Tsafendas said Tom was one of the nicest and funniest people he ever met, but he lost touch with him after he left the United States and never learnt what happened to him. Tsafendas told Tom's story, exactly as stated here, to the two priests, Minas and Ioannis, who visited him in the prisons and in the hospitals where he was held, and were interviewed by the author. He told them that it was from Tom that he got the idea of a tapeworm to use for his own purposes. He also told them that he decided to use it after he was caught pretending to be mad by the psychiatrists of a hospital in the USA.¹⁹⁶³ The author is not in position to know whether Tom really believed he had a tapeworm or not.

Confirmation of the existence of this Tom comes from the Grafton State Hospital Report. In it appears that Tsafendas spoke at length to the psychiatrists who examined him about a certain Tom, a missionary who recruited him to a Christian sect. In the hospital report, Tsafendas mentions Tom's full name as Thomas Tuff.¹⁹⁶⁴ Needless to say, Tsafendas did not tell the psychiatrists that Tom had been diagnosed as a schizophrenic who believed that he had a tapeworm inside him, nor that it was Tom who gave him the idea about using a fictitious tapeworm himself.

After his deception at the Metropolitan State Hospital was discovered, Tsafendas was given a choice by the US Immigration Department: "Deportation back to Africa or work for the Merchant Marine." He chose the second option and spent the remaining years of World War Two on merchant ships.¹⁹⁶⁵ On June 24, 1943, Tsafendas was discharged from the Metropolitan State Hospital but remained in detention until August 14, 1943 when he was released on a \$1,000 bond. On September 2, 1943 he was reshipped aboard the SS *Pillory* under what the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) described as "a warrant of

¹⁹⁶² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁹⁶³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Fathers Minas Constandinou and Ioannis Tsafaridis were also told the exact same story about the origins of the tapeworm story by Patrick O'Ryan (Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015).

¹⁹⁶⁴ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁶⁵ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

deportation.”¹⁹⁶⁶ Tsafendas's new status followed a recommendation by the INS on February 21, 1944 that he should be “admitted as a seaman” because he had been following such a calling since the *Pillory* trip on September 2, 1943.¹⁹⁶⁷ The ship sailed to Greenland then returned to the United States, docking in Boston. When the *Pillory* arrived back in Boston, Tsafendas got a job on a Liberty ship¹⁹⁶⁸ and remained on different Liberty ships till the end of the war in 1945.¹⁹⁶⁹ At some point, a Liberty ship on which Tsafendas was serving was torpedoed and only managed to limp to port.¹⁹⁷⁰ The experience fuelled Tsafendas's terror of drowning in a fiery sea and he did everything possible to avoid further service aboard ship. His usual tactic was to pretend to be mentally unfit and so spend as much time as possible in hospitals or at least safely on dry land.¹⁹⁷¹

After returning to Boston on the *Pillory*, Tsafendas shipped out on the SS *Benson*, travelled to New York and checked into the Seamen's Convalescence Home at Oyster Bay, Long Island. He remained there until shipping out on the SS *John Holmes* on May 9, 1944. Tsafendas said he left this vessel when it arrived in Liverpool, England, and in June 1944, he secured admittance to the US Army 96th General Hospital in Worcestershire, England. He remained there until leaving aboard the US Army hospital ship, *Wisteria*. On August 12, 1944, Tsafendas arrived at the port of Charleston, South Carolina, on the *Wisteria*, and was certified by public health service physicians to be suffering from an undetermined type of psychosis. A Board of Inquiry was held at Roper Hospital, Charleston, on September 2, 1944, and the physicians concluded that Tsafendas was “insane at time of arrival.” Furthermore, the Board of Inquiry declared that Tsafendas had been excluded under the provisions of Section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 as an insane person, and thus was not eligible for a visa permit for the USA. However, since he had been found insane, it was decided that he

¹⁹⁶⁶ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁶⁷ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁶⁸ The Liberty ship was a low-cost cargo vessel of simple construction which was built in huge numbers in American yards during World War Two. It was developed to meet British requirements for transports to replace ships torpedoed by German U-boats. Capable of carrying, ammunition, tanks, food, even troops, Liberty ships manned by merchant seamen served in all theatres during the war but primarily guaranteed that Allied forces in Europe were supplied with war materiel from North America (Elphick, 2006).

¹⁹⁶⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹⁷⁰ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

¹⁹⁷¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

be kept in Roper Hospital for the time being. Sometime after the hearing, Tsafendas escaped from Roper Hospital, but he was apprehended on October 5, 1944, in Boston, Mass. He was then transferred to a US public health facility at Ellis Island, New York. On February 25, 1945, he was deported from New York aboard the Greek vessel, *SS Maria Nicolao*, but he was soon back in America. In a letter from 42 Alexander Avenue, Medford, Mass., Tsafendas wrote to President Roosevelt complaining that he had been granted a stay of only twenty-nine days back in the United States. He cited his service in the US Merchant Marine and asked to be considered for additional time. The letter was sent to the INS but when its officials inquired, they found that Tsafendas had shipped out of Boston on June 13, 1945.¹⁹⁷²

In January, 1946, he was arrested at St Bernard's Home on West 95th Street in New York City. He said he had entered the United States at New York on December 3, 1945, as a mess waiter on the *SS Robin Locksley*. He was charged with violating the 1924 Immigration Act by remaining longer in the United States than permitted as a seaman, and was deported aboard the *SS Hood Victory* on February 10, 1946. He returned to New York on the *Hood Victory* on March 10, 1946, and three days later he attended a meeting of his Christian sect, in Medford, Mass. Tom Tuff, who had recovered from his tapeworm obsession as soon as the war had ended, was also there.¹⁹⁷³

Tsafendas's persistence in returning to the United States time after time may appear to be at odds with his frequently voiced dislike for the country and its treatment of minorities. What he told friends was that he admired the USA as "very modern and very advanced technologically," but his lived experience convinced him he was right in his long-held belief that this was a racist society, a "land of the free" only for White Americans. As in his youth, he wanted to blow up the Statue of Liberty, since, he claimed, there was no liberty for African-Americans, native Indians, or Communists.¹⁹⁷⁴

Ironically, it was an American play, *A Flag Is Born*,¹⁹⁷⁵ that Tsafendas watched at some point during his stay in the United States, which impressed him deeply on account of its concern for social equality and independence. The play advocated a homeland for Jews in

¹⁹⁷² Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁷³ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁷⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

¹⁹⁷⁵ By Ben Hecht, premiered on Broadway with Paul Muni and Marlon Brando in September 1946.

ancient Israel, a theme which resonated with Tsafendas because of his Jewish ancestry, of which he was so proud. He kept his theatre ticket for years and sometime later he gave all his spare cash and even sold some of his clothes to support a fund-raiser for the creation of Israel.¹⁹⁷⁶ Indeed Tsafendas had a life-long love affair with the theatre and went to plays in almost every country he visited, always keeping his ticket stub. His favourite playwrights were William Shakespeare and Bertolt Brecht.¹⁹⁷⁷ In America and in Europe, he went to the opera when he could, but also became a jazz lover, tracking down clubs to listen to this new music live.¹⁹⁷⁸

Soon after the end of the war, when the Holocaust and the Nazi atrocities became known, Tsafendas felt deeply ashamed and guilty that he had not fought the Nazis, indeed that he had done everything possible to avoid direct conflict. He felt this shame and guilt until he died, considering it the worst thing he ever did, that he was a coward and afraid to die.¹⁹⁷⁹ Tsafendas spoke at length to witnesses about his time in the United States, especially about the hospitals and what he considered to be cowardly behaviour. He said he was perfectly fine and only used his insanity act to avoid imprisonment and deportation for being in the USA illegally. More importantly, he feared serving in the Navy because he was terrified of the Nazi U-boats after one of his warships was torpedoed and almost sunk. He said he wanted to fight the Nazis, but on land and not at sea. Finally, he also said that he regretted pretending to be mad when he discovered that an American immigration law prohibited entry to the USA of mentally ill people.¹⁹⁸⁰ According to Tsafendas, the only genuine health issue he had while in the country was an enormous feeling of guilt due to his prison escapee friend breaking his leg and the fact that he was afraid to go to sea and fight the Nazis.¹⁹⁸¹

During his stay in the United States, Tsafendas spent a lot of time reading about the American Revolution and visiting associated sites in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and New York State. He particularly admired Benjamin Franklin and through him discovered the argument that tyrannicide, the killing of a tyrant, was considered morally justifiable by many

¹⁹⁷⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 April 2015.

¹⁹⁷⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

¹⁹⁷⁸ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

¹⁹⁷⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁹⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁹⁸¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

great thinkers. Reading more on this subject, Tsafendas discovered that tyrannicide had its roots in ancient Greece but found approval from several important political and religious thinkers, including John of Salisbury and Saint Thomas Aquinas.¹⁹⁸²

On March 19, 1946, Tsafendas admitted himself to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital. He spent a week there then entered Grafton State Hospital.¹⁹⁸³ Tsafendas spent sixteen months in this hospital and his medical report said “he is in the habit of smearing the walls in his room with faeces and is hallucinated and suspicious. He hears voices coming though the radiators. He is orientated as to the month but completely disorientated as to place and situation. He has peculiar mannerisms. He is wont to assume silly grimacing expression and is prone to misidentify the attendants and the examiner.”¹⁹⁸⁴ Much of this description seemed to fit with Tsafendas’s deceptions, including pulling faces and pretending to hear voices. However, Tsafendas could see that his doctors were not entirely convinced and fearing that he would be found out again, he decided to steal Tom Tuff’s tapeworm story. It worked. The doctors were intrigued and began to take a particular interest in his case.¹⁹⁸⁵ He was discharged from Grafton on July 31, 1947, with the diagnosis being “schizophrenia-Hebephrenic type. Condition Improved.”¹⁹⁸⁶

After his discharge from the hospital, the Immigration Department considered Tsafendas’s situation. A decision to deport him was not easy since he had a residential history in Mozambique and South Africa and held both Greek and Portuguese passports. He said, “This puzzled the American authorities (because) I was also in possession of American seamen’s papers.”¹⁹⁸⁷ Furthermore, the Immigration authorities had concluded that Tsafendas was “unstable though not insane” but the “type of man who could easily be used as an instrument of Communist or hostile organizations.” The impression of the American Immigration people at the time was that “he had been manipulated and was under the

¹⁹⁸² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

¹⁹⁸³ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁸⁴ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁸⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

¹⁹⁸⁶ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁸⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

influence of someone or some organisation.” Subsequently, they decided to deport him to Europe.¹⁹⁸⁸

Tsafendas wanted to be sent to South Africa but immigration officials decided on August 22 to expel him to Greece and on September 27, he travelled to Piraeus, the port city of Athens, aboard the SS *Marine Jumper*.¹⁹⁸⁹ This decision would be a fateful one for Tsafendas, forcing him into a sixteen-year-long odyssey, during which he was forbidden to enter either Mozambique or South Africa.

GREECE, 1947–1949

Certainly, Piraeus, Athens's harbour, in October 1947¹⁹⁹⁰ was not where Tsafendas wanted to be. Greece was in the middle of a bloody civil war between the Greek army supported by pro-royalists with the backing of the United States and Britain, and the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), the military wing of the Greek Communist Party. Tsafendas felt like “a complete stranger”¹⁹⁹¹ and in the month of his arrival he applied for permanent residence in South Africa. The application was declined the following month, November 1947. According to the Commission of Enquiry into Verwoerd's death, “In file G.8226, the following endorsement appears on one of the documents relating to his (Tsafendas's) application: ‘He is a Communist, a half-caste and a previous illegal immigrant. Refusal strongly recommended.’”¹⁹⁹²

However, Tsafendas would not give up. His determination to return to South Africa or to Mozambique was so great that from virtually every country he entered during the sixteen years of his personal diaspora, he filed applications for entry visas or permanent residence. His requests were invariably denied, often for the reasons quoted above.

¹⁹⁸⁸ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 09/09/1966. COE, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

¹⁹⁸⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

¹⁹⁹⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 2. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

¹⁹⁹¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹⁹² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 12. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

Tsafendas had difficulty finding work in war-ridden Athens and in order to survive, he sold his clothes which he had brought from America.¹⁹⁹³ However, he got in touch with members of the Christian sect whose contact details had been given to him by Tom Tuff, and they came to his assistance. Later, feeling indebted to them, he agreed to their suggestion that he be baptised and this happened on a beach in Athens, whereupon he became a full member of the sect.¹⁹⁹⁴

Tsafendas then managed to get in touch with his good boyhood friend, John Michaletos, cousin of George Michaletos who was married to his Aunty Artemis. However, there were actually two men named John Michaletos with similar characteristics and the author has not been able to clarify which one of the two it was; they were each other's cousins and cousins to George Michaletos, and both knew Tsafendas since childhood and they had grown up together.¹⁹⁹⁵ Both were Communists and good friends of Tsafendas. One was a professor of literature, the other a doctor; Tsafendas was very close to both of them while in Mozambique. While in Greece, he got in touch certainly with one of them, conceivably both. Michaletos, the professor, was not only a member of the Greek Communist Party but also of its military wing, the Democratic Army. It is not known if the doctor was also a member of the Democratic Army although he was certainly a member of the Communist Party. Tsafendas would stay in touch with one of these two Michaletos and would correspond with him regularly over the ensuing years. During the assassination investigation, the South African police would become aware of Tsafendas's relationship with Michaletos and the fact that he was an active Communist.¹⁹⁹⁶ It is very likely that they discovered it was Michaletos who recruited Tsafendas to the DSE as both the police and the

¹⁹⁹³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

¹⁹⁹⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

¹⁹⁹⁵ In total there were four men named John Michaletos. 1) Tsafendas's godfather. 2) Tsafendas's nephew, son of George Michaletos (son of the above John Michaletos) and Artemis Michaletos, Tsafendas's aunt. 3) Nephew of Tsafendas's godfather and cousin of the above and below Michaletos. Professor of Literature, Tsafendas's childhood friend, they had grown up together in Lourenço Marques. Member of the Greek Communist Party and the DSE. 4) Nephew of Tsafendas's godfather and cousin of the above two named Michaletos. He had been at school with Tsafendas in Middelburg. A very good friend of Tsafendas and also a Communist. He was a doctor and had a private clinic in Athens.

¹⁹⁹⁶ Costas Michaletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Commission of Enquiry would do everything possible to locate this Michaletos, including asking for PIDE's help, but it would seem that they were unsuccessful.¹⁹⁹⁷

One of the two put Tsafendas in touch with Greek Communists and he voluntarily joined the DSE. Thus, in the mountains around Athens and in Central Greece, Tsafendas received basic training in the art of guerrilla warfare. More details about Tsafendas's activities during the Civil War are not clear since he did not talk much about it. However, he said that he did not participate in any fighting while he was in the mountains with the Democratic Army as his unit was mostly on the run from the Government forces. He also said that he did not hesitate to join the DSE since he felt guilty about his conduct during the Second World War. When his commanding officer asked him to go to Athens to do some "jobs" and work as an informant there, Tsafendas was reluctant because he wanted "action." However, he acknowledged that he would be more useful in Athens since nobody knew him there.¹⁹⁹⁸ Tsafendas said that when he left the mountains, he buried his partisan clothes near a tree and made a mark there, so he could retrieve them when he was asked to return to the mountains. He never did return and never revealed anything else about his activities while in the mountains.¹⁹⁹⁹

Returning to Athens, Tsafendas used his World War Two service in the American Navy to help him secure a job with the American Reconstruction Mission. This was part of the US Marshall Plan to aid the recovery of war-torn Europe, specifically here to provide war material to the Greek army, and its British and American allies, for its war against the Communists. Tsafendas used his position as an interpreter and foreman to provide information on the war supplies to his comrades in the DSE. When his contract expired, he secured a job as an interpreter for Messrs. Steers-Grove, another American company. In April 1949, six months before the end of the Civil War when it was obvious that the Communists would lose, Tsafendas thought it would be safe now for him to leave Greece. He approached

¹⁹⁹⁷ Letter of the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Director of PIDE requesting information regarding John Michaletos, 7 November 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

¹⁹⁹⁸ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

¹⁹⁹⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

the Greek immigration authorities and managed to obtain a refugee passport through the Greek Red Cross.²⁰⁰⁰

The same month, on April 12, 1949, Tsafendas penned yet another appeal for permission to return to South Africa. The letter gave Tsafendas's home address as Box 80, Central Post Office, Athens, and was addressed to the Department of the Interior in South Africa, where it was date-stamped received on April 26. Tsafendas pointed out that he did war work in Johannesburg between 1940 and 1942, then "joined the Merchant Navy voluntarily and risked my life in submarine-infested seas all over the South & North Atlantic." He concluded, "I am here a man without a country, living in strange lands with people who have different ways of living, customs & languages." He signed the letter James²⁰⁰¹ Demetrios Tsafandakis.²⁰⁰² There was no known response, but almost certainly it was turned down, as were all his previous and subsequent applications. Tsafendas then approached a shipping company in Athens which allowed him to work his passage to France aboard the Greek cruise ship, *Corinthia*.²⁰⁰³ From France, he thought he could get to Portugal and from there back to Mozambique.

FRANCE AND PORTUGAL, 1949–1954

Arriving at Marseille, Tsafendas disembarked illegally but could find no work so travelled by train to Paris.²⁰⁰⁴ There, he presented himself to the immigration authorities and legalised his situation in France. He acquired a ninety-day visa for Spain, but stayed there for only three days, having decided to go on to Portugal.²⁰⁰⁵ In Paris, he visited the many historical sites associated with the French Revolution and bought two *bonnets rouges*, the soft, conical, red

²⁰⁰⁰ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas, NASA; Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, subject: Algemeen, NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁰⁰¹ James is an anglicised form of Dimitri often used by Greek people outside of their home country. Dimitri can also become Jimmy or Jim.

²⁰⁰² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 17. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²⁰⁰³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁰⁰⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁰⁰⁵ PIDE Confidential Report about Demetrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafantakis, 13 November 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

caps worn by the revolutionaries. He posted one to his father and kept the other for himself.²⁰⁰⁶

On November 8, 1949, Tsafendas was arrested at the Portuguese border post of Barca d'Alva as he left the train from Spain. He was carrying a passport issued in Athens²⁰⁰⁷ but officials said he did not hold the necessary identification to enter Portugal and there were doubts that he was Portuguese.²⁰⁰⁸ The police in Lourenço Marques informed the Portuguese that Tsafendas was indeed registered as Portuguese, adding that he was dismissed from his workplace for “voicing Communist ideas,” although nothing was proven.²⁰⁰⁹ Tsafendas was detained at Barca d'Alva for three months, then moved to Aljuba Prison in Lisbon,²⁰¹⁰ a notorious detention facility for political prisoners, which he described as “very bad.” He was held in a small cell for six months and said that at one point he thought that they would put him up against a wall and shoot him.²⁰¹¹

While Tsafendas was held in Aljuba Prison, the Portuguese authorities discovered that he had not served the compulsory military service in the Portuguese Army. Subsequently, he was taken to the Machine-gun Regiment 1 in Lisbon,²⁰¹² where he was brought before the Military Board of Inspection. Tsafendas claimed he had been rejected by a recruiting board in Mozambique because his mother was a Coloured woman. Investigators replied that there was no racial discrimination in Portuguese East Africa, that everyone must serve and therefore he must complete his service.²⁰¹³

When the Portuguese authorities contacted the colonial administration in Lourenço Marques about Tsafendas, they were told that he was not a deserter and had attended his military call-up interview but had been rejected because his mother was Coloured.²⁰¹⁴

²⁰⁰⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

²⁰⁰⁷ PIDE Confidential Report about Demitrio Tsafendas, 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁰⁸ PIDE Confidential Report about Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafantakis, 13 November 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁰⁹ PIDE Confidential Report about Demitrio Tsafendas, 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰¹⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT

²⁰¹¹ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3. 'Brainwashed in jail held man told Argus.'

²⁰¹² Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 November 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰¹³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰¹⁴ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

However, the law had changed four years earlier and every male Portuguese citizen was required to serve in the army. Thus, even if he was not a deserter, he was told that he must complete his military service.²⁰¹⁵ Tsafendas “did not want to serve a dictatorship”²⁰¹⁶ and with no avenue of escape, he pretended to be mad. Psychiatrists examined him and concluded that he was indeed insane, and so he received official exemption from military service.²⁰¹⁷ He was required to pay military taxes for his exemption in the sum of 1,200 Portuguese escudos and his situation in Portugal was legalized.²⁰¹⁸

After his release, Tsafendas requested and received from the Director of the International Police a card which declared him to be a maritime salesman, but again he faced difficult times.²⁰¹⁹ He said that he “could not find work but managed to survive through selling goods as a hawker.” He sold embroidery, postcards and watches, mainly to holidaymakers on cruise ships.²⁰²⁰ This would become one of Tsafendas’s favourite jobs and he would often resort to it when he did not have a steady job. In many ways, it was the perfect job for him, combining business and learning with pleasure, as he said. He was his own boss and could work wherever he wanted, for as long as he wanted; he travelled around Europe, seeing new places and meeting people, something he had always wanted to do, expanding his education and broadening his mind, as said. Had the work been more profitable and less arduous, he would have done it permanently, he said.²⁰²¹ Tsafendas was a hawker for most of the time while he was in Portugal, but then again in South Africa.

²⁰¹⁵ Letter of Tsafendas to the Ministrao du Ultramar, 27 October 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT

²⁰¹⁶ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3. ‘Brainwashed in jail held man told Argus.’

²⁰¹⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁰¹⁸ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰¹⁹ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰²⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁰²¹ Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 January 2014

In October 1951, Tsafendas travelled on the ship *Save* to Lourenço Marques.²⁰²² When he was refused admittance by an order of the General Administration²⁰²³ because of his record as a Communist and the suspicion he was involved in subversive activities,²⁰²⁴ he dramatically doubled over, apparently stricken by acute appendicitis. He was rushed to a hospital in the city where he made a miraculous recovery and within an hour slipped out to freedom.²⁰²⁵ Tsafendas's half-sister, Katerina, said the appendicitis trick embarrassed the whole family. She told the author:

“All the Greeks in Lourenço Marques heard about it, even people in Pretoria mentioned it to our father. Even years after, people were still talking about how he pulled this dreadful act ... Anthony Maw was a very good friend of our family, especially my father, and we often socialised together. When Mr. Maw told my father about it, he [her father] almost died of shame.”²⁰²⁶

Tsafendas's first port of call was the home of his boyhood friend, Giorgos Grispos. Grispos gave his old friend food and volunteered to hide him, but Tsafendas wanted a Greek passport to get him to South Africa, so he headed for the office of the honorary Greek consul.²⁰²⁷ This was the Englishman, Anthony Maw, his father's old friend and neighbour. Maw greeted Tsafendas coldly since he was well aware of his reputation as a political trouble-maker and refused to issue any kind of travel document.²⁰²⁸ A few days later, the Portuguese police tracked down the fugitive Tsafendas and detained him for two weeks in the civil jail in Lourenço Marques.²⁰²⁹ Artemis Michaletos, Tsafendas's aunt, accompanied by

²⁰²² PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰²³ Portuguese Security Police's report regarding Dimitrio Tsafendas dated 21 February 1962, translated by the South African Department of Defence and sent to the COE on October 12, 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/6, Department of Defence. NASA.

²⁰²⁴ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

²⁰²⁵ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 May 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2014; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; All of the above witnesses, apart from Father Minas, were living at the time in Mozambique and heard about it. Father Minas was told about it by Tsafendas himself in the mid-1990s. Henk van Woerden in the *Mouthful of Glass* also describes the same scene (2000: 70), presumably because he was told about it by Tsafendas.

²⁰²⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

²⁰²⁷ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

²⁰²⁸ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

²⁰²⁹ PIDE Record of questions. 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

her son John Michaletos, visited Tsafendas in prison and took him food that she had cooked.²⁰³⁰ On December 15, 1951, Deputy Police Chief António Fernandes Roquete, with Mário Figueira, agent and clerk, interrogated their prisoner, who gave his name as Demitri Tsafendas and not Tsafandakis.²⁰³¹ Tsafendas described his life up to that time and was soon released without any charges,²⁰³² but was informed that he was banned from entering Mozambique.²⁰³³ On December 26, 1951, he was put on the ship *Angola*²⁰³⁴ to Lisbon.²⁰³⁵ Because of his political ideas and activities, he would spend the next twelve years in exile, unable to return to the country where he was born.

Tsafendas arrived back in Lisbon in January 1952. The Portuguese authorities demanded that he pay for the trip since in Lourenço Marques he had claimed he could not afford the ticket. Tsafendas refused, arguing that he had not been allowed to disembark in Lourenço Marques and he should not have to pay for a trip that he was forced to make.²⁰³⁶ The authorities then asked PIDE in Mozambique to provide them with Tsafendas's file. Security reports from Mozambique told the Portuguese that Tsafendas was a "half-caste" and a "Communist" who was under suspicion of "unclear activities" during his time in Mozambique.²⁰³⁷ The police wanted to know more about these "unclear activities" and whether he was still a Communist and he was interrogated about these matters. Apparently unconvinced by his answers, the police decided to detain him for further interrogation. He was transported to the Cascais (Caxias) Fort, a notorious detention facility for political prisoners, controlled by PIDE. He remained behind bars there there for about a year.²⁰³⁸

In 1962, Neville Vincent, a prominent London barrister, member of the Labour Party and chairman of the Prisoner of Conscience Fund, was sent by Amnesty International to investigate the conditions of political prisoners in Portugal. Two of the institutions he

²⁰³⁰ John and Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²⁰³¹ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰³² Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰³³ Confidential Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no: 2.077- S.R., 3 May 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰³⁴ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰³⁵ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰³⁶ PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 5 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰³⁷ *Diário Popular*, 9 September 1966, 'E conhesido em Lisboa o assassino do Dr. Verwoerd.'

²⁰³⁸ PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 5 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

inspected were Aljuba, where Tsafendas was detained in 1949, and the Caxias Fort where he was held in 1952. Vincent wrote:

“Torture of political prisoners is common; men are brutally beaten; prisoners are kept in dungeons in practically permanent darkness in solitary confinement for long periods; people practically out of their minds are put in a room with yellow walls, painted blue round the top. They think the blue represents the outside world and take crazy running jumps at the walls with dreadful consequences. I learned of a case of a woman badly beaten, and then burnt all over with cigarette ends, however, the most common torture is the statue. Prisoners are made to stand against a wall or post continuously for as long as seven days and seven nights; after two or three days their legs begin to swell, but if they fall down a guard is there continuously to kick them until they stand up again. Throughout this period the PIDE come and question the prisoner to obtain such information as they require. The cells are either grossly overcrowded, or, if you are in solitary confinement, the cell measures one metre by two metres; many of these are extremely damp, and the prisoners consistently complain about the cold in the winter.”²⁰³⁹

Both Aljuba and the Caxias prison were controlled by the secret police. Whereas up to 1945, the disposition of political prisoners was decided by military courts, from 1945 to 1949 regular courts assumed this responsibility, but as Vincent wrote, “this proved highly unsatisfactory to the government.” A decree of June 13, 1949, specifically provided that it was the duty of the PIDE to apply or extend “security measures,” namely internment, to suspect persons “as long as they show themselves dangerous.” The decree effectively authorised the police to keep men and women in prison indefinitely.²⁰⁴⁰

Tsafendas did not escape the torture meted out to his fellow prisoners. He told several witnesses, and later the police in South Africa, that the police gave him electric shocks in an attempt to find out about his activities in Mozambique, but also to change his political beliefs.²⁰⁴¹ At one point, he said, he could not take the pain and so played the madman again. He claimed a tapeworm lived inside him, ate his food and controlled his life. According to

²⁰³⁹ Vincent (*The Spectator*), 12 April 1962: 11, ‘The shame of Portugal.’ Available at <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/13th-april-1962/11/the-shame-of-portugal>

²⁰⁴⁰ Vincent (*The Spectator*), 12 April 1962: 11, ‘The shame of Portugal.’ Available at <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/13th-april-1962/11/the-shame-of-portugal>

²⁰⁴¹ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.’; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Tsafendas, the police then stopped torturing him.²⁰⁴² He was then taken to the Instituto de Medicina Tropical and then to the Hospital do Ultramar for psychiatric examination. A PIDE report said that “During his interrogations he gave signs of having some sort of mental disability, which was confirmed by the Hospital do Ultramar.”²⁰⁴³

The Hospital do Ultramar’s report described Tsafendas as a victim of “intestinal parasitosis (and) manic-depressive psychosis.”²⁰⁴⁴ Adjudged not to be dangerous, he was released from the hospital. Friends of Tsafendas said he was proud of how he fooled his Portuguese torturers and secured his release from one of the most feared prisons in Portugal.²⁰⁴⁵ On April 23, 1953, he moved to the Albergue da Mitra (Hostel Mitra), a hostel for the aged and destitute in Lisbon,²⁰⁴⁶ and remained there until August of the same year.²⁰⁴⁷ Harassed constantly by PIDE, which subjected him to house searches and identification inquiries,²⁰⁴⁸ Tsafendas decided to move elsewhere. On November 26, 1953, a Portuguese passport (nº. 12326/53, Series BO-0332) was issued to him and on January 8, 1954, Tsafendas left Portugal.²⁰⁴⁹

DENMARK, SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY, 1954–1955

Tsafendas’s first exposure to Western Europe came in Denmark and Sweden, where he worked as a carpenter,²⁰⁵⁰ but not for long. He liked both countries and the people, but found it difficult to cope with the severe cold. At some point in 1954, he travelled to West Germany, but without the necessary paper work and unable to speak good German, it was

²⁰⁴² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²⁰⁴³ PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 12 December 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 5 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁴⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 24. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²⁰⁴⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁰⁴⁶ http://www.cmjornal.xl.pt/nacional/sociedade/detalhe/albergue_da_mitra_cedido_a_santa_casa.html

²⁰⁴⁷ PIDE report regarding Demetri Tsafendas. 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁴⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²⁰⁴⁹ Letter of the Director-General of the Economic and Consular Affairs of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Director of PIDE regarding Tsafendas, proc. 518/15/55. 5 April 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁵⁰ Ochsensall Hospital report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 6 June 1955. K150. Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub-file: 1/8. NASA.

impossible to get a job. Unemployed, homeless and penniless, he presented himself to the Tropen Krankenhaus hospital in Hamburg, claiming to suffer from tapeworm trouble. He said a tapeworm had been bothering him since 1937. Nothing was found and he was discharged.²⁰⁵¹

Turning to the Greek Orthodox Church of St. Nicholas in Hamburg, Tsafendas made friends with some of the Greek parishioners, as well as with the priest, Father Damaskinos Doxiartis, who gave him some church jobs to earn a little money. At the same time, Tsafendas made contact with the local Communists and began an affair with a young party member, a university student. After a while, he moved in with her, but despite all his efforts, he failed to obtain a work permit. Embarrassed to live as he was, effectively supported by the German girl, he broke off the relationship and moved out. One advantage, however, was that during the time he spent with her, he improved his German quite a lot.²⁰⁵²

Once again homeless and penniless, he turned up at the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital in Hamburg on February 11, 1955, claiming he had taken twenty sleeping tablets in an attempt to commit suicide. When the doctors pumped his stomach without result and knowing that sooner or later he would be told to leave, Tsafendas started talking about a tapeworm. According to the hospital report, he also showed symptoms of depression, appeared soporific and blamed the tapeworm for all his ills.²⁰⁵³

Tsafendas had not told anyone about his hospitalization, so Father Damaskinos was surprised to see him as a patient when he visited church members who were patients in the hospital. The priest told Tsafendas's friends and they started dropping in on him. They included his German ex-girlfriend who resumed the relationship with him.²⁰⁵⁴ Among them were Swiss, Greek and American preachers from the same Christian sect he belonged. One of the sect's leaders, Ralph Daniels, an American, travelled from Karlsruhe to see him. However, a member of his sect warned the doctors that he did not trust Tsafendas as he had admitted to him that he had deserted during the Second World War.²⁰⁵⁵

²⁰⁵¹ Dr. Bieser's medical report on Tsafendas, Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital, 6 April 1955. K150. Vol. 4, Sub-file 1/8. NASA.

²⁰⁵² Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁵³ Dr Bieser and Dr Schmidt-Janssen report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

²⁰⁵⁴ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁵⁵ Ochsensall Hospital report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas. 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub-file: 1/8. NASA.

Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis, who later replaced Father Damaskinos at Saint Nicholas's church, met Tsafendas when he visited the hospital with Father Damaskinos. He recalled to the author:

“I don't remember much and I did not know him very well. I only saw him four-five times ... he went to the church quite often ... he seemed perfectly fine... I can't remember what he told us about why he was hospitalised, but he definitely never told me or Father Damaskinos anything about this tapeworm, not even when we were in the hospital, I would have remembered such thing ... he came to the church to see us when he was released from the hospital and seemed fine ... he never said or did anything to make me or Father Damaskinos believe that he was insane or even a little unbalanced. His German was very good. I remember Father Damaskinos telling me that this man learned the language within a few months of his arrival in Germany and there were Greeks who had been living there for many years and their German was not as good as his ... he never discussed politics with me.”²⁰⁵⁶

Asked by the author if he or Father Damaskinos got the impression that Tsafendas might be faking his illness, Father Efthimios said, “He did not give me that impression ... I am not sure about Father Damaskinos, but I think he also did not get such an impression. I certainly did not get the impression that he was faking it, why would he do such thing? But I also certainly did not get the impression that he was mentally ill. Definitely not, he was perfectly normal.”²⁰⁵⁷

With the resumption of his relationship with the German girl, Tsafendas had no reason to remain in the hospital and on June 6, 1955, he was discharged. A report by Dr. Bieser and Dr Schmidt-Janssen said their patient gradually improved with care, suffered a setback at one point requiring further treatment, but eventually “was quieter, had no complaints and no more paranoid ideas.” The diagnosis of Dr. Bieser, a senior physician, was “*mixed-pictured phasic psychose*”²⁰⁵⁸ and that of Dr. Nachtwey, a psychiatrist, was “*endogenous depression, mixed-picture.*”²⁰⁵⁹ The report said Tsafendas was picked up by a

²⁰⁵⁶ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁵⁷ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁵⁸ Dr Bieser and Dr Schmidt-Janssen report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

²⁰⁵⁹ Medical Buletin of Dimitrio Tsafendas, 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

female friend who was going to accommodate him.²⁰⁶⁰ The female friend was his German girlfriend.²⁰⁶¹ Tsafendas spent the next few months staying with friends in the city²⁰⁶² during which time he associated with Turkish immigrant workers and began picking up a few words of Turkish. By then, his German had so improved so much that he was able to hold a fluent conversation in the language.²⁰⁶³

PORTUGAL, 1955-1958

Sometime in the summer of 1955 Tsafendas made an application to the Portuguese consulate in Hamburg for his “urgent repatriation.” It was accepted and he returned to Portugal on June 11, 1955 on board the Portuguese ship, *India*. There he resumed his life as an itinerant hawker.²⁰⁶⁴ He associated openly with leftists, Communists and other opponents of Salazar’s dictatorship,²⁰⁶⁵ and thus became a PIDE target once more, constantly watched,²⁰⁶⁶ and subjected to house searches and ID inquiries.²⁰⁶⁷ Jorge Perestrelo, who met Tsafendas in Lisbon, found him to be “a queer chap, and most reserved, although apparently harmless. Nevertheless, one could see how anxious he was to oppose the authorities.”²⁰⁶⁸ It was at this time that Tsafendas began a relationship with a Portuguese woman which, for a time, became serious, since at one point, she moved into with him in his apartment.²⁰⁶⁹

Since being expelled from Mozambique in 1951, Tsafendas had made several requests to the Portuguese Government to be allowed to return, but he was always turned down.²⁰⁷⁰

²⁰⁶⁰ Ochsensall Hospital report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas. 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub-file: 1/8. NASA

²⁰⁶¹ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁶² Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw, 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁰⁶³ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁶⁴ PIDE report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas or Dimitrie Tsafandakis. 21 February 1962. K150, Vol. 4, Sub-file: 1/6. Department of Justice. NASA.

²⁰⁶⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²⁰⁶⁶ Numerous PIDE reports throughout the years regarding Tsafendas’s movements and activities. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁶⁷ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²⁰⁶⁸ Cuttings from the *Diario Popular* of 9.9.66. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁰⁶⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁰⁷⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

On April 18, 1956, he wrote to the Minister of the Interior²⁰⁷¹ and on April 7, 1958, he sent a letter to the President of the Portuguese Republic as follows: “I am writing to inform you that I have been exiled in Portugal since 1951. I do not know why I am here, since there are no charges against me, and I have not been judged. I wish that, according to the law of amnesty, to go back to my homeland, or to be judged before a court so I am at least aware of the motives of my situation, and of who wishes me harm.”²⁰⁷²

After PIDE supplied information regarding Tsafendas’s “political and professional activities,”²⁰⁷³ both requests were turned down. The PIDE reports contained information about Tsafendas’s life, travels, arrests, and the fact that he was dismissed from a job “for voicing Communist ideas,”²⁰⁷⁴ while both concluded with the same sentence: “During his interrogations he gave signs of having some sort of mental disability, which was confirmed by the Overseas Hospital.”²⁰⁷⁵

In 1957 and 1958, Tsafendas “applied for, and was granted, permission to go on board ships lying in the Tagus to ply his trade of itinerant vendor of regional articles and embroideries.”²⁰⁷⁶ Later in 1958, he travelled to Belgium for the Brussels World Fair (Expo 58) where he exhibited stocks of embroidery.²⁰⁷⁷ He later spoke of his shock and disgust at the exhibition of a Congolese village, a “Human Zoo,” at the Fair, considering it the most appalling thing he had witnessed in so-called “civilised” Europe. He complained about it to

²⁰⁷¹ Letter of Demetri Tsafendas to the Interior Minister. 18 April 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁷² Letter of Demetri Tsafendas to the President of the Portuguese Republic. (n.d. but according to the reply it was on March 1958) PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁷³ Letter of the Directorate-General of the Political and Civil Administration of the Overseas Ministry to the Director of the International and State Defence Police. 7 April 1958. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁷⁴ PIDE report regarding Demetri Tsafendas. 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁷⁵ PIDE report regarding Demetri Tsafendas to the Minister of Interior. 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; PIDE report regarding Demetri Tsafendas to the Director General of the Civil and Political Administration Overseas Ministry. 18 April 1958. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁷⁶ PIDE report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas or Dimitrie Tsafandakis. 21 February 1962. K150, Vol. 4, Sub-file 1/6. Department of Justice. NASA.

²⁰⁷⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

various officials, but nothing happened.²⁰⁷⁸ Tsafendas's venture in Brussels was not the financial success he had hoped and he moved on.²⁰⁷⁹

WEST GERMANY, 1958-1959

In September 1958, Tsafendas arrived back in West Germany and registered at the Frankfurt Aliens Office.²⁰⁸⁰ With some of the money he had made at the Fair, he bought an elderly American automobile from an American soldier stationed in Germany. The soldier was going back to the United States and wanted a quick sale, so he let it go quite cheaply.²⁰⁸¹

On September 18, Tsafendas started work as a welder at the heavy engineering company of Fries and Son in a Frankfurt suburb. Horst Hartmann, Senior Personnel Officer at the company, said:

“He drove up here in a big battered American car. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous ... a very pleasant man. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman, and his looks certainly didn't fit the job he wanted. But he spoke good German, so I took him on.”²⁰⁸²

Six weeks later Tsafendas left Fries and Son voluntarily, with a very good reference in his briefcase. Horst Hartmann said, “we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker. He left of his own accord ... we would have liked to keep him.”²⁰⁸³ Although he stayed with the company for only six weeks, Tsafendas made a lasting impression. Eight years later, Guenter Haafe, fifty-seven, the factory gatekeeper, remembered the jovial greeting Tsafendas gave him every morning. He said: “He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come into my locker room to say hi. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met and trust me, in my twelve years as a doorman I have seen thousands and

²⁰⁷⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

²⁰⁷⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁰⁸⁰ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966 (late edition): 2. ‘Did he live in W. Germany?’

²⁰⁸¹ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁸² *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression.’

²⁰⁸³ *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly.’

thousands of faces coming in and out. This man was courteous, they do not make them like that anymore.” Three other workmates said, “He was a nice guy,” “He was a good comrade” and “He left me with a good impression”²⁰⁸⁴

Tsafendas spent another year in West Germany, including six months working for Anglo-American Fashions and Designers in Frankfurt, and the rest at a US Army printing works in Hochst, a district of Frankfurt.²⁰⁸⁵ At some point during his time in Germany, though the author cannot state precisely when, Tsafendas visited the birthplace of Karl Marx in Trier.²⁰⁸⁶ Sometime in 1958, Tsafendas returned to Hamburg to see his friends there, including the Communist girl and the priests from Saint Nicholas's church. He was driving the automobile he had bought from the departing American soldier in Frankfurt and Father Efthimios was impressed. “It was one of these big American cars you see in the movies,” he said, “very long and it seemed to be quite old, too.”²⁰⁸⁷

Tsafendas wanted to sell it because he was going to England and did not want to take it with him. Some Greeks expressed interest but they offered very little because of the machine's condition and age. Eventually, he gifted the car to his girlfriend as thanks for her kindness when he had nothing. According to Father Efthimios, throughout the time that he knew him, Tsafendas “seemed very well, nothing to indicate that he might be unbalanced. He was certainly perfectly fine.”²⁰⁸⁸

ENGLAND, 1959²⁰⁸⁹

After five years in continental Europe, Tsafendas arrived in Dover, England from France, on May 16, 1959.²⁰⁹⁰ As a Portuguese passport-holder, however, work was hard to come by and

²⁰⁸⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly.’

²⁰⁸⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁰⁸⁶ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁸⁷ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁸⁸ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

²⁰⁸⁹ Tsafendas visited England and specifically London at least twice, in 1959 and 1962. Those who met him in London are unsure about the exact dates. One told the *Guardian* in 1966 that they met “a few years ago,” while another testified to the South African police that it was about 1960.” Events taken from these people's statements are included here at the time that seems most likely. However, it is possible that the events described took place at Tsafendas's other London visit.

²⁰⁹⁰ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

the best he could get were casual jobs.²⁰⁹¹ He asked the authorities if he could take a language test and work as a hotel porter but this was refused, as was his application to remain in the country as a student; he was ordered to leave the UK by September 2, 1959.²⁰⁹² However, he ignored the order and remained in the UK “working clandestinely because legally he was not authorised.”²⁰⁹³

While in London, Tsafendas again applied for permission to enter South Africa, sending a letter and an application form dated August 4, 1959 to the Union's immigration attaché in London. A note attached to his file at the embassy stated that Tsafendas had sought permanent residence status in South Africa several times without success, that in 1941 he entered illegally and was fined; it said he had Communist leanings and had threatened to enter without permission if he was denied again. The diplomat dealing with the application wrote, “Refusal is suggested”. On September 11, 1959, “Demetrio Tsafandakis, alias Demetrio Tsafendas,” was blacklisted by the South African Department of the Interior, meaning that he could receive no passport or admission facilities without the consent of the Department's head office.²⁰⁹⁴

Tsafendas frequently visited the headquarters of the Anti-Slavery Society, and sometimes spoke there about the living conditions for non-White South Africans and Mozambicans in their respective countries. He became very active for the society, participating in meetings and demonstrations. He also became friendly with Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt, the secretary of the Society and one of the leading figures in the modern anti-slavery movement. When Tsafendas's money ran out and he was left homeless, Fox-Pitt arranged for him to stay at a hostel in Victoria in central London and gifted him with a grey flannel suit, which Tsafendas kept up to the assassination. Fox-Pitt characterised Tsafendas as “very simple-minded and not at all sinister.”²⁰⁹⁵ Tsafendas remembered Fox-Pitt as one of the finest men he ever met.²⁰⁹⁶

²⁰⁹¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁰⁹² Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

²⁰⁹³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁰⁹⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraphs 28-30. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²⁰⁹⁵ *The Guardian*, 30 September 1966: 10, ‘Winding back’; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁰⁹⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

From contacts in the Anti-Slavery Society, Tsafendas got in touch with the British anti-apartheid movement, then in its infancy. He became an enthusiastic participant in public demonstrations and attended many lectures and speeches. He also got to know anti-apartheid activist David Gardener and the ANC representative in London, Tennyson Xola Makiwane, with whom he associated throughout his time in London, helping them with tasks, such as distributing leaflets and putting up posters.²⁰⁹⁷ He also met leading anti-apartheid activists such as Solly Sachs and the Church of England activist clergyman, the Rev. Canon Collins.²⁰⁹⁸

During his time in London, Tsafendas placed flowers on the grave of Karl Marx in Highgate Cemetery²⁰⁹⁹ and “was noticed in the company of leftists.”²¹⁰⁰ He also attended political meetings in Hyde Park, Labour Party meetings at London’s Caxton Hall and many others organised by the Committee of African Organisations.²¹⁰¹ Evidence was later submitted to the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination that while in London Tsafendas tried to “recruit people to take part in an uprising in South Africa.” Tsafendas admitted to the Commission that he endeavoured to recruit people for an uprising, but his aim was “confined to the Territory of Mozambique.”²¹⁰²

Unable to find work and too embarrassed to continue staying at the hostel at Fox-Pitt’s expense, Tsafendas moved out. In order to thank his benefactor for his kindness and generosity, he gave him one of the three copies of Paul Robeson’s *Song of Free Men* he had brought from the United States as a present.²¹⁰³ Subsequently, seeing no future for himself in Britain, he made another application for entry to South Africa. On September 11, 1959, after his application was turned down, he was placed on the Stop List of the South African Department of the Interior.²¹⁰⁴ High and dry in London, without money for bed and board and

²⁰⁹⁷ Edward Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Furness in his statement to the police on October 12, 1966, mentioned Makiwane as one of the people seen in London meetings of the anti-apartheid movement which were attended by Tsafendas. Tsafendas himself spoke to Father Minas Constandinou about a member of the ANC he met and associated in London who was later assassinated. Father Minas does not remember his name, but Makiwane was assassinated in 1980.

²⁰⁹⁸ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁰⁹⁹ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²¹⁰⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 31. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²¹⁰¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁰² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 32. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²¹⁰³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²¹⁰⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 30. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

with the police looking for him since he was now illegal, Tsafendas decided to take refuge in a hospital, until friends could help him get a job, so he could raise the fare to leave the country.²¹⁰⁵

On September 12, 1959 he “admitted himself to the mental ward of St. Pancras Hospital in London, telling doctors “that he had a fixation about a tapeworm.”²¹⁰⁶ He did not enjoy his stay at the hospital as the rules were quite strict and he was restricted to his ward. While there, he learned about the Isle of Wight, a “beautiful small island,” off the south coast of England, with an “impressive psychiatric hospital which was like an ancient castle.” He had never heard of this island, but he still decided to visit it because he “liked castles since he was a child.”²¹⁰⁷ Tsafendas accordingly cut short his stay at the St. Pancras Hospital after a few days. According to Tsafendas, he was treated for “depressive psychosis.”²¹⁰⁸

On October 4, although penniless, Tsafendas managed to make his way to the Isle of Wight, and after a look around, admitted himself at the Whitecroft Mental Hospital, near Newport, claiming mental problems.²¹⁰⁹ According to Tsafendas, the hospital staff was initially suspicious, considering it strange that a foreigner should just turn up at the psychiatric hospital of this small island. Most of the patients had been transferred there upon a doctor’s recommendation - nobody had ever turned up on the doorstep. Tsafendas said this was his trickiest problem. He could not claim that he was just passing, since it was a small island, and suddenly fell ill. Instead, he said he was a tourist and gradually managed to convince the doctors that his case was genuine. Unlike the St. Pancras Hospital, this was one very relaxed and he was allowed to walk out in the hospital’s garden. Tsafendas described his stay there as like “living in a very good hotel.”²¹¹⁰

On December 3, 1959, British police officers arrived at the hospital and arrested Tsafendas for being an illegal immigrant. The doctors issued a medical certificate which

²¹⁰⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²¹⁰⁶ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁰⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²¹⁰⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 33. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²¹⁰⁹ Secret Telegram from the South African Embassy in London to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

²¹¹⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

described his mental condition as good enough for him to travel to any country.²¹¹¹ Tsafendas said he was expecting this to happen because he could tell that the doctors were not convinced by his story and he expected them to contact the authorities. However, he had no money and it was impossible to take the ferry back to the English mainland.²¹¹² A deportation hearing was held the same day, which lasted only a few hours. The authorities wanted to deport him to Portugal, but he told them he wished to be sent to West Germany as this is where he had come from. Later that day, he was deported to West Germany.²¹¹³

WEST GERMANY AND MIDDLE EAST, 1959–1961

Tsafendas arrived in Frankfurt, where he managed to get a work permit. Subsequently, he worked for six months in a tractor factory in Munich, but his intention was always to return to South Africa.²¹¹⁴ Tsafendas was in Germany when he read about the massacre at Sharpeville, South Africa, where apartheid police shot dead, most of them in the back, sixty-nine peaceful, non-White protestors on March 21, 1960. Tsafendas later declared that this was a pivotal moment in his life and what convinced him to “do something” against Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid.²¹¹⁵ He applied for South African citizenship to return to the country but it was refused.²¹¹⁶

Since it was impossible for him to get back to South Africa legally, he decided to take an illegal route, travelling down through Africa. A temporary Portuguese passport was issued to him on May 25, 1960 and on June 30, he left Munich by train, travelling through Austria and Yugoslavia to Piraeus, Greece, then by ferry to Alexandria, Egypt. While there, his passport expired, and the Portuguese Consulate refused to renew it. However, he managed to obtain a refugee passport from the Red Cross and travelled to Beirut, Lebanon, by ferry. He

²¹¹¹ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

²¹¹² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²¹¹³ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Report of the COE, Chapter II B, Paragraph 33. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²¹¹⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹¹⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²¹¹⁶ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

stayed there for a few days with some people from the Christian Church.²¹¹⁷ At some point, he crossed the River Jordan and travelled to Jerusalem, where he presented himself on January 20, 1961 at the Consulate-General of Spain, requesting a visa for Israel, as a refugee. The consul-general could not determine if Tsafendas was in fact a political refugee, and did not assist him.²¹¹⁸

Tsafendas also contacted the Portuguese Consulate-General asking for a new passport, but was refused after the consul-general received the following communication from the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“Referring to your request Proc. 518/15/55-CO334- of the 5th of this month, I am honoured to inform that Demitrio Tsafendas was suspected, when he was in Mozambique, of voicing Communist ideas, but nothing concrete was proven. In 1951, he came to the Metropolis because he was not allowed to continue to reside in that Province. Once here, he became a marine salesman, and went on several trips with his Greek passport (he is the son of a Greek and of a half-caste Portuguese), having been imprisoned a few times in Canada and in the USA, for clandestine immigration. He seems to have some sort of mental disability, which was confirmed by the Overseas Hospital. According to what has been stated, he cannot be considered as a political refugee, since we know nothing of his recent activities that would classify him as such, and hence keeping him is not important.”²¹¹⁹

Tsafendas was accommodated in Jerusalem by the Lutheran Church while he looked for a job to get enough money together to leave the country.²¹²⁰ He said, “I was living on my wits for about four months.” Nevertheless, he managed to visit the Jordan and sites in the Holy Land.²¹²¹ With his trans-Africa plan blocked due to his inability to get an acceptable passport, and being without money, Tsafendas decided to return to Portugal. Travelling through Lebanon and Syria by bus, he crossed the Taurus mountain range and reached

²¹¹⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹¹⁸ Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, proc. 518/15/55. Co. 334. 6 April 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²¹¹⁹ Confidential Report of the Director-General of the Economic and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2.077-S.R. 3 May 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²¹²⁰ Report of the Ministerio Dos Negocios Estrangeiros, proc. 518/15/55. Co. 334. 6 April 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²¹²¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Ankara in May 1961, where he stayed for a month, learning the rudiments of the Turkish tongue.²¹²² While there, he managed to get a Greek passport from the Greek Embassy.²¹²³

ISTANBUL, 1961

It must have been around June of 1961 when Tsafendas reached Istanbul.²¹²⁴ Virtually penniless, he sold his blood at a hospital. He was “paid about one pound for a pint of blood,”²¹²⁵ roughly equivalent to a Turkish labourer’s weekly wage.²¹²⁶ Soon after he arrived, he visited the Greek Orthodox church of Panagia in the city’s Pera Taxi district and met some Greek believers. One of them was Father Nikola Banovic, who he started helping with some work at the church and the Greek Orthodox cemetery, because “he had nothing else to do.” The priest was very impressed with Tsafendas’s “knowledge of the Bible and other holy scriptures.”²¹²⁷

Father Nikola Banovic described Tsafendas to the author as “a very polite and well-mannered man, a gentleman...” He told the author:

“He had vast general knowledge and was very well read ... he had some books with him and he would often come back home with a new book. Most of them were in Greek, but some were in Turkish... the way he spoke was very distinctive ... he spoke good Greek, but he used the grammar in a very different and distinctive way, talking like a teacher or an author, using nice words ... he was one of the kindest people I ever met... he had a good heart ...you don’t often meet people like Dimitris, he was special, a man in a million. Honestly it was a privilege to have met him.”²¹²⁸

One day Tsafendas asked if he could rent a small empty room near the church. The room had no bed or other furniture and Father Nikola invited him to move into a small spare room in his own home, which was in a block of flats, just fifty metres from the church. At that time, Tsafendas started teaching English to local children, mostly Greeks but also to

²¹²² Confidential Report of the Ministerio Dos Negocios Estrangeiros regarding Dimtri Tsafendas, proc. 518/15/55. Co. 367. 20 October 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²¹²³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹²⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹²⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹²⁶ Van Woerden, 2000: 76.

²¹²⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹²⁸ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

some Turkish children who lived in the neighbourhood. The children adored him; they found him funny and were fascinated by the stories of exotic Africa. The children's parents offered to pay for the tuition but Tsafendas refused to take their money. Several mothers then brought him food from their own kitchens. In two or three weeks, Tsafendas had some fifty students and spent three or four days per week teaching them. The main lesson took place in a room near the church, after the Sunday Mass.²¹²⁹

Tsafendas worked for several weeks part-time, whenever there were some Greek tourists, as a tour guide for them. Most of them were only interested in Greek religious places, like the Hagia Sophia and other churches, and it was easy for Tsafendas to show them around. It was Father Nikola who recommended him to the tourists when they visited his church. He also worked for about two-three weeks on the construction of a house, for which he was paid. Even though the job was very tiring, once he finished for the day, he would go to teach the children. Father Nikola said, "He believed education was the most important thing for someone and wanted to help the children learn. He loved children." Father Nikola's twelve-year-old daughter, Elena, adored Tsafendas and they spent hours together. He called her by the diminutive Elenitsa, helped with her studies, taught her English, African children's songs and held her spellbound with exotic stories about distant Africa.²¹³⁰

According to Father Nikola:

"[Tsafendas] never gave me the slightest indication that he might be mentally ill, absolutely none ... he was very intelligent and well-mannered, especially with the women and the elderly; always willing to help them. When I first met him, his Turkish was just good enough to communicate, but he improved extremely fast. In only two or three months in the country, he could not only communicate in Turkish, but teach English to Turkish students at the best college in Istanbul" [a reference to Tsafendas's time working at a prestigious college, the Limasollu Naci]. How someone could do that, I don't know! I know people who have been living here for five and six years and their Turkish is not as good as Dimitris's."

Tsafendas often visited the Grand Bazaar as he believed this was the best place to improve his Turkish; by talking to the merchants and people there.²¹³¹ He toured the city alone every day, visiting historical places, and he never got lost. When he told the priest

²¹²⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

²¹³⁰ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹³¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

where he had been, he was astonished how he managed to go to all these places. Tsafendas would also often go to the theatre and the cinema.²¹³²

Father Nikolas said:

“He [Tsafendas] never mentioned a tapeworm or any illness that he might have had ... he told me that he was arrested by the Portuguese because he was a Communist and anti-colonial. He said he was tortured by them and in order to make them stop, he ‘played the fool’ and it worked because they let him go ... he definitely told me he ‘played the fool’, but he never mentioned the tapeworm or this Saint Peter’s act you told me ... if I had known at the time that he had killed this man [Dr. Verwoerd], I would have gone to court to testify for him ... yes, I mean as a defence witness; I would have sworn that he was not insane; there is absolutely no way this man to have been insane. I lived with him in the same house for four months; there was never even the slightest indication that he might be even slightly unbalanced, never ... he was a good-hearted man with high principles.”²¹³³

According to Father Nikola, they spent many hours talking about Christianity, but even more about politics. The priest was unaware of the situation in South Africa and remembered Tsafendas using the word “Nazis” about the apartheid regime. He describes Tsafendas as fanatical about politics, a Communist and anti-imperialist, with revolutionary ideas. When Tsafendas admitted that he was a Communist, the priest urged him not to reveal this to anyone, since most Greeks would not be sympathetic, but also because Communism was then banned in Turkey. Tsafendas also had with him two records of Communist songs, one in Italian and one in Russian.²¹³⁴

While he was in Istanbul, Adolf Eichmann’s trial was taking place in Israel. Tsafendas was deeply interested in this event, buying newspapers and talking avidly about it. When the Nazi architect of the “Final Solution” was sentenced to death on December 15, 1961, Tsafendas expressed his delighted agreement. Father Nikola said he disagreed with the death penalty and Tsafendas explained that while he, too, opposed capital punishment generally, he believed that for people like Eichmann the death penalty should apply. He

²¹³² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹³³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹³⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

added that if he had money and knew the whereabouts of Nazi war criminals then still at large, he would try to locate them and would have no hesitation in killing them himself.²¹³⁵

The above was not the only disagreement between Father Nikola and Tsafendas. The priest found it very strange that he was a Communist and Christian at the same time. Tsafendas gave the same answer to everyone from 1961 to 1999. He said that “Jesus was the first socialist ever” and that “his teaching had a lot in common with Communism.” For Tsafendas, Jesus Christ was a revolutionary like “Che, Fidel, Lenin, Benjamin Franklin, Bolivar and Spartacus.” He believed that Jesus and his twelve apostles constituted the first socialist movement and he often said that “if Jesus was alive today, he would be a revolutionary”²¹³⁶ who would have been fighting apartheid and in revolutionary wars against colonialists and dictators.²¹³⁷

The priest was further surprised when one day Tsafendas introduced him to a Greek comrade, a fellow Democratic Army member who was with him in the Greek Civil War. This man was a dentist and travelled to Istanbul from Sofia, Bulgaria, just to see Tsafendas. He had escaped from Greece and settled in Bulgaria after the DSE was defeated during the war.²¹³⁸

While in Istanbul, Tsafendas became friendly with Father Agathagelos Vaporidis, the priest at Hagia Triada (Holy Trinity) church. Ms. Alexandra Vaporidis, wife of Father Agathagelos, met Tsafendas. “I didn’t know him very well. My husband and Father Nikola knew him well. To tell you the truth, I was a little scared of him because he was a Communist.”²¹³⁹ She remembers the first time she met him when her husband told her that a “Greek Communist from Africa is coming for dinner.” She told the author:

²¹³⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹³⁶ Father Camilo Torres Restrepo (1929-1966), a Colombian Roman Catholic priest, socialist, university professor and member of Colombia’s National Liberation Army, had said something similar, namely that “If Jesus were alive today, he would be a guerrillero.” The author is not in position to know whether Tsafendas was rephrasing Restrepo’s quote or if it was his own inspiration. More likely it was Tsafendas’s own creation since he had been using the phrase from at least 1961, before Father Restrepo became internationally known. Also, several renowned philosophers, like Robert Eisler and Karl Kautsky, have expressed their views that Jesus was a revolutionary and the first Communist. The author is not in position to know whether Tsafendas’s belief about Jesus being a revolutionary was his own or if it was inspired by the writings of such philosophers.

²¹³⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²¹³⁸ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹³⁹ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

“I was a little scared; I had never met a Communist before and I was a little worried. But he was a normal man ... no, I was not expecting a monster, but he was not what I have expected. You know these days we were hearing all those things about Communists; they were portrayed almost as monsters ... I don't remember what we discussed ... He seemed like a normal person. The times we spoke he never said anything that would make me think that he was insane ... my husband also never mentioned anything. If he was insane, he and Father Nikola would have noticed; they spent a lot of time together and I know they both thought highly of him ... He seemed like a very nice man; everyone liked him and we were all sad to see him go, especially the children. We were very grateful that he was teaching the children English for free. I don't remember if he came to our house again but I definitely saw him a few times in the church and the cemetery ... after he left, he sent us a post-card ... I can't remember where from, thanking us for our hospitality. When he killed the man, my husband and Father Nikola prayed for him; they were both devastated.”²¹⁴⁰

One of Tsafendas's favourite poets was Nazim Hikmet, a Turkish Communist, and Father Nikola remembers him searching every bookshop in Istanbul for his works in Turkish.²¹⁴¹ Hikmet remained a life-long favourite and Tsafendas often talked of him and his poetry to the priests who visited him in hospital and in prison. When Father Minas told him that his act cost him all these years in prison, Tsafendas quoted a verses from Hikmet's poem *Like Karem (Kerem Gibi)*:²¹⁴²

*“If I don't burn,
if you don't burn,
if we don't burn,
how will the light vanquish the darkness?”*

A Greek woman whose son attended Tsafendas's classes was very friendly with a Turkish woman who taught English at Limasollu Naci, the most prestigious private language school in Turkey. She thought of introducing Tsafendas to her, so she could perhaps get him a job at the college since he was so good and popular with the children.²¹⁴³ Tsafendas met the

²¹⁴⁰ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

²¹⁴¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹⁴² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²¹⁴³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

Turkish woman²¹⁴⁴ when she visited one of his classes. She was impressed by him and his teaching, so she offered to introduce him to the owner of the language college, for whom it was named, Mr. Limasollu Naci.²¹⁴⁵

Limasollu Naci (1921-1992), who would become one of Tsafendas's best friends, was a Turkish Cypriot who moved from Cyprus to Turkey when he was four. He began his working life as a photographer and in 1940 became the first professional to use cine film in Istanbul. He held his first photo exhibition at the Faculty of Arts in 1947, opened his second in 1948 at the Community Centre in Beyoğlu, and later exhibited his work in Paris and London. He won first prize in an international photography contest in Turin, Italy in 1948.²¹⁴⁶ Limasollu is widely recognised as pre-eminent in the provision of private foreign languages institutes and distance learning in Turkey. He also pioneered the concept of introducing young Turks to foreign languages at summer camps, initially in the coastal regions of Turkey and later in Britain.²¹⁴⁷ He established his college in 1953; it was the first private language institute in Turkey and widely considered to be the best and certainly the most prestigious, with many students from wealthy and powerful families.²¹⁴⁸

Limasollu interviewed Tsafendas and offered him work at the college for a week on a trial basis, promising that if he was proficient and the students liked him, the position would be permanent. The pupils took to their new teacher immediately, mostly because of his fund of funny and exotic stories from Africa, so Tsafendas was hired permanently.²¹⁴⁹ Although he taught at the college full-time, he continued his free classes at the church and now that he had money, he would buy sweets for the children in his class.²¹⁵⁰

Tsafendas began going out with the Turkish woman and eventually, side-stepping her Islamic principles, they lived for some time together in her home. He was in love and very happy. However, after a few months, relations began to deteriorate. She wanted to marry him,

²¹⁴⁴ Father Nikola is the only person interviewed by the author who met this woman, but he does not remember her name. Tsafendas spoke about her to several people, including his sister Katerina, to Ira Kyriakakis and to the priests, but no one remembers her name. She is also mentioned at van Woerden's *A Mouthful of Glass*, but again her name is not given.

²¹⁴⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

²¹⁴⁶ *En so Haber*, 23 May 2012, 'Limasollu Naci kimdir.'

²¹⁴⁷ Akinturk, 2011: 2014

²¹⁴⁸ Durgun, 2013: 2; Advije Vedia Limasollu in a personal interview, 8 January 2016.

²¹⁴⁹ The fact that Tsafendas worked as teacher of English at the Limasollu Naci is mentioned in many official documents which I found at the archives such as: However, as we will see in the chapter about the Commission of Enquiry, the fact is briefly mentioned and is downgraded.

²¹⁵⁰ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

but Tsafendas did not want to live permanently in Istanbul, he wanted to get back to South Africa and Mozambique and fight their respective regimes. What's more, he was Christian and she was Muslim and neither was willing to convert to the other's religion.²¹⁵¹

Tsafendas developed a very good relationship with Limasollu. They would spend hours talking about politics, especially about Communism, since Limasollu was also a Communist. Limasollu told Father Nikola that Tsafendas was the best-read and most knowledgeable person he had ever met.²¹⁵² Tsafendas never forgot Limasollu or Father Nikola. He characterised Limasollu as "a great and very generous man, one of the best men" he ever met²¹⁵³ and Father Nikola as a "saint," an "unbelievably kind and wonderful man" and the best priest he ever met, "exactly as priests should be."²¹⁵⁴

Around December, 1961, after working for five or six months at the college, Tsafendas resigned. He told Limasollu and Father Nikola he intended to travel to Bulgaria and meet the dentist comrade's family, then go on to Athens and meet up with another comrade from the Civil War, John Michaletos, and spend Christmas there with his friend's family. His intention after that was to go back to Portugal, where he was hoping to convince the Portuguese to allow him to return to his beloved Mozambique. He said he was determined to do whatever it took to be given an amnesty. The college owner tried to change his mind and even asked for Father Nikola's help, but Tsafendas was resolute. Failing to change his mind, Limasollu gave Tsafendas extra money for his journey and handed him a glowing reference, which he would use later to get the job at the South African Parliament. Limasollu reiterated that Tsafendas was welcome back at the college any time.²¹⁵⁵

Before he left, Tsafendas bought gifts for every student, both at the college and the church. When he left, the English lessons stopped for the Greek children. Said Father Nikola, "He made a very positive contribution to the Greek community here and after he left, we all missed him, especially the children... for many years, they asked, 'When is Mr Dimitris coming back?' He had great affection for people, especially for poor people and children." Tsafendas maintained contact with both Father Nikola and Limasollu Naci until he died.²¹⁵⁶

²¹⁵¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

²¹⁵² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹⁵³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²¹⁵⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²¹⁵⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²¹⁵⁶ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

Furthermore, Tsafendas asked Father Nikola and Father Agathagelos to look after a stray dog that was lurking around the Greek Orthodox cemetery and which he was feeding. He had named it Robespierre. When Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd, Father Agathagelos and Father Nikola prayed constantly for him.²¹⁵⁷ Father Nikola was relieved to hear that Tsafendas was not executed; he had no doubt that he had “played the fool,” as he had done with the Portuguese, in order not to be hanged.²¹⁵⁸

After leaving Istanbul, Tsafendas sent presents to Father Nikola's daughter, Elena. What he did not know was that Elena had drowned while swimming in the sea in September 1962, just nine months after he last saw her. She was thirteen. Tsafendas only found out about her death about two years later when he was in Pretoria.²¹⁵⁹ He was devastated and cried for days and for the first time in his life he lost his appetite.²¹⁶⁰

GREECE, DECEMBER 1961 – JANUARY 1962

Sometime in December 1961, Tsafendas travelled by train to Sofia to meet his dentist comrade again.²¹⁶¹ It must have been this orthodontist who fitted Tsafendas with a bridge and capped his upper teeth with silver,²¹⁶² something that was to be remarked upon by many in the future.²¹⁶³ After his visit ended, instead of heading towards Athens, for reasons the author has not been able to establish, Tsafendas boarded a train back to Istanbul. There, he hitched a ride on a fish refrigeration truck to Athens, where he spent the Christmas of 1961, as planned, in the home of his boyhood friend and later DSE comrade, John Michaletos.²¹⁶⁴

²¹⁵⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

²¹⁵⁸ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹⁵⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹⁶⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

²¹⁶¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹⁶² Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

²¹⁶³ According to the Commission of Enquiry, Tsafendas had his teeth made in Turkey or in Russia (Chapter II C, Paragraph 18). According to some press reports of the time (*Umtali Post*, 9 September 1966), he had them made in Russia. However, Tsafendas himself told Alexander Moumbaris, Ira Kyriakakis, Andreas Babiolakis, Helen Grispos, Mary Eendracht and several others that he had them made in Bulgaria. Father Nikola Banovic also stated that when he left for Bulgaria he did not have the teeth. All of this, plus the fact that Tsafendas's DSE comrade in Bulgaria was a dentist, suggests that he did indeed have them made in Bulgaria, very likely by his fellow fighter.

²¹⁶⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

At the beginning of January, 1962 he travelled from Piraeus by ferry to Crete to find his father's relatives. The visit initially did not go smoothly. He had problems locating relatives of his father and when he did trace them, he discovered they had never heard of him and had difficulty accepting him as part of the family.²¹⁶⁵ Not all, however. He was accepted into the home of an uncle, Giorgos Tsafantakis, and a few months later he sent from another country a note thanking the family for their hospitality.²¹⁶⁶

Another person who welcomed him was Costas Kargakis (nicknamed Psarocostas), with whom Tsafendas stayed for two-three weeks. Kargakis' granddaughter, Katerina, was married to Michalis Tsafantakis, a nephew of Dimitris, who at the time were living in Germany. Kargakis' son was killed during the Second World War and he had brought up Katerina himself. He was living alone when he welcomed Tsafendas as an uncle of his son in law. Kargakis had fought with the Greek resistance during the occupation of Crete by the Nazis and had participated in an extraordinary story which made a profound impression on Tsafendas. In April, 1944, in one of the most daring exploits of World War Two, a band of Greek partisans and two British officers kidnapped the German military governor of Crete, General Heinrich Kreipe, and evading Nazi soldiers, spirited him off the island to Egypt. Kargakis was among the team of partisans of Capitan Petrakoyeorgis, who transported Kreipe across the Cretan mountains to a rendezvous where the General and some of his kidnapers were picked up by a British submarine.²¹⁶⁷

All the surviving Cretans who were involved in the operation talked to Tsafendas and together they sang revolutionary songs of the Greek Resistance. They showed him the spot where the general was taken and explained how the coup took place. What's more, Tsafendas heard that George Tyrakis, one of the kidnapers, now lived in Johannesburg. Tsafendas said that as soon he heard the kidnap story he decided he would try to abduct Dr. Verwoerd and

²¹⁶⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁶⁶ Aris Tsafantakis in a personal interview, 13 April 2016.

²¹⁶⁷ Alexandros Tsafantakis in a personal interview, 15 February 2016; Maria and Michalis Tsafantakis in a personal interview, 16 February 2016.

exchange him for South African political prisoners.²¹⁶⁸ Kargakis also taught Tsafendas how to make bombs with fertilizer and other commodities you could buy in shops.²¹⁶⁹

Tsafendas's visit to Crete lasted about a month. Before he left, he visited members of the Christian Church in Iraklion and Rethimnon. He then returned by ferry to Piraeus, took a bus and then a ferry to Corfu and then a seagoing ferry to Brindisi in southern Italy.²¹⁷⁰ Tsafendas arrived in Brindisi, on January 31, 1962, and with very little money and nowhere to stay, he secured admission to the A. Di Summa Hospital by claiming that he was suffering from acute gastro-enteritis. He spent eight days at the hospital, during which time he wrote to the Portuguese Embassy seeking help to return to Portugal, arguing that he was a Portuguese citizen and entitled to assistance.²¹⁷¹

Upon hearing that the Embassy was going to help him, Tsafendas's became healthy again and left the hospital and travelled to Rome where on February 8, 1962, he called at the Portuguese Embassy. A consular statement dated February 10, said, "His weak health and the fact that he wasn't in possession of any resources made him request repatriation." The embassy gave him an allowance of 6,000 lire and a Rome-Lisbon train ticket costing 26,000 lire. The statement quoted Tsafendas as promising that once resettled he would start work to pay back the expenses of his repatriation.²¹⁷²

PORTUGAL AND ENGLAND, 1962

When Tsafendas arrived in Lisbon in February 1962, after his long train ride from Rome, he was penniless, having spent the allowance from the Portuguese Embassy during the journey. He admitted himself to the Albergue da Mitra (Hostel Mitra), the shelter for destitutes where

²¹⁶⁸ Tsafendas told Father Minas Constandinou, Bishop Ioannis Tsafarides and Nick Papadakis about his experience in Crete and his idea to kidnap Dr. Verwoerd. He spoke about a distant relative who was involved in the kidnapping and had smuggled the general along with the kidnappers through the mountain. Unfortunately, Tsafendas's relatives who met him in Crete have all died as far as the author was able to establish. However, Tsafendas's story is confirmed by the fact that Kargakis was indeed a distant relative and further Kargakis's granddaughter (Maria Tsafantakis) and her husband (Michalis Tsafantakis) confirmed in a personal interview with the author (16 February 2016) all the details which Tsafendas mentioned about him.

²¹⁶⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²¹⁷⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁷¹ Seccao Consular Report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 10 February 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²¹⁷² Seccao Consular Report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 10 February 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

he had stayed some ten years earlier.²¹⁷³ He left the hostel as soon as he found work - as a welder on a bridge over the river Tejo for 120 escudos per day – but he was dismissed for being lazy. Offered alternative employment at 60 escudos per day, he refused, saying he intended to work for himself, and returned to the hostel.²¹⁷⁴ During his time at the shelter, Tsafendas showed great affection for his companions and was always well-behaved. He often had a group of “guests” around him,²¹⁷⁵ especially during any political disturbances in Lisbon, and he offered his opinion on religious matters constantly and with great passion.²¹⁷⁶

On February 14, 1962, Tsafendas's father died in Pretoria,²¹⁷⁷ but he would only find out a few months later. Although Marika wrote immediately to give him the news, he had changed addresses and did not get her letter.²¹⁷⁸ South Africa and Mozambique were never far from Tsafendas's mind and he resumed his efforts to return there as soon as possible. He made several applications but without success.²¹⁷⁹ Determined this time to return to Mozambique, he visited a police station and requested a hearing about his situation and the fact that he was exiled without having been accused of anything. He tried to convince the authorities that he was not a Communist or anti-Portuguese any longer, indicating that he may be a little mad and in need of family care.²¹⁸⁰

The authorities referred him to the Institute of Psychiatric Welfare of Lisbon, where on April 6, 1962, he was examined by Dr. Pegado. It seems that the doctor was convinced not only by Tsafendas's mad act, but also by his claim that he needed the care of his family. He wrote to his report to the authorities: “Demitrio Tsafandakis is fundamentally a psychopath who leads an always unstable and adventurous life. At the moment he does not show signs of

²¹⁷³ Confidential PIDE report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas, No: 3.699-G.U, 13 November 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²¹⁷⁴ Confidential PIDE report regarding Dimitro Tsafendas, 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²¹⁷⁵ Translation of the PIDE report regarding Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafantakis, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

²¹⁷⁶ *Diario de Lisboa*, 8 September 1966, ‘Dimitri Tsafendas esteve internado na Mitra e foi observado no Julio de Matos.’

²¹⁷⁷ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁷⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²¹⁷⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

psychosis. I agree entirely with Captain Cascais in that one should wait for information regarding his family before finally deciding what destination he is to be given.”²¹⁸¹

In the event, nothing came of it, and after his new failure to return to Mozambique, Tsafendas decided to visit England again. He had not enjoyed his previous visit much due to his poor financial situation, but now that this had improved he decided to try his luck again. He had kept in touch with members of the anti-slavery society and the British anti-apartheid movement. Sometime in June or July 1962, Tsafendas found himself in London for a second time and quickly got in touch again with the British anti-apartheid movement and the Anti-Slavery Society. He also became involved with an anti-fascist movement, the Yellow Star.

On July 1, 1962, a British fascist group, the National Socialist Movement (NSM) had planned an anti-Semitic rally in Trafalgar Square called “Free Britain from Jewish Control.” Tsafendas was one of 2,000 anti-fascists who occupied the square to forestall the rally. Their action was organised by the Communist Party and various Trotskyist and anarchist groups, as well as the Jewish Defence Committee. One of the organisers was the Rev. Billy Sargent, vicar of Holy Trinity Church in Dalston, who handed out Yellow Star badges similar to the yellow Star of David which the Nazis forced Jews to wear. This was where the movement took its name.²¹⁸² Tsafendas proudly pinned one to his coat and sent a London postcard and a photograph of himself wearing the badge to his father, unaware that he was dead.²¹⁸³ Tsafendas often sent postcards, souvenirs and pictures of himself to his parents from wherever he happened to be.²¹⁸⁴ He also sent postcards to his siblings, especially Eleni, with whom he developed a close relationship, although he had not seen her since she was four. He was very fond of this stepsister and they exchanged letters constantly while he was travelling in Europe.²¹⁸⁵

Tsafendas also frequently visited the North Middlesex Cricket Club in Hornsey, North London, which happened to be the meeting place for members of the British anti-apartheid movement. Tsafendas told Edward Furness, one of the members of the Club, that he wanted “to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience” and

²¹⁸¹ Dr. Pegado's report regarding Dimitrio Tsafandakis, 6 April 1962. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/6, subject: Departement van Verdediging. NASA.

²¹⁸² Hann, 2013: 211.

²¹⁸³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

²¹⁸⁴ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007.

²¹⁸⁵ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007.

that he was willing to do “anything that would get the South African regime out of power.” Furness said Tsafendas, “was well-dressed and appeared to be wealthy.”²¹⁸⁶

On some occasions during his visits to England, Tsafendas and other anti-fascist and anti-apartheid activists fought physically with members of fascist leader Oswald Mosley's Union Movement. In one confrontation Tsafendas was stabbed in the hand, leaving him with a small scar, of which he was very proud. He considered it to be a badge of honour and often proclaimed, “I beat up a lot of fascists in London.” At the same time, he remained active with the anti-apartheid movement and took part in an anti-apartheid demonstration, carrying a placard depicting a man in a Ku Klux Klan outfit labelled “DR. VERWOERD.”²¹⁸⁷

It was October of 1962, when Tsafendas, who was either in London or Lisbon at the time, that he received a letter from his step-mother informing him that his father had died. Her letter was a response to the postcard and picture of himself he sent to his father from London.²¹⁸⁸ His parents at the time were still married, but for the last few years had been living separately, barely talking to each other.²¹⁸⁹ Tsafendas was devastated to hear that his adored father had died and he became desperate to return to South Africa and visit his grave.²¹⁹⁰

On October 27, 1962, he visited again a police station in Lisbon in an attempt to have his exile from Mozambique ended.²¹⁹¹ He did not achieve anything and in November, 1962, he made yet another application for entry to South Africa, which he submitted to that country's embassy in Lisbon. Having checked his name, the immigration attaché wrote to

²¹⁸⁶ Edward Furness statement to the police 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁸⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Tsafendas proudly showed this photograph to Mary Eendracht, Helen and George Grispos, Antony Michaletos, Artemis Michaletos, John Michaletos, Ira Kyriakakis, Patrick O’Ryan, and to his half-sisters Katerina Pnema and Eleni Vlachopoulos. Unfortunately, the date the picture was taken remains unknown, but it must have been in 1959 or in 1962, most likely the latter.

²¹⁸⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²¹⁸⁹ Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²¹⁹⁰ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²¹⁹¹ Letter of a police agent to the Ministry of Interiors regarding Tsafendas's exile. 30 October 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

Tsafendas in January 1963 urging him not to incur any further expense in connection with his application.²¹⁹² In other words, do not bother to ask.

Tsafendas did not give up though. He knew that the only way to be allowed to return to Mozambique was to convince the Portuguese that he was no longer a Communist, had no subversive ideas, did not support the independence of Mozambique and that he was a reformed man and loyal supporter of Salazar, the Portuguese dictator. He stopped associating with leftists, and began talking publicly against Communism and in support of Salazar. He believed that PIDE agents would sooner or later hear about it when they enquired about him.²¹⁹³

Sometime in the summer of 1963, after another application for amnesty, Tsafendas attended an interview regarding his request. He attempted again to convince the Portuguese that he was “a little mad,” harmless and that his subversive and communist ideas belonged to the past.²¹⁹⁴ Finally, in August or September of 1963, after twelve years of exile, the Portuguese government, obviously convinced by his “act,” decided to extend its powers of amnesty to Tsafendas and permit him to return to Mozambique.²¹⁹⁵ A few weeks later, Tsafendas received his fare from the government’s social services and in October 1963 sailed to Mozambique aboard the *Princippi Perfecto*.²¹⁹⁶ He had two big suitcases with him. They contained a few clothes, gifts for the family and friends and anti-apartheid and Communist literature,²¹⁹⁷ but fearful of searches, Tsafendas had replaced all the book covers with innocent titles.²¹⁹⁸

²¹⁹² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 40. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²¹⁹³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²¹⁹⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²¹⁹⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁹⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²¹⁹⁷ The study is not in position to know how Tsafendas obtained such literature; the likelihood is that he brought it from England the previous year or it was sent to him by comrades in the British anti-apartheid movement.

²¹⁹⁸ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

MOZAMBIQUE, 1963

Back in Lourenço Marques, Tsafendas stayed at the home of his favourite aunt, Artemis Michaletos, who was delighted to see him again after twelve years. Artemis got in touch with his stepmother in South Africa and told her of Dimitris's arrival. Marika was aware that Dimitri was banned from entering South Africa so decided to go to Mozambique and see him there for the first time in twenty-two years.²¹⁹⁹ While waiting for Marika, Tsafendas visited Manuel, his best childhood friend,²²⁰⁰ and Antony Maw, Greece's Honorary Consul in Lourenço Marques, who had refused to issue a Greek passport to him back in 1951. This time, Tsafendas asked about the location of his mother's grave. Maw was unable to help him, as he "only remembered (Tsafendas) as a baby living with his father and an African servant girl."²²⁰¹ At the same time, Tsafendas also spent some evenings in Shangaan villages meeting old friends and his old students who had now grown up.²²⁰²

During his stay in Lourenço Marques, Tsafendas met and briefly associated with two Greeks, George Liberopoulos and George Ananiades. Both men considered him to be "a normal person with a very high intelligence."²²⁰³ Tsafendas also met a young Greek Orthodox priest, Father Minas Constandinou. They became very good friend and spent several hours together discussing Christianity, history and politics. Father Minas was deeply impressed by Tsafendas's knowledge; not only about Christianity, but about other religions too.²²⁰⁴

Father Minas Constandinou, who also visited Tsafendas in prison on several occasions after Verwoerd's assassination, told the author:

"Dimitris was the most political person I ever met. He lived and breathed politics. Most of his conversations were about politics... he was very Communist, very, very Communist. But you know he was not one of those Communists who just say they are Communists. Dimitris had read a lot about Communism and he practised and preached Communism, he did not just claim to be one... he was also anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid. He was very much for the independence of Mozambique and actually, not just Mozambique,

²¹⁹⁹ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²²⁰⁰ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²²⁰¹ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

²²⁰² Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

²²⁰³ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; George Ananiades in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

²²⁰⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

but all the colonies in Africa.

Dimitris used to say that apartheid was like colonialism, because a few Europeans were ruling a land which belonged to Blacks because their ancestors had invaded and conquered it. I remember he used to call the Portuguese in Mozambique and I think the whites in South Africa too, 'conquerors' and 'occupiers;' he considered Mozambique and South Africa to be 'occupied lands,' conquered by foreigners. He used to say that Verwoerd was Hitler's best student, because he had learned from him some of his methods and laws and he was applying them to the Blacks.²²⁰⁵

Describing Verwoerd as "Hitler's best student" was a trademark characterisation of South Africa's Prime Minister by Tsafendas and one which he used constantly. When asked to explain what he meant, Tsafendas always gave the same answer, namely that Dr. Verwoerd had copied some of Hitler's anti-Jewish Nuremberg Laws and was applying them to non-White South Africans. Tsafendas also employed two particular words to describe Verwoerd: "tyrant" and "dictator." He considered that Verwoerd was a "tyrant" because he was oppressing South Africa's non-Whites, and a "dictator" because he was elected by the Whites only; since the country's majority non-Whites did not have the vote, Verwoerd was not democratically elected in Tsafendas's view, and was in essence a dictator.²²⁰⁶

John Michaletos, Artemis's son, said of his uncle Dimitri:

"You could see his pathos about Communism and for the independence of Mozambique in his face. He was very passionate about both. He had a fighting Communist spirit, he talked very, very passionately about his political ideas, his cheeks sometimes getting red and sweaty from the passion. He was very self-assured about his ideas and you could not have a political debate with him, he would have cut you into pieces. He was very well read, especially in politics, while he had this ability I haven't seen in anyone to be able to convince you that he is right. He would bring argument after argument and example after example to convince you that he is right. Sometimes, I wondered whether all these [political and

²²⁰⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²²⁰⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

historical] examples and facts he was talking about were true. I did not know. I was not aware of any of these. And you couldn't check at the time, there was no internet, but it all sounded very, very convincing. I used to tell him, and my mother used to tell him too, that he should be a politician or a lawyer."²²⁰⁷

Soon after, Marika, along with her son Victor, his wife Anna, and her son-in-law, Nick Vlachopoulos, Eleni's husband, arrived in Lourenço Marques by car from Pretoria. Eleni was desperate to travel with the rest of the family, but she had to stay behind to look after her two little boys, so her husband, who was very anxious to meet Tsafendas after what he was told by his wife, went instead. When they all met, Dimitri expressed his desire to go and live with them in Pretoria, but acknowledged that he was banned from entering the country.²²⁰⁸

However, Aunt Artemis's husband, George Michaletos, was a friend of J.J. van den Berg, the passport control officer at the South African consulate in Lourenço Marques. Artemis proposed, and eventually the family agreed, to offer a financial inducement to van der Berg to turn a blind eye to Tsafendas's banning. Marika and Victor were reluctant but persuaded by Artemis and Vlachopoulos, eventually agreed and they proceeded accordingly. Van den Berg, also reluctantly, eventually accepted²²⁰⁹ and on Saturday, November 2, 1963, Tsafendas appeared before him at the consulate and applied for a permit for temporary sojourn in South Africa. Van den Berg overlooked the ban and issued a visa to Tsafendas, although his name appeared on the Government's Stop List.²²¹⁰

²²⁰⁷ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²²⁰⁸ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²²⁰⁹ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²¹⁰ J.J. van den Berg statement regarding the 'Admission to the Republic of Demitrio Tsafendas,' 20 September 1966. Report COE, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

PRETORIA, 1963–1964

On Monday, November 4, 1963, Tsafendas and his family re-entered South Africa by car via the Komatipoort border point.²²¹¹ He moved into the house of his half-sister, Evangelia, in Pretoria, where she lived with her husband Charles Nissiotos and their children. Immediately afterwards, he applied for permanent South African residence. Nissiotis offered him work at his café²²¹² in the belief that it would help Tsafendas's application if he could show that he had a job. Nissiotis even gave Tsafendas a letter stating that he was his "guarantor" and would be financially responsible for him while in South Africa.²²¹³ On the application form, Tsafendas flatly lied that "he had never previously applied for permanent residence in South Africa, had never been found guilty of a criminal or unlawful action; that he had never been refused entry to any South African harbour and also had never been deported from South Africa or any other country."²²¹⁴

Tsafendas attended three interviews with three different officers of the Department of Immigration and made a very favourable impression on all of them.²²¹⁵ In addition, in order to be granted permission, he had to be medically examined and found to be perfectly healthy and capable of working by two State doctors. Therefore, on November 11, 1963, he was examined by Dr. C. Been and was found "not to be mentally or physically defective in any way," and "generally in a good state of health."²²¹⁶ On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined again for the same reason by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who also wrote "a favourable report." After the third and final interview with an Immigration officer, a certificate for permanent residence was issued to Tsafendas.²²¹⁷

²²¹¹ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 1. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²²¹² Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

²²¹³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²¹⁴ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

²²¹⁵ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

²²¹⁶ Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

²²¹⁷ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

One day, Marika panicked when she discovered the contents of his suitcases, which included a poster of the executed Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba and several anti-apartheid pamphlets. To make matters worse, she discovered that most of the books in his suitcase were not literary classics as their covers suggested but Communist and anti-apartheid titles.²²¹⁸ There were also two medical books, one about insanity and psychiatry, the other concerning intestinal disorders.²²¹⁹ Tsafendas had read them to ensure the medical authenticity of his madness acts. When asked by his family why he kept them, Tsafendas said, smiling, "I like reading medicine ... it could save your life."²²²⁰ Marika pleaded fearfully with him to get rid of the political literature,²²²¹ but he refused.²²²²

Other items were a Bob Dylan album and several Paul Robeson's records which he played often, staying in tune with the singers. Tsafendas also had his records with Communist songs from Italy and Russia which his step-mother pleaded with him not to play loudly in the house. "You are going to put us all in jail," she used to tell him, since Communism was outlawed in South Africa.²²²³ Tsafendas considered *Bella Ciao*, an Italian Communist song to be one of his all-time favourites. He whistled it throughout his life and remembered its lyrics even shortly before he died.²²²⁴

A few days after his arrival in Pretoria, a Sunday morning, Tsafendas, along with everyone from his family, attended a Greek Orthodox Church service. At the end of the service, the Greek priest spoke briefly. He welcomed a family newly arrived from Greece and went on to praise South Africa and its policy of apartheid for the opportunities they gave to people to come and work there, offering them a better life than anywhere else in the world. He then attacked Communists and other "enemies" of the country.²²²⁵

²²¹⁸ Antony Michaleto in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²¹⁹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²²⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

²²²¹ The author is not in position to know what Tsafendas did with the anti-apartheid literature he had with him.

²²²² Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²²³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²²⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²²²⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

Tsafendas was enraged and only his half-brother Victor stopped him from interrupting the priest. However, when the time came for Communion, Tsafendas refused to take the sacrament or to kiss the priest's hands, as was customary. Instead, and despite the efforts of Nick Vlachopoulos and Victor, he started arguing quietly with the priest. He said that he should be ashamed for praising apartheid. The priest was polite and replied that Greeks should be grateful for South Africa's hospitality and that they should not bite the hand that fed them. Tsafendas said the Whites found things easy in South Africa because they exploited the non-Whites, but life for the majority of people was far from rosy. By this time, other members of the congregation had come forward to see what was happening and began protesting on behalf of the priest and denouncing Tsafendas. However, Tsafendas remained calm throughout, supporting his views. Finally, his family managed to pull him away from the priest.²²²⁶

Returning home, Tsafendas was rounded upon by his family for speaking out in public. They reminded him that he is not in Europe where he could say whatever he wanted. Marika said that she had hoped that now he was grown up, he would have changed his political ideas, and she blamed her husband for giving him such ideas. She complained that he had embarrassed them all in front of everyone in the church and the whole Greek community would now hear about it. Tsafendas apologised for putting them into a difficult position and promised to keep his mouth shut from now on. However, Evangelia, who anyway was not very happy with her half-brother's work rate (she found him to be "lazy" and "the slowest waiter ever"²²²⁷), fearing that they would lose their Greek customers over the church incident or that Tsafendas might start arguing with their customers, asked him to stop working at their café.²²²⁸

A few days later, to avoid Evangelia's complains, Tsafendas moved out of their house, with his books and everything else he had brought from Europe. Vlachopoulos offered him a rent-free apartment he owned, but which was not immediately available. To bridge the gap, Fotini Gavasiadis, Vlachopoulos's twenty-five year old sister, and her husband Markos suggested that Tsafendas should stay with them until the apartment became available. Thus,

²²²⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²²⁷ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²²⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

Tsafendas spent the next few weeks sharing living quarters with Fotini, Markos and their three-year-old son, Nick, and they soon became very good friends. When Vlachopoulos's apartment became available, Tsafendas duly moved in. It was next door to the Gavasiadis's house and so they were neighbours for the next eight months that Tsafendas remained in Pretoria, spending most of his time in their home. Tsafendas filled his apartment with books and political posters, some of them referring to international figures such as Ahmed Ben Bella, Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba.²²²⁹

Fotini became very close to Tsafendas and considers him to be the man who opened her eyes to the world of politics, in particular the evils of apartheid. The first of many things he gave her to read was *The Freedom Charter*. She was frightened when Tsafendas told her that the pamphlet was banned in South Africa, but she read it and kept it anyway. Tsafendas also gave copies to Nick Vlachopoulos and Mary Eendracht. When news came that Tsafendas had been arrested for Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, the three hurriedly burned their copies for fear the police would search their homes.²²³⁰

Nick Vlachopoulos owned the Proclamation Hill Café on Church Street West, Pretoria, where Fotini and Markos helped out. Tsafendas would often drop by for a coffee and to read the newspapers.²²³¹ Since he spent a lot of time in the café, Tsafendas would help out and serve coffee and snacks when it was busy. At first, Vlachopoulos was not keen on Tsafendas working there, fearing he would argue politics with his customers. However, Tsafendas never did. He was polite and respectful and in time became very popular because of his stories and friendly manner. The voluntary work in the café expanded, so that whenever he was in employment, he would work there part-time, mostly weekends, and when he was unemployed he would work at the café full-time.²²³²

Although Vlachopoulos found him to be lazy and slow with the physical aspects of his job, he valued his popularity, especially with older people, some of whom visited the café just to talk to Tsafendas. Vlachopoulos and his wife were happy and offered Tsafendas a permanent situation on good wages. Tsafendas declined and continued working on a voluntary basis, refusing to take any money since they had given him a free-rent apartment.

²²²⁹ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

²²³⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²³¹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

²²³² Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

Fotini Gavasiadis told the author that while Tsafendas worked at her brother's café, he "was always with a smile in his mouth, chatting and joking with the customers... he was very popular, especially with the older customers. Some of them were coming to the café just to talk to him. They were quite old and had no else to talk to. Dimitris patiently listened to their stories or whatever they had to say. He always had a comforting word for them and for those who needed it."²²³³

When he worked voluntarily in the café, Tsafendas worked out the price of things in his head and was invariably correct. Fotini Gavasiadis said Tsafendas rarely had money because he spent heavily on books, but when he did, he was open-handed. "If he had only one rand in his pocket, he would give it without hesitation to someone who needed it," she said.²²³⁴ In particular, and despite the protests of their parents, Tsafendas bought toys and chocolates for his nephews, who he adored more than anything. He would often baby-sit them while their parents were at work.²²³⁵

Fotini Gavasiadis remembers him as being "fiercely anti-Afrikaner, often equating them with the Nazis and Dr. Verwoerd with Hitler." Although he could read Afrikaans, he never looked at Afrikaans-language newspaper, declaring that "the only truth you can read in an Afrikaans newspaper is the obituaries." He even refused to speak Afrikaans, as he considered it the language of the oppressor.²²³⁶ Gavasiadis and her brother were astonished by Tsafendas's appetite and estimated that his consumption was the equal of two-three adults. Although he was a big man, he was not obese, and Tsafendas believed that was due to his having a good metabolism and drinking lots of water.²²³⁷

One of Tsafendas's favourite occupations in Pretoria was babysitting his nephews, Dino and Michalis Vlachopoulos, Eleni's sons, aged seven and five, and Nick Gavasiadis, Fotini's three-year-old son. The boys loved being with Tsafendas, singing and playing, and begged their parents constantly to let them spend time with their newly arrived uncle. In the evenings, Tsafendas would often go to the movies or the theatre with Fotini, Markos or his half-sister Eleni; he always insisted on paying. Although he was earning good money, he also

²²³³ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

²²³⁴ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

²²³⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

²²³⁶ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²³⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

spent it freely and Fotini and Eleni repeatedly urged him to save for the future. He gave them the same answer he gave to everybody: "I can't. Saving money is like holding my breath, not letting me breathe properly, just taking small breaths in order to survive. I can't live like that, life is too short and we only live once, I want to enjoy it while I can." He said if he had children, it would be different, but being single and without any obligations, he believed he could always find a job with money to eat and a place to stay. When they asked him about his retirement plans, he said, "I will retire to Cuba, I won't need much there." He believed that as a former member of the South African Communist Party and of the DSE of Greece, he would be made welcome in Cuba.²²³⁸

Fotini Gavasiadis remembers Tsafendas as "a real gentleman." He would always open the door for her and carry her bags. In an asexual but deeply genuine way, she "loved" Tsafendas, and described him as "adorable" and one of the "kindest, funniest and most openly generous men" she had ever met. "He would give you his clothes and his food." She looked upon him as a big brother and spent hours talking with him about politics and his travels. What impressed her most was his intelligence. He had a "quick mind and was very intelligent," she said. "Dimitris could buy you and sell you²²³⁹ any time he wanted and as many times as he wanted to. He was so clever." Tsafendas, she said, was also very "convincing and persuasive - he could turn black into white! If you disagreed with something with him, he would find a way to convince you that he is right and that you are wrong - even if you *know* that you are right and that he is wrong! If he made a mistake about something, he would turn things upside-down and at the end, he would even make you apologise to him!"²²⁴⁰

His half-sister, Eleni Vlachopoulos, was also close to Tsafendas and he spent a lot of time with her in the nine months he lived in Pretoria.²²⁴¹ She remembers him as "a fanatical Communist and anti-racist," who "read newspapers all day" and "talked and argued all day about politics." She is sure that "he was not crazy, he was very, very clever, cleverer than any

²²³⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

²²³⁹ This is a Greek expression to describe someone who is extremely intelligent and extremely able.

²²⁴⁰ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

²²⁴¹ Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

of us. And very able. If he wanted to do something, if he had a target, he would always achieve it.”²²⁴²

As well as helping out at the café, Tsafendas completed two stints as a welder. Over the Christmas-New Year period, December 9, 1963 to February 3, 1964, he did maintenance and development work for City Engineering and Carron Limited.²²⁴³ On February 7, he started work with F.A. Poole Engineering Pty. Ltd. as a welder but was later transferred to the fitter-turner department. “He was put in charge of the removal of machinery from the old factory to the new one and did this work well.”²²⁴⁴ During his time in Poole Engineering, Tsafendas “bullied the other Portuguese workers and had fights with several white workers,”²²⁴⁵ but he never argued with Coloureds.²²⁴⁶

Foreman Albert Vercueil considered Tsafendas to be an “intelligent person and completely mentally balanced,” “friendly but opinionated.” He did not find him to be “a very good worker,” but “an intelligent worker mainly because he quickly grasped when work was entrusted to him.” However, Tsafendas was also “very sloppy in his work.” On July 10, 1964, Vercueil admonished him for sloppy work. “When he began to mumble again, I told him to come to my office and told him, ‘Demetri, you are no good to me, you are always causing trouble and your work is no good. You must leave today.’ He became extremely angry and put his finger in my face... he then said, ‘You are like your bloody Government, but I will get you, and I will get your Prime Minister too!’” According to Vercueil, during the period Tsafendas worked there, “he showed no signs of mental disorder or any other abnormality.”²²⁴⁷ During his time there, Tsafendas “was certainly unpopular among white workers ... adapted more to the non-whites.”²²⁴⁸

Pursuing his political agenda, Tsafendas made contact with old friends and South African Communist Party comrades but it was quickly clear to him that they were reluctant to

²²⁴² Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007. This part is available in the rushes.

²²⁴³ Report by D.G. Gallard of City Engineering and Carron Limited regarding Demitrio Tsafendas to the Commission of Enquiry, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

²²⁴⁴ Report by N.F. Lubie of F.A. Poole PTY, Ltd regarding Tsafendas to the Report of the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

²²⁴⁵ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²²⁴⁶ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²²⁴⁷ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Albert Vercueil statement to the Commission of Enquiry, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial transcripts. NASA.

²²⁴⁸ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

be involved in anything risky and that they did not fully trust him because he had been away from South Africa for so long.²²⁴⁹ He also got in touch with local members of the Christian Church who would often fetch him to attend services, including occasionally in Johannesburg.²²⁵⁰ In July 1964, Tsafendas decided to accept his half-sister Katerina's invitation to visit her in Rhodesia and become acquainted with her husband, Gerry Pnefmatikos (Pnefma), who he had never met.²²⁵¹

RHODESIA, 1964

Tsafendas entered what was then Southern Rhodesia on July 19, 1964, on a temporary tourist permit, valid until August 9, and travelled to the small town of Marandellas, an early centre for white settlement some seventy-two km south-east of Salisbury, the capital, where his half-sister lived. She and her husband ran a grocery store.²²⁵² The visit did not go well. During the one night as their guest, Tsafendas spoke openly against colonialism in Rhodesia and Mozambique. In an effort to stop him talking about politics, Gerry Pnefma asked Tsafendas to tell them about his time in Europe. Tsafendas told them that he had joined the Democratic Army during the Greek Civil War and then showed them photographs of himself in various places, one being from the anti-apartheid demonstration in London, where he was holding the placard with Dr. Verwoerd as a KKK member, and another of himself wearing the Yellow Star badge. His frightened hosts were convinced that he was still a "Communist and an anti-colonialist."²²⁵³

Katerina was further shocked to learn that her half-brother had been baptised in Greece as a member of the Christian Church, a sect she had never heard of and which she found absurd. She was also angered that he had changed his surname to Tsafendas, but the final stroke came when Tsafendas enquired how much the couple paid their Black domestic workers. He thereupon accused them of taking advantage of the workers, adding that from what he had seen so far in Rhodesia, most Greeks and Whites exploited the poor Blacks who

²²⁴⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 28 September 2012.

²²⁵⁰ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

²²⁵¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²²⁵² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

²²⁵³ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

worked for them. He even claimed that it was a disgrace for the country to be named after Cecil Rhodes. Katerina's husband was shocked, and Tsafendas left the next day because of the arguments.²²⁵⁴

Katerina was unhappy after Dimitri left and regretted shouting at him:

"I knew if I kept him, there would be big trouble. I knew him. He would have definitely got into a political argument with someone and you know we were living in a small town. News would have spread very fast that my brother had such ideas and we would have lost all our customers. And he left. And I was right because he then went to Mozambique and he started his Communistic talk and they put him in jail. If he remained in Rhodesia the same thing would have happened and he would have ruined us."

However, Pnema now regrets sending him away and wishes she could have spent more time with him. She told the author:

"He was such a gentle, polite, kind-hearted man, you can't imagine. But when he started talking about politics, my God, he was uncontrollable. It was like Jekyll and Hyde. He just could not keep his mouth shut; when he heard something political or if he saw something, he had to comment. It would have been ok if he had not such ideas, but you know at these times, you could not talk like this and he just could not understand it. That's why he ended up in jail so many times in Mozambique."²²⁵⁵

After spending some time in a rented apartment in Avondale, Salisbury, Tsafendas travelled to Lake Malawi in Nyasaland in search of work. Two or three weeks later, he returned to Salisbury.²²⁵⁶ There he received an invitation from his childhood friend George Grispos, whom he had not seen since 1939, to visit him in Umtali, some 213 km from the capital. Grispos was now married to Helen Kavadias, who also knew Tsafendas from the days when she had attended his English classes in Lourenço Marques. Grispos's house was small, so Tsafendas stayed for two nights next door, in the home of Sophia Kavadias, Helen's

²²⁵⁴ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 April 2015.

²²⁵⁵ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 April 2015; Katerina Pnema does not remember the name of the person who introduced Tsafendas to this sect, but she clearly remembers that it was someone in the USA. She also does not remember the name of the person who baptised her step-brother, but she thinks that Tsafendas might not even tell her these names.

²²⁵⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

mother, who had a spare room.²²⁵⁷ Both nights of his stay were spent talking politics and discussing Tsafendas's adventures around the world.²²⁵⁸ Helen Grispos considered Tsafendas to be a "well-mannered and intelligent person,"²²⁵⁹ and her husband had the same opinion about him.²²⁶⁰

Helen Grispos recalled Tsafendas being "very angry and saddened by what he had seen in South Africa, Mozambique and Rhodesia, and the way non-White people were treated there." Tsafendas used to lend books to both his friends while they were children and now, before he left, he gave his hosts another book, as a gift, insisting they should read it. He said it was "excellent" and had become one of his favourites. It was titled "*Invisible Man*"²²⁶¹ and Helen and her husband assumed it was a science fiction adventure. When Helen began reading it, she discovered it was the story of an African-American man, who, because he was Black, assumed an aura of invisibility to the White people around him.²²⁶²

While in Umtali, Tsafendas also met fellow Greeks John Galanakis owner of the Galas' Cash Store, Nikolas Spanos, owner of Umtali Green Grocers, Spiros Raftopoulos and Father Costas Condos, a Greek Orthodox priest.²²⁶³ On August 22, 1964, while at Kavadias's house, Tsafendas was arrested by immigration officials because his tourist permit had expired.²²⁶⁴ They deported him to Mozambique and he left Rhodesia from Umtali by train.²²⁶⁵

²²⁵⁷ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, File 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

²²⁵⁸ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

²²⁵⁹ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

²²⁶⁰ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

²²⁶¹ Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* was published in 1952 to widespread acclaim. Proposing that colour rendered a Black person invisible to the Whites around him, Ellison examined a range of critical emerging issues in America including Marxism, identity and Black Nationalism.

²²⁶² Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

²²⁶³ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

²²⁶⁴ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

²²⁶⁵ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

MOZAMBIQUE, 1964–1965

From August 28 to October 8, 1964, Tsafendas lived in a boarding house, Stelios Marangos Pension Gloria, in Beira.²²⁶⁶ There, he met Nick Papadakis, a young Greek from Crete, with whom he became friendly. Papadakis characterised Tsafendas as “a man of revolutionary zeal, eager to fight apartheid and for the independence of Mozambique.” Papadakis also told the author about Tsafendas:

“Most of us [the Greeks] had heard about him but no one had met him before. In the beginning, we were a little distant because we had heard about him being a rebellious character, a troublemaker and about his arrests by the Portuguese police. Slowly though, he came closer to us as we realised that he was completely different from what we had heard. He was very polite and open-hearted, very witty and sarcastic, even about himself, and often cracked jokes ... he was sarcastic about his weight ... we enjoyed hearing stories from his travels around the world ... he was a gentle giant with a big heart who was helping everyone around him ... poor but very generous ... very clever with a very fast brain.”²²⁶⁷

Tsafendas was unable to find work in Beira, however, and decided to try his luck again in Rhodesia. On October 9, Tsafendas tried to re-enter Southern Rhodesia at Umtali through the Forbes Border Post,²²⁶⁸ but he did not have the necessary visa and was declared a prohibited immigrant.²²⁶⁹ The following day, he returned to Mozambique,²²⁷⁰ travelling to Gondola where he quickly found work with the Hume Pipe Company.²²⁷¹ He spent the next month in Gondola and the weekends in Beira.²²⁷²

At Tsafendas's suggestion, Nick Papadakis also applied for work at Hume Pipe and was accepted. The two men, now good friends, moved soon afterwards into a two-bedroom

²²⁶⁶ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

²²⁶⁷ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²²⁶⁸ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

²²⁶⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

²²⁷⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 17. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²²⁷¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²²⁷² Irimi Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

apartment.²²⁷³ While at work at the Hume Pipe Company, Tsafendas often complained that Portugal was exploiting Mozambique's oil.²²⁷⁴ He argued with Portuguese and other Whites, accusing them of mistreating the Black workers. He also accused Portuguese and other Whites of mistreating the Black workers who he urged to go on strike. However, the non-Whites were too frightened to take such action.²²⁷⁵

Another workmate at the Hume Pipe Company was an elderly Indian whose daughter was planning to get married. The old man was building an extra room onto his own small house for the girl and her husband, but the work was moving very slowly because of the man's age and lack of money. Each day after finishing work, Tsafendas voluntarily worked alongside his elderly colleague until the job was finished. Tsafendas was then the only non-Indian person to attend the wedding.²²⁷⁶

While in Gondola and Beira, Tsafendas associated with many Greeks and frequently patronised John Verghis's café shop;²²⁷⁷ in Gondola, he visited the Scala Café, which was popular with Greeks, including the Greek Consul in Beira, Captain P.A. Sanianos who regarded Tsafendas as "a very intelligent person."²²⁷⁸ In Beira, he encountered Andreas Babiolakis, his childhood friend from Lourenço Marques; and fellow Greeks Andreas Kavallieratos, George Nikolaou and his daughter Marina Nikolaou-Tsichlakis.²²⁷⁹ A thing that impressed the Greeks in Beira was that when Tsafendas finished work for the day, he would gather a group of Mozambican children and teach them English and History.²²⁸⁰ Tsafendas believed that education was very important for these children and it is their best weapon for their future and against poverty.²²⁸¹

One day, Tsafendas accused Greeks in general of exploiting the Mozambicans.

²²⁷³ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²²⁷⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²²⁷⁵ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²²⁷⁶ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²²⁷⁷ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, File 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

²²⁷⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, File 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

²²⁷⁹ Marina Tsihlakis in a personal interview, 3 April 2015.

²²⁸⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²²⁸¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Although he did not mention a specific individual, one of those in his company told him he was an embarrassment to the Greek community and a traitor. Tsafendas replied that he was proud to be such an embarrassment and such a traitor and that they were an embarrassment to the human race. One of the younger Greeks moved to attack Tsafendas but was held back by his friends. Greeks often asked Tsafendas to stop talking about politics because he could get them all into trouble. He said he wanted to have nothing to do with the Greek community as they were mostly racist and fascist and supported the Portuguese authorities.²²⁸² Advocate George Bizos was also considered to be an “embarrassment” and a “traitor” by the Greek community in South Africa because of his anti-apartheid stance.²²⁸³

Ira Kyriakakis characterised Tsafendas as “an idealist. He was very passionate about politics; he despised racism and colonialism and wanted Mozambique to get rid of the Portuguese; he was very strong in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”²²⁸⁴ Andreas Babiolakis held different political views from Tsafendas and judged some of his ideas as “too extreme.” Tsafendas made no attempt to hide his detestation for colonialism and apartheid, and he told Babiolakis one day that he “considered Verwoerd and [Portuguese Prime Minister] Salazar to be fascist dictators who should be executed like Mussolini.”²²⁸⁵ However, Babiolakis admits now that Tsafendas was “ahead of his time.” He told the author:

“Everything he was saying about Africa and Mozambique was correct and have happened. He was telling us [the Greeks], including me, to take our money and leave as long as there was time, because sooner or later the Portuguese would be kicked out and everything we had ‘stolen’ from the Mozambicans would be returned to them. We should have heard him, but none of us did and I told you what happened ... he was a good and bright man. The things he was saying at the time seemed wrong and stupid, but we couldn’t see beyond our noses...he was right about everything.”²²⁸⁶

Tsafendas’s vast knowledge and good manners made a good impression on Xenofon and Marika Conti, whose daughter Irene was engaged at the time to John Michaletos, Tsafendas’s nephew and Aunt Artemis’s son. Marika, too, got on well with Tsafendas; she

²²⁸² Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²²⁸³ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; *To Vima*, 13 June 2010, ‘Γιώργος Μπίζος: Υποφέρουμε όπως εσείς στους Ολυμπιακούς’; Advocate George Bizos in Manolis Dimelas’s *Live and Let Live*, 2007.

²²⁸⁴ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

²²⁸⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

²²⁸⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

would often invite him home for dinner, preparing Greek food especially for him. Irene Conti-Michaletos said Tsafendas “was very, very clever and he knew a lot. He was very well-read ... very friendly and talked a lot, mostly about Communism and Christianity. He had very strong political convictions and nobody could change his ideas. He was very staunch in what he believed.”²²⁸⁷

While in Gondola, Tsafendas attended the wedding of Vittorio, an Italian friend and fellow Communist, probably from Naples, who was working with him at the time. As the celebrations proceeded, Tsafendas rose from his chair and raised his glass. Everyone thought he was about to deliver a speech. He did indeed deliver a very short speech wishing the newly-weds well, but then, in a ringing baritone, he launched passionately into an Italian Communist song. Most of the Greeks among the guests were speechless, but Vittorio and his Italian friends joined in eagerly, clapping and rhythmically pounding the table with their fists or table spoons. When he finished he received huge applause and Vittorio and some of his friends called for another song. Tsafendas obliged with a second Italian Communist anthem and again many guests joined him.²²⁸⁸ The songs were probably *Bella Ciao* and *Fischia il Vento*, the two Italian songs which Tsafendas sang often throughout his life.

Among the Greeks he met in Beira was John Emmanuel Marvis, who one day lent Tsafendas twenty escudos, which Tsafendas paid back a few days later. Tsafendas told Marvis that he was in “favour of full integration and intermarriage between Coloureds and Whites.”²²⁸⁹ One day, Marvis, along with Andreas Babiolakis, Papadakis and Tsafendas were at the Scala Café, discussing politics. Tsafendas was dismayed that racism and wars existed all over the world. He believed that things would never change as long as the world remained as it was, with different countries, different nationalities, different religions and different races, all of them creating differences among peoples. He concluded that this situation would never change because it was impossible to eradicate borders, nationalities and religions. Tsafendas's theory was that for wars, conflicts and racism to be eradicated, countries, religions and the different races had to cease to exist. Then the whole world would be united in one state with no religions, or with only one world religion for everyone. As for how to eradicate the different races, he said (half-jokingly, half-seriously): “Everyone should have

²²⁸⁷ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

²²⁸⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²²⁸⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

sex with someone of a different colour, so a new race will be created where everyone will be the same colour or at least they will all be mixed! Only then will there be no racism and discrimination anymore!” Everyone laughed and this remark was discussed for a long time in Beira.²²⁹⁰

Although Tsafendas was joking about the sex issue, he was absolutely serious about his belief about the three things that needed to be done for the world to become a better place. This was a belief that he had for several years, and he expressed it to several people. Until the day he died, he still believed that racism, wars and conflicts would be eradicated only if these three things took place.²²⁹¹ As we will see, this comment was misconstrued at the summary trial as meaning that Tsafendas was paranoid and wanted to create a new race, like some mad villain in a movie.

During his time in Gondola and Beira, Tsafendas was often seen in the villages of the area chatting with local people in their native dialects.²²⁹² According to PIDE, Tsafendas was “advertising in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”²²⁹³ He went further than that. As well as preaching Communism, Tsafendas urged the villagers to revolt against the Portuguese and join the rebel FRELIMO movement launched two years earlier. Wherever he went to the villages, Tsafendas always carried a suitcase filled with revolutionary and anti-colonial literature; books about Mao Zedong, about Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution and about the Soviet revolution. Most important for Tsafendas were the works of Frantz Fanon,²²⁹⁴ the political revolutionary, philosopher and psychiatrist from the Caribbean island of Martinique, who had argued that violence against colonialism was not only necessary in order to free the

²²⁹⁰ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²²⁹¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²²⁹² *Diario de Manhã*, ‘Chegou a ser detido na Beira por suspeita de actividades subversivas a assassino do Dr. Verwoerd,’ 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²²⁹³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²²⁹⁴ Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) was born of mixed-race parents in what was then the French Caribbean colony of Martinique. He left in 1943 to join the Free French forces fighting the Nazis in Europe and received the Croix de Guerre after being wounded at Colmar, France. Educated at Lyon, Fanon qualified as a psychiatrist in 1951 and began publishing works which inspired and influenced national liberation movements all round the world. He died in Bethesda, Maryland, United States, aged thirty-six, a few months after publishing *The Wretched of the Earth*, his classic analysis of colonialism and liberation. Fanon’s life and thoughts influenced revolutionaries such as Ali Shariati, Steve Biko, Malcolm X and Ernesto Che Guevara (Gordon, L.R., Sharpley-Whiting, T.D., White, R.T. (eds.) (1996) *Fanon: A Critical Reader*. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 138; Bianchi, E. C. (1972) *The Religious Experience of Revolutionaries*. Doubleday. p. 29-48, 87-105, 206). The influence which Fanon’s philosophies brought to bear on Steve Biko and the black consciousness movement are analysed in Alan L. Turner’s *Franz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought* (1986). Fanon’s other works include *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952); *A Dying Colonialism* (1959) and *Toward the African Revolution* (1964).

people, but also legitimate. As well as his books, Tsafendas carried many photographs of Fanon. On the back of each photo, he had written some of Fanon's quotations and he would hand the pictures out to people he met. He believed that Fanon's messages would carry greater weight with the people he talked to if they saw that he was Black. Fanon's books were in English and French and Tsafendas would translate them for local people. He memorised numerous quotes from Fanon's writings and could repeat them flawlessly even twenty-eight years after the assassination.²²⁹⁵

While preaching Communism and for the independence of Mozambique in the villages, Tsafendas always carried several small Bibles in case he needed to convince the Portuguese that he was a minister of religion. Should this fail, he always had his "insanity" act to fall back on. He believed the Portuguese would never harm him because he had been diagnosed as insane in Lisbon. To prove it, he always carried the certificate with the diagnosis. Once, Ira Kyriakakis warned him about talking against the Portuguese. Tsafendas told her smiling, "I am crazy, I can do what I want" (and get away with it), and showed her the hospital certificate.²²⁹⁶ Tsafendas said this was a tactic dating back to the early years of Christianity, known as "being foolish for Christ," when Christian believers would pretend to be mad so that the Romans would leave them alone.²²⁹⁷

Sometime in November, Tsafendas wrote to his brother-in-law in Pretoria, Nick Vlachopoulos, asking him to send the proceeds from the sale of some of his furniture which he had left at a second-hand shop in Pretoria. Vlachopoulos gave the money, R20.00, to Marika and she sent it to Tsafendas in Beira.²²⁹⁸ At some point during his stay in Beira, Tsafendas appealed to the Greek Consul, Captain P.A. Sanianos, for help in his search for work. When he mentioned that he could speak Russian, Sanianos arranged for him to work as an interpreter when a Soviet ship arrived in the harbour.²²⁹⁹

²²⁹⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 27 May 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 18 October 2015.

²²⁹⁶ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

²²⁹⁷ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²²⁹⁸ Nick Vlachopoulos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²²⁹⁹ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 21. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

On November 12, 1964, Tsafendas was at the bar of the Gondola Hotel, discussing politics “in the company of various native races” and some Greeks, including Nick Papadakis and Andreas Babiolakis. At one point, Tsafendas said:

“This land is not called Portugal, it is called the United States of Mozambique; our flag has the colour blue and a rainbow, that rainbow that represents all of the colours. We already have money, what we need is not to be mistaken by saying that we are Portuguese. No! We are Africans. Someday this will be over, I am sure that it will be over. Check my face in front of everyone, I don't like the Portuguese flag. Long live our land, the United States of Mozambique. Do not be fooled by my colour, my mother was African, I am also African.”²³⁰⁰

According to several witnesses, Tsafendas often mentioned his idea about a flag with the colours of the rainbow when talking about Mozambique's independence. He believed that the new national flag after independence should display the colours of the rainbow, representing the country's races and minorities.²³⁰¹ Thirty years later, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela used the term “Rainbow Nation” to describe post-apartheid South Africa after its first fully democratic general election in 1994.²³⁰²

Tsafendas travels through Mozambique's villages propagandizing for independence did not remain unnoticed by the Portuguese for long. On November 16, 1964, Tsafendas was arrested in Maforga, a small town five miles from Gondola, by the Portuguese Public Security Police, accused of “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.” He was taken to a police substation in Beira for interrogation.²³⁰³

When the police searched his suitcase, they found several Bibles in addition to the left-wing political literature. Tsafendas was subsequently accused of pretending to be a missionary spreading the word about religion,” while in reality preaching “under the guise of

²³⁰⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²³⁰¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

²³⁰² BBC, 22 July 2010, ‘Archbishop Tutu in his own words.’ Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10734471>; Manzo, 1996: 71-73.

²³⁰³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

religion in favour of Mozambique's independence..." The following is an extract from PIDEs' Confidential Report Regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, dated 25 November 1964:

"When asked to describe all of the subversive activities that he has been developing against the Country and in favour of Mozambique's independence, he answered: That, he hasn't been developing any kind of such subversive activities against the Country neither in favour of Mozambique's independence. However, wishes to clarify that he supports, as a Mozambican, the idea of Mozambique's independence, governed by the natives of that Province, whether they are black or white.

When asked to say the reason why, on the last day twelve, in Gondola, he was, together with various black nationals, advertising in favour of Mozambique's independence, saying the following phrases: 'This land is not called Portugal, It is called United States of Mozambique; our flag has the colour blue like the rainbow, that rainbow that represents all of the colours: we already have money, what we need is not to be mistaken by saying that we are Portuguese. No! We are Africans. At any day this will be over, I am sure that it will be over. Check my face in front of everyone else, I don't like the Portuguese flag. Long live to our land "United States of Mozambique". Do not be fooled by my colour, my mother was African, I am also African.' He answered: That, in fact, when the respondent found himself, together with the other black nationals, at the bar in Gondola Hotel, in the middle of that uplifted environment and already with a "few glasses", he pronounced those words. His attitude is due to his ideas, already mentioned before, about Mozambique's independence. That he wishes to clarify that, although he agrees with Mozambique's independence, he doesn't belong, however, to any subversive party or organization that works in this sense.

When asked to say what was his religion and if it was true or not that he has dedicated himself to preach as a missionary and, under the guise of this same religion, advertised in favour of Mozambique's independence, answered: That he is a Christian and considers himself a representative of God on earth, a missionary, that wishes he could preach the Christian religion but that he is not allowed to because, on this earth, there is no freedom of expression. That is not, then, true that, under the guise of the religion, he has been advertising

in favour of Mozambique's independence. That, being a Christian, he is not, though, Roman Catholic."²³⁰⁴

Costas Poriазis and Andreas Babiоlakіs were good friends of a high-ranking Portuguese police officer who told them about Tsafendas's arrest. He said that Tsafendas was detained with a suitcase full of "Communist and subversive books" and that the Portuguese authorities had information that he was conducting propaganda for the independence of Mozambique.²³⁰⁵

Due to the seriousness of the charges, Tsafendas was handed over next day to the Sub-Delegation of PIDE in Beira.²³⁰⁶ There, he was interrogated by PIDE's Sub-Inspector, Joaquim Piçara Sabino, Brigade Chief Augusto de Sousa Maia, and agent Virgílio Francisco.²³⁰⁷ Inspector Horacio Ferreira, who was in charge of the police cells where Tsafendas was kept for some fourteen days after his arrest, characterised him as being "intensely anti-white" and convinced that "the Portuguese Government has never done anything for its non-whites." He added that Tsafendas was "normal" and he regarded him "as a very intelligent person." During his detention, he was often seen to read books written in "Bantu languages, but never the Bible."²³⁰⁸

On November 25, 1964, the Sub-Director of the PIDE in Mozambique sent the transcript of Tsafendas's interrogation along with request, n°.2707/64-S.R, for additional information about Tsafendas, to the General Director of the PIDE in Lisbon.²³⁰⁹ PIDE wanted evidence that Tsafendas belonged to or was in contact with FRELIMO and Tsafendas found it difficult to convince them otherwise since he had openly urged the villagers to join the

²³⁰⁴ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Andreas Babiоlakіs in a personal interview, 19 May 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²³⁰⁵ Andreas Babiоlakіs in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²³⁰⁶ PIDE report about the Defendant: Demitrio Tsafendas or Dimitrius Tsafendakis. 19 January 1965. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; PIDE report regarding Demitrio Tsafendas or Dimitrius Tsafendakis, 19 January 1965. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas

²³⁰⁷ PIDE Record of questions. 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²³⁰⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, File 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

²³⁰⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25/1125 November 1964/1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

independence movement. He was also asked about the comments he had made at the bar of the Gondola Hotel.²³¹⁰

According to the transcript of the interrogation, Tsafendas told his interrogators about his life and his travels around the world, and then “confessed to the accusation quoting the above sentences and other phrases, stating however, that even though he had a ‘few glasses,’ his words resulted from ideas he had about the independence of Mozambique; a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother-nation. He denied belonging to any party or subversive organization which worked for the independence of Mozambique, or of having promoted subversive activities against the security of the state, although he clearly stated he was in favour of the independence of Mozambique.”²³¹¹

At some point in late November or early December, Tsafendas was transferred to PIDE’s headquarters in Beira, where he was further interrogated and kept in solitary confinement for the next two months.²³¹² It was there apparently that he changed his stance and began pretending to be mad in order to secure his release. Since he faced accusations of pretending to be a missionary and because he carried Bibles and holy books, Tsafendas came up with an idea that neatly fitted the situation. This time he pretended to be Christ’s apostle, Peter, and quoted the Christian scriptures at length. This was easy because he knew much of the Bible by heart and having copies with him made his act convincing. Later, Tsafendas told several witnesses exactly which passages he had parroted from the scriptures. The deception worked and he was transferred to the Government Hospital in Beira for examination.²³¹³

²³¹⁰ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²³¹¹ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²³¹² Inspector Horacio Ferreira said in his report that Tsafendas was kept at the cell under his guard for two weeks. According to various PIDE’s reports and the Commission of Enquiry, Tsafendas was arrested on November 16 and released on January 26, which obviously means that Tsafendas was not released after the two weeks he spent under Inspector Ferreira, but was taken somewhere else. It is not clear in the reports where exactly Tsafendas was held the rest of the time. However, Tsafendas told Andreas Babiolakis, Costas Poriazis and Nick Papadakis that after two weeks of interrogation at a “small police station,” he was transferred to the police headquarters in Beira, where the interrogation continued for another two and half months. Since all the PIDE reports state that Tsafendas was imprisoned for three months and Inspector Ferreira claims that Tsafendas was with him for only two weeks, we can safely assume that Tsafendas was indeed held for the remaining of the three months at another place. Correspondence between PIDE officers from November 15, 1964 to January 20, 1965 further confirms that Tsafendas was in PIDE’s custody and not that of the Public Security Police who first arrested him.

²³¹³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

While Tsafendas was in custody, all the Greeks in Gondola who knew him were questioned by the Portuguese police. They were asked specifically if Tsafendas talked politics with them and whether he was insane. They replied in the negative to both questions because they did not want the police to think they knew about his political ideas but did not inform the authorities.²³¹⁴ Costas Poriазis was subsequently told by a Portuguese policeman that Tsafendas was released from custody because he was insane and thought he was Saint Peter. Poriазis was shocked to hear this and concluded that Tsafendas made it up in order to be released, but naturally he did not say this to the policeman. When later he saw Tsafendas and asked him about it, Tsafendas appeared to be deeply embarrassed. He simply said he had a nervous breakdown while he was in custody but he was ok now, and changed the subject.²³¹⁵ News of Tsafendas's apostle act quickly circulated within the small Greek community in Gondola. Tsafendas himself was embarrassed about it and when he was released, he avoided Greeks who knew about his act.²³¹⁶

On December 18, 1964, PIDE's General Director in Lisbon sent to his colleagues in Beira PIDE's file on Tsafendas, which was held in Lisbon, along with a PIDE report regarding Tsafendas written on December 12, 1964. The PIDE report contained extensive information about Tsafendas's travels, "a story of what his life had been, an authentic adventurer novel, peregrinating around the world," and also stated that after he was arrested by the Portuguese police, "in the course of inquiries he demonstrated signs of mental illness, a fact that was confirmed by Ultramar Hospital."²³¹⁷

On January 19, 1965, Francisco Bartolomeu da Costa Lontrão, a PIDE officer in Beira, wrote to the Sub-Director of the PIDE in Lourenço Marques that "the defendant Dimitrius Tsafendakis is a supporter of the independence of this Province, without however being a militant for any of the clandestine and subversive organizations that strive for it. As the criminal facts he is accused of (and has admitted to) indicate that he has a certain abnormality, a fact that has been observed before (fls.19), it is convenient that all investigations stop and the archives be handed to the Sub-Director of the Delegation, so that

²³¹⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²³¹⁵ Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²³¹⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²³¹⁷ PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 12 December 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

they can be assessed and he can decide what should be done with them, as well as with the defendant.”²³¹⁸

On January 23, upon reading Lontrao's report, Alberto Henriques de Matos Rodrigues, a PIDE officer in Lourenço Marques, made the following suggestion to the Sub-Director of the PIDE in Mozambique: “Having seen the archives, it is remarked with a minimal margin of error, that the defendant Demétrio Tsafendas (id. a fls. 10) is mentally ill and therefore not chargeable at a juridical or penal level. Given this, it seems to us a pure waste of time to continue working on these archives, since we already know what their end will be. Therefore, considering the probable fact that the defendant cannot be charged, and he is not at all dangerous, I propose the release of the defendant, and closure of the archives.”²³¹⁹ The Sub-Director agreed with the recommendation, presumably supported by the diagnosis from the Government Hospital in Beira, and requested that Tsafendas be released.²³²⁰

Tsafendas was eventually freed on January 26, 1965.²³²¹ Once again, he had managed to convince the Portuguese that he was mad and harmless. Penniless and homeless upon his release, Tsafendas asked the fire-fighters at the Beira fire department if he could sleep at the department's premises and they agreed. He slept there for ten nights, making sure that “he arrived at mealtimes, when he was invited to share in the food.” Eventually, he left - according to fireman Jose Lopez Baltazar without thanking them - and was not seen again.²³²² Sometime in late January or early February, 1965, Marika sent Tsafendas another R20.00 from the sale of his furniture.²³²³ For a couple of weeks in February, Tsafendas stayed in Andreas Babiolakis home in Beira. He told him about his prison conditions and that he was kept in solitary confinement for many weeks.²³²⁴

²³¹⁸ Letter of Francisco Bartolomeu da Costa Lontrao to the Subdirector of the PIDE in Lourenço Marques, 19 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²³¹⁹ Alberto Henriques de Matos Rodrigues conclusion to the Subdirector, 23 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²³²⁰ Conclusion, signed by António Fernandes Vaz, 22 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²³²¹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²³²² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

²³²³ Nick Vlachopoulos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³²⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

Tsafendas then asked his half-sister Katerina Pnefma and her husband Gerry to help him find a job in Mozambique. Although they had argued, Katerina, cared for her half-brother, and she and her husband, unaware of his latest arrest, agreed to help him. Gerry Pnefma was friendly with the manager of a dock in Beira and persuaded him to hire his brother-in-law as an interpreter. Tsafendas lasted only a few days before being dismissed for urging the Mozambican workers to strike because of their working conditions. Tsafendas denounced the manager and the company as “capitalists exploiting the workers.” The manager told Gerry Pnefma about the incident and said the “only reason he did not call the police was that he did not want to cause his family problems.” He urged his friend not to help Tsafendas again because he was “a dangerous Communist” who could get him into trouble.²³²⁵

At some time in February, shortly after he was dismissed from his job at the docks, Tsafendas was at John Verghis's café shop in the company of several Mozambicans and Greeks, among them Andreas Babiolakis and Nick Papadakis. At one point, Tsafendas bought beer for everyone there, then paraphrasing Mark Anthony in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, happily called out, “Friends, countrymen, lend me your glasses.” However, when he called on them to drink to a recent attack by FRELIMO rebels, everyone froze and lowered their glasses untouched while Tsafendas downed his beer. Verghis politely asked Tsafendas to leave and he never returned.²³²⁶

The next day Tsafendas was arrested again by the Portuguese Public Security Police because of his comments at the bar and his activities at the docks. He was also reported to have been “seen in cafes with Coloured political suspects.”²³²⁷ However, he was released a few days later because the police had by now accepted that he was “mentally ill and therefore not chargeable at a juridical or penal level” and there was no point in detaining him any longer.²³²⁸

A few hours after his release, Tsafendas was seen by Giangos Babiolakis, Andreas's brother, and Costas Poriазis. He was in a bad state: his shirt was torn apart and his head had

²³²⁵ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²³²⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²³²⁷ *Daily Mirror*, 9 September 1966: 11, ‘The clouded past of an assassin’; Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

²³²⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

bruises. He told the men he had been beaten up while in custody. Giangos Babiolakis took Tsafendas home and let him stay there for a few days. Penniless and unable to find work due to his political leanings and activities, and with PIDE keeping a close watch on him, Tsafendas realised he had no future in Mozambique and determined to leave for South Africa. Giangos and six other Greeks voluntarily offered to help him leave Mozambique for South Africa by boat. Contributing 500 escudos each, Giangos and Andreas Babiolakis, Costas Poriadis and three of their Greek friends handed Tsafendas 3,500 escudos, or about 1,000 Euros at today's rate. Tsafendas promised to pay them all back, though the men said the money was a gift. A few months later, he returned all the money he had borrowed.²³²⁹ March 5, 1965, Tsafendas left Mozambique for Durban, South Africa, aboard the Indian Ocean liner, *Karanja*.²³³⁰

DURBAN, MARCH – OCTOBER 1965

When the *Karanja* docked at Durban on March 8, 1965, officials of the Department of the Interior boarded the vessel to check the passenger list and ensure that none of the arrivals was on the Department's Stop List. On the roll of the banned which they brought with them was a person named Tsafendakis Dimitrio alias Tsafendas Demetrio. The *Karanja's* passenger manifest contained the name Tsafendas Demetrio. Extraordinarily, the official concerned failed to spot the connection. He was the fifth government officer in a row not to notice Tsafendas's name on the Stop List.²³³¹

Soon after he settled in Durban, Tsafendas went to meet Rowley Israel Arenstein,²³³² a well-known Communist lawyer who was banned from practising law because of his anti-

²³²⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²³³⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150. Vol. 3, File: 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

²³³¹ Report of the COE, Chapter II C, Paragraphs 23 and 24. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²³³² (1919-1996) Attorney, prominent anti-apartheid activist who was opposed to violence; trade union advisor, member of the South African Communist Party, leader of the Congress of Democrats and an official advisor to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi (South Africa History Online, n.d.). Arenstein was banned from the practice of law between 1953 and 1955 and between 1960 and 1986, and was under house arrest from 1962 to 1980. The disbarment applied under legislation which made it illegal for Communists or Marxists to practise law (Arenstein quoted in Suttner, 1997: 386); Tsafendas spoke extensively and very highly to Father Minas Constandinou about a 'Jewish Communist lawyer in Durban' who have helped him a lot. Father Minas does not remember the name of the lawyer. However, as we will see in Chapter Four, a witness, Esperanza Theron, testified to the police that Tsafendas was often seen in Arenstein's office. In addition, Tsafendas told Father Minas that he became aware of Saint Thomas Aquinas after the lawyer in Durban gave him a book about him.

apartheid and Communist stances. Tsafendas had been given Arenstein's address from a member of the anti-apartheid movement in London. Arenstein told him they were looking for interpreters in the city's court. Tsafendas had a positive reference from Limasollu in Istanbul, but Arenstein suggested he get another from someone local.²³³³ Tsafendas approached Antonis Kalogirou, a Greek who was a good friend of his father and had known the family in Lourenço Marques. Kalogirou was very wealthy, was a member and financier of the National Party and had close ties with some of the Party's MPs.²³³⁴ He was not aware of Tsafendas's political ideas as he had not seen him since he was seven or eight, and happily agreed to provide a reference, helping him eventually to get the job.²³³⁵

The head interpreter at Durban Magistrate's Court, Cornelius Johannes Rudolph, said Tsafendas called in two or three times a week to see if there was any work. He said, "I made use of his services on several occasions.... he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent, he spoke English properly."²³³⁶ A fellow interpreter at Durban court described him as a "whiner" and as a man who often complained about the working conditions and his lack of money,²³³⁷ while other colleagues described him as the "chatty Greek."²³³⁸

Between March 16 and April 7, 1965, Tsafendas worked for South African Railways at Umbilo, Durban, having been medically examined and pronounced fit. The examination took place on March 15, 1965. One of the questions was if Tsafendas had suffered or was suffering from 'any mental or physical defect, disease or infirmity' which would not allow him to perform his duties. Tsafendas replied 'no.' He also replied 'no' to the questions if he had ever suffered from any "disease, disability, illness or injury, nervous breakdown, psycho-neurosis or mental disease."²³³⁹

Saint Thomas Aquinas was one of Arenstein's favourite political philosophers and thinkers (Arenstein quoted in Suttner, 1997: 402). Furthermore, Ronnie Kasrils stated in a personal interview with the author (16 May 2016) that Arenstein was the only "Jewish Communist lawyer in Durban." If we take this and all the above under consideration, we can conclude that certainly Arenstein must have been the person Tsafendas spoke so highly about.

²³³³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²³³⁴ Michelis, 1988: 14; Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 23 January 2016.

²³³⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012.

²³³⁶ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³³⁷ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. 'Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.'

²³³⁸ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, 'Algumas versoes sobre a vida de Tsafendas.'

²³³⁹ South African Railways Confidential Medical Examination Certificate of Demitrio Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 7, File: S 83708, Tsafendas: D. NASA.

On his first day at work Tsafendas said he had just arrived from Mozambique and had no money to travel to work and had not yet found a place to stay. Garnet Vincent Muller, the senior foreman, organised a staff collection and gave Tsafendas about two rand; he also arranged accommodation for him at a hostel. Tsafendas's job was removing and replacing jumper cables, work he said was "unsuitable to him" as he was a boilermaker by trade. Muller considered Tsafendas "to possess intelligence above that of the average person."²³⁴⁰ Tsafendas's immediate boss, Johannes Jacobus Uys Aurets, described Tsafendas as "well-mannered, well-spoken and good-natured. He was a good worker."²³⁴¹

While in Durban, Tsafendas often visited a Greek Café Shop owned, by Peter Pappas, a former Greek army officer. According to Pappas, Tsafendas spoke angrily about the Salazar regime in Portugal and the Mozambique police. Furthermore, Tsafendas was friendly with "white down-and-outs" and when he had some money "he would give them a few cents." "When his luck was out, I sometimes gave him a free meal, but when he started work he paid me," Pappas said.²³⁴² J. Willemse, Tsafendas's landlord characterised him as a "sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man."²³⁴³

On April 19, 1965, Tsafendas started work as a fitter and turner with Fraser and Chalmers Ltd, at Mandini, a town about a hundred kilometres north of Durban, and was described by his boss, Charles Edwin Woods as "a good tradesman,"²³⁴⁴ "a very good worker, far from being a crank, fairly intelligent, but he was a violent type and we couldn't keep him."²³⁴⁵ Tsafendas was discharged on May 9, 1965 after fighting with another White man, a Greek, Nikolas Vergos.²³⁴⁶ Vergos gave to the police his age as sixty, though the police file said fifty-four.²³⁴⁷

According to Tsafendas, Vergos was fascist, racist and bullied the African workers. Vergos would often order the non-White workers to run personal errands for him, such as

²³⁴⁰ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁴¹ Johannes Jacobus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁴² *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.'

²³⁴³ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. 'Assassin - man with a chip on his shoulder.'

²³⁴⁴ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁴⁵ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, 'Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.'

²³⁴⁶ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁴⁷ Charge sheet, Case No 276 1965, 14 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

getting cigarettes, which Tsafendas told him to stop doing. Tsafendas frequently talked to people about Communism and against apartheid and Vergos heard about this. He told Tsafendas to stop because he would get them all dismissed or arrested, but Tsafendas ignored him.²³⁴⁸ Vergos had urged their supervisor Charles Edwin Woods, to get rid of Tsafendas because he was a Communist,²³⁴⁹ and even denounced him to a police sergeant, Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie, as a “Communist bastard.”²³⁵⁰

On May 7, 1965, Vergos and Tsafendas fought physically.²³⁵¹ Vergos had hired two Africans who were working in same company to do some work for him in his house, then refused to pay them, claiming that they had not done a good job. When they complained, he threatened them with the loss of their jobs and since the work they had done was illegal, they could not complain to the police or the company.²³⁵² Tsafendas heard about it and one day, while both men were in the company’s canteen arguing with Vergos, he intervened and demanded that Vergos pay them. Vergos refused and started swearing at Tsafendas. Tsafendas slapped him twice in the face and Vergos fell down. The fight then stopped and both men left the canteen.²³⁵³

Tsafendas then went to his room, but shortly afterwards Vergos appeared with a knife in his hand. Tsafendas told him “to get out,” but Vergos attacked him with the knife. Tsafendas said in his statement to the police, “He gave me one stab in my hand which was trying to ward off the blow, then aimed another blow at my stomach. I jumped away and he

²³⁴⁸ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²³⁴⁹ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁵⁰ Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²³⁵¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File Verklarings. NASA.

²³⁵² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²³⁵³ Demetrio Tsafendas’s statement in the court regarding the incident, 14 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

only scratched me. I then pushed him away.”²³⁵⁴ For the next two months Tsafendas needed medical treatment at the hospital on his injured right arm.²³⁵⁵

In testimony to the police, Vergos failed to state the reason for the dispute, saying Tsafendas attacked him out of the blue for no reason.²³⁵⁶ Tsafendas's version of the incident also fell short of the whole truth and did not reveal any apparent reason for the fight. According to Tsafendas's statement to the police, “Vergos entered the canteen swearing.” Tsafendas asked him to “behave himself” and then they fought.²³⁵⁷ Vergos could not give the cause of the fight because he had used two African workers illegally and Tsafendas did not refer to this because the Africans would have been fired for their illegal work.²³⁵⁸ After the fight, Vergos told Johannes Jacobus Botha, the company's security officer, that Tsafendas was “the biggest communist in the Republic of South Africa.” Subsequently, Botha shared Vergos' comment with a member of the South African Police of Inyoni.²³⁵⁹ Vergos then asked Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren, their boss, to fire Tsafendas because he was “a kaffir and a Communist.”²³⁶⁰ Because of the stabbing, Tsafendas took Vergos to court. He was found guilty and paid a fine.²³⁶¹

Soon after this, in Mandini, Tsafendas argued with a German-born Roman Catholic priest, Father Hanno Probst, who ran the Mangete Catholic Mission in Zululand. According to Father Probst, one day in June, 1965, he saw Tsafendas sitting on a bench in front of a store. His arm was wrapped in a bandage and “he looked rather lost.” Tsafendas said he had been stabbed. The priest said he could tell he was from Mozambique whereupon Tsafendas began swearing at the Mozambique government, saying it did nothing for the Black people. When Tsafendas said he had travelled a lot and could speak eight languages, Probst tried him

²³⁵⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas's statement to the police regarding the incident, 7 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

²³⁵⁵ Tsafendas's statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁵⁶ Nikolas Vergos' statement to the police regarding the incident, 14 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

²³⁵⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas's statement in the court regarding the incident, 14 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

²³⁵⁸ None of the witnesses remembers what the two African workers had exactly done for Vergos.

²³⁵⁹ Johannes Jacobus Botha's statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁶⁰ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²³⁶¹ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

and found he could speak Spanish, Czech, Italian, English and the Munich dialect of German fluently.²³⁶²

Father Probst testified to the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd's death:

“During our conversation he also mentioned to me that he had been to Germany and actually stated that he had visited Munich in Germany. Because very few people in South Africa can speak or understand the Munich Dialect of German, I spoke to him in this dialect. I was surprised to hear that he could speak this dialect so well. I gained the impression that this person was very well trained in the different languages and I actually said to him that he must have had very good teacher in Moscow to be able to speak the different languages so well. To my surprise he admitted have been in Moscow.”²³⁶³

It should be mentioned here that the author has not been able to establish with certainty whether Tsafendas visited Russia and if he did, when that happened. However, even if he did, he did not learn any languages there, as he already knew them. The topic will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

Tsafendas asked which Church the priest belonged to and when he heard it was the Roman Catholic Church, Father Probst said “He then suddenly started to swear at the Roman Catholic Church and also at the Portuguese Government in Mozambique, stating that the Nuns in Mozambique Hospitals inject the natives to get rid of them and that the Portuguese Government approves of this.” Angrily, Probst retorted that far from getting rid of natives, the Catholic Church helped them. The priest told Tsafendas he was speaking like one of Patrice Lumumba's Simba rebels in the Congo, accused him of being a Communist and reminded him that Communism was outlawed in South Africa. Finally, he suggested that he would not get far in South Africa with such ideas and attitude and “that it would be better if he returned to Mozambique.”²³⁶⁴

The next day Father Probst called on a security officer at the factory of South African Pulp and Paper Industries (SAPPI), who he named as a “Mr. van Vuuren.” The priest outlined his conversation of the previous day, describing the Mozambican as “a Communist and a

²³⁶² Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²³⁶³ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²³⁶⁴ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

dangerous person.” Not knowing his name, he gave a description of him. Probst also told the police that he described the Mandini encounter to Gladstone Dunn, a Coloured man who lived in the Mangete Reserve. The priest said he never saw Tsafendas in the Mangete Reserve but believed he had some influence on the local inhabitants. He said, “During the period he stayed at Mandini, the youngsters in the Mangete Reserve became unruly and aggressive.” This was only suspicion, he said, and later, when Tsafendas was gone, everything became quiet again and the youngsters controllable.²³⁶⁵

Between June 21, 1965 and August 24, 1965, Tsafendas lived at the Durban Men’s Home at 160 Queen Street. A staff member, Kenneth Heugh Ross, said Tsafendas was registered as an interpreter at the Magistrate’s Court but at that time was unemployed. According to Ross’s statement to the police after Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination that Tsafendas “was very fond of discussing politics” and gave him “the idea that he was well versed in politics. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government and was definitely pro-Russian ... in general, Demitrio Tsafendas was opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me ... [Tsafendas] objected to Communists being banished to Robben Island.” Ross was also “aware that Tsafendas possessed a large quantity of literature,” but did not take a note of the names of the books he read.²³⁶⁶

The night clerk at the Home, Robert Harpur Smith, said Tsafendas invariably discussed politics and said if South Africa “was a Communistic state, there would be no need for a Durban Men’s Home because everybody would have sufficient.” He said the South African government’s policies were “rotten” and the members and officials of the United Party and the National Party were “capitalistic roughs.” According to Smith, Tsafendas was a “fanatic on politics and seldomly spoke of anything else.” Smith was also aware that Tsafendas had “a large quantity of literature,” but did not know “the nature thereof.”²³⁶⁷ Tsafendas was also well liked by Mr. J. Willemse, another former landlord who described him as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”²³⁶⁸

²³⁶⁵ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²³⁶⁶ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966, K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁶⁷ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁶⁸ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

In June 1965, while he was in Durban, Tsafendas received a letter from Helen Dorothy Daniels, thirty-six, a Coloured woman from Cape Town who was a Minister of the Christian Church. She said she wanted to meet and marry him. In a reply she received on July 10, 1965, Tsafendas said he wanted to meet her before giving a positive response. Helen sent him another four letters and a photo of herself; he replied to the letters but did not enclose a photo. Tsafendas was first mentioned to Helen Daniels in April 1965 when she visited friends and fellow members of her church in Boksburg, some 800 miles north of Cape Town. There she heard very good things about Tsafendas and the friends recommended she should contact him. He was a nice man, her friends said, and the two should meet. Subsequently, Helen asked her friends to find out his address. When she was told he was in Durban but they did not have his address, she wrote a letter to him and gave it to friends who were going to Dublin on holiday. They gave the letter to the Church's preacher in Durban who passed it on to Tsafendas.²³⁶⁹

Daniels was a highly respected minister in her Church and the way she heard about Tsafendas suggests that he was held in high esteem by the Church members who recommended him. The fact that she went to considerable trouble to get in touch with him, attempting to find his address, sending him a letter with a friend of hers and then sending him four more letters and a picture of hers, implies that she expected to meet a good man who was warmly recommended by her friends.

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Travelling partly by train and partly hitching, Tsafendas journeyed from Durban to Cape Town over nearly twenty-four hours, arriving on August 28, 1965.²³⁷⁰ He visited Helen's parents' home, where she too lived, in the Belleville suburb. The visit was not a success. Neither was impressed by the other when they met in the flesh. Tsafendas said, "She would have been just right for me ... It's a pity she is so fussy."²³⁷¹ Helen testified to the police after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination:

²³⁶⁹ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

²³⁷⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Peter Daniels's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

²³⁷¹ *The Post*, 18 September 1966: 1, 'I jilted Tsafendas, says Coloured girl.'

“His clothes were dirty and neglected and I had a very bad impression of him... we had a spare room and gave him lodging... after a few days I decided I could never marry such a man... he also did not try to establish a relationship with me... he never discussed our relationship ... I was happy that my earlier proposal died a sudden death.”²³⁷²

On September 1, 1965, Tsafendas applied for reclassification as a Coloured person²³⁷³ and gave up his white identity card. For this reason Tsafendas frequently visited the Department of the Interior and complained to a certain Mr. Rossouw. Tsafendas said Rossouw “always wanted to know where I was staying and whether the people I was staying with were White or Coloured.” Tsafendas was eventually given a blank identity card but it was soon taken back again by Rossouw.²³⁷⁴

The author has not been able to establish for a fact why Tsafendas applied to be reclassified as a Coloured person. He told the police that he did it in order “to marry a Coloured woman named Helen Daniels.”²³⁷⁵ However, according to Helen Daniels, Tsafendas appeared to have no interest in marrying her and made no attempt to establish a relationship with her.²³⁷⁶ The report of the Commission of Enquiry also stated that Tsafendas gave as a reason for his application that “he regarded himself as a Coloured and that he wished to marry a Coloured.”²³⁷⁷ Attorney General W.M. van den Berg stated in a memorandum that according to a statement in his possession “there was never any question of a marriage between him (Tsafendas) and the Coloured woman, Helen Daniels from Bellville South. Information from Home Affairs files indicated that Tsafendas applied for reclassification because he wanted to apply for a business licence in a Coloured area.”²³⁷⁸

Patrick O’Ryan testified that Tsafendas was “favourable towards the Coloureds and he repeatedly applied to be classified as a Coloured.”²³⁷⁹ Tsafendas also told David Bloomberg that he wanted to change his classification “because he felt Coloured, and he was

²³⁷² Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

²³⁷³ Report of the COE. Chapter IX, Paragraph 1. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²³⁷⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁷⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁷⁶ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File VDSO 17/64, NASA.

²³⁷⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 39. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²³⁷⁸ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

²³⁷⁹ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

more comfortable with the Coloured people, and he had been living with Coloured people in Cape Town.”²³⁸⁰ Tsafendas never spoke to any other of the witnesses interviewed by the author about his application to be reclassified, at least they do not remember such a topic. It is not possible, therefore, to determine for certainty what his reason was. However the likeliest explanation seemed to be that Tsafendas considered himself to be Coloured and wanted to live freely among Coloureds.

On October 16, 1965, Tsafendas left and Helen never saw him again. During the six weeks he stayed with the Daniels family, Tsafendas attended all their church services, sang and prayed with other members and received Communion, while he also got a job at the Power Station in Cape Town. Helen Daniels said “besides his messy ways, I did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal. His stories about travelling abroad were interesting.”²³⁸¹

Tsafendas then moved to No. 7 Prince Street, Cape Town, where Violet Manning rented out rooms. He made a good impression on his landlady, who found him “well-dressed and well-spoken” and took him to be “a businessman ... a man of means.” She was impressed that although his room was “a serviced room,” she found him making his own bed. A few weeks later, however, another tenant, Mrs Ferreira, complained that Tsafendas “was a nuisance... going into the kitchen to fetch water and spilling water on the floor.” Manning told Tsafendas about the complaint and asked him to not go to the kitchen again. However, sometime later, Ferreira complained again. Manning gave Tsafendas notice to leave at the end of the month, which happened to be two days later. Tsafendas returned the keys at the end of November and left.²³⁸²

Shortly before Tsafendas left Manning’s house, Patrick O’Ryan, a Coloured teacher and a member of the Christian Church, was told by a good friend about a “highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages” who was looking for accommodation.²³⁸³ O’Ryan met this gentleman, who turned out to be Tsafendas, and invited him to stay with his family, comprising his wife Louisa and eleven children, at 9 Westminster

²³⁸⁰ David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

²³⁸¹ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File VDSO 17/64, NASA.

²³⁸² Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

²³⁸³ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

Street in the Lansdowne area of Cape Town. Tsafendas moved in immediately after leaving Manning's house.²³⁸⁴

O'Ryan took a "deep liking" for Tsafendas,²³⁸⁵ considering him to be an enlightened person,²³⁸⁶ and the feeling was mutual. Indeed, O'Ryan would turn out to be the best friend Tsafendas ever had. The new lodger quickly became part of the family and the children called him "Uncle Dimi." Tsafendas loved the children, would babysit them and regularly bought them sweets and toys. O'Ryan said that as head of the family this was embarrassing for him, but Tsafendas continued. What he said, however, was that their father and he had bought the sweets together.²³⁸⁷ Reuben O'Ryan, a son of Patrick, said about Tsafendas, "We all loved him ... he was an adorable man ... he was the answer to our prayers. We were poor and he brought food to our house."²³⁸⁸

O'Ryan spent a lot of time listening to Tsafendas's tales of his adventures around the world. He did not personally have any particular interest in politics, but would address the subject when it came up, which was often. He remembered Tsafendas as being very anti-White, excitedly referring to the treatment of Blacks and Coloureds by the Whites. One day, Tsafendas said that "if he ever got hold of Dr. Verwoerd he would bash his skull" and that he considered him to be "Hitler's best student." O'Ryan did not reveal any of their political discussions to the police when questioned about Tsafendas.²³⁸⁹

Tsafendas talked to many people but confided certain things only to Patrick O'Ryan. One of these was how he got involved with the Christian Church and how he met Tom Tuff. Tsafendas told his friend about Tom's tapeworm story, describing how he copied it and used it to convince the Portuguese he was mad so as to receive amnesty and return to Mozambique, but also to make them stop torturing him when he was under arrest.²³⁹⁰ O'Ryan

²³⁸⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²³⁸⁵ Patrick O'Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

²³⁸⁶ Patrick O'Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

²³⁸⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²³⁸⁸ Reuben O'Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

²³⁸⁹ Patrick O'Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²³⁹⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

appears to be the only person Tsafendas told about Tom Tuff and the origins of the tapeworm story before the assassination.

One day when Tsafendas was starting on a second or third plate of food, one of the O’Ryan boys, who was not eating his food, asked how he managed to eat so much. His dad joked that it was because Uncle Dimi “has a tapeworm inside him which eats his food.” He added that if his son did not eat his own food, Uncle Dimi would take it and give it to the worm. Fascinated and a little frightened, the boy plied Tsafendas with questions, whereupon Tsafendas opened his eyes wide and breathed heavily, saying that was what happened when the tapeworm ate. After that, the children often asked about the tapeworm and Tsafendas would repeat his performance. Upon hearing about the tapeworm, Louisa told her husband, “that figures,” referring to Tsafendas’s appetite. Patrick did not tell her about Tom Tuff or that the tapeworm was imaginary and he enjoyed joking with Tsafendas about it. He had promised never to divulge his secret.²³⁹¹ Tsafendas built a very good relationship with Louisa because she sympathized with his “problem,” unaware it was a joke.²³⁹²

One time, at a prayer gathering in a church member’s house, Yvette O’Ryan, the four-year-old daughter and youngest child of the family, asked Tsafendas to show their friends how the tapeworm acted. Embarrassed, Patrick said this was not the right place for it, but Tsafendas, evidently untroubled, staged his act. When some parents inquired about the tapeworm, Louisa O’Ryan said it was true, he had a tapeworm, but Patrick said he was just joking. Tsafendas appeared perfectly relaxed about the tapeworm business and put on his act when he was with the O’Ryan children or their friends’ children.²³⁹³

After five months in O’Ryan’s house, Tsafendas moved out²³⁹⁴ because members of Patrick’s extended family were coming to stay for a few months. O’Ryan insisted that there would be space for all but Tsafendas left, knowing that this was not exactly true. The children cried but Tsafendas said he would visit often and would return again when the visitors had gone. In the event, he never did stay with the O’Ryans again because by the time the guests were gone, he was living in a house which was much more convenient for his commute to

²³⁹¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²³⁹² Louisa O’Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

²³⁹³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²³⁹⁴ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Patrick O’ Ryan statement to the COE, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

work, while he was embarrassed that O’Ryan continued to refuse any rent from him. However, Tsafendas kept up his close relationship with the O’Ryans, visiting at least once a week and invariably bringing meat for the pot and sweets and toys for the children. He also met with Patrick at their Church’s prayer and social gatherings.²³⁹⁵

Tsafendas thought very highly of the O’Ryan family and loved the children as his own. He often praised Patrick for his generosity, kindness and hospitality. Patrick “never got the impression that there was anything wrong with him.” For him, Tsafendas was a “normal, natural person,”²³⁹⁶ he had “confidence in him” and described him as a “very kindly man” with “a good heart.”²³⁹⁷ Stanley O’Ryan, another of Patrick’s children, saw Tsafendas as a “very down-to-earth man, very friendly.” He said, “I never suspected, even in the slightest, that he might be unstable. Nothing at all. Perfectly normal.”²³⁹⁸

Looking back, Tsafendas concluded that it was O’Ryan who saved him from being hanged after Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination. Later, in prison and in hospital, Tsafendas would often weep, remembering the O’Ryan family and wondering how they were doing and what the children grew up to become.²³⁹⁹ When Tsafendas died in 1999, Patrick and Louisa travelled 1,425 kilometres from Cape Town to Sterkfontein, to attend the funeral. They were the only friends who came.²⁴⁰⁰ As we will see in Chapter Five, Patrick O’Ryan was the defence’s most important witness at Tsafendas’s summary trial and the one who spoke extensively about the tapeworm.

During his time in Cape Town, Tsafendas became friendly with many Greeks, among them Costas Chagios, who owned the Belgravia Café. Chagios told the author about Tsafendas:

“I knew him for about a year ... he used to come to my restaurant and I got to know him very well. He must have been to my restaurant more than fifty times ... he was a gentleman, very polite, with very delicate manners, and it seemed that he was very well-read

²³⁹⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 7 April 2015.

²³⁹⁶ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

²³⁹⁷ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

²³⁹⁸ Stanley O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 9 April 2015.

²³⁹⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁴⁰⁰ *South African Press Association*, 9 October 1999, ‘Small group gather for Tsafendas’s funeral.’

because of the delicate way he talked and all the things he knew ... he was very well aware of politics and what was happening around the world.”²⁴⁰¹

Most of Chagios' customers were Greeks. They would all greet Tsafendas, but no-one ever invited him to join them and he would sit at the bar and talk to Chagios. The Greeks considered him to be a troublemaker. They knew he was a Communist and against apartheid and that he had been arrested by the Portuguese for subversive activities in Mozambique. Chagios told the author that Tsafendas never told him anything “about a tapeworm and he never said or did anything which would indicate there was something wrong with him. On the contrary, he was very, very clever, certainly cleverer than most people ... he was also very witty. I have no doubt that he was not insane ... The only strange thing I remember about Tsafendas was the fact that his face seemed to be always sweaty... and you could tell that this man was not happy. Many times he seemed sad.”²⁴⁰²

Tsafendas worked as a fitter at the Table Bay power station from September 13, 1965 to October 25, 1965, when he received a one-week notice of dismissal because his work was deemed unsatisfactory. He resigned on the same day to avoid being discharged.²⁴⁰³ In November, 1965, he applied for work with City Tramways in Cape Town. On the 19th of that month he was medically examined, found to be fit to work and duly hired.²⁴⁰⁴ Tsafendas worked for this company as an apprentice bus conductor, number 10236, between December 29, 1965 and January 12, 1966. His supervisor, Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen, found Tsafendas to be “slow” and “lazy,” but he “did not at all get the impression that mentally anything was wrong with him,” and found him to be “mentally normal.” Before he left, Tsafendas said, “This is too much for me. I cannot do it and I will resign.”²⁴⁰⁵

In November 1965, Tsafendas met Sybie Barendilla, a twenty-eight-year-old Indian-Coloured girl, at a gathering of the Christian Church. He tried to date her, but without success

²⁴⁰¹ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015.

²⁴⁰² Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015.

²⁴⁰³ Dpt. of Labour report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 323/026034, n.d. K150, Vol. 1, Sub file: 1/2. NASA; *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA; Donald Neville Mackay statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁰⁴ Donal Neville Mackay statement to the COE, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁰⁵ Johannes Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

because she considered him to be too old for her.²⁴⁰⁶ The same month, Tsafendas instructed a Cape Town lawyer, Ismail Essop, to claim \$100,000 compensation from the American government for his “forced deportation” from the United States to Greece in 1947. In a four-page affidavit to the US consulate in Cape Town, Tsafendas stated that he had served on American Liberty ships during World War Two, from 1941 to 1946, and was repatriated against his will to Greece, an unknown to him country where he knew no-one, instead of South Africa, where he had had friends and family. He sought payment of \$50,000 for damage to his health and \$50,000 for loss of income.²⁴⁰⁷ Tsafendas was given a full hearing and the affidavit was forwarded to the State Department, which replied in January 1966 that such claims had to be taken up by the individual’s embassy in Washington or through a federal court. By coincidence, John Hurley, the US vice-consul who interviewed Tsafendas about his compensation claim, would later be in Parliament at Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination.²⁴⁰⁸

On January 13, 1966, Tsafendas applied for work at the Marine Diamond Corporation and was medically examined that same day. Completing a company questionnaire, Tsafendas ticked the “no” box to an inquiry whether he ever had “any mental complaints.” He did not mention any health issues, presenting himself as a fit healthy person. The doctor who examined him²⁴⁰⁹ found Tsafendas to be perfectly healthy and capable of working for the company.²⁴¹⁰

For the first three months, he was employed as a machine operator under the maintenance foreman, Reginald Spence. A few weeks after he started working there, Ralph Lighton, the company’s supervisor, concluded that Tsafendas was “lazy and inefficient,” so he put him in charge of two action-dredge pumps which involved less work, and responsibility. However, Lighton, “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound” and found Tsafendas to have “excellent reasoning powers.”²⁴¹¹ The change of jobs

²⁴⁰⁶ Sybie Barendilla statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

²⁴⁰⁷ Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA.

²⁴⁰⁸ Shaw, 2007: 58.

²⁴⁰⁹ The doctor’s name in the medical report is indecipherable.

²⁴¹⁰ Tsafendas’s Marine Diamond Corporation application for Employment, 13 January 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

²⁴¹¹ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

did not improve Tsafendas's work rate. Another employee, Keith Martincich, found him to be "one of the laziest persons" he have ever seen.²⁴¹²

A co-worker in the Marine Diamond Corporation named Hulse, recalled Tsafendas as "talkative" and "not disturbed." Tsafendas later told him that he left the Diamond Corporation because "the work was too hard for an old man like him."²⁴¹³ Carel van Heerden, the company's senior security officer, said once when they were on a boat in "terrible rough seas," everyone became seasick, apart from Tsafendas, who had "adapted well. Upon landing, he [Tsafendas] filled the mess-basin on the lower deck with water and started shaving. His calm way struck me that he [Tsafendas] must know the sea," Van Heerden said. He described Tsafendas as "friendly, outgoing, and not aloof ... I noticed that his eating was messy. Otherwise he was completely normal."²⁴¹⁴ Gillian Lieberman, the company's secretary, said that in conversations with Tsafendas, she got the impression that "he does not agree with authority, Governmental or other." She found him to be "intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange person, a unique character."²⁴¹⁵

On February 25, 1966, Tsafendas made the first of a series of visits to the Ear, Nose and Throat department at Groote Schuur hospital in Cape Town. He complained of a blocked nose and was found to have a deviated nasal septum blocking his left nostril. On April 19, Dr. Leon Goldman performed a surgical resection of the septum and Tsafendas was discharged on April 22. On April 26, he was treated for a recurrence of bleeding, then checked on May 3 and discharged as fit on May 17, 1966.²⁴¹⁶

For about six or seven weeks during April and May of 1966, Tsafendas lived at a home for elderly people kept by Elizabeth Magdalena Groves, a former nurse who had worked in mental institutions. Groves said she found Tsafendas to be a "very good eater" but "besides his rough table manner," she had "nothing against him." She said, "He was completely normal ... a normal person to the best of my knowledge." However, she "received

²⁴¹² Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁴¹³ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966, K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Hulse's first name is not given in this statement, but in Henk van Woerden's *A Mouthful of Glass* the name is given as John.

²⁴¹⁴ Carel van Heerden statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴¹⁵ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴¹⁶ Statement by Dr I. Eisenberg regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

complaints that he was argumentative” and he claimed that “Afrikaners were a backward nation.” She said, “It was clear that he (Tsafendas) had nothing good towards Afrikaners.”²⁴¹⁷

Sharing a room with him in Groves’ house was a traffic policeman, Jacobus Johannes Bornman, aged twenty-two. Bornman found his roommate “normal, intelligent and friendly,” but also thought that he was “a lazy person.” Once when Bornman was out of funds, Tsafendas realised this and gave him five cents. When Bornman tried to return the money later, Tsafendas refused to take it. According to Bornman, Tsafendas “stood up a lot for the Coloureds” and “talked about Russia but not as if he had ever been there. He often criticised the South African government and seemed to have a grudge against Dr. Verwoerd. He was neat in his person but his eating habits were messy.”²⁴¹⁸

On May 7, 1966, Tsafendas applied for a veteran’s pension/disability grant from the government.²⁴¹⁹ The Department of Social Welfare referred him to the District Surgeon’s office. Because he was aged under sixty, it was necessary that he be found “unable, owing to infirmity of mind or body” to undertake regular work and therefore qualify for the grant.²⁴²⁰ On June 17, 1966, Tsafendas was examined by the district surgeon, Dr. Ralph Kossew. He told the doctor that in the house where he was living twenty people were murdered by poison in their food. After an examination that lasted “a little bit longer” than ten minutes, the doctor declared that Tsafendas was suffering from a serious form of schizophrenia and that he had delusions of a persecutory nature, and therefore was eligible for the pension since he was unfit to do any work.²⁴²¹ Dr. Kossew’s examination will be considered in detail in the Summary Trial Chapter.

However, as we have seen, whenever Tsafendas wanted to be found fit to work, he always proved fully capable. On at least three occasions in the previous two years (Marine Diamond Corporation, City Tramways and South African Railways), he was examined by doctors and pronounced fit for the work he was seeking. He was also found to be perfectly healthy when examined by Dr. Been and Dr. A.C. McDonald for his residence permit.

²⁴¹⁷ Elizabeth Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴¹⁸ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴¹⁹ Demitrio Tsafendas application Veteran’s Pension, 7 May 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Social Welfare and Pensions, NASA.

²⁴²⁰ House of Assembly, Question No. 17. 3 February 1967. K150, Vol. 12, File: Social Welfare and Pensions, NASA.

²⁴²¹ Dr. Ralph Kossew testimony at Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966: 88. K150, Vol. 10, File: Union of S.A. NASA.

Tsafendas later told four witnesses that whenever he wanted to be found sane, he was found sane, and whenever he wanted to be found insane, he was found insane.²⁴²²

Even so, Tsafendas lost his pension appeal. Even though he was found “unable to do any work,” according to the Act’s requirement, Tsafendas was disqualified “on the grounds that he had not rendered war service as defined in the Act.”²⁴²³ Unable to find work in the city, Tsafendas applied to the British Consul in Cape Town on May 11, 1966 for “permission to reside in Zambia.”²⁴²⁴ The following day, the Consul informed Tsafendas that he could not help him and he should the Chief Immigration Officer in Zambia for the necessary forms.²⁴²⁵

On May 25, 1966, in an attempt to find work, Tsafendas registered at the Department of Labour,²⁴²⁶ and was interviewed several times thereafter by Ian Boswell, the Department’s administrative assistant. Boswell said Tsafendas was “at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being overtalkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality during his interviews with me.”²⁴²⁷ Tsafendas was also seen twice by Pieter Geldenhuys, another employer of the Department, who also “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”²⁴²⁸

A clerk in the enquiries office at the Department of Labour, Gideon Cloete, also met Tsafendas twice. The first time was on April 26 of that year as Tsafendas came to his office to apply for illness allowance. Tsafendas came back to Cloete’s office in July of that same year to ask for his assistance to use Cloete’s phone in order to apply for work of which he had three English newspaper clippings of vacancies. Cloete assisted Tsafendas by calling the employers and got hold of a foreman at an Engineering Firm in Maitland where a vacancy existed for someone to do welding. According to Cloete, Tsafendas “seemed eager to get

²⁴²² Gordon Winter’s correspondence with David Beresford, 8 September 1998. From Liza Key’s personal collection; Gordon Winter in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²⁴²³ House of Assembly, Question No. 17. 3 February 1967. K150, Vol. 12, File: Social Welfare and Pensions, NASA.

²⁴²⁴ Tsafendas letter to the British Consul in Cape Town, 11 May 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/7 Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

²⁴²⁵ H.M. Consul letter to Demetrio Tsafendas, 12 May 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/7 Departement van immigrasie. NASA; There are no further records in the archives regarding Tsafendas’s inquiry and he never spoke about his intention to live in Zambia to any of the witnesses interviewed by the author.

²⁴²⁶ Memorandum of the Department of Labour regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub file: 1/1. NASA.

²⁴²⁷ Ian James Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

²⁴²⁸ Pieter Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966, K150, Vol. 1, Sub file: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

employment, was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance.” Cloete also stated that he saw no signs of abnormality with Tsafendas, “he seemed perfectly normal.”²⁴²⁹

On June 4, 1966, Tsafendas rented a room in Wilhelmina de Vos’s house in Woodstock, Cape Town. She considered that Tsafendas was “dirty and had bad habits and his house manners were poor,” and “that he was work-shy.” After some time, she asked him to leave as she “could not endure his messy ways any longer.” However, she “considered him to be a completely normal person.”²⁴³⁰ During June and late July 1966, Tsafendas had his meals at Mary Scott’s boarding house in Woodstock.²⁴³¹

Mary Scott was Greek, married to a White South African. She often cooked Greek food and many Greeks would visit her house to eat.²⁴³² Scott considered Tsafendas to be “very poorly mannered” but she “never got the impression that he could be mentally unbalanced,” indeed she thought that he “appeared to be perfectly normal.”²⁴³³ Pamela Abrahams, a South African who often visited the house along with her Greek boyfriend and future husband, Panagiotis Peroglou, said Tsafendas was very well mannered, especially with women. According to Abrahams, “Tsafendas was a gentleman. He would always get up from the table to greet you and he always offered you his seat or went to find you a seat... he was certainly very well mannered.”²⁴³⁴

Panagiotis Peroglou was a good friend of Scott but also does not remember Scott ever complaining about Tsafendas. Peroglou remembers Tsafendas as being “very well mannered, especially with women and elderly people... he was very talkative and friendly and he had a lot of respect for the women. He would bring them a chair or he would offer his chair.” Peroglou remembers Tsafendas as being “well educated, especially about Greece’s history and Christianity.”²⁴³⁵ Peroglou and Abrahams associated with Tsafendas for about three months and both “never got the impression that he might be insane. He never did or said

²⁴²⁹ Gideon Cloete testimony at Tsafendas’s summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Union of South Africa. NASA.

²⁴³⁰ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴³¹ Mary Cathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴³² Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

²⁴³³ Mary Cathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴³⁴ Pamela Abrahams in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

²⁴³⁵ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

anything to make us think he was insane. He was definitely sane.” Peroglou and Abrahams do not remember Tsafendas talking politics.²⁴³⁶

Elias Constantaras, another Greek, was friendly with Scott and often ate at her house. He strongly disagrees that Tsafendas had poor manners. The only complaint he remembered from Scott, which she mentioned two or three times, was that Tsafendas talked politics persistently at the table in front of her boarders and she suspected him of being a Communist. According to Constantaras, Scott was afraid of Tsafendas talking like that and she asked him to tell Tsafendas to stop. Constantaras did so and though Tsafendas was not happy that Scott did not tell him herself, he complied with her request.²⁴³⁷

Constantaras remembers Tsafendas discoursing on history. “He knew a lot about Greek and world history.” Tsafendas “was anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid; he described Dr. Verwoerd as ‘Nazi’ and ‘Hitler’s best student’ and the white South Africans as Nazis. He [Tsafendas] believed that Dr. Verwoerd was doing to the Blacks what the Nazis did to the Jews.” Seeing all the books in his room, Constantaras one day asked Tsafendas to lend him one. Tsafendas gave him Jean-Paul Sartre’s “*Anti-Semite and Jew*,”²⁴³⁸ claiming it was exceptional and that he had just finished reading it.²⁴³⁹

Constantaras quickly returned it since he had been looking for an adventure story. Most of Tsafendas’s books were political and historical, Constantaras said, but he did not notice any Communist or anti-apartheid books, or anything that could have been banned in South Africa. In terms of mental stability, Constantaras remembers Tsafendas as being “perfectly fine. He was not insane. None of us ever got the impression that he could be insane ... I remember I was impressed by the way he was talking ... he talked very nicely; he knew how to speak properly. He sounded like an educated man ... he was very friendly and easy-talking with everyone ...”²⁴⁴⁰

Stratis Vamvarapis, another Greek, lodged with Scott at the same time as Tsafendas and knew him for about a year. He found Tsafendas to be a “strange man - strange as a character, not mentally strange. He was easily crossed when he disagreed with people.”

²⁴³⁶ Pamela Abrahams and Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

²⁴³⁷ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

²⁴³⁸ Published in 1946, soon after the liberation of Paris from German occupation, Sartre’s keynote essay examined reactions to race hatred, arguing that anti-Semitism was not so much an idea or a point of view as a passion.

²⁴³⁹ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

²⁴⁴⁰ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

Initially, Tsafendas had little to say, but became more talkative as they grew to know each other, though he never discussed politics with him. According to Vamvarapis, Tsafendas “never appeared to be schizophrenic or insane” and he never heard him mention a tapeworm.²⁴⁴¹

In late July, after he had left de Vos' boarding house, Tsafendas rented a room in Alice Theyser's house, also in Woodstock, and stayed there until August 30, 1966. Theyser “never got the impression in any way that he (Tsafendas) might be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared a quite normal person.”²⁴⁴² During this period Tsafendas started visiting the nearby “Barlings Tea Lounge.” Herbert Summers, the owner, “never had reason to even suspect that he (Tsafendas) could be mentally unbalanced. He acted quite normal.”²⁴⁴³

In July 1966, Tsafendas's visited Mr. N.D. Hartford, a reporter of the *Cape Argus*. Earlier in the year, he had asked Hartford if there was any news of the freedom fighters in Mozambique due to his continuing interest in efforts to overthrow Portuguese rule in Mozambique. He had described himself as a rebel from Mozambique and Hartford, thought Tsafendas might provide material for a magazine article. During the subsequent, seventy-five-minute interview, Tsafendas described how he had entered South Africa illegally from Mozambique in 1936 when he was a teenager. He made no criticism of South Africa but denounced Portuguese rule and said he still suffered from headaches as a result of police brutality when he was arrested in Lisbon after the Second World War.²⁴⁴⁴ Hartford considered Tsafendas to be normal – he had “no reason to believe that he was mentally defective.”²⁴⁴⁵

Sometime in July, Tsafendas started observing the Parliament building to explore the possibility of assassinating Dr. Verwoerd. His preference was to kidnap him and exchange him for political prisoners, but he knew that would be impossible on his own. He had hoped that one day the common people would storm the building, as the French revolutionaries had done with the Bastille. He visited the area two or three times in a week, though not every day so as not to be noticed. He would sit on a bench and feed the birds while observing the

²⁴⁴¹ Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

²⁴⁴² Alice Mary Theyser statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁴³ Herbert Summers statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁴⁴ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, 'Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.'

²⁴⁴⁵ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

building.²⁴⁴⁶ One day, a man came out of Parliament and began feeding the birds. They started chatting and Tsafendas mentioned that he was unemployed. The man told him that he was a Parliamentary messenger and that the Parliament office was desperate for messengers and Tsafendas should apply for a position. He assured him he would be accepted as they were short-staffed. Tsafendas couldn't believe his luck.²⁴⁴⁷

Tsafendas bought a new suit and paid for a shave in a barber's shop. On July 18, 1966, he put on his suit, took his two best references, from Limasollu Naci College in Istanbul and from Fries and Son in Frankfurt.²⁴⁴⁸ He was interviewed by Piet Burger, the Chief Messenger at the Assembly, and two senior messengers Piet Schuin and Sydney Wiehand. It was a standard practice that two messengers would be present when conducting "interviews for the reason being that if they notice something about the person being interviewed, they could bring it to Mr. Burger's attention."²⁴⁴⁹ "Nothing out of the ordinary" was noticed about Tsafendas, who seemed to be "the same as any other person that had worked there."²⁴⁵⁰

Sydney Wiehand noted that a man with his qualifications could easily get a better job elsewhere. Tsafendas replied that he "couldn't find any work at the moment, and he must fill his stomach."²⁴⁵¹ He was so eager for the job that he expressed his willingness to work for R100 per month rather than the normal messenger salary of R238.²⁴⁵² Tsafendas was notified in writing on July 20, 1966 to report for duty at the Parliament on August 1, 1966.²⁴⁵³ Also interviewed on that day was Felix George Miles. Miles did not talk to Tsafendas but "did not notice anything unusual about his clothing or behaviour." Both men started work that same day.²⁴⁵⁴ Tsafendas's salary was R238 per month.²⁴⁵⁵

²⁴⁴⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁴⁴⁷ Interview by Mr T.I. Potgieter, Senior Magistrate, Pretoria with Demitriou Tsafendas at the Pretoria Central Prison on 20 October 1987. Correctional Services. File: 80/0043, A123, Dimitrio Tsafendas, Vol. 1. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁴⁴⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁴⁴⁹ Piet Bester Burger interviewed by Judge van Wyk on behalf of the Commission of Enquiry, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File Excerpts from testimony. NASA.

²⁴⁵⁰ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin interviewed by Mr. Terblanche on behalf for the Commission of Inquiries. 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File Excerpts from testimony. NASA.

²⁴⁵¹ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

²⁴⁵² *Die Volksblad*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Dimitri Tsafendas. Nuwe feite oor bode onthul.' K150, Vol. 6, File 4. NASA.

²⁴⁵³ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 73. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²⁴⁵⁴ Felix George Miles statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 2, File 1. NASA.

²⁴⁵⁵ *Die Volksblad*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Dimitri Tsafendas. Nuwe feite oor bode onthul.' K150, Vol. 6, File 4. NASA.

In 1987, when he was in Pretoria Central Prison, Tsafendas described to a senior magistrate, T.I. Potgieter, how he got the job in the Parliament. He approximately said the same things he would later tell the other witnesses, excluding though some crucial details:

“One day I was sitting in front of the Assembly and I bought fish and chips from a Portuguese shop across the road... I sat on a bench and started throwing pieces to the seagulls... While I was doing that, somebody comes and sits next to me on the bench. He was a small man, dark, he says, ‘What are you doing here?’ I says to him, ‘Well, I’m doing nothing.’ He says to me, ‘Are you out of a job?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ He says to me, ‘Look, there is a part-time job here. Don’t say I told you. Go there and tell them, inquire if you can get the job, but don’t say I sent you or told you about it.’ So, I went there ...”²⁴⁵⁶

In the meantime, and while Tsafendas was working full-time at the Parliament, his application for reclassification was being slowly but thoroughly examined by the South African authorities. After exchanges of files and correspondence among various departments, it was discovered that Demitri Tsafendas was the same person as Demitrio Tsafantakis, who had entered South Africa illegally in 1939 and had been on the Government’s Stop List since September 1959. Consequently, on August 8, 1966, the Secretary of the Interior submitted a memorandum and an order for Tsafendas’s removal to the Minister of the Interior. The following day, August 9, the Minister approved the recommendation and signed a warrant for Tsafendas’s deportation. However, due to the snail’s pace of the movement of the bureaucracy, the warrant was never executed.²⁴⁵⁷

THE ELENI, JULY – SEPTEMBER 1966

Tsafendas spent much of July and August working part-time for Michaelis Augustides, owner of a clothing store, Mike’s Outfitters, in Woodstock, in addition to his full-time job at the Parliament. Augustides said Tsafendas came by his shop one day and said he could contact ships at Cape Town docks and bring seamen to his shop. He agreed and when Tsafendas brought customers he paid him commission totalling about ten rand.²⁴⁵⁸

²⁴⁵⁶ Interview by Mr T.I. Potgieter, Senior Magistrate, Pretoria with Demitriou Tsafendas at the Pretoria Central Prison on 20 October 1987. Correctional Services. File: 80/0043, A123, Dimitrio Tsafendas, Vol. 1. NASA.

²⁴⁵⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter IX. 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria. December.

²⁴⁵⁸ Michaelis Augustides statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

Neville Judson, a salesman at the shop, accompanied Tsafendas to the docks on about three occasions and found customers, some of whom he brought back to the shop by car while others came on their own. Tsafendas always took him to the same Greek ship, the *Eleni*. Judson chatted a lot with Tsafendas and said that he “never got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared like a normal man with a lot of normal reasoning powers.”²⁴⁵⁹ Nick Augustides, Mike’s nephew, also worked at Mike’s Outfitters at the time, and he remembers Tsafendas “talking violently about politics and about the apartheid system ... he was very passionate about politics. He definitely was not insane.”²⁴⁶⁰

The *Eleni* had moored in Cape Town for repairs on July 24, 1966, having sustained damage to its rudder en route to the Persian Gulf.²⁴⁶¹ She had a crew of thirty-eight, of whom thirty-four were Greek,²⁴⁶² nine of them from the tiny Greek island of Kasos. When Tsafendas told them he was a former seaman and his origins were also in Kasos, the men were sceptical, thinking that he was simply seeking their friendship. They were surprised when he told them about his step-mother, Marika, who was from the island, and named some of his relatives still living there. That he was an ex-seaman with origins in Kasos immediately made Tsafendas popular with the crew, especially with the Kasos islanders.²⁴⁶³

On his first visit, one of the crew, Emmanuel Tsabouniaris, gave Tsafendas money to buy him a couple of short-sleeved T-shirts and some cigarettes ashore. When Tsafendas left the ship late that night, his crewmates made fun of Tsabouniaris, saying, “Don’t expect to see him or your money again.” However, Tsafendas arrived with the T-shirts and cigarettes early next morning. Said Tsabouniaris, “He gave me the change and I told him to keep it, but he insisted on giving it back to me.” According to Tsabouniaris, Tsafendas was “very friendly and talkative ... good hearted, very polite and very well mannered; a true gentleman.”²⁴⁶⁴

Tsafendas spent much of his time at the *Eleni* over the next month and half. He felt at home on the tanker and was comfortable with the crew, most of whom were leftists, some Communists. They were all much younger than he was, many in their twenties, and they were

²⁴⁵⁹ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5, Subject: South African Police. NASA.

²⁴⁶⁰ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

²⁴⁶¹ John Patrick Leach testimony to the COE, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5, Subject: South African Police. NASA.

²⁴⁶² *Eleni* crew list, 18 July 1966, Greek Department of Maritime Labour, Office D; *Eleni* crew list, 24 July 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

²⁴⁶³ Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 13 January 2015.

²⁴⁶⁴ Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015.

fascinated by Tsafendas's stories from his many adventures around the world and "listened attentively to him."²⁴⁶⁵ He visited every night and often at lunch. Afternoons, he would take crew members on tours of Cape Town, sometimes to Mike's Outfitters, and once to a Greek Orthodox Church service.²⁴⁶⁶ He also taught Emanuel Tsabouniaris, Panteleimon Aspiotis and some other sailors how to fish lobster which was Tsafendas favourite food.²⁴⁶⁷ Some of the men asked Tsafendas to take them to a good Greek restaurant. One evening, he did so, and despite their protests, paid the bill for them all. He said that they were "strangers in his town" and he should pay.²⁴⁶⁸

Many nights aboard the tanker were spent singing Greek songs and sometimes, with some of the crew, Communist and partisan songs. The sailors were surprised that Tsafendas knew the lyrics of all the songs, which he would sing passionately, often weeping during the partisan songs. Some of the Communist crew members' relatives had fought in the Greek Civil War or were imprisoned and exiled afterwards. Tsafendas confided to some of them that he had joined the DSE, too, but "had not shot any fascists" because he was sent to Athens to do clandestine work there. He also spoke to some of them about his arrests and imprisonment by the Portuguese. One day, when some of the crew were telling stories of their compulsory military service in Greece, Tsafendas told them proudly that he had pretended to be crazy to avoid service in the Portuguese army.²⁴⁶⁹

When the seamen asked Tsafendas to recommend shopping places in Cape Town, he urged them not to spend their money in Cape Town's stores since they would be contributing to South Africa's economy. To help the men understand the political situation, Tsafendas took at least eight of them to a "small village area" where Black South Africans lived, probably a township. The men were Cleanthes Alachiotis, Nikolas Billis, Nikolas Kambouris, George Kantas, Michalis Vasilakis, Manolis (Emanuil) Mastromanolis, Grigoris Pouftis and

²⁴⁶⁵ Peter Protoulis statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. der Stafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁶⁶ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; I. Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁴⁶⁷ Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015.

²⁴⁶⁸ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 15 February 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁴⁶⁹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

Dimitris Zafiriadis. He explained that they had been displaced from their former homes by the government, that they needed passes to travel from one place to another and that they were forbidden to enter some areas at all. Some of the Africans there knew Tsafendas and greeted him warmly. He took them to a Black family's house where they had tea. Tsafendas knew the family and brought presents for their three young children.²⁴⁷⁰

What they saw had an enormous and profound effect on the *Eleni* men; saddened and angered, some of them said the Afrikaners “should be taught a lesson.” The boatswain, Manolis Mastromanolis, declared that “the South Africans need a good whipping.”²⁴⁷¹ Michalis Vasilakis, the tanker's fireman, equated the conditions he saw with those in Greece during the Second World War, when that country was under German occupation.²⁴⁷² Dimitrios Zafiriadis, the tanker's “donkeyman,” who was a Communist and had become very close to Tsafendas, was deeply affected. He wept when they left and referring to South Africa's Whites, exclaimed, “What kind of people are these?” Zafiriadis agreed with Tsafendas's suggestion to spend the minimum necessary while in South Africa, and urged the other seamen to do the same.²⁴⁷³ Nikolas Kambouris, the assistant cook, told the author, “Everyone was in shock at the appalling conditions in which these people lived. I had heard of apartheid, but I didn't know it was like this. I saw Black men and children in the streets with poor, torn clothes, but the places they lived was a real shock, not only for me, but for everyone. We were not prepared for it. It hit us very hard; it was like a fist in our bellies.”²⁴⁷⁴ None of those who were taken to this “small village” ever forgot it. While in Cape Town they kept their money in their pockets and even urged men from other vessels to do the same.²⁴⁷⁵

According to some seamen, Tsafendas talked incessantly about politics and was very aware of what was happening around the world. He often discussed the political situation in South Africa with the crew and gave his opinions freely. It was clear to them that he strongly

²⁴⁷⁰ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 13 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁴⁷¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 13 January 2015.

²⁴⁷² Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁴⁷³ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁴⁷⁴ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

²⁴⁷⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 13 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

opposed apartheid and colonialism. He repeatedly called Dr. Verwoerd a “bastard” and a “tyrant,” and equated the white government with the Nazis, denouncing government members and supporters as “Hitler’s best students” on account of what they were doing to the non-White South Africans. He also named Cuba as the place he wanted to live the rest of his life, because of its “socialism and exoticism.”²⁴⁷⁶

Cleanthes Alachiotis considered Tsafendas to be “fanatical against apartheid” and said, “He referred to the South African Prime Minister as the monster who created it all. He was very anti-South African, always telling us what the Whites had done to the Blacks. He said most Greeks in South Africa were no better, as they, too, were racist and fascist. He called the Prime Minister ‘Hitler’s best student.’”²⁴⁷⁷

Once, Vasilakis brought a South African newspaper with Dr. Verwoerd’s photograph. When Vasilakis pointed to the picture, Tsafendas directed a spitting gesture at the floor, a classical Greek demonstration of contempt.²⁴⁷⁸ When Kambouris warned that he should be careful about such gestures or he could be arrested by the South African police, Tsafendas smiled, said “I will be fine,” and pointed to his temple, meaning he had the brains to avoid the police.²⁴⁷⁹ Some thirty years later, when Tsafendas was in Pretoria Prison hospital, Father Minas Constandinou showed him a newspaper photograph of Dr. Verwoerd and he repeated the spitting gesture.²⁴⁸⁰

Tsafendas made a very good impression on all the seamen. Georgios Kantas remembers Tsafendas as a “kind-hearted, compassionate man who cared a lot for the people ... an idealist, very passionate about politics; a passionate Communist ... very anti-fascist and anti-colonialist.”²⁴⁸¹ Dionisis Lallis, the wiper of the tanker, did not associate much with Tsafendas, but remembers him as “a very polite man; it looked like he had a good upbringing.”²⁴⁸² Nikolaos Billis was impressed with Tsafendas’s “vast knowledge about

²⁴⁷⁶ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁴⁷⁷ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010.

²⁴⁷⁸ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; V. Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁴⁷⁹ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

²⁴⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁴⁸¹ Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012.

²⁴⁸² Dionisios Lallis in a personal interview, 19 June 2015.

politics and history” and remembers him as “an intelligent and cultured man.”²⁴⁸³ Vasilakis said Tsafendas seemed “able to convince anyone that his political ideas were right. ... You couldn’t disagree with him about anything. He always found a way to convince you that he was right. He was very, very able in reasoning and developing and explaining an argument. He was extremely good with words and arguments.”²⁴⁸⁴

The seamen were surprised by Tsafendas’s knowledge, but also that he was softly spoken.²⁴⁸⁵ “We were all wondering how come he knew all these things. How could he be talking like this? He was talking like a university professor.”²⁴⁸⁶ Some of the crew began calling Tsafendas “Professor” for his fluency and this made Tsafendas laugh. Vasilakis said, “I can’t explain it, but I remember he had a very specific way of talking, using not very common, but absolutely correct, words. He knew how to speak and how to pick up words. He was talking like a professor; this is what we used to say between us and what we called him ... He was a very knowledgeable man.”²⁴⁸⁷

Soon after he started work at Parliament, Tsafendas realised that it would be possible to secrete a bomb inside the building or to kill Dr. Verwoerd alone. He dismissed the idea of the bomb because Helen Suzman and non-politicians might die too, and decided he would personally assassinate Dr. Verwoerd. The problems were, how to do it and how to get away. He decided he would shoot Dr. Verwoerd from the lobby, run from the building, get to the docks and hide in the *Eleni*. If he acted shortly before the tanker was due to leave, he could be out of the country within hours.²⁴⁸⁸

Tsafendas now needed a firearm. He knew a licence was necessary and he knew seamen often carried guns for protection, so he approached Vasilis Perselis from the *Eleni* saying he wanted a weapon to scare people off.²⁴⁸⁹ Perselis referred him to Mastromanolis.²⁴⁹⁰ Mastromanolis told him that he only had a knife and he would not sell it as it was a souvenir from Australia. However, he knew that Nickolas Mavronas, the

²⁴⁸³ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

²⁴⁸⁴ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 5 December 2015.

²⁴⁸⁵ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015.

²⁴⁸⁶ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

²⁴⁸⁷ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁴⁸⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁸⁹ Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015.

²⁴⁹⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015.

seventeen-year-old galley boy, had a pistol, a Beretta, which he bought recently in Cape Town. He had not seen it but Mavronas claimed it was genuine. Mastromanolis thought Mavronas might be willing to sell the gun for a quick profit and told Tsafendas that he could let him have it, along with a knife, for eighty American dollars.²⁴⁹¹ Mastromanolis said there were no bullets but Tsafendas assumed they could be bought locally. Tsafendas did not have eighty dollars, so decided to wait until he got his wages at the end of August.²⁴⁹²

Meanwhile, Tsafendas pondered the details of his escape and scoured the tanker for a hiding place. Once, two seamen found him wandering near the engine room. It was unusual for him to be there but Tsafendas said he was lost and the seamen did not think there was anything suspicious. Soon, Tsafendas found his ideal place and decided to test it. One evening after dinner, he pretended that he was leaving, but instead hid in the secret place. He took a can of beer with him, so that if he was found, he could say he got drunk. The rehearsal worked and nobody noticed him. A few days later, he repeated the rehearsal with the same results. He also calculated how long it took to get from Parliament to the *Eleni*, as well as figuring out the best way of getting there.²⁴⁹³

Sometime in early September, Tsafendas visited the O’Ryans and as usual brought presents for the children. At one point, he told young Reuben that if anything happened to him, he would like him to have his tool box containing his welding equipment. Reuben was only sixteen at the time and did not see anything untoward about Tsafendas’s wish. Reuben never did get the tool box, which is assumed to have been confiscated by the police.²⁴⁹⁴

Tsafendas spent the following days waiting for the repairs to the *Eleni* to be completed, so he could put his assassination plan into effect. On August 30, the perfect opportunity seemed to arrive when a Parliamentary messenger, Fred Feinauer, asked Tsafendas to work as a waiter at a function organized by Parliamentary correspondents, which Dr. Verwoerd was scheduled to attend. The event was set for Friday, September 2, one day before the *Eleni*’s scheduled departure and Tsafendas was one of seven messengers asked

²⁴⁹¹ Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 13 January 2015.

²⁴⁹² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁹³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁴⁹⁴ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

to serve drinks.²⁴⁹⁵ He planned to shoot Dr. Verwoerd, flee to the ship, which he knew like the back of his hand, and hide until departure the next day.²⁴⁹⁶

The following day, Thursday, September 1, 1966, a Ministry of Interior clerk typed a letter to be sent to the police directing them to serve the removal order on Tsafendas. However, it was not dispatched in time for the police to act.²⁴⁹⁷ The same time, Tsafendas bought eighty dollars from Barclays Bank on Adderley Street.²⁴⁹⁸ When the clerk, Brenda Jessie Nicholson, asked him why he needed the money, he said he was going to Mozambique. He paid R57.78, mainly in very dirty R2 notes.²⁴⁹⁹

Tsafendas then took a taxi to the *Eleni*. Mastromanolis, who had forgotten about the deal, said it was not he who had the Beretta but Nikos Mavronas. Mastromanolis was under the impression that the gun was real and it was only when he asked for it from Mavronas that he discovered it was a gas pistol. However, it was a very close replica of the real thing and Mavronas, who wanted to make a quick profit, told Mastromanolis to sell it to Tsafendas anyway and they would share the money. Mastromanolis agreed, reasoning that Tsafendas said he needed a pistol to “scare people off,” not kill them, and the gun would be good enough to do that. Mastromanolis wrapped the weapon in a newspaper, put it in a plastic bag and took it to Tsafendas. Since there were a lot of people around, Tsafendas took the bag without opening it or examining the gun.²⁵⁰⁰ He glanced and saw it was metallic and assumed it was the authentic article.²⁵⁰¹

That night, when Tsafendas got home, he discovered the weapon was only a gas pistol. The following day, Friday, September 2, the day of the function, as soon as he finished his work at Parliament, he returned to the ship with the gas pistol and asked Mastromanolis and Mavronas for another gun or his money back. The men said they had no other firearms and that they had spent the thirty dollars. Tsafendas appealed to the captain but received no

²⁴⁹⁵ Fred Peinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁹⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁴⁹⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter IX, Paragraph 5. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²⁴⁹⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁴⁹⁹ Brenda Nicholson statement to the police, 12 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵⁰⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 13 January 2015.

²⁵⁰¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

help from him.²⁵⁰² He then asked Tsabouniaris for a knife he knew he had, but Tsabouniaris did not want to sell it as it was a souvenir.²⁵⁰³ Angered and disappointed, he returned to Parliament and helped to serve drinks at the reception where he had planned to kill Dr. Verwoerd. As it happened, the Prime Minister did not attend.²⁵⁰⁴

After the function, Tsafendas returned to the tanker because the crew had organized a party for their last night in the city. Tsafendas sat at a table with a number of his seamen friends, among them Nikolaos Billis, Giorgos Kantas, Cleanthes Alachiotis, Nikolaos Kambouris, Michalis Vasilakis, Dimitris Zafiriadis and Grigoris Pouftis. Also there was Ioannis Xexenis, the ship's carpenter and, at fifty-seven, the oldest member of the crew. He was a quiet man who mostly kept himself to himself, though Tsafendas knew him in passing. During the conversation after the men's meal, Xexenis mentioned a Greek village, where one of his parents was born. Also from the village, he said, was a Greek man, Ioannis (Jean) Karageorgis, who had assassinated Prince Rwagasore, the first elected President of Burundi after that nation's independence. He asked Tsafendas whether he had met him in Africa. Tsafendas said no, but he had heard of his case. The other crew members were unaware of the assassination, which took place on October 13, 1961, so Tsafendas told them about it. He fiercely condemned the murder, stating that Karageorgis was hired by Belgian colonialists and that he was rightfully executed after his arrest.²⁵⁰⁵

A discussion about assassination ensued, prompting several bored men to leave. Others listened as the conversation extended to other assassinations such as John F. Kennedy's and that of King George I of Greece. Tsafendas said that if Karageorgis had assassinated Dr. Verwoerd, it would have been justifiable, a tyrannicide, because South Africa's Prime Minister was a tyrant and a dictator who was oppressing his people.²⁵⁰⁶ This, he said, did not apply to Prince Rwagasore, who was democratically elected. The

²⁵⁰² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵⁰³ Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 14 May 2016.

²⁵⁰⁴ Fred Peinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵⁰⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁵⁰⁶ Some thirty years after the assassination, Tsafendas repeated his belief that assassinating Dr. Verwoerd was justified because he was a tyrant and a dictator to Fathers Minas Constandinou, Ioannis Tsaftaridis and Spiros Randos.

conversation lasted late into the night, with some men agreeing with Tsafendas, others disagreeing.²⁵⁰⁷

As we will see in chapters Four and Six, two witnesses told the police and the Commission of Enquiry that three days before Dr. Verwoerd was assassinated on September 6, the evening before the *Eleni* left Cape Town, the Prime Minister's death was discussed on board the tanker. Judge van Wyk of the Commission of Enquiry referred to this in his Report, commenting that "there is a lot of evidence that on the Friday morning before the murder people had been running back and forth screaming to one another that Dr. Verwoerd had been murdered."²⁵⁰⁸ However, the Commission did not mention anything regarding Tsafendas's justifiable assassination claim; it only speculated about how the conversation might have started, despite the fact that the sailors had told the South African police about this conversation.

The next afternoon, Saturday, September 3, Tsafendas visited the *Eleni* for the last time. He brought cigarettes and sweets for various friends and gave books to Kambouris, Vasilakos and Zafiriadis. They do not remember the titles but they were "against apartheid" and, according to Tsafendas, were "banned in South Africa."²⁵⁰⁹ At 17.00-17.30 that day, the *Eleni* weighed anchor and sailed away,²⁵¹⁰ leaving Tsafendas on dry land. On the evening of Sunday, September 4, 1966, Tsafendas attended a service at the home of a fellow church member, a Mr. Hall, in Pinelands, Cape Town.²⁵¹¹

Monday was a public holiday and Rosamund Popkiss, the woman in whose house Tsafendas was then living saw him pacing up and down outside, looking troubled. He told her he was very worried and that he had something in mind. She did not ask him what it was.²⁵¹² With the shooting plan a non-starter, he decided he would use a knife to stab Dr. Verwoerd. He knew that it would not be possible to get away after stabbing him, but he "did

²⁵⁰⁷ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁵⁰⁸ Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

²⁵⁰⁹ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁵¹⁰ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

²⁵¹¹ Harry Hall statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol 12, File Verklarings. NASA.

²⁵¹² Rosamund Elizabeth Popkiss statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

not care about the consequences” for what would happen to him afterwards. He was “so disgusted” with apartheid, he decided to go ahead with his plan and kill its architect, hoping that sooner or later a “change of policy would take place” as a consequence.²⁵¹³

TSAFENDAS'S PARTICIPATION IN THE GREEK CIVIL WAR

A hugely important event in Tsafendas's life which has remained largely unknown is his participation in the Greek Civil War as a fighter with the Democratic Army (DSE), the military wing of the Greek Communist Party. Because of the significance of this issue, it is important to check all available evidence on the subject. Tsafendas spoke about this part of his life to several other people who were close to him, such as his immediate family, his first cousin, Mary Eendracht, Artemis Michaletos, his aunt who brought him up in Egypt, and his good friends Andreas Babiolakis, Elias Constantaras, George Grispos, Ira Kyriakakis, Father Nikola Banovic, Costas Poriазis and Nick Papadakis. None of them doubted that Tsafendas had participated in the war.²⁵¹⁴ Tsafendas told his half-sister Katerina Pnefma and Artemis Michaletos's family that he was recruited to the Democratic Army by his good childhood friend, John Michaletos, who was known to all of them and Artemis's nephew. He also showed them a picture of himself in Bulgaria in 1961 with people he claimed had fought with him in the Greek Civil War.²⁵¹⁵

Tsafendas also talked about his participation in the war to Father Minas Constandinou and Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis. He did not go into detail, but he said he “never shot any fascists” because his unit was constantly on the run from Governmental forces in the mountains. He said he was sent to Athens to do clandestine work for the DSE because he was not known to the authorities there as a Communist. Leaving the mountains, he buried his partisan clothes in a field near a certain tree, intending to collect them when he was called back for action. He could not go back to the city in such clothes as he would have been

²⁵¹³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵¹⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 19 June 2014; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

²⁵¹⁵ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

arrested or killed. For reasons unknown to the author, he never returned for his clothes. He gave the priests precise details of the burial spot as well as vivid descriptions of the places he saw when he was in the mountains.²⁵¹⁶ He said the same things to some of the *Eleni* seamen.²⁵¹⁷ None of the priests or the seamen doubted Tsafendas's stories. They believed it would have been impossible for him to describe situations and locations so precisely if he was not present, but also to just lie to them.

Perhaps the strongest evidence for Tsafendas's participation in the war comes from Father Nikola Banovic. Tsafendas talked to him about this period of his life when they lived in the same house in Istanbul in 1961. Father Nikola urged him not to mention this part of his life to anyone in Turkey. At some point during his stay in Istanbul, Tsafendas informed Father Nikola that a "former comrade of his from the Civil War" would come from Sofia, Bulgaria to see him. The priest met this man, but could not remember his name. However, he clearly remembered that he was a dentist who fled Greece and found refuge in Bulgaria after the Civil War, as did many Greek Communists. Father Nikola said Tsafendas and his friend talked in front of him constantly about their time in the mountains during the war. In December 1961, Tsafendas told Father Nikola that he was going to Sofia to see his friend again as well as other former comrades who had also found refuge in Sofia. From there, he planned to travel to Athens to spend Christmas at the house of an old friend who was also a DSE fighter. Father Nikola could not recall the name of the friend, but it was John Michaletos, as Tsafendas later told his half-sister Katerina that he had spent Christmas in Athens with his family. Christmas of 1961 was the only Christmas Tsafendas had spent in Athens, so clearly it was Michaletos he visited.²⁵¹⁸ This confirms Father Nikola's statement that Tsafendas went to Athens to spend Christmas with an old comrade from the Civil War, while it also confirms what he told his half-sister, that he spent Christmas at the home of John Michaletos, the friend who recruited him in the DSE.

Tsafendas told the South African police that he went to Sofia from Istanbul and then moved on to Greece.²⁵¹⁹ This is compatible with what Father Nikola said. Furthermore,

²⁵¹⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²⁵¹⁷ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁵¹⁸ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

²⁵¹⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Tsafendas appeared in 1963 in Mozambique with silver steel teeth and Father Nikola is positive that he did not have them in Istanbul in 1961. Tsafendas also told several people that he had his teeth made in Bulgaria.²⁵²⁰ This again suggests that the person who worked on Tsafendas's teeth was the dentist mentioned by Father Nikola.

Tsafendas mentioned fighting in the Civil War to some of the *Eleni* seamen whose relatives had also taken part.²⁵²¹ Nikolas Mavronas, one of the seamen, said in an interview with the South African police that Tsafendas told them that he "joined the Greek Army during the war and that he was an expert shot."²⁵²² It is not clear from the statement which war he was talking about. It seems likely that the South African policeman who questioned Mavronas was unaware that there had been a civil war in Greece and thought Mavronas was referring to the Second World War. Presumably this was why he did not ask him to clarify it. In addition, the full name of the DSE was Democratic Army of Greece. During the Second World War it was called ELAS and some people continued to refer to the DSE as ELAS, since it was basically the same force. ELAS in Greek means Greece, so when Mavronas said the Greek Army, he would have meant ELAS or the DSE, certainly not the regular Greek Army. The six seamen who participated in the conversation remember clearly that Tsafendas told them that he had served with the Allied Navy during the Second World War and with the DSE during the Greek Civil War. They are quite positive that Tsafendas never said he joined the Greek regular Army and that he had indeed joined the DSE. None of them doubted that Tsafendas had joined the DSE. It was clear to them that he knew how the DSE was organized and how it operated.²⁵²³

The South African police were aware of John Michaletos, though it is not clear what exactly they knew about him or his relationship with Tsafendas. However, it is likely that they knew, perhaps because Tsafendas himself told during interrogation, that Michaletos was the person who recruited him into the DSE. Costas Michaletos was asked specifically by the

²⁵²⁰ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

²⁵²¹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

²⁵²² Nicolas Mavronas statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

²⁵²³ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

South African police about a “John Michaletos.” The police had allegedly found a letter by John Michaletos in Tsafendas’s possession. Costas Michaletos told the police then:

“Dr. John Michaeletos, who also had his schooling in Middleburg (Transvaal) and went to school with Dimetrios, is currently a physician in Greece. He has a clinic in Athens, Greece ... When I visited Greece in 1952, I heard that he was an active Communist... The letter which was found in the Bible of Dimetrios Tsafantakis, supposedly comes from Dr. John Michaeletos of Athens, because they know each other well and grew up together.”²⁵²⁴

That Costas Michaletos refers to John as “an active Communist” suggests that he was specifically asked by the police about a “John Michaletos” who was a Communist. It also suggests that this Michaletos was also active during the Civil War, as was usually the case with the Communists in 1952. The Greek Communist Party was outlawed immediately after the Civil War and its members hunted down. In 1952, eight Communists were executed in Athens while thousands of others were imprisoned or exiled. This would be compatible with Tsafendas’s claim that his childhood and Communist friend, John Michaletos, had recruited him to the DSE during the war, since Michaletos was an “active Communist” at the time. As we have seen, there was another John Michaletos who was very close to Tsafendas; he too had grown up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and he was also a Communist. This John Michaletos was a professor of literature and a cousin of Dr. Michaletos, the physician with a practice in Athens. He was also a member of the Greek Communist Party and of the DSE. As stated, the author has not been able to establish which of the two recruited Tsafendas to the DSE and corresponded with him at the time, but it appears likely that it was the literature professor, for a reason we will examine soon.

It was known that Tsafendas corresponded with several people around the world and it is likely that the police found some of these letters at the time of his arrest. Then, why would the police ask about someone in Greece corresponding with him? It could have been the contents of the letter (which was not found in the archives), but it could also have been information that Michaletos had recruited Tsafendas to the DSE. The police enquiries about John Michaletos did not stop after the approach to Costas Michaletos. Indeed, they went to great lengths to find out more about this Communist Michaletos. This suggests that Michaletos was not just someone who was corresponding with Tsafendas.

²⁵²⁴ Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

On November 7, 1966, the Commission of Enquiry into Verwoerd's death contacted the Portuguese Embassy in Pretoria "requesting any possible information regarding an individual named John Machletos from whom, allegedly, Demitrio Tsafendas, who claims to be a Portuguese citizen, would have received mail from abroad." The Commission's request was passed by the embassy to the Director General of PIDE in Lisbon.²⁵²⁵ On November 17, PIDE sent a letter to the Director-General for Political Affairs and Internal Administration in Lisbon stating that "there are no records of John Machletos in the registries of this Police."²⁵²⁶

That the Commission contacted the Portuguese for information about Michaletos suggests that this man was not just someone who was writing letters to Tsafendas, although that cannot be ruled out. It seems rather unlikely that the Commission would have sought information about a simple letter-writer. Tsafendas corresponded regularly with people abroad, like Father Nikola Banovic in Istanbul, Manuel in Lourenço Marques or George Grispos in Rhodesia for example. No inquiries were made about any of them, although it cannot be ruled out that the South African authorities did not become aware of such information. That Michaletos was a Communist and that Tsafendas had claimed he was the one who recruited him to the DSE must have been known to the South African authorities and would explain why they tried to locate him. The logical thing for the Commission to do would have been to contact the Greek authorities since Michaletos was Greek and according to Costas Michaletos, he was a doctor who had a clinic in Athens. However, the obvious failure of the Greeks to locate him would explain why the Portuguese were contacted about him on November 7, two weeks after Tsafendas's summary trial ended.

A feasible explanation for the failure of the Greeks to locate Michaletos is that his name was misspelled by the Commission. It appeared as Machletos in the Commission's request and also in the PIDE letter to the government in Lisbon, therefore it is very possible that it was also misspelled when it was given to the Greek Authorities. It is also very possible that the Greek authorities located Dr. Michaletos, as it could not have been difficult to do so since he had a clinic in Athens, but it turned out that he was not the Michaletos they were

²⁵²⁵ Confidential Letter of the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Director of PIDE requesting information regarding John Machletos. 7 November 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁵²⁶ Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Mr. Director-General for Political Affairs and Internal Administration regarding John Machletos. 16 November 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

looking for. This angle suggests then that it is more possible that Tsafendas's recruiter was not the doctor but the professor.

There are no records of any of the Commission's requests to PIDE in the National Archives of South Africa. However, the Portuguese National Archives contain the Commission's request in PIDE's file on Tsafendas. There are no records of Tsafendas in the Greek National Archives and therefore it cannot be ascertained with certainty whether the Greek authorities were indeed contacted by the South Africans. It seems unlikely that the Commission made enquiries to PIDE about a childhood friend who was just writing to Tsafendas.

Finally, the South African newspaper *Die Landstem* submitted to the Commission of Enquiry information it had collected about Tsafendas which contained the following reference:

*"In 1947 he was sent to Greece which was in a bad state after WWII. There was general hunger, food shortages and unemployment among the Greek people. Tsafendas wandered around starving and without shelter until he joined the Greek Communist Party, with whom he fought against the Greek Government."*²⁵²⁷

The Commission ignored this information in its Report.

²⁵²⁷ *Die Landstem* telegram. n.d. K150, Vol 5. NASA.

CONCLUSION

According to testimony from the many people who met him, Demitrios Tsafendas was a gifted, well-read, good-hearted man, an accomplished linguist with an insatiable intellectual curiosity and a deep compassion for the disadvantaged. He was a political animal, with strong socialist views, committed to Marxist principles, anti-imperialist, anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist, anti-fascist, a revolutionary with a lively political conscience. His outspokenness often brought him into serious conflict with authority, the result not so much of naiveté as of angry defiance of the political oppression he loathed.

Tsafendas had spent approximately five of his first seven years in Egypt, but he was much loved by his grandmother and auntie there, and was accepted without reservation by his step-mother on his return to Mozambique. Marika protected Dimitri from the knowledge of his birth origins and her own children saw him as a full brother and part of the family. Dimitri worshipped his father, who influenced him enormously, his political attitudes quickly reflected in his son's boyish revolutionary notions, wanting to liberate Mozambique from the Portuguese as Simon Bolivar liberated South America from the Spanish.

Tsafendas was "a man of revolutionary zeal." As a youth and an adult, he strongly supported Mozambique's independence from Portugal and wanted to see "a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother-nation."²⁵²⁸ For this reason, he repeatedly conducted "subversive" propaganda in Mozambique, seeking to raise awareness about Communism and the independence of Mozambique. His anti-colonial activities in Mozambique led to his five arrests by the Portuguese police, to imprisonment and torture, the loss of at least three jobs and the creation of a PIDE file (n° 10.415)²⁵²⁹ which was got bigger with every passing year. PIDE's very detailed file on Tsafendas was around 130 pages long at the time of Dr. Verwoerd's assassination.

Tsafendas stoutly opposed apartheid, considering the National Party to be akin to the Nazis and its members "capitalistic roughs." For him, Dr. Verwoerd was a dictator, a monster, the brains behind apartheid, an evil man, a tyrant who was oppressing the people, and, as he often said, "Hitler's best student," who had applied legislation similar to the

²⁵²⁸ PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

²⁵²⁹ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

Nuremburg Laws to the non-Whites of South Africa. He wanted to see in South Africa “a Government that would represent all South African People”²⁵³⁰ and was ready to do “anything that would get the South African regime out of power.”²⁵³¹ He joined the British anti-apartheid movement and participated in anti-apartheid and anti-fascist demonstrations in London, often getting into physical fights with fascists; he smuggled banned anti-apartheid and other revolutionary leaflets into South Africa.

He was also a Communist: a member of the South African Communist Party (1939-1941), a member of the Greek Communist Party and its military wing, the DSE, during the Greek Civil War (1947-1949) and associated with Communists in Portugal, Germany, Turkey and England. Very importantly, due to his political activities, Tsafendas was exiled from the place of his birth from 1951 to 1963, leading him to a “forced globetrotting”²⁵³² where he wandered through many countries in Europe and the Middle East. During those twelve years Tsafendas made several applications to be allowed to return to Mozambique, but they were all turned down. Between 1935 and 1959, all requests from Tsafendas to the Home Affairs Department to allow him to enter South Africa were dismissed out of hand.²⁵³³

On September 11, 1959, Tsafendas was placed on the Stop List of the South African Department of the Interior and further requests were also turned down.²⁵³⁴ In total, he made nine applications (1935, 1936, 1938, 1941, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1950 and 1959) for permanent residence in South Africa and they were all rejected.²⁵³⁵ However, with the help of his family, he obtained a temporary permit and entered South Africa in November 1963 and in January 1964, he secured a permit for permanent residence.

Though invariably poor, he was also generous, refusing to take back money he had lent to Jacobus Bornman, giving money to poor White men in Durban, buying food and toys for the O’Ryans as well as gifts for displaced Black children in Cape Town. He helped an old man build a room for his daughter in Beira, worked without pay in his brother-in-law’s coffee shop and taught children free in Turkey and in Mozambique.

²⁵³⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵³¹ Edward Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵³² Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA.

²⁵³³ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

²⁵³⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 30. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²⁵³⁵ Report of the COE. Chapter VI, Paragraphs 18 and 20. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

He was argumentative and outspoken and this often got him into trouble. However, he was also well-spoken and reasoned well in conversation, convincing his listeners that his point and his ideas were right. He liked his food but many found his table manners as messy. He spent most of his money on books and then food.

Tsafendas was not only very capable and adaptable; as workmates have testified, he was also highly intelligent. As we will see in the next chapter, tests carried out at the request of his defence team during his trial in 1966, gave him an IQ reading of 125. Usually penniless, he managed to travel to scores of countries in East and West Europe, in the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa, learning as many as eight or nine languages in the process. Though his formal education ended at the age of ten, he managed to work as a teacher of English at Limasollu Naci, then the best private language college in Turkey and find various jobs in numerous countries all over Europe.

More importantly, Tsafendas used his brain to get out of his frequent scrapes. Seven times he was arrested and imprisoned by the authorities in the United States, Mozambique and Portugal and each time he secured his freedom after demonstrating during his interrogation “symptoms of mental illness.” At the same time, each time, he very soon managed to recover from his “illness” and return to freedom on the streets. When homeless and penniless in Germany and England, Tsafendas also used his usual, standard act to survive by admitting himself to hospitals.

It is clear that Tsafendas was able to be “sane” or “insane” according to which condition was most convenient for him at the time. If he needed to be healthy, for example in 1963 in South Africa in order to get a resident’s permit or to get jobs with South African Railways, the City Tramways and the Marine Diamond Corporation, he was found to be perfectly healthy. He was found “mentally ill” when he wanted to secure release from detention, to earn a veteran’s pension, to evade service in the Portuguese Army and to convince the Portuguese authorities that he is “insane” and “harmless” in order to grant him amnesty so he can return to his beloved Mozambique.

Judge Jacques Theodore van Wyk of the Commission of Enquiry said in his final report that Tsafendas was “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders—he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him—and therefore (the Commission) adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently

intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”²⁵³⁶

As we will see in the next chapters, in 1966, the South African police and the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd's death interviewed some two hundred people who knew Tsafendas. Not a single one said Tsafendas was schizophrenic or that he had told them about the notorious tapeworm. On the contrary, as we have already seen and will see in more detail in the following chapters, they saw Tsafendas as he is shown here and never as he was portrayed by the Commission or at his trial. Further, none of the statements quoted here, apart from Patrick O’Ryan’s, were used during Tsafendas’s trial, and most were ignored by the Commission of Enquiry in an attempt to misrepresent Tsafendas.

Upon reading Tsafendas’s statement to the South Africa police after he killed Dr. Verwoerd, Professor John Dugard said that it “confirms the view that Tsafendas was not insane. It reads like a very normal story of a politically informed person, angry with apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd, determined to make a change with nothing to lose personally. Really an incredible statement which was carefully concealed.”²⁵³⁷

²⁵³⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²⁵³⁷ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ASSASSINATION

THE ASSASSINATION

With his shooting plan a non-starter, Tsafendas decided to buy a knife and stab Dr. Verwoerd to death in the Chamber of the House of Assembly; the only part of the building where the Prime Minister was not escorted by his two bodyguards.²⁵³⁸ On Tuesday, September 6, he arrived at the House of Assembly at 6.45 am, one hour ahead of his normal start time, so that he could get his work done then go out and buy a suitable knife. Two shops which stocked knives were both closed when he arrived and he called at another store and inquired when they would open. He then walked up and down the pavement until City Guns opened²⁵³⁹ and he entered the shop in 57 Hout Street, Cape Town at 9.05 am. He was wearing grey, baggy flannels, a white shirt and light-coloured jacket. He asked the prices of sheath knives displayed in the window and was shown two. He asked about one which had a metal sheath and a spring clip and slipped it inside his trousers. He bought the knife, tendering a R10 note and receiving change.²⁵⁴⁰

Tsafendas then went to Wm. Rawbone en Kie, a local hardware store, and bought for R3.30 another sheath knife, with an aluminium handle more like a stiletto, whose blade was approximately 5½ inches long.²⁵⁴¹ He said, "I bought two weapons in order to make certain of the job I had in mind. I thought that something might go wrong and one weapon might be taken away from me."²⁵⁴² He later said he chose knives that were long enough to cause serious damage.²⁵⁴³

Returning to Parliament, Tsafendas took the knives out of their wrapping paper and placed them in his locker. He poured an anti-rust solution on the blades, hoping it would

²⁵³⁸ Alhadeff, 1985: 107; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵³⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵⁴⁰ A.J. Harrison statement to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File 3. NASA.

²⁵⁴¹ Maurice Klein testimony to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

²⁵⁴² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵⁴³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

poison Dr. Verwoerd's blood should he survive the stabbing. He used a small box of anti-rust solution which he kept for his work tools.²⁵⁴⁴ Tsafendas then changed back into his navy blue messenger's uniform under which he wound a waist belt with the two empty sheaths, and walked up to the first floor to serve tea and coffee to the reporters.²⁵⁴⁵ His colleagues said he seemed restive,²⁵⁴⁶ but he said he was waiting for an "important phone call."²⁵⁴⁷ He asked one of them if Dr. Verwoerd was going to speak that day and received a positive answer.²⁵⁴⁸

In the course of the morning, Tsafendas asked a fellow messenger to change lunch breaks with him so that he could take the 1pm-2pm slot instead of his rostered noon-1pm. His colleague refused and Tsafendas said he was going for a walk in the gardens that surround the Parliament, which he did around 12:15. Tsafendas was seen again in the Press Gallery at 13:05²⁵⁴⁹ and a little later he took an order for lunch from Gerald Shaw, the parliamentary correspondent for the *Cape Times*. When Tsafendas returned with his hamburger and a pot of tea, Shaw paid with a currency note and Tsafendas counted out change which was ten times more than the reporter was due.²⁵⁵⁰ At 1.05 pm, Tsafendas shared his lunch, curry with rice, with another messenger in the messengers' room. When he finished, he brought a member of the South African Broadcasting Corporation staff his curry lunch. The correspondent complained about the meal and Tsafendas asked another messenger to take the uneaten curry back to the cafeteria, saying he was "in a hurry." This was around 1.50 pm. The messenger was still on his lunch break and refused, so Tsafendas took the plate and hurried off. "I have something to do," he said as he went.²⁵⁵¹

A few minutes before 2.10 pm, when the division bell calling Members to the sitting was scheduled to ring, Tsafendas retrieved the knives from his locker and inserted them into the sheaths inside his pants. He then waited in the lobby until Dr. Verwoerd appeared and

²⁵⁴⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Liza Key in a personal interview, 2 April 2015.

²⁵⁴⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵⁴⁶ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd is slain by assassin in the South African Parliament.'

²⁵⁴⁷ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Motiv für attentat auf Dr. Verwoerd noch völlig unklar.'

²⁵⁴⁸ *The Cape Times*, 10 September 1966, 'Messenger's journey before killing.'

²⁵⁴⁹ *Noticias*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Os movimentos do criminoso.'

²⁵⁵⁰ Shaw, 2007: 57.

²⁵⁵¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'I have something to do, said the assassin.'

followed him into the debating chamber²⁵⁵² just minutes after the bell rang.²⁵⁵³ The Prime Minister's two bodyguards left him and sat in the Public Gallery, about a hundred feet from his bench.²⁵⁵⁴ Verwoerd looked full of life and sat down with a jaunty air. He was expected to make a speech announcing a new South African foreign policy towards the newly independent states of Botswana and Lesotho.²⁵⁵⁵ MP Aubrey Radford, who was a surgeon, walked in behind Dr. Verwoerd and as he did so, he was pushed violently; looking up, he saw the back of a parliamentary messenger hurrying in Dr. Verwoerd's direction.²⁵⁵⁶ Tsafendas's plan was to attack Dr. Verwoerd as he walked towards his place on the front bench and but he had difficulty pulling the dagger from its sheath and by the time he did so, Dr. Verwoerd had taken his seat.²⁵⁵⁷

Tsafendas moved rapidly up the Chamber to the front bench. Dr. Verwoerd looked at him calmly and without suspicion, assuming he was going to hand him a message. Tsafendas came up and stood over the seated Dr. Verwoerd, who leaned forward slightly to listen to what the messenger had to tell him.²⁵⁵⁸ At that point, Tsafendas put his hand into his coat and drew out a long knife.²⁵⁵⁹ His right hand rested on Dr. Verwoerd's left breast. He remained in that position for a portion of a second. When he lifted his right hand, he was holding a knife in his hand.²⁵⁶⁰ Dr. Verwoerd raised an arm to stop the attack, but he was too late as blood was already dripping from his chest.²⁵⁶¹ Tsafendas plunged the knife repeatedly into the Prime Minister's chest and neck.²⁵⁶² Dr. Verwoerd slumped forward in his seat with blood spurting from his neck and chest, which quickly made a large pool on the carpet.²⁵⁶³

²⁵⁵² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵⁵³ Frank Walter Waring statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁵⁴ Alhadeff, 1985: 107.

²⁵⁵⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 7, 'Unsaid speech was expected to set new SA foreign policy.'

²⁵⁵⁶ Dr. Aubrey Radford statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁵⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁵⁵⁸ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 7 September 1966: 2, 'O assassinato do Dr. Verwoerd.'

²⁵⁵⁹ Shaw, 2007: 57.

²⁵⁶⁰ Paul van der Merwe statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁶¹ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 7 September 1966: 2, 'O assassinato do Dr. Verwoerd.'

²⁵⁶² Shaw, 2007: 57.

²⁵⁶³ *The Canberra Times*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated in Parliament House.'

For a few moments, there was a stunned silence in the House before Members realised what had happened.²⁵⁶⁴ Then, several MPs jumped up from their seats and chaos reigned.²⁵⁶⁵ Frank Walter Waring, Minister of Sport and Tourism, aged fifty-eight, a former member of the South African Springboks rugby team, jumped from his place behind and to the right of the prime minister, got a neck-lock on Tsafendas and pulled him away. Tsafendas resisted but Waring pulled him further back, over a desk and on top of himself, and spotted a large dagger in Tsafendas's hand.²⁵⁶⁶ Someone shouted, "Get the knife,"²⁵⁶⁷ and someone else, "don't kill him, remember Oswald."²⁵⁶⁸

Many MPs sat immobilised by shock but others joined in and threw themselves onto Tsafendas. Nationalist Party MPs formed a whirling scrum around Tsafendas, punching and kicking him.²⁵⁶⁹ Tsafendas's fingers were clenched around his knife and he managed to slash Waring's trousers before he was thrown to the ground. Dr. W.L. Venter grabbed his hand and with the help of others managed to prise the fingers open and seize the knife.²⁵⁷⁰ M.P. Cas Greyling punched Tsafendas in the mouth, injuring his own hand.²⁵⁷¹ Waring said later that he had spent many years playing international rugby and considered Tsafendas to be as strong as any man he ever tackled.²⁵⁷²

As Tsafendas was manhandled out of the Chamber, he shouted about Waring who had broken his nose, "Where is that bastard? I will get that bastard."²⁵⁷³ His face was covered in blood and the front of his shirt was bloodstained.²⁵⁷⁴ MPs were shouting for an ambulance and Felix George Miles, one of the Parliamentary messengers, dialled for one, but found all the lines were engaged.²⁵⁷⁵ Police Captain Christian Pieter Coetzee found the second knife on

²⁵⁶⁴ *The Australian*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd stabbed.'

²⁵⁶⁵ Willem L.D.M. Venter statement to the COE, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁶⁶ Frank Walter Waring statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁶⁷ Willem L.D.M. Venter statement to the COE, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁶⁸ Stephenson, 1978: 27.

²⁵⁶⁹ Shaw, 2007: 57.

²⁵⁷⁰ Frank Walter Waring statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Willem L. D. M. Venter statement to the COE, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁷¹ *The Australian*, 8 September 1966: 1.

²⁵⁷² Barron, 2005: 336.

²⁵⁷³ *Daily Express*, 7 September 1966: 2, 'Assassination.'; *Deutsche Zeitung*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Sudafrikas Ministerpräsident Dr. Verwoerd im Parlament von einem Weiben erstochen'; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd slain at his Parliament desk.'

²⁵⁷⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 2, 'Desperate fight to reach killer, save Prime Minister.'

²⁵⁷⁵ Felix George Miles statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 2, File: 1. NASA.

Tsafendas's belt²⁵⁷⁶ and Dr. Venter put the attack knife on the table in front of the Speaker's chair, from where the police retrieved it.²⁵⁷⁷ Shaw looked at the Assembly clock, which was always kept five minutes fast, and scribbled the time in his notebook, twenty past two. He then rushed to telephone his news editor, Tom Jessop, that Dr. Verwoerd was bleeding to death. Jessop did not believe him and put the phone down. Shaw had to call him back to convince him he was serious.²⁵⁷⁸

The dying Dr. Verwoerd was quickly surrounded by MPs, at least six of whom were doctors – Radford, E.L. Fisher, G. de V. Morrison, C.V. Van Der Merwe, Venter and Maud Clark. He was deathly pale and bleeding profusely, with his left arm hanging by his side.²⁵⁷⁹ The front of his shirt was bloodstained and blood dripped onto the green carpet.²⁵⁸⁰ Dr. Muller, the Foreign Minister, placed a cushion under Dr. Verwoerd's head.²⁵⁸¹ Dr. Fisher was the first doctor to treat Dr. Verwoerd.²⁵⁸² He tore open the Prime Minister's shirt and waistcoat²⁵⁸³ and found heavy bleeding from four wounds in the chest.²⁵⁸⁴ At Dr. Fisher's request, Dr. Morrison performed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.²⁵⁸⁵ Dr. Fisher had his medical bag in the House, in which he kept an emergency supply of drugs.²⁵⁸⁶ He asked Dr. Morrison to fetch the cardiac stimulant, Coramine, from his office and the contents of two syringes were injected into Dr. Verwoerd's heart by Dr. Fisher and Dr. Morrison. He was given four injections in all.²⁵⁸⁷

Dr. Fisher, a psychiatrist and United Party MP, said, "We did everything we could to stop the bleeding. We gave mouth-to-mouth breathing and tried artificial respiration."²⁵⁸⁸ Dr.

²⁵⁷⁶ Christian Pieter Coetzee statement to the police, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA

²⁵⁷⁷ Willem L.D.M. Venter statement to the COE, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁷⁸ Shaw, 2007: 57.

²⁵⁷⁹ Paul van der Merwe statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁸⁰ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

²⁵⁸¹ *The Times* (London), 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd murdered in the Parliament.'

²⁵⁸² *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

²⁵⁸³ Dr. Aubrey Radford statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁸⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 7, 'Desperate fight to reach killer, save Prime Minister.'

²⁵⁸⁵ Dr. Aubrey Radford statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁸⁶ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

²⁵⁸⁷ Dr. Aubrey Radford statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁸⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

Radford felt for Dr. Verwoerd's left pulse. It was completely absent and never returned; he and Dr. Fisher, speaking quietly, decided that the Prime Minister was dead.²⁵⁸⁹ Dr. Fisher said, "We kept on treating him and trying respiratory treatment ... but by then he had no pulse at all. It was hopeless."²⁵⁹⁰ Dr. Verwoerd lay slumped in his seat, his head tilted back. He never uttered a word or a sound during the attack.²⁵⁹¹ He had died within two minutes of being stabbed in the heart.²⁵⁹²

Dr. Verwoerd's wife, Betsy, was brought into the debating Chamber. She had been in the building, but she did not see the killing because the elevator to take her to the Chamber was delayed.²⁵⁹³ She bent slowly over the lifeless body of her husband, stroked his hair and kissed him on the forehead. At about 2.30 pm, an ambulance crew carried Dr. Verwoerd's body from the Chamber on a stretcher past ranks of stunned MPs, and transported it to Groote Schuur hospital. There, a team of three surgeons, two physicians and five medical students were standing by with emergency equipment prepared.²⁵⁹⁴

As MPs, officials and spectators in Parliament began to realise that Dr. Verwoerd was dead, uproar broke out. Two MPs collapsed in the lobby, others bellowed with anger.²⁵⁹⁵ Cabinet Minister and future Prime Minister P.W. Botha turned to Helen Suzman, the lone Member of Parliament representing the Progressive Party, and shaking his finger in her face, shouted in Afrikaans, "It's you who did this. It's all you liberals. You incite people. Now we will get you. We will get the lot of you."²⁵⁹⁶

Around 3.00 pm, some forty-five minutes after the stabbing, Barend J. Schoeman, the Leader of the House, said he believed the Prime Minister was dead.²⁵⁹⁷ Dr. Verwoerd's death was confirmed at 3.05 pm, two days before his 65th birthday, by Groote Schuur's medical superintendent, Dr. J.G. Burger, who said that he had probably died instantly.²⁵⁹⁸ Official

²⁵⁸⁹ Dr. Aubrey Radford statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁵⁹⁰ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

²⁵⁹¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 7, 'Desperate fight to reach killer, save Prime Minister.'

²⁵⁹² *Daily News*, 10 September 1966, 'Death inside two minutes says MP.'

²⁵⁹³ *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 11 September 1966, 'Lift delay spared window.'

²⁵⁹⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

²⁵⁹⁵ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd is slain by assassin in the South African Parliament.'

²⁵⁹⁶ Suzman, 1993: 69.

²⁵⁹⁷ *The Times* (London), 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd murdered in the Parliament'; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, 'Dr. Verwoerd stabbed to death at his desk in Parliament.'

²⁵⁹⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

confirmation of death followed at 3.30 pm, in a statement which said Dr. Verwoerd was dead on arrival at the hospital.²⁵⁹⁹

AFTER THE ASSASSINATION

Tsafendas had already been frogmarched out of the Chamber by three policemen, his face covered in blood, “streaming blood from his face,” and the front of his shirt blood-stained.²⁶⁰⁰ A young man, crying hysterically, tried to attack him as he was led through the lobby but was fended off by the police.²⁶⁰¹ Tsafendas was then thrown by the policemen at the back of a police van²⁶⁰² and at 2.30 p.m. he was led by Captain Genis of the South African Security Police, to the police station in Caledon Square round the corner from Parliament.²⁶⁰³

Due to his injuries and bleeding, Tsafendas was seen at 2.50 p.m. by Dr. Ralph Kossew, the district surgeon who had examined him on June 17, 1966 over his claim for a disability grant. Dr. Kossew found that Tsafendas had a gaping wound of one and a half inches from his forehead to the bridge of his nose, which was swollen, and a half-inch cut on the lower lip. Tsafendas answered the questions guardedly but did not appear confused and the doctor noticed nothing wrong with his mental state.²⁶⁰⁴ Immediately the doctor left, the handcuffed Tsafendas was taken to a cell and seriously beaten by policemen. When Brigadier Aucamp²⁶⁰⁵ arrived, he began interrogating the prisoner while the violence continued. Tsafendas was kicked as he lay on the floor, then the policemen made him stand and took turns punching him. When he fell they kicked him and when he stood they punched him. One policeman used his baton.²⁶⁰⁶

At 4:20 pm, with Tsafendas still in the police cell, Captain Genis searched his room, No. 7, at Aldor Apartments, Rustenburg Ave, Rondebosch. In the second drawer of the

²⁵⁹⁹ *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 6 September 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd killed.’

²⁶⁰⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘How Dr. Verwoerd died’; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘Dr. Verwoerd stabbed to death at his desk in Parliament.’

²⁶⁰¹ *The Australian*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd stabbed’; *The Canberra Times*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd assassinated in Parliament House.’

²⁶⁰² *Sunday Express*, 11 September 1966: 15. ‘Schoolgirl: I saw assassin strike.’

²⁶⁰³ Dirk Kotze Genis statement to the police, 24 October 1966. COE, K150, Vol: 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

²⁶⁰⁴ Dr. Kossew’s report on examination in case of alleged assault or other crime, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File 3. NASA.

²⁶⁰⁵ The author is not certain of the correct spelling, but this is a close phonetic rendering.

²⁶⁰⁶ Tsafendas in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. The clip is available in the rushes.

wardrobe, he found the gas pistol²⁶⁰⁷ that was sold to Tsafendas by Mastromanolis and Mavronas.²⁶⁰⁸ At 4.30, the first statement regarding the assassination was taken by the police. It was the statement of Captain Christian Pieter Coetzee of the Security Police:

“I’m a captain in the South African Police, stationed Security Police, Headquarters, Pretoria. I serve as marshal of the President and is currently in Cape Town for the duration of the parliamentary session. On the 6th September 1966, at 2: 14 p.m., I was sitting in the parliament house and in the box of the president. I sat and watched as Dr. Verwoerd entered the hall. I followed him until he sat in his position on the bench. Dr. Verwoerd sat on the left side of the bench. Shortly after Dr. Verwoerd took his seat, I saw a person dressed in a messenger’s uniform, walk to the bench of Dr. Verwoerd. The person leaned across the bench like he wanted to say something to Dr. Verwoerd. At the same time I saw an object that looked like a knife, in the person’s hand. He stabbed Dr. Verwoerd. I could see that he stabbed Dr. Verwoerd in the left breast. Dr. Verwoerd raised his arms as if he wanted to avoid the stabbing. The person, however, gave two quick stabs to Dr. Verwoerd. The one in the right breast and on in the back. At that point I rushed to aid Dr. Verwoerd. A number of members of the Assembly, however, pounced on the man and overpowered him. Col. Buitendach and I took over the person. I also searched him and a second knife in a sheath, bound with a belt around his body was found. I seized this knife. Col. Buitendach handed me the dagger with which the person stabbed the Prime Minister. The person was arrested and taken to the A.K. Caledon Square. Later I discovered that the person was a messenger employed by Parliament. He was dressed in a uniform of the Assembly.”²⁶⁰⁹

In the police station, because of his injuries from the beating, the officer in charge asked Brigadier Aucamp to take Tsafendas to hospital.²⁶¹⁰ That Tsafendas was taken to hospital after almost four hours in custody supports his claim that he had been tortured. If the injuries were sustained during the brawl in Parliament, he would presumably have been taken there immediately or very soon afterwards, not four hours later. Brigadier Aucamp and his detail must have arrived with Tsafendas at the casualty department of Groote Schuur hospital

²⁶⁰⁷ Dirk Kotze Genis statement to the police, 24 October 1966. K150, Vol: 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

²⁶⁰⁸ Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 13 January 2015.

²⁶⁰⁹ Christian P. Coetzee’s statement to the police, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

²⁶¹⁰ Tsafendas in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. The clip is available in the rushes.

around 6.30.²⁶¹¹ During a heavily-guarded, one-hour visit,²⁶¹² the police imposed a total security blackout on the hospital and nobody was allowed to see Tsafendas. Plain-clothed policemen were by Tsafendas's side constantly, including when he stripped to be examined.²⁶¹³

At 6.40, Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Darby who found him to be "co-operative" and "composed." According to Dr. Darby's report, Tsafendas had a broken nose with blood obstructing the airways, a ragged laceration from the right eyebrow to the nose and a laceration of the lower lip. The cuts were stitched, the nose put in a splint and he was given an anti-tetanus injection. Nothing about his mental state was mentioned in this report.²⁶¹⁴ Policemen stayed with Tsafendas the entire time, even inside the X-ray theatre.²⁶¹⁵ Dr. Darby's examination would have lasted about twenty minutes.²⁶¹⁶ Whether Dr. Darby's report on Tsafendas's injuries was wholly accurate and comprehensive is not something the author can know. There is no evidence to suggest it is less than trustworthy, but it has to be noted that it was written at a time when doctors are known to have colluded with police to conceal crimes by the authorities.

Having been examined by Dr. Darby, Tsafendas was seen at 7 pm for around 30-45 minutes²⁶¹⁷ by a psychiatrist, Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky, the hospital's head of psychiatry, at the request of the Security Police and the Casualty Officer.²⁶¹⁸ Dr. Sakinofsky gave to the author a vivid, first-person account of the scene that greeted him when he arrived at the hospital in response to a call to his home by Dr. Tockar, the psychiatry registrar/resident on duty. He said:

"We found Mr. Tsafendas in a room that was milling about with uniformed and plain-clothed security men of all ranks. It would have been impossible to establish any kind of

²⁶¹¹ Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Darby at 6.40, therefore he must have arrived at the hospital just before that.

²⁶¹² *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas in hospital'; *Natal Mercury*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin rushed to hospital.'

²⁶¹³ *Natal Mercury*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin rushed to hospital.'

²⁶¹⁴ Dr. Darby's statement regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, G.S.H. No: 65/14-081, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁶¹⁵ *Natal Mercury*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin rushed to hospital.'

²⁶¹⁶ Dr. Darby's report says that he examined Tsafendas at 6.40 pm., while Dr. Sakinofsky's report states that he examined him at 7 pm., which obviously means that Dr. Darby's examination lasted twenty minutes.

²⁶¹⁷ According to the newspaper reports Tsafendas's visit lasted one hour (*Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966; *Natal Mercury*, 7 September 1966.). Since Dr. Darby examined Tsafendas at 6.40 and Dr. Sakinofsky around 7, we can assume that Tsafendas arrived at the hospital around 6.35 the latest, which means that the hour visit gives Dr. Sakinofsky from 7 to around 7.35-7.45.

²⁶¹⁸ Dr. Sakinofsky testimony in Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966: p. 131. K150, Vol. 10. NASA.

rapport with him under these conditions, so there proceeded a stand-off where we refused to examine him until the room was cleared of the security personnel, which we were eventually able to effect only after we contacted the superintendent of the hospital and got his support. After we had interviewed Mr. Tsafendas at length and after calming his agitation at the time and gaining rapport, we did complete our examination. We deliberately refused to make any public announcements until the following day. We would have liked to have detained him in the hospital for further study and treatment but the security authorities overrode our wishes and took him away.”²⁶¹⁹

After the examination, Dr. Sakinofsky concluded that “the patient is not of sound mind, that his thought processes are grossly impaired and deluded, and that he is therefore not in a position to evaluate correctly the consequences of his deed. I consider that it is probable that his mental state is the result of damage caused by previous attacks of a mental disease called schizophrenia. In my opinion further important information on the state of his mind should be obtained by the following:

1. He should be detained in a closed mental hospital ward for a period of observation. I would like myself to assess his mental state over a period of time and at successive interviews.
2. He should have the following special investigations:
 - Electro-encephalogram, blood and C.S.P.
 - Wasserman reaction (occasionally an organic disease of the brain can mimic the clinical picture of schizophrenia).
 - Psychological tests.
3. Medical reports should be obtained via the Portuguese government; and from the Grafton State Hospital, New York, and the Krankenhaus.”²⁶²⁰

Dr. Sakinofsky’s report contains no mention of Tsafendas’s physical condition and the injuries he had just received treatment. Strictly speaking, Sakinofsky’s duty was only to examine Tsafendas’s mental state, but to ignore glaringly obvious physical problems would seem to be taking his instructions rather too literally. It might also be assumed that the physical injuries could have had some effect on his mental condition at the time, but this does not seem to have been explored. Dr. Sakinofsky’s examination is considered in detail in the

²⁶¹⁹ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky in correspondence with the author, 30 March 2016.

²⁶²⁰ Dr. Sakinofsky’s psychiatric report on Demitrio Tsafendas, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File 3. NASA.

following chapter. Tsafendas was then driven off in a black American Sedan and returned to the police station in Caledon Square,²⁶²¹ where he was soon again interrogated and beaten by Brigadier Aucamp and his men.²⁶²²

While all this was taking place, the Minister of Justice and Police, John Vorster, summoned the Commissioner of Police, Lt. Gen. John Keevy, and directed him to place Major-General Hendrik van den Bergh, head of the Security Branch and Deputy Commissioner of Police, in charge of the investigation. He considered him to be “the man best qualified to get to the bottom of this quickly.”²⁶²³ A few hours later van den Bergh was flying to Cape Town, accompanied by Brigadier Gideon Joubert,²⁶²⁴ head of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). As soon as they arrived, van den Bergh and Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw, head of the Security Police in Cape Town, took over the interrogation of Tsafendas.²⁶²⁵

Tsafendas claimed that van den Bergh interrogated him all night but he was not tortured or harassed when “the General” was present. His claim is confirmed by a statement by John Vorster²⁶²⁶ that Tsafendas was interrogated for forty-eight hours by General van den Bergh.²⁶²⁷ Furthermore, according to Tsafendas, van den Bergh was very polite, offered him a cigarette, which he turned down, and water, which he accepted. However the General refused to let him sleep, saying he would sleep only when the interrogation was concluded.²⁶²⁸

Tsafendas was held under the 180-Day Act²⁶²⁹ which gave the police authority to keep him in custody and interrogate him for up to 180 days without the presence of a

²⁶²¹ *Cape Times*, 7 September 1966, ‘Suspect’s jaws broken.’

²⁶²² Tsafendas in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. The clip is available in the rushes.

²⁶²³ D’ Oliveira, 1977: 180.

²⁶²⁴ Born in Transvaal in 1912; joined the police in 1932, served as Deputy Commissioner of the CID from 1964 to 1968, promoted to General and Police Deputy Commissioner in 1968, before becoming Commissioner of the Police in 1972 (*International Magazine Services* photo archive, n.d.).

²⁶²⁵ *Cape Times*, 7 September 1966, ‘Suspect’s jaws broken.’

²⁶²⁶ In 1976, Vorster revealed that General van den Bergh had questioned Tsafendas for forty-eight hours, adding that “if a man does not break after forty-eight hours of van den Bergh’s questioning, then you know that he does not know a thing” (D’ Oliveira, 1977: 180).

²⁶²⁷ D’ Oliveira, 1977: 180.

²⁶²⁸ Father Minas Constantinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁶²⁹ *A Voz*, 8 September 1966. ‘A Policia de Joanesburgo pediu as autoridades de Mozambique e Lisboa todas as informacoss possiveis sobre Tsafendas.’

lawyer.²⁶³⁰ Meanwhile, Dr. T.E. Donges, the Finance Minister, had temporarily taken over the duties of Prime Minister.²⁶³¹

ACCURACY OF THE MEDICAL REPORTS DURING APARTHEID

The author is not in position to know the accuracy of any of the doctor's reports, but they must be read against a background of known collusion by physicians with the authorities in those years, especially when in reference to Tsafendas's physical condition. According to Sydney Kentridge, QC, "In South Africa, one after another inquests into deaths in detention found that 'no one was to blame' as the security police, the judiciary and district surgeons conspired to keep torture and murder under wraps."²⁶³²

Professor Alban Burke affirmed to the author the control of doctors and hospitals during apartheid and questioned whether there was any "state pressure on them." He said:

"Yes, I would question it, because there was immense state government control at that point, and they controlled various things. I mean, even the mental hospitals; in those times; psychiatric hospitals, were split between black and white, and the black people ... and I observed it, I mean, I worked in one of those hospitals in the eighties... did not receive the same level of treatment as the white people. It was impossible to become a psychologist or a psychiatrist in those days if you were black, for a number of reasons, so it was a very controlled environment. So, I think there was that fear and that paranoia, as well, and I'm wondering, to what extent, that may have influenced their decision in the end."²⁶³³

A good example is the following: after the Sharpeville massacre, the police insisted that they had used normal bullets and not the banned dum-dum variety. This was after telling medics at the hospital where the dead and injured were taken that it would not be in the national interest for them to make "exaggerated" disclosures. When victims were brought in,

²⁶³⁰ The 180-Day Detention Act (the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, Number 96 of 1965) allowed the government to detain individuals for interrogation for up to 180 days without a lawyer being present. The public were not entitled to any information, not even the identity or whereabouts of people being detained. Detainees could literally and effectively "disappear." If no charges were laid, Special Branch were required to release detainees after 180 days. At the time, Vorster boasted that this was repeatable "until this side of eternity" ("A Distinguished South African Lawyer," 1965: 4; Herbstein, 2004: 75; Mandela, 2013: 402; Vassen, n.d.).

²⁶³¹ *The Times* (London), 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd murdered in the Parliament.'

²⁶³² Quoted in Bizos, 1998: vii; For a detailed account of deaths in detention, the subsequent inquests and how the State conspired with doctors, jourists and the police "to keep torture and murder under wraps" see Bizos, G. (1998) *No One to Blame? A Personal Account of Inquests into Some Deaths in Detention under Apartheid*.

²⁶³³ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

police officers removed those bodies that had been badly damaged by explosive dum-dum bullets. The hospital doctors did not interfere or protest. Up to twenty-four dead were buried in secret, ensuring that no post-mortems were carried out which might disclose evidence of the use of dum-dums.²⁶³⁴

The most infamous case of doctors conspiring with the apartheid authorities, however, was that of Steve Biko.²⁶³⁵ Dr. Ivor Lang, the Port Elizabeth district surgeon, examined Biko in detention and stated that he “found no evidence of any abnormality or pathology on detainee.”²⁶³⁶ The doctors who examined him before his death made a diagnosis of malingering in spite of overwhelming evidence that he had suffered traumatic brain injury. The inquest into Biko’s death provided a rare insight into the manner in which state doctors sometimes functioned in relation to the police and during apartheid²⁶³⁷ and “it became clear that the two responsible district surgeons, Drs Ivor Lang and Benjamin Tucker were deeply implicated in Biko’s death through gross neglect and falsification of medical records.”²⁶³⁸

Dr. Lang had “failed, apparently, to see the injury on the forehead on the occasion of his first and subsequent examinations, ... failed to attach any significance to the lip injury, or to other bruises and visible symptoms which Dr. Lang admitted in court having noticed. He failed to ask the patient for his account of how these injuries were sustained. He did not prescribe any treatment, carry out any routine blood or urine analysis tests, or take the patient’s temperature at any stage. He did not recommend to the police that Mr Biko should not be left lying on the floor on urine-soaked bedding. He failed to keep the patient under medical observation following Biko’s transfer from Sydenham Prison Hospital to the Walmer Police Station. He did not keep Drs Hersch and Keeley fully informed about the patient’s condition or of actions taken which may have affected his condition. He failed to insist upon proper hospitalisation, or to oppose Dr Tucker’s acquiescence in the plan to send the patient

²⁶³⁴ Frankel, 2001: 148-149.

²⁶³⁵ For a detailed account of the doctor’s conduct during apartheid and in Biko’s case see: Baxter, L.C. (1985) *Doctors on Trial: Steve Biko, Medical Ethics, and the Courts*; Berat, L. (1989) *Doctors, Detainees and Torture: Medical Ethics v. the Law in South Africa*; Dowdall, T.L. (1991) *Repression, Health Care and Ethics under Apartheid*; McLean G.R., Jenkins, T. (2003) *The Steve Biko Affair: A Case Study in Medical Ethics*; Rayner, M. (1987) *Turning a Blind Eye? Medical Accountability and the Prevention of Torture in South Africa*; Rayner, M. (1990) *From Biko to Wendy Orr: The Problem of Medical Accountability in Contexts of Political Violence and Torture*; Silove, D. (1990) *Doctors and the State: Lessons from the Biko Case*; Zwi, A.B. (1987) *The Political Abuse of Medicine and the Challenge of Opposing it*.

²⁶³⁶ Baxter, 1985: 137-140.

²⁶³⁷ Silove, 1990: 417.

²⁶³⁸ Dowdall, 1991: 52.

to Pretoria. And only after Steve Biko died did Dr. Lang make any notes or reports of his findings.”²⁶³⁹

Dr. Lang eventually conceded that his diagnosis was incorrect as far as the question of abnormality was concerned and “highly inaccurate” insofar as it related to pathology.²⁶⁴⁰ However, the inquest concluded that “the available evidence does not prove that the death was brought about by any act or omission involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person.”²⁶⁴¹ The South African Medical Council (SAMDC) also concluded that there was no evidence of improper or disgraceful conduct on the part of the two doctors.²⁶⁴²

It took eight years of intense pressure before the SAMDC took disciplinary action. On 30 January 1985, the Pretoria Supreme Court ordered the SAMDC to hold an inquiry into the conduct of the doctors who treated Steve Biko for five days before he died. In his judgment, Judge President of the Transvaal Mr Justice W. G. Boshoff said that there was prima facie evidence of improper or disgraceful conduct on the part of the Biko doctors in a professional respect.²⁶⁴³ Dr. Land was then stripped of his medical qualifications.²⁶⁴⁴ Biko’s death had serious consequences for the medical profession in South Africa and led to the expulsion of its Medical Association from the World Medical Association, though it was later re-admitted. The British Medical Association expressed the view at the time that “South African doctors do not have the ethical machinery capable of dealing with the affair.”²⁶⁴⁵

Fortunately, not all doctors were like Dr. Lang, ready to cooperate with the apartheid state. For example, Dr. Wendy Orr,²⁶⁴⁶ a district surgeon in Port Elizabeth, would make notes of police brutality and torture when she examined prisoners. Although Dr. Lang happened to be her direct superior, Dr. Orr took her evidence to law and forced the Supreme Court to issue an interdict against the abuse of detainees. As a result of Dr. Orr’s intervention, she was ordered onto “other duties” and barred from visiting political detainees in prisons.²⁶⁴⁷

²⁶³⁹ Dowdall, 1991: 52; Rayner, 1987: 28.

²⁶⁴⁰ Baxter, 1985: 137-140.

²⁶⁴¹ Bizos, 1999: 71.

²⁶⁴² Nicholas, 2014: 19.

²⁶⁴³ SAHO, n.d. “The Inquest into Biko’s death and his funeral.”

²⁶⁴⁴ Nicholas, 2014: 20.

²⁶⁴⁵ Baxter, 1985: 137-138.

²⁶⁴⁶ For more about Dr. Orr’s case see: Dowdall, T.L. (1991) *Repression, Health Care and Ethics under Apartheid*; Orr, W. (2000) *From Biko to Basson: Wendy Orr's Search for the Soul of South Africa as a Commissioner of the TRC*; Reyner, M. (1990) *From Biko to Wendy Orr: The Problem of Medical Accountability in Contexts of Political Violence and Torture*.

²⁶⁴⁷ Dowdall, 1991: 52-53; *The New York Times*, 6 October 1985, ‘Doctor is shifted by South Africa.’

In 1995, the Medical Association of South Africa apologised “for its attitude and silence during the years of apartheid.”²⁶⁴⁸ Two years later, South Africa’s medical profession found itself in the dock at the TRC hearings, when it was forced to answer for its complicity with the regime during the apartheid years. Evidence was submitted that doctors not only ignored the routine torture of prisoners, but helped some back to health so they could be tortured again. The support of district surgeons in matters of security facilitated the abuse of detainees.²⁶⁴⁹

The Commission heard that more than seventy prisoners died in detention between 1960 and 1990, in some cases largely from negligence. Instead of securing improvements in the health of its people, evidence suggested that the national health policy, because of the way it operated, actually contributed to the ill health of the poor. Such data were covered up to falsify the picture for public consumption. The Medical Association described its members as “both perpetrators and victims of apartheid and human rights abuses.” It conceded that “there was a close relationship between the Association’s leadership, the Department of Health, the security police, and the Medical and Dental council.”²⁶⁵⁰ Given the extent of the abuses throughout the apartheid era, doubt must remain over medical reports and examinations concerning Tsafendas, especially, in view of his political importance.

REACTIONS TO THE ASSASSINATION

Within hours of the assassination, the South African authorities declared that the killing was devoid of political meaning and that the killer was a madman. Although Tsafendas had not even been interrogated and nothing was known about him, the South African embassy in Brussels released a communique along exactly those lines. It said that the murder of Dr. Verwoerd had “manifestly been perpetrated by an unbalanced individual and was therefore devoid of political significance. Independently of the fact that South Africa has been plunged into mourning by the death of a man who, in view of his age, had become a father for both the Whites and Blacks, there will be no changes, despite the speculations which could arise

²⁶⁴⁸ Sidley, 1995: 148.

²⁶⁴⁹ Sidley, 1997: 1850.

²⁶⁵⁰ Sidley, 1997: 1850.

on this subject.” It said work would be continued on the basis of the “peaceful apartheid policy for which Dr. Verwoerd had laid the foundations.”²⁶⁵¹

As result of the assassination, cinemas were closed, regular radio programmes and sports events were cancelled, shops shut and university lectures postponed across South Africa.²⁶⁵² Dr. Verwoerd’s death also had financial implications, “shocking the Rand into numbness”²⁶⁵³ the Johannesburg Stock Exchange shut down²⁶⁵⁴ while in London and Paris the stock market fell.²⁶⁵⁵ Newspapers rushed out special editions with huge headlines and regular radio programmes were halted. A seven-minute documentary film entitled “A Nation’s Tribute” was created within twenty-four hours by Killarney Studios in Johannesburg. Copies were flown to Durban and to Cape Town and shown for a week in the cities’ centre cinemas, then in suburban ones after normal programmes. The documentary opened with a shot of flags flying at half-mast, then, using newsreel film, traced Dr. Verwoerd’s eight years as Prime Minister. It closed on a moment of hope, with requiem music playing as Dr. Verwoerd gazed ahead with a smile on his lips.²⁶⁵⁶

On September 22, 1966, just sixteen days after the assassination, John Vorster who had been selected as Prime Minister, announced that the planned new version of the one-Rand silver coin would bear the head of Dr. Verwoerd instead of that of Jan van Riebeeck, founder of the first colony in Cape Town in 1652.²⁶⁵⁷ One South African government official commented about the assassin, “Thank God he wasn’t Coloured. That would have sparked off a reaction that would make apartheid seem like child’s play.”²⁶⁵⁸

A Black woman in Cape Town told a reporter, “thank God it was not one of our people who did it.” A White bus conductor said, “They have killed our Prime Minister. Now I hope that Vorster takes over and shoots them all. The Communists, liberals, all of them.”²⁶⁵⁹ Describing a tribute session held in Parliament in the wake of the assassination, the Cape

²⁶⁵¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966, ‘Devoid of political meaning.’

²⁶⁵² *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 17, ‘Assassination stirs concern among leaders of Black Africa’; *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966, ‘Sports cancelled as mark of respect for Dr. Verwoerd’, 7 September 1966.

²⁶⁵³ *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 7 September 1966, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s Death shocks Rand into numbness’,

²⁶⁵⁴ *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘Dr. Verwoerd stabbed to death at his desk in Parliament.’

²⁶⁵⁵ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 69, ‘London stocks fall after Dr. Verwoerd assassination’; *Die Welt*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd ermordet’; *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg) 11 September 1966: 24, ‘Assassination shakes market’; *The Canberra Times*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Stock Exchange numbed.’

²⁶⁵⁶ *Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 3, ‘Durban Indians pay tribute in prayer’; *Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, ‘Dr. Verwoerd film in city.’

²⁶⁵⁷ *The Canberra Times*, 23 September 1966: 6, ‘Coins honour Verwoerd.’

²⁶⁵⁸ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

²⁶⁵⁹ *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘Dr. Verwoerd stabbed to death at his desk in Parliament.’

Town correspondent of *The Australian* said the atmosphere was one of “restrained emotion.” Dr. Verwoerd’s green leather front bench was conspicuously empty and on the green carpet next to it there was a faint discolouration where he bled to death.²⁶⁶⁰

SOUTH AFRICA

Reaction to the killing in South Africa ranged from shock and outrage in the Afrikaner community to hilarity among some Black Africans. Some non-White officials condemned the assassination publicly but the vast majority of ordinary non-Whites were delighted²⁶⁶¹ although they were reluctant to demonstrate their support in public. However, where non-Whites lived away from white eyes, they hailed the news that “the tyrant is dead” by singing, dancing and drinking. Black neighbourhoods in Johannesburg were subjected to special police patrols as a “precautionary measure.”²⁶⁶² A song was composed and sung about Dr. Verwoerd’s death and later became a playground ditty for non-White children playing skipping rope.²⁶⁶³ Some non-Whites began to dub Tsafendas “Dimitri Defendus,” meaning Tsafendas “defended us” from Dr. Verwoerd.²⁶⁶⁴ Non-White South Africans were not the only ones who celebrated Dr. Verwoerd’s death though. Stanley Uys, parliamentary correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, stated many years later that an unnamed member of Dr. Verwoerd’s cabinet threw a party at his home that night.²⁶⁶⁵ None of this was published in the South African press at the time.

On Robben Island, the political prisoners heard the news almost immediately. One of them, Lionel Davis, a prominent anti-apartheid revolutionary, told the author that the news delighted them all and Tsafendas immediately took on heroic stature. He said, “We all saw him as a hero. He was a hero in our eyes. All political, orchestrated political persuasions on the island, hailed him as a hero.” However, they were careful not to show their delight as they knew what would follow.²⁶⁶⁶ This was described by Nelson Mandela as follows: “As often

²⁶⁶⁰ *The Australian*, 8 September 1966. ‘Murder shocks world, but some leaders are glad.’

²⁶⁶¹ Lionel Davis in a personal interview, 8 April 2015; Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 23 January 2016; Mary Vasilakou in a personal interview, 25 March 2015.

²⁶⁶² *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Sudafrikas Ministerpräsident Dr. Verwoerd im Parlament ermordet’; *Noticias*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Proseguem as investigacoes.’

²⁶⁶³ Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

²⁶⁶⁴ Louise O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

²⁶⁶⁵ Baron (*Sunday Times*), 9 January 2014, ‘Stanley Uys: Veteran journalist who tracked the rise and fall of the Nats.’

²⁶⁶⁶ Lionel Davis in a personal interview, 8 April 2015.

happened on the island, we had learned significant political news before our own guards. But by the following day it was obvious that they knew, for they took out their anger on us. The tension that had taken months to abate was suddenly at full force. The authorities began a crackdown against political prisoners as though we held the knife that stabbed Verwoerd.”²⁶⁶⁷

In contrast to the majority, many prominent non-White leaders condemned the assassination. They included the Rev. Benjamin Rajuili, Chief Whip of the Opposition Transkeian Democratic Party, the Rev. O. Mooki, chairman of the Orlando School Board, and M.P. Vundia, member of the Joint Advisory Board. African supporters of apartheid, including Ephraim Tahabalala, President of the African Foundation, and F.S.M. Mneube, President of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, vigorously denounced the killing.²⁶⁶⁸ The Reverend J.S. Gericke, Moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church, compared Dr. Verwoerd to the Biblical King David, describing him as the victim of vicious attacks and lying propaganda. He added that “if anyone thinks this sad event will break us, he doesn’t know the strength of the people who produced a Hendrik Verwoerd.”²⁶⁶⁹

South African politicians who commented included the Minister of Transport and Leader of the House of Assembly, Barend J. Schoeman, who said Dr. Verwoerd’s death was “an irreplaceable loss to South Africa, but it was God’s will,”²⁶⁷⁰ and Helen Suzman, the sole MP of the Progressive Party, who called the assassination “one of the most ghastly shocks” she had ever experienced.²⁶⁷¹ MP A. E. Trollip said in the House the next day that when Tsafendas’s dagger stabbed Dr. Verwoerd’s heart, “he stabbed in the heart of South Africa.”²⁶⁷² In Britain, staff at the South African embassy in London’s Trafalgar Square reacted with disbelief, then shock. One hour after the news broke, the embassy flag was lowered to half-mast.²⁶⁷³

The Hindu Foundation of Durban held special prayer services,²⁶⁷⁴ and Mr. A. Habib, who sat on the Indian Council, joined the condemnations. The South African Jewish community also held special prayer services for Dr. Verwoerd. A rabbi in Johannesburg praised Dr. Verwoerd as “one of the greatest, if not the greatest, Prime Ministers South Africa

²⁶⁶⁷ Mandela, 2013: 513.

²⁶⁶⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 2. ‘Act condemned by non-white leaders.’

²⁶⁶⁹ *The Australian*, 12 September 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd victim of lies says moderator.’

²⁶⁷⁰ *Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, ‘It was God’s will says Schoeman.’

²⁶⁷¹ *The Globe and Mail*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Assassination condemned by friend and foe alike.’

²⁶⁷² Schoeman, 1975: 2.

²⁶⁷³ *The Cape Times*, 7 September 1966: 10, ‘Sorrowing South Africa’s solemn tributes.’

²⁶⁷⁴ *Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 3, ‘Durban Indians pay tribute in prayer.’

has ever produced.” Rabbi Super acknowledged that in 1936 Dr. Verwoerd opposed the admission to South Africa of Jewish refugees from Germany, but added that in 1948 he endorsed the new National Party policy of non-discrimination against any section of the European population in South Africa.²⁶⁷⁵ Chief Rabbi B.M. Casper expressed his personal grief and the “sorrow and dismay of the Jewish community,” while Dr. T. Schneider, President of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, sent the following telegram to Betsy Dr. Verwoerd: “The South African Jewish community is deeply shocked by this tragic national calamity and offers you and your children heartfelt condolences. We mourn the passing of a dedicated son of this country.”²⁶⁷⁶

Alan Paton, leader of the Liberal Party and known worldwide as the author of the novel *Cry, the Beloved Country*, said “acts of violence such as this can never achieve anything, no matter what the intention of the assassin.”²⁶⁷⁷ Twenty days later Paton described Dr. Verwoerd in realistic terms in an article in *The Star* entitled, “Dr. Verwoerd: his world of illusion.” Paton there described the Prime Minister as hypocritical, charging that he was racist during the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s, although he changed for the better later.²⁶⁷⁸

The South African media published numerous messages of condolence and condemnation, avoiding any statement applauding the killing, either from inside or outside South Africa. Typical was *The Cape Times* which published detailed condemnations from politicians, prominent citizens, church leaders and representatives of the Jewish, Indian and Coloured communities, clearly in an effort to demonstrate that all South Africans condemned the assassination.²⁶⁷⁹ Elsewhere, Dr. Verwoerd was characterised as the “father of the nation,” the “Moses of the Afrikaner tribe” and “apartheid’s architect.”²⁶⁸⁰ However, Johnny Makhathini, an ANC exile leader in Algiers, hailed the assassination as “the beginning of the end for apartheid,”²⁶⁸¹ and said that it would “help the morale of guerrilla fighters in South Africa ... it would increase confusion among the Republic’s whites.”²⁶⁸²

²⁶⁷⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Act condemned by non-white leaders’

²⁶⁷⁶ *South African Jewish Times*, 09 September 1966: 1, ‘South African Jewry share in national grief.’

²⁶⁷⁷ *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁶⁷⁸ Paton (*The Star*), 26 September 1966: 18, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: his world of illusion.’

²⁶⁷⁹ *Cape Times*, 7 September 1966: 10 ‘Sorrowing South Africa’s solemn tributes.’

²⁶⁸⁰ Lepierre, 2009: 126.

²⁶⁸¹ *The Australian*, 8 September 1966, ‘Murder shocks world, but some leaders are glad.’

²⁶⁸² *The Globe and Mail*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Assassination condemned by friend and foe alike’; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

Albie Sachs, the South African barrister and freedom fighter who had arrived in London just a month earlier after spending eight months in solitary confinement in Cape Town for anti-apartheid activities, said in an interview on the British television programme *Twenty-Four Hours* that there would be “jubilation” among Black people in the townships that “a tyrant has fallen.” He added, “One thinks of the people who were killed at the time of Sharpeville... of the other various victims of apartheid.”²⁶⁸³ Asked if he regretted the assassination, he replied, “Murder is foul, wherever it happens, but I would be hypocritical if I said I had any regrets.”²⁶⁸⁴ None of these statements was published in the South African press. Later a judge, Albie Sachs told the author that he had also said during the interview that “assassination never solved problems.” However, this comment was omitted by the newspapers that reported his interview.²⁶⁸⁵

The Afrikaans media responded to the assassination in emotional terms. *Die Transvaler* wrote, “Dr. Verwoerd is no more. That is a thought which pierces the soul of all who have known him... it is heart-rending... it is not only that a great void has come about in the life of the people of South Africa, but a void has come that cannot again be filled.” *Die Burger* wrote that “the death of the Prime Minister and the horrible circumstances surrounding it is a shock that will, to a large extent, test our political system and our public life. Winds of excitement and change, of distrust and indignation will blow through our country and they will be fanned by those who seek our destruction.” The newspaper called for “calm and balance” from all sections of society, stating that, “it is with these characteristics that the governing party will have to approach the problem of a permanent successor.”²⁶⁸⁶ On 10 September, author G. H. Calpin, in an article in *Die Vaderland* wrote: “I cannot think of South Africa without Dr. Verwoerd.”²⁶⁸⁷

Volkshandel, an Afrikaner monthly periodical, characterised Dr. Verwoerd as “a great statesman and a dynamic leader” and added:

“Hendrik Verwoerd will stand in history on the same pedestal as Paul Krueger [the leader of the Afrikaner republics in the Boers Wars]. He is the political as well as economic father of our white Republic ... His sincere efforts to help non-white races developed

²⁶⁸³ *The Times* (London), 7 September 1966: 1, ‘BBC News criticized.’

²⁶⁸⁴ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

²⁶⁸⁵ Albie Sachs in a personal interview with the author, 27 September 2016.

²⁶⁸⁶ *Pretoria News*, 9 September 1966, ‘Assassination swept all away.’

²⁶⁸⁷ Schoeman, 1975: 90.

independently in their own areas has laid the foundation for a future template of multi-racial state with independent ethnic groups.”²⁶⁸⁸

Under the headline “A Heinous Crime,” the English-language *Rand Daily Mail* said the people of South Africa had experienced the “most profound shock and horror,” adding that “non-white leaders of all political opinions were quick to express horror” at Dr. Verwoerd’s death. The Rev. Benjamin Rajuili, Chief Whip of the opposition Transkeian Democratic Party, said, “If his murderer believed this would help the African people, he must be a misguided madman.”²⁶⁸⁹ *The Zululand Times* in a very small article condemned this “reprehensible and irresponsible act”²⁶⁹⁰

Around the same time, youngsters play-acting with knives, started yelling at one another, “I’ll Demitrio you” or “I’ll Tsafendas you!” Three weeks after the assassination, two jokes started going around South Africa about Dr. Verwoerd’s death. The first one was set in heaven, where St. Peter asked Dr. Verwoerd, “How did you get here?” He replied, “A messenger sent me.” The second was a “knock-knock” joke, showing that Dr. Verwoerd was already forgotten by some:

“Knock, knock.”

“Who’s there?”

“Hendrick.”

“Hendrick who?”

“Have you forgotten already?”²⁶⁹¹

GREEKS IN SOUTH AFRICA

News that a Greek had killed Dr. Verwoerd had a huge effect on members of South Africa’s Greek community, numbering some 40,000,²⁶⁹² complicated by the “pro” or “anti” reactions of their White and non-White friends. Those who knew Greeks who were of a liberal disposition were not afraid to express their views, congratulating them that a compatriot had

²⁶⁸⁸ Miller, 2016: 40.

²⁶⁸⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Act condemned by non-white leaders.’

²⁶⁹⁰ *Zululand Times*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘The late Dr. Verwoerd.’

²⁶⁹¹ Kahn, 1968: 148, 164.

²⁶⁹² *Rand Daily Mail*, either 7 or 14 September 1966. ‘Greeks are given ‘no retaliation’ assurance.’

assassinated their tyrant. In Cape Town, Peter Protoulis employed a Black woman servant whose brother was imprisoned on Robben Island. She would often point to the island and tell Protoulis about him. After the assassination, she pointed again and told him that her brother would be very happy about Dr. Verwoerd's death. She was delighted that it was a Greek who killed the man she said caused them so much suffering and she told Protoulis that there were celebrations throughout her neighbourhood.²⁶⁹³ Also in Cape Town, some of Elias Constantaras's non-White colleagues congratulated him for being Greek and expressed happiness over the assassination.²⁶⁹⁴ In Johannesburg, Mary Vasilakou's and Akis Apergis's Black friends and colleagues expressed their satisfaction and said there were celebrations in their home communities. Some Black South Africans asked Mary Vasilakou if she knew Tsafendas personally and praised his bravery. Vasilakou said it was the first time in South Africa that she felt so proud of being Greek.²⁶⁹⁵

The reaction of White South Africans was mostly angry and Greek shops became targets for their wrath. In Cape Town, Johannesburg and Pretoria, the windows of Greek shops and houses were smashed,²⁶⁹⁶ some Greek shopkeepers were verbally abused and others received threatening telephone calls. The canopy outside a Greek shop in Johannesburg was set on fire,²⁶⁹⁷ many café customers turned hostile and some walked out after making insulting remarks. An assistant at a Greek café in Sunnyside, Pretoria arrived for work to find one of the glass doors broken. A cartridge case for a 0.25 bullet was found in the doorway and the bullet was embedded in a pile of scattered sweet tins. The owner said he could not understand why people were reacting against the Greeks: "We feel as badly as all South Africans about the assassination of our Prime Minister. There is no proof at all that the man is Greek."²⁶⁹⁸ The Commissioner of Police, Lt. Gen. J.M. Keevy, ordered that no reprisals be taken against South Africa's Greek community. He said "Tsafendas was not and had never been a member of the Greek community."²⁶⁹⁹ The South African Government also declared that it would not tolerate retaliation against Greeks.²⁷⁰⁰

²⁶⁹³ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 28 May 2016.

²⁶⁹⁴ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 19 June 2014.

²⁶⁹⁵ Akis Apergis in a personal interview, 24 March 2015; Mary Vasilakou in a personal interview, 25 March 2015.

²⁶⁹⁶ Akis Apergis in a personal interview, 24 March 2015; Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 28 May 2016; Mary Vasilakou in a personal interview, 25 March 2015.

²⁶⁹⁷ *The Times* (London), 7 September 1966: 1, 'Attacks on Greek shops.'

²⁶⁹⁸ *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'City Greek café hit by bullet.'

²⁶⁹⁹ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 9 September 1966: 9, 'Don't touch the Greeks.'

²⁷⁰⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Assurances for Greeks.'

Greeks in South Africa, and Mozambique, too, tried hastily to distance themselves from Tsafendas, many claiming he was not Greek so as not to tarnish the Greek name in South Africa.²⁷⁰¹ Most Greeks in South Africa supported apartheid and many were “more royal than the king,” eager to show their loyalty to the regime. Generally, Greeks co-operated with apartheid for commercial, political or personal reasons, but some gave financial support to the army and the National Party. Opponents of apartheid were widely considered to be traitors, including Advocate George Bizos, who was shunned by his fellow countrymen and considered to be a “traitor.”²⁷⁰² The following statement by a “leading South Coast Greek businessman” in *The Daily News* is a representative example of the attitude of most Greeks at the time: “when I arrived in South Africa some fifteen years ago I had holes in my shoes. With the help of the Government I was able to find employment, and within a matter of six years I had my own business and two cars. I am sure that I speak for all Greeks in South Africa when I say we never had it so good... we as Greeks have always had the highest regard for D. Dr. Verwoerd. He had done a great deal for us, allowed and given us every reason to want to be South Africans and succeed in business.”²⁷⁰³

The Greek community in Pretoria was the first publicly to distance itself from this “infamous and reprehensible assassination.” A spokesman hastily declared that “the criminal was in no way attached to any religious or social Greek organisation and he was not recognized as a Greek.”²⁷⁰⁴ The Consul for Greece in Cape Town, Mr. E. Kallos, stated that “Tsafendas was not a Greek subject and was not registered with any of the Greek consulates in the country.” Another consular official suggested that “Tsafendas was in fact a Portuguese citizen ... he is not of Greek origin at all.”²⁷⁰⁵ A spokesman for the Hellenic Community in Cape Town declared: “we are greatly perturbed by the fact that the assassin seems to have a Greek name. Actually the name is the only indication that he might be of Greek descent, as he is completely unknown to the community and its members. He is also unknown to the Greek priests and has never attended any religious service or social function.”²⁷⁰⁶

A spokesman for South Africa’s Hellenic community expressed “profound and heartfelt sympathy for the tragic passing of Dr. Verwoerd,” adding, “On behalf of the various

²⁷⁰¹ *Eleftherotipia*, ‘Οι έλληνες φίλοι του απαρχάιντ’, 4 July 2010.

²⁷⁰² Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Advocate George Bizos in Manolis Dimelas’s *Live and Let Live*, 2007.

²⁷⁰³ *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 9, ‘S.A. Greeks had high regard for Dr. Verwoerd.’

²⁷⁰⁴ *Noticias*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Proseguem as investigacoes.’

²⁷⁰⁵ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966, 8, ‘Vorster gives Greeks assurance.’

²⁷⁰⁶ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966, 8, ‘Vorster gives Greeks assurance.’

Greek communities in South Africa and all South African Greeks, we wish it to be known that we dissociate ourselves entirely from this infamous and reprehensible act.”²⁷⁰⁷ The leader of the Greek community in Johannesburg, Peter Paizes, said he was a personal friend and admirer of Dr. Verwoerd;²⁷⁰⁸ he spoke of his “tremendous grief” and expressed “indescribable consternation” that the assassin apparently was partly of Greek extraction.²⁷⁰⁹

The President of the Greek Community in Bloemfontein, Georgios Manidis said about Tsafendas, “He must be insane. He does not represent the feelings of the Greeks of South Africa. Most of the Greeks in South Africa are supporters of Dr. Verwoerd.”²⁷¹⁰ In Cape Town, a delegation of Greek leaders called on the Minister of Justice, John Vorster, and expressed deep sympathy. They assured the minister that Tsafendas was not of Greek origin and was not connected in any way with the Greek community in South Africa.²⁷¹¹ On September 8, the Greek Consul in Cape Town asked all Greek traders to close their businesses at 12.30 p.m. on September 10, the day of Dr. Verwoerd’s funeral, and attend a memorial service in his memory.²⁷¹²

The entire South African press found something good to say about Dr. Verwoerd, from eulogies to modest praise, according to the newspaper’s political stance. However, the wildest encomiums came not from the Afrikaner media, but from *Acropolis*, a Greek newspaper in South Africa. A front-page article by owner and editor Georgios P. Sakellaridis, outdid all others in lauding the slain Premier and characterised Dr. Verwoerd as “perhaps the greatest son of the South African nation ... a philosopher, an intellectual, a true Christian, a philanthropist, a visionary ... a holy symbol of Christian civilization and of real patriotism ... who turned South Africa to the only bastion of Christianity in an atheistic, godless continent and to the only hope of the free people of the continent against the cancer of Communism.” Sakellaridis went as far as to declare Dr. Verwoerd to be “a modern Prometheus Unbound, who has been misunderstood, slandered and wrongfully accused by the unfair and irresponsible international community which is unaware of everything he has done for the black South Africans.”²⁷¹³

²⁷⁰⁷ *The Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966, ‘City Greek café hit by bullet.’

²⁷⁰⁸ *To Vima*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Η δολοφονία του Φέρβειρντ: Ελληνικής καταγωγής ο δράστης.’

²⁷⁰⁹ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Grief expressed by leader of Greeks in Johannesburg.’

²⁷¹⁰ *Kathimerini*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Ατομον ελληνικής καταγωγής εδολοφόνησε τον Φέρβειρντ.’

²⁷¹¹ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966, ‘Vorster gives Greeks assurance.’

²⁷¹² *The Cape Argus*, 9 September 1966: 1, ‘Greek shops asked to close’; *The Cape Times*, 8 September 1966: 7, ‘Greek shops to stop for funeral.’

²⁷¹³ *Acropolis*, ‘Ολόκληρον το Νοτιοαφρικόν Έθνος εκήδευσε τον πρωθυπουργό του’, 17 September 1966: 1.

AFRICA

There was very little mourning in Africa for Dr. Verwoerd's death, indeed there were celebrations in several places. In Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania, Gerge Magomba, secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee, declared that the death of South Africa's Prime Minister would encourage delegates at the Commonwealth Conference, then gathering in London, to demand a continuation of the fight against the ideas defended by the late Dr. Verwoerd, and would serve as a warning to (Ian) Smith and (Antonio de Oliveira) Salazar.²⁷¹⁴ Commonwealth General Secretary Arnold Smith said, "Meaningless violence and assassinations will not solve South Africa's political problems."²⁷¹⁵ In Algiers, Mnoko, representative of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which was banned in Rhodesia, declared that oppression could lead only to death. "The attack ... proved the vulnerability of this fascist empire," he added. Katjivena, representative in Algiers of SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) declared that "the fascist Dr. Verwoerd got what he deserved."²⁷¹⁶

In Zambia, neither President Kenneth Kaunda nor any of his ministers commented on the assassination, but when the news was announced in Parliament by Wesley Nyirenda, the Deputy Speaker, there was laughter by some members of the parliament.²⁷¹⁷ Under the headline, "Death of an Evil Genius," *The Times* of Zambia editorialised that there were few who more deserved a violent death than the South African Prime Minister. It said, "The society he created in South Africa is sick. For him... the sickness has proved mortal."²⁷¹⁸

The New York Times, reporting from Nairobi, Kenya, wrote that throughout East Africa, "People were shocked but not really distressed." It said, "Black Africans seemed confused by the assassination... it was as if they were not sorry it happened but were worried lest events rush in on them and make a bad situation worse... that Dr. Verwoerd's successor might be worse for Africans." A statement issued on behalf of Kenyan President Jomo

²⁷¹⁴ *Le Courrier d'Afrique*, 9 September 1966: 3, 'A eleicao do sucessor.'

²⁷¹⁵ *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd im Parlament ermordet.'

²⁷¹⁶ *Le Courrier d'Afrique*, 9 September 1966: 3, 'A eleicao do sucessor.'

²⁷¹⁷ *The Globe and Mail*, 8 September 1966: 4, 'Dr. Verwoerd Party vows to continue Apartheid'; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, 'Murder shocks world'; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 7 September 1966, 'World condemns Dr. Verwoerd murder'; *TIME*, 16 September 1966, 'South Africa: Death to the architect.'

²⁷¹⁸ *The New York Times*, 8 September 1966: 12, 'Zambians call death deserved.'

Kenyatta said, “Perhaps the assassination will act as a timely lesson to Dr. Verwoerd’s supporters in redeeming their country from many more such deaths.”²⁷¹⁹

The Kenya African National Union, the ruling Party, stated that force would be the ultimate method of overthrowing apartheid. It characterised the assassination as “a symbolic and heartening act, from which millions suffering from apartheid would draw hope.”²⁷²⁰ Kenya’s Minister of Defence, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, said when first told about the stabbing, ‘I hope it is successful. It would be a good thing.’²⁷²¹ The *East African Standard* reported the assassination without comment, but the Kenya *Daily Nation* published a front-page editorial signed by the editor, George Githii. It said in part, “Dr. Verwoerd’s regime has been carrying out an inhuman social experiment, but unlike scientific experiments in laboratories, factors affecting the human mind are unpredictable and cannot entirely be suppressed by the force of arms.” MP Henry Wariithi said, “This has been expected. He should not be buried in African soil.”²⁷²²

In Lagos, many Nigerians shouted “hallelujah,” danced in the streets and jumped for joy when they heard the news of the assassination of the “apostle of apartheid.”²⁷²³ Brigadier Ogundipe, leader of the Nigerian delegation in the 1966 Commonwealth Conference, said, “There may be a message in this for Mr. Ian Smith of Rhodesia.”²⁷²⁴ In Ethiopia, a banner headline in the *New Times* of Addis Ababa said, “The Sharpeville Butcher Stabbed to Death,” and the English-language *Voice of Ethiopia* said, “He who raises the sword shall perish by the sword.”²⁷²⁵ Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister called Dr. Verwoerd’s death “the natural result of apartheid, which breeds blind hate and evil.”²⁷²⁶ Cairo’s *Al Akhbar* newspaper said Egypt had “no tears to shed” for Dr. Verwoerd.²⁷²⁷

From Salisbury, Rhodesia, the *Rand Daily Mail* of South Africa reported that Dr. Verwoerd had become “a sort of idol” to White Rhodesians,²⁷²⁸ while *The Chronicle* in

²⁷¹⁹ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 17, ‘Assassination stirs concern among leaders of Black Africa.’

²⁷²⁰ *The Guardian*, 9 September 1966: 11, “Stinking” quotation by BBC.’

²⁷²¹ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

²⁷²² *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 17, ‘Assassination stirs concern among leaders of Black Africa.’

²⁷²³ *Daily Express*, 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Epitaph for a fanatic’; *The Times* (London), 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Jubilation at news in Nigeria’; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 1, ‘How Africa took the news’; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁷²⁴ *The Australian*, 8 September 1966. ‘Murder shocks world, but some leaders are glad.’

²⁷²⁵ *The Globe and Mail*, 8 September 1966: 4, ‘Dr. Verwoerd Party vows to continue apartheid.’

²⁷²⁶ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, ‘South Africa: Death to the architect.’

²⁷²⁷ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 6, ‘Assassination sends a wave of shock around the world’; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁷²⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 7, ‘Ghastly, says a socked Ian Smith.’

Bulawayo characterised him as a “good friend of Rhodesia.”²⁷²⁹ The *Rhodesia and World Report* wrote that South Africa’s Prime Minister was “misunderstood by those who prefer to misunderstand” and that he “stood with courage and dignity for the principles he held. That these principles may in time be accepted even where they are at present most bitterly resisted is not beyond the bounds of possibility.” The newspaper went on to claim that his death would be “equally” felt in Rhodesia “whose desperate needs he served far above the call of duty or political expediency” and characterised him as “a great man, a humanitarian and outstanding intellect, in whom the spirit flamed with rare brilliance.”²⁷³⁰

In Parliament, Prime Minister Ian Smith, a close ally of Dr. Verwoerd whose country depended on South African economic support, looked pale²⁷³¹ when he said, “I am sure this ghastly event has deeply shocked Honourable Members, as it has myself.” He promised a full tribute next day, then adjourned Parliament two hours early.²⁷³² A little later, he characterised Dr. Verwoerd as “the champion of the ideals of civilization and Christianity”²⁷³³ and described his death as a “tragic loss.”²⁷³⁴

The Economist reflected on the effect of Dr. Verwoerd’s death on a white-ruled Rhodesia beset by British-imposed sanctions. It said Dr. Verwoerd “was much more than a very good friend and neighbour; he was the only national leader of world prominence who gave Rhodesians moral and material support in their struggle to make sanctions less effective... “The weekly magazine said, “There is no immediate fear that Dr. Verwoerd’s successor will alter the South African policy of helpful neutrality ... but one fear has always nagged White Rhodesians... that no fighting war would be waged by South Africa to prevent Rhodesia becoming an African state if that seemed inevitable.”²⁷³⁵ In Umtali, Rhodesia, the Rev. T.C. de Villiers, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, said Dr. Verwoerd was his fellow student at Stellenbosch University and a personal friend. “He was a born leader as well as a brilliant student... he will live in the hearts of tens of thousands of South Africans and Rhodesians.”²⁷³⁶

²⁷²⁹ *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 7 September 1966, ‘Senseless act – Jonathan.’

²⁷³⁰ *Rhodesia and World Report*, September/October 1966, Vol. 1, No. 5: 1, ‘The pattern of assassination. In memoriam of Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd.’

²⁷³¹ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 1, ‘How Africa took the news.’

²⁷³² *The Rhodesia Herald*, 7 September 1966, ‘World condemns Dr. Verwoerd murder.’

²⁷³³ *Le Courrier d’Afrique*, 9 September 1966: 2, ‘A eleicao do sucessor.’

²⁷³⁴ *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁷³⁵ *The Economist*, 10 September 1966: 1000-1001, ‘Whites in mourning.’

²⁷³⁶ *Umtali Post*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Umtali Minister pays tribute to an old friend.’

Chief Leabua Jonathan, Prime Minister of Basutoland, an ally of Dr. Verwoerd and the first Black African head of government ever to make an official visit to South Africa, forced a motion of condolence through Basutoland's Assembly by a paper thin vote of 29 to 28.²⁷³⁷ He expressed his "shock and grief" at the assassination and said it left him "with a real sense of personal loss."²⁷³⁸ Chief Kasper Matanzima, Chief Minister of the Transkei, said the nation of South Africa had lost its "greater leader of all time" and the African people within its borders a friend and father.²⁷³⁹

In Uganda, many applauded the killing of the "hated leader of the persecution of Africans"²⁷⁴⁰ and danced in the streets.²⁷⁴¹ However Uganda President Milton Obote said, "It is a very bad thing to solve political problems through assassination and I regret his death." Elsewhere, Forbes Burnham of Guyana characterised the assassination as, "interesting," and Dawda Jawara of Gambia said, "I can only hope that the new leader will steer South Africa away from a policy which can only be described as disastrous."²⁷⁴²

The Algerian-French magazine *Revolution Africaine* applauded the assassination, referred to Dr. Verwoerd as "the apostle of hatred," and said, "The most hated man of Africa is no more. The jailor of the Cape, with more than thirteen million Africans at his feet thanks to the complicity, more or less active, of three million Whites of European origin, and thanks to the indifference, if not complacency, of the Halogen groups, died last Tuesday." In another article, the magazine characterized South Africa as a "ghetto for the Black People," and said that Dr. Verwoerd was "the head of the criminals of the large prison that South Africa had become." It said, "Dr. Verwoerd's madness, and that of his acolytes, turned it into a ghetto for colored people, since South Africa is solely the home of a minority, excluding a majority. This is the principle of the philosophy that inspires the system upon which rests all the politico-social structure reserved to a category of 'supers.'"²⁷⁴³

Finally, the Congolese newspaper *Le Courier d'Afrique* reported that at the United Nations a few African representatives had planned to celebrate Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, partly as a response to the celebration of the South African delegation about the rejection of

²⁷³⁷ *TIME*, 16 September 1966: 39, 'South Africa: Death to the architect.'

²⁷³⁸ *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 7 September 1966: 1, 'Senseless act – Jonathan.'

²⁷³⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 6, 'Assassination sends a wave of shock around the world'; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, 'London Conference shocked by slain.'

²⁷⁴⁰ *Kathimerini*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Ατομον ελληνικής καταγωγής εδολοφόνησε τον Φέρβειρντ.'

²⁷⁴¹ *Daily Express*, 7 September 1966: 2, 'Epitaph for a fanatic.'

²⁷⁴² *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, 'Murder shocks world.'

²⁷⁴³ *Revolution Africaine*, 9 September 1966: 3, 'The apostle of hatred is no more.'

the International Court of Justice of the action against Pretoria, regarding the mandate over the African Southeast. However, after further consideration, they preferred to refrain from manifestations of this kind.²⁷⁴⁴

EUROPE

In Britain, the newspapers reported the assassination with banner headlines, page-wide photographs and many columns of text. Prime Minister Harold Wilson sent the following message to Dr. Theophilus E. Donges, South Africa's senior Cabinet minister and acting Prime Minister: "I was shocked to hear the news of the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. Please accept condolences on behalf of the British Government and myself and convey our sympathy to Dr. Verwoerd's family."²⁷⁴⁵ The leader of the opposition Conservative Party, Edward Heath, declared that he strongly opposed Dr. Verwoerd's apartheid policy but he was sorry for "this barbaric assassination." The Liberal Party leader, Jo Grimond, commented: "It is obvious that the regime leads to violence of this kind. This should serve as a warning to all of those who wish to lead autocratic regimes in Africa."²⁷⁴⁶

A few hours after the assassination, Sir Arthur Michael Palliser, private secretary to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, reflected on the effects of Dr. Verwoerd's absence on the international scene. In a letter to the British Foreign Office, he wrote, "Whatever one may think of Dr. Verwoerd's policies, no other South African minister has his experience, and prestige and we are likely to regret the disappearance of his skill, caution and realism in the conduct of South Africa's external affairs." He concluded by correctly predicting that John Vorster would be his successor. "The ruthless and former pro-Nazi Minister of Justice seems the most likely candidate," he wrote.²⁷⁴⁷

Initially, the head of state, Queen Elizabeth, remained silent and sent no messages to the Dr. Verwoerd family or the South African government.²⁷⁴⁸ It was understood by the press

²⁷⁴⁴ *Le Courrier d'Afrique*, 9 September 1966: 2, 'A eleicao do sucessor.'

²⁷⁴⁵ Copy of Harold Wilson's message to Dr. Donges. 6 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. British National Archives (*hereafter cited as BNA*); *The Rhodesia Herald*, 7 September 1966, 'World condemns Dr. Verwoerd murder.'

²⁷⁴⁶ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 7 September 1966: 2, 'Qualquer violencia e lamentavel.'

²⁷⁴⁷ A.M. Palliser letter to the Foreign Office. 6 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

²⁷⁴⁸ *The Sun* (Vancouver), 12 September 1966: 3, 'Advice to Queen shocking'; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, 'Murder shocks world.'

that she took such a decision on the advice of Prime Minister Harold Wilson.²⁷⁴⁹ *The Canberra Times* of Australia said, “It seems likely that it was considered inappropriate for the Queen to send a message, especially as many of the Commonwealth leaders (then meeting in London) might not have been in sympathy with it.”²⁷⁵⁰ However, a few days later, the Queen sent a private message of condolence to Dr. Verwoerd’s wife, Betsie. The delay came about because the Prime Minister’s office considered such an action would be against precedent. However, the Queen said after Dr. Verwoerd’s funeral that she “would very much like to send a purely private word of sympathy to Mrs. Dr. Verwoerd.” The PM’s Office bowed to her wish, but was at pains to explain to the media that this was not “a formal message, which would be from the Queen to a head of state, but a purely private and personal message, conveyed on her behalf to the widow.” The message, sent on September 10, said: “The Queen was deeply shocked by the news of the assassination of your husband. Her Majesty, who feels very deeply for you in your loss, desires me to convey to you and to all the members of your family an expression of her most sincere sympathy.”²⁷⁵¹

The BBC interrupted its programmes to announce the assassination.²⁷⁵² But there were protests when an unnamed African appeared on a news broadcast and stated that Dr. Verwoerd’s death was the “happiest day of his life and he only wished he had committed the murder himself.”²⁷⁵³ The South African *Die Vaderland* responded to BBC with an article entitled “Away with the BBC.” The newspaper said that the fact that BBC allowed this man to make such a comment “stinks in nostrils of the civilised world.”²⁷⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the BBC News on the night of the assassination attracted some twelve and a half million viewers, one of the highest audience figures of the year.²⁷⁵⁵

The *Daily Mail*’s headline on the front page said “the final irony-Dr. Verwoerd, apostle of apartheid is carried out dead... killed by the hand of a White man.” Below the headline was a picture with Dr. Verwoerd’s body being carried out from the Parliament on a stretcher. The Left-wing *Daily Mirror*’s headline was “Missionary of hate-he shaped the laws

²⁷⁴⁹ *Umtali Post*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘No message from Queen.’

²⁷⁵⁰ *The Canberra Times*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Matters of protocol.’

²⁷⁵¹ Queen’s condolences message to Betsie Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

²⁷⁵² *Pretoria News*, 6 September 1966: 1, ‘Shock news on BBC’; *Umtali Post*, 6 September 1966: 1, ‘BBC reports the death.’

²⁷⁵³ *The Guardian*, 9 September 1966: 11, “Stinking’ quotation by BBC’; *The Times* (London), 7 September 1966: 1, ‘BBC news criticized.’

²⁷⁵⁴ *The Guardian*, 9 September 1966: 11, “Stinking’ quotation by BBC.’

²⁷⁵⁵ *The Stage*, 20 October 1966: 10, ‘BBC drops further behind in September.’

of apartheid,” while the Right-wing *Daily Sketch* called Dr. Verwoerd “this misguided man.” The *London Times* editorial said, “what has been tragically seen in recent years, notably in the murder of President Kennedy is that the closest security system ca pan protect nobody against the private vendetta of a solitary man with a grievance.”²⁷⁵⁶

Writing from London, the historian and politician Lord Altrincham said, “Dr. Verwoerd was certainly the ablest practical and theoretical exponent of apartheid, but the system was not his creation, nor will it die with him. Indeed, his supposed martyrdom may give it additional strength.”²⁷⁵⁷ The London *Economist* disagreed. After considering Dr. Verwoerd’s possible successors, it said, “Whoever wins, one thing seems certain: the days of apartheid as an intellectualised and rationalised philosophy are over. The death of Dr. Verwoerd is to ‘separate development’ what the death of Lenin was to Communism. The theories will remain but they will ossify.”²⁷⁵⁸

On September 17, the British satirical magazine, *Private Eye*, carried several cartoons and spoof conversations about the assassination, including a front-page photograph of Africans dancing and leaping. The caption, ironically suggesting they were celebrating their Prime Minister’s death, proclaimed, “Dr. Verwoerd: A Nation Mourns.”²⁷⁵⁹ South Africa’s Publications Control Board banned the issue. A *Daily Dispatch* reporter who saw the magazine said the cover picture showed Africans in trial dress dancing jubilantly above a caption which suggested they were reacting to news of Dr. Verwoerd’s death.²⁷⁶⁰

In Athens, Foreign Minister Ioannis Toumbas said, “The Greek Government feels horror for the odious crime whose victim was the South African Premier.”²⁷⁶¹ *Kathimerini*, a leading Greek newspaper of the time, said in a front-page editorial, “Greek public opinion has been struck with horror ... the assassin was probably disturbed in his mind. The fact that he is of Greek origin provokes a national feeling of sorrow.”²⁷⁶² Messages of condolence poured into the South African embassy in Athens from all parts of Greece.²⁷⁶³ In Cyprus, President

²⁷⁵⁶ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 6, ‘Assassination sends a wave of shock around the world.’

²⁷⁵⁷ *The Australian*, 10 September 1966. ‘Dr. Verwoerd killer: Sad little psychopath or messenger of doom?’

²⁷⁵⁸ *The Economist*, 10 September 1966: 1000-1001, ‘Whites in mourning.’

²⁷⁵⁹ *Private Eye*, 17 September 1966: cover, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: A nation mourns.’

²⁷⁶⁰ *Daily Dispatch*, 14 October 1966: 1, ‘Satire on Dr. Verwoerd death banned.’

²⁷⁶¹ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Grief expressed by leader of Greeks in Johannesburg.’

²⁷⁶² *Kathimerini*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Ατομον ελληνικής καταγωγής εδολοφόνησε τον Φέρβειρντ.’

²⁷⁶³ *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘City Greek café hit by bullet.’

Makarios, who opposed apartheid, said, “Assassinations are terrible things. I am terribly shocked and express my sympathy.”²⁷⁶⁴

At the Vatican, Pope Paul VI extended his condolences over Dr. Verwoerd’s “tragic death,”²⁷⁶⁵ while the governments of West Germany, Denmark and Norway all expressed shock. Denmark, however, expressed serious criticism of apartheid and announced that the government would not send an official representative to attend Dr. Verwoerd’s funeral.²⁷⁶⁶ Portugal, whose Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was a close ally of Dr. Verwoerd, characterised the murder as a “criminal act,”²⁷⁶⁷ while a spokesman at the Portuguese Foreign Ministry said, “Nobody could deny the personal integrity, the patriotic devotion and the moral courage of the Premier of South Africa.” In Paris, government officials said they were certain the murder would strengthen racial opposition within South Africa,²⁷⁶⁸ although France’s Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Mourville, expressed the “sad condolences” of his Government.²⁷⁶⁹ Dr. Borg Olivier of Malta said, “I hope it does not happen to any of us.”²⁷⁷⁰

In Moscow, the Soviet News Agency *Tass* reported the assassination without comment but it identified Dr. Verwoerd as “the head of the racist regime” in South Africa.²⁷⁷¹ The government newspaper, *Izvestia*, wrote that “for millions of honest people in Africa and all over the world,” Dr. Verwoerd was “the embodiment of the monstrous doctrine of total racism.”²⁷⁷² It added that although the Russian tradition required a person to say either good things or nothing at all about the dead that was impossible in Dr. Verwoerd’s case.²⁷⁷³ The Communist Party daily *Pravda* also reported the assassination without comment in a single paragraph of thirteen lines.²⁷⁷⁴

The *Melbourne Herald* of September 7, 1966, recalled how the Soviet Union once put Hendrik Verwoerd on trial, in absentia. The newspaper said news of Dr. Verwoerd’s death came too late for Soviet officials to be contacted, but added that the Kremlin was unlikely to

²⁷⁶⁴ *The Vancouver Sun*, 6 September 1966: 3, ‘Verwoerd assassination shocks world leaders.’

²⁷⁶⁵ *The New York Times*, 8 September 1966: 12, ‘Pope sends condolences.’

²⁷⁶⁶ *Pretoria News*, 10 September 1966, ‘Denmark will not send diplomat.’

²⁷⁶⁷ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

²⁷⁶⁸ *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 7 September 1966: 5, ‘Die Wahler honorieren die Apartheid.’

²⁷⁶⁹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 7 September 1966, ‘World condemns Dr. Verwoerd murder.’

²⁷⁷⁰ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

²⁷⁷¹ *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁷⁷² *The New York Times*, 8 September 1966: 12, ‘Moscow assails Dr. Verwoerd.’

²⁷⁷³ *To Vima*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Απειλούν τους Έλληνες εις την Ν. Αφρική.’

²⁷⁷⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 6, ‘Assassination sends a wave of shock around the world.’

have any regrets. Russia had never had diplomatic relations with South Africa and two years ago, an “international court of public opinion” was set up as a youth forum in Moscow to try Dr. Verwoerd for racist crimes. The court concluded that the South African leader was liable to be condemned as a heinous, international criminal and an enemy of mankind. It “summoned” Dr. Verwoerd to appear before it, a summons, the newspaper said, which he never obeyed.²⁷⁷⁵

In Italy, *Corriere Della Sera* characterised Dr. Verwoerd as the ‘fanatical executor’ of apartheid. Recalling his comment that “we are Christian, we want to help them (non-whites) stand up,” the newspaper asked, “How could they stand up if they had no room to place their feet, when three million and four hundred thousand whites control 86% of the land and twelve million negroes only 14%?”²⁷⁷⁶

In divided Germany, opinion about Dr. Verwoerd was also divided. In West Germany, most of the media condemned the assassination without commenting on Dr. Verwoerd’s policies. *Handelsblatt* claimed that Dr. Verwoerd was misunderstood and what he did was for the benefit of the Blacks.²⁷⁷⁷ However, *Frankfurter Allegemeine* declared that Dr. Verwoerd had “sown hatred and discord.”²⁷⁷⁸ In East Germany, the *Neues Deutschland* attacked Dr. Verwoerd as “the leader of the white racists ... one of the most eager defenders of apartheid, the barbaric racial oppression of 13 million Africans and Asians, whose methods are barely inferior to the ‘Nuremberg Laws.’” The newspaper reminded its readers that according to the Swiss, German-language daily, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of April 15 this year, the International Agency for Employment in Geneva had declared that the “state of African labour bound to a South African economy under the principles of White supremacy” could “barely be differentiated from slavery.” *Nues Deutschland* pointed out that West Germany supported Dr. Verwoerd’s fascist racial politics. It was “none other than the current President of West Germany and concentration camp builder Lübke, who visited South Africa in 1959 and told the racist regime that ‘the problems surrounding native peoples are in good hands here.’” The article said Dr. Verwoerd was “a victim of his own politics of violence.”²⁷⁷⁹

²⁷⁷⁵ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

²⁷⁷⁶ *Corriere Della Serra*, 8 September 1966, ‘L’apartheid.’

²⁷⁷⁷ *Handelsblatt*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Sudafrika sucht nachfolger für Dr. Verwoerd.’

²⁷⁷⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 6, ‘Assassination sends a wave of shock around the world.’

²⁷⁷⁹ *Deues Deutschland*, 9 September 1966: 7, ‘Dr. Verwoerd.’

REST OF THE WORLD

The chairman of the UN Special Committee on apartheid, Mr. Achkar Marof, said, “The international community should be grateful to the assassin if his act produces a change in South Africa’s race policy.” UN Secretary General U Thant expressed deep regret and declared that “any violence is deplorable.”²⁷⁸⁰

In the USA, Martin Luther King also commented on the assassination, saying that “few individuals in modern times have been so insidious and diabolical in their schemes of oppression as Hendrik Verwoerd, but even in this case, one must deplore the fanatical act of assassination.”²⁷⁸¹ Julius W. Hobson, another leading civil rights activist commented, ‘I am not in favour of murder, but that’s not the point. This man has been responsible for the death of thousands of Black South Africans. I am not going to advocate killing anybody, but I am delighted he is dead.’²⁷⁸² US President Lyndon Johnson, who sent a personal message to Betsie Dr. Verwoerd, called the assassination “a deplorable act, a stroke of violence that shakes the sensibilities of men who believe in law and order.”²⁷⁸³ Senator Robert Kennedy, himself to be assassinated two years later, said he was “deeply shocked” and added, “violence is not answer the problems which must be worked out between people, with compassion and understanding on both sides.”²⁷⁸⁴

The day after the assassination, the *New York Times* carried the headline, “Verwoerd: Relentless Advocate of Apartheid. Pro-Nazi and Harsh Racist, He Seemed Outwardly Genial.” The newspaper described Dr. Verwoerd’s policies as “the harshest race laws since Hitler.”²⁷⁸⁵ In another article on the same page, the newspaper carried another headline dedicated to the slain Prime Minister: “Unafraid of Assassins, Dr. Verwoerd Said in 1962.” The story below said that two years after he was shot by David Pratt, Dr. Verwoerd was

²⁷⁸⁰ *The Globe and Mail*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Assassination condemned by friend and foe alike’; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world’; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁷⁸¹ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Johnson decries assassination; Rights leaders echo dismay’; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁷⁸² *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Johnson decries assassination; Rights leaders echo dismay.’

²⁷⁸³ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world’; *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Johnson decries assassination; Rights leaders echo dismay’; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd slain at his Parliament desk.’

²⁷⁸⁴ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Johnson decries assassination; Rights leaders echo dismay’; *The Vancouver Sun*, 6 September 1966: 3, ‘Verwoerd assassination shocks world leaders.’

²⁷⁸⁵ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.’

asked if he was not afraid someone else might shoot him. “No, I’m not afraid,” he said. “I don’t think anyone wants to kill me.” A reporter pointed out that he was sitting in front of an open window of his office on street level. “My desk just happens to be placed here,” he responded. “If someone really wants to kill you, it’s not a very hard job. One thing is certain, there’s no point going around worrying about it.”²⁷⁸⁶

Also in the United States, *LIFE* magazine published an article by Anthony Samson, former editor of South Africa’s *DRUM* magazine and the future official biographer of Nelson Mandela. The article was titled, “Violent end for the apostle of apartheid.” In it, Samson called Dr. Verwoerd a symbol of “reckless white supremacy” whose “repressive policies were applied with police state efficiency to keep twelve million non-Europeans powerless in South Africa and to separate them from the 3.4 million Europeans.” He noted that at the time of his death, Dr. Verwoerd was at “the height of his political power.”²⁷⁸⁷

From Bombay, India, the *Economic and Political Weekly* warned, “If no tears need to be shed for Dr. Verwoerd, there is equally nothing to take heart in his exit for the future of the Africans in South Africa. For most of the three and a half million Whites, in their psychopathic fear of the Africans who outnumber them so overwhelmingly, apartheid appears as the only means of survival and cling to it they must.”²⁷⁸⁸ Appasaheb Pant, India’s Ambassador to Egypt, offered his sympathy to Dr. Verwoerd’s family but also to the “hundreds of thousands of people who suffered from Dr. Verwoerd.”²⁷⁸⁹

In Canada, acting Prime Minister Paul Martin said, “The Canadian government regrets this shocking act of violence. I have this morning sent to the acting Prime Minister of South Africa a message of condolence. This regret, of course, does not affect the government’s well-known attitude on apartheid. We thoroughly disagree with this policy, but our difference of views does not dilute our regret at this brutal assassination.”²⁷⁹⁰ Tommy Douglas, the leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada, said, “one cannot help but fear that unless there is some reversal of policies in South Africa a great deal more blood will be spilled in that unhappy country.”²⁷⁹¹ The *Toronto Star* published an article headlined, “The

²⁷⁸⁶ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, ‘Unafraid of assassins, Dr. Verwoerd said in 1962.’

²⁷⁸⁷ Schoeman, 1975: 89.

²⁷⁸⁸ *Economic and Political Weekly*, 10 September 1966: 146-147, ‘Apartheid unassassinated.’

²⁷⁸⁹ *Kathimerini*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Ατομον Ελληνικής καταγωγής εδολοφόνησε τον Φέρβερντ.’

²⁷⁹⁰ *The Globe and Mail*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Canada regrets death but stand still same.’

²⁷⁹¹ *The Vancouver Sun*, 6 September 1966: 3, ‘Verwoerd assassination shocks world leaders.’

man is dead - his monster grows,” suggesting the monster of apartheid was far from moribund.²⁷⁹²

Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia condemned the murder as “repugnant.” Premiers Lester Pearson of Canada and Keith Holyoake of New Zealand had identical reactions: “I am shocked.”²⁷⁹³ In Wellington, New Zealand, members of a Maori tribe presented a bouquet of flowers at the South African consulate-general.²⁷⁹⁴ Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew was less sympathetic and said, ‘If you run regimes like that, this is part of the risk.’²⁷⁹⁵ In Cuba, a Radio Havana broadcast commented that “the reactionary bloc has lost one of its infamous representatives. Dr. Verwoerd has left behind him the result of his segregationist policy.”²⁷⁹⁶

TSAFENDAS’S FAMILY REACTION

When Tsafendas’s family heard about the assassination, his siblings and in-laws, apart from Katerina who was in Rhodesia, gathered in Marika’s house in Pretoria. All were deeply shocked, fearing the worst for themselves because they had bribed van den Berg to allow Tsafendas to enter South Africa. They believed that if Tsafendas was tortured, he would reveal everything. Nick Vlachopoulos was the calmest and said that it was very possible the police would not find out because Tsafendas had experience of torture and could possibly to withhold anything damaging to the family. All agreed that if asked, they would deny knowing Tsafendas was not allowed to enter South Africa.²⁷⁹⁷

Marika and her son Victor were the most frightened. Victor suggested they should pack their bags and be ready to leave the country at any time. At one point, he even suggested leaving then and there. Eventually, he and his wife remained, but with their bags packed and ready to flee. All agreed that, if asked, they would distance themselves as far as possible from Tsafendas, claiming they had no contacts with him since he had been away for many years and they were unaware of his political views and activities. They feared that if it became

²⁷⁹² Schoeman, 1975: 90.

²⁷⁹³ *The Herald* (Melbourne), 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Murder shocks world.’

²⁷⁹⁴ *Pretoria News*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Simple Maori tribute paid to Dr. Verwoerd.’

²⁷⁹⁵ *Daily Express*, 7 September 1966: 2, ‘Epitaph for a fanatic’; *The Australian*, 8 September 1966, ‘Murder shocks world, but some leaders are glad’; *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁷⁹⁶ *Washington Post*, 7 September 1966: 8, ‘London Conference shocked by slain.’

²⁷⁹⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

known he was a Communist, they would be in trouble for not reporting him since Communism was illegal.²⁷⁹⁸

Fearing an imminent police search of their houses, Marika and her daughter Evangelia burned all of Tsafendas's books, both those in his step-mother's house and in the apartment Vlachopoulos had given him. Every single book went into the flames, although not all of them were political. Marika also burned photographs which Tsafendas had sent them from around the world, along with family photographs from Mozambique. She also destroyed Tsafendas's two records with the Communist songs along with all of Paul Robeson's, just because he was Black.²⁷⁹⁹

However, the person who was most frightened after the assassination was George Michaletos, Tsafendas's uncle and Artemis's husband. It was he who arranged to bribe J.J. van den Berg, the passport control officer at the South African consulate in Lourenço Marques, to ignore Tsafendas's name on the Stop List and issue him a visa. For more than a month after Tsafendas's arrest, Michaletos was unable to sleep and lived in constant fear of arrest. He wanted to flee the country and go back to Greece, but Artemis was calmer and insisted that they should remain. Michaletos cut off any contact with van den Berg, but when he heard that the passport officer had been taken for questioning, he left Lourenço Marques immediately and took refuge in a relative's house in Zambia. He stayed there for three or four weeks, still terrified, and only returned to Lourenço Marques after Tsafendas's summary trial had ended. Even then, he remained nervous and suspicious over the years, fearing that one day bribe might be discovered.²⁸⁰⁰

²⁷⁹⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²⁷⁹⁹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

²⁸⁰⁰ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE POLICE INVESTIGATION

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the findings (and non-findings) of the South African police during their investigation of Dr. Verwoerd's assassination. Non-findings include important information regarding Tsafendas which was withheld by PIDE, the Portuguese Security Police. We will look at the statements which the South African police took from people who had known Tsafendas, documents received by the South African authorities from various institutions and organizations around the world, medical reports, police memoranda and police reports.

The investigators were confronted by thousands of documents specific to Tsafendas and many which were irrelevant to the case. This study will look only at documents relevant to Tsafendas and the assassination. Documents which repeated information that we have already seen are also not listed. However, all statements taken by the police from people who knew Tsafendas, including two statements by Tsafendas himself, are included. All the top secret documents are included.

This chapter also includes some of the Press reports published during the investigation to demonstrate how the media covered the issue and to illustrate the "climate" of the day, but also to examine how Tsafendas was portrayed at the time, bearing in mind that most news reports contained false, incomplete or exaggerated information.

BACKGROUND ON GENERAL HENDRIK JOHAN VAN DEN BERGH

Before we examine the police investigation into the assassination, we will explore the nature of the man who was in charge of it. General van den Bergh played a massively important role in the case and was deeply involved in creating the portrait of Tsafendas that emerged from his summary trial and from the proceedings of the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd's death. Arguably the most feared man in South Africa during the 1960s and 1970s Police Chief Hendrik Johan van den Bergh created, headed and became virtually synonymous with the Bureau of State Security (BOSS),²⁸⁰¹ an all-embracing security organisation which he employed ruthlessly in defence of the apartheid state.²⁸⁰² He was the oppressive power behind the apartheid government of John Vorster.²⁸⁰³ At the height of his power in 1976, van den Bergh plotted with two close associates to secure a share of power at the highest level following the expected retirement of Vorster,²⁸⁰⁴ but after exposure of his involvement in a government corruption scandal, he was forced to retire.²⁸⁰⁵

Born on November 27, 1914²⁸⁰⁶ into an Afrikaner farming family in Vredefort, Orange Free State, Hendrik Johan van den Bergh was known to his friends as HJ, the initials of his given names, but to everyone else, he was *Lang Hendrik* (Tall Hendrik) on account of his height, a towering 1.96m (6 feet 5 inches).²⁸⁰⁷ Van den Bergh joined the police in 1934,²⁸⁰⁸ but when World War Two broke out, he was interned in Koffienfontein camp as a suspected member of the *Stormjaers*, the military wing of the pro-Nazi organization *Ossewabrandwag*²⁸⁰⁹ (OB - Oxwag Sentinel).²⁸¹⁰ A fellow internee who held general's rank in the OB, was Balthazar Johannes Vorster, the future Prime Minister. He and van den Bergh quickly became friends²⁸¹¹ and subsequently van den Bergh became Vorster's closest

²⁸⁰¹ For more about BOSS and its activities see: Hepple, A. (1969) "South Africa's Bureau for State Security;" International Defence and Aid Fund (1969) *South Africa: The BOSS Law*; International Defence and Aid Fund (1975) *BOSS: The First Five Years*; O'Brien, K.A. (2010) *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*; Sanders, J. (2006) *Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service*; Swanepoel, P.C. (2007) *Really Inside Boss: A Tale of South Africa's Late Intelligence Service*; Winter, G. (1981) *Inside BOSS*.

²⁸⁰² Leonard, 1983: 123

²⁸⁰³ Braid (*The Independent*), 20 August 1997: 12, 'Obituary: Hendrik van den Bergh.'

²⁸⁰⁴ Burns (*The New York Times*), 23 March 1979: A3, 'Vorster rejects allegations in South Africa's Information Scandal'; Sanders, 1999: 61; *TIME*, 26 March 1979, 'South Africa: Rhodie's Story.'

²⁸⁰⁵ Sanders, 1999: 64.

²⁸⁰⁶ Pogrud, 1997: 17.

²⁸⁰⁷ *The New York Times*, 1 April 1979: 10, 'Acid general is key to Pretoria scandal'; Winter, 1981: 34.

²⁸⁰⁸ Hepple, 1969: 437.

²⁸⁰⁹ For more about the *Ossewabrandwag* see Chapter One.

²⁸¹⁰ Sanders, 2006: 34-35.

²⁸¹¹ O'Meara, 1996: xxxvii.

confident, security advisor and a devoted advisor.²⁸¹² During the time of their detention, van den Bergh was Vorster's "counter-intelligence chief," tasked to seek out and expose the government's agents sent in to spy on the internees.²⁸¹³

After the war, van den Bergh worked as a clerk at the South African Institute of Architects²⁸¹⁴ before re-joining the police in 1950.²⁸¹⁵ He reached the rank of captain in 1953,²⁸¹⁶ but his police career was unspectacular until Vorster became Minister of Justice in 1961.²⁸¹⁷ Van den Bergh was then swiftly promoted to lieutenant colonel and at the end of 1962 he was named by Vorster as head of South Africa's Secret Police.²⁸¹⁸ His progress thereafter was unstoppable: promoted to full colonel in 1963,²⁸¹⁹ when, as ordered by Vorster, he established the Republican Intelligence Service;²⁸²⁰ brigadier in 1964, major-general in 1966,²⁸²¹ lieutenant general in 1968; and in 1969 full general and head of the notorious Bureau of State Security (BOSS),²⁸²² which through the 1970s was the controlling national organisation in South Africa.²⁸²³ South African judges, professors and lawyers, some of them even supporters of apartheid, protested against the methods of the BOSS and condemned its increasing power and unaccountability. The *Veg* ("Fight"), a journal published by Afrikaner intellectuals, suggested that it should instead be called the Bureau for Intimidation, Victimization and Elimination, or just the Gestapo.²⁸²⁴

General van den Bergh was Vorster's *eminence grise*, his closest adviser and chief hatchet man²⁸²⁵ and was widely considered the second most powerful man in the country. Some believed that van den Bergh was at the time even more powerful than Vorster; since the Prime Minister was answerable to Parliament and to his Party, while the General was answerable only to the Prime Minister, who was his best friend and closest associate.²⁸²⁶ BOSS, which was modelled on America's CIA,²⁸²⁷ was responsible for some of apartheid

²⁸¹² Rotberg, 1983: 13-14.

²⁸¹³ Bell and Ntsebeza, 2003: 41.

²⁸¹⁴ Sanders, 2006: 35.

²⁸¹⁵ Hepple, 1969: 437; *The Times*, 19 August 1997: 19, 'Hendrik van den Bergh.'

²⁸¹⁶ Sanders, 2006: 34-35.

²⁸¹⁷ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 15; Sanders, 2006: 35.

²⁸¹⁸ O'Meara, 1996: 211.

²⁸¹⁹ Hepple, 1969: 437.

²⁸²⁰ Sanders, 2006: 35.

²⁸²¹ Hepple, 1969: 437.

²⁸²² Dubow, 2014: 153; O'Meara, 1996: xxxvii; Sanders, 2006: 35.

²⁸²³ Hain, 1996: 84.

²⁸²⁴ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1969a: ii-4.

²⁸²⁵ O'Meara, 1996: xxxvii.

²⁸²⁶ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1969a: 5.

²⁸²⁷ Grundy, 1986: 42- 43.

regime's worst excesses in the 1970s, with van den Bergh overseeing blackmail, torture and assassination at a time when the Cold War gave the ruling National Party an alibi – fighting international Communism – for its true mission, the prevention of democratic rule.²⁸²⁸

In 1966, van den Bergh publicly denied that he had ever been a member of the OB, although his adherence to the group along with other prominent figures was widely known. He even claimed that he was unfamiliar with the principles and policies of the organization.²⁸²⁹ However, when he acted as a pallbearer at the funeral of Hans van Rensburg,²⁸³⁰ Commanding General of the *Ossewabrandwag* during World War Two,²⁸³¹ he saluted him with the organisation's Fascist, arm-across-the-chest salute.²⁸³² A life-long Afrikaner nationalist, van den Bergh was also a member of the Afrikaner Broederbond. His membership number was 6745²⁸³³ and in 1964, the Broederbond awarded him a medal for his services.²⁸³⁴

Van den Bergh was fanatically anti-Communist and anti-Semite and in September 1966, he outraged South Africa's large Jewish community by claiming that Jews were becoming Communists because "Communism is the highest form of capitalism." Addressing an anti-Communist symposium at the height of the Tsafendas investigation, he charged that Communists subverted the White South African way of life by engaging in "psychological sabotage." The Communist leaders of the campaign were "white so-called intellectuals," most of whom, he said, were Jewish."²⁸³⁵ In the 1970s, however, he developed close official ties with Israel.²⁸³⁶ Communists, however, remained high on his hate list. He said, the Communist Party consisted of "a very select group of people" and "possessed everything

²⁸²⁸ Braid (*The Independent*), 20 August 1997: 12, 'Obituary: Hendrik van den Bergh.'

²⁸²⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 October 1966: 1, 'van den Bergh: I wasn't an OB.'

²⁸³⁰ (1898-1966) A lawyer and Nazi supporter who served as Secretary of Justice in 1933. In 1938, he helped in the formation and organization of the Nazi organization the *Ossewabrandwag* and he became its commander general from 1941 until 1952. He died on the 25th of September 1966. (Rees, 1990: 401). On the day of his funeral, the newly appointed Prime Minister John Vorster, sent a wreath and ordered all flags in Pretoria to fly at half-mast, a military guard of honour was at the service and ex-OB members gave their semi-fascist salute (Furlong, 2010: 73).

²⁸³¹ Furlong, 2010: 73.

²⁸³² *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 October 1966: 1, 'van den Bergh: I wasn't an OB'; Sanders, 2006: 35.

²⁸³³ Bell and Ntsebeza, 2003: 28; Serfontein, 1978: 272; Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: A239.

²⁸³⁴ Serfontein, 1978: 18, 91.

²⁸³⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 September 1966: 1, 'Reds and Jews by v.d. Bergh'; Winter, 1981: 87; van den Bergh, 1967, 21-45.

²⁸³⁶ Polakow-Suransky, 2010: 89-90.

except a person's soul."²⁸³⁷ He also said Communism was furthered by "self-indulgence, self-pessimism and sickly sentimentality."²⁸³⁸

Van den Bergh was known to be unstable and to take pleasure from inflicting pain²⁸³⁹ and throughout his career, he left a trail of violence in his wake. The methods of torture he applied were learned, or refined, from his contacts with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and from training he received in interrogation techniques in France and Algeria during the first half of the 1960s.²⁸⁴⁰ Evidence of van den Bergh's cruelty was demonstrated as early as March 21, 1960 at the Sharpeville massacre when he was sent to the Baragwanath hospital where many victims of the police shootings had been taken. His team of White and Black policemen dragged wounded people from their beds, irrespective of their condition, handcuffed them and transported them to Boksburg Prison. There they were stripped naked, hosed down and ordered to dress again in their bloody clothes, which they were forced to wear unwashed for months afterwards as an example of the price of "agitation."²⁸⁴¹

As a reward for this exemplary action against sick and injured people, van den Bergh was awarded a role in the Sharpeville investigation.²⁸⁴² Judge Wessels, the sole member of the Commission of Inquiry, appointed van den Bergh as the chief police investigator to determine, among other things, who fired the first shots and who shouted "shoot." Unsurprisingly, van den Bergh "failed" to discover the guilty parties,²⁸⁴³ but Judge Wessels praised him nonetheless for the industry he displayed.²⁸⁴⁴ As chief police investigator, van den Bergh was also responsible for concealing evidence of the use by the police of illegal dum-dum bullets.

In 1965, Hugh Lewin, a White South African reporter and anti-apartheid activist, was arrested on charges of sabotage, and beaten by police. He was brought before van den Bergh

²⁸³⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 October 1961: 1-2, 'van den Bergh: I wasn't an OB.'

²⁸³⁸ Bunting, 1986: 412.

²⁸³⁹ Lambley, 1980: 235.

²⁸⁴⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 16, 195.

²⁸⁴¹ Frankel, 2001: 194-195.

²⁸⁴² *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 July 1960, 'Sharpeville Magistrate.'

²⁸⁴³ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 154; Roux, 1972: 408.

²⁸⁴⁴ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 10.

with a bruised and bloody face. Lewin subsequently brought charges of assault against the police. The accused officers unanimously denied the charges and stated on oath that Lewin sustained his facial wounds when he banged his head accidentally against the door of a police car. For his part, van den Bergh was clearly unafraid to lie before the law, since advocates told the court that he was prepared to testify on oath that no member of his force ever assaulted Lewin.²⁸⁴⁵ Later, van den Bergh affirmed accusations that his department was impervious to legal constraints by stating, “We were fighting a revolution those days. It was not kid-gloves stuff, it was war... as far as I was concerned there was no time for peacetime legal niceties.”²⁸⁴⁶

In July 1961, van den Bergh announced that forty anti-apartheid activists had been arrested in the previous two weeks alone under the 90-day detention clause of the General Law Amendment Act. He said there was nothing arbitrary about recent police actions. “Before we raid anyone or detain them, we give the matter our most thorough consideration... we have files on all leftists in this country. If we do not have a file on a person, the investigating officer’s motivation must be exceptionally strong before we will agree to detention under the 90-day clause.” A panel of six senior officers under his chairmanship decided whether to arrest suspects, he said. “Unless we all agree to the detention, the request is referred back to the investigating officer for further motivation,” van den Bergh stated.²⁸⁴⁷

Van den Bergh’s successes on behalf of apartheid were evident in the steep increase in trials of political activists from the early 1960s onwards which saw thousands imprisoned. As a result, he was credited with having “practically wiped out” sabotage in South Africa.²⁸⁴⁸ His biggest coup was organising the arrests of the most prominent members of the ANC at Liliesleaf Farm in July 1963.²⁸⁴⁹ It was, he said, “one of the most important round-ups so far.” The arrests led to the Rivonia Trial²⁸⁵⁰ the following year when Nelson Mandela and eight ANC activists were sentenced to life imprisonment. For his success, the then Colonel van den Bergh was raised to the rank of brigadier - the youngest holder of that rank in the South African Police.²⁸⁵¹ In addition, in 1964, van den Bergh ordered the arrest of Bram

²⁸⁴⁵ Lewin, 1976: 23-37.

²⁸⁴⁶ Bizos, 1998: 3.

²⁸⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 12 July 1964: 5, ‘40 in South Africa arrested in raids.’

²⁸⁴⁸ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 15.

²⁸⁴⁹ Braid (*The Independent*), 20 August 1997: 12, ‘Obituary: Hendrik van den Bergh’; Dubow, 2014: 96; *The New York Times*, 11 July 1963: 3, ‘17 seized in raid in South Africa.’

²⁸⁵⁰ For more about the Rivonia Trial see Chapter One.

²⁸⁵¹ Sanders, 2006: 35.

Fischer, followed by the arrests of several Communists and anti-apartheid activists.²⁸⁵² Robben Island,²⁸⁵³ the infamous penitentiary where most of the political prisoners were detained during the apartheid era, was described at the time as “van den Bergh’s monument.”²⁸⁵⁴

On July 24, 1964, shortly after John Harris’s bomb had exploded in Johannesburg Railway Station, van den Bergh sat in his car pondering, “Who did this?” Suddenly, he claimed, the name “John Harris” came into his mind, although he had never heard of him. Van den Bergh attributed this flash of inspiration to divine revelation.²⁸⁵⁵ As we will see, it was not the only thing in his life that he attributed to the hand of God. Gordon Winter, a former BOSS agent and very close friend of the General, claimed that on March 31, 1965, van den Bergh offered John Harris,²⁸⁵⁶ on the eve of his execution, the chance to escape from prison in exchange for information about his accomplices. Harris declined to betray his comrades and was hanged the next day.²⁸⁵⁷

In 1965, infuriated by a *Rand Daily Mail* story alleging torture and inhumane conditions in South African prisons, van den Bergh ordered a raid on the newspaper’s offices.²⁸⁵⁸ Laurence Gandar, the newspaper’s editor, described the police action as an unprecedented campaign of savagery.²⁸⁵⁹ The police swoop was not without gallows humour. After the raid and the presumed bugging of the newspaper’s offices, staff at editorial conferences, when discussing sensitive matters, would look up at the ceiling and say, “Hope you can hear OK, General.”²⁸⁶⁰

Justice Minister Vorster, who in 1966 accepted the additional portfolio of Police and Prisons, instructed van den Bergh that anyone deemed to be a threat to the state should “be taken out of circulation in one way or another, if there are valid reasons for not bringing that person to trial.”²⁸⁶¹ For this reason, in 1969, General van den Bergh created within BOSS a

²⁸⁵² Pike, 1985: 405.

²⁸⁵³ For more about Robben Island see Chapter One.

²⁸⁵⁴ Pogrud, 1997: 17.

²⁸⁵⁵ Pike, 1985: 405.

²⁸⁵⁶ The man who planted a bomb in a Johannesburg train station. For more see Chapter One.

²⁸⁵⁷ Winter, 1981: 99-100.

²⁸⁵⁸ Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 27 January 1966: 13; Lelyveld (*The New York Times*), 2 July 1965: 3; *The New York Times*, 19 August 1965: 30, ‘Reprisals in South Africa.’

²⁸⁵⁹ *The New York Times*, 19 August 1965: 30, ‘Reprisals in South Africa.’

²⁸⁶⁰ Pogrud, 1997: 17.

²⁸⁶¹ D’Oliveira, 1977: 157-158.

special unit known as the Z Squad tasked to eliminate both enemies of the state and security risks.²⁸⁶²

When van den Bergh appeared before the Erasmus Commission of Inquiry²⁸⁶³ into the so-called “Infogate” scandal in 1978, that eventually brought him down, he acquiesced with Vorster’s remark but also hinted that his department had an operational capacity which did not exclude murder. He said, “Mr. Commissioner, I really want to tell you that I am able, with my department, to do the impossible. I can today tell you here, not for your records, but I can tell you, this is not bragging, I have good men, Afrikaners, I don’t have weak men... I have enough men to commit murder if I tell them, ‘Kill’... I don’t care who the prey is. These are the types of men I have...”²⁸⁶⁴ There were several cases which seemed to bear out van den Bergh’s boast.²⁸⁶⁵ In front of the same commission van den Bergh also had added “that if he wanted to do something nobody would stop him and that he would stop at nothing.”²⁸⁶⁶

Working together, Vorster and van den Bergh engineered legislation which gave the security forces virtual carte blanche in their pursuit of apartheid’s interests. In 1969, the General Law Amendment Bill was passed, whose notorious Clause 29 authorised the Prime Minister or his nominee (i.e. van den Bergh of course) to prohibit oral testimony or the production of any document before any court or statutory body should they believe the evidence or document would be “prejudicial to the interests of the state or public security.”²⁸⁶⁷ In reality, this permitted the police and the security forces to conceal or ensure the unavailability of any document or evidence which might jeopardise their cause. As we will see in the following chapters, the Tsafendas case exemplified such a situation, when documents and evidence contradicting the judge’s trial verdict and the “findings” of the Commission of Enquiry were concealed or disappeared.

In 1975, according to the *South African Observer*, the head of BOSS was so powerful at the time that Prime Minister Vorster would have been “unable to govern the country without having General van den Bergh at his elbow.” The newspaper argued that the

²⁸⁶² Bale, 2006: 43.

²⁸⁶³ The Erasmus Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate “alleged irregularities” into the Department of Information.

²⁸⁶⁴ Burns (*The New York Times*), 18 May 1980: 3, ‘Pretoria scandal testimony reveals talk of murder’; Leonard, 1983: 124; Luyt, 1989: 110; *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 June 1979; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 18.

²⁸⁶⁵ Leonard, 1983: 124.

²⁸⁶⁶ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Department of Information, 1978: par. 386.

²⁸⁶⁷ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 11; Jackson, 1980: 40.

Nationalist Party had become “a mere instrument in the hands of these two ambitious men.”²⁸⁶⁸ The close relationship between the minister and the security supremo was made clear by Vorster when he declared, “General van den Bergh is an officer with whom I co-operated intimately during the most difficult years which South Africa experienced at the time, of the Poqo and the ANC and other problems. He is an officer for whom I have the highest regard and respect because of his ability and the manner in which he performs his work.”²⁸⁶⁹ These two men made the police virtually sacrosanct and systematically destroyed not only what little room for democracy remained, but also, from the beginning of the 1960s, opposition from any quarter,²⁸⁷⁰ turning South Africa effectively into a police state.²⁸⁷¹ By 1966, just three years after his appointment as police and security overlord, van den Bergh had trebled the strength of the security police and was promoted from lieutenant colonel to brigadier.²⁸⁷²

In 1971, Ahmed Timol, a thirty-year-old teacher and member of the South African Communist Party and the MK, died after falling from the tenth floor of the notorious John Vorster Square police station while he was in custody. The police version was that Timol flung open a window and leaped out. However, it was common knowledge that Timol had been tortured systematically in detention and almost certainly murdered, prompting people to demand a public inquiry. His fingernails had been pulled out, his right eye gouged from its socket, his testicles crushed, and his body was covered in blue bruises and livid burn marks. General van den Bergh declared that there was no need for a public inquiry, but “there will be an inquest and all the facts relating to his death will be made public then.” The inquest was held in secret and the result of the post-mortem was not released.²⁸⁷³

General Stoffel Buys, head of the CID, who investigated the incident concluded that Timol had “stormed towards the window and jumped through it.”²⁸⁷⁴ Naturally, the usual verdict in such cases was announced: “Suicide.” The Magistrate said in his judgement, “Mr. Timol was not assaulted by any person. I am satisfied that despite the long hours of the

²⁸⁶⁸ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 15.

²⁸⁶⁹ Debates of the House of Assembly, 21 April 1971.

²⁸⁷⁰ Van der Westhuizen, 2007: 96.

²⁸⁷¹ O’Meara, 1996: xxxvii.

²⁸⁷² Bizos, 1998: 3.

²⁸⁷³ Bernstein, 1972: 1-3; Bizos, 1998: 18-36; Jadoo (*The Citizen*), 27 October 2015, ‘New light shed on Ahmed Timol’s death’; Houston and Magubane, 2007: 440-441; Magubane, 2007: 5; SAHO, n.d., Ahmed Timol; World Peace Council, 1972: 4-8.

²⁸⁷⁴ Bernstein, 1972: 1.

interrogation to which he was subjected, he was treated in a civilised and humane manner.” Timol was the twentieth political prisoner to die in police custody in eight years.²⁸⁷⁵

However, on October 12, 2017, Judge Billy Mothle of the Pretoria High Court, ruled at the conclusion of an inquest which ran from June to September 2017 that Timol was murdered, thereby overruling the verdict of the original inquest. Judge Mothle said in his judgement that the magistrate at the time had relied on “a limited version of events.” Archbishop Desmond Tutu said, “It is sad that it took so long and there are many other TRC matters that haven’t been resolved.”²⁸⁷⁶

During the 1970s, van den Bergh did not confine his techniques of persuasion to the physical. He was one of the brains behind the launch in 1976 of the government-funded English-language newspaper, *The Citizen*,²⁸⁷⁷ a propaganda sheet designed to counter the liberal political position of the long-established *Rand Daily Mail*. However, it was his involvement in murky, pro-apartheid propaganda and his bitter relationship with Defence Minister P.W. Botha and South Africa’s Defence Forces that ultimately led to his downfall.²⁸⁷⁸

In 1978, Judge Anton Mostert, the sole member of the one-man Commission of Inquiry into exchange control regulations, discovered evidence of widespread government corruption, particularly at the Ministry of Information. It became known as the “Information Scandal”²⁸⁷⁹ (also nicknamed Muldergate after the Information Minister, Cornelius Mulder), directly involving van den Bergh and Vorster,²⁸⁸⁰ despite their efforts to conceal their involvement long before the scandal broke. In 1976, van den Bergh and Vorster had instructed their associates in the Ministry to destroy all “unnecessary documentation” that would disclose their involvement in the case.²⁸⁸¹ In 1977, these two, along with Mulder, ordered L.S. Reynders, a civil servant investigating the irregularities, to exculpate them from

²⁸⁷⁵ Bizos, 1998: 18-36; Jadoo (*The Citizen*), 27 October 2015, ‘New light shed on Ahmed Timol’s death’; Houston and Magubane, 2007: 440-441; Magubane, 2007: 5; SAHO, n.d., Ahmed Timol; World Peace Council, 1972: 4-8.

²⁸⁷⁶ Nicolson (*Daily Maverick*), 12 October 2017, ‘Timol Inquest: He was murdered but culprits are dead, court rules.’

²⁸⁷⁷ Sanders, 1006: 99.

²⁸⁷⁸ Cawthra, 1986: 38.

²⁸⁷⁹ For more about the scandal see: Rees, M., Day, C. (1980) *Muldergate: The story of the info-scandal*; Rickard, C. (2012) *Thank You, Judge Mostert!*

²⁸⁸⁰ Smith, 1979: 43; *The Globe and Mail*, 6 April 1979: 6, ‘Secret life of Pretoria.’

²⁸⁸¹ Sanders, 1999: 62.

any involvement. His “findings” offered van den Bergh, Vorster and Mulder the whitewash they wanted.²⁸⁸²

However, Judge Mostert discovered evidence linking van den Bergh and Vorster, the two most powerful men in the country at the time, to the scandal. Despite heavy pressure from the government, the judge disclosed at a press conference that in seeking ways to influence public opinion in favour of apartheid, the Ministry collaborated closely and covertly throughout the 1970s with van den Bergh’s BOSS.²⁸⁸³ Among Mostert’s findings was that in 1973, Vorster agreed to a plan to shift sixty-four million Rand secretly from the defence budget to fund a series of propaganda projects. These included bribes for international news agencies, an attempt to buy the US *Washington Star* newspaper for twenty-five million dollars and the expenditure of thirty million dollars setting up an English-language newspaper, *The Citizen*, as a government mouthpiece in opposition to the liberal *Rand Daily Mail*.²⁸⁸⁴ For making his disclosures public in his final report, Judge Mostert was fired and the Commission of Inquiry was disbanded.²⁸⁸⁵

As a result of Muldergate, the Erasmus Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate. By June 1979, the Commission had issued three reports implicating Vorster and Mulder in misleading Parliament about the secret funding of *The Citizen* and laying responsibility for extensive financial irregularities on Mulder and van den Bergh.²⁸⁸⁶ When L.S. Reynders was questioned by the Commission, in the words of the Commission report, “he burst into tears and, like a lanced boil, made a clean breast of things.”²⁸⁸⁷ He admitted producing the whitewash under fierce pressure from van den Bergh, saying he feared that had he opposed him, the general would “pulverise” him, because “few people in this land realise what power van den Bergh possesses.”²⁸⁸⁸

In a sign of how the mighty had fallen, van den Bergh had his passport confiscated²⁸⁸⁹ and he even signed a nationwide petition calling for his own prosecution.²⁸⁹⁰ However, when

²⁸⁸² Pollack, 1981: 31.

²⁸⁸³ Burns (*The New York Times*), 18 May 1980: 3, ‘Pretoria scandal testimony reveals talk of murder’; Hachten and Giffard, 1984: 243-244.

²⁸⁸⁴ Hachten and Giffard, 1984: 250-251, 275.

²⁸⁸⁵ *The Globe and Mail*, 6 April 1979: 6, ‘Secret life of Pretoria.’

²⁸⁸⁶ Leonard, 1983: 163.

²⁸⁸⁷ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Department of Information, 1978: chap. 11, par. 383.

²⁸⁸⁸ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Department of Information, 1978: chap. 11, par. 385.

²⁸⁸⁹ Ashford (*The Spectator*), 17 March 1979: 8, ‘The revelations of Dr Rhoodie.’

²⁸⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, 4 February 1979: 5, ‘South African General signs petition for his own prosecution.’

he appeared before the Commission and was accused of being a “ruthless manipulator,” he responded by calling the panel “a big farce” and denouncing its report as “full of lies.” He also boasted about his “sinister network of agents” and his willingness to “stop at nothing” to achieve his ends. The Commission accused him of attempting to manipulate the election of Vorster’s successor as prime minister just a year earlier.²⁸⁹¹

The accusation was true. In 1979, Eschel M. Rhoodie, secretary of the Department of Information and close associate of van den Bergh and Mulder,²⁸⁹² described a plot involving van den Bergh which could be construed as a bid for power. Rhoodie claimed that before Vorster resigned, he (Rhoodie), van den Bergh and Mulder planned to install Mulder as Vorster’s successor, then form a triumvirate at the head of the nation’s affairs.²⁸⁹³ As result of the scandal, van den Bergh was forced to resign and retire. BOSS was subsequently renamed as Department of National Security (DONS), headed by Dr. Niel Barnard.²⁸⁹⁴ Van den Bergh faded from public view, farming broiler chickens quietly for two more decades before dying at Bronkhorstpruit, Pretoria, on August 16, 1997. He was eighty-three.²⁸⁹⁵

Today he is remembered as the sanctioner of assassination and torture on behalf of apartheid and as a consummate blackmailer through his network of spies and informers. Almost anyone who was not a rampant Afrikaner was his enemy. “Tall Hendrik” cast his considerable shadow far beyond South Africa’s borders in his hunt for anti-apartheid activists.²⁸⁹⁶ He was described by the International Aid and Defence Fund as “a cruel and ruthless man with scant regard either for justice or humanity.” Along with Prime Minister Vorster, he was responsible for the torture and death in detention of many opponents of apartheid.²⁸⁹⁷ Judge Mostert described van den Bergh as a “sinister figure who saw himself as the power behind the throne of Prime Minister Vorster.”²⁸⁹⁸ Professor Dan O’Meara said van den Bergh personified “the most paranoid and the most vicious tendencies in Afrikaner

²⁸⁹¹ *The New York Times*, 1 April 1979: 10, ‘Acid general is key to Pretoria scandal.’

²⁸⁹² Sanders, 1999: 72.

²⁸⁹³ Burns (*The New York Times*), 23 March 1979: A3, ‘Vorster rejects allegations in South Africa’s Information Scandal’; Sanders, 1999: 61; *TIME*, 26 March 1979, South Africa: Rhoodie’s Story.’

²⁸⁹⁴ Sanders, 2006: 64, 77, 161.

²⁸⁹⁵ Pogrund, 1997: 17.

²⁸⁹⁶ Braid (*The Independent*), 20 August 1997: 12, ‘Obituary: Hendrik van den Bergh.’

²⁸⁹⁷ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 15.

²⁸⁹⁸ *The Globe and Mail*, 6 April 1979: 6, ‘Secret life of Pretoria’; *The New York Times*, 1 April 1979: 10, ‘Acid general is key to Pretoria scandal.’

nationalism,”²⁸⁹⁹ while Helen Suzman described him in Parliament as “South Africa’s own Heinrich Himmler.”²⁹⁰⁰

There were others who thought him plain mad. The best-selling British author and foreign correspondent Frederick Forsyth²⁹⁰¹ described a disturbing encounter with van den Bergh, whom he described as “the originator and enforcer of apartheid.” Forsyth wrote, “I once found myself enclosed with General van den Bergh, the head of the Bureau of State Security, the dreaded BOSS, and he insisted on telling me a story to prove not only his legitimacy but his sanity as well.”²⁹⁰² This is what van den Bergh told Forsyth:

“I was standing once, quite alone on the High Veldt, when a great storm came up. I knew the land was riven with iron ore deposits and lightning strikes would be often and dangerous. So I took shelter under a large mwataba tree. There was an old kaffir standing nearby, also sheltering. The storm raged with biblical intensity. The thunderbolts poured out of the sky and the thunder was enough to deafen me. The tree was struck and split down the middle, its core a smoking ruin. The old kaffir was struck and at once electrocuted. But the storm passed and the sky cleared, and I was not touched. And that was when I knew that the hand of God was upon me.”

Forsyth concluded that the “master of one of the most brutal secret police forces in the world” was “mad as a frog.”²⁹⁰³

GENERAL VAN DEN BERGH'S INTERROGATION

General van den Bergh spent the evening of September 6 and most of the following day interrogating Tsafendas, while Security Police officers in Cape Town worked through the night on the investigation.²⁹⁰⁴ The fact that General van den Bergh personally interrogated Tsafendas is confirmed in two interrogation transcripts found in the archives at a later date. In his first statement on September 11, Tsafendas refers explicitly to van den Bergh, saying, “I must have made a mistake by telling General van den Bergh this.”²⁹⁰⁵ On September 19, in

²⁸⁹⁹ O'Meara, 1996: 211.

²⁹⁰⁰ Winter, 1981: 26; Debates of the House of Assembly, 8 December 1978.

²⁹⁰¹ Author of, among others, *The Day of the Jackal* (1971), *The Odessa File* (1972) and *The Dogs of War* (1974).

²⁹⁰² Forsyth, 2015: 334-335.

²⁹⁰³ Forsyth, 2015: 334-335.

²⁹⁰⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1. ‘All night work’; *The Cape Times*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Riddle of Dr. Verwoerd’s assassin’; *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Security men work all night.’

²⁹⁰⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

his second recorded statement, Major Rossouw, who is conducting the interrogation, tells Tsafendas: “You told Gen. van den Bergh about a girl you were interested in ...”²⁹⁰⁶ Furthermore, John Vorster confirmed in a statement²⁹⁰⁷ which we will examine later that Tsafendas was interrogated for forty-eight hours by General van den Bergh.²⁹⁰⁸

What was said during this first interrogation? The author found in the archives two of the written statements which Tsafendas gave to the police and to Major Rossouw, but not the one that was taken by General van den Bergh on that first day. This statement was originally lodged in the archives, along with the two found by the author, but it has been missing for at least the last ten years. That such a statement existed is proven not only by the references above, but because it has been accessed in the past by at least four other persons: Terry Bell, an investigative journalist and anti-apartheid activist; David Beresford, foreign correspondent in South Africa for Britain's *Guardian* newspaper; Liza Key, a researcher and filmmaker who made a documentary about Tsafendas; and Jan-Ake Kjellberg, a Senior Police Adviser at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and an investigator in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's National Investigative Unit. All four, in personal interviews with the author, spoke at length about the contents of the interrogation transcript. They were unanimous, that Tsafendas told the general he had killed Dr. Verwoerd because he did not agree with his policies, that there was nothing in the transcript to suggest that Tsafendas was not sane, and that van den Bergh was most interested in finding out whether Tsafendas had any accomplices or discussed his intentions with anyone.²⁹⁰⁹

The first person known to the author to have access to the document is Jan-Ake Kjellberg. It was during his work as an investigator for the TRC in 1997 that he came across the document in Tsafendas's police file. Kjellberg told the author that the interrogation transcript indicated that although Tsafendas told van den Bergh that he had killed Dr. Verwoerd because he “disagreed with him,” the general was more interested in whether Tsafendas had any accomplices and whether he had discussed the assassination with anyone

²⁹⁰⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁹⁰⁷ In 1976, Vorster revealed that General van den Bergh had questioned Tsafendas for forty-eight hours, adding that “if a man does not break after forty-eight hours of van den Bergh's questioning, then you know that he does not know a thing” (D' Oliveira, 1977: 180).

²⁹⁰⁸ D' Oliveira, 1977: 180.

²⁹⁰⁹ Terry Bell in a personal interview, 10 April 2015; David Beresford in a personal interview, 11 April 2014; Liza Key in a personal interview, 2 April 2015; Jan-Ake Kjellberg in a personal interview, 5 March 2015.

else. Kjellberg also said that there was nothing strange in the statement or anything to suggest that Tsafendas might not be sane.²⁹¹⁰

Around the same time as Kjellberg saw the transcript, it was also accessed by David Beresford and Liza Key. Key, in her 1997 documentary *A Question of Madness*, and Beresford in articles in the *Guardian* in 1997 and 1999, made reference to Tsafendas's statement to General van den Bergh and subsequent statements by Tsafendas while he was in custody. Both emphasised in their works that the police had tried persistently to make Tsafendas say that the tapeworm "ordered him" to kill Dr. Verwoerd, but Tsafendas insisted that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he "disagreed with his policies."²⁹¹¹

In an article in the *Guardian* in 1997, Beresford wrote, "Although there were attempts by police, during interrogation, to suggest to him (Tsafendas) that he believed a tapeworm had 'ordered' him to carry out the killing, he never seems to have made the claim himself."²⁹¹² In the 1999 article in the *Guardian*, Beresford wrote, "Police interrogators, try though they did, never managed to get his admission that the worm talked to him, much less ordered the murder of the prime minister of the Republic of South Africa."²⁹¹³ Key, in her documentary, said exactly the same thing as Beresford, adding that Tsafendas had also said he had killed Dr. Verwoerd because he "disagreed with his policies."²⁹¹⁴ Both Beresford and Key reaffirmed to the author what they had said in their work about Tsafendas. Both also told the author that Tsafendas always maintained to them when they interviewed him over several hours that he had killed Dr. Verwoerd because he "disagreed with his policies," and he never said to them that the tapeworm had anything to do with it.²⁹¹⁵

Terry Bell was given a copy of Tsafendas's interrogation transcript by Kjellberg. Subsequently, in his 2003 book *Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth*, co-authored with advocate Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Bell wrote that Tsafendas, according to the transcript of the interview, gave as his reason for killing Dr. Verwoerd the fact that he "didn't agree with him." Furthermore, still according to Bell and Ntsebeza, the transcript showed that

²⁹¹⁰ Jan-Ake Kjellberg in a personal interview, 5 March 2015.

²⁹¹¹ Beresford (*The Guardian*), 6 November 1997: 6-7, 'Inside Story: The madness that destroyed apartheid.'; Beresford (*The Guardian*), 11 October 1999: 18, 'Demitri Tsafendas: Long-jailed assassin of South African premier.'; Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

²⁹¹² Beresford (*The Guardian*), 11 October 1999: 18, 'Demitri Tsafendas: Long-jailed assassin of South African premier.'

²⁹¹³ Beresford (*The Guardian*), 6 November 1997: 6-7, 'Inside Story: The madness that destroyed apartheid.'

²⁹¹⁴ Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

²⁹¹⁵ David Beresford in a personal interview, 11 April 2014; Liza Key in a personal interview, 2 April 2015.

Tsafendas had mentioned the notorious tapeworm only in passing, when asked about his hospitalizations, and he replied that he had suffered from tapeworm infestation. According to the authors, the transcript indicated that van den Bergh was more interested in whether Tsafendas had any accomplices and whether he had discussed the assassination with anyone else.²⁹¹⁶ In a personal interview with the author, Bell confirmed in detail the contents of Tsafendas's first interrogation as reported in his book and as stated by Beresford and Key in their respective works.²⁹¹⁷

Tsafendas himself insisted to three priests, Fathers Minas Constandinou, Spiros Randos and Ioannis Tsafaridis, who visited him in Pretoria Prison hospital and in Sterkfontein Hospital in the 1990s that he never told the police that the tapeworm had anything to do with the assassination and stressed that he had mentioned it only once, as the reason why he was hospitalised.²⁹¹⁸ That Tsafendas did not give the tapeworm as a reason for the killing is further validated by the contents of two statements he made to the police which were found in the National Archives. As we will soon see in this chapter, there is no mention of the tapeworm or of anything that might suggest he could be "schizophrenic"; what there is, however, is a lucid and logical political explanation as to why he killed Dr. Verwoerd.

If Tsafendas had told van den Bergh about the tapeworm having something to do with the killing, he would almost certainly have repeated it in his subsequent statements. However, what he said was that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he hoped "a change of policy would take place."²⁹¹⁹ Tsafendas said the same thing to the three priests mentioned above. He told them that he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a dictator and a tyrant who was oppressing his people and because he was the "brains behind apartheid," he hoped his assassination would lead sooner or later to the downfall of apartheid.²⁹²⁰ As we will soon see in this chapter, in both discovered statements, Tsafendas told the police much the same as he told the three priests and nothing about the tapeworm.

Further confirmation of the first statement comes from Michalis Michelis, a Greek journalist. In 1988, Michelis published an article about Tsafendas in the Greek political

²⁹¹⁶ Bell and Ntsebeza, 2003: 56-57.

²⁹¹⁷ Terry Bell in a personal interview, 10 April 2015.

²⁹¹⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²⁹¹⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁹²⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

magazine *Sholiastis*, which was subsequently cited by *Eleftherotipia*, the biggest and most reliable newspaper in Greece at the time. The article was titled “I did my duty, what about you?”²⁹²¹ It was based on interviews which Michelis conducted in South Africa and elsewhere with people who knew Tsafendas. Among them were the South African writer, painter and anti-apartheid activist Breyten Breytenbach, who was with Tsafendas in “Beverly Hills,” a section in Pretoria Prison, Dimitris Kalogirou, who gave Tsafendas a reference in Durban in 1965 and who knew him since he was a child, and Dimitris Apostolidis, who knew Tsafendas in Durban. Michelis also interviewed a retired Afrikaner policeman who was present in the police station in Caledon Square when Tsafendas was detained there after the assassination. The policeman told Michelis he saw Tsafendas almost every day and spoke to him on some occasions.²⁹²²

Michelis did not disclose in his article the name of the policeman because the interview was given on condition of anonymity. The policeman told Michelis that he “never heard Tsafendas saying anything about the tapeworm” and that “he seemed to be perfectly sane.” He also added that “none of the policemen thought Tsafendas might be insane.” The policeman said Tsafendas told them that he considered it his “duty” to kill Dr. Verwoerd, hence the title of the article, because he believed him to be a “tyrant and a dictator who was oppressing his people.” Tsafendas would repeat exactly the same statement in the mid-1990s to Fathers Minas Constandinou, Spiros Randos and Ioannis Tsafataridis. He told them the assassination was morally and politically justifiable because Dr. Verwoerd was a dictator and a tyrant. He said that he had the “chance to kill the tyrant who had created apartheid,” that it was his “social responsibility,” indeed a “duty,” and he would have regretted it all his life if he had not acted when he had the chance.²⁹²³ A detailed account of what Tsafendas told the priests is given in the following chapter.

Tsafendas had also characterised a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as “justifiable” on grounds that he was “a dictator and a tyrant,” when he talked to a group of *Eleni* crew members three days before the actual assassination. Tsafendas characterised Dr. Verwoerd as a tyrant and a dictator when he was interrogated by Major Rossouw on September 11, 1966 and though he did not use those exact words that was clearly what he

²⁹²¹ Michelis, 1988: 14-15.

²⁹²² Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 12 December 2015.

²⁹²³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafataridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

meant. He said that in his mind, Dr. Verwoerd was not the real representative of his country. "I wanted to see a government representing all the South African people. I do not think the nationalist Government is representative of the people and I wanted to see a different government."²⁹²⁴

Furthermore, according to Michelis, quoting the South African policeman, Tsafendas had said that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he had created apartheid and he hoped that his death could bring an end to it sooner or later.²⁹²⁵ Tsafendas told Major Rossouw on September 11 that he had killed Dr. Verwoerd because he believed "a change of policy would take place" after his death.²⁹²⁶ Finally, still according to Michelis quoting the South African policeman, Tsafendas said, "I don't care what you will do to me, kill me."²⁹²⁷ Tsafendas would twice repeat an almost similar sentiment while he was interrogated. When he was interrogated by Major Rossouw on September 11, 1966, he said, "I did not care about the consequences for what would happened to me afterwards. I was so disgusted with the racial policy that I went through with my plans to kill the Prime Minister."²⁹²⁸ On September 19, Tsafendas told the Major, "I never thought about hiding if I had to do the job with a knife. I didn't have much of a chance of getting away when using a knife. I didn't care much and didn't give it a second thought that I would be caught."²⁹²⁹ Tsafendas also told other witnesses after the assassination that he "did not care what would happen" to him and that he knew he was going to be executed.²⁹³⁰

The marked similarity between what Michelis wrote in 1988 and what Tsafendas told Major Rossouw on two occasions clearly indicates that Michelis's policeman was present when Tsafendas was in custody in Caledon Square police station. Michelis could not otherwise have known the content of Tsafendas's words, since the interrogation transcripts only became publicly available in the mid-1990s, long after the policeman was interviewed

²⁹²⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁹²⁵ Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 12 December 2015.

²⁹²⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁹²⁷ Michelis, 1988: 15.

²⁹²⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁹²⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

²⁹³⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

by Michelis and had his article published. Only someone who was present at the time could have known what Tsafendas told the police then.

Perhaps the strongest evidence that the policeman was present when Tsafendas was held in custody came from the fact that he told Michelis that Tsafendas was visited in his cell by a Greek-South African policeman. Michelis traced then this policeman, but he declined to talk to him.²⁹³¹ However, Tsafendas later told Fathers Minas Constandinou and Spiros Randos that a Greek-South African policeman had indeed visited him while he was in custody,²⁹³² thus confirming that Michelis's police informant had to be in the police station to witness this. We will talk later in this chapter about the role of the Greek-South African policeman in the case.

Tsafendas's interview with General van den Bergh is not his only missing statement. The two statements Tsafendas gave to the Commission of Enquiry have also disappeared. According to the Commission's report, Tsafendas gave evidence twice; on October 25 and November 11.²⁹³³ Neither of these statements can be traced. Apart from the written statements, the Dictaphone recordings of these two testimonies are also missing. It would be a remarkable coincidence for both copies, one typed and one recorded for each of the testimonies, to disappear, whether by accident or incompetence.

As we will see, Tsafendas's statements are not the only ones to disappear. The report of the Commission of Enquiry stated that "one hundred and five persons, including Tsafendas himself, gave oral evidence before the Commission."²⁹³⁴ However, fewer than half of these witnesses' statements were found in the archives. The surprising thing is that in most cases where a typed statement survived, so did the recording; but where a typed statement went missing, the recording did, too. It is not unusual for documents to go missing from archives for a variety of reasons, but it strains credulity that in every case where a written statement disappeared, so, too, did the accompanying recording. The issue of the missing statements will be discussed in detail later in this chapter and in chapter Six.

²⁹³¹ Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 12 December 2015.

²⁹³² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²⁹³³ Report of the COE. Chapter II D, Paragraphs 18-19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

²⁹³⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter I, Paragraph 4. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

TSAFENDAS'S LEGAL REPRESENTATION

Soon after his arrest, though the author is not in position to know exactly when, Tsafendas formally requested that the well-known anti-apartheid activist and human rights lawyer, Advocate George Bizos, should be appointed to defend him in forthcoming legal proceedings. Tsafendas had not met Advocate Bizos, but was well acquainted with his work as a defence lawyer at political trials and had a very warm relationship with his father, Antonis Bizos. Receiving no response, Tsafendas repeated his request, but the result remained the same.²⁹³⁵ He did not see a lawyer until September 26, when he had been in custody for twenty days, and the lawyer was not Advocate Bizos but a defence team appointed by the State.

According to Advocate George Bizos, he was never contacted by the State or anyone else about representing Tsafendas, although it was a prisoner's legal right to be defended by a lawyer of his choice. Bizos was not surprised since he was himself *persona non grata* with the State. Not long before the assassination, Police Minister John Vorster's personal lawyer, by name of Krueger, had transmitted a warning from Vorster to Bizos that "Bizos's leash is getting shorter."²⁹³⁶

The rejection of Tsafendas's request for the politically active Bizos to be his defence counsel was mirrored years earlier in the case of Nelson Mandela. Prohibitions against lawyers who had defended anti-government leaders meant that many accused persons were robbed of their right to the counsel of their choice. Mandela's defence counsel was threatened with imprisonment unless he left the trial precincts. This prompted Mandela to address the presiding magistrate as follows: "It is my duty to make this point: One of the few rights left to the Black man in this country is the right to choose his own Counsel. I suspect a deliberate decision to deprive me of Counsel of my own choosing. This is not a reflection on the State prosecutor. I think it is a high-level conspiracy to make it difficult for me to prepare for this trial."²⁹³⁷

²⁹³⁵ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²⁹³⁶ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 1 September 2016.

²⁹³⁷ "A Distinguished South African Lawyer," 1965: 8-10.

TSAFENDAS TORTURED WHILE IN DETENTION**BACKGROUND**²⁹³⁸

In 1976, Prime Minister John Vorster revealed that General van den Bergh had questioned Tsafendas for forty-eight hours, adding that “if a man does not break after forty-eight hours of van den Bergh’s questioning, then you know that he does not know a thing.”²⁹³⁹ Van den Bergh himself claimed that “no person in South African history has ever been interrogated as much as Tsafendas.”²⁹⁴⁰ Given that the police of the apartheid era were notorious for their use of torture during questioning, we must assume that some violence was inflicted on Tsafendas. After all, he was interrogated more than any other prisoner during the apartheid years and he had committed the greatest possible crime by killing the architect of apartheid.

It is indisputable and now widely accepted that the South African police tortured, even murdered, detainees during the apartheid era. It is also a fact that detainees were routinely tortured for lesser crimes than those of Tsafendas. According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission “torture was the dominant form of violation by the apartheid police during the 1960s.”²⁹⁴¹ Through the General Law Amendment Act of 1963 (the 90-day detention law), the police were given the power to detain individuals without charge and to use solitary confinement.²⁹⁴² In 1965, the 90 days were doubled and thus became the 180-day law. From June 1963 to September 1966 three detainees under this law, the same law under which Tsafendas was held, “killed themselves” while in police custody.²⁹⁴³ In total, between 1960 and 1969, twenty prisoners died in detention. Of these deaths, eleven were labelled suicides and seven the result of natural causes, of which two were described as “slipping” accidents and one an accidental fall down stairs.²⁹⁴⁴

At that time, the police used torture widely against prisoners accused of crimes far less serious than those laid against Tsafendas. Tsafendas was not the first or last prisoner to be tortured by the apartheid police, nor were the techniques used reserved for him only.²⁹⁴⁵ As we will see, most of what happened to Tsafendas was simply routine and the torture

²⁹³⁸ For a more detailed account of torture during apartheid see Chapter One.

²⁹³⁹ D’ Oliveira, 1977: 180.

²⁹⁴⁰ Pike, 1985: 461; Winter (*The Citizen*), 20 October 1976: 1, ‘Why I killed Verwoerd.’ ???

²⁹⁴¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 3, 1998: 530.

²⁹⁴² Eades, 1999: 16.

²⁹⁴³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 January 1967: 2, ‘Three 180-day detainees have killed themselves’; Sachs, 1970: 26.

²⁹⁴⁴ Fullard, 2004: 362.

²⁹⁴⁵ Since it would take a whole new study to list all the torture cases and torture techniques of the apartheid authorities, for anyone interested in learning more see: the reports of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

techniques used on him, apart from the mock hanging, as far as the author can tell, were employed routinely by the apartheid police, especially the use of electric shocks.²⁹⁴⁶ Minister of Justice and former Nazi collaborator, John Vorster, had essentially legalised torture after the passing of the Sabotage Act of 1962, “It is not a very nice thing to see a human being broken... I have seen it... the men taking these powers must be responsible for them.”²⁹⁴⁷

Since then, torture had become increasingly vicious the widespread use of electric shocks,²⁹⁴⁸ solitary confinement, constant exposure to bright lights, partial suffocation and beatings.²⁹⁴⁹ Several detainees of this period had described a wide range of mistreatments, including being beaten, tortured with cold water, forced into uncomfortable positions, told lies and interrogated for hour after hour, and degrading treatment such as being strip-searched.²⁹⁵⁰ Many victims developed psychiatric problems and had to be transferred to mental hospitals.²⁹⁵¹ By the early 1960s, about sixty four deaths of people being held in detention were reported, and the government did not even bother contesting them.²⁹⁵² Large numbers of prisoners committed suicide rather than submit to yet more torture.²⁹⁵³

Between 1960 and the middle years of the sixties, torture became more refined, moving beyond routine physical assault to techniques designed primarily to extract information. In January 1964, Minister Vorster told Parliament that forty-nine complaints had been received about the ill treatment and torture of prisoners, twenty-eight alleging assault and twenty electric shock. He said thirty-two had been investigated and found to be of no substance. Contemporaneous claims of torture across region, rank and organisation nevertheless bore a remarkable consistency²⁹⁵⁴ and Helen Suzman, speaking in the House of Assembly, urged a review of prison regulations. Vorster refused, claiming that the system was “operating efficiently.”²⁹⁵⁵

²⁹⁴⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 3, 1998: 38.

²⁹⁴⁷ Asmal et al, 1996: 118.

²⁹⁴⁸ Fullard, 2004: 356.

²⁹⁴⁹ Foster, 1987: 5.

²⁹⁵⁰ Foster, 1987: 127: 235.

²⁹⁵¹ Bunting, 1986: 227-233.

²⁹⁵² Foster, 1987: 2.

²⁹⁵³ Fullard, 2004: 357.

²⁹⁵⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 198.

²⁹⁵⁵ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1967: 1

THE TORTURE

On September 26, 1966, twenty days after the assassination, David Bloomberg, one of Tsafendas's lead lawyers, visited him for the first time. He said Tsafendas had "some facial injuries" which Major Cerff, the police officer who accompanied Bloomberg to the cell, claimed had "occurred during the struggle to subdue him in Parliament." Bloomberg "doubted this explanation since three weeks had elapsed since the assassination", but he decided he would "not reveal" his "misgivings" as "the injuries appear to be superficial."²⁹⁵⁶

The assumption is that Bloomberg would have taken action over more serious injuries. However, Bloomberg was not a doctor and not qualified to determine whether or not the injuries were superficial. Further, since Tsafendas was fully dressed, Bloomberg could not know if Tsafendas carried injuries to his body, such as would be caused by beating or electric shocks. The use of violence and electrical shock torture was widespread at the time, as Bloomberg, a lawyer, should have known. Lyttelton Mngqlikana, who was held in Vooruitsig Prison in 1964, stated that the warders were "careful not to hit a prisoner on parts of the body which would show. It was futile to complain about a beating unless a prisoner could show marks."²⁹⁵⁷

During a subsequent visit, Bloomberg again found Tsafendas with "visible injuries."²⁹⁵⁸ He has given two different descriptions of this encounter. According to his 1997 account in Liza Key's documentary *A Question of Madness*, he discovered Tsafendas "huddled in a corner and badly bruised." Bloomberg said Tsafendas told him that a "madman, in his own words, got into his cell during the night and had beaten him up." Then "after further investigation, not only from the police, but around the town," Bloomberg discovered that on the night of the beating, a very famous horse trainer²⁹⁵⁹ had been out drinking with a very senior policeman. At the end of their drinking binge, the men went to the police station where Tsafendas was held and the "horse trainer was allowed into the cell and performed what I,²⁹⁶⁰ what he, probably thought was a very loyal act and beat him up." Bloomberg said the horse trainer had to be restrained from beating Tsafendas even more. In effect, Bloomberg attributed Tsafendas's injuries to an unnamed individual who had somehow gained access to

²⁹⁵⁶ Bloomberg, 2007: 74-75.

²⁹⁵⁷ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1967: 43.

²⁹⁵⁸ David Bloomberg in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. The part is available in the rushes.

²⁹⁵⁹ By coincidence, Abe Bloomberg, David Bloomberg's father, was president of a racecourse club in Cape Town. Judge Beyers was a board member of this club and a friend of Abe Bloomberg.

²⁹⁶⁰ This is exactly what David Bloomberg said. The 'I' must have been a slip of his tongue.

the cell. Not only did he absolve the police of any blame, he credited them with preventing Tsafendas from being more severely beaten.²⁹⁶¹

In his 2007 memoir *My Times*, Bloomberg downplayed the incident. In this version, Tsafendas is not “badly bruised,” but only had “some scratches and minor bruising on his face.” Bloomberg claimed that Tsafendas told him he was woken in the middle of the night by a police officer and a man in civilian clothes. The man in civilian clothes “suddenly rushed at him and started punching him and the officer intervened to restrain him and the two then left.” According to Bloomberg, the duty officer “denied that any unauthorised person could possibly have been allowed into this high security part of the police station and said that Tsafendas must have had a dream.” Bloomberg did not enquire how it was possible to acquire facial injuries by dreaming.²⁹⁶²

This was the second time Bloomberg had found Tsafendas with facial injuries and again he did nothing. Instead of asking for a doctor to examine Tsafendas’s face and body, he ignored the matter. Judges Gerald Friedman and Robin Marais, both of whom were practising counsel then and had no connection with the case, thought that it would ordinarily be the duty of a lawyer to whom a client complained of having been assaulted while in continuing police custody to take the matter up with higher authority and, if material physical evidence of assault was still detectable, to require a medical examination to take place.²⁹⁶³

According to Advocate George Bizos and Professor John Dugard given the seriousness of Tsafendas’s offence, and because of the police’s reputation for torture and brutality, Bloomberg should have asked that Tsafendas be examined by a doctor to determine if there were other injuries and if the facial injuries were indeed only superficial.²⁹⁶⁴ Professor John Dugard told the author:

“You must remember the environment of the time in South Africa. The mid-sixties were undoubtedly the worst period in South Africa for that kind of treatment. And so I think that lawyers... I don’t know Bloomberg at all, but I know that lawyers were afraid to raise complaints of this kind. In my book on it, I mentioned the handful of lawyers who I thought

²⁹⁶¹ Bloomberg, 2007: 82.

²⁹⁶² Bloomberg, 2007: 82.

²⁹⁶³ Judge Gerald Friedman in a personal interview, 18 August 2016; Judge Robin Marais in a personal interview, 3 June 2016.

²⁹⁶⁴ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

were good, brave lawyers, and Wilfrid Cooper was one. So I would have expected him to raise it. He certainly would have. But other lawyers, advocates and attorneys were terrified.”²⁹⁶⁵

Judge Robin Marais seriously doubts whether a civilian could have walked through many locked doors and beaten up Tsafendas.²⁹⁶⁶ Professor Dugard described Bloomberg’s claim as “absolute nonsense,”²⁹⁶⁷ Judge Gerald Friedman founds the story “unbelievable”²⁹⁶⁸ and Advocate George Bizos believes it to be a “lie.”²⁹⁶⁹

Tsafendas later told several people that he was tortured severely by the police while in custody, both mentally and physically, and he described the torture in detail. Those he talked to include the cinematographer Liza Key, journalist David Beresford, Alexander Moumbaris,²⁹⁷⁰ an Umkhonto We Sizwe freedom fighter and fellow prisoner in Pretoria Maximum Security Prison, and three priests²⁹⁷¹ who visited him in prison and later in the two hospitals (Pretoria prison hospital and Sterkfontein), namely, Fathers Minas Constandinou and Spiros Randos and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis.²⁹⁷² The South African policeman who was present while Tsafendas was held in Caledon Square Police Station told Michalis Michelis that Tsafendas was “badly tortured” while in custody, but he only mentioned severe beatings.²⁹⁷³

²⁹⁶⁵ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

²⁹⁶⁶ Judge Robin Marais in a personal interview, 3 June 2016.

²⁹⁶⁷ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

²⁹⁶⁸ Judge Gerald Friedman in a personal interview, 18 August 2016.

²⁹⁶⁹ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

²⁹⁷⁰ Alexander Moumbaris, born in Egypt to Greek parents in 1938, was arrested in 1972 on the Botswanan border, along with his two-to-three months’ pregnant French wife Marie-Jose, while he was attempting to smuggle MK fighters into South Africa. He was charged under the Terrorism Act, and was found guilty of conspiring with the ANC to instigate violent revolution in South Africa, of aiding “terrorists,” of distributing ANC pamphlets in Durban in 1968 and of reconnoitring the Transkei to find places for seaborne landings. He was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. He was sent to Pretoria Central Prison, from where he escaped in December 1979, along with fellow political prisoners and anti-apartheid activists Stephen Lee and Tim Jenkins. During the 1980s, he ran the ANC office in Paris. For his efforts in the anti-apartheid struggle he was later awarded the national order of Grand Companion of O.R. Tambo Medal and the Sabotage Campaign Medal (Keable, 2012: 122-131; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 19 July 2014; Pike, 1985: 474-478). For Moumbaris’s activities in South Africa see Keable, K. (ed.) (2012) *London Recruits: The Secret War against Apartheid*. For the amazing story of Moumbaris’s escape see Jenkin, T. (2003) *Inside Out: Escape from Pretoria Prison*.

²⁹⁷¹ Tsafendas was also visited during the late 1980s and early 1990s by a fourth priest, Father Michalis Visvinis. Father Michalis was extensively interviewed several times by the author on the condition that what he said would not be published. He agreed to talk in order to “point the author to the right direction.” Everything he said is completely compatible with what Tsafendas told his three fellow priests and several other witnesses.

²⁹⁷² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²⁹⁷³ Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 12 December 2015.

Tsafendas said he was never tortured while “the General” was present. The “only thing” that van den Bergh insisted upon was that Tsafendas should not be allowed to sleep until the interrogation was finished.²⁹⁷⁴ The no-sleep tactic was not a first. Bram Fischer, who defended Nelson Mandela at the 1963-64 Rivonia trial, was captured after a woman he knew was interrogated and threatened for seventy hours non-stop.²⁹⁷⁵ Tsafendas said that at first his torture was designed to find out more about him and whether he had any accomplices, but later it simply became revenge for his killing of Dr. Verwoerd.²⁹⁷⁶

Tsafendas claimed that while in custody in Caledon Square Police Station, policemen would enter his cell several times a day and kick him and beat him with their fists. There was no bed and he was forced to lie, often naked, and handcuffed, on the concrete floor. Sometimes, he would be put in a straitjacket and beaten, and this continued after he was transferred to prison. Tsafendas also said that he was given electric shocks. He described a small wooden box with wires, which he said the police used to electrocute him after they had removed some of his clothes. At the same time, they poured water over him to heighten the shock while tightening a burlap sack or a plastic bag around his head, causing a suffocating effect. He often lost consciousness and when he came to found himself half-naked on the floor. Tsafendas admitted, crying, that a few times he realised he had urinated on himself. He wore the same soiled clothes day after day and was only given clean clothes and allowed to have a bath when he was seen by his defence team or was examined by doctors.²⁹⁷⁷

In addition to purely physical violence, Tsafendas was subjected to a series of mock hangings, which combined bodily and psychological torture. Almost every day, starting shortly after his arrest, Tsafendas would be taken blindfolded and with his hands tied, to another room. On the way there, the policemen shouted, “Now, you bastard, now your time has come.” Inside the room, they placed him on a chair with a rope around his neck. They then asked him if he had a last wish. A few seconds later they pulled the chair from under him, leaving him hanging from the rope. Tsafendas dangled for a few seconds in mid-air while the policemen shouted and laughed, before they loosed the rope and let him fall. Once

²⁹⁷⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁹⁷⁵ Peires, 2004: 107.

²⁹⁷⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

²⁹⁷⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

on the floor he was kicked and beaten again. After a few days of this, Tsafendas did not have the strength to stand and the police had to carry him into the “hanging” room.²⁹⁷⁸

In another form of psychological torture, Tsafendas was taken to the window in a different room where the police threatened to throw him out, saying they would claim he had tried to escape.²⁹⁷⁹ Abdullay Jassat, an anti-apartheid activist arrested in 1963, described a similar torture: “they then pushed me into a louvre-fitting window and [I was] made to lie on it. I was held by both my feet by the police whilst they were simulating me trying to commit suicide. This was a known method of killing people in detention and they were well co-ordinated in their actions whilst the one was holding my foot and the other making as if to let me fall down from the window. I was then fearing that I was going to die.” Jassat was also given electric shocks and was severely beaten.²⁹⁸⁰

Tseliso Phofu, an anti-apartheid activist and one of the student leaders during the Soweto uprising, also experienced the “window treatment.” He said, “During the night, they’d open a window and hold you by your legs, lying looking downwards, and they’d tell you that if you don’t tell the truth ‘we can leave you here and you’ll drop down. And when you are dead, we will just tell the people whom you are leading that you tried to commit suicide, you tried to run away.’”²⁹⁸¹ Interestingly, in 1971, Ahmed Timol²⁹⁸² died while in detention. The police claimed that he had opened a window and jumped from a 10th floor office of the John Vorster Square police station, where he had been detained, brutalised and interrogated.²⁹⁸³

All the torture techniques used on Tsafendas, apart from the mock hanging as far as the author can establish, were widely used by the enforcers of apartheid. For example, in 1963, Isaac Tiale was given electric shocks and was tied into a straightjacket. He described how he was handcuffed and subjected to electric shocks with a bag tied over his head until he lost consciousness twice.²⁹⁸⁴ Around the same time, Ndovela Nxasana almost lost his hearing from electric shocks and had the bones of his joints broken from beatings.²⁹⁸⁵

²⁹⁷⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁹⁷⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

²⁹⁸⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 539.

²⁹⁸¹ Tseliso Phofu in Discovery Channel’s *Apartheid’s Last Stand*, 1998.

²⁹⁸² For Timol’s biography see Cajee, I. (2005) *Timol – Quest for Justice*.

²⁹⁸³ Houston and Magubane, 2007: 440-441; Magubane, 2007: 5; SAHO, n.d., Ahmed Timol; World Peace Council, 1972: 4-8.

²⁹⁸⁴ Transition, 1976: 53.

²⁹⁸⁵ Fullard, 2004: 357.

Looksmart Ngudle, a member of the ANC and the Communist Party, and leader of the MK in the Western Cape, is generally considered to be the first person to die in detention.²⁹⁸⁶ He was found hanged in his cell on September 5, 1963.²⁹⁸⁷ In November 1963, counsel for his family, Vernon Berrange, stated that twenty witnesses told him they were subjected to “gross brutalities” to make them talk. They were told to undress, made to jump up and down continuously and, when exhausted, they were blindfolded and handcuffed in a squatting position with a stick under their knees. They were then given electric shocks until, in some cases, they lost consciousness.²⁹⁸⁸

On January 24, 1964, James Tyitya became the first political detainee to die in police custody in Port Elizabeth. The cause of death was given as “suicide by hanging.”²⁹⁸⁹ Four years later, the police claimed that James Thabiso Lenkoe, who was held in police custody under the 180-day detention law, “committed suicide” by hanging himself with his own belt. There was clear evidence from autopsy results that electrical torture had been used during his detention.²⁹⁹⁰

Laloo Chiba, an MK fighter, was also given electric shocks and was severely beaten. Chiba stated that the police officers poured water during the electrocution process and Jassat said he was taken to a three-storey window and ordered to jump. When he refused, police thrust him through the window, holding him upside down by his ankles. Periodically, they would let go of alternate ankles, so at times he was hanging by one limb held by a single policeman. Mountain Qumbela was beaten, given electric shocks and forced to hold physical positions for long periods. Zollie Malindi was given the helicopter treatment, suffocated with a plastic bag and given electric shocks.²⁹⁹¹ Since all of the aforementioned prisoners were given electric shock torture, it is clear this was routine and it can be no surprise that it was applied to Tsafendas too.

Other forms of torture were used widely, though not on Tsafendas. In 1966, some thirty-seven SWAPO members were hung from pipes by their handcuffed wrists with their toes barely touching the ground for days at a time.²⁹⁹² On April 6, 1965, Thami Mhlambiso

²⁹⁸⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 532.

²⁹⁸⁷ Fullard, 2004: 363.

²⁹⁸⁸ Transition, 1976: 53.

²⁹⁸⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 3, 1998: 41.

²⁹⁹⁰ Bernstein, 1972: 30-31; Madida, 2016: 15

²⁹⁹¹ Fullard, 2004: 358-363.

²⁹⁹² Fullard, 2004: 362.

was forced to walk barefoot across rough ground littered with broken glass.²⁹⁹³ Women were not immune from torture. Eleanor Kasrils was beaten, spat in the face and had her head banged on a table by Lieutenant Grobler as he shouted, “You bitch! I’ll break you or hang you!”²⁹⁹⁴ Violet Weinberg, Bram Fischer’s friend, was interrogated continuously for almost three days and nights, at times by three officers at once; she was threatened with committal to a mental and forced to listen to threats against her children, one of whom was disabled.²⁹⁹⁵ Stephanie Kemp of the African Resistance Movement was punched in the face and her head was slammed repeatedly against the floor.²⁹⁹⁶ On her release, she was ordered to report to the then Brigadier van den Bergh. She refused, but after receiving a telegram from van den Bergh himself, she agreed. Under interrogation by him, she broke down and made several revelations about the ARM.²⁹⁹⁷

Even children were tortured. A 1986 study by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reported that children under eighteen who were arrested by the security forces were “routinely assaulted with fists, rifle butts and sjamboks (whips.)” During five days in detention, a boy aged sixteen was repeatedly beaten and given electric shocks and had to undergo surgery afterwards. At least three children, including a three-year-old, died in detention during 1985 as a result of police abuse.²⁹⁹⁸ In 1987, a sixteen-year-old Soweto boy was dragged into a mini-bus by members of a “mobile torture squad” that was active at the time. He was kicked and punched and wired up to a hand-cranked electric generator. After his release, a pathologist found burn marks on his skin consistent with electric shocks.²⁹⁹⁹ Archbishop Desmond Tutu reported that Johnny Mashiane, aged fifteen, was detained in a psychiatric hospital for a month. He was a normal child before his arrest; after it, he was barely able to speak.³⁰⁰⁰

In 1967, the Terrorism Act was introduced, providing for indefinite detention without trial. Soon after this, there was a spate of deaths in detention. Renowned anti-apartheid activist, Law Professor Barend van Niekerk, was indicted for contempt of court because he urged the judiciary to reject evidence secured under pre-trial conditions. Professor Niekerk had already

²⁹⁹³ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1967: 42.

²⁹⁹⁴ Kasrils, 2012: 6.

²⁹⁹⁵ Peires, 2004: 107.

²⁹⁹⁶ Fullard, 2004: 362

²⁹⁹⁷ Pike, 1985: 415.

²⁹⁹⁸ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986: 4-7.

²⁹⁹⁹ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1988: 21.

³⁰⁰⁰ Tutu, 1987: i.

stated that “the very purpose of the detention clause of the Terrorism Act is to procure evidence by way of torture.”³⁰⁰¹ He argued that the reluctance of the courts to rule out confessions taken from detainees increased the likelihood of prisoners being abused.³⁰⁰²

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission received statements from the families of three of the people who died while being held under this legislation. Official explanations for the deaths included suicide by hanging, “slipped on a bar of soap,” and “jumped from the tenth floor of John Vorster Square.” Forensic evidence indicated torture and assault in these cases, but inquests found no-one responsible for the deaths.³⁰⁰³

More than a decade later, General van den Bergh appeared before the Erasmus Commission of Inquiry into the so-called “Infogate” scandal. He declared: “I can today tell you here, not for your records, but I can tell you, this is not bragging, I have good men, Afrikaners, I don’t have weak men... I have enough men to commit murder if I tell them, ‘Kill’... I don’t care who the prey is. These are the types of men I have...”³⁰⁰⁴ If van den Bergh’s men were willing to kill, then clearly they would have no qualms about torture. The Minister of Police, Jimmy Kruger, also defended his force against accusations of violence. In an interview with the *New York Times* on October 22, 1977 regarding the death of Steve Biko, he said, “I don’t believe that my police have done anything wrong ... if there is anything wrong in the Biko case, I will be surprised ...”³⁰⁰⁵

TSAFENDAS TORTURED IN PRISON

The torture of Tsafendas did not stop after he left Caledon Square. He was physically and systematically abused in prison for many years after the assassination. Tsafendas himself has described how he was beaten, brutalised, tortured and his food contaminated by the warders’ urine.³⁰⁰⁶ He told Liza Key and David Beresford:

“It was very bad in prison. They used to hang people there next to my cell, half a dozen at a time ... six a week, mostly Coloureds from the Cape ... The warders ... they used to

³⁰⁰¹ Dugard, 1978: 294-302.

³⁰⁰² Rayner, 1990: 173.

³⁰⁰³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 532.

³⁰⁰⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 18; Burns (*The New York Times*), 18 May 1980: 3, ‘Pretoria scandal testimony reveals talk of murder’; Leonard, 1983: 124; *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 June 1979.

³⁰⁰⁵ Malan, 1997: 68.

³⁰⁰⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

take me into a disguised locker of clothes ... and they used to put a straight-jacket on me and then they used to punch me until I fell unconscious to the floor. Every morning the two officers used to come out in my dormitory, my room. I had to follow them. They took me out into the place and I had to walk. They wanted me to walk for exercise. Back. Long like this. And Potgieter followed me with a baton behind. He was a rugby player and used to beat me with club on the head. Mostly behind the head here. Blood used to come out. One men there stood up for me. He says, ‘that’s enough! That’s too much.’ One officer. I still remember him... they used to take me into the laundry room where they kept their clean clothes and they used to beat me. Scale, see my weight and then I’d jumped down and they’d start punching, all around the room. I couldn’t get away. Small laundry room... then when I came out of the laundry room, I couldn’t stand up straight. I couldn’t walk straight. I had to bend from the waist-line down ... They used to take me into a locker of clothes and put a straight-jacket on me and then they punched me until I fell unconscious.”³⁰⁰⁷

In December 1968, Bernard Mitchell, a former inmate in Pretoria Central was interviewed about his time in prison. He briefly mentioned Tsafendas, saying:

“They built a special cell – a flat they called it – for him [Tsafendas] in the death block in Pretoria Central Prison, where I was at the time. This mate of mine in the death wing told me they put a screen around the landing in front of the cell and ‘exercised’ Tsafendas there. A screw would stand in each corner and Tsafendas’s exercise would consist of dodging their truncheons as they threw him from one side to the other. We used to exercise in the yard below his cell and you could hear him screaming.”³⁰⁰⁸

Apart from the physical abuse, Tsafendas underwent the psychological torture of spending twenty-three years in a cell right next to the death chamber where the hangings took place. The apartheid authorities were at that time the world’s “busiest hangman,” executing about one hundred people per year. In order to cope with the “workload” and make the executioners’ work easier, the authorities had erected a special gallows at Pretoria Central Prison which could hold a number of nooses, for occasions involving multiple hangings.³⁰⁰⁹ Tsafendas’s cell was right next to this gallows.

Each execution, and they were frequent (on average two persons per week), involved

³⁰⁰⁷ Dimitris Tsafendas in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

³⁰⁰⁸ de St Jorre (*The Observer*), 1 December 1968: 7, ‘I was glad that cancer got me out of Vorster’s jail.’

³⁰⁰⁹ Sachs, 1970: 1.

at least a week of mental agony for Tsafendas because the condemned man was moved into the cell next door seven days before his due date. There then began physical preparations for the hanging, including testing of the mechanism which operated the trapdoors, a procedure which caused a loud creaking noise. The day before the execution, political prisoners and other condemned men on Death Row would begin to sing.³⁰¹⁰ Tsafendas himself would weep and wail when the hanging took place, always at dawn. He later said he saw the ritual as a reminder of what to expect if he ever became sane.³⁰¹¹

A vivid picture of how it must have been for Tsafendas spending years within earshot of men being hanged was offered by a fellow prisoner and anti-apartheid activist, Professor Renfrew Christie. He recalled that “we were also put as close to the gallows as possible... we listened to about three hundred hangings ... you would hear the sound of the trapdoors opening and half an hour later you would hear the sound of nails being driven with a hammer, which meant the people were dead and were being placed into coffins.”³⁰¹²

During most of his twenty-three years next to the death chamber, Tsafendas was kept in solitary confinement for twenty-three hours a day, sometimes not allowed out of his cell even for the permitted sixty minutes, often left there for days without explanation; he was not in contact with any fellow prisoner and was not allowed access to newspapers, magazines or books, apart from the Bible; his guards urinated in his food and beat him daily, sometimes several times a day, and sometimes after putting him in a straightjacket so he was unable to protect himself.³⁰¹³

In 1971, the issue of Tsafendas’s treatment was raised by Professor Barend van Niekerk.³⁰¹⁴ The Professor informed Progressive Party MP Helen Suzman and Justice Ludorf,³⁰¹⁵ that “Tsafendas is being subjected to the cruellest possible treatment. Perhaps you

³⁰¹⁰ Beresford (*The Guardian*), 9 June 1989: 12, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s insane killer being brutalised on SA Death Row: Cell next to gallows for 71- year old prisoner’; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Ledwaba (*News 24*), 7 January 2012, ‘My ANC: ‘We were put close to the gallows’; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Thornycroft and Lee (*Sunday Tribune*), 15 May 1994, ‘Amnesty for Tsafendas?’

³⁰¹¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

³⁰¹² Ledwaba (*News 24*), 7 January 2012, ‘My ANC: ‘We were put close to the gallows.’

³⁰¹³ Breyten Breytenbach in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Mather (*The Observer*), 1 August 1976: 17, ‘Horror in black and white.’

³⁰¹⁴ (1939-1981) Prominent South African Law Professor. Passionate human rights activist and outspoken critic of apartheid.

³⁰¹⁵ (1913-1982) Joseph Francis Ludorf. Member and strong supporter of the National Party. He had admitted being an officer of the pro-Nazi Ossewabrandwag during the Second World War (International Defence and Aid Fund, 1969: 4). He was one of the judges in the Treason Trial but had to withdraw when the defence argued there was a conflict of interest and he could be prejudiced because he had represented the Government in 1954.

may raise the question of his treatment in the Justice vote. I think it is shocking that he should at all be detained in gaol, where he probably does not get the psychiatric treatment he needs.”³⁰¹⁶ The same year, A.M. Towert, a civil servant, informed Suzman that Tsafendas was kept in the “execution block at Central Gaol, Pretoria.”³⁰¹⁷ Suzman responded that it would be best if she raised the matter privately with the Minister of Justice and the Commissioner of Prisons, knowing that if she raised it in public, she “will simply get a flat denial.” She felt that by doing it privately, there was a “chance that something might be done.”³⁰¹⁸

However, despite Suzman’s efforts, the torture did not stop, with claims of brutality as much ten years after the assassination. Tsafendas’s torture was also the subject of an article in the British Sunday newspaper, *The Observer*, on 1 August 1976. A former prisoner, Brian Price, claimed that Tsafendas “was treated with gross inhumanity and was a broken man.” He said that the guards urinated in Tsafendas’s food then forced him to eat it and he was routinely beaten and kicked. “For the first five years or so, the warders used to lay into Tsafendas. He was a plaything for sadists.”³⁰¹⁹ The fact that Tsafendas was still being systematically tortured was confirmed by another two prisoners, anti-apartheid activists Alexander Moumbaris and Breyten Breytenbach, by two other unnamed prisoners and later by Tsafendas himself.³⁰²⁰

Breyten Breytenbach, convicted of sabotage and jailed for nine years,³⁰²¹ who was with Tsafendas in Pretoria Maximum Security Prison in the mid-1970s, told Liza Key:

He was a lawyer for the police when Harold Wolpe sought a court interdict to eject the police from a meeting of the Congress of the People (Mandela, 2013: 29-30). He was the judge in John Harris’s trial. He found Harris guilty and he was hanged (Beresford, 2010: 326-341). Nevertheless, in the late 1960s, he protested against the BOSS’s methods and increasing power (International Defence and Aid Fund, 1969a: 4).

³⁰¹⁶ Letter to Helen Suzman from Professor Barend D. van Niekerk of Wits referring to the “cruellest” treatment being meted out to Dimtri Tsafendas in jail, 9 April 1971. Helen Suzman Papers 1944-2009. Mb2.10.1.5. University of the Witwatersrand.

³⁰¹⁷ Letter to Helen Suzman from A.M. Towert informing her that Tsafendas is held in the “execution block” at Central Gaol, Pretoria, 16 May 1971. Helen Suzman Papers 1944-2009. Mb2.10.1.5. University of the Witwatersrand.

³⁰¹⁸ Letter from Helen Suzman to Prof. B.D. van Niekerk (Wits) who’d written to her saying that “Tsafendas is being subjected to the cruellest possible treatment.” 5 May 1971. Helen Suzman Papers 1944-2009. Mb2.10.1.6. University of the Witwatersrand.

³⁰¹⁹ Mather (*The Observer*), 1 August 1976: 17, ‘Horror in black and white.’

³⁰²⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Thornycroft and Lee (*Sunday Tribune*), 15 May 1994, ‘Amnesty for Tsafendas?’, Tsafendas and Breyten Breytenbach in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁰²¹ Abel, 1995: 16.

“[The warders] were martyring the man. There was no doubt about that ... throw out his food, throw it on the floor, walk in it, have him clean it up, throw a bucket of water on his floor and get him to dry it... this seems to be a continuing and ongoing sport amongst the warders They felt personally responsible of called upon to punish him for what he had done. He was never going to be tried and he was never going to be executed ... were really egging one another on to see who could be the most awful. Some of them felt that they personally had to take it out on him for having killed Dr. Verwoerd. He had to be punished day after day ... ‘you killed our leader’ kind of thing... although they themselves had never known Dr. Verwoerd, they were too much too young to be concerned with that... but there was this kind of revenge ... generally using him as a punching bag.” Breytenbach also confirmed that he had seen Tsafendas in a straight-jacket, but the warders told him that they put it on to him because he was “out of control.”³⁰²²

Breytenbach also told Key:

“Under those circumstances ... one-is extremely sensitive to the slightest change in regime ... when you get your food late, when you get your food cold ... when they come to tip over your bed and you have to do it all over again ... And they used to do things like that all the time to him, throw out his food, throw it on the floor, walk in it, have him clean it up ... throw a bucket of water on the floor ... get him to dry it ... pour water on his bed ... And this seems to be a continuing and ongoing sport among the warders ... they were really egging one another on to see who could be the most awful. Some of them felt that they personally had to take it out on him for having killed Dr. Verwoerd. He had to be punished day after day... ‘You killed our leader’ kind of thing ... although they themselves had never known Dr. Verwoerd, they were too much too young to be concerned with that... but there was this kind of revenge ... generally using him as a punching bag.”³⁰²³

Alexander Moumbaris said about Tsafendas in 1980, “He was being buried alive. The warders beat him several times a day. Although he is not a sane man, the treatment he is getting for his illness is non-existent. He told me and this was corroborated that he was often put into a straight-jacket and his testicles twisted by warders.”³⁰²⁴ In a personal interview with the author, Moumbaris clarified his reference in the *Guardian* to Tsafendas as “not a

³⁰²² Breyten Breytenbach in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁰²³ Breyten Breytenbach in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁰²⁴ Omond (*The Guardian*), 22 January 1980: 7, ‘South Africans demand POW status.’

sane man.” He said, “I couldn’t tell otherwise. This is what they thought. If they knew he was sane, they would have killed him.”³⁰²⁵

Two unnamed former inmates of Tsafendas told the *Sunday Tribune* that Tsafendas was “beaten and brutalised time and time again for his assassination of Dr. Verwoerd.”³⁰²⁶ Advocate George Bizos told the author, “The information I got from Alex Moumbaris and others [fellow prisoners] regarding Tsafendas’s treatment in prison was enough to make one throw up.”³⁰²⁷ Professor Renfrew Christie, an anti-apartheid activist who was sentenced for passing to the ANC important secret information on the apartheid government, including its nuclear development plans, was also an inmate at Pretoria Central Prison. He met Tsafendas briefly in the early 1980s. He told the author:

“I was left alone with Tsafendas for a very short time. He was shocked and his face, his hair, were bleached grey/white and he was clearly a man who had been through immense stress and he was, and the best word to use is, a ghost. Neither of us was expecting this meeting; I think one of the warders must have said, ‘This is Tsafendas.’ But I don’t know if I was identified although I think he understood that I was there for my opposition to apartheid and we had three sentences together, no more, as a greeting. He was a man sleep-walking and in great, great shock; distinctly distressed.

My sense is that these particular warders wanted to do him a favour and let him see some other person but I cannot say what their motive was... I believe that the warders who arranged this accident were trying to do him a favour, to let him see some other person, and they picked me. Maybe they thought I was friendly, I don’t know, but we said little more than, ‘Hello. How are you?’ Polite conversation and, of course, the warders were present and we could not say anything serious... I cannot say that the person I met was insane in any way, I can say he was deeply, deeply stressed and he looked like a ghost but that doesn’t make him insane, that makes him someone who’s been in solitary for fifteen or eighteen years or whatever the number is.”³⁰²⁸

In 1989, Tsafendas was seventy-one, but still on Death Row and still being tortured, according to the British *Guardian*. The newspaper made a widely noted point that instead of

³⁰²⁵ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 28 August 2013.

³⁰²⁶ Thornycroft and Lee (*Sunday Tribune*), 15 May 1994, ‘Amnesty for Tsafendas?’

³⁰²⁷ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 6 April 2016.

³⁰²⁸ Professor Renfrew Christie in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

being detained in a psychiatric hospital, as the law required for the mentally ill, he had been kept not only in a maximum security prison, but on Death Row.³⁰²⁹

³⁰²⁹ Beresford (*The Guardian*), 9 June 1989: 12, 'Dr. Verwoerd's insane killer being brutalised on SA Death Row: Cell next to gallows for 71-year old prisoner.'

THE POLICE INVESTIGATION

What follows is a detailed diary of the police investigation that followed the assassination. It contains all the statements made by persons interrogated about Tsafendas, correspondence of the police and the government with various agencies and foreign governments, embassies' reports, police reports, an account of the PIDE's role and many of the press reports for each day.

WEDNESDAY, 7 SEPTEMBER 1966

STATEMENTS

The morning after the assassination, September 7, 1966, van den Bergh continued his interrogation of Tsafendas while his men began interviewing people who knew the accused. At the same time, the police contacted the PIDE in Mozambique for information about Tsafendas.³⁰³⁰ That day, the first full day of the investigation, at least eleven people³⁰³¹ were questioned and they are the following:

MARIKA MICHAEL TSAFANTAKIS³⁰³²

I am the widow of the late Michael Tsafandakis who died at Pretoria on 14.2.62, and lives at No. 1 in Fatti's Building, in Paul Cruger Street, Pretoria. I married Michael Tsafandakis in 1920 in Port Said, Egypt and we moved to Lourenço Marques during 1921. At the time of our marriage I heard that Michael had a child with another woman, Amelia William. The child was then living with Michael's mother in Alexandria, Egypt. This child was named Demitrio Tsafendas. According to a birth certificate which I now produce, he was born at Lourenço Marques during July 1918. In 1924 the grandmother wrote to Michael stating that she was ill and unable to care for the child. The child was then brought to Lourenço Marques, where he lived with us and went to school in Lourenço Marques. When the child was approximately ten years old, we sent him to school in Middelburg, Transvaal. As far as I can remember, he attended school at Middelburg between three and five years. I cannot remember the name of the school, but as far as I know it was a government school. Eventually he was brought back to Lourenço Marques and he then attended a Portuguese school.

At the age of fifteen and even before, he was difficult to control and his father often had to punish him in order to get him disciplined. His association with other children at this stage, however, was good. He showed a particular interest in the use of gunpowder and explosives at this stage and at one time nearly blew up our house. Also at this stage I often

³⁰³⁰ *Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 1; '180-day prison for Tsafendas.'

³⁰³¹ "At least" as some statements have disappeared from the archives and we cannot say for sure how many people were questioned.

³⁰³² Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

found him gazing in space and when I asked him what he was doing, his reply was that he was thinking.

He left school at the age of about sixteen and refused to attend further school. He then started work as a shop assistant and in his spare time took up boxing. He became a particularly good boxer and took part in many tournaments. I do not know him ever to have been injured in boxing. I remember that he was suffering from malaria over a period of years. He however never had blackwater fever. I also remember having taken him to a doctor at the age of about seven-eight years old as one of his teeth took too long to come out. The doctor then told me that this child was showing tendencies of idiocy.

During 1936 he was offered employment by a British firm, apparently building a base or an aerodrome in Mozambique, on account of him being able to speak English and Portuguese. I then lost trace of the accused and my husband and I moved to Johannesburg during 1937. During 1939 he however turned up at my home in Johannesburg and stayed with us until 1940. He at that time tried to get permanent residence in South Africa. Before this was finalised, he left for Durban and took up employment on a ship. I saw him for the first time in 1963 when he came to Lourenço Marques. During this period I received letters from him from all over the world and he was always asking for money.

When he returned during 1963 he told me that he wanted to settle down and he wanted me to help him. I then caused him to come to South Africa and he subsequently got permanent residence in the Republic. In Pretoria he took up employment with Poole's engineering as a welder and general maintenance. He did not live with us while working in Pretoria. Within a year he disappeared again and I never saw him again. The Greek legation in Lisbon at one time wrote to me that the accused was imprisoned in Lisbon but I do not know what for. I also heard from friends that he was at one stage in prison in Lourenço Marques. I also believe that he was in prison in Beira about two years ago.

I do not know to which religion the accused belongs. He however often mentioned that he is a Christian. As far as I know, the accused never showed any tendencies towards violence or criminality. The accused also told me that the ship he was working on during the war was torpedoed. As far as I know the accused was in America, Portugal, Egypt, Germany, Palestine, South Arabia at one or other stages of his life. I do not know the accused to be in any way politically inclined. He has never discussed politics with me. As far as politics is concerned, the Portuguese Government would be in position to furnish more definite

information.

Pretoria 7.9.66. (SGD) J.W. Strumpher. Justice of the Peace.

COMMENTS ON MARIKA TSAFANTAKIS'S STATEMENT

Marika naturally revealed that she was aware that he was imprisoned in Beira, as she could not have done otherwise with such a well-known incident. She also volunteered that her stepson had had an interest in explosives as a teenager, and “nearly blew up” their house, as this too was such a well-known event among the Greek community in Lourenço Marques that the police would almost certainly have heard about it. However, she stated that Tsafendas “never discussed politics” with her and that he was not “in any way politically inclined.” As we have already seen, Marika Tsafantakis had often disagreed with her stepson’s political ideas and these ideas and his outspokenness were among the main reasons that he was left behind in Lourenço Marques in 1937 when the family immigrated to South Africa.

According to Katerina Pnefma, Marika’s daughter and Tsafendas’s half-sister, who was in Rhodesia at the time and was questioned there twice after the assassination by the police, her mother deliberately did not mention to the police Dimitri being a Communist nor did she refer to his anti-apartheid ideology. Pnefma told the author that this was something every member of the family did. She said:

“What could she have told them [about Tsafendas’s political ideas]? It was natural for my mother to say that she did not know anything about his political ideas. We all said the same thing: he never discussed politics with us ... how could she and us have told them that he was a Communist? That he was anti-apartheid? That he was anti-colonialist? That he called Dr. Verwoerd ‘bastard,’ ‘Hitler’s student’ and ‘dictator?’ That he has been getting us into trouble because of politics since he was child? They [the police] would have said ‘Why did you bring him here then [to South Africa]? Why didn’t you report him to the police?’ They might have even thought that we had the same ideas as him. Remember these were very difficult times for anyone who was even suspected of being a Communist and anti-apartheid. The Communist Party was illegal at the time in South Africa ... my mother had not only known that he was a political animal, but she had helped him to come to South Africa. Can you imagine what would have happened to her and to us if they knew that we knew that he

was Communist and anti-apartheid and we helped him to come to South Africa?

My poor mother was so terrified that they might find out they had bribed this guy in the Embassy in Lourenço Marques and that they would all go to jail. None of us told the police that he [Tsafendas] was a Communist and anti-apartheid. How could we have said such things then? They might have deported us all or even worse ... who knows what they could have done to us if they had found out that we knew. Even so, it took another twelve years before our application to reside permanently in South Africa was accepted. We had to hire lawyers and appeal several times. We spent a fortune ...”³⁰³³

Fotini Gavasiadis, whose brother Nick Vlachopoulos, was Marika’s son-in-law, and who became extremely close with Tsafendas over nine months in Pretoria in 1963-1964, also stated that the “family tried to distance themselves as much as possible from Dimitri. They also couldn’t admit that Dimitri was a Communist and against apartheid. They all said ‘we knew nothing about his political ideas. He never discussed them with us.’ They were terrified, absolutely terrified. They did not know what would happen to them.”³⁰³⁴

Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas’s cousin, who was in Pretoria at the time agreed. She told the author:

“We could not admit we knew [that Tsafendas was a Communist and anti-apartheid], especially about what he thought about Dr. Verwoerd [being a dictator and a tyrant]. You could not have admitted any of these things, we would have been into big trouble... They [the family] could not have hidden that they drove all the way to Lourenço Marques to pick him up and bring him back to South Africa. All their friends knew and the police would have easily found out. Yes, just like Katerina said, they [the police] would have said, ‘Why did you help him come to South Africa when you knew his political ideas?’ It was a very difficult time even for us [her own family].”³⁰³⁵

Finally, Marika testified to the Commission of Enquiry on October 21, 1966. According to Judge van Wyk of the Commission, this is what she told him:

“Tsafendas was favoured over the other children and sent to Middelburg because Portuguese children could only receive a proper education either there or in Swaziland. After he returned from Middelburg, he was again sent to a Portuguese school...She had heard that

³⁰³³ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁰³⁴ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

³⁰³⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

Demitrio had worked at a café, but that he only worked intermittently and that he had been sent back to Lourenço Marques around 1937 or 1938 after the Police had been summoned as he had been accused of being a Communist. In 1963 someone phoned Mrs. Tsafandakis from Lourenço Marques to tell her that Demitrio had asked her to intervene in bringing him back to his family. She had felt it to be her duty to do so as Tsafendas's father had died. Tsafendas never talked to the family about his tape worm. According to them, he was definitely not insane. He always had proper accommodation in Pretoria. According to his stepmother, Tsafendas only learned that he had coloured origins when he looked for work at the aircraft factory. He had grown up as one of her children. He was depressed after he had learned about this, but never said anything about it."³⁰³⁶

ROBERT HARPUR SMITH³⁰³⁷

White male, aged 64 years, Durban.

I am an adult White pensioner and now reside at the above address. From March, 1965, until December, 1965, I was employed as Night Clerk at the reception office of the Durban Men's Home, 160 Queen Street, Durban. During this period I was also residing on the premises. On 21.6.1965 a White Male, Demitrio Tsafendas, I.D. No. 963/081129 (W), obtained accommodation at the said Men's Home. On 24.8.1965 Demitrio Tsafendas left the home.

During his period I often used to converse with him. He invariably discussed politics and he told me that if this was a Communistic state, there would be no need for a Durban Home because everybody would have sufficient.' He made mention that he had met Mr. Canon Collins and Solly Sachs in London and that they had assisted him. He did not state when that was but I gathered that it must have been fairly recently.

One night I was again approached by Tsafendas and he asked me if I knew what Mr. Arenstein, the solicitor's residential address was. I replied that I did not. Tsafendas stated that there would be a revolution throughout the Western world and that the Communists

³⁰³⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

³⁰³⁷ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

would rule. He said that the South African Government's policy was "rotten" and often simulated conditions in South Africa with that of Russia, stating, "Look at all the poor people in South Africa, such conditions don't exist in Russia because Russia is a Communistic state."

Tsafendas did not state that he was a Communist but he was definitely pro-Communistic. Tsafendas was in my opinion a fanatic on politics and seldomly spoke of anything else. He said that "the United Party and National Party officials and members were capitalistic roughs" and continually stated that the time was drawing closer for a change throughout the world. Eventually Tsafendas's political philosophy and fanaticism irritated me to such an extent that I would try to avoid him.

About a week before Demitrio Tsafendas left the Men's Home, he told me that a friend of his would take him to Cape Town but did not give any reason or state where he was going to stay. Demitrio Tsafendas did receive mail at the Men's Home but this was only a small quantity. I am also aware that he has a large quantity of literature but do not know the nature thereof. Tsafendas did not associate with residents of the Home and kept himself to himself most of the time. I am unable to state what associates he had outside the Home. I never saw Demitrio Tsafendas again after he left the Men's Home.

The above statement taken by (Sgd.) R.D. Wilson. No. 40205 D/Sergt. Commissioner of Oaths.

Durban 7.9.1966 – 11.20 a.m.

JOHANNES TOBIAS BENADE³⁰³⁸

White male, Pretoria.

I live at above-mentioned address and am working for City Engineering and Carron, 30 Zeiler Street, Pretoria West. Mr. Dimitri Tsafendas is known to me. From 09/12/63 to 03/02/64 he was working for the same firm as me. He pretended to be a welder fitter.

³⁰³⁸ Johannes Tobias Benade statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

According to the work he delivered, it was clear that he did not have much knowledge on the subject, and as a result he was dismissed on 03/02/64. While he worked here, he did not draw my attention in the political field, although he did seem egotistical. He was even-tempered. He carried out his orders without objections.

Statement taken by me this 7th of September 1966 in Pretoria. (Sgd.) D.J. Bezuidenhout D/SGT. Commissioner of Oaths. S.A. Police, Pretoria

KENNETH HEUGH ROSS³⁰³⁹

White male, aged 66 years, resident and employed at Durban Men's Home, Durban.

I am a member of the staff of the Durban Men's Home, 160 Queen Street, Durban. The inmates of the Durban Men's Home and the Stores fall under my supervision. I have been employed at the said address since 1960. According to the records maintained by the Home and to which I have access by virtue of my position, Demitrio Tsafendas I.D. No. 963/081129 (W), a White Male, obtained accommodation at the said Home from 21.6.1965 until 24.8.1965. Demitrio Tsafendas was born on 14.1.1919 in Lourenço Marques and by accommodation was an interpreter at the Magistrates Courts. He was also employed at Fraser and Chalmers for a period of two months until 31.5.1965, when he left as a result of an injury sustained in a stabbing incident.

During Demitrio Tsafendas's period of residence in the Durban Men's Home, I became fairly friendly with him. We often discussed his travels, in which he revealed that he had been to Egypt, Angola and many other countries. As far as I can recollect, he never mentioned that he had visited countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Tsafendas often stated that the political position of South Africa was unfair and that everybody should have the right to franchise. He sympathised with the Communistic principle of collectivism and objected to the Communists being banished to Robin-Island because of

³⁰³⁹ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

their political opinions and actions. In general, Tsafendas opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me.

Tsafendas was very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in politics. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government, and was definitely pre-Russian, but did not state that he was a Communist or that Communism was the solution to South Africa's problems. I am aware that Tsafendas possessed a large quantity of literature but did not take note of the names of the books he read.

The above statement taken by (Sgd.) R.D. Wilson. No. 40205 D/Sergt. Commissioner of Oaths.

Durban 7.9.1966 – 10.25 a.m.

CORNELIUS JOHANNES RUDOLPH³⁰⁴⁰

I am the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban, and as such I act and arrange for interpreters in the different courts, and if necessary I get or take temporary interpreters in employ where foreign languages are required. I keep a register of interpreters who can interpret in foreign languages. In the register, among other names, is the name Demitrio Tsafendas. About a year ago, the latter approached me and asked whether a suitable vacancy on the staff exists where he can be appointed. I told him that no such vacancy exists and that a Greek or Portuguese interpreter is seldom used in the courts. I was led to believe those were the two languages in which he is proficient. I took his name and address, and wrote it in my register, and also his phone number and promised him that if I need a Greek or Portuguese interpreter, I would get in touch with him.

It happened that I made use of services on several occasions. He was in the habit of regularly reporting two or three times a week to ask whether there is any interpretation work. I got to know him pretty well and would have no trouble identifying him. He later also gave

³⁰⁴⁰ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

me different addresses where I could contact him, all the addresses are written in my registry. He was away for some time and I did not see him, and upon his return he told me that he worked at Mandeni, Zululand, and he now got work on the Railways. Later he visited me again at the office and told me that he lived at the "Durban Men's Home", 160 Queen Street, and was unemployed. Thereafter he came back to my office and told me that he would now move to Cape Town, because he cannot get work here in Durban. It was about eight months ago. I have not seen him since. I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.

Statement taken by me at Durban this 7th September 1966 at 11.30 a.m. (Sgd.) A. Geysler. No. 72504.

ANTONY MAW³⁰⁴¹

I arrived in Lourenço Marques September 1919 with my wife and a little while later rented a small house in Rua Andrade Corvo. In the semi-detached house next to us lived a Greek, Michael Tsafandakis by name, and a half-caste baby boy named Dimitri of between one and two years of age, and an African girl Maria to look after the latter. The father was employed as fitter and turner at the Buccellato workshop in Rua Lapa.

In 1919 or 1920, the man approached my wife asking her to request a certain Greek lady (Schinas by name) who was about to embark on a sea trip to Athens via Port Said, to take under her wing the baby Dimitri. It was arranged that Mr. Tsafandakis' mother and sister would proceed from Alexandria to meet the boat at Port Said to take delivery of the baby. Dimitri stayed in Alexandria a few years where he attended school and arrived back in Lourenço Marques some years later (I guess between 1926 and 1928) and I have a vague recollection that he attended school in Middelburg (Transvaal). After this period Dimitri lived in Lourenço Marques for some years and then went to sea as a merchant seaman.

A few years after the war, he touched port aboard a steamer and claiming illness was hospitalized here. The local Authorities would not let him stay (on confidential grounds of

³⁰⁴¹ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

suspected Communist tendencies) and compelled him to leave by the same steamer. Prior to entering hospital, he approached me and asked in case of death he did not wish rites from a priest or the Church. I did not lay eyes on him again until approximately 2 or 3 or 4 years ago when he called in at my office very unexpectedly. He said he had been all over the world and was here aboard a passenger steamer. He said he was calling on me with a view to obtaining information as to the identity of his mother and the location of her grave. I advised in reply that I remembered only himself as a baby living with his father and an African servant girl.

Sometime later I learnt that he had obtained permission to reside in South Africa. Mr. Michael Tsafandakis, during Dimitri's sojourn in Egypt, journeyed there and married a Greek girl in Port Said. Both Dimitri's father and step-mother originated from the island of Crete and the family name is Tsafendis or Tsafantis, the father having been known also as Tsafandakis, it being usual for Cretans to append -akie to the family name.

Dimitri's father Michael Tsafandakis and subsequent family lived in Lourenço Marques for some years but immigrated to Pretoria where he was employed at Iscor. A little while after his retirement he died and was buried there. Dimitri Tsafendis (or Tsafandakis) was baptised in Lourenço Marques by a Greek orthodox priest and he was registered in the local Administraçao Civil as a son of Mr. Tsafandakis (or Tsafendis). From 1926 to 1936, I was assistant (honorary) to an eminent local citizen, Mr. P. dos Santos Gil, in respect of his duties as Honorary Consul for Greece (1926-1936) and from 1936 to 1954 (the time when I myself was Honorary Consul for Greece) Dimitri Tsafendis (or Tsafandakis) was never registered in the Consular register as a son of Michael Tsafandakis, and in fact a Greek passport was refused him by me in line with Greek Civil Code. I am ignorant with what nationality and passport he has circulated.

Lourenço Marques, 7th September, 1966.

*Signed by A. Maw (Antony Maw) in my presence this seventh day of September, 1966. (Sgd.)
G.C. Nel*

COMMENTS ON MAW'S STATEMENT

In his statement, Maw uses the phrase “claiming illness” to describe Tsafendas’s attempt to enter Lourenço Marques after being denied entry. According to Katerina Pnema, Maw told her and her father that Tsafendas had “pretended to be suffering from appendicitis” after the Portuguese authorities refused to let him disembark in Lourenço Marques. According to Pnema, Maw also told her and her father that Tsafendas staged this trick to be allowed off the ship and onto land, where he was taken to a hospital from which he subsequently escaped.³⁰⁴² According to Katerina Pnema, Helen Grispos and Ira Kyriakakis, the fact that Tsafendas pretended to be suffering from appendicitis in order to enter Mozambique was well known by the all the Greeks in Lourenço Marques.³⁰⁴³

GARNET VINCENT MULLER³⁰⁴⁴

I am Senior Running Foreman on the South African Railways at the electric running sheds, Umbilo, Durban. I am resident at 183 Frere Road, Durban – telephone no. 358112.

During the morning of 16th March, 1965, Demitrio Tsafendas, who was up to then unknown to me, arrived at my office and produced a letter from the System Manager’s Staff Office, Durban, to report for duty as a shed attendant, under my supervision. From my observations I could see that Demitrio Tsafendas was a foreigner and he informed me at that time, that he was a Portuguese and had then just arrived from Lourenço Marques to seek employment in Durban. On his own accord, Demitrio Tsafendas informed me that the people where he came from are dying from starvation.

Demitrio Tsafendas also informed me that he had no money to pay for his transport to and from work daily and that he also had by then not found accommodation. I collected among my staff and I handed Demitrio Tsafendas the amount of approximately two rand (R2) and I also arranged accommodation for Demitrio Tsafendas at the E.R. CARNEY Hostel at Montclair. He later furnished me with his room no. as 166.

³⁰⁴² Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁰⁴³ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁰⁴⁴ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

In his capacity as shed attendant, Demitrio Tsafendas's duties consisted of removing jumper cables from between electric unit sets and replacing the jumper cables as and when required. He also had to assist the shedman under whose immediate supervision he worked. Demitrio Tsafendas worked 12-hourly shifts, i.e. 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. and every alternative week night shift, i.e. 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. While on day shift, Tsafendas would come under my control as from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Demitrio Tsafendas worked his last shift from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. on the 7th April, 1965. He did not report for further duties and he was eventually regarded as having absconded from the service as from the 7th April, 1965.

Tsafendas usually conversed in English. He did say to me on an occasion that this job is unsuitable to him and said he was a boilermaker by trade. He gave me to understand he took on this position on a temporary basis. The position as a shed attendant entailed no academic qualifications and could be undertaken by any person of low school qualification. After having been employed for a few days, I observed Demitrio Tsafendas to possess intelligence above that of the average person who is likely to accept a position with the little responsibility which is attached to that of shed attendant. This is all I know about Tsafendas.

KYRIAKOS SKORDIS³⁰⁴⁵

I am the proprietor of the Cuban Hat Tea Room, North Beach, Durban. I know Demitrio Tsafendas. I cannot remember the date, but it was about a year ago or more, he came to me at the Cuban Hat. At that time I was the president of the Greek Community in Durban and Natal. He introduced himself to me and I asked him where he came from. He told me that he was from Lourenço Marques and that he was looking for a job. I asked him whether he had any relations in the Republic and he said that he had some, but did not tell me who they were, neither did I ask him who they were.

After a few days he came and told me that he was offered a job at the law courts as an interpreter and told me that he know four or five foreign languages. He asked me whether he could use my address to give to the officials at the Court House, so that they could contact him, whenever they needed him through me. I agreed to this. At that time he told me that he

³⁰⁴⁵ Kyriakos Skordis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

had a room at the Parade Rooms. A few days later he informed me that he had obtained accommodation at a hotel off Muagrave Road, Berea. He was contacted through me by the Court authorities.

I cannot remember how long he was here in Durban, then he disappeared. After a couple of months he re-appeared. I asked him where he was and he told me in Zululand. He did not mention what he did in Zululand. He stayed for a while in Durban. I cannot say where, but he just disappeared shortly after his return from Zululand and I have not seen him since. He never discussed his previous life with me, neither did I have any discussions with him. He appeared to be quite normal and was apparently in a poor financial position. At that time I was living in a flat in Prince Street in Crown Point Plats, number 1404. He never visited my home.

Statement taken by me at Durban this 7th September 1966 at 3.15 p.m. (Sgd.) A. Geysler. No. 72504: W/O.

JOHANNES JACONUS UYS AURETS³⁰⁴⁶

I am a European Male employed by the 3.A. Hallways as a Shedman at the South African Railways, Umbilo, Durban. During the early part of 1965, I cannot recollect the exact date, a European male accompanied the Senior Running Foreman, Mr. G.V. Muller, to my office where he introduced the man to me as Demitrio Tsafendas, a Shed Attendant to work under my supervision. Demitrio Tsafendas thereafter worked under my direct supervision. We worked shifts, one week from 6.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. and the following week 6.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. The duties of Tsafendas entailed connecting and disconnecting air pipes and vacuum hoses between electric units and the removal and replacement of electric cables between electric units as and when required.

Tsafendas was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature. During the time he was employed under my supervision i.e. for approximately 3 weeks, I did not see him

³⁰⁴⁶ Johannes Jacobus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

being cross at any time. He was a good worker. I can remember one night whilst on duty, it was approximately 2.00 a.m., he was relaxing in the office when the Shedman (known as the Outside Shedman) Mr. P.A. Louw, threw a paper bag containing water at Tsafendas where he was lying on a bench. Tsafendas stood up, water running down his clothes. He appeared to be a bit annoyed and asked how he could work in wet clothes. Mr. P.A. Louw has then run away so as not to be seen. Tsafendas then said that he was going home as he was not going to work in wet clothes and walked off. About a week later he returned and took some personal effects of his. He then mentioned that he was working for a firm somewhere on the North Coast.

During the time he worked under my supervision, he often related about his travels overseas. He also mentioned that he was of mixed origin - Portuguese and Greek. He further stated that he was an interpreter in Court and that he could speak several languages. He never showed any signs of being of violent nature. Occasionally he complained about his wages. I do not know anything more about Tsafendas.

The deponent acknowledges that he knows and understands the contents of this affidavit and that it is the truth. Read over, sworn to and signed before me this 7th day of September, 1966, at 2.40 p.m. at Durban.

(Sgd.) V.H. Dyssel, D/Sergt. 3250. S.A.R. Police: Durban. EX Officio: Commissioner of Oaths. R.S.A

CAROLINE BARBEAU³⁰⁴⁷

Durban.

During about April, 1965, Demitrio Tsafendas came to the above address presenting himself as being one of the members of our church viz. The Christian Church. In all, this person stayed with us for about 5 days, but he visited us quite frequently. During this time and his

³⁰⁴⁷ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

visits, he told us his life history and as I recollect it now, he told me that he was interned for a couple of years during the war in Greece because he did not want to join the Army. At the time he stayed with us, he told me that he was working on the S.A.R. & H. and had a very inferior job to his intelligence and left the S.A.R. & H., apparently because he was unhappy with his work. Then he got a job at the Mandini Paper Factory and not long after he came back and he had been involved in some knife fight with another Greek at the Mandini Factory. During this fight his right hand was injured and he was treated at the Addington Hospital.

During my conversations with him, he told me also that he has a brother and a sister in Johannesburg and somehow I got the impression that he was the black sheep of his family. I also got the impression after having known him for some time, that he was not all there. Then one day after he came back from hospital, he told me that he was going to the Cape and he wanted some addresses of people he might visit there. He then left. I believe he stayed with a Daniels family in 1, St. Souci Road, Bellville, Cape Town (Bellville South) for about 3 months. I also got the impression that Tsafendas was a rolling stone and a sponger because he never stayed long in one place and never offered to pay any rent.

When this Greek was staying with the Daniels family in Belleville, I heard by rumour only that he wanted to marry a Miss Daniels and was going to take out a Coloured identity for the purpose. He told me also that he was working in South West Africa at one time and that he was a well-travelled man. I believe also that he told me that at one time he stayed at the Railway Hotel. From his actions he was a very strange man and not very talkative; he liked to pity himself saying that his family did not want him but at the same time he never thanked one for any kindness shown him. He never discussed politics with us and I cannot say if he had any difficulty with his attempt at obtaining a Coloured identity card.

The deponent has acknowledged that she knows and understands the contents of this affidavit which was affirmed to before me and signed in my presence.

(SGD.) D. Wessels, 25689 D/W/O. Commissioner of Oaths

COMMENTS ON BARBEAU'S STATEMENT

Many of the Church's members resented being linked to Tsafendas through his membership of their sect and were deeply embarrassed to be questioned by the police.³⁰⁴⁸ They considered the association with Tsafendas reflected badly on their Church and, like the Greek community in South Africa, tried to distance themselves and the Church from him.³⁰⁴⁹

Tsafendas had also clashed with the Church leaders because they advocated "the Biblical idea of subservience to a Government," including to the governing National Party and its policy of apartheid, a stance which he hotly disputed.³⁰⁵⁰ None of the Church members mentioned this to the police, apart from Patrick O'Ryan.³⁰⁵¹ When O'Ryan asked fellow members at a prayer gathering to pray for Tsafendas, his suggestion was met with angry protests and a minister of the Church pleaded with him to distance himself from Tsafendas and not present him as "one of us."³⁰⁵² Barbeau and another Church-goer, James Johnston, who would also testify to the police, were the only ones to speak negatively about Tsafendas's mental state.

CASPER ANDRIES WILLEMSE³⁰⁵³

I am the housemaster at E.R. Carney, Clair Wood (telephone no. 310-7590). Beginning 15 March 1965, lodging was allocated to one D. Tsafendas who had been employed under the supervision of the chief Loko, Elektrotegnies, Umbilo. Room no. 166 was granted to him and he lived in the home until 14 April 1965. When Tsafendas took up residence, he gave next of kin as one Mr. N. Vlachopoulos (brother), Church Street 600, West End, Pretoria. Room furnishing included a Bible, it is the New Testament in English and Afrikaans, and after he vacated his room, the Bible was missing. I had no opportunity to ask him to give an

³⁰⁴⁸ *The Observer*, 18 September 1966: 2, 'Police question S. African sect.>'; *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 18: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

³⁰⁴⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

³⁰⁵⁰ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013.

³⁰⁵¹ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁰⁵² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

³⁰⁵³ Casper Andries Willemse statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

explanation as to the missing Bible. The amount of 60 cents was charged in respect of the Bible from his payroll.

To the best of my knowledge, Tsafendas had no special friend in the home and number 166 is a single room. During his stay, I was requested on three occasions by the court to convey a message to Tsafendas to report to the court to act as an interpreter. I asked him about it and Tsafendas told me that the interpreter job was only temporary. He usually spoke English. He made no political statements, and I did not receive any reports relating to such statements and or behaviour on the part of Tsafendas from any of the other residents and/or servants.

Statement taken by me at Durban this 7th September 1966. (Sgd.) T.J. Gunter. Commissioner of Oaths.

WILLEMSE'S INTERVIEW IN THE SUNDAY TIMES

In an interview with the *Sunday Times*, Willemse described Tsafendas as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”³⁰⁵⁴

COMMENTS ON STATEMENTS

According to documents found in the South African archives, the aforementioned eleven people were interviewed by the police on September 7, 1966, the first day of the murder investigation. As we saw, Tsafendas is portrayed by people who knew him as being well versed in politics,³⁰⁵⁵ who talked politics fanatically and constantly,³⁰⁵⁶ freely expressing his

³⁰⁵⁴ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8, ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

³⁰⁵⁵ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁵⁶ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

political views,³⁰⁵⁷ pro-Russian and Communist³⁰⁵⁸ and for this reason denied entry to Mozambique.³⁰⁵⁹ He was further described as against apartheid³⁰⁶⁰ and having characterised members of the National Party and United Party as “capitalist roughs,” of once being associated with the South African trade unionist and anti-apartheid activist, Solly Sachs, and the campaigning Anglican priest, Canon John Collins,³⁰⁶¹ and having a large quantity of literature.³⁰⁶²

Tsafendas was also described as a normal person and intelligent,³⁰⁶³ indeed to possess above-average intelligence,³⁰⁶⁴ a well-mannered and well-spoken person,³⁰⁶⁵ quite normal,³⁰⁶⁶ a good worker, non-violent,³⁰⁶⁷ someone who wanted to be reclassified as Coloured in order to marry Helen Daniels.³⁰⁶⁸ On the other hand, other witnesses claimed that Tsafendas did not discuss politics with them,³⁰⁶⁹ that he was a strange man and not very talkative who indulged in self-pity.³⁰⁷⁰ Marika also denied that he ever discussed politics³⁰⁷¹ with her, but this was

³⁰⁵⁷ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁵⁸ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁵⁹ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

³⁰⁶⁰ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶¹ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶² Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶³ Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶⁴ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶⁵ Johannes Jacobus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶⁶ Kyriakos Skordis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶⁷ Johannes Jacobus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶⁸ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁶⁹ Casper Andries Willemsen statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁷⁰ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁷¹ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

for the reason we have set out already.³⁰⁷²

It is not surprising that the above statements contain differences. It was natural for Tsafendas to discuss politics with some people and not with others. This could be for a number of reasons, perhaps that he did not trust the person, or the person did not seem interested in politics. It is also possible that they did discuss politics with Tsafendas and that he told them what he told other witnesses, such as being against apartheid and like Marika and her family members, they chose to not reveal it.

THE AUTOPSY ON DR. VERWOERD

An autopsy performed on Dr. Verwoerd established the cause of death as “multiple stab wounds, one of which penetrated the left ventricle of the heart.” The doctor who performed the examination reported that “there were no grounds for a rumour that the wounds had been inflicted by an expert stabber.” They were “quite ordinary,” he said.³⁰⁷³

VORSTER: “ONE-MAN JOB”

On the afternoon of the same day, just twenty-four hours after the assassination, Minister of Justice John Vorster publicly declared that, “Present information indicates that it (the assassination) was the deed of one individual, and his actions and movements are being investigated in the finest detail.” The statement said in full, “Present information indicates that it was the deed of one individual, and his actions and movements are now being investigated to the finest detail. I am aware that much speculation is going the rounds and I want to warn the public not to attach exaggerated value to rumours. Our departed leader believed in law and order. In this case also, the law will take its relentless course and the public will be kept informed as necessary.”³⁰⁷⁴

According to Vorster, it was General van den Bergh who informed him that the assassination was a “one-man job,” after he personally interrogated Tsafendas.³⁰⁷⁵ As we will

³⁰⁷² Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁰⁷³ Report of the COE, Chapter: II D, Paragraph 12. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³⁰⁷⁴ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966 (late edition): 1, ‘Killer was a Lone Worker.’

³⁰⁷⁵ D’Oliveira, 1977: 180.

see later in his two subsequent statements to the police, Tsafendas maintained that he planned and executed the assassination alone. Vorster most probably had learned from van den Bergh of Tsafendas's statements to the police and of his long history of political activism. Desperate to ensure that no-one would suggest that the "greatest political crime ever committed in South Africa" was politically motivated, he immediately spread the word assiduously that the assassin was "a simple-minded man whose action could not have political implications of any kind."³⁰⁷⁶

It should also be mentioned that six years previously, just twenty-four hours after David Pratt had shot Dr. Verwoerd, the police had made the exact same statement. On that occasion it was the Deputy Commissioner of Police in the Western Cape, Colonel Terblanche, who had stated that "the attack on the Prime Minister was not an organised one: it was purely an isolated attack by an individual."³⁰⁷⁷

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

Tsafendas's assassination of Dr. Verwoerd received blanket coverage in South Africa and wide attention overseas. The *Daily Dispatch* of East London reproduced on its front page two teletype messages received from the *South African Press Association* newsroom in Parliament, each marked FLASH, the most urgent of news agency designations. The first, timed at 14.15, said, DR. VERWOERD ASSAULTED BY KNIFE IN THE ASSEMBLY. The second, sent at 15.30, said PRIME MINISTER DEAD.³⁰⁷⁸ South African newspapers carried blow-by-blow descriptions of the murder scene in Parliament, along with early reactions from local and world leaders.³⁰⁷⁹

The *Cape Argus* published an interview that Tsafendas had given to it six weeks ago, in which he described himself as an "anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship." However, during the interview, which the paper said lasted seventy-five minutes, Tsafendas did not express any hostility towards South Africa's political leaders. He claimed he had become anti-fascist during his time in Middelburg, Transvaal, that he was imprisoned without trial for three years in Portugal and "brainwashed," a procedure from

³⁰⁷⁶ Lapierre, 2009: 126.

³⁰⁷⁷ *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960, 1, 'Isolated attack, says police chief'; *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960: 10, 'Dr. Verwoerd'; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, 'Dr. Verwoerd moved to Pretoria.'

³⁰⁷⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

³⁰⁷⁹ See 'Assassination Reaction,' Chapter Four.

which he said he had never fully recovered. He also spoke about his imprisonment in Lisbon, in Barca d'Alva, in Aljuba and at the Machinegun Regiment 1 where he refused to serve in the Portuguese Army. He said that he was not allowed to return to Mozambique until 1963.³⁰⁸⁰ Tsafendas did not explain what he meant by brainwashing but he believed that the Portuguese were trying to change his Communist ideology and his anti-Portuguese convictions. That Tsafendas was telling the truth about all these matters is confirmed, apart from the torture, by the PIDE in its "Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas, no: 2707/64/SR, of November 15, 1964."³⁰⁸¹

Newspaper reports after the assassination described Tsafendas as being "something of a mystery man" to his fellow workers in Parliament. Early articles said he had travelled widely and he had two obsessions – a quotation from the Book of Kings in the Bible which puzzled him, and the cost of living for poor Whites in South Africa.³⁰⁸² He was a bitter, withdrawn man with few friends³⁰⁸³ and according to a *Pretoria News* dispatch from Lourenço Marques, he was also "a Red," having been deported from Mozambique for alleged Communist connections after the Second World War. The dispatch said he had an African mother and it quoted local Greeks as scoffing at any suggestion that Tsafendas might have been the key figure in an international plot to assassinate Dr. Verwoerd.³⁰⁸⁴ The *Cape Argus* reported that according to reports from Mozambique, Tsafendas was "violently anti-Portuguese."³⁰⁸⁵

A Cape Town landlady, Alice Theyser, told *The Cape Times* that Tsafendas had lodged with her in the Woodstock neighbourhood for two months. She described him as a strange, untidy man with silver-capped teeth. "He was not a happy man, I feel sorry for him," she said.³⁰⁸⁶ Theyser also told the *Cape Argus* that Tsafendas left water on the bathroom floor after he had bathed and one time burnt out her electric kettle by forgetting to switch it off and she made him reimburse her for it. Eventually, she asked him to leave because of his habits and attitude. A neighbour said Tsafendas was given the nickname "The Texas Millionaire" because of his bearing. H.J. Summers, proprietor of Barling's Tea Lounge in Woodstock, said

³⁰⁸⁰ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, 'Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.'

³⁰⁸¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT

³⁰⁸² *Daily Dispatch*, September 7, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

³⁰⁸³ *The Sun* (Vancouver), 7 September 1966: 'Assassin bitter about white pay.'

³⁰⁸⁴ *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dimitrio a Red, they alleged.'

³⁰⁸⁵ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 1, '180-day prison for Tsafendas?'

³⁰⁸⁶ *The Cape Times*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Landlady tells of strange, untidy lodger.'

Tsafendas would order tea and scones there from time to time. Once, when he described South Africa as a “bastard country,” Summers ordered him out.³⁰⁸⁷ Twenty days after he made these remarks in a newspaper interview, Summers was questioned by the police. He did not mention the above incident and described Tsafendas as “a quite normal, innocent type ... I never had reason to even suspect that he could be mentally unbalanced. He acted quite normal.”³⁰⁸⁸ *The Pretoria News* came closest to providing a reasonably accurate description of Tsafendas’s life with a report from its Durban correspondent who had met Tsafendas. He said Dr. Verwoerd’s assailant had travelled widely, spoke many languages, was a former seaman and had been a casual interpreter at Durban law courts.³⁰⁸⁹

Greeks throughout South Africa and in Mozambique, too, sought hastily to distance themselves from Tsafendas. Some people who had never met Tsafendas before and knew nothing about him claimed that he was insane or that he was not Greek.³⁰⁹⁰ Georgios Manidis, President of the Greek Community in Bloemfontein and supporter of apartheid, said Tsafendas “must be insane. He does not represent the feelings of the Greeks of South Africa. Most of the Greeks in South Africa are supporters of Dr. Verwoerd.”³⁰⁹¹

In Mozambique, some Greeks described him as “a strange man who could easily have been mentally unbalanced,” and expressed astonishment that a person of his “mental calibre and background” was able to get a job at the Parliament.³⁰⁹² As we will see, none of the Mozambique Greeks who described Tsafendas as “a strange man ...” testified to the police. The senior South African police officer, Col. van Wyk, was in Mozambique at the time seeking out people who knew Tsafendas, and he did not report any such contacts or claims. The belief generally held by Greek expatriates was that to kill the prime minister, Tsafendas “must” or “could” have been unbalanced. It is a stance that remained unchanged over the years. When the author interviewed several Greeks in Mozambique in 2015, some said that “Tsafendas must have been insane,” although they did not know him. Their reasons? Dr. Verwoerd had done nothing to Tsafendas so Tsafendas must have been crazy to kill him; a normal person would not kill such a popular and “good” Prime Minister; Tsafendas was a

³⁰⁸⁷ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas seen as a bitter, withdrawn man.’

³⁰⁸⁸ Herbert James Summers statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁰⁸⁹ *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dimitrio a Red, they alleged.’

³⁰⁹⁰ *Eleftherotipia*, 4 July 2010, ‘Οι έλληνες φίλοι του απαρτχάιντ.’

³⁰⁹¹ *Kathimerini*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Θλίψις εις την Ελληνικήν παροικίαν του Γιοχάνεσμπουργκ.’

³⁰⁹² *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dimitrio a Red, they alleged.’

Communist going around saying things against the Portuguese, so he could not have been normal; he had no reason to kill Dr. Verwoerd - if he was Black it would have been different.

Most Greeks at the time, including government officials, sought to distance themselves from Tsafendas so as to protect their communities and to demonstrate their loyalty to state authorities, either the apartheid regime in South Africa or the Portuguese colonialists. There was often a racist undertone, too. Some Greeks interviewed by the author said they did not consider Tsafendas to be Greek because he was born in Mozambique and his mother was Mozambican. One said, “How could someone with a Black mother be Greek?” None of these Mozambique Greeks was ever interviewed by the police because they had never met nor even seen Tsafendas. That is hardly surprising. Between 1939, when he left Mozambique as a twenty-year-old for South Africa, and the assassination in 1966, Tsafendas spent only eleven months in Mozambique: three months in 1951, two months in 1963 and six months, three of them in prison, in 1964/65.

The Greeks of South Africa, who were likewise unacquainted with Tsafendas, considered that he “must have been crazy” because he killed Dr. Verwoerd, who was a “wonderful man,” a “great man,” and a man “loved by both Blacks and Whites.” The willingness of people to talk about someone they do not know is well-known to journalists looking for on-camera comments. Interviewees often claim knowledge of a person in the news when the only thing they have in common is that they are of the same nationality or live in the same neighbourhood.

When news of the assassination broke, journalists flocked to the home of George Michaletos, Tsafendas’s uncle, in Lourenço Marques, but none of the family spoke to them.³⁰⁹³ Ira Kyriakakis, Tsafendas’s childhood friend in Lourenço Marques, was also sought out for interview but refused.³⁰⁹⁴ As did Costas Poriazis, Nick Papadakis and Andreas Babiolakis in Beira.³⁰⁹⁵ Elsewhere it was different. Not only were Greeks in Mozambique and South Africa keen to declare Tsafendas a non-Greek and probably a lunatic, so at least was one Greek in Greece itself.

The following incident is a perfect example of the attitude of most of the Greeks. The Athens newspaper *To Vima* of September 9, 1966 published an article headlined, “Dr.

³⁰⁹³ John and Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

³⁰⁹⁴ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

³⁰⁹⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

Verwoerd's assassin was unstable since he was child, says an Athenian who met him." The newspaper declared, "The assassin of South Africa's Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, must be unstable. He is not Greek. He is the illegitimate son of a Greek from Egypt, M. Tsafendas, and of a mixed-race woman, Amelia Williams."³⁰⁹⁶

The article was based on an interview with a certain Mr. Charitakis, who said that he met Tsafendas when he was on holiday in Lourenço Marques and Tsafendas was thirteen years old. He said, "I don't know his past well. I only happened to meet him by chance when we were in Lourenço Marques." Charitakis added, "Generally, he was a strange guy with strange behaviour...we did not hang around together much because my holidays finished and I left Lourenço Marques." He also claimed that Tsafendas told him that he had been sick and admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Pretoria. Referring to the assassination, Charitakis said, "I believe he must have been crazy in order to reach this point and do such a thing. Dr. Verwoerd was very much loved by everyone and was keeping the prestige of the white race in the Dark Continent."³⁰⁹⁷

Like all the other Greeks, Charitakis uses the words "must have been crazy," deducing this from the fact that Tsafendas killed the much-loved Dr. Verwoerd, that he was a strange boy when he was thirteen and that he had been in a psychiatric hospital in Pretoria. In fact, according to police records, his family's statements to the police and the Commission of Enquiry, his medical records and people interviewed by the author who knew Tsafendas when he was a child, he was never admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Pretoria. Indeed, he had never been to Pretoria during the first thirteen years of his life. Again, like his fellow Greeks, Charitakis assumed that Dr. Verwoerd was loved by everyone and concluded that to kill him must be an act of insanity.

How reliable as a witness was Charitakis, a man who briefly met a thirteen-year-old boy thirty-five years earlier? Certainly such testimony would never have been brought to court but was obviously good enough for a newspaper desperately seeking local angles on an event of international significance. The key factor emerging from this interview, however, is not so much the reliability of the witness as his personal opinion – that Tsafendas "must have been crazy" to kill a man "loved by everyone," who was "holding up the prestige of the white race in the Dark Continent."

³⁰⁹⁶ *To Vima*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'Από παιδί ήταν ανισόρροπος ο δολοφόνος του Φερβέρντ.'

³⁰⁹⁷ *To Vima*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'Από παιδί ήταν ανισόρροπος ο δολοφόνος του Φερβέρντ.'

THURSDAY, 8 SEPTEMBER 1966

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY IN LISBON

At 08.40 on the morning of September 8, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Cape Town received a secret telegram from the South African embassy in Lisbon, written and sent from there the previous evening at 7.23 p.m. It said that according to “a very reliable local source,” Tsafendas “has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances, including shouting pro-Communist anti-Portuguese slogans,” but that he had “never been convicted as courts have found him to be of unsound mind.” The telegram concluded with the following sentence: “If information correct, we suspect Portuguese may play down assassin’s previous political activities and we would suggest full details in this connection be sought.”³⁰⁹⁸

This telegram contained two important pieces of information: the fact that Tsafendas had a criminal record and that he had been arrested several times. Both were correct. Tsafendas was arrested three times while in Mozambique and twice while in Portugal for political reasons. PIDE indeed had a file on him (n° 10.415) since he was “suspected of distributing Communist propaganda” in 1938.³⁰⁹⁹ As we will see, even though the embassy in Lisbon warned the South African authorities through this telegram about the Portuguese authorities’ likely reaction, the South African police did not investigate Tsafendas’s political past, but accepted what was given to them by the Portuguese.

PIDE’S INVOLVEMENT

More importantly, the embassy’s telegram could not have predicted the Portuguese reaction more accurately. That same day, the Chief Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon sent a top-secret telegram to the Sub-Director of PIDE in the “Overseas Province of Mozambique,” instructing him that any “information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of your country should not be transmitted to the South African authorities, despite the relations that

³⁰⁹⁸ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁰⁹⁹ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. 25 August 1951. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

exist between your delegation and the South African Police” (*informo ainda V.Ex^a. que às autoridades da Africa do Sul, mesmo ao nível das relações directas entre essa Delegação e a Polícia Sul-Africana, não devem ser dadas informações que indiquem o TSAFENDAS como partidário da independência dessa Província*).³¹⁰⁰

To ensure that there would be no mistakes concerning the information given to the South African police, PIDE in Lisbon compiled a report on Tsafendas, and it was sent to the Sub-Director of PIDE in Mozambique along with the above communication. The report was to be given to the South African authorities and it had downplayed and even omitted several of Tsafendas’s political activities. This report is as follows, translated into Afrikaans by the South African police:

DEMITRIO TSAFENDAS or DEMETRIO TSAFANDAKIS -

Illegitimate child of Michel Tsafendas, of Greek nationality, and Amelia William, of mixed race, Portuguese, maritime salesman and interpreter. Born in Lourenço Marques on 19th January, 1918. Left at school-going age for South Africa to study and afterwards returned to Mozambique to start work. While residing in that Province, he was twice a suspect of communist activities, but evidence of such activities was never found.

On arrival in Portugal on 8th November, 1949, he was detained at the post of Barca d’Alva, due to insufficient documentation. There were doubts as to whether he was Portuguese. The documentation which was seized made it clear that he had been expelled from the United States of America by the Immigration Authorities and sent to Greece. The investigations made concluded that he was entitled to Portuguese nationality, but as he had not performed his military service, he was handed over to the Military Government in Lisbon, on the 6th of February, 1950, as a deserter.

In December 1951 he boarded on a ship to Mozambique, but due to his past, he was not allowed to reside in that Province, having to go back to the Metropolis. In 1952 he tried to leave the country in possession of a Greek “Laissez-Passer” nationality, which he also had a right to, but was detained for investigation. During the interrogations he gave signs of mental disability, which was confirmed by the Hospital do Ultramar. On 23rd April, 1953, he

³¹⁰⁰ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

was handed over to the 'Albergue da Mitra' in Lisbon, where he left in August of the same year. It appears that during the political disturbances in Lisbon, and while he was at the Institute, he would gather around him several other 'guests' of the hostel.

In the 16 of November 1964, he was brought to the Substation of this Police in de city of Beira, by the P.S.P [Public Security Police], being accused of spreading subversive propaganda amongst the native masses. Specifically, and amongst other phrases, he was accused of the following phrase: "This country is not called Portugal, it is called the United States of Mozambique. We already have money, what we need is to not make the mistake of saying we are Portuguese. No. We are Africans. I do not like the Portuguese Flag." Under interrogation, he confessed to the accusation, having plead that when he said these and other sentences, he was in a hotel bar in Gondola, with other nationals of the black race, having had a little too much to drink and in a state of exaltation. He added, though, that his words are the product of his ideals regarding the independence of Mozambique, a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother-nation. TSAFENDAS described a history which was his life, an authentic adventurous romance, travelling through several countries of the world. He denied being part of any subversive organization or party that would be working towards the independence of Mozambique, as well as having developed any subversive activities against the security of the State, although he is a partisan of the independence of this province. Although, as above mentioned, TSAFENDAS is mentally deficient, the truth is you find in him an obvious spirit of rebellion against the Portuguese Administration, and a clear adhesion to the independence of Mozambique.

His criminal and police records have nothing against him. However, and as already noted, TSAFENDAS had already annotations in his Police Registration Certificate, as he himself confessed. Analyzing his declarations, and taking into account that he was mentally ill – and therefore not imputable in the juridical system – his case was archived and he was freed, since he was not considered dangerous.

This is what, in sum, is known about DEMITRIO TSAFENDAS.

7/9/66 xxx³¹⁰¹

³¹⁰¹ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

COMMENTS ON PIDE'S ROLE

As we see from this report, the PIDE in Lisbon downplayed some of Tsafendas's political activities while completely omitting others. More importantly, PIDE provided information that was of no great importance or was already known to the South Africans, without offering them anything fresh or significant. For example, that Tsafendas was suspected of Communist activities while living in Mozambique had been known to the South Africans since June 29, 1937. The information was contained in a letter from the South African Consul General in Mozambique in response to a request from the Deputy Commissioner of Police in Johannesburg.³¹⁰²

While some of Tsafendas's arrests are mentioned, others are omitted and the specific reasons for his arrests are not given. His arrest in Gondola in 1964 by the Portuguese Police was an incident which was well known to many in Mozambique while it had already even appeared in the South African press and so could not have been concealed. However, the incident is downplayed and important details are not mentioned. These included the fact that he had anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist and Communist literature in his suitcase and that he was subsequently accused of preaching "under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence."³¹⁰³

On the other hand, the report states that even though Tsafendas was mentally deficient, "the truth is you find in him an obvious spirit of rebellion against the Portuguese Administration, and a clear adhesion to the independence of Mozambique." This is presumably included because PIDE knew that it would be extremely easy for the South African police to find out about it by talking to people who knew Tsafendas, since most of the Greeks were well aware of his political beliefs and arrests and that he was widely known among their community as "The Red." The following points include the omitted material:

- First and most important, the report lied that Tsafendas's "criminal and police records have nothing against him." In reality, PIDE had a detailed file of 130 pages on Tsafendas

³¹⁰² Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 16. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³¹⁰³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

entitled *Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*.³¹⁰⁴ The file contained details of his political and other activities since 1938 when he was first “suspected of distributing Communist propaganda.”³¹⁰⁵ The file shows Tsafendas as a passionate supporter of independence for Mozambique.

- Absent are the reasons he was denied entry to Mozambique in October 1951 and his subsequent imprisonment for two weeks when he was interrogated regarding his past “unclear activities.”³¹⁰⁶ The report simply says “owing to his past,” but gives no details. According to another PIDE report³¹⁰⁷ and the statement by Greece’s honorary Consul in Lourenço Marques, Antony Maw,³¹⁰⁸ this was due to his suspected Communist tendencies and the suspicion that he was involved in subversive activities.
- Tsafendas’s arrest in Lisbon in January 1952,³¹⁰⁹ immediately after his arrival from Mozambique, is omitted. Presumably this is because of the reason behind his arrest; that the Portuguese Police in Lisbon had been informed by PIDE in Lourenço Marques about his political activities in Mozambique in the 1930s and wanted to question him about them.³¹¹⁰
- No reference is made to the fact that Tsafendas was banned from entering and residing in Mozambique and was forced to live in exile from 1951 to 1963.³¹¹¹ In this way, the fact that the ban was on account of his political ideas and activities was concealed.
- The fact that he was only given amnesty to return to Mozambique in 1963.³¹¹²

³¹⁰⁴ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. 25 August 1951. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³¹⁰⁵ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³¹⁰⁶ PIDE Record of questions. 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

³¹⁰⁷ PIDE Confidential Report about Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³¹⁰⁸ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

³¹⁰⁹ PIDE report regarding Demetri Tsafendas to the Minister of Interior. 07 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; PIDE Record of questions. 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³¹¹⁰ PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 5 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³¹¹¹ Confidential Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no: 2.077- S.R., 03 May 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Letter of a police agent to the Ministry of Interiors regarding Tsafendas’s exile. 30 October 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³¹¹² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

- The fact that Tsafendas made several applications to be allowed to return to Mozambique and they were all turned down, each time after PIDE supplied the Ministry of Interior with information regarding his “political and professional activities.”³¹¹³
- The fact that he remained in prison for ninety-three days following his last arrest by the Public Security Police.³¹¹⁴
- The fact that he was arrested a second time by the Portuguese Police while in Beira in February 1965.³¹¹⁵ The South African, Portuguese and the international media were aware of the arrest and had referred to two arrests of Tsafendas while in Mozambique and not one.³¹¹⁶
- The fact that each time he was arrested by the Portuguese police, “during his interrogations he gave signs of having some sort of mental disability.”³¹¹⁷

CONCLUSION REGARDING PIDE’S ROLE

We can only speculate as to why the Portuguese authorities wanted to conceal information pointing to Tsafendas “as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique,” but the likeliest reason is that he was a Portuguese citizen. It would have looked bad for Portugal if the Prime Minister of a friendly country was murdered by a Portuguese national who was known to the security authorities for his long history of revolutionary and subversive activities. It would appear significantly less damaging if the assassin were labelled as a psychopath rather than a political revolutionary. Because he was known to be a revolutionary and a Communist who had often been arrested, many people would have wondered how such a man was allowed by

³¹¹³ Letter of the Directorate-General of the Political and Civil Administration of the Overseas Ministry to the Director of the International and State Defence Police. 07/04/1958. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³¹¹⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³¹¹⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 May 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

³¹¹⁶ *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’’; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 8 September 1966: 1, ‘The killer: Five passports and a record of subversion’; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Assassin said to have been deported from P.E.A. for Communist connections.’ *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, ‘Assassin had five passports.’

³¹¹⁷ PIDE Confidential Report, 3.282.-S.R, regarding Demitrios Tsafandakis sent to the Chief of Staff of the Interior Minister, 9 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

the Portuguese to walk free. Even worse, that someone with a 130-page police dossier and known for his anti-Portuguese and Communist beliefs, managed to walk free in Mozambique.

TSAFENDAS'S HEARING

At 2.15 pm on Thursday, September 8, 1966, Tsafendas was brought before Cape Town's Chief Magistrate, Mr. C. Willman, in a room at the police station in Caledon Square, where he was being held. A high-ranking official said, "This was done in the interests of the accused. We did not want a repetition of what happened between Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby in Texas."³¹¹⁸

Mr. H.C.F. Jacobs, Senior Public Prosecutor, asked that Tsafendas be remanded in custody until October 6. A certificate from Cape Attorney General Willem van den Berg was presented to the Chief Magistrate. It said in part that "I, Willem van den Berg, in the interests of public order, hereby order that Demetrio Tsafendas, who has been arrested on a charge of having committed murder, shall not be released on bail or otherwise before sentence has been passed or before he has been discharged, as the case may be." Mr Willman asked Tsafendas if he understood the application and Tsafendas replied "I understand, my lord." The magistrate then granted the application and ordered that Tsafendas be detained in the police cells in Cape Town.³¹¹⁹

Tsafendas wore a white, open-necked shirt and grey flannel trousers and answered his name firmly. The charge sheet described him as a male adult, aged forty-eight, a messenger, of Portuguese nationality. He gave the impression of considerable physical strength. He was not handcuffed. The hearing began exactly forty-eight hours after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination and lasted five minutes. Eight police officers were present, including Major D.J. Rossouw, head of the Security Police in Cape Town.³¹²⁰ The Commissioner of Police, Lt. Gen. J.M. Keevy, said Tsafendas might appear again in court before the October 6 remand date since the police investigation was expected to be completed in the next week or two.³¹²¹ He said the case might take the form of a preparatory examination, but there was also

³¹¹⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas in court'; *The Globe and Mail*, 9 September 1966: 4, 'Dr. Verwoerd's slayer appears for formal hearing in court.'

³¹¹⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas in court.'

³¹²⁰ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas: fear for life.'

³¹²¹ *Daily Dispatch*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas in court'; *The Star* (Johannesburg), 9 September 1966: 3, 'Tsafendas remanded and questioned'; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 9 September 1966: 9, 'Don't Touch the Greeks.'

provision in the Criminal Procedure Act for a murder case to be heard summarily by the Supreme Court. Documents would be laid before the Attorney-General, who would decide.³¹²²

STATEMENTS

HENDRIK JOHANNES VAN LOGGENBERG³¹²³

White male, manager of “Baron’s Meubels” Pretorius Street 191, Pretoria.

The last time I saw Dimitrio Tsafendas known to me as Miemie, was about 2 to 3 years ago. I am well known among the Greek community. I know the accused’s stepmother Ant-Marika very well and also his other family in Pretoria. It was through his family members that I met the accused. I occasionally ate with the accused at his family. He also ate at my house.

The accused was work-shy for hard work and considered himself very worthy and learned, which he obviously was not. He constantly changed jobs as well as habitation. He was never satisfied. In accord with my observation taken, he was not welcome among his own people and they cast him out. The accused had a sombre appearance and was never upbeat. He constantly carried a Bible with him. I do not know what religion he belonged to. From the stories the accused told, he had to visit a lot of overseas countries. He mastered several languages. It was against the accused’s principle to use strong liquor. Accused definitely came across as normal and was an unmarried man. He also seemed healthy and did not smoke.

Pretoria 8.9.1966. Statement taken by me. (Indecipherable name). Commissioner of Oaths.

³¹²² *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas may reappear in court.’

³¹²³ Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

MAGDALENE WARLASS DOROTHEA SANDERS³¹²⁴

Coloured Female, 66 years old, 65 Wills Road, Durban.

Demitrio Tsafendas attended church services in my house on several occasions and also delivered his testimony on the verse or chapter he had read from the Bible. He gave me the impression he was a firm believer in God. I don't know where he was staying at the time. On one occasion, he arrived at my house with his suitcase and placed it in the pantry. I told him I had no accommodation and he had to go elsewhere. He had one meal here. Whenever he arrived for church service, he had his Bible with him ... First time saw him was about two years ago and the last time was when he had injured his arm. His hand was bandaged. I don't remember which one. He never discussed politics.

PAUL STEFANUS VAN DEN MERWE³¹²⁵

603 Portman Place, Fir Ave, Sea point and Welgeluk, Otjiwarongo, S.W.A.

I am an adult white man and a Member of Parliament for Midlands. I am a member of the National Party in the Assembly and hold a seat behind the Prime Minister. My seat is two steps behind that of the Prime Minister.

On Tuesday, 06/09/66, I entered the Assembly Hall at approximately 2:17 pm according to the Council's watch. (Official time 2:12 pm.).

I entered the hall through the main door. I was still on my way to my seat when I saw the deceased at his seat. He had just arrived at his seat and was about to sit down. There were other council members who were still on the way to their seats.

I walked past the late Dr. Verwoerd and sat in my seat. I noticed that I did not have a notebook and got up and went to the Speaker's table to fetch a book. To get to the Speaker's table I have to pass on the left-hand side of the late Dr. Verwoerd.

³¹²⁴ Magdalene Warlass Dorothea Sanders statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³¹²⁵ Paul Stefanus van der Merwe statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

On the way back to my seat, I decided to discuss something with Dr. Verwoerd. I stood on the left-hand side of Dr. Verwoerd. At that time he was looking in the direction of the Opposition, i.e. right in front of him. I bowed to talk to him.

Before I could say a word, I noticed that a messenger whom I later had identified as the accused Dimetrio Tsafendas, cast himself halfway across Dr. Verwoerd's seat on top of him. I noticed that his right hand rested on Dr. Verwoerd's left breast. Tsafendas remained in that position for a portion of a second. When he lifted his right hand from Dr. Verwoerd's chest, I saw a dagger of about 8 inches in his hand. Only then did I realize that he stabbed Dr. Verwoerd with the dagger.

From where I stood on the left side of Dr. Verwoerd's table/seat, I immediately tried to fend off the assailant, but he was too far away from me and before I could get around the seat, he had given different blows to Dr. Verwoerd's body with the dagger.

Other members of the Assembly, had at this stage grabbed the assailant from behind and removed him from the hall.

Cape Town

8/9/66. 2.50 p.m.

Statement taken by me. (SGD.) A.J. van Dyk. Captain.

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

Forty-eight hours after the assassination, South African newspapers front-paged plans for Dr. Verwoerd's funeral on September 10, carried speculation about his successor and probed further into the life and character of his assassin. They also published further messages, mostly of shock and condolence, from world and local leaders.³¹²⁶

The evening edition of *The Cape Argus*, reported that Tsafendas appeared that afternoon before Cape Town Chief Magistrate Mr C. Willman in an office in the Caledon Square police station in connection with the murder of Dr. Verwoerd. He was remanded in

³¹²⁶ See 'Assassination Reaction' Chapter Four.

custody until October 6.³¹²⁷ Newspapers carried the first photograph of Tsafendas, apparently a file shot, showing him in shirt and tie, smiling slightly. The *Rand Daily Mail* headlined the photograph “Face of the Assassin,”³¹²⁸ and in another article, Dr. Samuel Schmahmann, a former schoolmate at Middleburg, recalled Dimitri as being “not very bright at school,” but “a popular boy and not the least introverted.” He said, “I particularly remember him singing a Greek song at a school concert. He was very funny and had us all in stitches.”³¹²⁹

George Sakellaridis, editor and owner of *Acropolis*, a Greek newspaper in South Africa, was a passionate supporter of apartheid and such an admirer of Dr. Verwoerd that he hung his portrait on his office wall.³¹³⁰ Sakellaridis published a eulogy for the slain Prime Minister which outdid all other encomiums in its unctuous adoration. It praised him as “perhaps the greatest son of the South African nation ... a philosopher, an intellectual, a true Christian, a philanthropist, a visionary ... a holy symbol of Christian civilisation and of real patriotism ... who turned South Africa into the only bastion of Christianity in an atheist, godless continent and the only hope of the free people of the continent against the cancer of Communism.” Sakellaridis characterised Dr. Verwoerd as a modern “Prometheus Unbound,” who had been misunderstood, slandered and wrongfully accused by the unfair and irresponsible international community which was unaware of everything he had done for Black South Africans.³¹³¹

Although Sakellaridis had never met Tsafendas, he told a negative story about him which was picked up and published by most of the South African media. He claimed that he had made inquiries among some Greeks in South Africa, and discovered that when he was a child Tsafendas was called “Blackie,” causing him to have “an inferiority complex.”³¹³² Both claims were untrue but no-one questioned them and the story became widely accepted as fact. Even today, half a century later, the story persists in some quarters. However, those people who grew up with Tsafendas are adamant that he was never called “Blackie,” that he was not black anyway and showed no signs of having an inferiority complex.³¹³³

³¹²⁷ *The Cape Argus*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas appears in court.’

³¹²⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Face of the assassin.’

³¹²⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘Boyhood days of Tsafendas.’

³¹³⁰ Mary Vasilakou in a personal interview, 25 March 2015.

³¹³¹ *Acropolis*, 17 September 1966: 1, ‘Ολόκληρον το Νοτιοαφρικόν Έθνος εκήδευσε τον πρωθυπουργό του.’

³¹³² *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘Boyhood days of Tsafendas’; *Natal Mercury*, 8 September 1966: 5, ‘The face of Demitri Tsafendas.’

³¹³³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 June 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

William Mare Volbrecht, a psychologist and Tsafendas's schoolmate in Middleburg, testified to the police that "at that stage, Tsafendas was seen as white and there was never anything that pointed to someone regarding or treating him as a non-white or to him being discriminated against. I cannot remember whether he was ever guilty of misconduct; he was never a loner and mingled freely with us."³¹³⁴ According to his step-mother's testimony to the Commission of Enquiry into Verwoerd's death, Tsafendas "association with other children at this stage, however, was good." His half-sister, Katerina Pnefma, described him as a boy to the author as such: "He was very white, peculiar as it is, as white as all the family. But he had different hair. But it wasn't so much like the Blacks; it was like the Coloureds. But he did not look Black at all, he was as white as me."³¹³⁵ Furthermore, according to his cousin Mary Eendracht, Andreas Babiolakis, Ira Kyriakakis and Helen Grispos, who all grew up with him, Tsafendas was never called "Blackie." They said his skin colour was white and it was not possible to tell he was of mixed race. Photos of Tsafendas as a schoolboy and in later life confirm this. A man cannot be very dark as a child but become whiter with the passage of time. In fact, none of the children, including Helen Grispos's husband George, who was one of Tsafendas's best friends and classmate, knew at the time that Tsafendas was of mixed racial origin; their parents knew, but not the children.³¹³⁶

Katerina Pnefma told the police shortly after the assassination, that growing up with Tsafendas "to all intents and purposes it was understood" by her and her siblings that "he was a member of the family... his complexion was such – as also his manner – that he passed as a European."³¹³⁷ As for bullying, none of these witnesses ever remembered anyone bullying or mocking Tsafendas for his colour. Tsafendas was much bigger and stronger than most of the boys of his age and given his outspoken and aggressive character, it would not have been easy for someone to intimidate him.³¹³⁸

³¹³⁴ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Verklaring deur Majoor Venter. NASA.

³¹³⁵ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³¹³⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 June 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

³¹³⁷ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

³¹³⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 June 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

Sakellaridis also claimed that Tsafendas's family had disowned him.³¹³⁹ This, too, was false, but also came to be widely believed. What is true is that his family sought to distance themselves from him after the assassination, but up to then he was an accepted family member. His step-mother, his brother-in-law, his half-brother and his half-brother's wife had all travelled by car from Pretoria to Lourenço Marques three years earlier to meet him and take him back to South Africa even though they were aware that he was banned from entering the country. His family bribed J.J. van den Berg, the passport officer at South Africa's Consulate in Lourenço Marques, to ignore the fact that Tsafendas was on the South African Stop List and to issue him with a visa. It was his family who then gave him a job in a family business and a rent-free apartment in Pretoria for eight months upon his return to South Africa. These are hardly the things a family would do for someone it has disowned.

Another story current at the time concerned a comment attributed to Tsafendas – that “the government worried too much about the Black population and did nothing to help the poor whites.” He was said to have made this remark while working in Parliament, although none of his fellow messengers recalled him making such a statement when they were questioned by the police. If he had told them something of the sort they would have probably mentioned it. The story was started by the Parliamentary correspondent of *Die Vaderland* newspaper, the National Party's mouthpiece. He said that Tsafendas complained frequently that the Government did more for Blacks than for Whites.³¹⁴⁰ It is perfectly possible that Tsafendas made such a comment, knowing he was talking to a reporter for a pro-Government newspaper, perhaps to distract any suspicions from his own political sentiments, or perhaps simply from sarcasm. Several people who knew him very well testified to the author that Tsafendas was often sarcastic.³¹⁴¹ The author asked forty-four people who were acquainted with Tsafendas, including some who knew him very well, and all denied that Tsafendas could have made such comments. If he did, they said, he could not have meant them.

Examining Tsafendas's assault upon Dr. Verwoerd, the *Pretoria News* said Tsafendas carried three knives, and published a photograph of a blade it said was similar to the one used against the prime minister.³¹⁴² The newspaper also said Tsafendas told an

³¹³⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 September 1966: 2, 'Boyhood days of Tsafendas.'

³¹⁴⁰ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, 'O assassinio do primeiro-ministro Sul-Africano.'

³¹⁴¹ For example Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015 and many others.

³¹⁴² *Pretoria News*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'He carried three knives.'

acquaintance that he could not leave Cape Town because he “had a job to finish here first.” The remark came in a conversation with two men who also stayed at his lodging house during a discussion about leaving to work in South West Africa.³¹⁴³ The same newspaper also raised the question of Parliamentary security: “Was he properly screened at Parliament?” And how, as a temporary messenger, was he able to enter the Chamber and make the attack without security officers preventing him?³¹⁴⁴

The *Daily Dispatch* said Tsafendas took advantage of the Sergeant-at-Arms’ absence from the lobby for duties connected with the Speaker’s procession to slip into the Chamber.³¹⁴⁵ *The Cape Times* also carried a facsimile of his signature, apparently from a job application form. The same newspaper, in another article published a description of Tsafendas’s bedroom as he left it in his Rustenburg Avenue lodgings on the morning he set out to kill Dr. Verwoerd. A reporter who was allowed to see the room under security guard described Tsafendas’s quarters as untidy and grimy, with an unmade bed and personal effects strewn across the floor; on the dressing table were a hammer, a file, a pair of socks, polish, shoe brushes, cutlery, a hair brush and an Oxford English Dictionary.³¹⁴⁶ However, this was after the police had searched the room and the likelihood is that it was their search which left it in that condition.

The *Daily Dispatch*, *The Daily News* and the major Portuguese newspaper, *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, published a news report from Frankfurt containing interviews with some of Tsafendas’s colleagues. In these reports Tsafendas was described “as extremely nice and friendly by people who met him.” Mr Horst Hartmann, senior personnel officer at the heavy engineering company Fries & Son, where Tsafendas worked as a welder, said, “Yes, sure, I remember him. He drove up here in a big, battered American car. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man...he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on. He left of his own accord. We would have liked to keep him.”³¹⁴⁷

³¹⁴³ *Pretoria News*, 8 September 1966, ‘Said he ‘had a job to do’.’

³¹⁴⁴ *Pretoria News*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘What screening did Tsafendas have.’

³¹⁴⁵ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Assassination a one man’s job – says Vorster.’

³¹⁴⁶ *The Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, ‘Untidiness, grim in his bedroom.’

³¹⁴⁷ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

Although he was with Fries & Son for only six weeks, Tsafendas made a lasting impression on Guenter Haafe, the factory doorman, who eight years later still remembered the jovial greeting Tsafendas gave him every morning. “He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come into my locker room to say hello. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met, and trust me, in my twelve years as a doorman, I have seen thousands and thousands of faces coming in and out. This man was courteous, they do not make them like that anymore.”³¹⁴⁸ Three other colleagues in the same job said about Tsafendas that “He was a nice guy,” “He was a good comrade” and “He left me with a good impression.”³¹⁴⁹

The Cape Times, *the Daily Dispatch* and *The Daily News* also revealed that Tsafendas was a schoolteacher in Turkey, that he had “taught the phonetics of elementary English” at an Istanbul college five years ago.³¹⁵⁰ Although this was a significant pointer to Tsafendas’s abilities, it would not be mentioned again, not even during Tsafendas’s summary trial. *The Sun* of Vancouver, Canada, front-paged a different, unsmiling, photograph of Tsafendas, alongside a Cape Town-dated dispatch from the *Associated Press*, which said, “There are reports he was anti-Nazi, anti-fascist, anti-everything.”³¹⁵¹ *The Chronicle* of Bulawayo, Rhodesia, spelling his name “Stafendas,” said Tsafendas was “a mystery man who had few friends.” It repeated fragments of information which were becoming current, including his origins in Lourenço Marques, deportation from Mozambique due to his Communist tendencies, time in the Merchant Navy, reactions in Frankfurt and the remarks of his former landlady, Mrs. Theyser.³¹⁵²

The Daily News, *The Herald* of Melbourne, Australia, the *Rhodesia Herald* and the *Herald African News Service* reported that Tsafendas was picked up in Mozambique holding five passports and was questioned about his “suspicious activities” in an area on the Malawi-Mozambique border where unrest had developed among the Africans. The reports said that while he was in Mozambique, Tsafendas was arrested twice for subversive activities and that after the Second World War he was deported because of “Communist activities.” They said

³¹⁴⁸ *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

³¹⁴⁹ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

³¹⁵⁰ *The Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas taught Turks English’; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas taught English in Turkey’; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man.’

³¹⁵¹ *The Sun* (Vancouver) of September 8, 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd assassin painted as anti-everything loner.’

³¹⁵² *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas: Mystery man of parliament.’

the South African police were investigating how he got a job as a messenger in Parliament.³¹⁵³ All of this information was correct, including the five passports. However, it seems there was nothing sinister about the passports, as no mention of them is made by PIDE who arrested Tsafendas on this occasion. They could easily have been Tsafendas's old passports that he had kept. If they were forgeries or there was something suspicious about them, this would almost certainly have been stated by PIDE in its reports.

The French national news agency, *Agence France-Presse*, quoted workers at the Julio de Matos Psychiatric Hospital as saying that Tsafendas appeared for a medical appointment there on March 2, 1962, but never returned after that first appointment. The story said that people in touch with him on that occasion described him as "a reserved man who didn't want his past to be mentioned."³¹⁵⁴ The "people in touch with him" must have had exceptional memories to remember, four and a half years later, a man they met once in their lives, while their work required them to see tens, perhaps scores, of people every day. It is possible that Tsafendas made such a big impression on them that they did remember him. However, they still did not say anything regarding his mental state.

VORSTER'S ANNOUNCEMENT

The main news story of September 8 was Justice Minister John Vorster's statement from the previous night that present information indicated that the assassination was the work of one individual.³¹⁵⁵ Ten years later, Vorster revealed that General H.J. van den Bergh had questioned Tsafendas for forty-eight hours, adding that "if a man does not break after forty-eight hours of van den Bergh's questioning, then you know that he does not know a thing."³¹⁵⁶ Van den Bergh himself declared that "no person in South African history has ever been interrogated as much as Tsafendas."³¹⁵⁷ Given that the South African Police at the time were notorious for their use of torture during interrogation, we can conjecture with a high

³¹⁵³ *Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man''; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 8 September 1966: 1, 'The killer: Five passports and a record of subversion'; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin said to have been deported from P.E.A. for Communist connections.'

³¹⁵⁴ *Agence France-Presse*, NOTIC DSR 16, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³¹⁵⁵ *The New York Times*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Plot is doubted by South Africa'; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Assassination a one man's job says Vorster'; *The Australian*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd's assassin acted alone, Police say.'

³¹⁵⁶ D' Oliveira, 1977: 180.

³¹⁵⁷ Pike, 1985: 461; Winter (*The Citizen*), 20 October 1976: 1, 'Why I killed Verwoerd.' ???

degree of certainty what must have been done to Tsafendas during his interrogation. Vorster's statement regarding van den Bergh's efficiency during interrogation can safely be interrupted as an allusion to torture by van den Bergh and his men.

After van den Bergh completed his questioning of Tsafendas, he informed Vorster that this was a one-man job and that Tsafendas was not responsible for his actions ...³¹⁵⁸ However, this latter conclusion is flatly contradicted by the investigation itself. Firstly, if Tsafendas told van den Bergh what he told the police in the two subsequent statements (which is obviously the most likely scenario), then there was no sign of insanity in Tsafendas's words. According to Terry Bell, Jan-Ake Kjellberg, Liza Key and David Beresford, who saw the transcript of the first interrogation, there was no sign of insanity and Tsafendas, as he did in his next two statements, gave political reasons for the assassination.

Furthermore, according to Michalis Michelis, the Greek journalist who interviewed a South African policeman who was present while Tsafendas was in custody after the assassination, none of the policemen who interacted with Tsafendas at this time believed that he was insane. Importantly, none of the witnesses who had testified so far claimed that Tsafendas was insane or that there was something wrong with him. On the contrary, everyone, along with the report of the South African Embassy in Portugal, was talking about a man with strong political convictions; a Communist. Therefore, even though the evidence suggested that Tsafendas was perfectly sane, a Communist and passionate about politics, van den Bergh ignored this and declared him to be insane. It is worth asking why, if Tsafendas was insane or van den Bergh really believed he was insane, he did he not ask a psychiatrist to examine him while he was in custody. Finally, why did it take twenty days for lawyers to be appointed to defend Tsafendas if he was insane?

³¹⁵⁸ D' Oliveira, 1977: 180.

FRIDAY, 9 SEPTEMBER 1966

**SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY IN
WASHINGTON**

At 9.00 am on September 9, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Cape Town, received another secret telegram, this time from the South African embassy in Washington, DC. Written in telegraphic style, this stated that a “very reliable source with first-hand knowledge” informed them that the U.S. Immigration authorities had a file on Tsafendas, which had already been handed to Attorney-General Katzenbach with “suggestions it be made available” to the South African embassy in Washington, something the Attorney-General was “reluctant to do at this stage.”

The reason was that the State Department believed that “handing over information at this stage could have undesirable consequences at the Commonwealth Conference since file apparently reveals Tsafendas is quarter Negro or African.” Tsafendas’s file contained “full particulars” of his time in the United States. “He is understood to have shown under psychiatric treatment that he was unstable though not (not)³¹⁵⁹ insane, but type of man who would easily be used as instrument of Communist or hostile organizations. Impression of U.S. Immigration people at the time was that he had been manipulated and was under influence of someone or some organization. He was subsequently deported to Europe.”

The author of the telegram then suggests that his embassy should contact the U.S. authorities for any possible information on Tsafendas, given that they know he served in the U.S. merchant navy at one time, but without revealing knowledge of the above information. The telegram concludes that if the U.S. authorities “refuse or deny existence of material, it could be very embarrassing for U.S. if existence of material subsequently leaked out.”³¹⁶⁰ As we will see in the following chapter, this document, along with anything else which suggested that Tsafendas was not insane, would be ignored by the police, by the Commission of Enquiry and also during Tsafendas’s summary trial.

³¹⁵⁹ This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second ‘not’ within brackets.

³¹⁶⁰ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY IN LONDON

That same morning, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Cape Town received another secret telegram, this time from the South African embassy in London. It stated that Tsafendas arrived in England on May 16, 1959 and wanted to take a language test and be granted landing permission to be employed as a kitchen porter at a hotel. Both requests were refused. He then asked for permission to remain in the UK as a student, but this request was also refused and he was ordered to leave on September 2, 1959. On September 12, 1959 Tsafendas admitted himself to a mental ward claiming that he "had a fixation that he had a tapeworm." He left the hospital later in September - the exact day is not given - with the police looking for him since he was now in the country illegally. Tsafendas admitted himself to the Whitecroft Hospital in the Isle of Wight on October 4, 1959. On December 3, 1959, he was arrested at the hospital and deported to Germany.³¹⁶¹

MEMORANDUM OF THE SPECIAL BRANCH OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE IN SALISBURY³¹⁶²

On this day, the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Salisbury, Rhodesia, sent its first report regarding Demitrio Tsafendas to the South African Police:

MEMORANDUM

XY6. 194/B/11/22.

Demitrio TSAFENDAS

1. *The abovenamed, born in Lourenço Marques, Portuguese East Africa, on the 14th January, 1918, first entered Rhodesia at Bulawayo by train on the 19th July, 1964. He was travelling on Portuguese passports number 6511/63, issued in Lourenço Marques on the*

³¹⁶¹ Secret Telegram from the South African Embassy in London to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

³¹⁶² Memorandum of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Salisbury regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

2nd November 1963, and valid until the 2nd November, 1965. He gave his race as white, his marital status as single and his nationality as Portuguese.

2. *Stating that his last permanent address was 600 Proclamation Hill Café, West End, Pretoria, he said that his occupations were Linguist, Translator, Interpreter and Maintenance Fitter. He was in possession of £50 and gave the purpose of his entry as a visit to his sister, Catherine HARALAMBOS, of Marandellas Store, Marandellas.*

3. *He was granted an Alien's Tourist Permit, valid to the 9th August, 1964, and it is noted that this permit is endorsed with a stamp indicating that he re-entered Rhodesia via Salisbury Airport on the 27th July, 1964, until this date and no indication as to the country from which he re-entered.*

4. *On the 11th August, 1964, following the expiry of his Alien's Tourist Permit, TSAFENDAS was requested to produce a return ticket to South Africa or to pay a deposit if he required an extension. At this stage he sought employment in Rhodesia from the Public Services Board, an official of which asked the Immigration Department if there was a vacancy to which, as a linguist, he could be appointed.*

5. *The Immigration authorities wrote to TSAFENDAS at the O.E. Bottle Store and Liquosetto, Efthyvoulos House, King George Road, Avondale, on the 19th August, 1964, informing him that his permit had expired and that he must immediately report to their offices. On the following day they informed the Public Services Board that TSAFENDAS was in the country illegally and could not be given employment in Rhodesia.*

6. *He reported to the Immigration offices on the 21st August, 1964, stating that he was without funds and was seeking employment. He was informed that, as he was not in possession of a Police Certificate, the Residence Permit for which he would have to apply before being permitted to work would take a minimum of four weeks to be completed, and that he could not be allowed to remain in the country during that period. He then stated that he had once been a missionary in Egypt and North Africa and belonged to a Christian community which was not a recognised denomination and had no church. From this community he had received the cost of a rail fare to Vila de Manica. He was then advised to leave Rhodesia on the following day, and he accordingly departed by train, crossing the border at Umtali on the 22nd August, 1964.*

7. *TSAFENDAS again entered Rhodesia at Umtali on the 9th October, 1964. He was not in possession of the required visa and was declared a prohibited immigrant in terms of Section 6 of the Immigration Act, 1954. On this occasion he gave his intended destination*

as Galanakis Grocery Store, Main Street, Umtali, his race as Greek and his nationality as Portuguese. His last permanent address was 600 Church Street, West End, Pretoria and he stated that he was employed as an Interpreter and Technician by the Companhia Do Pipeline Mocambique, on whose behalf he wished to enter on a business visit to the Hume Pipe Company. He was given a Temporary Permit for two weeks, but when the circumstances of his previous visit became known, the permit was withdrawn on the following day and he was instructed to leave Rhodesia forthwith. He accordingly departed from Umtali on the 10th October, 1964.

Special Branch Headquarters,

SALISBURY.

9th September, 1966.

STATEMENTS

FATHER HANNO PROBST³¹⁶³

Priest, white male, Manete, Dist. Mtuhzini. 5.45 pm.

Sometime during 1965 I cannot remember the month, I went to Mandini store. When I came out of the store, I saw a man sitting on a bench in front of the store and I noticed that one of his arms was bandaged. He looked a bit lost and I went up to him and asked him what had happened. He told me that he had been stabbed in the arm. I could see that he was not a South African, and I asked him whether he had come from Mozambique, he said "how do you know that" I told him that I could see. He started swearing at the Mozambique Government, and said that they had no sense and did nothing for the black people. I said to him, you are a Portuguese and you should love your Government and when you behave in that spirit, you are not liked in South Africa. I asked him how long he had been in Mozambique, he said that he was not there for long.

He told me that he could speak eight languages. I tried him with a few languages and I found that he spoke them all perfectly. He asked where I was born, I told him that I was

³¹⁶³ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

born near Munich in Germany. He then started to talk in Munich dialect. I then tried him in Spanish, Italian, German tried a few words in Czech and he answered me in Czech. I asked him where he had learned all these languages, he told me that he was in Russia and that he had learned these languages in a training school in Russia.

He asked me to which church I belonged and I told him that I was a Roman Catholic Priest. He started to swear against the Roman Catholic Church and said that they should be done away with. I asked him why and he said that in Mozambique the Roman Catholic Sisters in the Hospitals Inject the Bantu people with something to get rid of them, and they died like flies and it is being done with the approval of the Mozambique Government. I told him that it was the same propaganda like in the Congo, against the sisters. I said to him you speak like a Semba of the Congo. I got annoyed with him and I warned him about his attitude, told him that he would not get very far in South Africa, I called him a communist and I left him.

NIKOLAAS JACOBUS NEL³¹⁶⁴

I am a 34 year old white male resident at the above address and working in Howden, James and Safanco, Booysens.

About the middle of 1964, I was still working at FA Poole Engineering Works, Carl Street, Pretoria West. The same time there was a man working with the name Dimitrio Tsafendas. He is the same person who is currently accused of killing Dr. Verwoerd. Accused was employed as a Fitter and Welder. While the accused and I were busy off-loading cranes from the truck on a certain day, we had quarrelled. He wanted to exercise authority, while I was in charge of the specific work and the Bantus who were helping us. During our argument the accused threatened that he would stab me with a knife. He had no knife with him nor did he bring one forth. Accused and I never spoke to each other again. Accused was certainly unpopular among white workers. Accused adapted more to the non-whites. He could speak several languages and seemed normal. Accused had a messy and dirty appearance. I do not know much more of him because I did not want to have anything to do with him after of our

³¹⁶⁴ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

argument. Accused said he was of Greek descent. However I cannot say which nationality he was from.

JAN BANIS³¹⁶⁵

White male, employed at Quix Snax, Cape Town.

I met him (Tsafendas) about three months ago, when he came to eat at 42 Chamberlain Street, Woodstock. He was a table boarder at this address. I saw him there on and off for about a month before I first had occasion to speak to him. I asked him where he was employed and he told me that he was looking for a job. He then told me his name. He told me that he had found a job in South West Africa, but before going there he was going to take a job in the House of Parliament for two months. He did not tell me why he wants a job in the House of Parliament.

GLADSTONE DUNN³¹⁶⁶

54 years old, Coloured Male, Good Hope Farm, Dist Mtunzini. 4.00 pm.

During May, 1965, a man came to my house. He introduced himself to me as Demitrio Tsafendas. He told me that he had just come from court, where he had charged another man with assault on himself, but that the other man was found not guilty. He told me that he was working for Fraser and Chalmers at Mandeni, that the assault took place in the messroom. He told me that before he had come to Mandeni, he had heard about me from E. Barbeau, 41 Botanic Avenue, Durban. Tsafendas spoke about religion, it then transpired that both of us belonged to the same Faith. I belong to Christs Church. During the conversation Tsafendas told me that the present Government was not playing fair with the non-whites. He said that the wages paid to non-whites was very unsatisfactory, as well as the political situation. When he said this to me, I asked him why he did not go back to the place where he had come from.

³¹⁶⁵ Jan Banis statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³¹⁶⁶ Gladstone Dunn statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

He said that he could not get on there.

He also told me that from here he would be going to Cape Town where he will change his identity, he said that he would become a coloured. He told me that he had been to Germany, France, Portugal and South America. He said that while he was in Portugal he refused to join the army and was imprisoned and after his release he returned to Mozambique. He also told me that he could not get on with his family and that they did not want to have anything to do with him... He told me that he came to Durban where he got a job at the law courts as an interpreter, from there he went to the railways where he also worked. I cannot remember what he did on the railways. When he left the railways he came to Mandeni where he worked for Frazer and Chalmers. He slept the night at my house and the next morning I took him back to Mandeni.

ANTONIO TEIXEIRA DA SILVA³¹⁶⁷

Welder at F.A. Poole's Engineering Works, Pretoria

I started employment with, this firm during March 1964 and saw the accused Demetrio Tsafendas for the first time. He was also employed by this firm. I met him on the first day as I was working next to him in the shop. During the first two days of my employment I had a conversation with the accused and he made enquiries what I did whilst in Mozambique. I told him that I served in the Portuguese Army for three years.

He then enquired how life in the army was and what salary I got. He also asked me whether the army had many activities and whether we often had trouble with the natives. I told him that the only thing I had against the army was that the period of training was too long. The accused also questioned me as to what my opinion was about Dr. Salazar the Prime Minister of Portugal. I told him that I was not interested in discussing this with him. Soon after this discussion, I noticed that the accused became aggressive towards me and started accusing me falsely of not doing my work properly. He also made several reports against me to the works foreman Mr. Vercueil. The accused pretended that he was an educated man but according to his manners and approach to other people I would say that

³¹⁶⁷ Antonio Teixeira Da Silva statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

he was very ill-mannered. Otherwise the accused was acting normal and I never noticed anything wrong with him. I have seen an insane person before but I can state that the accused never behaved as an insane person whilst employed here.

ROSAMUND ELIZABETH POPKISS³¹⁶⁸

Aldor Apartments, Rustenburg Avenue, Rondebosch.

I am the temporary manageress of the above-mentioned apartments. On 31.6.1966 Mr. Dimitrio Tsafendas moved into room no.7 which was vacant and which was advertised. The rent for the room is R20 p.m. Although he spoke to some of the other residents he seemed very reserved. On Monday 5.9. 1966 at about 6.30 p.m. I met him outside in the garden. I was looking for ray cat and he was just walking up and down. To me he looked very worried. I then spoke to him and asked him whether he saw my cat. I told him that I was very worried about the cat. He then said that he was also very worried and that he had something on his mind. I did not peruse this any further and left him there.

Rondebosch. 9.9.1966. 8.20 pm.

(SGD.) R.E. Popkiss.

Statement taken by me. (SGD.) A.J. van Dyk. Captain.

FRANK WALTER WARING³¹⁶⁹

White male, Cabinet Minister in the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Cape Town, 5.30 pm.

On 6/9/66 I entered the Assembly shortly after the bells rang at 2.10 p.m. and sat down at my desk. My desk is behind and to the right of that of the Prime Minister... A noise attracted my attention and I looked up to see Dr. Donges apparently trying to clutch at

³¹⁶⁸ Rosamund Elizabeth Popkiss statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/8, NASA.

³¹⁶⁹ Frank Walter Waring statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

someone who, at the same time, I saw plunge something into the right hand shoulder of Dr. Verwoerd. I jumped at him and put a neck lock on him and pulled him away. He resisted and seemed to play around with his arms to get out of my grip. I pulled him further back and over on top of me on the bench of Dr. Donges which is to the right of that of the Prime Minister.

It was then that I saw he had a large dagger, of the type exhibited, in his hand. His hand movements were now restricted by the bench and desk, although momentarily, his hand freely held the dagger. In a matter of seconds, however, his hand was held by other members and the dagger removed. He was then pulled off me and when I got up, also in a matter of seconds, was on the floor where I grabbed hold of his right leg and could see his face clearly for the first time. Those who held him on the floor were making an effort to drag him outside. At that stage the State President's body-guard, Capt. Buytenbach also grabbed hold of his leg and told me to leave it to him which I did and moved away and sat next to Sen. Trollip. Some ten minutes later it was pointed out to me that the left hand leg of my trousers had two tears which appeared could have been made by the dagger. The one is about two inches and the other about one inch in length. I, however, received no injuries.

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

Perhaps the biggest story of the day was a false one, a report in the *Rand Daily Mail* that Amelia Williams, Tsafendas's mother, was alive and living in Lourenço Marques. The *Mail* had lifted the erroneous report from the Portuguese newspaper, *Diario de Lisboa*, of the previous day.³¹⁷⁰ It was one of a number of false stories published about Tsafendas at the time. The *Cape Times* reported that police had visited a mill at Mandini where Tsafendas had a fight with a fellow worker, Nikolas Vergos, and took statements from men who met Tsafendas.³¹⁷¹ However, only one statement taken that day in Mandini was found in the National Archives, that of Gladstone Dunn.³¹⁷² This must mean either only this man gave a statement that day or the other statements have gone missing.

³¹⁷⁰ *Diario de Lisboa*, 8 September 1966, 'A mae de Dimitrio ainda vive nos arredores de Lourenço Marques'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 September 1966, 'Tsafendas' Mother still alive'; *Diario de Lisboa*, 13 September 1966, 'Localizada a Mae de Tsafendas.'

³¹⁷¹ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, 'Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.'

³¹⁷² Gladstone Dunn statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Further newspaper investigations of Tsafendas's past turned up Nikolas Vergos of Johannesburg, aged sixty-one (of fifty-four according to other reports), who described a fight he had with Tsafendas when they worked for the same company in Mandini, Zululand, in May, 1965. Vergos said one day in the canteen, Tsafendas knocked him to the ground twice and so he drew a razor and slashed his wrist. He thought Tsafendas hit him "because he resented the fact I would have nothing to do with him." The men's foreman, Charles Woods, described Tsafendas as a very good worker and "far from being a crank. He seemed to be a fairly intelligent man but he was a violent type and we couldn't keep him."³¹⁷³

The *Daily Dispatch* carried a reproduction of Tsafendas's signature and an analysis by Dr. R.M. Schweitzer of East London, South Africa, who it described as a graphologist of thirty years' standing. Dr. Schweitzer managed to portray Tsafendas quite accurately, indeed more accurately than any psychiatrist would do in his summary trial. He suggested the writer experienced difficulty in accepting discipline, had unsteady working habits, showed evidence of vindictiveness, but was idealistic, a person of great enthusiasm and a quick thinker. By studying loops, whirls and letter shapes, Schweitzer concluded that the signatory was intelligent and "capable of learning and thinking logically and can at times co-operate," but he also nurtured emotional inhibitions and needed more sympathy in his emotional life. By underlining his signature three times, the writer signalled that he could be extremely vain.³¹⁷⁴

The written media presented a jumble of false claims about Tsafendas. The *Pretoria News* said Tsafendas lived in Pretoria for about two years. It quoted an unnamed colleague of Tsafendas at a city engineering firm as saying that Tsafendas lived in an empty car packing box. "In the evenings he bought meat and fried it on the fire at work, then he would take it back to his motor-car box," the man said.³¹⁷⁵ The story did not name the company, which must have been City Engineering or FA Poole Engineering Works, as these were the only two firms Tsafendas worked for in Pretoria, apart from his sister's café. Every aspect of the story is false. Tsafendas lived in Pretoria for nine months, not two years and he lived for a few days at his half-sister's house, for a few weeks at Fotini Gavasiadis's house and then for the rest of his time in the rent-free-apartment given to him by Nick Vlachopoulos. His whole family

³¹⁷³ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, 'Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.'

³¹⁷⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'The hand the killer wrote',

³¹⁷⁵ *Pretoria News*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'Dimitrio lived in Pretoria.'

testified to the Commission of Enquiry that “he always had proper accommodation in Pretoria.”³¹⁷⁶

The author also asked two people, Fotni Gavasiadis and Mary Eendracht, who saw a lot of Tsafendas at the time and both dismissed the newspaper’s report. Tsafendas lived in the house of Fotini Gavasiadis and her husband Markos for several weeks. When he left, he moved into an apartment next to their house, where he stayed for the next eight months, seeing Fotini and Markos every day, and spending a lot of his time at their home. Tsafendas and Fotini also worked together for nine months in her brother’s café. Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas’s cousin, lived in Pretoria at the time and was close to him throughout his stay. Both characterised the report as a “lie” and confirmed that throughout his time in Pretoria Tsafendas had only lived either with Marika in her house, or with Fotini and Markos in their house or in the rent-free apartment given to him by Vlachopoulos and never in a packing case.³¹⁷⁷

A *Cape Times* story said Tsafendas was stopped by Israeli border police in Jerusalem on January 22, 1961. The newspaper’s London correspondent said Tsafendas arrived at the Mandelbaum Gate at the entrance to the old city of Jerusalem with a Portuguese passport issued in Hamburg but without money. He said he was sure the Greek churches in Israel would not let him starve. The immigration officer turned Tsafendas over to the security police, who denied him entry.³¹⁷⁸ In about October 1964, Tsafendas was seen in Umtali, Rhodesia, where he visited a café. The lady owner was curious about his teeth, which looked as if they were made of silver. She quoted Tsafendas as saying they were false teeth which were made for him when he visited Russia. He said he travelled a lot and did not belong to any country.³¹⁷⁹ Police in Cape Town combed the city for anyone who had met or had any associations with Tsafendas, but it was believed that nothing had been discovered that remotely connected Tsafendas with any political organisation in South Africa or abroad.³¹⁸⁰

³¹⁷⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

³¹⁷⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

³¹⁷⁸ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas: Fear for life.’

³¹⁷⁹ *The Umtali Post*, 9 September 1966: 1, ‘Assassin was seen in Umtali.’

³¹⁸⁰ *The Australian*, 9 September 1966, ‘Search goes on for killer’s friends.’

SATURDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER 1966

STATEMENTS

COSTAS MICHAELETOS³¹⁸¹³¹⁸²

White man, 51 years, born in Greece, South African citizenship acquired during 1955, owner of Metro Cafe, Vryburg, telephone number 213, declares:

I am well acquainted with the alleged attacker of the late Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, His Excellency Dr. H. F. Verwoerd. The full name of the attacker is Dimetrios Tsafantakis or Mimis and he is of mixed descent. His father is a Greek by birth and his mother was a Portuguese Coloured woman. Tsafantakis is an illegitimate child and was born in Lourenço Marques at about 1916. The exact date of his birth is unknown to me.

Dimetrios Tsafantakis' father is Michael Tsafantakis who emigrated from the island Crete to Mozambique. Michael Tsafantakis is a brother of my uncle, George Michaeletos's wife. George Michaeletos is currently living at PO Box 187, Lourenço Marques. George Michaeletos married Diana Artemis.

During the time Dimetrios Tsafantakis was born, I was also living in Lourenço Marques and Dimetrios Tsafantakis grew up before me, and I even taught him at school in Lourenço Marques. Later Dimetrios Tsafantakis went to Middelburg (Transvaal) where he completed his schooling.

The father of Dimetrios Tsafantakis was seeing a Portuguese Coloured woman named Amelia. Because of the relationship between Michael Tsafantakis and Amelia, Dimitri Tsafantakis was born out of wedlock. Michael Tsafantakis has discussed the birth of his illegitimate child with me several times.

When Dimetrios Tsafantakis was about 10 years old, his father married a Greek girl with the name Marika Sakelis, who hails from Port Said and from this marriage three children were born in with the name -

³¹⁸¹ Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³¹⁸² The correct spelling is Michaeletos, not Michaeletos.

a) *Bagela, a daughter who later married a certain Nissiotis, who currently owns a cafe at the Municipal Market in Pretoria and who is well known to the Greek community in Pretoria.*

b) *Victor, a son who has a disability in his left leg.*

c) *Then there was a daughter named Bussa, who later married a Greek, presumably with the name Kuwaris. The Kuwaris' owns a cafe in Pretoria but the name of the cafe is unknown.*

Dimetrios Tsafantakis is well known to a certain Tamos Tamburazis who works at the Tattersalls in Pretoria.

Dimetrios Tsafantakis grew up with his half brothers and sisters and was always treated as part of the family.

During 1933-1934, Dimetrios Tsafantakis left Lourenço Marques when he joined the Navy. I can, however, not say which country's navy Dimetrios Tsafantakis joined.

I left Lourenço Marques during 1935 and came to South Africa and shortly afterwards the Tsafantakis family also came to South Africa. Michael Tsafantakis worked about 20 years for Iscor, Pretoria. Michael Tsafantakis died about four years ago. Michael Tsafantakis' wife is still living somewhere in Pretoria, but her address is unknown to me.

Since Dimetrios Tsafantakis left Lourenço Marques during 1933-1934, I had not seen him again. On 8/9/66, however, I saw a picture of Dimetrios Tsafantakis in the newspaper and recognized him immediately. Dimetrios Tsafantakis looks just like his father.

Dr. John Michaeletos who also had his schooling in Middelburg (Transvaal) and went to school with Dimetrios, is currently a physician in Greece. He has a clinic in Athens, Greece. Dr. John Michaeletos' mother, Sophia Michaeletos, lives in Aharnon Street, Athens.

There is also a professor John Michaeletos in Greece, but I do not know where he currently finds himself. When I visited Greece in 1952, I heard that he was an active communist. I also think that the doctor and the professor know each other. Mrs. Helen Kallos, the Greek consulate in Cape Town is well acquainted with both the doctor and the professor. Mrs. Kallos' maiden name is also Michaeletos and she is a cousin of mine.

Ever since I knew Dimetrios Tsafantakis, I never/anytime observed that he showed any deviations. He also never was an aggressive type person. I am aware of the fact that Dimetrios Tsafantakis was a withdrawn type person, possibly due to the fact that he never actually was recognized as a member of his family.

The letter which was found in the Bible of Dimetrios Tsafantakis, supposedly comes from Dr. John Michaeletos of Athens, because they know each other well and grew up together.

Of the actions of Dimetrios Tsafantakis as a mature person I have no knowledge.

That's all I want to say.

COMMENTS ON MICHALETOS'S STATEMENT

As we can see, Michaeletos was asked by the police about a "John Michaeletos" who corresponded with Tsafendas (a letter of his was found inside a Bible). It seems highly unlikely that the police would have made enquiries about a simple pen friend of Tsafendas, given that at the same time he was corresponding with several people overseas – for example, Father Nikola Banovic and Limasollu Naci in Istanbul – and none of them, as far as the author can establish, was contacted about his relationship with him. The fact that Tsafendas's friend John Michaeletos was a member of the Greek Communist Party and of the DSE, and had even recruited Tsafendas into the DSE, must have been known to the police; that is surely why they made inquiries about him. Such information could have easily become known to the police through the interrogation of Tsafendas or the content of the letter. The fact also that Costas Michaeletos then explicitly refers to one of the two "John Michaeletos" he mentions as "an active communist", suggests further that he was specifically asked about the political ideas of that person. Furthermore, as we will later see, the fact that subsequently the South African police and the Commission of Enquiry made inquiries regarding this "Michaeletos" to PIDE, and almost certainly to the Greek police too, suggests even more strongly that the man they were looking for was not just a pen friend.

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY REPORT OF THE SPECIAL BRANCH OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE IN UMTALI

On September 10, a second confidential security report from the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Rhodesia, written by D/S/O/ Stannard, was sent to the South African police. It contained information about Tsafendas's movements in Rhodesia, plus interviews from people in the country who knew him.

It has been ascertained that, on the 9th October, 1964, Demitrio Tsafendas entered Umtali from Mocambique through Forbes Border Post. Immigration register details state that Tsafendas gave out that he was Portuguese, and a Technician from Pretoria. A Temporary Permit, No. 892, was issued to him, valid until 23rd October, 1964.

Tsafendas gave out that he was on a business visit to the Hume Pipeline, and that his address in Umtali would c/o Mr. GALANAKIS, Main Street, Umtali. His Permit instructions were that he was to leave Rhodesia though Bulawayo/Beit Bridge. Immediately beneath this entry, and on the same date, was the fact that one, Carmelo da Silva, Portuguese, a clerk in Beira, had entered Rhodesia en route to Salisbury. It is possible, although not confirmed, that Tsafendas entered in this man's company. Photostat copies of the Temporary Permit are attached for your information and retention.

It has been ascertained that Tsafendas visited the Umtali Green Grocers, situated in Main Street and spoke to Nikolas George SPANOS, the owner. SPANOS has been interviewed and states that he remembers this occasion, and states that TSAFENDAS said that he was on a business trip. He asked SPANOS if he was from Egypt, and whether or not he spoke any foreign languages. Spoke to SPANOS in French, and Greek, but when asked what nationality he was, he declined to comment. SPANOS states that he was a mysterious man. SPANOS was asked if he was related to GALANAKIS. He replied that he was a cousin, and thereafter referred TSAFENDAS to John GALANAKIS, who owns the Gala's Cash Store, Main Street, Umtali.

John GALANAKIS stated that Tsafendas entered his shop, having been referred to him by SPANOS. He states that he formed the impression at the time that TSAFENDAS was on the scrounge, but realised that he was an intelligent man and that he spoke Greek, Portuguese and Afrikaans fluently. He asked GALANAKIS how Africans in this country live and what their conditions were. He also stated that he had owned some form of tapestry factory in Madeira, but that this concern had since fallen through, and that he was looking for employment. He stated that he might try and secure employment with the Oil Refinery, as he considered he would be an asset, being fluent in several foreign languages. He asked GALANAKIS if he could rent his farm in Vila Nanica, Mocambique, but this offer was declined, as GALANAKIS realised he had no money. TSAFENDAS stated that he was looking for accommodation, and in this regard, he was introduced to the local Greek priest Father

CONDOS, who approached one Mrs KAVADIAS. She agreed to accommodate him and he is known to have stayed there for two nights.

Father CONDOS when seen reiterated what GALANAKIS has said, and stated that he merely secured accommodation for him. He did add, however, that he was convinced that TSAFENDAS was not of Greek origin, but of Turkish extract.

Mrs. Helen GRISPOS, the daughter of Mrs. KAVADIAS, was seen and stated that she met Tsafendas while he stayed with her mother. Described him as being well mannered and intelligent. She stated that he was collected by Immigration officials after his two nights with her mother as his papers were not in order, and that he would have to go.

TSAFENDAS was also known to have visited the Vumba Milk Bar, owned by Mr. Spiros RAFTOPOULOS. RAFTOPOULOS stated that he remembered this man well, and that he visited his shop on two occasions. He mentioned that he was trying to secure a job with the Pipelines. RAFTOPOULOS mentioned that the most outstanding thing" about Tsafendas was his silver or platinum coloured teeth. When he asked TSAFENDAS about this, he replied that he had them done while he was staying in Russia. He also mentioned that he was born in Lourenço Marques, but that he had not been there for some considerable time, and that he had visited Cyprus, Turkey, and in fact, most places in the world.

It is known that Tsafendas visited two Greeks in Gondola after being declared a Prohibited Immigrant. These two Greeks are Andrew KAVALIERATOS and Paul BABIOLAKIS. He was arrested by the Portuguese Police at Maforga, 5 miles from Gondola, when he was living and mining with Africans in that area. He was thereafter conveyed to Beira for interrogation. He was not seen in Umtali since that occasion.

All the persons above state that Tsafendas had silver and platinum coloured teeth. The only luggage Tsafendas had was one small blue suitcase.

Comments: *Mrs. KAVADIAS is now living at Cedult Farm, 10 mile peg, Melsetter road. Enquires continue to ascertain whether or not there was any connection between TSAFENDAS and GALANAKIS. It is considered curious that TSAFENDAS should give the name GALANAKIS as his address when entering Rhodesia, and yet GALANAKIS states that he only met with him by chance, having been referred to him by his cousin SPANOS. It is also understood that TSAFENDAS visited Rhodesia on two previous occasions in July and August,*

1964, via Bulawayo and Salisbury, and that he left Rhodesia via Umtali by train on the 22nd August, 1964.

Special Branch Headquarters,

Salisbury.

9th September, 1966.³¹⁸³

COMMENTS OF HELEN GRISPOS AND ANDREAS BABIOLAKIS TO THE AUTHOR REGARDING THEIR STATEMENTS

For unknown reasons, Sophia Kavadias was apparently not questioned by Special Branch, although Tsafendas stayed at her house and was arrested there. She had long known Tsafendas and his family, having lived next door to them in Lourenço Marques in the mid-1930s. However, her daughter, Helen Grispos, was questioned. Helen was married to George Grispos, who was a very close friend of Tsafendas and his schoolmate in Lourenço Marques. In an interview with the author, Helen Grispos remembered the police asking her about Tsafendas after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination:

“I don't remember if my mother spoke to the police then ... I remember George was away in Mozambique at the time, so he was not questioned... I can't remember if he was questioned by the police in Mozambique, but I think not ... I don't remember at all what I told them [the police] ... I don't think I would have mentioned that he was a Communist.” Asked if she told the police that her husband was Tsafendas's friend, she replied, “I don't remember, but I don't think I would have done it after what he [Tsafendas] did!”³¹⁸⁴

Andreas Babiolakis was a good friend of Tsafendas from childhood and had stayed at his house in Beira for a couple of months. In a personal interview with the author, he said that he and Kavallieratos were questioned by the police after the assassination. However, their statements were not found in the archives. Babiolakis does not remember exactly what he told the police or by whom he was questioned. He clearly remembers trying to distance himself from Tsafendas as much as possible, but also telling the police about Tsafendas's two

³¹⁸³ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

³¹⁸⁴ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

arrests in Beira two years earlier, knowing that they would be aware of them. As for the Report's question regarding Galanakis's statement that he only met Tsafendas by chance, it is true that Galanakis knew Tsafendas from the past, very probably from back when they were children. He obviously lied in order to distance himself from Tsafendas, as did most people at the time.³¹⁸⁵

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

Five days after the assassination, newspapers reported that Tsafendas would appear for summary trial in the Cape Town Supreme Court on a charge of murder. *The Cape Times* said the Judge-President of the Cape, Mr. Justice Beyers, would probably preside with two assessors; the Attorney General of the Cape, Mr. Willem van den Berg, would appear for the State, and Judge Beyers would likely appoint a defence advocate, or two, for Tsafendas. Van den Berg was expected to spend the weekend studying statements from the police, after which an indictment would be drawn up.³¹⁸⁶

The Daily Dispatch quoted van den Berg as saying that the tightest possible security measures would be taken. "Everything possible will be done to see that these measures are watertight for the safety of all concerned," he said. The available courts were small, seating no more than 120 members of the public and only four reporters. Special measures would be taken to accommodate more Press representatives. Tsafendas was still being held at Caledon Square police station.³¹⁸⁷

The New York Times reported that Tsafendas carried on a twenty-year feud with the United States, culminating in a demand for extensive damages. In an affidavit drawn up by lawyers in Cape Town, Tsafendas declared he was suing the United States for \$100,000 because in 1947 he was deported by US authorities to Greece instead of to South Africa, as he wished. He also claimed \$50,000 for loss of salary and mental and physical suffering and \$50,000 for "inconvenience imposed upon me during the past twenty years, which was entirely due to the negligence of the American authorities."³¹⁸⁸ In a dispatch from Washington, *The New York Times* reported that Tsafendas had been deported from the USA

³¹⁸⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

³¹⁸⁶ *The Cape Times*, 10 September 1966:1, 'Top security for trial of assassin.'

³¹⁸⁷ *Daily Dispatch*, 10 September 1966: 1, 'Security clamp-down for trial of Tsafendas.'

³¹⁸⁸ *The New York Times*, 10 September 1966: 15, 'Assassin planned suit against the USA.'

in 1947 on grounds that he entered the country illegally. There was no record of his having sued the United States but he had threatened to do so during numerous visits to the US Consulate in Cape Town.³¹⁸⁹

Newspapers began searching for any news about Tsafendas, even if it was previously published elsewhere. The *Dagbreek* and *The Star* printed the report of Tsafendas being picked up in Mozambique with five passports, his arrests there (two according to *The Star* and three according to *Dagbreek*) and his deportation after the Second World War because of “communist activities.”³¹⁹⁰ *The Star* also published the story that had been in the *Pretoria News* two days earlier about Tsafendas telling an acquaintance he could not leave Cape Town because he “had a job to finish here first.”³¹⁹¹ The *Natal Witness* republished interviews with some of Tsafendas’s Frankfurt colleagues.³¹⁹²

DR. VERWOERD’S FUNERAL

Dr. Verwoerd’s body, accompanied by his bulldog Punch, was flown from Cape Town to Pretoria on September 8.³¹⁹³ Wilhelm Verwoerd, Dr. Verwoerd’s eldest son, wanted a small, family funeral, but government ministers insisted that a State funeral was necessary and he eventually agreed.³¹⁹⁴ Dr. Verwoerd was buried on Saturday, September 10, at 2.15. A mile-long cortege, led by a Mounted police escort, processed through the heart of the capital to Heroes’ Acre in the Old Cemetery on Church Street West. The ceremonies were watched by the biggest crowd ever seen in South Africa, estimated at 250.000.³¹⁹⁵

The State funeral began with a one-hour religious service in the amphitheatre of the Union Buildings, attended by 10,000 people led by State President Charles Robert Swart and including many diplomats in formal dress. The only national leader mentioned was Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia. Separately, in the shadow of the West Wing, sat

³¹⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, 11 September 1966, ‘Records show deportation.’

³¹⁹⁰ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas het vir V.V. in Persie gewerk’; *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, ‘Assassin had five passports.’

³¹⁹¹ *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, ‘He had a ‘job’ to do.’

³¹⁹² *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

³¹⁹³ *The Globe and Mail*, 9 September 1966: 4, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s slayer appears for formal hearing in court.’

³¹⁹⁴ Goodman, 2001: 154-155.

³¹⁹⁵ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 6th September and 7th September, 1966; 2015-2016; *Personality*, 29 September 1966: 19-24, ‘The State funeral of Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, Prime Minister’; *Scope*, 23 September 1966: 12-18, ‘The entire nation mourns ... and a critical world press passes caustic comments’; *The Star*, 11 September 1966: 1, ‘Vast crowds pay last respects to Dr. Verwoerd.’

Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima and some twenty Africans representing seven ethnic groups. Representatives of the Indian and Coloured communities also sat there.³¹⁹⁶

The coffin was carried in by eight military officers flanked by eight senior Cabinet ministers and the mourners rose when Mrs. Dr. Verwoerd took her place with her children. The national anthem rang out and an Air Force guard of honour saluted as the casket was placed on a purple and black draped catafalque in front of the pulpit. The service was conducted by the Rev. J.H. Louw of the Pretoria East Ned Geref Kerk, of which Dr. Verwoerd was a member; the Lesson was read by Church of England Bishop S.C. Bradley, and the funeral eulogy was delivered by the Rev. J.S. Gericke, Moderator of the Ned Geref Kerk of the Cape.³¹⁹⁷

The service lasted for just over an hour, whereupon the cortege moved slowly towards the cemetery headed by thirty-eight Mounted Policemen, motorised army detachments and four hundred troops. Overhead, in a clear blue sky, flights of Harvard aircraft formed the letters "HV." The committal at the cemetery was restricted to family and the Cabinet, but as the coffin was carried to the graveside, the thousands gathered outside heard nineteen-gun salvos fired from the hills around Pretoria.³¹⁹⁸ The funeral proceedings were aired by the South African Broadcasting Corporation in eleven different languages so that people from all around the world could follow them.³¹⁹⁹

Die Vaderland, the National Party's mouthpiece, declared on its front page that although Dr. Verwoerd was gone, "his message remains."³²⁰⁰ Most of the foreign press was not so complimentary. David Holden of the London *Sunday Times* wrote: "So now he goes, respected by many, hated perhaps by many more according to the colour of their skin, but not apparently very much loved. His former minions have surrounded his funeral with some of that aloofness and isolation that characterised his policies by refusing all visiting correspondents like myself any official facilities for covering the event." John Griff of the London *Guardian* wrote: "He leaves behind him a system established by force, and which

³¹⁹⁶ *The New York Times*, 11 September 1966, '10.000 people attend funeral service'; *The Canberra Times*, 12 September 1966: 5, 'Dr. Verwoerd buried in Heroes' Acre.'

³¹⁹⁷ *The Times* (London), 12 September 1966: 7, 'Hundreds file past grave of Dr. Verwoerd'; *The Cape Argus*, 11 September 1966: 1 (late edition), 'Magnificence for "quiet man"'; *The Star*, 11 September 1966: 1, 'Vast crowds pay last respects to Dr. Verwoerd.'

³¹⁹⁸ *The Illustrated London News*, 17 September 1966: 1, 'The State funeral of Dr. Verwoerd'; *The Star*, 11 September 1966: 1, 'Vast crowds pay last respects to Dr. Verwoerd.'

³¹⁹⁹ *The Cape Times*, n.d. 'State funeral on air in 11 languages.'

³²⁰⁰ *Die Vaderland*, 10 September 1966: 1, 'Hy is weg, maar syboodskap bly.'

only force can destroy ... His work may endure for several generations – the power of the modern state is so hard to shake – but in the long run it must surely be doomed.”³²⁰¹

³²⁰¹ *Scope*, 23 September 1966: 12-18, ‘The entire nation mourns ... and a critical world press passes caustic comments.’

SUNDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER 1966

TSAFENDAS'S STATEMENT TO THE POLICE³²⁰²

Major Rossouw questioned Tsafendas in a session which started on this day, September 11, and ended on September 12. Copies of the transcript were found in the National Archives in Pretoria. Maj. Rossouw, head of the Security Police in Cape Town, was an experienced interrogator, having also questioned John Harris, Stephanie Kemp and other ARM members, all of whom were tortured during their time in detention.³²⁰³ This is what Tsafendas told Major Rossouw:

Demetrio Tsafendakis or Tsafendas,

States:-

I have been warned by Maj. Rossouw that he is investigating a charge of murder against me arising from the death of the late Prime Minister, Dr. H. F. Dr. Verwoerd. My rights have been explained to me and I understand the warning given to me. I am in my sound and sober senses and I have not been influenced in any way to make this statement. I am prepared to make a statement.

1.

I was born on the 14th of January, 1918 in Lourenço Marques, Portuguese East Africa. My father was a marine engineer named Michael Tsafendakis. He was originally from the island of Crete and according to my knowledge, he was of Greek nationality. Only later in my life did I find out that my mother was a non-European woman, a person known in Portuguese as a Mulato woman, meaning a Portuguese Coloured woman. Her name was Amelia Williams and she was of German origin. My father wasn't married to my mother and I never knew my mother. I ascertained later that my father separated from my mother and that my father had sent me to Egypt when I was one year old. I was in Egypt until I reached the age of six. I resided in Egypt with my grandmother, i.e. my father's mother. By that time my father had

³²⁰² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³²⁰³ South African Democracy Education Trust, 2004: 362.

married again and had sent for me to be brought back to Lourenço Marques. We then lived at the Britannia Hotel. This was about 1925.

2.

I remained with my father until the year 1927 when I was sent to a kindergarten school called the Anglican Mission in L.M. As I could not get along with my stepmother, my father decided to send me to boarding school in Middelburg, Transvaal. I used to go home then only every six months.

3.

During the depression in 1930 my father lost his partnership in the firm Vucellato, a shipbuilding and engineering firm in Lourenço Marques, and because of financial difficulties he took me out of school in Middelburg and I went back to the Anglican Mission School in Lourenço Marques. I was at the latter school until 1933. From 1933-1935 I attended the Portuguese Mission School evening classes. I reached standard 5 in English and standard 4 in Portuguese.

4.

It was about 1936 when I was about 18 years old, I left L.M. and went to the Transvaal and obtained a job at the Fountains Cafe near the Pretoria railway station. I was there for about two or three months when I decided to go to Johannesburg. I worked in different places in Johannesburg. I remember working in the City Tea-room in Hillbrow, the Elgin Café in Jeppe Street and at the Cosmopolitan Restaurant.

5.

When war broke out in 1939 I started attending fulltime classes at the Progress College, Johannesburg studying to do welding. I only attended the Progress College for three months. I then obtained work at British Mining Supply Company in Eloff Street Extension, Johannesburg. I worked there until 1941 when I decided to go to Cape Town.

6.

I was in Cape Town for 15 days when I joined a merchant ship called SS Eugene Livanos, as a mess boy. Shortly after joining, the boat left for Canada. When the boat arrived in Canada I deserted. I went to the Canadian Immigration Department and told them I did not want to go back to the SS Eugene Livanos because the crew members were too rough. They were

smoking dagga and marijuana and were fighting amongst themselves. Instead of sending me to another boat I was detained by the Immigration Authorities in a detention barrack for seamen in Montreal. From there I was sent to Halifax. From this detention station me, myself and two other seamen, ran away and crossed the American border. We were arrested on the American border and sent to the American Immigration Authorities, in Boston. There we were placed on an American ship, the SS Pillory, which went to Greenland. I was not in detention while on the Pillory. I was doing war service.

7.

When the SS Pillory arrived back in Boston I got a job on a liberty ship, the name of this ship has slipped my memory. I wish to explain that I was on different liberty ships till the end of the war in 1945.

8.

At the end of the war I fell ill on one of the liberty ships on way to England. I was taken off this boat and flown to an American base in England. From there I was sent back to America. I was unconscious when I was removed from the boat. When I came to my senses I found myself in the Grafton State Hospital in Massachusetts. I was in this hospital until 1947. I do not know what the medical diagnosis was but two medical board meetings were held on my health condition. I was then asked whether I wanted to return to Africa. The medical services authorities decided to send me back to Africa, but the Immigration Authorities decided that it could not be done.

9.

I had a Portuguese passport before leaving Cape Town, but because Portugal was a neutral country and I did not want to be neutral, I obtained a Greek passport from one of the Greek Consulates in either Johannesburg or Cape Town. This puzzled the American authorities because, apart from holding a Portuguese and a Greek passport, I was then also in possession of American seaman's papers. Instead of sending me to Africa the American authorities deported me to Greece. I was a complete stranger in Greece and could not find work. In order to survive I sold my clothing which I brought from America.

10.

Eventually I managed to obtain employment with the American Reconstruction Mission under the Marshall Plan. This job was as a foreman and interpreter. I cannot say whether this was

a United Nations organization body or whether it was an American Aid Scheme. I remained on this job until 1949 when the project was concluded. I could not find alternate employment and eventually decided to go to the Greek Immigration Authorities. After some time I managed to obtain a refugee passport. I had no money and went to a shipping company where I was allowed to work my way on a ship, the Correnthia, to Marseilles.

11.

I left the boat at Marseilles and as I could not get a job there I went to Paris. I went by train after having purchased a train ticket with the money I had from my previous employment. This was during 1949. I moved from there to Ruan and Marseilles and back to Paris without being able to find work. From Paris I boarded a train through Spain to Portugal. I arrived in Portugal towards the end of 1949.

12.

When I arrived in Portugal with the refugee passport the immigration authorities did not recognise my passport and consequently detained me for about 6 months. I had already lost my Portuguese passport while in Canada. Before I left Greece I handed in my Greek passport in order to obtain a refugee passport. From the military detention depot I was sent to Machine Gun Depot Nr. 1 in Lisbon. There they wanted me to do military service and I refused to do military service. I told them I was a Christian and did not want to do military service. I was accused of deserting from Portuguese East Africa and for doing military service for foreign powers.

13.

I told the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon that I had been rejected by a recruiting board in Portuguese East Africa in 1936 because of my mother being a Coloured. They said there was no racial discrimination in Portugal and there was no reason for my refusal to do military service in Portugal. I still refused to do military service on the grounds of my Christianity. I was accused of disloyalty and they eventually discarded me. I was allowed to look for work in Lisbon but I was not allowed to leave the country. I could not find work but managed to survive through selling goods as a hawker. I sold embroidery and postcards and watches mainly to shipping passengers.

14.

I remained in Portugal until about 1953. I then tried to leave the country on my refugee

passport but I was arrested by immigration authorities and was detained for over a year at the Port of Casias.

15.

After my release I managed to obtain a Portuguese passport and left for Western Germany. I also went to Sweden and Denmark. I fell ill in Western Germany and was admitted to Oxensoll Krankenhaus for about six months. I deserted from this hospital. I returned to friends in Hamburg where I had stayed before going to hospital. I went to the Portuguese authorities in Hamburg and they arranged for my return to Portugal. I went back to Portugal and remained there until 1958. I worked as a hawker as I had done before.

16.

In 1958 I went to the Brussels Fair in Belgium to sell embroidery. This was not a success on account of too much competition from the Chinese. I was all over Western Europe trying to sell embroidery. As this business was unsuccessful, I found a job with the Anglo American Fashion and Designers in Frankfurt for three months. I also worked for Fries and Son, the American Army printing works in Höchst. I remained in these jobs in Germany until 1959.

17.

In 1959 I decided to leave Western Europe and try my luck in England, When I arrived in England I had many difficulties in finding employment because I had a Portuguese passport. I did casual work. I fell ill in England and was hospitalised on the Isle of Wight for about three to four months. This was a continuation of my previous nervous trouble. The immigration authorities decided in 1959 to deport me to Germany. They wanted to deport me to Portugal but I told them I came from Germany and I asked them to send me to Germany. I found a job in Munich in a tractor factory. I remained there for six months. I received my money and decided to go to Egypt. I travelled through the Balkan States from Germany by train to Pireus harbour from where I travelled by ferry-boat to Alexandria.

18.

My purpose was to travel through the Africa States south so South Africa. I went to the Egyptian authorities and explained my plight, but instead of helping me I was detained at a place outside Cairo for about 6 months. I was sent to Alexandria where I obtained help from the Red Cross to get to Beirut on a ferry-boat. I remained at Beirut for a few days and met some people of my church - the Christian Church - and they assisted me to purchase an

airline ticket to Jerusalem. I was living on my wits for about 4 months on the Jordan River and had a look at the Holy Land.

19.

I found I was unable to get back to Southern Africa so I decided to go back to Europe through the Middle East. Eventually I managed to get through Serbia³²⁰⁴ to Beirut and from Beirut to Tripoly, from Tripoly to Loadikia, from Loadikia to Hallipo, from there to Ohms and from there to Turkey to a place called Addena and from there to Ankara through the Torres Mountains. This journey was by bus. I was in Ankara for about a month and then went to Istanbul. I managed to obtain a job there as an English teacher, in the absence of a teacher at the Tarban College. I remained there for two months. I was stuck without money and gave blood transfusions at Istanbul. I was paid about one pound for a pint of blood.

20.

Sometime during 1961 I left by train to Western Europe through the Balkan States. I went as far as Bulgaria where I got off at Sofia. I could not find a job and after two weeks I boarded a train back to Istanbul. From Istanbul I got a free ride by a fish cooling truck to Athens.

21.

I remained in Athens for a few days and then got a ferryboat from Pireus to Crete to visit my father's relatives. I was destitute then. I did not know where to find my father's relatives but managed to trace some relatives in Crete. I stayed there for three days when I was told that they could not keep me. I went to the Christian Church Mission in Hercules and then to Rethinon.³²⁰⁵ I stayed in Crete for about 20 days before I got a ferry-boat back to Pireus. From Pireus I got a bus to Corfu. From there I went by ferry-boat to Southern Italy. I went to the Vatican embassy (Portuguese) in Rome and they supplied with fare to return to Portugal.

22.

I arrive in Portugal with the intention of getting back to Africa. This was in 1962. I stayed in Portugal for over a year and during this time went to various embassies in an endeavour to obtain assistance to get back to Africa.

23.

³²⁰⁴ The spelling mistakes of names here are of the transcript, not of the author.

³²⁰⁵ The correct spelling is Heraklion and Rethimnon.

In August or September, 1963 I received amnesty and the Social Services agreed to pay my boat fare to Lourenço Marques. I left immediately on the Princippi Porfeeto and arrived in L.M. during approximately October, 1963. I stayed in L.M. with an uncle of mine for a few days. They contacted my half-brother in Pretoria and he and my stepmother came to L.M. to fetch me to Pretoria. In Pretoria I found a job with City Engineering Company in Mitchell Street, Pretoria as a maintenance fitter. I remained on this job for about three months. I then found another job with Pool Engineering in Pretoria and stayed there for about three to four months. I saved some money and then left for Rhodesia during June or July, 1964. I went to visit my half-sister, Catherine Pnematikatos. Things were politically upset in Rhodesia and I failed to find a job there. I had an apartment house in Avondale, Salisbury for one month. I left Rhodesia and went to Nyassaland in search of work. I stayed in Nyassaland at Lake Malawi for about 20 days before returning to Salisbury.

24.

Prom Salisbury I went to Umtali to look for a job with the Central African Petroleum Corporation. I failed to get a job so I crossed the Portuguese border to Beira. I found casual work in Beira and worked there for a few days. From there I found, a job with Central African Petroleum Corporation³²⁰⁶ at Gondola in Portuguese territory. I was there for about one month. I was arrested on the job by the Portuguese authorities because I criticised the Portuguese government for their policy in regard to petrol distribution. I was detained in Beira for 93 days.

25.

After my release I met business people of the Greek community in Beira who gave me money for a shipping ticket to Durban. I arrived in Durban during February, 1965. I found a temporary job as cable fitter in Durban on the railways. This job lasted about one month. I then took another job with Fraser & Chalmers in Manzini, Zululand as a structural fitter. I was with them for three months when I had an argument with another Greek who insulted me. We came to grips. Later on he came to my room with a knife and he cut me all up. I did not know he had a knife. I am showing a scar on my right forearm, and hand. I had to undergo an operation. I did not wish to return to the job after what had happened. After I was operated I want to stay in Durban Men's Home for a couple of months during which time

³²⁰⁶ Tsafendas meant here the Hume Pipe Company.

I underwent medical treatment for my injured right arm. While I was still living at the Durban Men's Home I was trying to obtain a lift to Cape Town. I managed to get a lift with a director of a cardboard factory in Cape Town in a Ford Sedan car. I got a lift with this man as far as Port Elizabeth.

26.

From Port Elizabeth I bought a train ticket Cape Town. I arrived in Cape Town during September or October, 1965. When I arrived in Cape Town I went to stay at 1 San Sauci Street, Belville with the family of a girl who was staying there and who had written to me previously to say that she wanted to marry me. Her name was Helen Daniels, a Coloured woman. She belong to the same church as me, i.e. "The Christian Church." I did not want to get married. This was her idea. I stayed there for almost two months while I was searching for a job. I found work at the Table Bay Power Station. When I found work I paid the Daniels family for my board and lodging.

27.

After I left the Daniels family I found a room at a boarding house in front of the traffic department in Green Point. I worked at Table Bay Power Station for a couple of months - two or three months, when I was discharged. I was out of work for several months and lived on my wits and my savings, until I found a job on the Marine Diamond Corporation Barge Colpantoon. I had to take care of 25 machines and pumps and found, the job too strenuous on account of my health, so I resigned after two months. I came back with my savings to have an ear, nose and throat operation at Grootte Schuur Hospital. I was operated there.

28.

After the operation, I stayed at Milton House, Milton Road, Observatory, for about two to three months. When I left Milton House to stay at 5 Wrench Road, Observatory with a Mrs. Vos.

29.

Mrs. Vos wanted a friend of hers to stay with her so she gave me notice. She found a place for me to stay at 48 Devon Street, Woodstock.

30.

After I was discharged from Table Bay Power station, while I was unemployed, I stayed at 9

Westminster Street, Lansdowne with one named Pat Ryan, a Coloured family. I stayed there for about a month or two but I wasn't paying board and lodging. I shared a room, with his children. I also stayed at 10 Walnut Street, Lansdowne for about one week to 10 days.

31.

At the time of my arrest I was staying Eldor Apartments, Rustenburg Road, Rondebosch. At this stage I feel tired and request that I be given a rest. I will continue this statement tomorrow.

(Time 11.45 pm on 11/9/66.) Accused's request complied with.

32.

I now wish to state something which I had forgotten to tell you last night. In 1927 when I came from Egypt my stepmother began to corrupt me because I was the Heir to my father's property. She got her brother to rape me when I was a child to try and destroy my manly qualities. Her brother forced me into a room and committed an unnatural deed with me. I got very scared, I was a child. This is what I had not stated before.

33.

I am politically inclined but do not belong to any political party. I like to read what goes on. I like to read foreign papers and I am generally internationally minded.

34.

I cannot say that I agree with world politics, but I was always in favour of the politics of the western world. I am a liberal but I would not describe myself as a leftist. I did say previously that I was a leftist but I had to say something.

35.

In England I did not associate much with other people because I was in hospital most of the time. In America I was on ships most of the time. While I was staying in England I did attend some political meetings. I attended meetings of the Committee of African Organisations and I attended meetings at Caxton Hall. I also attended political meetings Hyde Park in London. They were anti-colonial meetings, anti-apartheid meetings and anti-racial meetings. It's a long time ago and I cannot remember the names of all the speakers I remember speeches by Barbara Castle, Fenner Brockway and Callaghan. I used to like to attend these meetings and be present at the meetings to contribute so their way of thinking.

I did take part in a protest and propaganda meeting at Trafalgar Square. It was anti-colonial protests. I was holding the posters up but I did not speak at those meetings. I was never approached to become a member of the Communist Party. I was anti-colonial, against slavery and in favour of all colonies which were controlled by Belgium, France and Portugal to be afforded self-government. I was against apartheid because it separated the people of different races and brought a big barrier amongst them which is difficult to describe. It brought wrong ideas among the people causing the different races to hate one another. It caused misunderstanding and suspicion amongst the different races, and made them afraid to talk to each other. People in buses did not know where to sit. South Africa is a nation of minorities of Europeans, Africans, Coloureds and Indians, I mean that South Africa consists of various races. All the apartheid laws made things confusing amongst the different races. I refer especially to the laws applying to mixed marriage because people are unable to marry whom they want to marry according to their economic means. That is what I term oppression. If there was freedom there would be no restrictions and there would be evolution so that eventually there would be only one race. That is what I mean by evolution.

36.

I was in sympathy with the people fighting racialism hence the reason for attending the meetings mentioned above. Whilst attending these meetings it never struck me that by killing the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa the apartheid laws could be changed.

It is true that I mixed with South African people in London, some of whom were leftists. In private conversations with some of these people it was said that the South African Prime Minister deserves to be shot, I cannot remember by whom this statement was made because it was merely during private conversation that this statement was made. This sort of statement was made more than once by different people. I cannot remember any particular person having made such a statement. It was just casual talk. These were isolated statements by people happened to come across by chance. To say that this was the main thought amongst leftists, is a bit exaggerated. I must have made a mistake by telling General van den Bergh this.

I used to agree with the idea that the Prime Minister deserves to be shot. I sometimes agreed with them. Sometimes we used to discuss that Dr. Verwoerd was lucky he did not die the first time he was shot. There was no decision made that he should in fact be killed – I mean I did not decide on anything at that time. I never took upon me the task of killing the Prime

Minister nor did I tell anyone that I would kill the Prime Minister. I did believe that with the disappearance of the South African Prime Minister a change of policy would take place. I did set myself the task of destroying the Prime Minister. It was my own idea to kill him. No one offer me any reward for doing so. I did not care about the consequences for what would happened to me afterwards. I was so disgusted with the racial policy that I went through with my plans to kill the Prime Minister.

Nowhere in the world where I have travelled did anyone ever tell me to kill Dr. Verwoerd. In Western countries people know very little about the South African policies.

At this stage the deponent was again warned about the seriousness of the charge against him. It was explained to him that he faces a charge of murder and that there is a danger of him being hanged for a deed which he is alleged to have committed as the result of the incitement of another. Deponent replies that no one incited him to commit the murder. Apart from what I have read in papers and on account of inflationary conditions no one has ever incited me to murder the Prime Minister.

A contributory cause was also my dissatisfaction about the existent racial laws in South Africa. I say this because it caused me a lot of frustration as I was unable to mix with the class (financial) to which I belong. I was classed as a white person and I wanted to marry a Coloured woman named Helen Daniels. I went to the Department of Interior and complained to a Mr. Rossouw that I wished to be classified as a Coloured person. I had an European identity card which I gave to Mr. Rossouw same time last year when I applied for re-classification. I could not get myself an European wife therefore I wanted a blank identity card which was given to me but later taken back by Mr. Rossouw. I visited Mr. Rossouw's office frequently and then he always wanted to know where I was staying and whether the people I was staying with were White or Coloured. This was one of the main reasons for making me upset.

37.

The Coloured woman referred to above wrote to me and sent me her photograph while I was in Durban. She got my address through some people of my church in Benoni where she was on holiday. These people are named Tillik, a Coloured family. They live in Benoni or

Brakpan.

38.

It is no true that I returned to South Africa from England with the purpose of working my way to South Africa to kill the Prime Minister.

39.

It is true that I went to Rhodesia after my arrival in South Africa to visit my sister. I did this because I have not seen her for a long time. I did not go there to say good-bye because I thought I would never see her again. At that time I did not think about the serious mission which I would not survive. It was only after I came back to Gape Town that I decided to murder the Prime Minister.

40.

Because I was out of work I went to the Labour Department to look for work. At the labour department I learned that casual labourers would be required at the House of Assembly. I went to the House of Assembly three times to look for work. I contacted Mr. Wiese at the main entrance, who directed me to Mr. Burger and Mr. Wiehand in the basement.

I went there two or three times, but there was no work. I completed certain application forms and produced my identity card, residence papers and whatever was necessary. The second last time I was told to come at the beginning of August. I went there at the beginning of August and spoke to either Mr. Burger or Mr. Wiehand who signed me on. I started work as messenger the same day.

41.

Some days after I started working in the House of Assembly, all kinds of thoughts came to my mind about murdering the Prime Minister. I saw an opportunity of shooting the Prime Minister from the lobby. I thought of obtaining a firearm. I knew that I had to obtain a licence for a firearm. Obtaining a licence would take too long. This I found out at one of the shops where I enquired about purchasing a firearm in Durban. I thought of going to a ship, the Eleni, which I knew was in Cape Town for repairs. I was acquainted with the crew members of the Eleni. While I was unemployed I used to take the crew members to Mike's shop in Main Road, Woodstock where I get commission on goods sold to the crew members. I also got free meals from the ship. I had an idea that I might be able to buy a firearm on the ship because some sailors carry firearms. I went to this ship about three to four weeks before

the assassination of the Prime Minister. I saw the man in the engine room (the donkey man), who told me that the 'bosun' foreman of the crew may know where I could obtain a firearm. He said he could get me a "Beretta" revolver and a knife. I also enquired from him about a springleaf knife, which he said he could get for me. He said he wanted 80 dollars for the two items. I told him I wanted the revolver and the knife for self-defence, he said he wanted the money in American dollars. He did not show me a revolver or a knife. I said I would return in a couple of days with the money. I waited until the end of August when I got my pay. It was, I think, R95.00. I went to Barclays Bank, Adderley Street, Cape Town and enquired to buy 80 American dollars. I was told that it would cost R56. The lady teller wanted my passport.

The next day I brought my passport and she gave me the 80 dollars. I took a taxi and went to the ship. There I saw the "bosun" and told him that I have brought the money for the gun and the knife as arranged. He said he did not have the gun, but the galley boy had a small gun which he would try and get for me. The 'bosun' went to the galley boy and brought a small gun which he said I could have for 30 dollars.

I thought it was a small calibre pistol and I decided to buy it. I took it without examining it. They had no bullets. I thought I could buy bullets from local stores. I took the pistol home where I examined it and discovered that it was a gas revolver. On Saturday the 3rd of September, I took the gas pistol back to the ship. I found the 'bosun' with the intention to return the firearm to him. Both the 'bosun' and the galley boy told me that they had spent the money. I wanted another firearm or the return of my money but ended up getting nothing. I went to the captain to protest, but as I saw I could get nothing and did not want to cause a scandal I gave up and left. I returned to my room in Rondebosch.

42.

The next thing is that I decided to use a knife to stab the Prime Minister in the House of Assembly. I never discussed my plans with anybody. The shops were closed over the weekend and the following Monday was a public holiday. At about 9 a.m. on Tuesday, 6/9/66, I went to town to buy the knives. I bought one knife from the first shop which was open. This shop is known as City Guns. Then I went to another shop further down the road and bought another knife. Both shops were closed when I arrived. I walked up and down the pavement waiting for the shops to open. I enquired at a certain shop as to when the sports shop would open. I cannot remember whether I spoke to a man or a woman.

I started work at 7.49 a.m. on 6/9/66. I arrived at the House of Assembly at 6.45 a.m. on

6/9/66. I went to work early in order to do my work and then to go out to buy the knives. I did not ask for permission to go to the town to buy the knives. I entered City Guns first and purchased a dagger. I paid R.3.30 for this dagger. I then went to the other shop where I bought another dagger - the one with the aluminium handle. It was more like a stiletto. I bought two weapons in order to make certain of the job which I had in mind, I thought something might go wrong and that one weapon might be taken away from me. Both weapons were wrapped up in brown paper. After I bought the weapons I returned to the House of Assembly where I removed the paper wrappings from the weapons and left the paper wrappings in my locker. I also left the two daggers in my locker. I started working that morning wearing a khaki overall. When I went to the shops to buy the weapons I changed into a grey suit. When I came back I changed into my navy-blue messenger's uniform, then I changed into my uniform. I had a waistbelt underneath my uniform pant, to which two sheaths were attached. I left the two knives in the locker. I then went to the first floor to serve coffee and tea. I waited for the lights to go on indicating which offices were calling for tea and coffee. I was there until about 2 p.m. that afternoon.

43.

A few minutes before the Assembly bells began to ring for the starting of the session, I went to my locker to fetch the knives. I put them into the sheaths inside my pants and went into the Assembly lobby to wait for the Prime Minister's arrival. I had previously planned to stab the Prime Minister in the Assembly hall whilst walking to his bench. I watched him walk past and followed him into the Assembly hail. I tried to pull the dagger from the sheath but had difficulty in pulling it out. Eventually I managed to pull it out, but by that time the Prime Minister had already sat down in his bench. I was very nervous and confused that I cannot remember where I stabbed him the first blow, but I aimed at his chest. I remember stabbing him twice and then the people caught hold of me. They beat me up, kicked me and dragged me into lobby. I was disarmed and arrested.

44.

I deny that I am a Communist. I am a Christian and I believe in the Bible. I did not think I would get away after murdering the Prime Minister. I did not care what happened to me.

45.

The meeting between Dr. Verwoerd and Chief Leabua Jonathan was a contributory fact in my decision to murder Dr. Verwoerd. I say this because I thought the Prime Minister was

dealing with the wrong person. Both Dr. Verwoerd and Jonathan were, to my mind, not the real representatives of their countries. I wanted the Paramount Chief of Basutoland to represent the Basuto notion. I wanted to see a government representing all the South African People. I do not think the nationalist Government is representative of the people and I wanted to see a different government.

46.

I have a savings account at Barclays Bank, Adderley Street, Cape Town. It contains only a few rand. I deny that I ever received an amount of R5,000 from Pretoria while I was in Mozambique. I did receive about £10 to £15 from my brother for furniture he sold for me. I received no financial support from anyone.

(SGD.) Demetrio Tsafendas

Witness: (SGD.) D.J.V. Troost 23505 D/Sgt.

ANALYSIS OF TSAFENDAS'S STATEMENT

Before we discuss the content of Tsafendas's statement, it is important to consider something that Tsafendas told Major Rossouw which has not been placed on record. The following is an extract from Rossouw's testimony to the Commission of Enquiry:

COMMISSION: What was your impression, how does he feel about his deed? Does he regret it, or is he indifferent about it or did he not show any obvious emotion about it?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: I shall answer you to the best of my ability. When I originally questioned him, I accused him of being a horrible murderer. To which he answered: "That is what you think, but the world thinks differently!"

Major Rossouw then testified that at a later stage, when he asked Tsafendas again, Tsafendas told him that "he did feel remorse and that he was very sorry about what he had done." Rossouw also told the Commission that Tsafendas "told the truth – I never got the

impression that he tried to evade any question. He answered all the questions spontaneously” and he was “totally prepared to answer everything.”³²⁰⁷

We are not in position to know why Tsafendas’s remark that “the world thinks differently” was not written down. What is most likely is that the exchange took place on another occasion, possibly when Rossouw spoke to Tsafendas for the first time, soon after the assassination. What is important is that at that point of time at least, Tsafendas not only had no regrets for killing Dr. Verwoerd but believed that the assassination was applauded by people around the world. He appears to be happy and proud of what he had done.

It is also very important that we have Major Rossouw’s testimony that Tsafendas was “totally prepared to answer everything,” that he did not try “to evade any question” and answered “all the questions spontaneously.” This statement could have been very important for the *State vs. Tsafendas*, but it was ignored. As we will see, the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas claimed that he was unable to function on a reasonable level, unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, that he was talking in a disjointed manner and suffered from thought blocking. Major Rossouw, not a psychiatrist but a very experienced interrogator, failed to notice any of these symptoms, not only during this two-day interrogation but throughout the whole time that Tsafendas was in custody and interrogated by him.

Looking at the September 11/12 statement now, we see that Tsafendas refers to something he said previously to General van den Bergh, and presumably this was in the statement that went missing, “I must have made a mistake by telling General van den Bergh this.” Significantly, Tsafendas does not mention the tapeworm. He does not mention it in the next statement either, the one that was taken on September 19. On the contrary, Tsafendas gives clear political reasons for his actions. He states that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was “disgusted with the racial policy.” That he considered Dr. Verwoerd, to be a dictator is an opinion he expressed to many witnesses. In this instance, he does not use the word dictator but says he did not consider Dr. Verwoerd to be a real representative of his country, and he wanted “to see a government representing all the South African people.” He said, “I do not think the nationalist Government is representative of the people and I wanted to see a different government.” Dr. Verwoerd represented only the 13.8 per cent of South Africans

³²⁰⁷ Major Rossouw testimony to the Commission of Enquiry, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

who were White and eligible to vote, so Tsafendas was entirely correct. Even though Tsafendas did not employ the word “dictator” for Dr. Verwoerd, it is obvious that this is how he saw him.

Furthermore, Tsafendas said he believed that by killing Dr. Verwoerd, “a change of policy would take place.” It is clear that Tsafendas assassinated Dr. Verwoerd for political reasons, hoping that a change would come once the architect of apartheid was “removed.” Stating that apartheid “oppresses” people and there is no freedom under Dr. Verwoerd is another way of calling him a tyrant, the word he had used to more than thirty witnesses.³²⁰⁸

Tsafendas characterises his ideology as political, describing himself as against apartheid, slavery and colonialism and “in favour of all colonies controlled by Belgium, France and Portugal being afforded self-government.” He talked freely about his political past in England, where he participated in political meetings, anti-apartheid gatherings and protests, and where he held up placards, all confirmed by witnesses.³²⁰⁹

At one point, Tsafendas denies that he is a leftist (“I did say previously that I was a leftist but I had to say something”³²¹⁰) or a Communist (“I deny that I am a Communist”³²¹¹). However, at the beginning of his statement he said he was a member of the South African Communist Party in the late 1930s and 1940s, while many people who knew him told the police that Tsafendas was a Communist, even a dangerous Communist.³²¹² As we will see later in this chapter, in 1965 Tsafendas was described and reported to the South African Police as “the largest Communist in the Republic of South Africa.”³²¹³ That Tsafendas was a

³²⁰⁸ For example: Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 May 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016 and many others.

³²⁰⁹ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³²¹⁰ See Tsafendas’s statement, paragraph 34.

³²¹¹ See Tsafendas’s statement, paragraph 44.

³²¹² For example: Johannes Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Van Vuuren statement to the police, 14 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Robert Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³²¹³ See J.J. Botha’s statement on October 3, 1966; Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Communist, was evident even to people who had just met him, as in the case of Father Probst.³²¹⁴ Several witnesses told the author that Tsafendas considered himself a Communist and that he was “preaching” Communism.³²¹⁵ He had even joined the DSE, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party which he had joined during the Greek Civil War.³²¹⁶ Since Tsafendas himself initially admitted his belief to General van den Bergh, the question is, why did he deny it here?

According to Father Minas, Tsafendas said that the Greek-South African policeman at Caledon Square police station tried to become friendly with him and give him “advice.” Tsafendas told the priest that he believed the policeman had been instructed by General van den Bergh to become friendly with him and to play the “good cop” in a “good cop/bad-cop”³²¹⁷ scenario in order to find out more about him. Tsafendas characterised the policeman as “pathetic” and as “van den Bergh’s lackey.” Tsafendas was not even sure if he was Greek, as his name did not sound Greek, and he could not communicate in Greek, although he could speak some Greek. Tsafendas did not give more details about this policeman.³²¹⁸ Michalis Michelis met him in the mid-1980s and said that by then he had retired from the police force. He appeared to be in his mid to late sixties, thus in his mid to late forties when he knew Tsafendas.³²¹⁹

One piece of advice the Greek-South African policeman gave to Tsafendas was to stop saying he was a Communist and Dr. Verwoerd was a dictator because it irritated the

³²¹⁴ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³²¹⁵ For example: Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 May 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016 and many others.

³²¹⁶ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

³²¹⁷ This was also common practice by the apartheid police (Owusu, 1992: 180; Schalkwyk, 2001: 19; Wieder, 2013: 139; Wilson (*The Telegraph*, 13 December 2013, ‘Arsenal’s chief executive Ivan Gazidis: Nelson Mandela, dad and the fight against apartheid).

³²¹⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

³²¹⁹ Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 12 December 2015.

police and made things worse for himself.”³²²⁰ Tsafendas did not tell Father Minas or anyone else that this policeman was the reason he denied being a Communist or that he had indeed denied being a Communist during interrogation. What he said was that he was “advised” by this man to stop proclaiming his allegiance, so perhaps considered it advantageous to do so at the time. As we will see later, Tsafendas stated frankly in 1976 that he was a Communist then. He would also tell Father Minas Constandinou and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in the 1990s that he was a Communist and would die a Communist.¹²³¹³²²¹ We can only assume that Tsafendas denied being a Communist to ease the torture. He had done the same in Portugal in 1952 when he was tortured by the Portuguese, pleading that he was not a Communist anymore. Then in 1963, in order to convince the authorities to give him amnesty and allow him back into Mozambique, he assured them that he was not a Communist and his anti-colonial ideas belonged to the past.

Tsafendas claimed in his police statement that his step-mother asked her brother to rape him when he was nine. In 1946, in Grafton State Hospital, he spoke extensively about his sexual life and past sexual “traumas,” all of which he invented, but he did not mention a rape and instead claimed that his step-mother wanted to have sex with him. Tsafendas brought the rape story up with Dr. Cooper when he examined him for the defence at the summary trial. The author is not in position to know if such a rape occurred. What is almost impossible to believe is that his step-mother asked her brother to do such a thing and that Tsafendas really believed it happened. He spoke negatively about his relationship with his step-mother to two psychiatrists, but never to anyone else. On the contrary, he often described how loving she was and how she treated him as her own child. Tsafendas talked at length about his life and childhood to Fathers Minas, Ioannis and Spiros and invariably praised Marika, calling her mother and not stepmother. Several witnesses, including some who knew Tsafendas since he was a child, declared it impossible that Tsafendas would ever have believed Marika could have done such thing. Even if there had been a rape, he could never have believed Marika was the instigator. In addition, several witnesses told the author that at the time of the alleged rape, there was no uncle in Mozambique.³²²²

³²²⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

³²²¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

³²²² For example: Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January

Later in life, Tsafendas said two claims were necessary to make an “insane act” look real and convince someone you are mad:

- a. To have a family history of insanity and
- b. To have a childhood trauma.

The above seems to explain why Tsafendas said negative things about his step-mother to the psychiatrists, but not to anyone else or to the police, since at the time, he was not trying to prove he was insane. On the contrary, his statements do not show any sign of schizophrenia. It is very possible that Tsafendas made the rape claim to the police because he knew he might need to pretend madness to avoid torture or worse as a consequence of killing Dr. Verwoerd. If a mad act became necessary, having a childhood trauma in his past would add authenticity. The fact that he had talked about childhood traumas at the Grafton State Hospital back in 1946, without mentioning the rape, but by making up another absurd claim, would further strengthen his claim. However, the author has not been able to establish for a fact why Tsafendas made a claim of rape or whether such an incident ever occurred.

Could Tsafendas’s statement to Major Rossouw have been as a result of torture and intimidation? Certainly not for two reasons:

- What Tsafendas said about his political ideas, for example being anti-apartheid and anti-colonialist, is something he told several witnesses. They were his own, undisguised beliefs and no force was needed to make him say these things. Although Tsafendas is quite mild in describing Dr. Verwoerd and does not employ his usual denunciation of him as a dictator and a tyrant, he gets close by declaring that he is not the real presentative of all South African people. Tsafendas’s participation in anti-apartheid activities and demonstrations in London was confirmed to the police by Edward Furness’s statement.³²²³ Tsafendas said in his statement that he hoped a change of policy would take place after the death of Dr. Verwoerd, exactly what he told witnesses several years later.
- Assuming Tsafendas had been forced to make this statement, what was its purpose? It was not used during his summary trial or by the Commission of Enquiry and it was not publicised at the time, nor even later. Why would the police force Tsafendas to make such a statement when it was not going to be used anywhere and no one was going to see it?

2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015, and several others.

³²²³ Edward Furness statement to the police 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Perhaps the best indication that the statement represented Tsafendas's true feelings is that the ideas he set out were the same, cherished beliefs he had reiterated many times to numerous witnesses. If they were couched in milder terms, that would be natural, considering his circumstances at the time.

With reference to Tsafendas's statement about the psychiatrists' testimony at the summary trial, Professor Tuviah Zabow, a forensic psychiatrist, commented as follows:

"I have read the information with interest particularly the collateral background provided. Much of this was not available at time of psychiatric assessments or in the Court. Of interest is the Tsafendas statement which was done early on the investigation and much of the information he must have been able to provide or a least agreed upon if coerced to sign. If he was psychotic and unable to marshal his thoughts, this would not have been possible. This is significant in relation to the expert testimonies which are so central to the discussion that all these were provided without background factual information at than stage."³²²⁴

Neither Reyner van Zyl, the clinical psychologist who examined Tsafendas for the defence during the summary trial, nor Professors Alban Burke and Tuviah Zabow saw any signs of schizophrenia in the statement, nor any of the symptoms described by the psychiatrists in the court.³²²⁵ Tsafendas's statement was not given to his defence team and probably not to the State either. Van Zyl stated that "those sentiments expressed in the statement that he made to the police weren't ever mentioned to any of the psychiatrists." Van Zyl believes the statement should have been given to all of those who examined Tsafendas.³²²⁶

Professor Alban Burke told the author said about Tsafendas's statement:

"If he had been psychotic at the time that he was committing the murder, he would have been psychotic at the time of his arrest, because it doesn't disappear like that, so you would have picked up traces of that already in his statement. His statement would not have made sense; you would have had a lot of irrelevant detail in there, so it is, again, not the picture of somebody who committed a crime whilst he was under, or in, a state of psychosis."³²²⁷

³²²⁴ Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 3 September 2016.

³²²⁵ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016;

³²²⁶ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

³²²⁷ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

Denis Goldberg told the author that Tsafendas's statement "clearly shows that he was politically motivated [for killing Verwoerd] and not insane ... the man is determined to kill the Prime Minister because of the racism... [Tsafendas] has a clear political opinion about racism."³²²⁸ Professor John Dugard told the author that "the statement completely confirms the view that Tsafendas was not insane. It reads like a very normal story of a politically informed person, angry with apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd, determined to make a change with nothing to lose personally - really an incredible statement which was carefully concealed."³²²⁹

STATEMENTS

CONRAD OELEFSEN³²³⁰

White male, Durban, 5.18 pm.

I know Demetrio Tsafendas by sight. During 1963, about June, I met this man in Kitwe. He borrowed a lorry-jack from me one day. I often saw this chap afterwards. He was always with a few Bantu in a five-ton truck. I do not know whether he was the owner of the truck. He was carting fish — Luapala river to the Buchu compound in Kitwe, where it was sold. I saw this man for a period of about five months in Kitwe. I did not converse with this man at any time. During that period I did not know his name. I recognised him from a photo in the Sunday Tribune of September 11, 1966. I know nothing else about this man.

COMMENTS ON OELEFSEN'S STATEMENT

The report of the Commission of Enquiry states that "Tsafendas denies that he ever visited that country, and says that he did not leave Portugal until August or September, 1963."³²³¹

³²²⁸ Denis Goldberg in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

³²²⁹ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

³²³⁰ Conrad Oelefsen statement to the police, 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

³²³¹ Report of the COE, Chapter II B, Paragraph. 41. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

RUI FORJAZ³²³²

Beira, in a Memo to: Mr M.R. Hall.

I presume you know by now that Dimitris Tsafendas, the assassin of Dr. Verwoerd, worked on the Beira/Feruka oil pipeline for a very short time, the Police came and took him away. When he was freed, he called on us to claim a few days' wages with overtime Mr Ballard authorized me to pay him the amount of 1.644#40 as per copy of Debit Note no. 142 attached. This Debit Note is signed by him. I thought this information might be of interest to you.

Yours Faithfully

Rui Forjaz

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

The Johannesburg *Sunday Times* published that day a strikingly inaccurate portrait of Tsafendas by several anonymous "leading psychiatrists and psychologists," presenting him as "the classic picture of an incipient or an actual paranoid schizophrenic." Basing their diagnosis on scraps of information emerging in the first four days since the assassination, they pegged him as feckless, rootless, lacking in motivation and suffering from an inferiority complex. Contradicting evidence that Tsafendas was reared in a loving family environment, they declared that he was rejected by his family and spent his early years in an atmosphere of hostility. From this, they said, could have developed a fear and distrust of the outside world. This was a travesty of the truth, which, as testified by several people who knew him well, was that Tsafendas was gregarious, talkative and open to people. The psychiatrists concluded that Tsafendas did not get married because it was usual for "paranoiac-schizophrenic" people to see others as "threats," and women in particular could be seen in this light.³²³³

The experts were presumably unaware of Tsafendas's association with Helen Daniels, and, as we will soon see, his interest in marrying Sybie Barendilia or Stella. The medics also referred to Tsafendas allegedly being called "Blackie" at school, something reported by

³²³² Rui Forjaz in a Memo to Mr. M.R. Hall, 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³²³³ Smith (*Sunday Times*), 11 September 1966: 1, 'Classic picture of a psychotic.'

Sakellaridis, the racist Greek editor and supporter of Dr. Verwoerd who had never met Tsafendas and heard it by someone who do not even know if he really knew Tsafendas, which turned out to be a lie.³²³⁴ We will not examine every, invariably mistaken, deduction carried in this ludicrous report, but it is hardly surprising that the “leading psychiatrists and psychologists” mentioned remained unnamed.

On the same page, however, the same newspaper carried a markedly different story, in which Tsafendas was described as “a man who loved South Africa and seemed to worry about what he believed to be social injustices.” In addition, under the headline “*Assassin – man with a chip on his shoulder,*” the paper’s Durban correspondent wrote that Tsafendas had impressed the police in that city as being deeply concerned about South Africa’s Immorality Law. The story said he frequently visited Durban’s North Beach restaurants. Tsafendas was well liked by Mr. Willemse, once his landlord, who described him as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.” On the other hand, workers at the Mandini, Zululand factory described Tsafendas as a “violent sort of person” on account of his fight with Nikolas Vergos. A fellow interpreter at Durban court described him as a “whiner” who often complained about the working conditions and his lack of money.³²³⁵

The *Sunday Tribune* of Durban reported what it called an “amazing blunder” concerning Tsafendas’s status. It said he was declared a prohibited immigrant in 1950 and his name was still on the Stop List for visas. Yet this year he was granted permanent residence. The paper said attempts to confirm this with government departments drew a complete blank.³²³⁶

³²³⁴ Smith (*Sunday Times*), 11 September 1966: 1, ‘Classic picture of a psychotic.’

³²³⁵ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8, ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

³²³⁶ *Sunday Tribune*, 11 September 1966: 2, ‘Tsafendas-amazing blunder is disclosed.’

MONDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 1966

LT. COL. VAN WYK ARRIVES IN MOZAMBIQUE

On this day, Lt. Col. P.J.P. van Wyk of the South African Police arrived in Lourenço Marques to investigate Tsafendas's past and to interview anyone who knew him or might have useful information about him. His local assistant was sub-Inspector A. Vaz of the Portuguese police, who explained to van Wyk the strict instructions he had received from his headquarters in Lisbon. These were that he should help with the investigation where possible but that he must not become so deeply involved that other organisations might learn of it with possible negative repercussions for his government. Vaz briefed van Wyk about Tsafendas's arrest and release at Beira during 1964-65 and undertook to send a copy of the file to General van den Bergh.

Captain Rui Távora, the Police District Commander in Beira, also gave assistance to van Wyk. This officer circulated an official request for anyone knowing Tsafendas to come forward for interview; he provided a room where such interviews could take place.³²³⁷ As we will see, a copy of the Beira arrest file was duly dispatched to General van den Bergh. However, as instructed by sub-Inspector Vaz's superiors in Lisbon, "all information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique" was left out.

STATEMENTS

BRENDA JESSIE NICHOLSON³²³⁸

Teller at the Adderley Street Branch of the Barclays Bank, Cape Town.

She recognized Tsafendas as the "customer who had shortly previous been to the bank to my counter. I could not place the transaction but have since checked my records. I now remember that this man had been to the bank to purchase some American Dollars. I remember having asked him why he wanted the dollars. He said he was going to Mozambique. I asked him to bring me his passport. According to my sheets I have on

³²³⁷ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 12 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

³²³⁸ Brenda Jessie Nicholson statement to the police, 12 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

1.9.1966 sold 80 American Dollars for R57.78. I am sure that this deal was made with the accused. I also remember that the money he gave me was very dirty, I think all R2-notes.

Statement taken by D/Sergt. D.J.V. Troost.

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

The biggest story of the day, in the *Pretoria News*, said rumours that Tsafendas had hanged himself in his cell “spread today like wildfire.” A police spokesman dismissed the report with a laconic, “We know nothing about it.”³²³⁹ Most South African newspapers, with Dr. Verwoerd’s funeral over, refocussed on Tsafendas, describing him as a “drifter and an outcast”³²⁴⁰ and listing his deportations from Britain and America.³²⁴¹ A front page story in *The Cape Times*, headed “*Tsafendas in turmoil all his life*,” presented a lengthy and largely accurate account of Tsafendas’s life, stressing that though he was deported from Britain, the United States and Mozambique and had been treated for mental illness, he still managed to gain employment in South Africa’s Houses of Parliament.³²⁴²

The *Daily Dispatch* quoted a spokesman for the British Home Office as saying Tsafendas was given permission to stay in Britain for three months but at the end of that period he appeared to have no money and was required to leave. He did not leave voluntarily and a deportation order was enforced on December 3, 1959. US Immigration Service records showed that Tsafendas was deported from the United States three times.³²⁴³ The *Toronto Globe and Mail* quoted US officials in Washington as saying that Tsafendas entered the United States by crossing the Canadian border at St. Stephen, New Brunswick.³²⁴⁴

³²³⁹ *Pretoria News*, 12 September 1966: 1, ‘Suicide of Tsafendas rumoured.’

³²⁴⁰ *The Cape Times*, 12 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas in turmoil all his life.’

³²⁴¹ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 September 1966: 2, ‘Tsafendas was deported from Britain and America’; *The Globe and Mail*, 12 September 1966: 2, Dr. Verwoerd slayer entered USA from Canada’; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 12 September 1966: 1, ‘Britain deported Tsafendas.’

³²⁴² *The Cape Times*, 12 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas in turmoil all his life.’

³²⁴³ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 September 1966: 2, ‘Tsafendas was deported from Britain and America.’

³²⁴⁴ *The Globe and Mail*, 12 September 1966: 2, Dr. Verwoerd slayer entered USA from Canada.’

VORSTER: “NO FILE ON TSAFENDAS”

The most important announcement came from John Vorster on his last day as Minister of Justice, Prisons and Police, and the day before he became Prime Minister. Vorster declared that the South African Security Police had no file on Tsafendas. The previous day, *Die Beeld* had claimed that the Security Police had a file on Tsafendas. Vorster denounced the report as “devoid of all truth.” He said many published reports were unduly sensational and some were totally untrue. He promised that a complete statement would be made when the time arrived. “The whole matter is still being investigated continuously and after the trial it will, as is proper, be disclosed to the public.”³²⁴⁵

As it turned out, Vorster was “misinformed” and the report was entirely correct since the Security Police did in fact hold a file on Tsafendas. Indeed, three further files on Tsafendas had been created by the Security Police, but only one could be found in September 1966. According to the report of the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd’s death:

*“Tsafendas’s name was in fact on the so-called “stop list”, and the Security Police had had a copy of the list since 1964. However, General van den Bergh was not aware of this when he made his statement to the Prime Minister, and in any case the denial did not refer to this list.”*³²⁴⁶

Unknown to Die Beeld when the report was printed, and unknown to General van den Bergh when the denial was made, was the fact that there was an old Police file, W.D. 10/10/4102, on Demetrios Tsafandakis. It was not until 13th September, 1966, that this file was traced by the Security Police as a result of information found in the files of the Department of the Interior. It is true that the file was found in a building which is now being used by the Security Police, but it was explained to the Commission that the room in which it was found is actually used to store so-called “dead files” of the Divisional Commissioner of the Witwatersrand.

This file contained, inter alia, the letters dated 13th October, 1941, and 20th October, 1941, quoted in paragraph 25 of Chapter II A of this report. It also appears from these letters that in 1941 the Commissioner of Police in Pretoria had a file 6/1835/3697 (the correct reference is 6/835/3697) on Demetrios Tsafendakis.

³²⁴⁵ *Pretoria News*, 12 September 1966: 11, ‘Vorster: Police had no file on Tsafendas.’

³²⁴⁶ Report of the COE, Chapter XI, Paragraph 4 December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

The Security Police Branch was established in 1947, and in 1950 files which were of importance to the Security Police were transferred to them. This file was apparently not considered important, and was destroyed in 1963.

*... There were also two other files of the Witwatersrand Division, W.D. 10/3/305 (see paragraph 16 of Chapter II A) and W.D. 2/2078/366, but the former cannot be traced and the latter was destroyed in 1946.*³²⁴⁷

Thus, according to the Commission, General van den Bergh was not aware of the existence of the file and inadvertently misinformed Vorster. Then the very next day the file was found, but Vorster did not make a new announcement to correct his mistake. Eventually the Commission discovered that there were FOUR files in total on Tsafendas and although two have been destroyed, the fourth had disappeared and no-one was able to locate it. What was in Tsafendas's missing file is something that the author is not in position to know, as the file is still missing.

The Commission's report, like most of the reports by similar Commissions at the time of apartheid, whitewashed the negligence of the Security Police and covered up for Vorster's apparent "mistake," attributing it to misinformation. This, of course, could have been true. However, the possibility that Vorster deliberately lied about the existence of the file in order to protect the Security Police, cannot be excluded. Vorster's waywardness with the truth had already been demonstrated in 1964 when he publicly denied that political prisoners were tortured despite widespread reports to the contrary. It will later be proven that Vorster had lied.³²⁴⁸

³²⁴⁷ Report of the COE, Chapter XI, Paragraph 5. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³²⁴⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 198.

TUESDAY, 13 SEPTEMBER 1966

**CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY REPORT OF D/S/O/ GRIST OF THE SPECIAL
BRANCH OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE IN UMTALI³²⁴⁹**

I refer to report of even referenced dated 8th September, 1966, from P.S.B.O. Mashonaland in connection with the above.

The Katherine HARALAMBOS mentioned therein has been identified as being identical to Mrs. Katherine Cleo PNEUMA (nee TSAFANDAKIS, born Lourenço Marques 1928).

According to Mrs. PNEUMA her father was named MICHAEL TSAFANDAKIS and was a marine engineer carrying on business in Lourenço Marques. Mr. TSAFANDAKIS evidently died in Pretoria four years ago, but her mother, Maria Tsafandakis is still resident there. Mrs. TSAFANDAKIS commutes between two daughters and a son, all resident at various addresses in Pretoria but the only one that Mrs. PNEUMA remembers is that of her younger sister, Mrs. Helen VLACHOPOULOS, 39 Quagga Road, Proclamation Hill, Pretoria.

Catherine Cleo PNEUMA is married to a Greek National Gerald Stephen Peter PNEUMA (Bn. Greece, 15/8/13, ent. Umtali June 1921) who carries the business of General Dealer in Marandellas under the trading name of "Marandellas Trading Company."

Mrs. PNEUMA alleges that DIMITRIO TSAFENDAS is the illegitimate son of her father who was born some years prior to her father marrying her mother. Although DIMITRIO was much older than his step brother/sisters, he nevertheless spent school holidays with the family and to all intents and purposes it was understood by Mrs. PNEUMA and her brother and sisters that he was a member of the family... his complexion was such – as also his manner – that he passed as a European.

It was about this time -1937- that Mrs. PNEUMA states she saw DIMITRIO for the last time for many years, in fact it was some twenty-six years later than she saw him, this time in Pretoria. She was visiting his sisters and mother there where she learned that DIMITRIO had 'turned-up' and was hanging around sponging. He was then met by her at her sister's house and within a short time she could agree with the other members of the family that he

³²⁴⁹ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

was unbalanced, talking nonsense most of the time -to the extent that the young children of the family were laughing at him. He had scrounged money for ... (indecipherable). One of the most outstanding recalls Mrs. PNEUMA had of her half-brother at the time (1964) was that he talked on and on for hours about his travels in various parts of the world and also discussed the bible and Religious teaching. He was well dressed and gave a good appearance although as far as she could see he had no visible means of support.

The next time she saw this man was when he suddenly arrived unannounced in Marandellas. He made considerable inquiry in Marandellas to locate her and from what she says she was thoroughly embarrassed by the intimation that he was her brother and that she did eventually see him in the store, after a short while, she told him to go and that he did. She said that during the time she spoke to him, he was talking rubbish although she could not remember outright to what in fact he had actually said. When he left, he told her that he intended leaving for Portuguese East Africa via Umtali (this would appear the visit to the country that he made in July 1964 when he entered via Bulawayo). The next time she heard of him was during the Easter holiday 1965 which she and her husband spent in Beira, whilst there they learnt that he had been in Prison in Beira. The reason for his detention was not known. The next and last encounter with him occurred when his name and photograph appeared at the front of the Rhodesia Herald.

From other sources it is learnt that the foregoing are well known facts among the more senior and well established Greek families, both in Marandellas and in Salisbury. It is also reliably reported that the TSAFANDAKIS family hold a good reputation among the Greek community and there are suggestions that MICHAEL³²⁵⁰ TSAFANDAKIS made a big mistake in attempting to raise his illegitimate son as a full member of his family.

At the time of the interview Mrs. PNEUMA was considerably upset and her opinion and facts might be slightly biased and inaccurate. She was unable to assist further with information as to Dimitrio's contacts and movements.

³²⁵⁰ Michael is the English for the Spanish/Portuguese Miguel. Michalis in Greek.

COMMENTS OF PNEFMA TO THE AUTHOR REGARDING HER STATEMENT

In an interview with the author, Katerina Pnefma said:

“Of course I was upset! He [Tsafendas] had ruined my life. I knew he had the moment I heard about it [the assassination]. I knew the destruction he had caused us. We had to be protected from reporters. My sister-in-law – my brother’s wife – and my two sisters at their businesses, the Afrikaans people would come and spit at them. Their houses, their windows were broken. They used to throw stones. We suffered an enormous amount. Now, I lived in a small town, so people would turn around to see me, to look at me, because I was Tsafendas’s sister.... I had this community, in which I was very high up in business, and we knew the whole little town, in which, of course, after that, I never felt the same. And, as I said before, we never went anywhere, anyway. And, after that, we were all stigmatised. My sister, Michalis’ mother, also never went anywhere. My poor sister that is now alone, she also... none of us, we were all totally destroyed. From then on my brother’s career was at a stop. He never went higher; he remained as he was. So he destroyed my brother’s career. He destroyed us as a family, because wherever we went, they knew who we were.

Then the police came – a lieutenant and two policemen – and I said, ‘Look, I have nothing to do with this man. He is only related to us from our father, but we have had nothing much to do with him.’ I remember it as if it was yesterday. I was by myself in the house ... no, they [the policemen] didn’t have a typing machine; they were keeping notes ... I didn’t say anything. I was so shocked that I don’t think... all I could think of was, ‘what are we going to do now he has disgraced us?’ I don’t remember saying that he was unbalanced, he certainly was not ... none of thought he was unbalanced. He was perfectly sane. He was very clever, cleverer than any of us [the family]. I must have meant that he had crazy political ideas, I don’t remember saying that at all... I remember saying that he was talking rubbish! He was always talking rubbish, but I couldn’t tell the police what exactly he was saying! He was saying that the South Africans are Nazis, he was calling Dr. Verwoerd Hitler’s best student ... that us and most whites were exploiting the black Rhodesians ... he was calling the Greeks racists, saying that one day the Rhodesians would kick us all out and take back what we stole from them ... that one day the Blacks in South Africa would throw the Whites into the sea ...

He believed Mozambique and South Africa should have a colourful flag, like a rainbow or something in order for each colour to represent each race! Have you heard

anything more absurd? He used to say that Jesus Christ was socialist and that if he was alive today he would have been a revolutionary, fighting apartheid and for the independence of Mozambique! Can you believe it? Well, this is what he was saying, all this kind of nonsense! How could I have told all these things to the police? They would have said ‘Why didn’t you report him to the police since he had such crazy ideas? Didn’t you know he was dangerous?’ You can’t imagine how many people had told my poor father to do something with him and his crazy political ideas. You can’t imagine how many! Even my poor mother told him to talk to him because he would get us into trouble someday, as he was often doing, but my dad did nothing. It was actually all his fault. He taught him all these things, but my father was a cautious man, he was not like Dimitri; he wouldn’t go around saying all these stupidities. His son was the opposite; he couldn’t keep his mouth shut ... what about the other thing? He changed his name because he thought it was insulting to be called Tsafantakis since this was the name given to our ancestors by the Turks! Wasn’t this nonsense?

I must have made a mistake or a lie to the police about seeing him for the first time after twenty or so years in Marandellas. I had seen him in Pretoria the previous Christmas [1963]. Yes, it was also a mistake or a lie that he came unannounced in Rhodesia. I had invited him to come meet my husband...”³²⁵¹

Finally, Tsafendas’s step-mother, two half-sisters and their husbands, his half-brother and his wife, all gave evidence to the Commission of Enquiry. Every one of them said clearly that Tsafendas “was definitely not insane.”³²⁵²

STATEMENTS

CHRISTOFFEL JOHANNES VAN VUUREN³²⁵³

White Male, 56 years old, Mandini, Zululand.

I am employed at the Mandini Paper Factory in Zululand as a security officer. I’ve been in the service of this factory for the past seven years. I have never been a member of the South African police, but have been part of the South African Permanent Force. At 5:55 pm

³²⁵¹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³²⁵² COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

³²⁵³ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

on Friday 05/07/1965, while I was on duty at the factory, a man who was known to me as Demetrios Tsafendas came to my office and showed me a wound to his right forearm. The wound looked serious and bleeding profusely. Demetrios told me that he was assaulted by one Nick Vergos, who is known generally among us as "Nicky the Greek, with a razor." I then took Demetrios to the emergency room, where he received treatment for the wound. I ordered him to come to me after the treatment. He came back and told me the whole story - I can only remember that he said they had an argument, but I cannot remember why. At the time of this incident Demetrios Tsafendas was employed by Fraser & Chalmers, an engineering company, working for our factory at Mandini. Nick Vergos was also employed by the same company. I fetched Nick Vergos at the recreation club and brought him to my office. On the way to the office Vergos admitted that he assaulted Demetrios with a razor, because the latter tried to assault him with a knife. Meanwhile, Demetrios Tsafendas was waiting at my office for us.

I summoned the SA police from Inyoni and while we waited for their arrival, the two spoke very hostilely and in a foreign language with each other. It was clear that they loathed each other. I suspect that they spoke Greek to each other. Among other things, Vergos told me in English that Demetrios was not a Greek, but a kaffir and a communist. However, I did not pay much attention to their comments and bad mouthing. The SA Police of Inyoni later came and removed both of them. I later learned that Vergos was found guilty and fined and that he paid his fine.

During the afternoon of 05.08.1965, Father Hanno of Mangete Catholic Church came to my office to get some information about a certain person. While Hanno and I stood together chatting, Demetrios Tsafendas stood just outside my office with his arm wrapped in a bandage. Father Hanno pointed to Demetrios and remarked to me: "That man there is a dangerous man - he is a communist. He can also speak nine different languages. Why don't you get rid of him?" That's all he said to me regarding Demetrios Tsafendas. However, I am not much bothered by him, because he (Hanno) is a man who likes to talk a lot and jump to his own conclusions. After Hanno spoke to me, I one day mentioned to Demetrios' employer (Mr. Woods) what Hanno had told me about Demetrios. Mr. Woods then told me that Demetrios will be dismissed anyway.

A few days after my conversation with Mr. Woods, Demetrios left Mandini and about a month afterwards I bumped into him again in West Street, Durban. He recognized me first

and greeted me. I then asked him where he was working, which he then said that he does not work, but that he is going to the Cape. He did not say when nor what he would be doing in the Cape. We went our separate ways and I never saw him again. One morning a few days after the attack on Dr. Verwoerd, I noticed the killer's portrait in a newspaper and immediately recognized him as Demetrios Tsafendas that previously worked for the company Fraser & Chalmers at Mandini and who was involved in the assault case.

Mandini 13 October 1966 at 10.00 am.

Statement taken by me ... (Indecipherable name)

VORSTER SELECTED AS PRIME MINISTER

On September 13, exactly a week after Dr. Verwoerd's death and after Leader of the House Barend J. Schoeman withdrew from the contest, Justice Minister John Vorster was chosen unanimously to be South Africa's new Prime Minister.³²⁵⁴ Vorster was only thirteenth in order of party seniority³²⁵⁵ and owed his win to the support he got from the National Party's extreme right wingers, the Broederbond, of which he was a member (Broeder number 3737³²⁵⁶), and the Dutch Reformed Church, of which his brother Jacobus was a leading minister.³²⁵⁷

In his first statements after his election, Vorster called for unity between English- and Afrikaans-speaking people for the sake of the fatherland. Emphasising his concern for the security of the state, he declared apartheid to be the only practical policy meeting the interests of all sections of the community. Vorster reaffirmed Dr. Verwoerd's assurances that South Africa would not interfere in the affairs of neighbouring states and asked that South Africa

³²⁵⁴ *TIME*, 23 September 1966: 34-37, 'South Africa: The security man.'

³²⁵⁵ Miller, 2016: 29.

³²⁵⁶ Bell and Ntsebeza, 2003: 28; Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: A290.

³²⁵⁷ *TIME*, 23 September 1966: 34-37, 'South Africa: The security man.'

should be accorded the same consideration and be left alone to work out her own salvation.³²⁵⁸

Vorster also promptly gave notice that he would follow in the doctrinaire footsteps of his predecessor, with apartheid remaining the country's guiding principle, promising to "walk further along the road set by Dr. Verwoerd."³²⁵⁹ He signalled that there would be no easing of security measures by announcing that he would retain responsibility for the police. Like Dr. Verwoerd, Vorster claimed that apartheid was the will of God, "I believe that we still have a long way to go in the process of fulfilling our calling and that God who has so called us through His Grace, will not abandon us until we have completed our task."³²⁶⁰ He then declared "I believe in the Nationalist Party and its principles and the full implementation of them with all their consequences" and praised his predecessor saying that no man in the history of South Africa had done more to promote national unity than Dr. Verwoerd. He added "as far as the people of this country are concerned, they want to come together and to stand together not because they are being forced to do so by outside circumstances but because they and I believe in this." He concluded by saying that as far as God gave it to a man to work out his own destiny, the destiny of South Africa would be decided in this country by South Africans themselves.³²⁶¹

Predictably, Vorster's accession disappointed the English-speaking press while delighting the Afrikaans media. The best the English newspapers appeared to hope for was some softening of Vorster's hard line against liberalism under the responsibilities of national leadership. The *Cape Argus* pointed out that "a demonstration of clemency would not detract from the complexion of strength or from the conviction of all South Africans that they are opposed to any interference in their affairs." However, the *Star* feared that Vorster's past record rendered the outlook for freedom bleak.³²⁶²

The Afrikaans press portrayed Vorster's appointment as evidence of the continuity of principles within the Nationalist Party, demonstrating the rewards of unity and solidarity. *Die*

³²⁵⁸ South Africa's New Prime Minister. Telegram of Sir H. Stephenson from Cape Town to the Foreign Office. 20 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

³²⁵⁹ *The New York Times*, 14 September 1966: 1, 'South African Party Picks Vorster as Prime Minister.'

³²⁶⁰ Mzimela, 1980: 155; van Jaarsveld, 1977: 17.

³²⁶¹ Telegram No. 525 of Sir Hugh Stephenson from Cape Town to the Foreign Office. 13 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

³²⁶² Telegram No. 525 of Sir Hugh Stephenson from Cape Town to the Foreign Office. 13 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

Burger said Vorster had become a controversial figure because of “the hard and unpleasant task which Dr. Verwoerd gave him,” but the paper considered he was well equipped for the highest office and expressed confidence that he would “grow into it.” It noted that it had become a familiar phenomenon “to sing praise at the end of a Premier’s career, which began with prophecies of doom.” Afrikaner reaction generally was a closing of ranks in support of a necessarily strong leader. As for the South African Broadcasting Corporation, the British ambassador Sir Hugh Stephenson, said it “indulged in fulsome praise of Vorster, which at times was reminiscent of the adulation heaped on Hitler or Stalin.”³²⁶³ *The New York Times* said that South Africa’s Nationalists had “flouted world opinion in the most dramatic manner possible by selecting Vorster as their new Prime Minister” since “none of the other prospective successors to Dr. Verwoerd symbolise so utterly the Republic’s oppressive racial policies and police-state laws ...”³²⁶⁴

Six days after he became Prime Minister, a confidential report by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office compared Vorster to Dr. Verwoerd in these terms:

“Vorster apparently did not share Dr. Verwoerd’s idealistic convictions about the policy of apartheid in the sense of separate development in equality. Dr. Verwoerd, despite his preeminence in Afrikaner politics - which Mr. Vorster does not share, was himself never able entirely to carry his followers with him in support of the very great efforts and expenditure he wished to devote to his conception of apartheid.”³²⁶⁵

The Portuguese newspaper *Portugal Democratico* announced Vorster’s win in an editorial entitled “South Africa’s Hitler.” It said, “It would be hard to find in all of Africa a man more extreme in his opinions about racism, more obstinate in the application of a dogma and more persuaded of the justice of his convictions.”³²⁶⁶ Very soon, Vorster appeared to justify the newspaper’s argument by placing old Nazi supporters and inmates from the internment camps of the Second World War into high positions in the security apparatus. The best known of them were General Hendrik van den Bergh, who became head of state security, and P.J. Rieketer who became his economic advisor.³²⁶⁷

³²⁶³ Telegram No. 525 of Sir Hugh Stephenson from Cape Town to the Foreign Office. 13 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

³²⁶⁴ *The New York Times*, 14 September 1966: 46, ‘South African Party picks Vorster as Prime Minister.’

³²⁶⁵ Confidential letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices to Certain Missions. 19 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

³²⁶⁶ *Portugal Democratico*, October 1966: 1, 3, ‘O Hitler da Africa do Sul.’

³²⁶⁷ Marx, 2011b: 559; Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 107.

JOHN VORSTER'S BRIEF BIOGRAPHY³²⁶⁸

John Vorster (1915-1983) was the thirteenth of fourteen children of a wealthy Afrikaner farmer. He studied law at Stellenbosch University,³²⁶⁹ graduating with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1936 and a Bachelor of Law in 1938. His first job was Registrar for the Judge President of the Cape, Justice H.S. van Zyl.³²⁷⁰ Although he graduated as a barrister, he practised as an attorney in Port Elizabeth.³²⁷¹ At the age of twenty-six, on December 20, 1941, Vorster married a former fellow student at Stellenbosch, Martini Malan, and they raised two boys and a girl. Martini became active on the public scene, managing Vorster's political campaigns after a spending time as a social, worker.³²⁷²

Vorster was a fanatical Nazi supporter and a leading member of South Africa's own pro-Nazi paramilitary organization, the Ossewabrandwag (OB). He first became a "Stormjaer" (Storm Trooper),³²⁷³ then, aged twenty-five in 1941, and later was appointed a "general" in the Port Elizabeth district.³²⁷⁴ In 1942, he said of the OB, "We stand for Christian Nationalism, which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic dictatorship if you wish. In Italy, it is called Fascism, in Germany, National Socialism, and in South Africa, Christian Nationalism."³²⁷⁵ Later that year, after expressing his admiration for Adolf Hitler and his contempt for democracy, Vorster was arrested as a Nazi agent and spent fourteen months in an internment camp at Koffiefontein in the Orange Free State.³²⁷⁶

³²⁶⁸ For more about Vorster see: D'Oliveira, J. (1977) *Vorster – the Man*; Giliomee, H. (2012) *The Last Afrikaner Leaders: a Supreme Test of Power*; Schrire, R. (ed.) (1994) *Leadership in the Apartheid State: From Malan to de Klerk*; Terblanche, H.O. (1983) *John Vorster: Ob-General en Afrikanervegter*.

³²⁶⁹ *TIME*, 23 September 1966: 34-37, 'South Africa: The security man.'

³²⁷⁰ Centre for African Studies, 1978: 2.

³²⁷¹ Uys (*The Guardian*), 12 September 1983: 8, 'Embitter leader, lies a spent force.'

³²⁷² Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, 'John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67.'

³²⁷³ Moodie, 1975: 257; Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, 'John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67.'

³²⁷⁴ *TIME*, 23 September 1966: 34-37, 'South Africa: The security man.'

³²⁷⁵ Bunting, 1986: 98; Okoth, 2006: 160; *The New York Times*, 25 July 1985: 22, 'Many of South Africa's leaders were pro-Nazi.'

³²⁷⁶ Legum and Legum, 1964b: 28; *TIME*, 23 September 1966: 34-37, 'South Africa: The security man.'

He was prisoner No. 2229/42 in Hut 48, Camp 1,³²⁷⁷ and at one point, he staged a hunger strike.³²⁷⁸ His wife was not allowed to tell the rest of his family where he was being held, so she sent a telegram reading “John is staying at the King’s Hotel,” and they got the message.³²⁷⁹ It was there that he met fellow proto-Nazi inmate, H.J van den Bergh.³²⁸⁰ They bonded quickly³²⁸¹ and before long van den Bergh was Vorster’s security advisor, closest confidante and best friend.³²⁸² Vorster was released on parole in January 1944 and placed under house arrest in Robertson.³²⁸³

Throughout his life, Vorster maintained that what he did during World War Two “was right.”³²⁸⁴ His views were too extreme even for the National Party, at least in those early days. In 1948, when the National Party came to power, it turned down his application for membership on grounds that he “believed in the ‘authoritarian state’ principle and advocated the destruction of parties.”³²⁸⁵ Rejected by the NP, he stood for Parliament on the old Afrikaner Party ticket and lost by four votes.³²⁸⁶ However, times changed and not long after the Sharpeville massacre, Dr. Verwoerd named Vorster as Minister of Justice, apparently signalling a hard-line approach to the enemies of apartheid.³²⁸⁷ In his first speech in that office, he made his intentions clear, declaring that “the rights of free speech, assembly and protest are getting out of hand.” Subsequent clampdowns in these areas earned him the nickname “Jackboot John” in some opposition newspapers, which took to caricaturing him as a jackbooted Nazi.³²⁸⁸

Fanatically committed to apartheid, an anti-Semite and anti-Communist,³²⁸⁹ Vorster targeted South Africans of a liberal disposition, arguing that “wittingly or unwittingly,”

³²⁷⁷ Bunting, 1986: 98.

³²⁷⁸ Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, ‘John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67.’

³²⁷⁹ Woods, 1987: 2.

³²⁸⁰ Fullard, 2004: 349,

³²⁸¹ O’Meara, 1996: xxxvii.

³²⁸² Rotberg, 1983: 13-14.

³²⁸³ Bunting, 1986: 99.

³²⁸⁴ *TIME*, 28 June 1976: 11, ‘Vorster: Man on a wagon train.’

³²⁸⁵ *The Economist*, 17 September 1966: 1119, ‘South Africa: Victory for the hero of the white ideal’; Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, ‘John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67’; *TIME*, 23 September 1966: 34-37, ‘South Africa: The security man.’

³²⁸⁶ Centre for African Studies, 1978: 2.

³²⁸⁷ *The Economist*, 17 September 1966: 1119, ‘South Africa: Victory for the hero of the white ideal’; *TIME*, 23 September 1966: 34-37, ‘South Africa: The security man.’

³²⁸⁸ Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, ‘John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67.’

³²⁸⁹ Bunting, 1986: 73-77.

liberals were “the prime promoters of Communism.”³²⁹⁰ He expressed his sorrow that the sons of good white South African parents should turn to violence in opposing the Government. Vorster was greatly admired by Afrikaners. He was seen as the man who had secured their safety by turning the police into a highly efficient force and effectively destroying the illegal opposition to the government. Even the English-speaking South Africans gave Vorster some credit, although he was hated by White liberals and non-Whites.³²⁹¹ It was Vorster who engineered the passage of such brutal laws as the Anti-Sabotage Act and the 90-day (and subsequently the 180-day) detention law. He justified his actions by declaring that he was “at war with the enemies of the *volk*.”³²⁹²

In 1962, as Minister of Justice, Vorster presented the General Law Amendment Bill giving the government sweeping authority over South African citizens. The Bill proposed to extend ministerial powers, allowing it to tighten control over the media, ban public meetings and forbid specified persons from speaking to the Press. He argued that the Bill was necessary because of the Cold War and of the Communist Party in South Africa whose growing strength was a threat to white supremacy.³²⁹³ Passed into law, it gave the government legal power to crush apartheid’s opponents. The detention clauses of the Act allowed the police to arrest anyone suspected of anti-government activism and hold them without charge, initially for twelve days without access to family or lawyers. It even empowered postal workers to intercept and investigate letters or parcels or other communications which they suspected may contain anti-government material.³²⁹⁴ Further amendments to the law extended the twelve days holding period to 90 days, then to 180 days and even beyond.³²⁹⁵ Vorster said such suspects could be held until “this side of eternity.”³²⁹⁶

The Sabotage Act in 1962 listed a series of activities forbidden to any banned person and anyone named under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950.³²⁹⁷ These included preparing material for publication, communicating with other such persons, joining organisations, entertaining visitors and attending social gatherings. Editors and publishers

³²⁹⁰ Spence, 1966: 413-415.

³²⁹¹ Telegram No. 526 of Sir Hugh Stephenson from Cape Town to the Foreign Office. 13 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

³²⁹² Bunting, 1986: 99.

³²⁹³ Ballinger, 1969: 48.

³²⁹⁴ South African Institute of Race Relations, 1964: 27; Thompson, 1966: 190.

³²⁹⁵ Beck, 2000: 145.

³²⁹⁶ “A Distinguished South African Lawyer,” 1965: 4; Herbstein, 2004: 75; Mandela, 2013: 402; Vassen, n.d.

³²⁹⁷ Sachs, 1965: 249.

were forbidden to print anything said by anyone who had been banned under the Sabotage Act. Nevertheless, in 1962, a total of 103 people were stated to have broken these laws. Meanwhile Vorster listed 437 people as Communists, banned the left wing newspaper, *New Age*, and proscribed the left-leaning Congress of Democrats. The government's definition of Communism was so broad that it could be taken to include anyone seeking improved wages or advocating racial tolerance.³²⁹⁸

Also in 1962, the police were given new powers by Dr. Verwoerd to torture suspects under the terms of the Sabotage Act.³²⁹⁹ Vorster was clearly aware of the implications of this dispensation in moral and human terms, when he said, "It is not a very nice thing to see a human being broken... I have seen it... the men taking these powers must be responsible for them."³³⁰⁰ That Vorster was aware of the high level of abuse and repression being wielded in the name of apartheid can be seen in his attempt to justify such methods in a speech on Republic Day, May 31, 1963. Vorster said, "We have reached the stage in our national life where we realize more and more that there are times in a nation's history when not only reason must speak but blood as well – and that time is now."³³⁰¹

In 1965, Vorster was accused of turning South Africa into a police state. He replied, "*This is no time to be sensitive about principles. In such times, it is the things that weigh heaviest that should count.*"³³⁰² To Vorster's Justice Portfolio, Dr. Verwoerd added responsibilities for Police and Prisons in 1966, whereupon Vorster gave instructions to van den Bergh that anyone thought to be a threat to the State should "be taken out of circulation one way or another, if there are valid reasons for not bringing that person to trial."³³⁰³ Aware of these developments, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) characterised Vorster shortly after his accession to power as "probably the most unpopular man in South Africa as far as the non-whites are concerned."³³⁰⁴

Vorster lost no time in defending the policy of apartheid. The day after his accession to prime ministerial office, he declared in a radio broadcast that apartheid was "not a denial

³²⁹⁸ Sachs, 1952: 68.

³²⁹⁹ Lodge, 2011: 178.

³³⁰⁰ Asmal et al, 1996: 118.

³³⁰¹ Bunting, 1986: 522.

³³⁰² *TIME*, 23 September 1966: 34-37, 'South Africa: The security man'; *The New York Times*, 12 June 1965, 7, 'South African aide defends jailing law.'

³³⁰³ D' Oliveira, 1977: 157-8.

³³⁰⁴ Confidential letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices to Certain Missions. 19 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

of human dignity,” but that it “gives the opportunity to every individual within his own sphere to develop and advance without restriction.”³³⁰⁵ In 1968, he cynically admitted, “It is true that there are blacks working for us. They will continue to work for us for generations, in spite of the ideal we have to separate them completely... The fact of the matter is this: we need them, because they work for us ... but the fact that they work for us can never entitle them to claim political rights. Not now, nor in the future... under no circumstances.”³³⁰⁶

One of his first actions as Prime Minister, on September 19, just six days after assuming power, was to secure the passage of legislation crucial to the National Party’s prospects. The Prohibition of Improper Interference Bill was drafted while Dr. Verwoerd was still alive, but was held up by his death. According to Sir Hugh Stephenson,³³⁰⁷ the British ambassador and former High Commissioner in South Africa, the Bill was Dr. Verwoerd’s brainchild and “generally held to be very much an expression of his personally rigid, logical conception of “separate development,” but his death stopped him from passing it. “Its purpose was to prevent the election of Progressive Party candidates for the four seats in the House of Assembly held by White representatives of the Cape Coloureds. The text of the Bill confirmed that this was its immediate purpose, but it went much further in restricting democratic rights.”³³⁰⁸

Furthermore, still according to Sir Hugh, “the Bill (which makes difficult reading because it talks of “interference in the affairs of any population group by persons not belonging to that population group” when it merely means in practice participation by Whites in non-White politics) is a complicated one with eleven clauses. The most important of these prevents Whites from helping non-Whites to register as voters (an activity which was the basis of the success of the Progressive Party candidates for the Cape Provincial Council seats the previous year), prevents their help with the organisation of non-White political parties, and prevents them taking any part in the political activities of non-Whites. The result of this was to make racially mixed political parties illegal. Under the Bill, no White may be elected to represent Coloured voters if he was a member or in any way connected with a White political party during the three years preceding his nomination as a candidate, although the

³³⁰⁵ Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, ‘John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67.’

³³⁰⁶ Davis, 1978: 5; First et al, 1973: 41; Schmidt, 1980: 2.

³³⁰⁷ Sir Hugh was present in the House of Assembly when Dr. Verwoerd was killed.

³³⁰⁸ Telegram of Sir H. Stephenson from Cape Town to the British Foreign Office. 20 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

position of sitting members is safeguarded. The press is, however, protected by a sub—clause which says that the terms of the Bill are not applicable to newspapers. The Bill represents a further major step to enforce the Government's policies of racial separation in the political field in one of the few areas in which racial cooperation is still possible. It illustrates the determination of the Government to close the remaining legal doors through which the non-Whites can express their opposition to the Government's apartheid policies."³³⁰⁹

Dr. Steytler, leader of the Progressive Party, said about the Bill:

“This is a hideous measure, totalitarian in its concept, extreme in its provisions and measured in terms of its long -term consequences, disastrous for South Africa ... This is an attempt, behind the facade of the ballot box system, to exercise State control of our political parties to give the State the power to approve or withhold approval of candidates for election, to enable the State to impose its will of political discussion in South Africa - to attempt to force South Africans to repudiate the effect of South Africa's multi-racial character.”³³¹⁰

In the aftermath of Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, the National Party entered a period of internal conflict which resulted in several hard-line rightists being dismissed from the Cabinet. The conflict reached its peak in 1969 when Vorster accepted the presence of Māori players in the country during a visit by the New Zealand Rugby Union team. The decision alienated NP extremists, who formed a splinter group, the Herstigte (Restored) National Party, led by Albert Hertzog, son of the former Prime Minister, General J.B.M. Hertzog.³³¹¹ At the same time, Vorster turned the Broederbond into a tool of the National Party,³³¹² regularly consulting its leaders on important governmental decisions.³³¹³

His concession to the Maoris apart, Vorster oversaw one of the most violent, brutal and repressive periods in the history of apartheid, with constant accusations of torture and otherwise violating the rights of liberals, anti-apartheid activists and Communists. With van den Bergh, he was accused of responsibility for the deaths in detention of many anti-apartheid activists³³¹⁴ and the 1970 report of the U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid noted

³³⁰⁹ Telegram of Sir H. Stephenson from Cape Town to the British Foreign Office. 20 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

³³¹⁰ Telegram of Sir H. Stephenson from Cape Town to the British Foreign Office. 20 September 1966. South Africa. Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. PREM 13/1211. BNA.

³³¹¹ Brotz, 1977: 45; Miller, 2014: 122-123; Murray, 1987: 25; *The Illustrated London News*, 13 December 1969: 17, 'Revolt in South Africa.'

³³¹² Callinicos, 1995: 30.

³³¹³ *TIME*, 21 November 1977: 85, 'Broederbond's big brother act.'

³³¹⁴ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 15.

that “torture at the hands of the Security Police has become the regular feature of political prisoners in South Africa.”³³¹⁵ Replying to concerns about the number of deaths in dubious circumstances in detention, Vorster said in 1970: “The Opposition can howl until the cows come home and the English-language editors can break down in fits of sobbing, but we will use our powers in the interests of South Africa.”³³¹⁶

In 1973 Vorster, praised the police for their “restraint” in an incident where they shot eleven men dead and wounded seventeen others. The men, workers at Western Deep Levels gold mine in Carletonville, Transvaal, were striking for higher wages. The final indictment of the apartheid system was given unconsciously by the Deputy Minister of Police when excusing the killings by his men at Carletonville: “They had no alternative but to shoot. You must remember that there were about 8,500 men in that compound.”³³¹⁷

A major crisis during Vorster’s term was the 1976 Soweto uprising, which series of protests led by high school students. It began on the morning of 16 June, when an estimated 20,000 students took to the streets of Soweto to protest against the introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of scholastic instruction. They were met with a brutal response by armed police. The government claimed that “only” twenty-three students were killed by police but a realistic death toll of students and supporters was estimated independently at 600 to 700.³³¹⁸ During the uprising, which continued for many months, one of the chants sung by the students was, *Where are you now that we need you, Dimitri Tsafendas?* It echoed *Where are you now that we need you, Harvey Oswald?* sung by opponents of US President Richard Nixon at the time of Watergate.³³¹⁹

Faced with growing national and international pressures, Vorster sought to rebrand racial segregation and create new networks of legitimacy for the apartheid regime. He reached out to the newly independent African nations, establishing diplomatic relations where feasible, for instance with the Malawi of the dictatorial Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, and with South Africa’s neighbour mini-states, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana.³³²⁰ He held talks with African countries such as Ivory Coast, Zambia and Liberia, whose leaders were

³³¹⁵ Farah, 1974: 86.

³³¹⁶ Cook, 1974: 28; *The Star*, 17 October 1970.

³³¹⁷ Cook, 1974: 18.

³³¹⁸ Brink et al, 2010: 9; Harrison, 1981: 143.

³³¹⁹ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

³³²⁰ Bloomberg, 1989: 229.

less doctrinaire in regard to the apartheid regime, and he permitted diplomats from black Africa to reside in white areas in South Africa.³³²¹

The height of Vorster's diplomatic involvement on the continent was working with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to bring together Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia and the black liberation movements which opposed him.³³²² Vorster engineered the release of several nationalist leaders fighting for an independent Zimbabwe so that they could talk peace with the Salisbury regime. Smith's white minority government had unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965, placing its South African neighbour in a diplomatically tricky situation. Vorster supported Rhodesia publicly but refused to accord recognition to the UDI regime for fear of angering America.³³²³ White South Africans supported Smith and Vorster sought to appease them by supplying materiel to Rhodesia in the form of helicopters, arms and ammunition. However he withdrew a South African paramilitary police force from Rhodesia.³³²⁴

Despite Vorster's pragmatism, South Africa remained anathema to the newly independent African nations. In 1976, Vorster again became involved in the affairs of another African country, in this case Angola. This vast West African colony of Portugal gained independence in mid-1975, as did Portugal's other African territory, Mozambique, which promptly turned Marxist. Fearing that Angola would follow suit, and encouraged by the US government, Vorster invaded the country in August 1975.³³²⁵ Although the South African army was initially successful, it was driven out of the country by March 1976 after a major counter-offensive by Angolan troops supported by other African countries, but mainly by Cuba.³³²⁶ US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited South Africa in August 1976 and was greeted by Vorster.³³²⁷

In 1975, Vorster was interviewed by Mr. Ogunsanwo, Editor of the *Sunday Times* of Lagos, Nigeria. Asked how he justified apartheid, he replied, "I don't know what you mean." Then the following dialogue took place:

OGUNSANWO: How do you explain separate facilities, separate shop entrances, separate

³³²¹ *TIME*, 28 June 1976: 11, 'Vorster: Man on a wagon train.'

³³²² Miller, 2014: 115-129.

³³²³ de St. Jorre, 1976: 186.

³³²⁴ *TIME*, 28 June 1976: 11, 'Vorster: Man on a wagon train.'

³³²⁵ Giliomee, 2012: 120; Holness, 1983: 8-9.

³³²⁶ Gleijeses, 2002: 254-262; Holness, 1983: 8-9.

³³²⁷ Miller, 2014: 115.

residences etc?

VORSTER: There is no single shop in South Africa having separate entrances for the races, there are different queues and entrances in the post offices but not in shops. This is because of our policy of separate development of the races. We do not discriminate against anybody on account of race or colour, the policy is very often misunderstood, especially by people in Africa. Certain measures are taken to avoid frictions between peoples and furthermore it is the policy that different peoples should be served by their own people and in that job opportunities are created for black people which never existed before. It is only since this government came to power that black postmasters came into being. Previously, there were no black policemen. It is my government that made it possible for blacks to become professors, school heads, etc. If and when we find it no longer necessary for the reasons I said to have this policy, it will be abolished, otherwise it will remain.

OGUNSANWO: Is there any possibility that our African political detainees, Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, would be released someday to lead their normal lives?

VORSTER: I don't have any political detainees. Nelson Mandela and Co. are not political detainees, they are serving sentences. They were convicted by judicial courts after being found guilty of having committed overt criminal acts. As far as Robert Sobukwe is concerned, he is under a banning order.

OGUNSANWO: Would you allow me to go and see Mandela on Robert Island?

VORSTER: I can only allow the International Red Cross to visit him.

OGUNSANWO: Finally, Prime Minister, let me ask you, could you bring yourself to think of the possibility of African majority rule in South Africa in the immediate or remote future?

VORSTER: Oh yes, there will be African majority rule in South Africa in Zululand, in the Transkei, in Botswana.³³²⁸

Exulting in a huge parliamentary victory for the Nationalist in November 1977, the largest in history, Vorster gave a speech which mixed bravado and defiance: "Let the world know," he said, "let it know tomorrow, let it know for all future time to come, small as we are, situated as we are, we will fight to the end with what we have got."³³²⁹ However, just a

³³²⁸ *Sunday Times* (Lagos), 30 March 1975: 8-9, 'Sunday Times editor interviews John Vorster.'

³³²⁹ Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, 'John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67.'

year later, after twelve years in office, Vorster retired as prime minister. In September 1978, he was succeeded by Defence Minister P.W. Botha and became State President, an honorary position, but eight months later, Vorster resigned in disgrace over the Muldergate scandal.³³³⁰

During his tenure as the country's primary leader, Vorster did not manage to keep apartheid stable and untouchable as Dr. Verwoerd had done. Despite his fierce reputation, it was Vorster who presided over apartheid's deterioration from a halcyon era of economic growth and white control to instability and uncertainty and finally into a landscape of rudderless chaos by the time he left the office in 1978.³³³¹ Vorster's fingerprints were evident in politics at the highest level even after he left office. In 1980, he denounced critics of apartheid as "no friend of the country, of the Afrikaner or of the white man," and in 1983, he rejected suggestions of black and white power-sharing "in whatever form." Later that year, he was rushed to hospital with a lung infection and after a blood clot developed in a lung, he died on September 10, 1983. He was sixty-seven.³³³²

³³³⁰ Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, 'John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67.'

³³³¹ Miller, 2014: 115.

³³³² Treaster (*The New York Times*), 11 September 1983, 'John Vorster, former South African Prime Minister, dies at 67.'

WEDNESDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 1966

BRITISH EMBASSY REPORT

On this day, the British Embassy in Cape Town sent a letter to the South African police which informed them that Tsafendas had made enquiries at the British Consulate-General in Cape Town regarding his application to emigrate to Zambia. The letter also states that Tsafendas had offered his services as Portuguese interpreter to the British ships on the Beira patrol.³³³³

STATEMENTS

CHRISTOFFEL JOHANNES VAN VUUREN³³³⁴

*White male, 56 years old, security officer at Mandini Paper Factory, Mandini, Zululand.
11.30 a.m.*

On the 7th of May of 1965 I was on duty when a male person of Greek heritage, Demitrio Tsafendis had lodged a complaint of assault. He had a wound to his arm. I then fetched Nick Vergos from the mess hall in Mandeni with the aim to later hand him over to the South African Police. After I told him that there was a complaint of assault filed against him, he declared that Tsafendis is a bad person and that he was also a dangerous communist. He gave no reason why he said so and I did not question him further on his allegation. Later during the night I handed Tsafendis and Vergos over to the South African Police in Inyoni. I'm not sure, but it is possible that I told the Police officer what Vergos said about Tsafendis. I'm not sure what Police Officer investigated the case, but I think it was Sargent Snyman. During his stay at Mandeni he was a quiet person who always moved around alone, but nevertheless, he appeared to be a person with a cruel nature.

³³³³ British Embassy in Cape Town letter to the South African Police regarding Tsafendas, 14 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³³³⁴ Christoffel Johannes Van Vuuren statement to the police, 14 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; This is the second statement taken from Van Vuuren, who was also interviewed the day before.

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

The big story in the Press this day was Vorster's unanimous election as South Africa's new Prime Minister. As for the murder inquiry, the *Rand Daily Mail* quoted a senior police officer in Cape Town as saying that investigations were still far from complete and it was doubtful the case could be ready by Tsafendas's October 6 remand date. "We still have hundreds of inquiries to make into Tsafendas's movements... the questioning of Tsafendas himself has not yet been completed and it is quite likely we shall have to ask for a further remand on October 6," he said. The story added that Tsafendas was believed still to be at Caledon Square police station.³³³⁵

A friend's view of Tsafendas appeared in a *Rand Daily Mail* interview with a Greek café proprietor in Durban. Peter Pappas said that eighteen months ago Tsafendas often ate at his café, always curry and rice, and he found him pleasant. Tsafendas said he liked the South African police and people generally but complained that South Africa was not the wonderful country he remembered as a child. Pappas, a former Greek army officer, said Tsafendas spoke angrily about the Salazar regime in Portugal and about the Mozambique police; he also denounced America, where he felt he had been badly treated. Tsafendas was friendly with white down-and-outs and when he had some money he would give them a few cents. "When his luck was out, I sometimes gave him a free meal, but when he started work he paid me," Pappas said. Pappas also described Tsafendas as "very powerful. I remember him once picking me up, playfully like a baby, and I am six feet tall." He said Tsafendas had a suitcase containing references he had collected from overseas jobs. One of them, which Tsafendas showed him, was from Frankfurt.³³³⁶

³³³⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'File on assassin far from completed.'

³³³⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.'

THURSDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 1966

PIDE REPORT

On this day, the military attaché at the South African embassy in Lisbon sent a folder containing various documents regarding Tsafendas to the Director of Military Intelligence in Pretoria. It included the following PIDE report written in Lisbon on February 21, 1962, which covered Tsafendas's story, from his entry to Portugal on February 8, 1949 to his applying for permission to work as a hawker on board ships in 1958:

DIMITRIO TSAFENDAS alias DIMITRIE TSAFANDAKIS,

(Portuguese) National

The man under reference entered Portugal on the 8th February, 1949, through the frontier of Barca d'Alva, where he was arrested by this Police and taken to Porto, from where he was transferred to this Office. Having come to the conclusion that he was a Portuguese national, he was handed over to the Headquarters of the Military Government due to the fact that he had not yet come before the Military Inspection Board on the 6th February, 1950. Before the Board, he was exempted from all military service. Once his situation was normalised, he applied for an identity card as a Portuguese national and began to ply the trade of itinerant vendor of various articles on board the ships lying in the Port of Lisbon.

In October, 1931, he proceeded to Lourenço Marques on the ship Sara, but was forced to return to Portugal, on the ship Angola, both owned by the Companhia Nacional de Navegacao, due to the fact that he was not allowed to land by order of the General Administration (Governo geral).

On the 14th January, 1952, he arrived in Portugal on board the ship Angola.

On the 17th March, 1932, he entered the Hospital do Ultramar, at the instance of the Instituto de Medicina Tropical, with the diagnosis of "intestinal parasitosis; maniacal-depressive psychosis (parasitose intestinal; psicose maniaco-depressiva)", having been discharged on the 9th April of the same year.

On the 24th May, 1952, as he was preparing to leave the Country with the passport with which he had entered on the 8th November, 1949, through the frontier at Beira, he was

detained by this Police and conducted to this Office, where he was detained until the 23rd April, 1953, date on which he was handed over by this police to the Lisbon Mendicants Shelter (Mitra), and where he remained until the 4th August of the same year. On this date he left the said Shelter due to the fact that he was given permission to make use of a Maritime Card to go on board the ships lying in the Tagus.

On the 8th July 1954, he left the Country on passport No. 12325/53 issued by the Governo Civil de Lisboa on the 26th of November, 1953, travelled through various countries of Europe, and on the 11th February, 1956, he was interned in a hospital for nervous complaints in Hamburg, Germany, suffering from mental depression. As he was destitute, application was made for his urgent repatriation to the Portuguese Consulate in that city, which repatriated him on the 11th June of the said year of 1955 on board the Portuguese ship "India."

During the years 1957 and 1958 he applied for, and was granted, permission to go on board ships lying in the Tagus, in order to ply his trade of itinerant vendor of regional articles and embroideries; after this date there is no further reference to this individual in the records of this Police.

Lisbon, 2nd February, 1962.

(sgd) Antonio Teixeira da Silva.

Agent.

The PIDE report stated that in October 1951, Tsafendas was denied entry to Mozambique by order of the General Administration, though it does not give the reason for the refusal. The report also does not say why Tsafendas was arrested on May 24, 1952 and detained until April 23, 1953. It then mentioned his hospitalization in Hamburg, suffering from mental depression, and his subsequent repatriation to Portugal. The report stopped in 1958, stating that "there are no further references to this individual in the records of the Police."³³³⁷

³³³⁷ Letter of the Military Attaché of the South African Embassy in Lisbon to the Director of Military Intelligence in Pretoria with a PIDE report regarding Tsafendas attached, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/6, subject: Departement van verdediging. NASA; Translation of PIDE report regarding Dimitrio Tsafendas alias Dimitrie Tsafandakis, 21 February 1962. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/6, subject: Departement van verdediging. NASA.

PIDE's report does not contain anything about Tsafendas's life prior to 1949, thus none of his political activities in Mozambique before then are included. Most importantly, it stops in 1958 and thus does not contain any information regarding his activities after that year, including, importantly, his arrests and imprisonment in Mozambique in 1964. That PIDE had run a file on Tsafendas since 1938 is also absent.

However, this is to be expected because the 1962 PIDE report was written at the request of the Social Services, who were interested not in his political ideas and activities, but in his life story and medical history, since he was then a patient in the Institute of Psychiatric Welfare of Lisbon. He was admitted there after he had applied for permission to end his exile and return to Mozambique. Since all his previous requests had been turned down, he had proclaimed himself to be a reformed person, no longer a Communist, but harmless and perhaps a little mad. The police had sent him to the Institute for evaluation, and the Institute had asked for information about him from the police. It seems clear that once again PIDE gave the South African authorities another document, the third, withholding vital information about his political activities and containing nothing indicating Tsafendas was a partisan for the independence of Mozambique.

The folder also contained a copy of a certificate written by Dr. Pegado of the Institute of Psychiatric Welfare of Lisbon on April 6, 1962, during Tsafendas's visit there, where it states that: "Demitrio Tsafandakis is fundamentally a psychopath who leads an always unstable and adventurous life. At the moment he does not show signs of psychosis. I agree entirely with Captain Cascais in that one should wait for information regarding his family before finally deciding what destination he is to be given."³³³⁸ Thus, PIDE clearly promotes the idea that Tsafendas was a psychopath without any reference to his political ideology and activities.

³³³⁸ Dr. Pegado's report regarding Dimitrio Tsafandakis, 6 April 1962. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/6, subject: Departement van Verdediging. NASA.

STATEMENTS

HELEN DOROTHY DANIELS³³³⁹

Coloured woman, 36 years old, 46 Kasselsvlei Way, Belville South.

During April 1965 I was visiting friends in Boksburg. There I learned of Demitrio Tsafendas. It was told to me that they would want me to meet him - he's a nice man. I never met him and later returned to Cape Town. When I was in Cape Town, I thought to correspond with him and wrote to my friends to find out his address. They said he was in Durban (the time I was in Boksburg), and when I requested his address, the friends did not respond. Other friends of mine went on holiday to Durban and I then wrote a letter to Tsafendas and asked my friends to give this to him. Our preacher is in Durban and I hoped to trace Tsafendas through the church. He was one of our parishioners, as he pretended.

I wrote my letter during the June holidays in 1965 and received a reply from him on July 10, 1965. I wrote in my letter that I would like to meet and wanted to marry him. His answer was that he wanted to meet me first before giving me a positive answer. I wrote to him again - four letters – all of which he answered. I sent him a picture, but he did not send me one in return. He sent word that he would come to Cape Town for our church conference - it would be in November 1965.

I lived with my parents and on August 28, 1965 - he arrived at my parents' house. When I saw him, his clothes were dirty and neglected and I had a very bad impression of him. However, I received him with friendliness. He said he was in Cape Town looking for work and his belongings are at the station. My brother went to fetch his belongings on one of the Cape stations. When belongings came, (there were two suitcases and a bunch of pots and pans and a large bundle of dirty laundry) I was very disappointed when I saw the state of his property. We had a spare room and gave him lodging. After he was with us a few days, I decided that I could never marry such a man. He also did not try to establish a relationship with me. I also heard from him that he has a blank identity card – although I never saw it. He said his father was a white Greek and his mother a native woman from Mozambique and that he is working on it to be registered as a Coloured. It did not impress me, as I had already

³³³⁹ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

made up my mind and he never discussed our relationship, thus I was happy that my earlier proposal died a silent death.

Meanwhile, he got a job at the power station in Cape Town. He had a lot of bad habits such as: helping himself to items in our stove and refrigerator - his table manners were ugly and messy - he simply laid with his shoes on the bedspread and such. When he found work, my father said he should pay lodging. He then became angry and wanted to know why my father never stated that in the first place. Shortly afterwards on October 16, 1965 at 9:00 pm, he left our house and I had never seen him again. Apart from the above, he was interested in the Bible and discussed church matters with us. He attended all of our services, sang together, prayed together, and used communion. On the face of it, his faith was beyond reproach. He said he sometimes gets headaches. Besides his messy ways I did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal. His stories about traveling abroad was interesting. He was mostly quiet and very withdrawn – he spent a lot of time in his room.

In March 1966, I left for the Free State. I have not heard anything again from Tsafendas. The Wednesday before the end of August 1966 I arrived back in Cape Town. About two weeks later I saw Tsafendas's picture in Cape newspapers and that he was detained in connection with the murder of Dr. Verwoerd. We never discuss politics in our home. He also never talked politics. When the identity card was mentioned he indeed said he was unhappy that he could not be classified as a Coloured. However, he did not criticize the country's laws and made no negative remarks in our presence. Our church does not have a building and our services are held from house to house mostly. Our rallies are held at Mrs. B. Bezuidenhout on the farm Bethany, Durbanville. The church in Cape Town is run by Mr. J. Johnson p/a J. Slater, "DELBY" Athlone Avenue, Plumstead. The belief is known as the Christian church. There are many branches of this faith throughout the world.

Statement taken by D/Sergt. D.J.V. Troost.

HELEN DANIELS AFTER HER STATEMENT

Helen Daniels immediately after the assassination, aware that the press would soon or later find out about her, and in advice of her family and friends, went to complete seclusion in a

family friend's house, the Snyders. She refused to speak to anyone and to make public appearances. The only people who saw her and spoke to her were the policemen who questioned her, a *Post* journalist for all of thirty seconds, and later Tsafendas's lawyers.³³⁴⁰ According to the *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), Daniels was questioned by the police for more than an hour.³³⁴¹

On September 18 two articles involving Helen Daniels appeared in the South African Press. One was at the *Sunday Times* and the other one at the *Post*. The *Sunday Times* contained an interview of her brother, Peter Daniels, where he twisted the facts and flatly lied about his sister's relationship with Tsafendas and how they had met. He told the newspaper that it was Tsafendas who had chased and written to Helen several times, but their meeting "did not result in a great friendship." He said, "Helen was not interested in marriage."³³⁴² This is a contradiction to the statement his sister gave to the police three days ago where she claimed that she heard about Tsafendas and wanted to meet him, so she asked for his address and she wrote to him.³³⁴³ Tsafendas also made a similar statement to the police.³³⁴⁴ However, Peter Daniels was not the only who twisted the facts in this article. A member of the Snyder family had also stated that "there was never a question of Helen and Tsafendas coming together as husband and wife. She was not interested in this. She has devoted her life to missionary work."³³⁴⁵

The second article in the *Post*, written by Security Police and later BOSS agent Gordon Winter, also contained an interview by Peter Daniels. Peter Daniels again completely twisted the facts behind his sister's meeting with Tsafendas. He claimed in this interview that "Tsafendas first came into contact with Miss Daniels through religious correspondence early last year." Tsafendas then travelled to Cape Town to meet her and while he was staying in her house he "became very fond" of her and "later told friends that he loved her. But Helen did not return his love. She was not impressed by his rather abrupt manner and general untidiness." She told her father, "Demetrio does not come up to the standards I am looking

³³⁴⁰ Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016; *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 18: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

³³⁴¹ *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 18: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

³³⁴² *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 18: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

³³⁴³ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

³³⁴⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³³⁴⁵ *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 18: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

for in a man.” When she was forced to make this clear to Tsafendas, he told her family: “She would have been just right for me ... It’s a pity she is so fussy.”³³⁴⁶

The article suggests that Winter has interviewed Helen Daniels and this is how he got some of these information as it also claims that she asked the *Post* not to publish her picture. However, Helen was not interviewed since she was still in seclusion and the remarks were in fact made by her brother, Peter. Winter saw her and spoke to her for thirty seconds on her doorstep. She refused to comment or answer any questions but asked that her picture should not be published, which the newspaper respected.³³⁴⁷ It is understandable that the member of the Snyder family and Peter Daniels tried to protect Helen’s reputation, especially since she was a missionary of the Christian Church, as it would probably have sounded bad for her if it had become known that she had written letters to Tsafendas, the man who was just assassinated Dr. Verwoerd, asking him to meet and marry. Peter Daniels would be a leading defence witnesses in the forthcoming summary trial and he would again lie and misrepresent the case.

Helen Daniels was not asked to testify at Tsafendas’s trial, either for the defence or the State, even though she had been close to Tsafendas and must have been an important witness. On the other hand, her brother and her sister-in-law, neither of whom knew Tsafendas as well as Helen, testified for the defence. As we will see, their testimony was a complete contradiction of the statement given to the police by Helen Daniels. We will examine this case in the Summary Trial Chapter.

MARY KATHLEEN SCOTT³³⁴⁸

Housewife, Woodstock.

I am a housewife and reside at the above address, where I keep some table boarders. Demitrio Tsafendas had his meals with me for about six weeks prior to his working in Parliament house. I do not remember the exact dates but he was with me part of June 66 and July 66 up to two days after his commencing work at Parliament. Before that he was out of work, and had newspaper cuttings to show that he was looking for a job. Whilst out of work

³³⁴⁶ *The Post*, 18 September 1966: 1, ‘I jilted Tsafendas, says Coloured girl.’

³³⁴⁷ Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

³³⁴⁸ Mary Kathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

he showed some of my boarders a newspaper cutting about a job in S.W.A. It was shown in my presence and purporting to be an engineering job to which a good salary was attached. The boarders suggested that he take the job. He made an odd remark "Oh! No, I cannot go to S.W.A. I have a job to do here before I go back."

I knew nothing of his life, and that he might have been to S.W.A. previously, apart from him mentioning that he has been to S.W.A. and said that S.W.A. was the only place where one can make money. The remark sounded odd for reason of him being unemployed at time, and knowing that there was money in S.W.A. Whilst the accused had his meals with me, I found him to be very poorly mannered - so-much-so that I named him "Vark" (pig). His clothing however was clean and always tidy. He even appeared fussy about his clothing. I never had conversations with him, as I disliked his manners, eventually giving him notice for that reason. He was a very restless man. I never got the impression that he could be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared perfectly normal. He talked to the boarders about being a Christian, belonging to no religion or church etc.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

COMMENTS ON SCOTT'S STATEMENT

Pamela Abrahams, a South African, who often visited Scott's house along with her Greek boyfriend and future husband, Panagiotis Peroglou, said Tsafendas was very well mannered, especially with women. She does not remember him having bad manners or being named "The Pig" by Scott. According to Abrahams, "Tsafendas was a gentleman. He would always get up from the table to greet you and he always offered you his seat or went to find you a seat... he was certainly very well mannered."³³⁴⁹

Panagiotis Peroglou was a good friend of Scott but also disagreed with her characterization of Tsafendas. He does not remember Scott ever complaining about Tsafendas or calling him a pig and is very surprised to hear such comments. Peroglou remembers Tsafendas as being "very well mannered, especially with women and elderly people ... he was very talkative and friendly and he had a lot of respect for the women. He

³³⁴⁹ Pamela Abrahams in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

would bring them a chair or he would offer his chair.” Peroglou remembers Tsafendas as being “well educated, especially about Greece’s history and Christianity.”³³⁵⁰ Peroglou and Abrahams associated with Tsafendas for about three months and both “never got the impression that he might be insane. He never did or said anything to make us think he was insane. He was definitely sane.” Peroglou and Abrahams do not remember Tsafendas talking politics.³³⁵¹

Elias Constantaras, another Greek, was friendly with Scott and often ate at her house. He was surprised to be told that she called Tsafendas a pig, saying she never did so in front of him. He also strongly disagreed that Tsafendas had poor manners. The only complaint he remembered from Scott, which she mentioned two or three times, was that Tsafendas talked politics persistently at the table in front of her boarders and she suspected him of being a Communist. According to Constantaras, Scott was afraid of Tsafendas talking like that and she asked him to tell Tsafendas to stop. Constantaras did so and though Tsafendas was not happy that Scott did not tell him herself, he complied with her request. In terms of mental stability, Constantaras remembers Tsafendas as being “perfectly fine. He was not insane. None of us ever got the impression that he could be insane ... I remember I was impressed by the way he was talking ... he talked very nicely; he knew how to speak properly. He sounded like an educated man ... he was very friendly and easy-talking with everyone ...”³³⁵²

Stratis Vamvarapis, another Greek, lodged with Mrs. Scott at the same time as Tsafendas and knew him for about a year. He found Tsafendas to be a “strange man - strange as a character, not mentally strange. He was easily crossed when he disagreed with people.” Initially, Tsafendas had little to say, but became more talkative as they grew to know each other, though he never discussed politics with him. Tsafendas never appeared to be schizophrenic or insane and he never heard him mention a tapeworm. He recalls him eating a lot but does not remember if his manners were messy and he never heard Mary Scott call Tsafendas “The Pig.”³³⁵³

³³⁵⁰ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

³³⁵¹ Pamela Abrahams and Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

³³⁵² Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

³³⁵³ Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

JOHANNES JACOBUS BOTHA³³⁵⁴

White male, 51 years. Security officer at South African Pulp and Paper Industries, Mandeni.

On or about 7 May 1965 I was on duty at the service office at the entrance to the factory. I received a call about a fight that is going on at the living quarters which are used by workers of the different contractors. A little while later after I received the call, a white male of Greek descent, Vergos, reported to me and told me about the incident, which happened to be of the said fight. During his conversation, he told me that Demitrio Tsafendis, the person with whom he was involved in a fight, is the biggest communist in the Republic of South Africa. I told him that I will bring it to the attention of the South African Police. I was not present when the police investigated the matter on the day.

On a certain date afterwards I did in fact share Vergos' comment with a member of the South African Police of Inyoni. I cannot remember to whom I conveyed the information. It had to be one of the white members of the force at Inyoni. The following members were stationed at Inyoni during that time: Germishuys, Francois Ferreira and Jannie Fourie. At a later date, after the fight occurred, a Roman Catholic priest also declared to me that Demitrios Tsafendas is a communist. In both cases, there were no reasons given as to why Tsafendis was suspected of being a communist. The name of the priest is not known to me. I suspect that he is from Stanger. He was dressed in a black suit with a collar that Priests usually wear. He had a full beard. That's all I know about the case.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. 23505 S/Sergt. at 11 p.m.

RICHARD POGGENPOEL³³⁵⁵

Adult Coloured Male, Rosedene, 10 Walnut Street, Lansdowne.

I'm a member of the "Mission." Our church actually has no name, but is the same faith as Helen Daniels of Belville. Around December 1965, I met Demitrios Tsafendas through our church, at O'Ryan of Westminster Street, Lansdowne. We knew that he was

³³⁵⁴ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³³⁵⁵ Richard Poggenpoel statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

sleeping with the O’Ryan children and there was little space and so offered that he can come stay with us until he finds accommodation and work. During December 1965 he stayed with us for 14 days. During his stay with us, he behaved very well. He attended our services and was generally quiet. He wrote many letters for work and during the day went searching for a job.

There was no mention or impression that he was mentally abnormal. He lived a completely normal life. He left as a result of a letter we received. The author pointed out that our daughter who lives with us and who is widowed, could receive a bad reputation because an unmarried man is living with us. I showed him the letter and he made his own decision to leave. He went to live with O’Ryan again. He never talked about any political issues. He just told us of his travels around the world and said that he had faced many troubles. He did not pay lodging, but later brought R4 to the woman.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. 23505 S/Sergt.

COMMENTS OF POGGENPOEL TO THE AUTHOR REGARDING HIS STATEMENT

Richard Poggenpoel stated in a personal interview that Tsafendas often talked politics when people were around, but he personally had no interest in politics. He remembers Tsafendas being “very much against apartheid.” He did not reveal this to the police because he thought that it would be better for Tsafendas.³³⁵⁶ As we will see, Patrick O’Ryan, a very good friend of Poggenpoel, also did not tell the police about his political discussions with Tsafendas for the same reason.³³⁵⁷

³³⁵⁶ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013.

³³⁵⁷ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

FRIDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER 1966

TSAFENDAS'S NAME MENTIONED IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

That day was the first time that Tsafendas's name was heard in the Assembly after the assassination. It was mentioned by Sir de Villiers Graaff, the Leader of the Opposition. He raised the question of Tsafendas's entry into South Africa, the conditions under which he came into the country and how he was granted permanent residence. He stated that he would not pursue the matter himself since the Commission of Enquiry planned to investigate all this.³³⁵⁸

³³⁵⁸ *The Cape Argus*, 16 September 1966: 4, 'Dramatic moment as name of Tsafendas is mentioned.'

SATURDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER 1966

STATEMENTS

RALPH LIGHTON³³⁵⁹

Employed with Marine Diamond Corporation, Cape Town. 9 a.m.

I have known Demitrio Tsafendas for the period of 9-10 weeks, approximately February - March 1966 when he was employed with M.D.C. aboard the Colpontoon in S.W.A. He was employed as machine operator. For the first half of his employment he worked under the maintenance foreman Mr. Reginald Spence. I got to know that he was lazy and inefficient, so I was requested to show him the care of two auction-dredge pumps which was much less work, and responsibility. By that time I have had conversation with him and knew he was of mixed Nationality and spoke Portuguese which appeared to be his home language. I found him to be a complete boar. He used to mix with the coloureds rather than with the Europeans. He got good audience from them.

He never mentioned to me what his political lookout was. He spoke about his world-wide travels and a woman keeping him in Germany. He stated frequently that he was about to get married, as he was 45 and thought is high time to get a wife. He never complained that he was physically incapacitated. He was a good eater. I have knowledge that he resigned for the following reasons - i.e. that the small transfer boat to get to our transport boat the Marina was too dangerous. He also said that the climbing of the ladders were too much for him.

I am fluent in Portuguese which I spoke to him. I never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers, but despite his former career in Merchant Marine, was unsuitable for our work. He stated that he had been a steward most of his time. He mentioned having been to Canada, the U.S.A about 6 yrs., to Britain, all of Europe, Turkey, Italy, Israel, North Africa, Greece, Portuguese East Africa - stating that he had a Portuguese Passport. He might be known to a security man of M.D.C. a Mr. Martincich (23 Yrs. old) Accused said he had Jewish Religion.

³³⁵⁹ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

PATRICK O'RYAN

As we will see in the chapter on the Summary Trial, according to the trial transcripts Patrick O'Ryan was also interviewed this day. The following dialogue took place between Attorney-General Willem van den Berg and Patrick O'Ryan:

VAN DEN BERG: You made a statement to the Police on the 17th September 1966, is that correct?

O'RYAN: Most probably. Yes, the date must be.

VAN DEN BERG: You can have a look at the statement?

O'RYAN: I did make a statement. Correct.³³⁶⁰

O'Ryan's statement was not found in the archives. His statement is extremely important, as we will see in the following chapter, because of remarks by Attorney-General van den Berg during his cross examination of O'Ryan. After O'Ryan had referred at length to the importance of the tapeworm in Tsafendas's life, van den Berg noted that O'Ryan had not mentioned anything to the police about the tapeworm and wondered why he had not done so since he claimed that it was so important to Tsafendas. According to the trial transcript, the following are excerpts from Patrick O'Ryan's statement to the police on September 17, 1966: "He (that is the accused) stayed with me for approximately 3 months, 2 weeks of which he stayed at Poggenpoel's, but afterwards returned to me. He read the newspaper and it was apparent that he was against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal. He made the impression with me that he was favourable towards the Coloureds and he repeatedly applied to be classified as a Coloured.

He said that he had a blank identity card, in other words his race was not recorded on it. He labelled the apartheid policies as unfair. His reasoning was not very intelligent. I did not encourage him, because we advocate the Biblical idea of subservience to a Government. His spiritual view seemed confused, but he was not spiritually or mentally disturbed. On the

³³⁶⁰ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

contrary, even though I did not consider him to be particularly intelligent, he was well spoken and had good vocabulary. I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind.”³³⁶¹

COMMENTS ON PATRICK O’RYAN’S STATEMENT

Patrick O’Ryan later said that Tsafendas was “very anti-white, excitedly referring to the treatment of Blacks and Coloureds by the Whites.” One day, Tsafendas told him that if he “ever got hold of Dr. Verwoerd, he “would bash his skull.” O’Ryan said he did not reveal any of their political discussions to the police when they questioned him about Tsafendas.³³⁶²

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

On this day, the first physical description of Tsafendas’s mixed-race mother appeared in the Press, in a *Rand Daily Mail* interview with Mr. Gugliemo (Willy) Conte, a friend of Tsafendas’s father, Michalis. In an interview with the paper’s reporter, Hazel Goldstein, Conte said he met Michalis soon after he (Conte) arrived in Lourenço Marques, aged eighteen, and they became business associates. He said Michalis and Dimitri Tsafendas’s mother lived together on the first floor of a white, two-storey house on 24th July Avenue, Lourenço Marques. He described Dimitri’s mother as “a plump, clean-looking woman with ivory-coloured skin.” She dressed in “native clothing – a print blouse with a white sash around her body.” Conte said that contrary to reports, Demetrios was not rejected by the family. Except for his school years in Middleburg, he said that he had always stayed with his father and Greek stepmother and their family.³³⁶³

³³⁶¹ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³³⁶² Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

³³⁶³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas timid and puny as a boy.’

SUNDAY, 18 SEPTEMBER 1966

No statements or any other evidence were found in the archives for this day.

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

The *Sunday Times* headlined its top story, ‘*Tsafendas’s brothers are quizzed*’ by the police. It said Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town members of the “Fellowship of Christ,” to which Tsafendas belonged, had made statements to the police.³³⁶⁴ They included Helen Daniels, who was interviewed by security officers for more than an hour. It was also the day when the two interviews which her brother Peter Daniels gave to the *Post* and the *Sunday Times* that were discussed earlier in this chapter were published. Finally, Attorney General van den Berg told the *Sunday Times* that Tsafendas would probably appear in court within the next fortnight. Mr. van den Berg said he had read some documents but new evidence was being investigated by the police.³³⁶⁵

³³⁶⁴ *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 5, ‘*Tsafendas’s brothers are quizzed.*’

³³⁶⁵ *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 5, ‘*Tsafendas’s brothers are quizzed.*’

MONDAY, 19 SEPTEMBER 1966

TSAFENDAS'S SECOND STATEMENT

Tsafendas's interrogation is again recorded this day and this is his second statement found at the archives. As we will see, unlike the previous one, it contains the questions Tsafendas was asked to answer. This is his statement:

Further Questioning of Demitrio Tsafendas at 2.45 p.m. on 19/9/66 by Maj. Rossouw³³⁶⁶

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Is it true that you told the American authorities that you have joined the Communist Party at the age of 20?*

TSAFENDAS: *I cannot remember having made such a statement to the American authorities. I was a member of the Communist Party. I joined the Communist Party just before the war in Johannesburg. I was about 19-20 years old then. It was during 1936, 37 or 36 - I cannot remember the date.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Where and with whom did you join the party?*

TSAFENDAS: *I was a member of the boiler workers and welders union when I joined at the Trades Hall in Johannesburg. I cannot remember whom I joined with - I mean who the person was - but I remember having received a Communist membership card and I used to pay two shillings and sixpence monthly as membership fees. I continued paying membership fees until I left in 1941. I paid my membership fees at an office in the Trades Hall. I paid my Trade Union fees at an office and the C.P. membership fees at a different office in the Trades Hall.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Did you ever attend Communist Party meetings?*

TSAFENDAS: *I did attend meetings on the City Hall steps in Johannesburg. I went there to listen to their speeches. They used to carry banners. I remember one Wolfson and one named Joffe who made speeches on the City Hall steps. I also went to see two film shows in the public library. The Communist Party was legal then and so was the Ossewa Brandwag. I*

³³⁶⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

made one mistake and that is that I told no one that I was leaving South Africa. After I left Johannesburg I paid no more monthly subscriptions. That was the end of my Communist Party membership.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Did you contact members of the Communist Party in America?*

TSAFENDAS: *No, I did not. I did not attend any C.P. rallies in America. I don't remember telling anybody in America that I was a member of the S.A. Communist Party.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Did you associate yourself or attend any Communist Party meetings elsewhere in the world?*

TSAFENDAS: *No, I did not. I attend meetings at Hyde Park, but not Communist Party meetings. I also attended Labour Party meetings in England at Caxton Hall, but they were not Communist meetings.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Did you lose interest in Communist Party activities after you left South Africa?*

TSAFENDAS: *I was an inactive person as far as politics were concerned and for that reason did not maintain political connections. Since leaving South Africa I did not consider myself a member of the Communist Party.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Can you name the hospitals in all the countries where you were hospitalised during your absence from South Africa?*

TSAFENDAS: *I received medical treatment at the Boston Psychosomatic Hospital, Sheepshead Bay Hospital for seamen outside New York, the Grafton State Hospital, Massachusetts. I also received medical attention at St. Pancras Hospital, London and at the Isle of Wight. In Europe I was in Oxensoll Krankenhaus in Hamburg and in the Tropical State Hospital in Lisbon. I was also a patient at the Government Hospital in Beira. I was in Addington Hospital in Durban for a state wound on my right arm. I also had an ear, nose and throat operation in Grootte Schuur Hospital, Gape Town during 1966.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Can you tell me what the nature of your illnesses were for which you received hospital treatment at the various hospitals?*

TSAFENDAS: *The diagnosis for being sent, to Boston Psychopathic Hospital was depressive psychosis. At Sheepshead Bay Hospital for depressive psychosis and exhaustion, at Grafton State Hospital for schizophrenia. That means a split personality. At St. Pancras*

Hospital I was also treated for depressive psychosis and at the Isle of Wight I was also hospitalised on account of a nervous condition. Also at Oxensoll Krankenhaus I received treatment for a nervous condition. I don't know what happened but I woke up after receiving shock treatment. At Beira I was hospitalised for recovery from an exhaustive condition.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *I think you left Lisbon out.*

TSAFENDAS: *There they must have done something to my brain because I was never the same again because I was always suffering from a persecution complex. After that something went wrong with my heart and my nervous system. The last time I was hospitalised for a nervous condition was in 1953 at Oxensoll Krankenhaus.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *You told Gen. van den Bergh about a girl you were interested in somewhere in Woodstock and whom you wanted to marry.*

TSAFENDAS: *Oh, her name was Miss Baxendella, an Indian girl - she was a mixed breed between Indian and Coloured. That was about six months ago when I was interested in her. She works in a shop near Woodstock Police Station. It is a grocery shop on the right hand side just before you reach Woodstock Police Station from Cape Town. I cannot remember the name of the shop but I can point it out to you.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *When did you first become a member of the Christian Church?*

TSAFENDAS: *I got to know about the church in 1933. To become a full member one has to be baptized, I left here in 1941 without being baptized. I was baptized in Greece (Athene) on the beach in 1948 or 1949.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Is it true that you must be self-supporting before you can become a member of the Christian Church?*

TSAFENDAS: *Yes, you must work. I do not consider myself a very faithful member because I did not comply with the requirements of the church.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Can you describe your church to me?*

TSAFENDAS: *My church consists of a group of people coming together holding a communion of gospel meetings. We have no church temple and we hold meetings according to where you stay. If I stay in Woodstock I attend meetings in the area where I stay. I used to attend meetings in Pinelands. We hold a convention once a year. Last year I attended a convention on n Mr. Bezuidenhout's farm in Durbanville.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Can you speak, read and write Arabic language?*

TSAFENDAS: *I can only speak a little bit of Arab language from what I learned in Egypt, Jordan, Beirut and Siria.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Name the languages in which you are fluent, others which you know less fluently and those in which you can help yourself?*

TSAFENDAS: *I am fluent in English, Greek, Portuguese. I am less fluent in German, French and Italian. I can help myself in Arabic, Afrikaans, Shangaan. I only know a few words in Turkish.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Were you ever indoctrinated by any person to commit the unlawful act for which you are now charged?*

TSAFENDAS: *No, I was not. I did not do it at the instigation of anyone. I did it on my own because I thought it was the right thing.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *It appears that you planned the assault on Dr. Verwoerd over a long period - can you tell me when your planning to kill Dr. Verwoerd first started?*

TSAFENDAS: *The idea of destroying Dr. Verwoerd entered my mind a few days after I started work as a messenger in the House of Assembly. I saw an opportunity to do so in the House of Assembly because I was inside the house. I first thought of buying a gun with which I could shoot him and then run away. I did in fact buy a gun from the crew of the Eleni hut I found that the gun was useless. I bought the gun at the end of the month when I got my pay. I went there before to try and get the gun but I had no money. I then waited until I got my pay. I was going to buy a Beretta but the man didn't keep his word and gave me the other pistol. He made all kinds of excuses. It was only after I found that the gun was useless that I decided on using a knife.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Did you ever discuss your plans of wanting to destroy Dr. Verwoerd with any person?*

TSAFENDAS: *No, I did not. The crew of the Eleni were discontented because they could not go out and have a good time with the Coloured women. They were bitter about not being able to have the woman outside but I did not discuss my intentions with any of them. I remember some of them mentioning, during casual conversation, that these people should be taught a lesson. The "bosun" was one for example. He did not put it in the same words as I put it. I explain in Greek what he said. His words is translated in English to mean; "The South*

Africans need a good raping.” I did not express my intentions to the “bosun” or anyone else. I cannot say that the strong feelings of the Eleni crewmen persuaded me to do what I already had in mind, but it did contribute to the final execution of the deed. None of them knew of what I was going to do. They asked me what I wanted the pistol for and I said I wanted it for self-defence.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *And if you managed to escape after assassinating the Prime Minister, where were you going to hide yourself?*

TSAFENDAS: *I was going to find refuge on the tanker, the Eleni, which I knew was sailing to South America. My plans were, however, upset when I could not get the right pistol. The boat sailed on the Saturday before the Tuesday on which I stabbed the Prime Minister.*

MAJ. ROSSOUW: *Did you know that the Eleni had sailed before you attacked, the Prime Minister? If so, what were your plans to get away?*

TSAFENDAS: *Yes, I knew the ship had already left. I never thought about hiding if I had to do the job with a knife. I didn't have much of a chance of getting away when using a knife. I didn't care much and didn't give it a second thought that I would be caught. I just happened to do it that way. I always had a grudge against the South African Government on account of its racial policies and I hated Dr. Verwoerd because he was a foreigner - a Hollander.*

This statement was read over to the deponent and he was asked whether the contents was correct in every respect, he acknowledged that the replies to questions put to him were answered freely and voluntarily without him being forced to do so in any way.

Are you prepared to sign this statement? Yes, I am prepared to sign it.

You have listened to the statement as read over to you. Is it correct? Yes, it is correct. Do you wish to read it over yourself? No, sir, I do not.

(SGD) DEMETRIOS TSAFENDAS

19/9/1966: CAPE TOWN

ANALYSIS OF TSAFENDAS'S STATEMENT

Once again, Tsafendas does not mention the tapeworm, even when he is asked why he was hospitalised in each hospital. Furthermore, he maintains that he did “the right thing” and that he did not care about the consequences. He also repeats the assertion that he bought a gun from the *Eleni* and adds that he was planning to escape after the assassination by hiding in the tanker. Tsafendas also referred to the *Eleni* extensively in his statements on the 11th and now he does so again, therefore it is natural to assume that he also mentioned it when he was first interrogated by General van den Bergh.

Thirteen seamen from the *Eleni* who came to know Tsafendas in Cape Town all strongly deny that any of the crew were upset about the Immorality Act, describing such a claim as ridiculous. They said those who wanted to have sex with Coloured South African women went ahead and did so, not on board, and Tsafendas knew about it. None of them was “bitter” or discontented. Only very few actually wanted to have sex with Coloured women but opportunities were available for those who did. Some of the crewmen had asked Tsafendas about women and he told them he did not know any prostitutes. The men eventually found ready access to both White and Coloured women through a Greek man named Panagiotis (Peter),³³⁶⁷ who was not known personally to Tsafendas, though Tsafendas was aware that he had “business” dealings with some of the crew.

Why would Tsafendas claim that the crew was discontented if there was no problem about sex? The men who were interviewed by the author suggested the existence of a political factor, specifically a hostility among the crew to apartheid. Some of the crew, especially those who were friendly with Tsafendas, were Communists and adopted an unfriendly attitude towards White South Africans since they considered them to be fascists. After the township visit, several of the crew began referring to South Africans as Nazis. Some of the men, especially Vasilakis and Zafiriadis, became quite aggressive towards visiting White South Africans. Vasilakis even got into an argument with one South African supplier over the treatment of non-Whites. Tsafendas told them to be careful about the way they talked because they could get into trouble. Vasilakis, Mastromanolis and Kambouris believe Tsafendas might have used that as an excuse to explain the hostility of the crew towards White South Africans that might have been reported to the police after the

³³⁶⁷ None of the witnesses remembers his surname.

assassination.³³⁶⁸

Mastromanolis confirms to the author that he said South Africans needed “a good whipping.” He says he made the comment after Tsafendas organised the township visit. Mastromanolis repeated this comment several times in reference to White South Africans he happened to encounter, saying things like, “What a good whipping this racist needs.” The phrase soon became a running joke within the crew and others would repeat it when they came across White South Africans. Tsafendas told Mastromanolis and the others to be cautious since Greek visitors to the *Eleni* could also be supporters of apartheid. It was also after the township visit that another sailor, probably Dimitris Zafiriadis, said that the South Africans needed to be “taught a lesson.” Both comments were the result of seeing conditions in the Black township and the men’s recognition of the reality of apartheid and had nothing to do with the Immorality Act.

Some of the seamen believe, and it sounds logical, that Tsafendas lied to the police in order to protect them. Their theory is that Tsafendas came to believe that some of the South Africans and the Greek-South Africans coming on board noticed the hostility of the crew towards them or heard them talking negatively about South Africa and that Tsafendas used the Immorality Act as a reason for their hostile behaviour. The fact that Tsafendas attributed Mastromanolis’s comment to the Immorality Act and not to the township visit strongly suggests that he did so to protect him. He may have feared that Greek visitors heard the comment and if so would have told the police about it. Of course, all of this is speculation and the author is not in position to know for certain what Tsafendas’s motives were in referring to the Immorality Act. However, the fact is that the crewmen were not discontented about the Act and freely admit that whoever wanted to have sex with a Coloured woman went ahead and did so.³³⁶⁹

The importance of the *Eleni* would also be highlighted later by the Commission of Enquiry for four reasons:

- That Tsafendas visited the vessel almost every day for forty-two days before the

³³⁶⁸ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

³³⁶⁹ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

assassination,

- That he bought a weapon from the crew
- That he was intending to escape aboard this ship.
- Three days before the assassination, Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed on-board the *Eleni*.

On the question of the Christian Church, Tsafendas is lying or mistaken or just not very clear about when he first heard of it. He stated here that it was in 1933. He would then have been aged fifteen and living in Lourenço Marques. It is possible that he meant 1943, when he was in hospital in the United States. He told several people he first came across the sect in an American hospital through the person of Tom Tuff. Tsafendas also said this to the doctors in the Grafton State Hospital in 1946. All of the witness interviewed by the author who knew Tsafendas in the 1930s stated flatly that Tsafendas was not associated at the time with this sect.

Tsafendas also declared in the above statement that he got the idea of killing Dr. Verwoerd after he began working in Parliament. In fact, he later claimed that previously he hung around Parliament's precincts to work out whether it would be possible to shoot Dr. Verwoerd or to kill him with a bomb. It was while doing this that, by chance, he got the opportunity to work there. When he realised he could easily kill Dr. Verwoerd, he did not hesitate. He considered that he had the chance of getting rid of a tyrant and if he had not done so, he would have regretted it all his life. He told the police at the time and repeated it thirty years later, that he hoped by killing Dr. Verwoerd "things would change" because Dr. Verwoerd was "the brains behind apartheid." He considered him to be a "monster" and an "evil person." He knew that things would not change overnight, but he hoped the prime minister's death would be a stepping stone towards the end of apartheid.³³⁷⁰

Tsafendas declares in his statement that "I always had a grudge against the South African Government on account of its racial policies and I hated Dr. Verwoerd because he was a foreigner - a Hollander." Tsafendas characterised Dr. Verwoerd in a similar fashion in his interview with Dr. Sakinofsky immediately after the assassination. However, he never told any of the two-hundred or so people who were questioned by the South African police and the Commission of Enquiry or the sixty-nine interviewed by the author that he had a

³³⁷⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

grudge against Dr. Verwoerd because he was a foreigner. What he told several witnesses was that he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a dictator, a tyrant, an oppressor of his own people and “Hitler’s best student.”

Why then did he make the allusion to “foreigner?” True, Dr. Verwoerd was born in Amsterdam, Holland, but Tsafendas was clearly using the word in a wider sense. In Mozambique in 1964, Tsafendas was accused of “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”³³⁷¹ When interrogated by the PIDE, he said he wanted to see “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they White or Black, and therefore separated from the mother nation.”³³⁷² This was a firmly held belief which he mentioned to numerous people, including Helen Grispos, Ira Kyriakakis, Katerina Pnema, Andreas Babiolakis, Mary Eendracht and Fathers Ioannis Tsafaridis and Minas Constandinou. They all said that Tsafendas considered the Portuguese rulers of Mozambique to be “foreigners” and “conquerors” and that he used those words to describe them. He believed the Portuguese had commandeered the land from its rightful owners.³³⁷³

In the case of South Africa, Mozambique and Rhodesia, he considered these to be “occupied lands” under the oppressive minority rule of incomers such as Dr. Verwoerd, Ian Smith and the Portuguese colonialists. He exempted Whites who backed majority rule but considered as classic occupiers those settler Whites who had made large fortunes from vast tracts of land effectively stolen from the indigenous non-Whites. What Tsafendas meant by “foreigner,” “occupier” or “conqueror” was “colonialist.” His position was that Mozambique was a province, i.e. a colony, of Portugal, and the Portuguese who ruled it were therefore colonialists, foreigners, incomers from Europe. He also believed that South Africa and Rhodesia should be governed by the majority and not by a handful of Whites. For Tsafendas, the word “foreigner” meant “colonialist.” With the witnesses mentioned above, he used the Greek word for foreigner, which can carry a darker shade of meaning than in English. He believed that all those who supported the Portuguese and the white Rhodesian and South

³³⁷¹ PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA.

³³⁷² PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³³⁷³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

African Governments were foreigners who had stolen the land from the native Mozambicans and Rhodesians and set themselves up as unilateral rulers. Equally, he believed that apartheid-supporting Whites in South Africa were also foreigners and occupiers who had seized and settled native land forcibly removing the non-Whites.³³⁷⁴

Father Minas told the author about Tsafendas's political ideas:

“Dimitris used to say that apartheid was like colonialism, because a few Europeans were ruling a land which belonged to Blacks because their ancestors had invaded and conquered it. I remember he used to call the Portuguese in Mozambique and I think the whites in South Africa too, ‘conquerors’ and ‘occupiers;’ he considered Mozambique and South Africa to be ‘occupied lands,’ conquered by foreigners. He used to say that Verwoerd was Hitler’s best student, because he had learned from him some of his methods and laws and he was applying then to the Blacks.”³³⁷⁵

As for Tsafendas seeing Dr. Verwoerd and the Whites in South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique as “foreigners,” he was certainly not the only one who thought that way. Even Dr. Verwoerd himself acknowledged this idea in a speech on February 8, 1961: “There are people who are far away and do not understand us. They see this southern point of Africa only as a White-dominated country in a large continent with over 200 million people who are black. And then they say we do not fit here, we are foreign to the body of Africa.”³³⁷⁶

Tsafendas considered apartheid to be a form of colonialism, not very different from the out-and-out colonialism of Mozambique and Rhodesia. We should note here that in 1963, the policy of apartheid had been declared by the South African Communist Party to be “colonialism of a special type.”³³⁷⁷ It is possible that this pronouncement confirmed Tsafendas’s own convictions on the subject.

Tsafendas also gives a detailed account of his various hospitalizations, but he does not mention the tapeworm. What is more, he presents the diagnoses in a less serious fashion than it appeared in the hospital’s reports. For example, he says he was hospitalized on the Isle of

³³⁷⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³³⁷⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

³³⁷⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 494.

³³⁷⁷ Visser, 1997: 79; Volpe, 1988: 28-35.

Wight and at the Oxensoll Krankenhaus Hospital merely for a “nervous condition.” However, the diagnosis by both hospitals was that Tsafendas was suffering from a psychotic illness.³³⁷⁸

As with Tsafendas’s previous statement, there are these questions: Could the police have forged it or imputed to Tsafendas things he did not say or did not mean? But then why would they work on something that was never going to be used? The statement was not tabled for the summary trial or the Commission of Enquiry.

TSAFENDAS’S MEDICAL EXAMINATION

At 3.30 this day, and after Tsafendas had been interrogated by Major Rossouw, he was examined by a doctor. The doctor’s name is indecipherable, but his medical report reads as follows:

“He (Tsafendas) complained of mild breathlessness at times and a feeling of discomfort in the throat. On examination, he appeared in good physical condition and nil abnormal was found in the chest. His temperature was 98.0 F. I came to the conclusion that he was suffering from hyperventilation at times and prescribed a multivitamin tablet containing phenobarbitone gr 1/2.”

Signed: ... (Indecipherable name) ...³³⁷⁹

ACCURACY OF THE MEDICAL REPORT

The author is not in position to know the accuracy of this doctor’s report, but as stated before, it must be read against a background of known collusion by physicians with the authorities in those years. Since collusion and cover-up were commonplace in apartheid South Africa, doubt must remain over any doctor’s report concerning Tsafendas, especially with regard to his physical condition while in police custody.

³³⁷⁸ Dr. Harold Cooper’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³³⁷⁹ Memorandum to Maj. Rossouw re. Demitrio Tsafendas, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3, NASA.

STATEMENTS

DR. AUBREY RADFORD³³⁸⁰

Specialist surgeon, Member of Parliament representing Durban Central Constituency. 12. p.m.

On 6/9/66 at about 2.13 p.m. I approached the main entrance to the debating chamber of the House of Assembly. This entrance is protected by a screen and as I approached from the northern end Dr. Verwoerd approached from the southern end accompanied by two members of Parliament with whom he was talking. I stopped to allow Dr. Verwoerd to go in before me. He and his companions entered and I followed immediately. Entering the House on the right side of the gangway, just before I reached the seat of the Chief Messenger, I was violently pushed from my left rear. This was so unusual that I glanced to see who had done it. I saw the back of a messenger going towards the left to where Dr. Verwoerd walked. I sat down in my seat almost opposite the seat usually occupied by the Prime Minister.

I heard a scuffle and looking towards the sound I saw arms and legs struggling with someone at Dr. Verwoerd's seat. At the same time Sir de Villiers Graaff ran across and before he reached Dr. Verwoerd he shouted - "Doctor." I ran to Dr. Verwoerd across the floor and found Dr. Fisher already there. Dr. Verwoerd's face was bloodless, his left arm hung over the side of the bench. Dr. Fisher tore open his shirt and waist-coat. There was then visible a stab wound in the area behind which lay the heart. This wound was bleeding slightly and Dr. Fisher put his hand over this wound to control any bleeding. I felt Dr. Verwoerd's left pulse. It was completely absent and never returned. Dr. Fisher lifted his hand from the wound and there was no bleeding. Bleeding came from the wound in the left base of the neck, but had seized when I looked at the wound. Dr. Morrison came to the second bench and Dr. Fisher asked him to give mouth to mouth breathing, which he did. Dr. Fisher then asked Dr. Morrison to go to his (Dr. Fisher's) office and bring down Coramine and a syringe. Dr. Morrison arrived with a full syringe which I passed to Dr. Fisher, who then injected it into the heart of Dr. Verwoerd. He asked for another syringe full which Dr. Morrison supplied quickly and I injected this into the same area. Dr. Fisher and I speaking quietly decided that Dr. Verwoerd was dead. We waited there until Dr. Verwoerd's body was removed by

³³⁸⁰ Dr. Aubrey Radford statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

ambulance ... Coramine is a powerful stimulant for the heart, especially in the case of an emergency.

(SGD.) A.J.P. Louw 16457 SGT.

CHARLES EDWIN WOODS³³⁸¹

White Male, aged 64 years, supervisor at Fraser and Chalmers, Mandeni, Zululand.

On 19.4.1965, Demitrio Tsafendas took-up employment with Fraser and Chalmers, and was posted to Mandeni. He was recruited in Durban, and was employed as a Fitter and Turner. He was qualified as a Fitter and Turner and was a good tradesman. Demitrio Tsafendas was discharged on 9.5.1965 because he had been involved in a fight with another White male, Nicholas Vergos. Demitrio Tsafendas sustained a severe laceration of the right wrist. During the time Demitrio Tsafendas was employed by ay firm, I never had any discussions with him along political lines. We discussed his travels in which he related that he had visited many countries but made no mention of any countries which he may have visited behind the iron curtain.

On the 9.5.1965, Demitrio Tsafendas told me that the fight between him and Nicholas Vergos was as a result of a political argument. He did not state anything further. I also interviewed Nicholas Vergos, who was employed by Congella Erection, who told me that I should get rid of Demitrio Tsafendas "as he is a Communist." Demitrio Tsafendas was not a person who mixed freely and kept to himself most of the time.

(SGD.) R.D. WILSON. D/SERGT.

COMMENTS ON WOOD'S STATEMENT

Two days after the assassination, Woods had described Tsafendas in an interview with the *Cape Times* as "a very good worker, far from being a crank, fairly intelligent, but a violent type."³³⁸²

³³⁸¹ Charles Edwin Woods's statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³³⁸² *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, 'Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.'

TUESDAY, 20 SEPTEMBER 1966

LT. COL. VAN WYK'S REPORT³³⁸³

On this day, Lt.-Colonel P.J.B. van Wyk wrote his first report "regarding the activities of Demitri Tsafendas in Rhodesia and Mozambique," from interviews he had conducted in both countries. The report was then sent to the offices of the Commissioner of the South African Police in Pretoria and of the Security Police in Cape Town. This is Lt.-Colonel P.J.B. van Wyk's report:

*A. The Commissioner,
South African Police,
Privatebag 94
Pretoria.*

*B. The officer in Charge,
Security Police
Cape Town.*

Activities: Dimitrio Tsafendas: Mozambique and Rhodesia.

Following my recent visit to Mozambique and Rhodesia and my investigation into the activities and background of the subject, I wish to report the following:

LOURENÇO MARQUES: 12.09.66

³³⁸³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

While at Lourenço Marques, I spoke with the following persons:

Members of the P.I.D.E:

Upon my arrival I was welcomed by Sub-Inspector A. Vaz and told that he received instruction from his headquarters in Lisbon to assist us wherever possible with the investigation in this matter, but that they must by no means be involved to such an extent that it came to the knowledge of other organizations and have possible international repercussions for their government. He briefly described the circumstances leading to the arrest and release of the subject at Beira during 1964/65, and promised to personally send a photocopy of the file to General van den Bergh.

George Liberopulis³³⁸⁴

George Ananiades

These people, both Greek, mentioned to me that they both went to school in Lourenço Marques and the Republic. During the beginning of 1965 they met the subject. He practically forced himself upon them and they treated him and often paid for his meals but further had nothing to do with him. He never spoke about politics with them. They describe him as a normal person with a very high-intelligence.

Manuel Hazis

He immigrated to Mozambique during 1963. During the beginning of 1965, he could not remember the date or period the subject came to his business, a bakery, and started a conversation with him. The subject said that he was an evangelist and he spoke out of the Bible often but never politics. He does not know Tsafendas and cannot furnish further information.

Mr. John Gianouris - Greek Vice Consul at Lourenço Marques

He is a literate and pleasant personality that has received much of his education in the Republic and without any doubt can be seen as a supporter of the Republican policy. He also

³³⁸⁴ The surname is misspelled; the correct spelling is Liberopoulos.

met Tsafendas during the beginning of 1965 when Tsafendas called on him for financial assistance. Tsafendas could not convince him that he is a Greek citizen and therefore he did not meet Tsafendas's request. He describes the subject as a normal and intelligent person. Mr. John Gianouris promised to make the necessary further inquiries among the Greek community and disclose any information that may be of importance to me. I believe that he will do his utmost to obtain more information for us.

Mr. Vaz promised to investigate the allegations of Tsafendas having received money from the Republic.

BEIRA

Here I was met by the District commander of the Police, Captain Rui Tavara who was very helpful during my investigation there. He even had an office made available to me, and people who knew the subject were called to the office. I spoke to the following persons there:

Inspector Horacio Ferreira P.S. Police (Uniform Branch)

He is in charge of the police cells and informs me that Tsafendas was detained in the police cells at Beira for a period of around 14 days from 14 November 1964 due to the fact that he spread subversive propaganda to the Bantu people. According to him, Tsafendas is intense anti-white and went as far as to tell him that the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-whites. Otherwise Tsafendas was normal and he regarded him as a very intelligent person. During his detention, it was often seen that he read books which were written in Bantu languages, but never the Bible.

Stelios Marangos

He is the owner of a boarding house and knows the subject who stayed at his lodgings from 28 August 1964 to 8 October 1964. He was unemployed and had only paid his lodgings for the period 28 August to 28 September. When he left he said he was going to look for work at the firm that lies the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia. During his stay in the boarding house

he was very quiet and almost never spoke. It was often seen that he carried a Bible with him. He never talked politics.

John Verghis

He is the owner of a café in Beira and met the subject during 1964. However, he could not remember the month or date. On a day the subject entered his shop where he spoke to other people in the cafe. He then frequently visited the cafe where he spent time in the company of other Greeks. The subject was quiet and never spoke much and never about politics. It seemed to him that the subject always visited the café to see just if someone would give him something to eat or drink. After the subject left Beira, he once received a letter from him that was posted from Durban. In this letter he only enquires of lottery tickets. Tsafendas was not a drinker. He only saw him drinking a beer once. According to him Tsafendas was a normal person. On one occasion Tsafendas told him that he was arrested by the Security Police of Mozambique but that nothing could be proved against him. He did not say why he was arrested.

John Emmanuel Marvis

He was in the Scala Café on the day when Tsafendas entered the cafe. After they determined that he speaks Greek, he was invited to join him and the other Greeks who were present. After that he often came into the cafe and they sometimes bought him food and drink. On one occasion he placed a letter on the table in the cafe and said that he had received it from his sister in Rhodesia. He was very upset and said that his sister is coming to Beira for a marriage ceremony but told him that she does not want to see him whatsoever, because he is a disgrace to the family. He took off his hat, which he never removed, pointed to his hair and said: "You see, my father is a Greek and my mother is a coloured. That is reason why my brothers and sisters do not want anything to do with me." He also told them that he left Lourenço Marques during the last war and travelled around the world. He visited all the countries in Europe except a few. Tsafendas never talked politics. On one occasion, however, he spoke in favour of full integration and intermarriage between coloreds and whites. He said that it is high time that a new race came into being. Tsafendas never had money. He mentioned once that he sold household objects in Johannesburg and made a bit of money. On one occasion he borrowed 10 escudos from Mr. Marvis.

Mr. Marvis did not have a 10 escudo piece and therefore had given him 20 escudos. A few days later Tsafendas came to him and took a 100 escudo note from his money-wallet to repay him with. There was a pack of 100 escudo notes in his wallet. (This money is probably his wages for the four days when he worked at Beira for Huma Pipes. See attached documents marked "A"). During the time Tsafendas lived in Beira, he was away for about 20-30 days. After his return, he said that he worked at the firm that lays the pipeline, but that the Rhodesian government deported him for reasons unknown to him. He left Beira and was never seen again.

Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul to Beira

He also visited the Scala Cafe often and was often in the company of the subject, Marvis and others had several conversations with him. He never talked politics and is regarded by him as a very intelligent person. On one occasion Tsafendas visited him at his office and requested help. He refused to help because he did not accept him as a Greek citizen. According to Mr. Sanianos, Tsafendas could also speak Russian. He was usually broke and took advantage others. Tsafendas once told him that he got R5000 from his family in Pretoria. Captain Sanianos is undoubtedly a supporter of the R.S.A policy and promised to convey all information to us regarding the background and associations of Tsafendas that came to his attention.

Jose Lopez Baltazar

He is attached to the fire department in Beira. He knows Demitrio Tsafendas and he met the latter at the beginning of 1965 when Tsafendas came to the fire department and asked permission to sleep on the premises because he had just been released from the police cells and had no money for lodging and food. Tsafendas slept on the premises for 10 nights and made sure that he arrived at mealtimes, he was then also always invited to join in the meal. He accepted Tsafendas as a white, but noticed that when Tsafendas was in the presence of whites he said little or nothing but was friendly and talkative with the Bantu. On one or two occasions Tsafendas, while talking with Bantu, stopped talking when he approached. Tsafendas left without thanking them for their hospitality and was never seen again.

In Beira, it was determined that he (Tsafendas) was examined there by a surgeon. I tried obtaining a copy of his report, but was told that we should formally apply for it; necessary steps are being taken.

RHODESIA

Mrs. C.C. Pneuma, the half-sister of subject.

During my conversation with her, she said she had already made a statement to the Rhodesian Security Police concerning what she knew about the subject. However, I asked her what he came to do at her and what he would have said. She told me that they had absolutely nothing in common, and that he only asked her for money, which she refused. It is noticeable that this lady is very upset about the events and that she never accepted the subject as a brother and had very little or nothing to do with him during her lifetime. She saw him at the beginning of 1964 in Pretoria and said that he talked a lot of nonsense.³³⁸⁵

SUMMARY:

Copies of reports by Security Police of Rhodesia attached, labelled A, B, C & D.

According to available information received and reports by the Security Police of Rhodesia it seems that on 02.11.63 the subject went to Lourenço Marques with a Portuguese passport No. 6511/63 valid until 02.11.65. On 19.07.64 he entered Rhodesia for the first time and gave the following personal details: he is white, single and his nationality is Portuguese, last residence Proclamation Hill Cafe, West End, Pretoria and his career as a linguist, translator, interpreter and mechanic.

He was in possession of £50 and the reason for his visit was that he wanted to visit his sister at Marandellas Store, Marendellas, Rhodesia. He was issued with a temporary tourist

³³⁸⁵ Katerina Pnema's response regarding what she said to Lt. Col. van Wyk is the same as her statement to the Rhodesian Police.

permit, valid until 09.08.64. According to an endorsement on his permit, he entered Rhodesia again on 27.07.64. There is no record whatsoever of the date on which he left Rhodesia after his first entry in 1964, nor any indication from which country he came to Rhodesia. On 11.08.64, after the expiry of his tourist permit Tsafendas was asked to show a return ticket to South Africa or to deposit an amount if he wanted to extend his permit. At this stage he was looking for a job as linguist at the Public Services Board of Rhodesia. On 19.08.64, the Department of Immigration wrote a letter to Tsafendas and requested him to report to their offices. On the following day the Public Services Board was notified by the Department of Immigration that Tsafendas was in the country illegally and that they cannot give him employment in Rhodesia. He reported to the Immigration offices on 21.08.64 and said that he did not have money and was looking for work. He was told that he is not in possession of a police-certificate, and that the permit for his stay in Rhodesia which he must apply for will take four weeks to be issued and that he cannot be allowed to remain in the country. On this occasion, he stated that he was a missionary in Egypt and North Africa and that he is a member of a Christian community that is not regarded as a Church Fellowship and that it is from this community that he received the money for his train ticket to Rhodesia. He was ordered to leave the country the next day and crossed the border of Mozambique at Umtali the following day. From the 28th August 1964 to the 8th October 1964 he lived in the boarding house at Stelios Marangos Pension Gloria in Beira.

After leaving the boarding house on the 9th October 1964, he again entered Rhodesia via Umtali on 09.10.64, and since he was not in possession of the necessary visa, he was declared a prohibited immigrant and sent out of the country. From there he went directly to Gondola near Beira, where he was arrested by the Security Police of Mozambique because of subversive activities on 16.11.64 while he worked at Hume Pipe, Gondola.

On 26.01.65, he was released again and slept for 10 days at the fire department in Beira. On 17.02.65 he demanded his wages for the few days he worked at Hume Pipe and the amount of 1644 escudos 40c was paid to him, which if it was paid in 100 escudo notes to him, 16 notes would make a thick pack. It is probably these notes which were seen in his possession by Mr. John Marvis. On the 5th March 1965 he left Beira per Indian Ocean liner Karanja for Durban. It is clear that during the period 22.08.64 to 05.03.65 he stayed in Beira.

It is therefore determined that he

- *never talked politics with any whites; that he has no political soul mates among whites and that it is not at all possible to obtain any information regarding his political affiliations in Mozambique;*
- *was most of the time without money and took advantage of others; (However, he was always neatly dressed);*
- *for all purposes can be seen as a normal, intelligent person.*
- *was an outcast in his family, a fact that grieved him immensely;*
- *most probably as a result of this and knowing full well that he had Coloured blood in him, was intensely anti-white.*

COMMENTS ON LT. COL. VAN WYK'S REPORT

First and foremost, the report confirms what everyone who was questioned by the South African police at the time said, that Tsafendas was not insane. Col. van Wyk concludes that he is a normal, intelligent person. His report also contains a statement by a Portuguese police officer that "Tsafendas is intensely anti-white" and believed "the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-whites." The policeman also thought Tsafendas was normal and he regarded him as "a very intelligent person." We have already discussed the "outcast" issue. Katerina Pnema said that everything she said to the author about her previous statement to the Rhodesian Police on September 13 also applied to the one she made to van Wyk.³³⁸⁶

Col. van Wyk's statement that Tsafendas never talked politics is inaccurate, but this is what he was told. None of the Greeks who were questioned by the police would admit that he spoke to them for fear of being suspected as sympathisers and possibly accused of withholding information about someone who was talking against the Portuguese Government. George Ananiades did indeed tell the author that Tsafendas did not discuss politics with him. However, George Liberopoulos told the author that Tsafendas constantly spoke about politics, and that it was clear to him that he was "strongly in favour of independence for Mozambique." Tsafendas also admitted to Liberopoulos that he was a

³³⁸⁶ See Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

Communist. Liberopoulos told the author that he did not reveal this to the police because “I did not want them to know that. It was not a good time to say that you had been talking to someone who you knew to be a Communist and who was expressing anti-Portuguese ideas, especially after what he did (Tsafendas killing Verwoerd).”³³⁸⁷ Several other witnesses, including all the members of Tsafendas’s family,³³⁸⁸ Patrick O’Ryan,³³⁸⁹ Helen Grispos³³⁹⁰ and Richard Poggenpoel,³³⁹¹ harboured the same fears as Liberopoulos and would not tell the police about their political conversations with Tsafendas. According to Nick Papadakis, Ira Kyriakakis and Andreas Babiolakis also often present at political discussions with Tsafendas was John Marvis and John Verghis, who presumably adopted the same attitude to the police for the same reasons.³³⁹²

Verghis testified that when he was in his café, Tsafendas “never spoke much and never about politics.” According to Andreas Babiolakis, Ira Kyriakakis and Nick Papadakis, all of whom knew Verghis well and visited his establishment over many years, this statement is untrue. They said Tsafendas often talked politics in the café and in Verghis’s presence. More importantly, it was in Verghis’s café that Tsafendas called for a toast to the FRELIMO rebels, an incident that became a local talking point. He bought a beer for everyone and asked them to drink with him, paraphrasing Mark Anthony in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*, “Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your glasses.” However, when he called on them to drink to a recent attack by FRELIMO rebels, everyone froze and lowered their glasses untouched while Tsafendas downed his beer. Verghis politely asked Tsafendas to leave and he never returned, though he left for Durban just a few days later anyway.³³⁹³ It was natural for Verghis to omit the above incident and pretend that Tsafendas never talked politics; all Greeks distanced themselves from Tsafendas at this fraught time.

The report’s conclusion that Tsafendas “was most of the time without money and took advantage of others” is accurate according to the information which Lt.-Colonel van Wyk

³³⁸⁷ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

³³⁸⁸ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

³³⁸⁹ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

³³⁹⁰ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

³³⁹¹ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013.

³³⁹² Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

³³⁹³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

collected. However, it must have been more than coincidence that such information came only from people who knew him in Beira. The police and the Commission questioned about two hundred witnesses³³⁹⁴ and it was only those in Beira who made such comments. None of the witnesses in South Africa or elsewhere described Tsafendas in such terms, indeed some, such as Bornman and Pappas, testified that Tsafendas was the exact opposite and helped people financially.³³⁹⁵

The fact that while he was in Mozambique Tsafendas had problems finding work, was arrested twice and spent three months in solitary confinement might have been contributing factors to any untoward behaviour. At one point during his stay, Tsafendas asked Nick Vlachopoulos, his brother-in-law, to sell some furniture which he had left in storage in Pretoria. Vlachopoulos did so and sent the proceeds to Tsafendas in Mozambique. It is unlikely that Tsafendas would have sold off his furniture unless he was in a desperate financial situation, since he could have done so before he left Pretoria and not left them in storage. The author also asked ninety-six witnesses whether Tsafendas was as described and all strongly denied it. Their statements and comments on the subject will be discussed in the chapter on the Commission of Enquiry.

When interviewed by the author, George Ananiades and George Liberopoulos denied ever telling van Wyk that Tsafendas had “practically forced himself upon them,” and both strongly condemned this use of words as being completely inaccurate. Ananiades remembers being questioned by the police, but he does not remember what he said in his statement. Anyway, he did not know Tsafendas well, and had only seen him only once or twice during the latter’s short stay in Lourenço Marques. When the author read to him the comment regarding Tsafendas “forcing himself upon them,” Ananiades said:

³³⁹⁴ The figure of 200 witnesses is arrived at as follows:

- 112 statements made to the police by witnesses who were questioned after the assassination were found in the archives. The study has established that at least another 37 witnesses were questioned but their statements were not found in the archives. However, these witnesses either spoke to the author about their interviews or the author found evidence that they were interviewed (the remaining 32 *Eleni* seamen, Eleni Vlachopoulos, Evangelia Nissiots, Panagiotis Peroglou, and Elias Costantaras) or the content of their statements became known at the trial (Patrick O’Ryan). This takes the total of witnesses questioned by the police to at least 149. It is likely that there were further witnesses who were not located by the author and whose statements have gone missing, therefore we are not in position to know the exact number of people questioned by the police.
- The Commission interviewed 105 people, including Tsafendas, thus 104 witnesses. However, 53 of these had also been questioned by the police, which gives us 51 new witnesses. Therefore the total number of witnesses questioned by the police and the Commission is at least 200.

³³⁹⁵ Jacobus Johannes Bornman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

“No, no, no, no. It was nothing like that. I met him one day in Costa do Sol where we had coffee. We spoke and he said he was leaving the next day for South Africa. That was all. He never asked me to pay anything for him or to give him any money. Nothing. Never. I can’t say if he generally was a beggar, but he was not like that with me and did not give me any such impression. He did not look or act like a beggar. It is not true (that Tsafendas forced himself upon him). I don’t know why it is in my statement, but I never said anything like that.”³³⁹⁶

George Liberopoulos associated more than Ananiades with Tsafendas during the latter’s short stay in Lourenço Marques, and they met again later in Beira. Liberopoulos does not remember what he told the police, but he too denies that Tsafendas “forced himself upon them.” He told the author that when he first met Tsafendas, he had paid for his dinner over Tsafendas’s protests because he was “a stranger in the town,” and it was a Greek tradition that those who lived there paid for a visitor’s dinner. The next day, “he (Tsafendas) insisted on paying for both” of their meals. Liberopoulos also told the author that although he did pay for some drinks for Tsafendas, “Tsafendas always paid for the next round.” This was the custom among Greeks in Mozambique: “one would pay for one round and the other for the next round.” Liberopoulos characterised Tsafendas to the author as a “proud man and no beggar.”³³⁹⁷

Babiolakis, Kyriakakis and Papadakis also disagree with Verghis’s opinion that Tsafendas “seemed always to visit the café just to see if someone would give him something to eat or drink.” It is true that many Greeks offered to buy drinks for Tsafendas, but not because he was begging. Firstly, most Greeks there were quite wealthy and Tsafendas was very poor. The Greeks always sat together and when Tsafendas came in, he would be invited to join them. Whoever had bought the current round of drinks would buy one for Tsafendas, the newcomer, according to drinking tradition. Babiolakis and Papadakis both said Tsafendas would accept such a drink only when he had enough money to buy the next round. Most times, it was obvious that he could not afford to buy everyone a drink, so he would decline the drink, but would sit in their company and talk with them.³³⁹⁸

³³⁹⁶ George Ananiades in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

³³⁹⁷ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

³³⁹⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

Another important issue is that, according to Marvis, Tsafendas “spoke in favour of full integration and intermarriage between Coloureds and Whites” and “said that it is high time that a new race came into being.” This is entirely true. Several witnesses confirmed to the author that Tsafendas said that. However, Marvis does not explain the context or the origin of Tsafendas’s thinking. Tsafendas was disturbed by racism and conflicts throughout the world and believed that things would never change as long as there were different countries, nationalities, races and religions. Babiolakis and Papadakis, along with Marvis, were in the Scala Café talking politics with Tsafendas when this subject came up. Tsafendas believed that the world would become a better and safer place if there were no countries, no religions, and all people were the same colour. When asked how the last of the three could be achieved, Tsafendas had jokingly said that “everyone should have sex with someone of a different colour, so a new race will be created where everyone will be the same colour or at least they will all be mixed! Only then will there be no racism and discrimination anymore!”³³⁹⁹ It was clear to them that Tsafendas said the sex part as a joke, but that he was serious about the rest of his theory.³⁴⁰⁰ Tsafendas would later repeat his theory and his comment about sex in the same conversational context, half-joke and half-serious, to several people.³⁴⁰¹ As we will see, his comment was misconstrued at the summary trial as meaning that Tsafendas was paranoid and wanted to create a new race, like some mad villain in a movie.

In an interview with the author, Katerina Pnema offered an explanation of his statements based on her long acquaintance with her half-brother:

“He was saying that the South Africans are Nazis, he was calling Dr. Verwoerd Hitler’s best student ... that us and most Whites were exploiting the Black Rhodesians ... he was calling the Greeks racists, saying that one day the Rhodesians would kick us all out and take back what we stole from them ... that one day the Blacks in South Africa would throw the Whites into the sea ... He believed Mozambique and South Africa should have a colourful flag, like a rainbow or something in order for each colour to represent each race! Have you heard anything more absurd? He used to say that Jesus Christ was socialist and that

³³⁹⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

³⁴⁰⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

³⁴⁰¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

if he was alive today he would have been a revolutionary, fighting apartheid and for the independence of Mozambique. Can you believe it? Well, this is what he was saying, all this kind of nonsense! How could I have told all these things to the police? They would have said ‘Why didn’t you report him to the police since he had such crazy ideas? Didn’t you know he was dangerous?’ You can’t imagine how many people had told my poor father to do something with him and his crazy political ideas. You can’t imagine how many! Even my poor mother told him to talk to him because he would get us into trouble someday, as he was often doing, but my poor dad did nothing. It was actually all his fault. He taught him all these things, but my poor father was a cautious man, he was not like Dimitri; he wouldn’t go around saying all these stupidities. His son was the opposite; he couldn’t keep his mouth shut. What about the other thing? He changed his name because he thought it was insulting to be called Tsafantakis since this was the name given to our ancestors by the Turks! Wasn’t this nonsense?’³⁴⁰²

Pnefma also remembered the wedding mentioned by Marvis at which she told Tsafendas that she did not want to see him because he was an embarrassment to the family. She confirmed that this is what she told him. Her anger flared after Tsafendas was dismissed from a job at the docks in Beira which Pnefma and her husband had helped him obtain. Tsafendas had asked the Mozambican workers to strike against the dock owner in support of their working rights.³⁴⁰³ Pnefma and her husband were rightly embarrassed since they had intervened on behalf of Tsafendas to get him the job. Furthermore, Pnefma learned that Tsafendas had been arrested twice by the Portuguese Security Police and that he had spent three months in prison.³⁴⁰⁴

³⁴⁰² Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁴⁰³ For details about the incident see Chapter Two.

³⁴⁰⁴ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

PIDE REPORT

The same day, a PIDE report regarding Tsafendas, written in Beira, on January 19, 1965, was sent by PIDE Sub-Inspector A. Vaz to General van den Bergh. It started with the following note:

Dear General,

I attach herewith a photocopy of a document which was requested from me by Col. van Wyk. I must inform you that this is the first time that a copy or the contents of this document has ever been revealed to anybody, not even to my Government.

My most respected compliments.

(SGD.) Vaz.

REPORT.

EXCELLENT SIR:

SUBJECT: DIMITRIO TSAFENDAS OR DIMITRIUS TSAFENDAKIS, single, without profession, born 14.1.1918. in Lourenço Marques, son of MIGUEL TSAFENDAKIS and of AMELIA WILLIAM, without permanent residence.

On 16th November last year, he was handed over to this sub-delegation by the P.S.P. (Uniformed Branch) of his city (Beira), accused of making subversive propaganda to the native masses.

TSAFENDAKIS or TSAFENDAS among many other phrases, was accused of having said the following:- "This land is not called Portugal, but United States of Mozambique. We already have money and what we do now need is not to be cheated when saying that we are Portuguese. No, we Africans and I do not like the Portuguese flag." When questioned, the accused confessed that he had said this, but that at the time, when he pronounced these words at the hotel bar of Gondola, among many Bantu people, he was under the influence of liquor

and also under exultations (excitement). On the other side, he also said that these words were caused by the ideas which he had about the Independence of Mozambique, a Mozambique governed by natives whether white or black, but separate from the mother-country (Portugal).

The accused describes on previous interrogations a history which has been his life, an authentic romance of adventure, in which he has travelled through diverse countries of the world.

The individual referred to states that he had never been a member of any subversive organization, neither has he ever worked for one in the direction of obtaining the independence of Mozambique. He also states that he has never been involved in subversive activities against the security of the State, even though he is all for the Independence of this Province.

After the accused was analysed by his actions and reasons, we have verified that he must be an individual who is mentally deranged and this has also been proved by the overseas hospital in Lisbon, where he was a mental patient, according to pages 19 of information which was given to us by the General Delegation of this Police Force. The individual referred to has on previous occasions been in the cells of this Police Force in Lisbon about twice. This was confessed by himself in statements. The first time in 1940, when crossing the border post of Barca d 'Alva to enter the country, without sufficient documentation. The second time in 1951 after arriving from Mozambique where he was not accepted and forced to return to Lisbon.

Even though, as has been said before, that he is mentally deranged, the truth is that it can be seen in him a certain spirit of revolt in relation to the institutions responsible for holding back the Independence of Mozambique.

On the other hand, as mentioned on the final portion of this information, already referred to, given by the General Delegation, he is an individual with a very bad moral background.

The accused has on many occasion been interned at the poor-house in Lisbon.

On the criminal registers nothing is registered against him. In the meanwhile as mentioned before, the Accused had already previous defaults on his Police register as by himself confessed on the statements.

Here is everything with respect to the accused and which I have the honour to forward to your Excellency, for a better judgement and your convenience.

Finally, I inform your Excellency that the Passport No. 6.511/63 issued in favour of the Accused, in Lourenço Marques on 2.11.63. and valid for S.A. S.R. N. Rhodesia, Malawi, Swaziland, Bechuanaland and Basutoland, is attached to the case docket. With the Passport is also a Bulletin of admission of the Portuguese Airways who escorted this man when he was handed over by this Police Force.

*BEIRA, 19th January, 1965.*³⁴⁰⁵

COMMENTS ON PIDE'S REPORT

This report is the translation of a report sent by the sub-Director of PIDE in Lourenço Marques to the Director General PIDE on January 19, 1965, while Tsafendas was in police custody for “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”³⁴⁰⁶ The report was accompanied by a letter stating that this report was the “opinion, dispatch and conclusion of the progress indicated in the margin, whose defendant is the national of African race, Demitrio Tsafendas or Dimitrius Tsafendakis.”³⁴⁰⁷ Seven days later, on January 26, 1965, Tsafendas was freed,³⁴⁰⁸ only to be arrested again a few days later.³⁴⁰⁹ Naturally, the second arrest could not have been included in the report. However, this is not the only important omission from the report.

As they did before, PIDE again fed the South African authorities with unimportant or known information. Vital facts regarding Tsafendas's political activities are once more

³⁴⁰⁵ PIDE report regarding Demitrio Tsafendas or Dimitrius Tsafendakis, 19 January 1965. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁴⁰⁶ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³⁴⁰⁷ Letter of the Subdirector of PIDE in Lourenço Marques to the Director General of PIDE in Lisbon, 23 February 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT

³⁴⁰⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Demitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³⁴⁰⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

missing. There is no mention of the fact that PIDE held a detailed file of 130 pages on Tsafendas,³⁴¹⁰ nor that he was arrested in 1964 in Mozambique accused of pretending to be a religious missionary while in reality, preaching “in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”³⁴¹¹ Missing also are the reasons he was denied entry to Mozambique in October 1951, that he was forced to live in exile from 1951 to 1963,³⁴¹² that he was only given amnesty in 1963 after convincing the Portuguese he was insane, and that he made several applications for permission to return to Mozambique and all were turned down -- each time after PIDE supplied the Ministry of Interior with information about his “political and professional activities.”³⁴¹³

Furthermore, parts of this report are identical, word for word, with the PIDE report sent by the Head-Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the sub-Director of the PIDE on September 8, 1966, which asked him not to reveal to the South African authorities any “information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the Independence of Mozambique.” Obviously, PIDE is still attempting to downplay, at times omit entirely, his political activities, and to conceal any information picturing Tsafendas “as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique.”

STATEMENTS

J.J. VAN DEN BERG³⁴¹⁴

The following is the statement of J.J. van den Berg; the passport control officer at South Africa’s Consulate in Lourenço Marques, who was bribed by George Michaletos and Nick Vlachopoulos to turn a blind eye and issue a visa to Tsafendas despite his being on the “Stop

³⁴¹⁰ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. 25 August 1951. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³⁴¹¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³⁴¹² Letter of a police agent to the Ministry of Interiors regarding Tsafendas’s exile. 30 October 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³⁴¹³ Letter of the Directorate-General of the Political and Civil Administration of the Overseas Ministry to the Director of the International and State Defence Police. 07/04/1958. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³⁴¹⁴ J.J. van den Berg statement regarding the ‘Admission to the Republic of Demitrio Tsafendas’, 20 September 1966. Report COE, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

List” of persons forbidden to enter South Africa.³⁴¹⁵ Naturally, van den Berg does not mention he was bribed.

The Consul General

Regarding: Admission to the Republic Demitrio Tsafendas

With reference to par. (3) of your query, I wish to point out that as a rule, the “Stop Lists” in this office are thoroughly checked before Temporary Permits or Visas (if necessary) are issued to persons who wish to enter the Republic for visits.

In the case of Tsafendas, it is extremely difficult to recall the exact circumstances in which this man was granted admission to the Republic. According to the data on the D.I.10, it was a Saturday morning and this office issued 64 actual permits - indicating that it must have been extremely busy. When reviewing the “Stop Lists,” the only explanation I can think of is the possibility that I looked the name up among the index letter “S”, following the sound association in the pronunciation of his surname. Under such busy conditions, I might not have taken the passport or D.I.10 form with me to the lists. (I may mention here that this was indeed the case when I heard the first reports of the incident and reviewed the records - I looked up the name Stafendas.)

Furthermore, if it did so happen that I did not check the list in the case of Tsafendas, the following factors would possibly have lead me to believe that the man’s bona fides left no hint of doubt. He presented a Portuguese passport which was issued to him that morning by local authorities. This passport would describe him as a resident of Lourenço Marques and also further state that he was born here. With the knowledge that the Portuguese authorities are extremely thorough when reviewing an applicant’s circumstances and background before a passport is issued, it was a determining factor which, together with the other information, made him come across as one of many bona fide visitors.

The fact that he wanted to visit family relatives whom have been staying in the Republic a long time, as well as the address in South Africa that he had given, which spoke of a good neighbourhood, would under the pressure of work contribute to justifying not

³⁴¹⁵ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas’s *Live and Let Live*, 2007; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

checking the records extremely intensively. I'm afraid that there is nothing more that I could add. However, I am deeply touched by the fatal consequences of admitting the man and will not easily live with it.

J.J. van den Berg.

Passport control officer.

Lourenço Marques

20 September 1966.

NEW EVIDENCE CONCERNING J.J. VAN DEN BERG'S ROLE IN THE CASE

In October 1964, Marika Tsafantakis, along with her son Victor, his wife Anna, and her son-in-law, Nick Vlachopoulos, Eleni's husband, arrived in Lourenço Marques by car from Pretoria. It was known to the family that Tsafendas was banned from South Africa.

According to Tsafendas, as well as his half-sisters Katerina Pnema and Elena Vlachopoulos, and his cousin Mary Eendracht, the passport officer, J.J. van den Berg, was bribed by George Michaletos, Tsafendas's uncle in Lourenço Marques, and Nick Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas's brother-in-law, to overlook the fact that Tsafendas was on South Africa's Stop List and to issue him with a visa. It was Tsafendas's aunt Artemis who convinced her husband, George Michaletos, to arrange it.³⁴¹⁶

The Commission of Enquiry, most likely unaware of the bribe, would later find van den Berg guilty of "a clear case of neglect of duty."³⁴¹⁷ However, the South African police very probably discovered the truth and made van den Berg pay the price. Arriving at his home one day, security officers arrested van den Berg, refused to tell his family where he was being taken, then subjected him to extended torture while in their custody. According to his son, Gavin, his father was interrogated non-stop and not allowed to sleep or to use the toilet. "He was kicked till his ribs were broken ... they made him stand naked for days on end in his own urine and faeces..." When he was finally released, this former diplomatic officer could

³⁴¹⁶ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁴¹⁷ Report of the COE, Chapter V. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

find no regular work and the family lived for a time in a relative's garage. Van den Berg moved "from job to job" and his children "from school to school."³⁴¹⁸

Even by South African police standards, this was extraordinarily harsh punishment for someone who simply "neglected his duty," raising strong suspicions that the police had learned about the bribe.³⁴¹⁹ If so, the fact was never revealed, obviously because of the huge embarrassment it would have caused to the Government if it was known that one of its employees accepted a bribe from the man who assassinated the Prime Minister.

Another factor that appears to support the theory that the police found out about van den Berg's bribe is that no action was taken against Piet Burger, the Chief Messenger at the Assembly, and two senior messengers, Piet Schuin and Sydney Wiehand, who had approved Tsafendas for employment in Parliament. These three men failed to screen Tsafendas properly and were arguably more to blame than van den Berg for Tsafendas getting so close to Dr. Verwoerd. The report of the Commission said about them, "They are good, decent people who did their duty as they saw and knew it. One can hardly blame them for the appointment which was made. They simply did not have the knowledge, ability and insight to make a proper selection."³⁴²⁰ The three continued working in Parliament as before. Furthermore, no action was taken against the three officials of the Department of Immigration who on three different occasions interviewed Tsafendas in Pretoria in November 1963 regarding his application for permanent residence. Tsafendas made a very favourable impression on all of them and they issued him with the required certificate.³⁴²¹ These three officials were unaware of "the fact that Tsafendas's name appeared on the Department's stop list."³⁴²²

In addition, according to the Commission's Report, "on 10th July, 1964, Tsafendas applied in writing to the Department of the Interior for a return visa to enable him to visit Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia. Miss J. Markram, an assistant in that Department,

³⁴¹⁸ Gavin van den Berg, son of J.J. van den Berg in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

³⁴¹⁹ Again, we can imagine what the South African police must have done to Tsafendas if they did all this to this man.

³⁴²⁰ Report of the COE, Chapter X, Paragraph 12. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³⁴²¹ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

³⁴²² Report of the COE, Chapter II C, Paragraph 2. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

checked the stop list and indicated that Tsafendas's name did not appear on it. In fact, it did appear on the list."³⁴²³ Further, always according to the Commission of Enquiry,

“On 5th March, 1965, Tsafendas left Beira on board the Indian liner *Karanja* and arrived at Durban on 8th March, 1965. When the *Karanja* arrived at Durban on 8th March, 1965, it was the duty of the officials of the Department of the Interior who went on board, *inter alia*, to check the passenger list with the stop list. On the stop list the names TSAFENDAKIS: DIMITRIO a TSAFENDAS: DEMETRIO appeared, and on the passenger list the name TSAFENDAS: DEMITRIO. Once again, for some reason or other, it was not ascertained that Tsafendas's name appeared on the stop list.”³⁴²⁴

Clearly all the above officials were no less negligent than van den Berg, since, like him, they missed the fact that Tsafendas's name was on the Stop List. However, they all kept their jobs and faced no consequences. Van den Berg was brutally and disproportionately punished for his “negligence,” although his “crime” was exactly the same as that of the Immigration and Interior officials and to a lesser extent that of the messengers. The fact that van den Berg received such viciously different treatment suggests that the police must have had discovered he had taken a bribe.

³⁴²³ Report of the COE, Chapter II C, Paragraph 11. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³⁴²⁴ Report of the COE, Chapter II C, Paragraphs 23 and 24. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

SATURDAY, 24 SEPTEMBER 1966³⁴²⁵

STATEMENTS

ESPERANZA THERON³⁴²⁶

Secretary, White woman, Durban. 10.30 a.m.

During 1963 my husband Daniel B. Theron moved his offices as an attorney to 101 Lincoln House, Masonic Grove. The offices occupied by my husband were situated adjacently the offices occupied by the listed communist, Rowley Arenstein. I was my husband's secretary and was thus always in the office. During 1965 or late 1964 I observed a White or Coloured male whom I have since identified from photographs in the newspapers as Demitrio Tsafendas, frequenting the offices of Rowley Arenstein. Demitrio Tsafendas used to pay visits to Arenstein's office regularly and on occasion he would greet me.

I observed Demitrio Tsafendas actually entering the general office of Rowley Arenstein but am unable to state for what purpose he visited Arenstein. I am unable to state the period of time that he used to visit Arenstein, but the visits were very regular. I have also observed Demitrio Tsafendas in the presence of Rowley Arenstein walking down the corridor from Arenstein's office.

(Sgd). R.D. Wilson D/Sgt.

TSAFENDAS AND ARENSTEIN

As a result of Theron's testimony, Arenstein and his secretary, Thelma Beryl Suddes, were questioned by the South African police. She testified that "to the best of her knowledge," she had never seen Tsafendas in Arenstein's office.³⁴²⁷ Arenstein was questioned on September

³⁴²⁵ No statements or other evidence were found in the archives for the previous three days.

³⁴²⁶ Eperanza Theron statement to the police, 24 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁴²⁷ Thelma Beryl Suddes statement to the COE, 22 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

24, 1966, by Brigadier Baster “at office Nr.505, The Grays, Johannesburg in connection with the assassination of the late Dr. Verwoerd.”³⁴²⁸

Arenstein denied knowing Tsafendas. This was a natural thing for him to do, especially at the time, since he was about to go on trial. On October 31, 1966, he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment under the Suppression of Communism Act for furthering the aims of Communism.³⁴²⁹ Tsafendas later spoke at length to Father Minas Constandinou about meeting in Durban with a “Jewish Communist lawyer.” Tsafendas was probably given his address by someone from the anti-apartheid movement in London. Father Minas did not remember the name of the Durban lawyer, but Ronnie Kasrils stated in a personal interview with the author that “Arenstein was the only Jewish Communist lawyer in Durban.”³⁴³⁰

COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY RAISED IN PARLIAMENT

The previous day, opposition leader Sir de Villiers Graaff listed six questions which he urged should be considered by the Commission of Enquiry into the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. In an intervention in the Assembly, de Villiers Graaff expressed confidence in the Commission judge, Mr. Justice van Wyk, and suggested that his terms of reference should seek answers to the following questions:

- What could be done to ensure, so far as was humanly possible, that nothing of this nature happened in South Africa again.
- How Dimitrios Tsafendas came to be admitted to South Africa and how a person of this sort had gained the right to permanent residence in the light of reports that had subsequently come to light.
- Whether the Department of Labour recommended his employment at Parliament, and if so, whether procedures of scrutiny were adequate.
- Whether there was sufficient liaison between the various departments of Government in matters of this kind.

³⁴²⁸ Johannes Christoffel Broodryk statement to the COE, 24 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁴²⁹ South Africa History Online (n.d) *Rowley Israel Arenstein*.

³⁴³⁰ Ronnie Kasrils in a personal interview, 16 May 2016.

- How Tsafendas came to be employed as a messenger at Parliament and how he had secured access to the Assembly Chamber.
- Whether the security arrangements for people occupying high offices were adequate.³⁴³¹

Prime Minister John Vorster replied that the terms and references of the forthcoming Commission of Enquiry were wide enough to cover all these points.³⁴³²

³⁴³¹ *The Star*, 24 September 1966: 3, 'Questions on Tsafendas.'

³⁴³² *The Canberra Times*, 23 September 1966: 5, 'South Africa: Assassination Inquiry.'

MONDAY, 26 SEPTEMBER 1966

THE APPOINTMENT OF TSAFENDAS'S DEFENCE TEAM

Tsafendas was held in police custody without legal representation, a situation which was lawful at the time. Under the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act No 96 of 1965,³⁴³³ police officers were permitted to detain anyone suspected of a political crime and to hold him without access to a lawyer for one-hundred and eighty days. For this reason, the legislation was popularly known as the 180-day Detention Act.³⁴³⁴ Only three days earlier, on September 23, 1966, it was revealed that Hendrik Bahula,³⁴³⁵ a member of the PAC, was held in isolation in a police cell for eighteen days without being formally charged.³⁴³⁶ Tsafendas was held for twenty days after the assassination without legal representation before a defence team was appointed to represent him *pro deo*, meaning his legal costs were met by the State.

As we have seen, Tsafendas soon after his arrest asked for a lawyer, specifically for human rights and anti-apartheid advocate George Bizos, but his request was turned down. Instead, the State appointed its own choices on September 26, exactly twenty days after the assassination. The first was attorney David Bloomberg, whose father Abraham was a good friend of Judge Beyers and a board member at a horse-racing club of which Bloomberg Snr was president. The second appointment was that of advocate Wilfrid Cooper, to whom the judge made it clear that that Tsafendas had only one line of defence and that was insanity. Otherwise, he warned, he would “swing.”³⁴³⁷

WILFRID COOPER (Advocate) 1927 –2004

Wilfrid Edward Cooper was born in Cape Town in 1926. He matriculated from Wynberg Boys High School, Cape Town, in 1944 and the following year enrolled for a BA (Law)

³⁴³³ The 180-Day Detention Act (the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, Number 96 of 1965) allowed the government to detain individuals for interrogation for up to 180 days without a lawyer being present. The public were not entitled to any information, not even the identity or whereabouts of people being detained. Detainees could literally and effectively “disappear.” If no charges were laid, Special Branch were required to release detainees after 180 days. At the time, Vorster boasted that this was repeatable “until this side of eternity” (“A Distinguished South African Lawyer,” 1965: 4; Herbstein, 2004: 75; Mandela, 2013: 402; Vassen, n.d.).

³⁴³⁴ Herbstein, 2004: 75; Nelson Mandela Organization, n.d., 1965. Criminal Procedure Amendment Act No 96; Rudolph, 1984: 12; World Peace Council, 1972: 14.

³⁴³⁵ The surname in the newspaper cutting is not clear, but seems to be Bahula.

³⁴³⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 September 1966, ‘Prisoner complains.’

³⁴³⁷ Wilfrid Cooper in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

degree at the University of Stellenbosch. He received his degree in 1947.³⁴³⁸ In 1948 he went to work as a clerical assistant in the Senate, where he encountered Hendrik Verwoerd and heard the future prime minister deliver his first Senate speech. For two days, he performed the duties of a parliamentary messenger, exactly like Tsafendas.³⁴³⁹

Between 1950 and 1952, Cooper clerked for Mr. Justice Herbstein while also acting as a prosecutor in Wynberg Magistrates Court and reading for his LL.B degree from the University of South Africa. Obtaining this qualification in 1952, he was called to the Cape Bar, then in 1965 appointed Senior Counsel.³⁴⁴⁰ Embarking on an illustrious academic career, Cooper held part-time positions as lecturer and examiner at the Universities of Cape Town and the Western Cape. In 1972, he received a Ph.D. from the University of Cape Town for his thesis, “*The Letting and Hiring of Immovable Property in South Africa.*” He authored fourteen books on such topics as motor law in South Africa, on which he was considered the foremost authority; for example, the 865-page *South African Motor Law*.³⁴⁴¹ He was also an avid reader of literature and was able to quote extensively from James Joyce.³⁴⁴²

Cooper’s career at the Cape Bar spanned thirty-six years. He was nicknamed “Tiger” by Justice Cyril Newton Thompson³⁴⁴³ for his fearlessness and the cross-examination skills³⁴⁴⁴ he demonstrated at a number of trials. He is remembered primarily for leading the defence team for Tsafendas, but he also figured prominently in such political cases as the 1962 trial of three members of the Armed Resistance Movement,³⁴⁴⁵ as defence counsel in 1976 for Jeremy Cronin and David and Susan Rabkin, charged under the Terrorism Act³⁴⁴⁶ and acted for Steve Biko just before his death in July 1977.³⁴⁴⁷

He appeared for the families of a number of anti-apartheid activists who died in detention, such as Imam Abdullah Haron in 1970³⁴⁴⁸ and Mapetla Mohapi in 1977.³⁴⁴⁹ He was also involved in the sensational criminal trial of Marthinus Rossouw for the murder of

³⁴³⁸ Gavin Cooper in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

³⁴³⁹ *The Daily News*, 21 October 1966: 3; *Cape Times*, 19 October 1966.

³⁴⁴⁰ *The Cape Argus*, 10 March 2004

³⁴⁴¹ Gavin Cooper in a personal interview, 10 April 2016; Kahn, 1968: 154.

³⁴⁴² Kahn, 1968: 154.

³⁴⁴³ *Cape Times*, 19 October 1966.

³⁴⁴⁴ Bloomberg, 2007: 75.

³⁴⁴⁵ Sachs, 1968: 68.

³⁴⁴⁶ *Cape Times*, 20 September 1976.

³⁴⁴⁷ Woods, 1978: 76.

³⁴⁴⁸ Desai and Marney, 1978: 73.

³⁴⁴⁹ *Daily Despatch*, 17 January 1977.

Baron Dieter von Schauroth in 1961³⁴⁵⁰ and in 1975 he successfully appealed the death sentence of Marlene Lehnberg, known as the “Scissors Murderess.”³⁴⁵¹ In South West Africa in 1976, he appeared for six members of SWAPO who were charged under the Terrorism Act for acts related to the assassination of Chief Minister Filemon Elifas in August 1975.³⁴⁵²

In August 1988, Cooper was appointed to the bench as an Acting Judge in the Eastern Cape Division and in March 1989 was permanently appointed.³⁴⁵³ In March 1991 he was transferred to the Cape Division and remained there until his retirement due to poor health in January 1991.³⁴⁵⁴ He died in 2004, having donated part of his private law library to the Cape Bar, now known as the Wilfrid Cooper library.³⁴⁵⁵ According to Professor John Dugard, Cooper was one of the very few brave South African lawyers who demonstrated the courage and dignity, in a hostile and fevered political atmosphere, to defend political detainees of all races during the apartheid years.³⁴⁵⁶

DAVID BLOOMBERG (Attorney) (1932-)

David Bloomberg was born in Sea Point, Cape Town, in 1932. His father, Abraham, widely known as Abe, was an attorney and at one time Mayor of Cape Town (1945-1947), and his mother Miriam, was a professional ballet dancer. David Bloomberg followed in his father’s footsteps by also becoming a lawyer and Mayor of Cape Town – in 1973, the youngest in the city’s history – and reflected his mother’s interests by involving himself in South African theatre.³⁴⁵⁷

Bloomberg, though Jewish, was educated by Roman Catholic teachers at the Christian Brothers’ College before graduating in law from the University of Cape Town.³⁴⁵⁸ He was a man of many talents. Alongside his legal career, he became a prominent theatrical impresario, responsible for several acclaimed productions; he brought famous performers to South Africa³⁴⁵⁹ and established the Barn Theatre at Constantia.³⁴⁶⁰ For more than two decades, he

³⁴⁵⁰ May, 1968: 131.

³⁴⁵¹ *The Cape Argus*, 20 June 1975.

³⁴⁵² *South African Press Association*, 11 March 2004.

³⁴⁵³ *Eastern Province Herald*, 06 March 1989.

³⁴⁵⁴ *Cape Times*, 24 November 1997.

³⁴⁵⁵ *South African Press Association*, 11 March 2004.

³⁴⁵⁶ Dugard, 1978: 243.

³⁴⁵⁷ *Business Day Live*, 29 March 2011.

³⁴⁵⁸ *Business Day Live*, 29 March 2011.

³⁴⁵⁹ Bloomberg, 2007: cover.

³⁴⁶⁰ Green, 2004: 164.

was Director of the Cape Performing Arts Board, and he wrote an arts column for two Cape Town newspapers.³⁴⁶¹

In 1965, Bloomberg caused some controversy in the USA by publically praising, defending and supporting apartheid. In an article in the *New York Times* on May 23, 1965, Bloomberg denounced Arthur Miller,³⁴⁶² Edward Albee³⁴⁶³ and other prominent American playwrights for refusing to allow their works to be performed in South Africa unless before mixed audiences, which had recently been prohibited. He said their refusal would “only succeed in harming the theatrical producers and directors who have been endeavouring to keep theatre in South Africa alive” and theatre would be set back fifty years. However, he added that a government as strong and stable as South Africa’s was unlikely to be intimidated by a group of American playwrights into changing its laws.³⁴⁶⁴

In an evident endorsement of apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd’s policies, Bloomberg described racial separation as “South Africa’s answer to the problem of achieving peaceful coexistence of different people at different stages of their development ... it is designed to make it possible for various racial groups to enjoy the full privileges of a free society, each in their own area, unhampered by the strains imposed by a multi-racial society. Apartheid is not a political ruse, but merely a notion that people get on best with their own kind.”³⁴⁶⁵

Bloomberg also wrote that the government, “in its wisdom,” had decided that separate development was “a more harmonious and peaceful solution than enforced integration” and was “in the best interest of the non-White population.” It was “regrettable” he wrote, that “American playwrights consider themselves qualified to pass judgement on a country about which their knowledge is minimal,” having been influenced by portions of the American Press which presented South Africa in a “most distorted picture.”³⁴⁶⁶

³⁴⁶¹ Bloomberg, 2007: cover.

³⁴⁶² Arthur Miller was America’s leading playwright at this time and works by him such as *Death of a Salesman*, *The Crucible* and *A View from the Bridge* were sought out by theatrical companies worldwide. In 1956, Miller was sub-poenaed to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee but refused to name friends who shared his left-wing political stance. He was found guilty of contempt of Congress, fined, sentenced to prison, blacklisted and had his passport confiscated. This decision was overturned in 1958.

³⁴⁶³ Edward Albee’s best-known plays, such as *Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* and *The Zoo Story*, were hailed for their realistic examination of the modern condition. *Virginia Woolf* (1962) examined the breakdown in the marriage of a middle-class couple and contains dialogue which has been hailed as some of the greatest in all of American theatre. The play was filmed in 1966 with Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor as the overwrought couple.

³⁴⁶⁴ *The New York Times*, 23 May 1965: xi, ‘David Bloomberg: Yes to South Africa.’

³⁴⁶⁵ *The New York Times*, 23 May 1965: xi, ‘David Bloomberg: Yes to South Africa.’

³⁴⁶⁶ *The New York Times*, 23 May 1965: xi, ‘David Bloomberg: Yes to South Africa.’

Bloomberg went on, “Little do these self-same authors know of the country’s achievements in the field of racial relations (or in any field); little do they know of what has been done for the non-white in the fields of hospitalization, education, housing and on a hundred and one other fronts, all of which have enabled a race to emerge from the darkness of ignorance and superstition in an astonishingly short time.”³⁴⁶⁷ Bloomberg’s defence of apartheid’s achievements for non-Whites does not bear scrutiny. What was actually done for non-Whites in education was the Bantu Education Act, and what was done for housing were forced removals, the Bantustans, and the denial of any land rights.

Bloomberg told the author in 2014 about Dr. Verwoerd: “Verwoerd was a gentleman, if a person who holds those views can be a gentleman [laughs]. But was a very polite man. I think Verwoerd believed in his theories and the theory of apartheid. He probably was an honest man.” When asked if he thought Verwoerd was racist, Bloomberg replied, “Of course he was a racist, yes.” He then volunteered, “I don’t think he was *corrupt*. There was never any evidence that he was corrupt. All the subsequent people, particularly John Vorster and one or two of the other people, you know, they had a reputation of being corrupt.”³⁴⁶⁸

In 1969, Bloomberg was elected a Cape Town city councillor, a position he held for twenty years. In 1971 he was elected Deputy Mayor of Cape Town, then was Mayor from 1973 to 1975. At forty-one years and one month, he was the youngest mayor since his father, who was forty-one years and six months when he assumed office in 1945. A newspaper reporter said of Bloomberg, “He looks like a smoother version of Canada’s heart-throb Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau.”³⁴⁶⁹

As mayor, Bloomberg was hailed as “hands-on” and “thoroughly modern.” According to him, his main achievements being the tackling of gangsterism on the Cape Flats, the opening of the Nico Malan theatre to people of all races and his campaign against petty apartheid and to speed up the fire department’s responses.³⁴⁷⁰ Four months into his mayoralty, Bloomberg launched what he described as “a campaign against petty apartheid... practices which did not necessarily create hardship but which were extremely humiliating to people of colour.” This was not an attack on the classic structures of apartheid, rather an attempt to address relatively minor complaints, such as discriminatory signs on lifts, toilets

³⁴⁶⁷ *The New York Times*, 23 May 1965: xi, ‘David Bloomberg: Yes to South Africa.’

³⁴⁶⁸ David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

³⁴⁶⁹ Bloomberg, 2007: 158-161.

³⁴⁷⁰ Bloomberg, 2007; *The Cape Argus*, 19 June 2011: 18, ‘Links in the mayoral chain.’

and entrances. After investigation of the complaint, Bloomberg would telephone the responsible parties and “invariably obtained their co-operation.” Other cities joined in the campaign, prompting Prime Minister Vorster to warn that the government would intervene if politically expedient actions by councils caused friction or disturbed the peace. In response to Vorster’s warning, he wrote, “My council is not a political body and does not practise a political system and its views with regard to petty apartheid are certainly not politically motivated.”³⁴⁷¹ Later, Bloomberg played golf with Vorster at the invitation of the district commandant of police.³⁴⁷² Bloomberg also claimed that he had tried behind the scenes, though unsuccessfully, to stop the destruction of District Six.³⁴⁷³

While Mayor of Cape Town, Bloomberg also became involved in at least two incidents which the Western press perceived as propaganda for apartheid. In 1974, South Africa’s Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, France’s ambassador to South Africa, M. Michel Legendre and Bloomberg discussed the possibility of twinning Cape Town with Nice, known as the capital of the French Riviera, and “how such a twinning could be the basis for a clandestine, second-tier diplomatic relationship in the event of formal ties between the two countries being suspended.”³⁴⁷⁴

Bloomberg liked the idea, even though Nice’s Mayor was the infamous Jacques Medecin,³⁴⁷⁵ a fascist and racist politician, anti-Semite and holocaust denier, and according to

³⁴⁷¹ Bloomberg, 2007: 175-177

³⁴⁷² Bloomberg, 2007: 177.

³⁴⁷³ Bloomberg, 2007. 169-174.

³⁴⁷⁴ Bloomberg, 2007: 177.

³⁴⁷⁵ Medecin had admitted publicly to agreeing with 99.9 per cent of the positions held by Jean-Marie Le Pen’s extreme right-wing National Front Party (Bresson (*Liberation*), 18 November 1998, ‘L’ancien maire de Nice est mort hier en Uruguay’; Riding (*The New York Times*), 13 June 1990, ‘French artists boycott museum opening’). He had allowed Le Pen to hold a congress of his party in a Nice municipal hall when no-one else would host it (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 4 April 1990, ‘Three Jews on City Council of Nice resign to protest ties with Le Pen’; Facaros and Pauls, 2001: 145), and subsequently, in his role of Mayor, received Le Pen and Franz Schonhuber, a former SS officer and head of the West German ultra-nationalistic Republican Party (Riding (*The New York Times*), 13 June 1990, ‘French artists boycott museum opening’). Three Jewish city councillors resigned in protest against Medecin’s association and cooperation with Le Pen, a man who called the Holocaust fraudulent (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 4 April 1990, ‘Three Jews on City Council of Nice resign to protest ties with Le Pen’). Medecin was also a fanatical anti-Semite, often making derogatory remarks about Jews, blaming them for his troubles. “It is the Jews who have created a fuss in a scandalous manner,” he said, declaring that they “are ungrateful people after all you have done for them.” He said he “did not know any Jew who will refuse a gift offered to him, even if he doesn’t like the gift” (Riding (*The New York Times*), 13 June 1990, ‘French artists boycott museum opening’).

In the early 1980s, Medecin was to gain international notoriety after being accused of corruption by British author Graham Greene in his pamphlet ‘*J’Accuse*.’ In 1990, exposed as a crook and an embezzler and currently being pursued by the courts and tax authorities for alleged serious financial irregularities, Medecin resigned the mayoralty he had held for 25 years and fled to Argentina and later to Uruguay (Eder (*The New York Times*), 5 February 1982, ‘On the Riviera. A morality tale by Graham Greene’; Lichfield (*The Independent*), 20 November 1998, ‘Obituary: Jacques Medecin’; Tempest (*Los Angeles Times*), 12 November 1990, ‘Mayor of Nice Takes

John Lichfield of *The Independent* an “indefatigable defender of apartheid.”³⁴⁷⁶ Medecin’s opinions did not seem to bother the Jewish Bloomberg, and he accepted the twinning idea with enthusiasm. He later did say that he had “fundamental political differences” with Medecin, but they did not stop him from becoming a close friend of the fascist and racist Frenchman.³⁴⁷⁷

The twinning arrangement came into effect on July 6, 1974. The move caused controversy not only in France³⁴⁷⁸ but around the world, with political parties, trade unions and civil rights organizations denouncing the link-up as “scandalous.”³⁴⁷⁹ France’s Peace Movement against Racism and anti-Semitism characterised the South African visitors to the ceremony in Nice as a “racist delegation”³⁴⁸⁰ and protestors gathered outside Bloomberg’s hotel characterised him as “this fascist Bloomberg representing his racist government.”³⁴⁸¹

During the ceremony, Medecin told Bloomberg, “We have much to learn from you. There is no segregation in your country corresponding to slavery, but parallel development of two populations. Life in Africa, the South, should be better understood, better explained.” Bloomberg appeared to be “thrilled” with Medecin’s comments³⁴⁸² and spoke about South Africa’s need for friendship and understanding abroad, claiming that his country had become “the prey of vultures who take vicarious delight in the troubles of others.”³⁴⁸³ Bloomberg claimed that after his return from France, Foreign Minister Muller sounded him about a

Flight in a Blow to French Politics: Scandal: He’s accused of skimming money, accepting kickbacks when corruption is a hot national topic’; Whitney, (*The New York Times*), 19 November 1998, ‘Jacques Medecin, 70, Dies; French Mayor.’). Bloomberg was “deeply shocked” when he heard of the accusations against his good friend (Bloomberg, 2007: 183), but he would later find himself in a similar position, also accused of corruption, and like Medecin, he moved from the country of his birth to escape prosecution.

³⁴⁷⁶ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 4 April 1990, ‘Three Jews on City Council of Nice resign to protest ties with Le Pen’; Lichfield (*The Independent*), 20 November 1998, ‘Obituary: Jacques Medecin.’

³⁴⁷⁷ Bloomberg, 2007: 179-183.

³⁴⁷⁸ Officially at the time, France had imposed sanctions to South Africa. However, they did not stop France from assisting South Africa with the Koeberg nuclear plant, being involved in a coal-to-petrol project at “Sasol,” importing South African coal and sending “co-operants,” like Pierre-André Albertini, to do their service there. Earlier, in the late 1950s and early to mid-1960s, several South African policemen, members of the security services and military personnel had visited Algeria and France to study the methods of interrogation and torture used by the French there. One of them was General van den Bergh (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, 1998: 16, 195).

³⁴⁷⁹ *The Times* (London), 8 July 1974: 4, ‘Protest in Nice at twinning with Cape Town.’

³⁴⁸⁰ *The Cape Times*, 8 July 1974, ‘Bloomberg: SA the prey of vultures.’

³⁴⁸¹ Bloomberg, 2007: 180.

³⁴⁸² Nice-Matin, 2013.

³⁴⁸³ *The Cape Times*, 8 July 1974: 4, ‘Protest in Nice at twinning with Cape Town.’

foreign diplomatic posting, but he refused because it was conditional upon his becoming a member of the National Party, something he was not prepared to do.³⁴⁸⁴

A few months later, Bloomberg was involved in another controversial incident as Mayor of Cape Town, when he was accused of seeking to promote South Africa's government at a time when a hostile London government was applying severe sanctions against the apartheid regime. When a flotilla of the British Royal Navy sailed into Table Bay on October 16, 1974, he invited the commander, Vice-Admiral Henry Leach, and his senior officers to lunch at City Hall and in an impromptu speech referred to the many links between the city and Britain's fighting ships.³⁴⁸⁵

The British government was not pleased and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan accused Bloomberg of "manipulating the visit" and giving it "a badge of respectability." He said the British government had "nothing in common with the policies of apartheid and racialism, which are repugnant to us," and he ordered that in future all British ships which needed to call at Cape Town should refuse hospitality. The London *Times* said Bloomberg and the South African government had "turned the operation into a propaganda exercise, saying that the visit is a demonstration of Britain's good will towards the Republic."³⁴⁸⁶

Bloomberg responded that the city council was "not politically structured or motivated" and his invitation "was not a clandestine attempt to influence foreign relations." He described the affair, which received wide international press coverage, as "an absurd incident."³⁴⁸⁷ Bloomberg described his two years as mayor as "a personally exhausting but stimulating experience." Some councillors suggested he stand for a further term, but "I was satisfied that I had done my job and it was time to move on."³⁴⁸⁸

According to Bloomberg, he was not a member and never voted for the National Party, "the party of the oppressor" as he characterised it, because of its pro-Nazi and anti-Jewish proclivities."³⁴⁸⁹ However, his hands-off approach to the party did not seem to affect Bloomberg's lofty public status. According to the ANC, it was because of his relationship with the National Party that he escaped prosecution in the late 1980s.³⁴⁹⁰ At that time,

³⁴⁸⁴ Bloomberg, 2007: 184.

³⁴⁸⁵ Bloomberg, 2007: 199.

³⁴⁸⁶ *The Times* (London), 25 October 1974: 1, 'Callaghan apology in navy visit dispute.'

³⁴⁸⁷ Bloomberg, 2007: 200.

³⁴⁸⁸ Bloomberg, 2007: 222-223.

³⁴⁸⁹ Bloomberg, 2007: 275.

³⁴⁹⁰ Parliamentary Bulletin, 16 September 1996.

Bloomberg, along with casino magnate Sol Kerzner, was accused of bribery, corruption, fraud and perjury.³⁴⁹¹ The Bantustans were reputed to be places where an easy profit could be guaranteed and many White South African and international business men turned their attention to the Transkei.³⁴⁹²

A September 16, 1996 statement by the Parliamentary caucus of the ANC, by then ruling South Africa after the collapse of apartheid, said, “Sol Kerzner and David Bloomberg were accused of paying R2 million in bribes in December 1986 and January 1987 to the former Transkei premier, George Matanzima, in exchange for a gambling monopoly in Transkei. In 1988, Kerzner and Bloomberg admitted the payment to the Harms Commission on cross-border irregularities but claimed they were subject to undue pressure by Premier Matanzima. In 1990, the Transkei Attorney General began preparations for extradition against Kerzner and Bloomberg and forwarded extradition applications to the National Party government in 1991.”³⁴⁹³

In 1993, the National Party “tried to kill off the case and defended Bloomberg’s involvement” in the casino contracts when the Transkei Government demanded his extradition³⁴⁹⁴ on grounds that there was no case to answer and the case was shelved, despite the insistence of Transkei’s Attorney General that there was a case to answer. The ANC statement accused the National Party of interfering to prevent the two men’s trial by “dragging its heels for ten years.”³⁴⁹⁵

Later in life, Bloomberg took to writing, publishing six books. Two were novels - *Simon’s Destiny* (2012) and highly acclaimed *The Don: Story of an Actor* (2014) – preceded by the story of a Holocaust survivor, *Won’t Forgive, Can’t Forget* (2006), reflections on politics, *Meet the People* (1975) and *The Chain Gang: Mayors Who Served in Cape Town’s City Hall* (2011), and his autobiography, *My Times* (2007). In the mid-1990s Bloomberg moved to England and later to Switzerland, where he currently resides.

³⁴⁹¹ Parliamentary Bulletin, 16 September 1996.

³⁴⁹² Gibbs, 2014: 142.

³⁴⁹³ Parliamentary Bulletin, 16 September 1996.

³⁴⁹⁴ Gibbs, 2014: 142.

³⁴⁹⁵ Parliamentary Bulletin, 16 September 1996.

BLOOMBERG AND TSAFENDAS

Immediately after Tsafendas's trial ended in his indefinite incarceration, David Bloomberg bought a number of blue neck-ties bearing a pattern of small worms which looked like tapeworms and gave them as gifts to all the members of the defence team, including lawyers, psychiatrists, psychologists and investigators, to celebrate their victory. He named them members of the "Tapeworm Club."³⁴⁹⁶ When asked about this during Liza Key's interview for her documentary, Bloomberg appeared extremely uncomfortable and asked her to stop the camera and "wait a moment, let me think about it." He then conceded that it was a "pretty naughty thing to do," and, referring to the film, asked Key, "You are not running this, are you?"³⁴⁹⁷ Bloomberg made no mention of the Tapeworm Club in his memoir.

During the first ten years of Tsafendas's imprisonment, Bloomberg was the only person who visited him, and that was twice. Throughout this period and for another thirteen years Tsafendas was kept in solitary confinement on Death Row in the maximum security section (Section C) of Pretoria Prison. He was placed in a cell close to the execution room where condemned prisoners were hanged, so he could hear their screams and cries. Tsafendas was forbidden to have any contact with his fellow prisoners and was not allowed access to newspapers, magazines or a radio.³⁴⁹⁸ Bloomberg's first visit was in January 1968³⁴⁹⁹ and the second was in 1976.

After visiting Tsafendas in January, 1968, Bloomberg wrote to Brigadier Floris Coetzee, whose position is not specified in the letter, thanking him for arranging the visit. He said in the letter:

"Physically, Tsafendas seems to be very well indeed. He has obviously lost an enormous amount of weight which is satisfactory, as he was previously grossly overweight. He told me that he has been well treated by the prison authorities, and certainly he has a much happier and friendlier disposition than when I last saw him. As to his mental condition, you will of course appreciate that I am really unqualified to express an opinion. However, through Tsafendas and other legal matters, I have picked up a fair amount of lay knowledge

³⁴⁹⁶ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016; Willie Burger in a personal interview, 9 April 2015; David Bloomberg in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁴⁹⁷ David Bloomberg in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁴⁹⁸ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Beresford (*The Guardian*), 6 November 1997: 6, 'Inside Story - The madness that destroyed apartheid'; Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁴⁹⁹ David Bloomberg letter to Brigadier Coetzee, 26 January 1968. Correctional Service. Demitrio Tsafendas, File number: 80/0043, A123, Vol. 1. NASA.

concerning mental conditions. My impression of Tsafendas at the present time is that outwardly he has improved, but that basically he still has the same obvious symptoms which resulted in his being diagnosed as a chronic schizophrenic. My view, for what it is worth, is that he is still mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act.”³⁵⁰⁰

Just eleven months after Bloomberg’s visit, Bernard Mitchell, a former prisoner, revealed in the British Sunday newspaper *The Observer* that Tsafendas was tortured and kept in a cell built especially for him on Death Row.³⁵⁰¹ It seems that Bloomberg did not notice that Tsafendas had been tortured or that he was detained in a special Death Row cell. Indeed, he found him to be “very well indeed.” He did notice that Tsafendas had lost a lot of weight, in reality twenty to twenty-five kilos, during the first fourteen months of his imprisonment.³⁵⁰² This he saw as something positive.

On August 1, 1976, the British Sunday newspaper, *The Observer*, published a lengthy article by Ian Mather entitled “*Horror in black and white.*” It consisted predominantly of a first-person account of life in Pretoria Central Prison and other South African penal institutions by Brian Price, a Briton who managed to escape while serving an eleven-year sentence for dealing the drug LSD.³⁵⁰³ *The Observer* said it published the story only after its editors “closely cross-examined” Price and checked his allegation as far as they were able. They decided to publish because the story was “consistent with reports from other sources.”³⁵⁰⁴ Ian Mather also confirmed to the author that Price’s story was thoroughly checked as much as possible and that the newspaper had no reason to doubt its authenticity.³⁵⁰⁵

In a long and detailed article about violence to prisoners, Price referred briefly to Tsafendas, claiming that “he was treated with gross inhumanity and was a broken man.” He said that the guards urinated in Tsafendas’s food then forced him to eat it and he was routinely beaten and kicked. “For the first five years or so, the warders used to lay into Tsafendas. He was a plaything for sadists.”³⁵⁰⁶

³⁵⁰⁰ David Bloomberg letter to Brigadier Coetzee, 26 January 1968. Correctional Service. Demitrio Tsafendas, File number: 80/0043, A123, Vol. 1. NASA.

³⁵⁰¹ de St Jorre (*The Observer*), 1 December 1968: 7, ‘I was glad that cancer got me out of Vorster’s jail’;

³⁵⁰² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

³⁵⁰³ Mather (*The Observer*), 1 August 1976: 17, ‘Horror in black and white.’

³⁵⁰⁴ *The Observer*, 11 November 1976, ‘South Africa’s evasions.’

³⁵⁰⁵ Ian Mather in a personal interview, 2 February 2015.

³⁵⁰⁶ Mather (*The Observer*), 1 August 1976: 17, ‘Horror in black and white.’

This was not the first or the last time that Tsafendas's fellow inmates revealed that he was physically abused and psychologically tortured. As we have seen, Breyten Breytenbach, Bernard Mitchell and Alexander Moumbaris, as well as two unnamed inmates in *Sunday Tribune* in 1994 spoke about it in the Press.³⁵⁰⁷ Journalist and BOSS informer Gordon Winter, who interviewed Tsafendas in 1976, confirmed later that Tsafendas was tortured.³⁵⁰⁸ Professor Barend van Niekerk had become aware of the ongoing abuse and attempted with the help of Helen Suzman to put an end in it.³⁵⁰⁹ As far back as 1971, a civil servant, A.M. Towert, also informed Suzman about Tsafendas's treatment and the fact that he was kept on the "execution block."³⁵¹⁰

The Observer article came at a sensitive time for apartheid – just six weeks after the Soweto uprising, which began on June 16, 1976, and coinciding with accusations of atrocities, including torture of prisoners, by South African troops in Namibia.³⁵¹¹ According to Bloomberg, Price's story "was syndicated widely and caused quite an international stir."³⁵¹² The South African government swiftly denied that Tsafendas was ill-treated and called the claim "a travesty of the truth." The apartheid government then invited *The Observer* to name a legal expert of its choice, who would be given "complete freedom to investigate the alleged facts contained in Price's story." The newspaper nominated Louis Blom-Cooper, QC, an acknowledged penal expert, chairman of Britain's Howard League for Penal Reform, member of the Home Secretary's advisory council on the penal system and one of the founders of Amnesty International. The South African government turned him down without explanation and instead sent a list to *The Observer* naming the lawyers they would accept.³⁵¹³

³⁵⁰⁷ Beresford (*The Guardian*), 9 June 1989: 12, 'Dr. Verwoerd's insane killer being brutalised on SA Death Row: Cell next to gallows for 71- year old prisoner'; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; de St Jorre (*The Observer*), 1 December 1968: 7, 'I was glad that cancer got me out of Vorster's jail'; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Thornycroft and Lee (*Sunday Tribune*), 15 May 1994, 'Amnesty for Tsafendas?'; Dimitris Tsafendas in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁵⁰⁸ Winter, 1981: 476-479.

³⁵⁰⁹ Letter to Helen Suzman from Prof. Barend D. van Niekerk of Wits referring to the "cruellest" treatment being meted out to Dimtri Tsafendas in jail, 9 April 1971. Helen Suzman Papers 1944-2009. Mb2.10.1.5. University of the Witwatersrand.

³⁵¹⁰ Letter to Helen Suzman from A.M. Towert informing her that Tsafendas is held in the "execution block" at Central Gaol, Pretoria, 16 May 1971. Helen Suzman Papers 1944-2009. Mb2.10.1.5. University of the Witwatersrand.

³⁵¹¹ *The Guardian*, 30 August 1976, 'Pretoria troops in rape of Namibia'; *The Guardian*, 31 August 1976: 2, 'International inquiry demanded into Namibia atrocities.'

³⁵¹² Bloomberg, 2007: 122.

³⁵¹³ *The Observer*, 11 November 1976, 'South Africa's evasions.'

The British newspaper refused and naturally asked, “if the South Africans are so keen to let the world know they have nothing to hide in their country, why do they persistently refuse entry visas to our reporters?”³⁵¹⁴ The editor of *The Observer* said the government’s handling of the matter “served only to reinforce the impression we have had throughout this affair - that your motive has not been to establish the truth about prison conditions in South Africa at all, but to score publicity points against *The Observer*.” He added, “We found it difficult at first to believe in all the barbarities described by Mr. Price. South Africa’s subtle evasions since then have now persuaded us that they must have something very serious to hide.”³⁵¹⁵

On September 27, 1976, a South African ex-soldier testified before the UN’s 25-nation Council for Namibia that South African military men gave electric shocks and water torture to Namibian prisoners, causing “screams of pain.” His testimony set off a storm of controversy adding to the regime’s embarrassment following *The Observer*’s allegations only the previous month.³⁵¹⁶

The day after the soldier’s testimony, September 28, and at the height of the Namibian torture controversy, David Bloomberg visited Tsafendas in prison, something no Western journalist, no other lawyer or *The Observer*’s nominee managed. This was despite the fact that Bloomberg was no longer Tsafendas’s legal representative and therefore the authorities were not obliged to give him access. On October 2, 1976, Bloomberg released a statement to the media, describing Price’s allegations as a “diatribe” and “without foundation.” Bloomberg said he found Tsafendas to have aged, but he was still “alert, has a sound memory, is personable, reasonably well-informed and not without a sense of humour.” He said that while Tsafendas “remembers having spoken to Price briefly on occasions,” he “firmly denies” that he suffered any ill-treatment. Bloomberg said, “Tsafendas spends his days reading, mainly the Bible, helping with gardening and has added Afrikaans to the many languages he speaks.”³⁵¹⁷

The following is an extract from Bloomberg’s statement:

“I found Tsafendas in apparently good physical condition and seemingly far healthier than he was ten years ago. His major mental aberration, that he has a giant tapeworm, which

³⁵¹⁴ *The Observer*, 19 December 1976: 8, ‘Pretoria propaganda.’

³⁵¹⁵ *The Observer*, 11 November 1976, ‘South Africa’s evasions.’

³⁵¹⁶ *The Cape Times*, 28 September 1976: 6, ‘Ex-SA soldier tells of torture.’

³⁵¹⁷ *The Cape Argus*, 2 October 1976: 1, ‘Tsafendas- is no broken man-Bloomberg.’

dictates his life, remains dominant in his thought processes. However, apart from this obsession, he is mainly rational and one is able to carry on a reasonably intelligent conversation with him.

I questioned him closely as to whether he had been ill-treated in any way. He had no hesitation in stating that he was completely satisfied with his treatment, cell conditions, exercise facilities and with the food given to him. He told me that he received the same rights and privileges as other maximum security prisoners and was perfectly happy in prison and had no desire to be released ... ”³⁵¹⁸

According to prison records, Bloomberg’s September 28 visit started at 14.15 p.m. and ended at 14.40 p.m., a total of twenty-five minutes, while two officers, a lieutenant and a prison warden, were present throughout the visit.³⁵¹⁹ Bloomberg must have known there was no chance that Tsafendas would admit in front of his guards that he had been tortured. It was also unlikely that he would make any such confession to Bloomberg, who well knew that Tsafendas had been beaten in custody in 1966 and had done nothing about it then.

Bloomberg said prison officials told him they liked and had “affection” for Tsafendas.³⁵²⁰ In this case, surely the guards would not admit that they tortured him. In addition, the fact that Bloomberg spent time talking privately to the guards means that he must have spent at least five minutes with them, leaving a maximum of only twenty minutes for Tsafendas - twenty minutes with a man who was in solitary confinement twenty-three hours per day and had not received a single visitor in eight years.

Furthermore, the similarities in Bloomberg’s description of Tsafendas with the way he described him in 1968 are more than obvious. Bloomberg presents Tsafendas as a satisfied and happy man with no desire to be released. The truth is Tsafendas was allowed only one hour per day outside his cell – presumably enough for Bloomberg to claim that he had access to exercise facilities and gardening. The most extraordinary claims in Bloomberg’s report are that Tsafendas was satisfied with his cell conditions and that he had no desire to be released. The fact that Tsafendas was in a cell in the Death Row and next to the room in which prisoners were hanged is not mentioned.

On March 1996, Tsafendas was asked during a visit to the Sterkfontein Hospital by

³⁵¹⁸ *The Cape Argus*, 2 October 1976: 1. ‘Tsafendas- is no broken man-Bloomberg.’

³⁵¹⁹ Correctional Service. Demitrio Tsafendas, File number: 80/0043, A123 Vol 2. NASA.

³⁵²⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 102.

former MK fighter and fellow prisoner at Pretoria Maximum Security Prison, Alexander Moumbaris, if he wanted anything. Tsafendas replied, “I want my freedom.”³⁵²¹ At the same visit, Tsafendas told Marie-Jose Moumbaris, Alexander’s wife and also an anti-apartheid activist and former prisoner at the women’s section at Pretoria Central Prison, “I want to see the sea once again before I die.”³⁵²² Tsafendas repeatedly told the priests who visited him that he hoped one day he would be released. He often used the Latin saying, *dum spiro spero* (“While I breathe, I hope”).³⁵²³

Bloomberg claimed that he had “retained an interest” in Tsafendas’s “mental condition and welfare” ever since he defended him, which was why he visited him on this occasion.³⁵²⁴ However, this hardly squares with the fact that he only spent around twenty minutes with him. Twenty minutes with a man who had no visitors in eight years and was in solitary confinement most of the time. The fact is he visited his erstwhile client only twice in his thirty-three years in custody. Bloomberg claimed he did not visit Tsafendas more often because the apartheid authorities made it “difficult” for him.³⁵²⁵ However, the authorities apparently had no problem about him seeing Tsafendas following *The Observer*’s allegations, while refusing the newspaper’s nominee and its reporters. Bloomberg no longer had a legal tie to Tsafendas which would have required the government to allow his visit, thus suggesting that the ever-suspicious authorities were confident he would not report anything unfavourable.

It might be purely a coincidence that Bloomberg visited Tsafendas immediately after the ex-soldier’s torture testimony. However, it is a fact that *The Observer* story about Tsafendas was published on August 1, 1976 and it took Bloomberg almost two months after that to visit Tsafendas and check if the newspaper’s claims were correct.

Questions about Bloomberg’s motives in visiting Tsafendas could also be raised by a letter dated October 7, 1976, which he sent to one of the prison officials who assisted him when he saw Tsafendas. This is what it said:

“Dear ... (the name is censored)

³⁵²¹ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

³⁵²² Marie-Jose Moumbaris in a personal interview, 8 March 2010.

³⁵²³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

³⁵²⁴ David Bloomberg in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. The part is available in the rushes.

³⁵²⁵ David Bloomberg in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. The part is available in the rushes.

I would like to thank you very much indeed for the courtesy extended to me when I visited Tsafendas recently. I thought you might be interested to read the statements which I issued to the press following this visit, and I enclose herewith a copy of same. This has received prominence in the South African press and, hopefully, will be published in England as well.

You might not have seen the article in the Argus, and I am enclosing a copy of that for you.

*Again, my grateful thanks to you for your co-operation and with kind personal regards ...*³⁵²⁶

It is normal that Bloomberg should write and thank the official for his assistance. What is surprising is Bloomberg's keenness to tell him of the statement which he issued denying *The Observer's* allegations and the fact that it had been reported widely in South Africa and hopefully would be published in England, too. It is clear Bloomberg assumes the official will be happy to hear a rebuttal of claims that were damaging to South Africa and to the official's prison. He goes so far as to enclose copies of his statement to the media and the article published in the *Cape Argus* newspaper, highlighting what he felt to be the main achievement of his visit. Bloomberg makes no direct reference to Tsafendas himself, ostensibly the reason for his visit.

Shortly after Bloomberg's visit, General van den Bergh sent Gordon Winter, a BOSS agent and journalist of *The Citizen*, the government's mouthpiece, to write a denial about the *Observer* story. Winter did this, but a few years later had the decency to admit that this was a propaganda stunt and that Tsafendas was indeed tortured.³⁵²⁷ *The Observer* characterised the government's handling of the case as "Pretoria propaganda," describing as "extraordinary" the lengths to which it would go "to score a dubious propaganda point."³⁵²⁸ And Bloomberg had once again offered an enormous help to apartheid, most probably not in official co-operation with the government, but as an individual who always knew which way the political winds were blowing. The inescapable question was: If Tsafendas was not tortured

³⁵²⁶ David Bloomberg letter to unnamed prison official, 7 October 1976. Correctional Service. Demitrio Tsafendas, File number: 80/0043, A123, Vol. 1. NASA.

³⁵²⁷ Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Winter, 1981: 476-479.

³⁵²⁸ *The Observer*, 19 December 1976: 8, 'Pretoria propaganda.'

and the authorities had nothing to hide, why were the *Observer*'s reporters and nominated lawyer not allowed to see him, but David Bloomberg and Gordon Winter were?

In 1997, Bloomberg was asked by filmmaker Liza Key, who was making a documentary about Tsafendas, whether he thought the assassination "changed the course of history in South Africa." Bloomberg replied, "I think that by assassinating Dr. Verwoerd, he certainly changed the course of history of that time. I have no doubt that the eventual outcome would have been the same with the passage of time, that one couldn't suppress the majority of the people of South Africa for all time ... Probably in retrospect, I think Tsafendas may have hurried things a little ..." ³⁵²⁹

However, sixteen years later, Bloomberg offered a different take on Tsafendas's place in South Africa's history. On October 22, 2013, Christian Martins, Eastern Cape MP for the ruling African National Congress, suggested that "homage should be bestowed upon Dimitri Tsafendas, a hero and martyr for the cause of the South African people," and that his grave should be declared a heritage site. ³⁵³⁰ Bloomberg was quick to respond. Two days later, he gave a statement to the *Cape Times* expressing "astonishment" at such an "outrageous request," since Tsafendas was a schizophrenic without any political motive whatsoever. ³⁵³¹

Bloomberg's letter is full of inaccuracies in an attempt to prove that Tsafendas does not merit such recognition. In challenging Martin's claim that Tsafendas "changed the course of post-war South African history," Bloomberg contradicted his own statement to Liza Key in 1997. Now, he said, "Dr. Verwoerd was succeeded by John Vorster and P.W. Botha, both strict adherents of the apartheid policy, and business continued as usual." ³⁵³² This hasty, latter-day analysis does not bear scrutiny. The fact is that Bloomberg contradicted his own 1997 statement to justify his view that Tsafendas should not be honoured by South Africa

TSAFENDAS MEETS HIS LAWYERS

Late in the morning of September 26, 1966, Tsafendas was seen by his three lawyers: Advocate Wilfrid E. Cooper and Attorney David Bloomberg, with Will Burger as his junior. The first of the defence team to visit Tsafendas was Bloomberg, who, passing through a

³⁵²⁹ David Bloomberg in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁵³⁰ *The Cape Times*, 22 October 2013, 'South Africans must 'honour' Dr. Verwoerd, Tsafendas.'

³⁵³¹ *The Cape Times*, 24 October 2013: 12.

³⁵³² *The Cape Times*, 24 October 2013: 12.

“succession of locked and barred doors,” arrived in “a large cell guarded on the outside by an armed policeman.” Tsafendas was “huddled in a corner” with a “dazed expression and seemed uninterested in his visitors.” As we saw earlier in this chapter, Bloomberg quickly noticed that Tsafendas “had some facial injuries, ‘which Major Cerff, the police officer who accompanied Bloomberg to the cell, claimed had “occurred during the struggle to subdue him in Parliament.” Bloomberg doubted this explanation since three weeks had elapsed since the assassination, but he decided “not to reveal” his “misgivings” since “the injuries appear to be superficial.”³⁵³³

Later, Tsafendas was visited by Wilfrid Cooper, who also found Tsafendas as a “bundle in the corner” on a dirty blanket on the floor. When he told Tsafendas that he was appointed to defend him, Tsafendas responded by saying that according to the tenets of his religion, he did not need legal defence. Cooper explained that it was in his best interest to be defended, to which Tsafendas responded: “I don’t know why the good Lord should have chosen such an infirm person like me.” According to Cooper, Tsafendas was aware of the implications of what he had done, but his emotional response was that of someone who “had participated in a dream.” Tsafendas’s description of the cause of Dr. Verwoerd’s death, while very exact in its clinical details, demonstrated what Cooper referred to in the film as “a certain remoteness about him, as if he wasn’t there.”³⁵³⁴

Cooper recalls his first interview and Tsafendas’s response when he told him that he had been appointed by Judge Beyers to act for him. Tsafendas responded immediately with a lie, saying that he did not believe in legal representation as it was against his religious beliefs.³⁵³⁵ In fact, it was not against his religion beliefs to have legal representation and Tsafendas had actually asked to be represented by Advocate George Bizos.³⁵³⁶ In addition, just ten months ago, in November, 1965, Tsafendas had instructed a Cape Town lawyer, Ismail Essop, to represent him in a \$100,000 compensation claim from the American government for his “forced deportation” from the United States to Greece in 1947.³⁵³⁷ Tsafendas was given a full hearing.³⁵³⁸ This is an indication of how Tsafendas’s attitude had changed since he was arrested and a pointer to how he would act in the future, lying when he

³⁵³³ Bloomberg, 2007: 74-75.

³⁵³⁴ Cooper, 2016: 101; Wilfrid Cooper in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁵³⁵ Cooper, 2016: 101-102.

³⁵³⁶ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

³⁵³⁷ Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA.

³⁵³⁸ Shaw, 2007: 58.

considered it expeditious to both his defence and to the medics who examined him.

When Cooper asked him why he had killed Dr. Verwoerd, rather than answering the question, Tsafendas told a long and irrelevant story about horse-racing. After several attempts to get a coherent answer out of him, Cooper said, "I gave up." Cooper noticed a strong "incongruity" about Tsafendas. "He had the appearance of a hobo, a rough looking individual, yet when he spoke, he described his feelings with a certain measure of delicacy."³⁵³⁹

The same afternoon, the entire defence team, Cooper, Bloomberg and Burger, saw Tsafendas together. According to Bloomberg, Tsafendas "looked tired and somewhat dazed and at first spoke slowly but coherently. He was polite and co-operative, but generally uninterested in the questions that were put to him. Gently, we tried to extract from him a life history, but this proved difficult as his powers of concentration wavered. When he did answer, he would start in the right direction and then go off at a tangent, with a series of non sequiturs, forgetting what the question was." However, "painstakingly," they "were able to learn" Tsafendas's background and of his travels around the world. Bloomberg opined that "he was not unintelligent, for along the way, he had learned to speak several languages and was reasonably well informed."³⁵⁴⁰

According to Bloomberg, "after a while he relaxed more and what became strangely apparent was that he showed no signs of distress or anxiety. The man knew that he was going to be charged with murder but showed an abnormal emotional attitude to his situation and surroundings. At one stage he said, 'I suppose when this whole thing is over, it will be difficult for me to live in Cape Town. Oh, well, I suppose I will have to live elsewhere!' Later he said: 'You know I didn't really like my work in Parliament. I don't think I will apply again for a job there.' Questioned about his health, he revealed that he had been in hospital a number of times, including the St Pancras Hospital in London, a hospital on the Isle of Wight, the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, the Sheep's Head Hospital and the Grafton State Hospital in New York, and the Ochosen Krankenhaus outside Hamburg in Germany. When pressed for the reasons why he had been a patient in these hospitals, he said it was all to do with a tapeworm that made him feel unwell and nervous."³⁵⁴¹

³⁵³⁹ Wilfrid Cooper in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁵⁴⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 76.

³⁵⁴¹ Bloomberg, 2007: 76.

It is noteworthy to remember that although during his questioning by the police Tsafendas mentioned all these hospitals, he said nothing about the tapeworm, simply telling them the diagnosis he received at each hospital and downplaying its importance. Tsafendas also told his defence team about his examination by Dr. Kossew when he had applied for a disability grant, who had found him to be schizophrenic. However, he did not mention any of the nine doctors who had examined him over the last three years for his permanent residency permit or for various job applications, all of whom had found him to be perfectly sane and healthy.

According to Bloomberg:

“Tsafendas went on to say that the tapeworm in fact controlled his life and that at one of the hospitals he had received electro-convulsive therapy to rid him of what he variously described as a ‘demon’, a ‘dragon’ and a ‘snake.’ Tsafendas told us that he had consulted many doctors and chemists to obtain medicines to enable him to pass the tapeworm and gave a lurid account of a portion of the worm emerging and snapping off in his hand. He described the tapeworm as being two inches wide with serrated edges and said that he could feel it wriggling around inside. If he passed near food that had good smells the tapeworm became aroused and the only way he could exercise any control over it was to eat and ‘the tapeworm then purred like a cat. He insisted that the tapeworm influenced his behaviour: ‘It has meant a lot to me, sir. It has caused me to see how other people live. If I didn’t have a tapeworm I’d really ... I’d probably only be living for myself, I would not know what the rest of the world was like, what other people thought, their difficulties. I would have taken life, I would have taken life, eh ... I would have only seen things eh ... well I would have taken life for granted, I would have just gone through life enjoying myself, taking life ... eh things easier.’”³⁵⁴²

Bloomberg claimed that when Tsafendas was asked if he remembered what had happened in Parliament on September 6, he related that on that morning he had walked into the city and purchased two long knives at a shop. He had then returned to Parliament, changed into his parliamentary uniform and concealed the knives beneath his jacket. His account of events then became very vague and his mind constantly wandered. While he acknowledged stabbing Dr. Verwoerd, he could provide no precise details of the attack. “I don’t even remember how it happened, in other words how I began stabbing the man. I can only remember when the people grabbed hold of me. If the people had not grabbed hold of

³⁵⁴² Bloomberg, 2007: 76.

me I would probably be ... probably just kept on stabbing him or how shall I say ... even though he were dead I could just keep on stabbing him but... eh ... not that I was... I don't know if you can call that angry."³⁵⁴³

According to Bloomberg, the only motivation that emerged was that Tsafendas had feelings of frustration towards life, in particular towards doctors and heads of state. Tsafendas told them that in the United Kingdom he had had a job for a short while in the Houses of Parliament but couldn't get close enough to Harold Macmillan to attack him; and that in the USA he did not like President Harry Truman but couldn't get employment at the White House.³⁵⁴⁴

That Tsafendas was lying to his defence team can easily be deduced by examining the above statement. The South African police received several reports from the British authorities regarding Tsafendas, and a very detailed report regarding his movements in England from the South African embassy in London. In none of them is there any indication that Tsafendas ever worked in the Houses of Parliament, which surely the British authorities would have known about. What's more, the South African embassy's secret telegram of September 9, 1966, states correctly that Tsafendas was not given a permit to work in the UK when he asked for one. In fact, he was refused permission to remain as a student and as a result was in the country illegally.³⁵⁴⁵ Furthermore, a confidential PIDE report regarding Tsafendas dated November 25, 1964 states that while in England, Tsafendas was forced to work "clandestinely, because legally he was not authorized."³⁵⁴⁶ Since he was not authorized to work in Britain, or even be in the country, it is inconceivable that he could have got a job in the Houses of Parliament. Tsafendas never told anyone but Bloomberg that he ever held such job.

In addition, Tsafendas, when he was questioned, did not tell the police he was frustrated in London and wanted to attack the British Prime Minister. What he told several people was that London was his favourite city because there were so many people from various races and there was no racism. He said that he supported the Labour Party and admired Macmillan. He said he would have liked to live in London but he could not because

³⁵⁴³ Bloomberg, 2007: 77.

³⁵⁴⁴ Bloomberg, 2007: 77.

³⁵⁴⁵ Secret Telegram from the South African Embassy in London to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

³⁵⁴⁶ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

he was not able to get a work permit.³⁵⁴⁷

As for Truman, Tsafendas was indeed anti-American, but not only did he not have a work permit, he did not have permission to reside in the United States and was arrested many times for violating its immigration laws. To even have applied for a job at the White House would have been the height of absurdity. More importantly, according to the several reports from various institutions, including the detailed account from the Grafton State Hospital, Tsafendas lived only in Massachusetts and New York, never in Washington. Finally, Tsafendas did not mention any of this to the police or to the psychiatrists who examined him. However, the likelihood is that none of this was known to the defence at the time, since they did not have access to the documents submitted to the South African police and authorities.

Bloomberg said that while Tsafendas could not give any motive for the assassination, he seemed to believe that society was against him and he saw Dr. Verwoerd as the head of that society. According to Bloomberg's 2007 memoir *My Times*, the tapeworm was paramount in Tsafendas's thoughts, and while he denied that the tapeworm had ordered him to kill the Prime Minister, its presence induced him to perpetrate the attack. However, ten years earlier, in 1997, Bloomberg gave a different story regarding the tapeworm. He said Tsafendas told him that it was the tapeworm which told him to kill Dr. Verwoerd. "I think the tapeworm determined that the time had arrived that Dr. Verwoerd should be removed and the tapeworm delivered this message to him."³⁵⁴⁸

Bloomberg said the defence team questioned Tsafendas "extensively about whether he had received instructions or advice, locally or from abroad, about the assassination, whether anyone had suggested to him that it would be a good idea to kill Dr. Verwoerd, and whether he had any accomplices. His response was negative on all these counts, and it seemed that his only confidante was the tapeworm. While he never disputed the stabbing, he seemed to fail to appreciate the magnitude of the crime or the consequences of his action."³⁵⁴⁹

Bloomberg quoted Tsafendas as speaking as follows:

"Yes, I see it as very serious ... I see it is very serious, because I doubt very much ...

³⁵⁴⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

³⁵⁴⁸ David Bloomberg in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

³⁵⁴⁹ Bloomberg, 2007: 77.

eh ... I wonder at times if... eh ... people see it as serious as I do. Well, not because it involves me ... I... am practically nothing but ... eh ... from what... eh ... I don't think it takes much thought to see that ... eh ... situation is serious ... me ... the situation is serious where we are getting to a stage in a ... eh ... stage or a period in ... eh ... where it does not concern countries anymore ... it is probably nothing now ... that concerns the whole universe."³⁵⁵⁰

None of the witnesses interviewed by the author who knew Tsafendas recognised the above as the way he spoke. All strongly denied that he could have spoken in such a way without doing it intentionally. Continuing their observation, the defence listened as Tsafendas “described how the tapeworm climbed into his throat and made him feel weak, feeble and distressed, and sometimes took over his being. He seemed to believe in witchcraft and thought that this might have something to do with the tapeworm.” After more than two hours, the defence team left to consider the information they had obtained. “We felt pretty confident that Tsafendas had been truthful with us and had not deliberately attempted to conceal any facts,” Bloomberg wrote later. “The presence of a tapeworm that controlled one’s life was a revelation to us and, from our laymen’s point of view, we considered our client to be seriously mentally disturbed. It was obviously necessary for us to have Tsafendas examined by experienced psychiatrists, to endeavour to make contact with the overseas hospitals where he had been treated and to interview the people he had lived with recently in Cape Town. To accomplish all this and other necessary investigations, and prepare for trial in the space of three weeks was going to be a gigantic task.” Bloomberg and his assistants began contacting hospitals and mental institutions in Europe and the USA whilst also searching for people in Cape Town who knew Tsafendas.³⁵⁵¹

Bloomberg demonstrated how inaccurate his picture of Tsafendas was and how little he knew of him when he told the author: “[Tsafendas] was opposed to apartheid, but he wasn't a political animal at all. I don't think that politics played a great part in his life and in his thinking.”³⁵⁵² However, Bloomberg was unaware that Tsafendas had been arrested four times and imprisoned three times by the Portuguese because of his political activities, that he was banned from entering South Africa and Mozambique for the same reason, that he had

³⁵⁵⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 77.

³⁵⁵¹ Bloomberg, 2007: 78.

³⁵⁵² David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

been a member of the SACP and the DSE, and that PIDE had opened a file on him as long ago as 1938.

Going back to the Tsafendas's defence, if the South African authorities wanted a demonstrably fair trial with the world watching, why did it not appoint Advocate George Bizos, the lawyer Tsafendas had specifically requested, and promptly when he asked for him, not twenty days later? Without suggesting that the lawyers appointed by the State were incompetent or puppets of the authorities, the fact is that Tsafendas was not allowed to have his preferred lawyer. Bizos was not asked by the authorities at any time to act for Tsafendas.³⁵⁵³

The other question is why it took twenty days for Tsafendas to get legal representation. If Tsafendas had shown signs of mental disorder while he was in custody, at least during the first two weeks, why did not the police ask a psychiatrist to examine him? If it was such a straightforward case and General van den Bergh believed Tsafendas was insane, as he later claimed, why did he not appoint a psychiatrist to examine him to confirm this?

THE TAPEWORM

The tapeworm, which from now on will be associated constantly with Tsafendas, makes its first appearance when Tsafendas is seen by his lawyers. That was on September 26, twenty days after the assassination, during which time he was in police custody. As we have seen, Tsafendas made no mention of a tapeworm during his questioning by the police, and none of the witnesses interrogated by the police testified that Tsafendas had ever mentioned such a thing. Further, in both of Tsafendas's statements found in the National Archives, he gives clear and logical political reasons for killing Dr. Verwoerd, reasons which were entirely compatible with all the other evidence the South African police collected regarding Tsafendas's political ideologies, namely that he was anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist, considered Verwoerd not to be the real representative of all the South African people and believed that by killing him a change of policy would take place. Tsafendas later repeated this exact statement to three priests who visited him in hospital and in prison, each at different times, Fathers Minas Constandinou, Spiros Rados and Ioannis Tsafataridis.³⁵⁵⁴

³⁵⁵³ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 1 September 2016.

³⁵⁵⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafataridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

In response to his police interrogators, Tsafendas's use of language is precise; he does not hesitate, stumble or repeatedly say "eh?" or "er" and his thought processes appear perfectly lucid. Tsafendas's statements to the police are coherent and quite unlike the halting, confused way in which he speaks to his defence team. Not once does he mention a tapeworm; instead he sets out a cogent set of political beliefs and motivations, and more than that, gives details of how he planned and executed the assassination.

The question then is, why does Tsafendas act so differently with his defence lawyers? The facts: Tsafendas gives the police a clear political motive for his actions and speaks perfectly logically in his statements of both September 11 and September 19, his last statement. On September 11, he said, "I did not think I would get away after murdering the Prime Minister. I did not care what happened to me"³⁵⁵⁵ and on September 19, he said, "I didn't care much and didn't give it a second thought that I would be caught."³⁵⁵⁶ The September 19 statement is of great importance because it carries the specific questions and Tsafendas's exact answers. His answers are lucid, logical and to the point and make no mention of a tapeworm or anything like it. Then, on September 26, exactly a week later, when he sees his lawyers, he has completely changed his tune. Obviously, something happened between the 19th and the 26th which led him to this change.

When Fathers Minas Constandinou and Ioannis Tsafaridis asked Tsafendas how the tapeworm had come up, he gave no specifics. He broke down and weeping said that he "couldn't take the torture anymore." He repeated this phrase and then said that he feared he would experience an "undignified" death, "hanged in his cell" while in custody, and that the police would claim he was insane and had committed suicide. He was led to believe, from what was happening to him through the torture he had sustained while in custody, that this was the arranged outcome. He believed that one day one of the mock hangings would turn out to be a real hanging and that would be the end of him. He realised that nobody would then know that he killed Dr. Verwoerd for political reasons and that he would simply be categorised as insane without political motive, like David Pratt.³⁵⁵⁷

Tsafendas was deeply emotional on this subject and was embarrassed to tell the

³⁵⁵⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁵⁵⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁵⁵⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

priests the details of how he had used the tapeworm to escape death. He clearly considered this to have been an act of cowardice. He said although he had played the fool in the past to escape detention and torture by the Portuguese, this time he was determined not to do so. Although Tsafendas did not say so, the priests gathered, that at one point, the prospect of stopping the torture and escaping “death by suicide,” and spending the remaining years of his life in a hospital as a result of playing the fool, attracted Tsafendas. After all, he had done the same thing before with the Portuguese police. Tsafendas said he knew that he was only going to get out of prison as an insane person, the crucial question being insane dead or insane alive. He chose the latter.³⁵⁵⁸

At some point after September 19, Tsafendas apparently did or said something which convinced the South African police that he was insane, and he was then given a team of defence lawyers. He told the priests that soon after he started playing the fool, the police stopped torturing him and allowed lawyers to see him. Observing that Tsafendas was reluctant to talk about that part of his life and appeared to be ashamed of his charade the priests never asked him about it again.³⁵⁵⁹

The author is not in position to know how the tapeworm first came into the frame. Although we do not know the exact day that Tsafendas changed his tune, nor what exactly he did or said to make the authorities think he was deranged, we can certainly state that it happened sometime between September 20 and 25. Lacking this specific knowledge, we can nevertheless state that up to September 19, Tsafendas talked perfectly logically to the police and that on September 26 when he first saw his defence team he was a completely different person. It seems abundantly clear that at some point after September 19, Tsafendas decided to “play the fool” once again, in other words pretend madness, to stop the torture and avoid being murdered while in custody.

REACTIONS OF PEOPLE WHO KNEW TSAFENDAS TO THE TAPEWORM STORY AND TO THE WAY HE SPOKE TO HIS DEFENCE TEAM

The most important testimony regarding the tapeworm and how Tsafendas spoke came from the approximately two hundred people who were questioned by the police and the

³⁵⁵⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

³⁵⁵⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Commission. Not one of them said they had heard Tsafendas mention the word tapeworm or talk in the way described by Bloomberg.³⁵⁶⁰ Major Rossouw, who questioned Tsafendas while in custody on at least two occasions and for at least three days, gave testimony to the Commission of Enquiry; he made no mention of Tsafendas speaking in the way claimed. What he said was that he “never got the impression that he (Tsafendas) tried to evade any question, that he answered all the questions spontaneously and that he was “totally prepared to answer everything.”³⁵⁶¹

It is also clear from both of Tsafendas’s statements that he did not speak in the way described by his defence lawyers when he was questioned by the police. In both statements, his speech is clear, as is his logic. More importantly, in the second statement, taken on September 19, which sets out the exact wording of the questions and answers, Tsafendas replies to all the questions perfectly logically. In both statements he gives a lucid and solid account of his movements, his life and his motive in a perfectly normal way.

The author has read everything which Tsafendas, according to David Bloomberg, told his defence team, to forty-four individuals who knew him. Nineteen of them knew Tsafendas very well. They included family members, such as his half-sister, a cousin, his sister-in-law, as well as people who shared accommodation with Tsafendas, who knew him since he was a child, and three priests who were close to him during the last ten years of his life. None of them recognised Tsafendas as talking in the incoherent way he did to his defence team or referring to a tapeworm, while some told me flatly they did not believe Tsafendas ever said these things. The author is not implying that Bloomberg made up these remarks, since Tsafendas came out with similar statements to the psychiatrists who examined him shortly before the trial. However, it is indisputable that no-one, apart from his defence team and the psychiatrists who examined him during this period, ever heard Tsafendas talk in this way.

Apart from Fathers Minas Constandinou, Spiros Randos and Ioannis Tsaftaridis, who were aware of Tsafendas’s play-acting with the tapeworm, none of the other witnesses the author interviewed knew anything about such a ruse. Equally important witnesses were Tsafendas’s family. As we will see in the Summary Trial Chapter, the defence claimed that Tsafendas had the tapeworm since he lived with his family in Lourenço Marques in the mid-

³⁵⁶⁰ Patrick O’Ryan will mention it to the Commission but not to the police. The issue is discussed in the summary trial chapter.

³⁵⁶¹ Major Rossouw testimony to the Commission of Enquiry, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

1930s. He lived with them from age six until nineteen and again from age twenty-one to twenty-three and then in South Africa from age forty-five to forty-eight.

Every member of his family flatly denied any knowledge of a tapeworm when they were questioned by Judge van Wyk for the Commission of Enquiry. They included his stepmother, Marika, who, according to his defence psychiatrists and witnesses in the summary trial, was supposedly responsible for the tapeworm. All told the judge that Tsafendas “never mentioned” any tapeworm and that he was “definitely not insane.”³⁵⁶² Charles Nissiotis, Tsafendas’s brother-in-law, told the police, “As far as I could established he never mentioned the tapeworm story to any of the family.”³⁵⁶³ Tsafendas’s half-sister Eleni confirmed this years later in 2007, as did his other half-sister Katerina in 2015.³⁵⁶⁴ The issue of the tapeworm and its “existence” will be examined in detail in the following chapter. However, let us examine here what Tsafendas told his defence team and the way he spoke.

An extremely important witness is Fotini Gavasiadis, sister of Nick Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas’s brother-in-law. Tsafendas lived in Fotini’s and her husband’s house for a few weeks, then for the next eight months in an apartment next to hers. Throughout this period in Pretoria in 1963-1964, they were very close; she saw and talked to him every day and they worked together in her brother’s café. The author read to her the transcription of Tsafendas’s halting remarks to his defence team, she laughed and said:

“There is absolutely no way Dimitri would have talked like that. This is a different man speaking. This is not only nonsense, which Dimitri would have never said, but he did not talk in that way. I don’t believe he said these things. It’s true, he ate a lot, but he never attributed [his appetite] to any tapeworm. He just liked food, he was a big man; it was natural to eat more than most people.”³⁵⁶⁵

Gavasiadis never heard Tsafendas mention a tapeworm and she ate with him at least once every day for nine months. She is certain that Tsafendas was pretending to avoid being executed, and said, “He was certainly capable of putting on an act like this. He was very, very clever. But he would never, never talk like this under normal conditions. Never! I cannot

³⁵⁶² COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

³⁵⁶³ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁵⁶⁴ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas’s *Live and Let Live*, 2007.

³⁵⁶⁵ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

picture him talking all this nonsense, no way, unless he did it deliberately. He was talking very nicely; if anyone had heard him talking, you would know these couldn't have been his words." She said, "Dimitri could buy you and sell you³⁵⁶⁶ any time he wanted, and as many times as he wanted to. He was so clever. I was with him almost every day for a year and we practically lived together for a few months. If he was talking like this or if there was something wrong with him, I would have noticed it." Furthermore, according to Gavasiadis, Tsafendas had a very distinctive way of talking and this was not it.³⁵⁶⁷

Another very important witness is Mary Eendracht, born in Egypt in 1923, was a first cousin of Tsafendas. She first knew him in Egypt and they grew up together in Mozambique. As an adult, Eendracht continued her close relationship and Tsafendas often confided to her his thoughts on various matters. He never mentioned a tapeworm or anything else that might suggest he was schizophrenic. She, too, dismissed the notion that Tsafendas ever spoke the way he was presented. She believed he was perfectly sane and made up the tapeworm story so as not to be executed. "I knew him all my life; we grew up together and he confined, I think, everything that had happened in his life. He trusted me. I was with him every day until 1939 when he went to South Africa. He was like a real brother to me. I don't believe for a moment he said these things to these people and he meant them. No way ..."³⁵⁶⁸

Another important witness is Father Nikola Banovic. Father Nikola had Tsafendas living with him for four months in Istanbul in 1961, saw him there almost every day for another two-three months and kept in touch with him with by letter until 1966. He is one of those who became very close to Tsafendas. Like Gavasiadis, Father Nikola laughed when I read Tsafendas's words to him and initially refused to believe it was Tsafendas talking. Tsafendas "was not talking like that and would never have spoken like that; these are the words of a madman, this is not Dimitri." He said that if he had been asked at the time to testify before a court, he would have sworn that Tsafendas was perfectly sane and that the statements attributed to him could not possibly have come out of his mouth. The only reason he might have talked in that way would have been to convince the police he was insane. The priest said Tsafendas never said anything that might suggest he was insane. "I assure you he was not insane. I am positive he made it up in order not to be hanged."³⁵⁶⁹

³⁵⁶⁶ This is a Greek expression to describe someone who is extremely intelligent and extremely able.

³⁵⁶⁷ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

³⁵⁶⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

³⁵⁶⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

Ira Kyriakakis is another very important witness as she grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques. Throughout her life, she was friendly with him and never heard him say anything about a tapeworm or something that would suggest he was insane. She is certain he did not believe he had one, that he would have told her if he thought he did, and that he simply made it up. She also does not believe Tsafendas could have spoken in the disjointed way described by the defence. “Dimitri was a devil since he was child; he was extremely intelligent and capable. If he wanted something, he would find a way to get it. Nothing and no one could stop him. He was not mad, he was very clever. Dimitri was so clever and able that he could even convince the devil to buy a Bible. You will never meet anyone who knew him well, apart from these psychiatrists and lawyers you told me about, who will tell you he was mad. He was not.”³⁵⁷⁰

Helen Grispos was born in 1930, when Tsafendas was twelve, and lived for nine years in the house next to the Tsafendas family in Lourenço Marques. George Grispos, who became her husband, was three years older than Tsafendas, but they were boyhood best friends. Helen Grispos’s mother was the best friend of Tsafendas’s step-mother, Marika. Neither Helen nor her husband or mother ever heard Tsafendas talk about a tapeworm and Helen does not believe he would have spoken as claimed. When she and her husband read newspaper trial reports about the tapeworm, they had no doubt Tsafendas was making it up. Because a lot of people knew that her husband had grown up with Tsafendas, they often asked about the tapeworm. George invariably replied that Tsafendas never mentioned such a thing. He was certain that if he believed he had a tapeworm, he would have told him about it.³⁵⁷¹

Father Minas Constandinou knew Tsafendas for about thirty-five years. He met him first in 1963 in Lourenço Marques, he visited him in Pretoria Prison in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, and he continued seeing him in Pretoria Prison hospital and the Sterkfontein hospital in the 1990s until Tsafendas died. We have just seen what he said about the tapeworm story based on what he was told by Tsafendas. Father Minas was another who laughed when he read Tsafendas’s words to his defence team. He told the author:

“Ha, ha, he told me what he did, but not in such detail. Fascinating! Even, if he had not told me that he had deliberately played the fool, I wouldn’t have believed that these were

³⁵⁷⁰ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

³⁵⁷¹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013

his words. Impossible! Even at the beginning, when I asked him why he did it and he pointed with his finger to his stomach, he did not say all these things. He didn't talk like this even then and he never told me anything like this, his speech was perfect. Even when he told me about the tapeworm, I was not sure that he was mad because everything else he was saying and the way he spoke did not suggest that he was mad ... later, when he told me that everything about the tapeworm was a lie, it all made sense."³⁵⁷²

Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis arrived in South Africa in 1993. He had heard a lot about Tsafendas from Rika Nikolatos and Father Minas Constandinou and was eager to meet him. He was very surprised that both considered Tsafendas to be perfectly sane when officially he was insane, even more that Minas considered him to be a hero of the anti-apartheid struggle, although he had killed a man. One day in 1994, Father Minas took Ioannis to the Pretoria Prison hospital and he met Tsafendas for the first time. The two priests visited him together once again a few weeks later, and Ioannis visited Tsafendas a third and last time, accompanied by Father Spiros, in Sterkfontein hospital at Christmas 1998.³⁵⁷³

Tsafendas eventually confided the truth about the tapeworm to Bishop Ioannis, but the priest said that even if he had not done so, he could have easily told that the words read to him by the author could not have naturally been spoken by Tsafendas under normal conditions. Bishop Ioannis told the author: "He never spoke like this. He never said anything like this; not only about the tapeworm, but generally he never said anything that would make me think 'this man is not mentally well.' He talked beautifully. I am certain that he deliberately talked like this to his lawyers and to the doctors."³⁵⁷⁴

Father Michalis Visvinis visited Tsafendas very regularly for five years in prison (1989-1994) and got to know him very well. They spent hours talking. He told the author:

"I felt that he [Tsafendas] needed to speak, so several times I would just let him speak. He enjoyed speaking and he could speak for hours. I also often asked him questions about his life, and his answers were always logical and what one would expect. He never evaded any question and I never had to repeat myself to him for a second time, nor was his answer ever off the subject. He never spoke to me this way [the way he did with the defence]. His speech was always absolutely fine. He always spoke like a normal man. [His speech] was

³⁵⁷² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

³⁵⁷³ Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

³⁵⁷⁴ Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

not disjointed or anything else. It was perfectly articulate and logical, always very coherent. He never said anything to suggest he had a mental problem or that he had any difficulty speaking or thinking and expressing himself properly. I really can't imagine him talking like this [the way Tsafendas did with his lawyers and those who examined him]. I find it hard to believe that he spoke like this."³⁵⁷⁵

Katerina Pnema, Tsafendas's younger half-sister, remained forever extremely angry with Tsafendas, believing that he ruined her life. She strongly condemned his murder of Dr. Verwoerd. In 1994, efforts were made under the first democratically elected government in South Africa to grant Tsafendas amnesty. He was aged seventy-six at the time and unable to care for himself. Judge Jody Kollapen, and subsequently governmental officials, asked Tsafendas's family to take him into their home and care for him. They refused and Tsafendas spent the remaining years of his life in Sterkfontein Hospital.³⁵⁷⁶ Despite her anger towards her half-brother, Katerina Pnema considers "it's impossible" for Dimitri to have spoken as his defence team described. "He would never have said anything like this ... what you read to me, it's nonsense; he never spoke like this and I don't believe he ever said those words ... I don't believe he even said it deliberately to play the fool. He was certainly capable of doing it [pretending to be mad], but to say all this nonsense? No, I don't believe it. Dimitri never spoke like this..."³⁵⁷⁷

Alexander Moumbaris met Tsafendas in late 1972 at Pretoria Maximum Security Prison while awaiting trial on political charges. He was found guilty of "conspiring with the ANC to instigate violent revolution in South Africa, aiding terrorists, distributing ANC pamphlets in Durban in 1968, and reconnoitring the Transkei to find places for seaborne landings."³⁵⁷⁸ Moumbaris spoke to Tsafendas for at least one hour every day for about three months. Initially, Tsafendas was cautious and although very talkative, it was obvious to Moumbaris that he did not trust him. However, as time passed, Tsafendas began opening up. One day, Tsafendas told him proudly in Greek about Verwoerd: "I got τον Ντσή τους" ("their tough guy" or "their champion," but in a pejorative sense). Moumbaris told the author that Tsafendas never mentioned a tapeworm to him or said anything to suggest he was insane; all the conversations they had were perfectly normal and he found Tsafendas to be "a very

³⁵⁷⁵ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

³⁵⁷⁶ Memorandum of Jody Kollapen of Lawyers for Human Rights, 24 November 1994. Tsafendas's file in the Lawyers for Human Rights collection (AL3183). SAHA.

³⁵⁷⁷ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁵⁷⁸ South African History Online. Alexander Moumbaris, n.d.

intelligent, witty, serious and knowledgeable person.” Tsafendas even asked him to teach him Algebra, but the lesson was short-lived as the warders forbade it. Moumbaris is certain that Tsafendas acted the fool in order to not be hanged. Moumbaris told the author: “I not only regard Dimitri Tsafendas as a sane man but also as the bravest and ill-treated man I have ever met.”³⁵⁷⁹

Andreas Babiolakis lived with Tsafendas for two-three months in 1964 in Beira and had grown up with him in Lourenço Marques. He strongly denies that Tsafendas could have spoken like this or believing to have a tapeworm. He does not recognise the babbling, broken phrases which Tsafendas used to his lawyers and the psychiatrists and is convinced that he made those up, too. Babiolakis heard in Beira in 1964 that Tsafendas had claimed to be Saint Peter while he was in police custody. When he later asked Tsafendas about it, Tsafendas seemed embarrassed and said that he had a nervous breakdown but was now ok. Babiolakis believed then that Tsafendas had made up the Saint Peter act and later believed the same about the tapeworm.³⁵⁸⁰

Of his language to his defence, Babiolakis told the author:

“I never heard Dimitri talking like this; this is someone else talking. He couldn’t have said these things unless he did it deliberately, which is what I think he did. Dimitri’s speech was very good and clear, whether it was in Greek, in English or in Portuguese. I’ve never heard him talking like this and I can’t believe he ever did. We were flatmates for three-four months; he was not talking like this and I never, ever thought even for a second that there could be something wrong with him. Never and not just me, all of us. I was not surprised when I heard about the tapeworm, because I knew he had lied before when he was arrested by the Portuguese and he told them he was the apostle Peter or the apostle Paul.”³⁵⁸¹

John Michaletos, Tsafendas’s cousin and the son of Artemis, Tsafendas’s aunt who brought him up in Egypt, met Tsafendas in 1951 and got to know him well between 1963 and 1965. During those years, Tsafendas spent a lot of time in John’s house and slept there on several occasions. Michaletos never heard him talking about the tapeworm or anything else that might suggest he was insane. He finds it hard to believe that Tsafendas spoke this way to

³⁵⁷⁹ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

³⁵⁸⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

³⁵⁸¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

his lawyers. He is absolutely certain that Tsafendas was perfectly sane. “I have no doubt about it, I never had,” he told the author. Michaletos added to the author:

“Dimitris never spoke like this. This is gibberish, I can’t imagine him talking like this. He always spoke clearly and made sense. We talked many times and for very long. He was an excellent story-teller. He could talk about so many things; he was very knowledgeable. We all enjoyed his company because of the way he talked. You could not have been bored talking to him. Never, not even once, he said anything that did not make sense or there was the slightest suspicion that there was something wrong with him. We all considered him to be very intelligent. When we heard about the tapeworm, we all fell off the clouds [a Greek adage, meaning we were completely taken by surprise], but we did not believe that he really thought he had one; we all knew he had made it up and the fact that he was talking like this to the doctors and lawyers confirmed it; he never spoke like this before.”

Irene Michaletos, John’s wife, knew Tsafendas for more than a year in 1964 and 1965 and he often visited and stayed at her house in Beira. They had several long conversations and she never experienced any problems conversing with him; on the contrary, she found Tsafendas to be an excellent and interesting conversationalist. She told the author:

“It is certainly false that he was unable to follow a conversation or that anyone had any difficulty talking to him. As a matter of fact, it was the exact opposite. I found the conversations with him very easy and interesting, too. He was a great storyteller. I had many long conversations with him. He was from the kind of people who have something to tell you, that you could sit and listen to them for hours. And I did that, I very much enjoyed talking and listening to him. He was not boring, he could talk to you about religion, politics and history, his travels and adventures around the world. But he did not show off when talking; he was a humble man, he never tried to show off, like that he had travelled in so many countries or that he was very knowledgeable. He was very modest and very down to earth, a serious man.”³⁵⁸²

Antony Michaletos, John’s brother and Artemis’s son, was also present when Tsafendas stayed in their house. He always considered him to be a “very clever and very logical person,” and he never doubted his sanity when he read in the newspaper about the tapeworm. He never believed that Tsafendas really thought he had a tapeworm and concluded

³⁵⁸² Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

immediately that his cousin had made it up “to save himself.” Michaletos also told the author about the tapeworm:

“What a hell of an invention, isn’t it! How he thought that up I don’t know. It was Antony [his brother] who first told me [that Tsafendas had spoken to his defence team about a tapeworm] and I did not believe him. I thought John was making it up, I knew Dimitris would have never said that. He insisted, but I still did not believe him. I honestly thought he was joking. I only believed it later that day when he showed me the newspapers. I burst into laughs when I read it. I remember me reading aloud from the newspaper what he had allegedly told the doctors and everyone laughing about it [his brother, his sister-in-law and his parents]. My mother got a real kick out of it; she really enjoyed hearing it. In our house, after we read the first day [of court proceedings] we couldn’t wait for the next one to see what else will be said, and again, we will sit around the table all together and I will read out loud. I remember there was also an old woman who lived next door to our house, she lived by herself, and she knew Dimitri since he was a little child. She could not read and she would ask me to read every single thing that the newspaper was writing about Dimitri. She even understood that he was making it up, but found it very amusing to hear all about it. I remember that when I was reading something that sounded very strange to her, especially about the tapeworm, she would ask me ‘Dimitri said that?’ and then she would cross herself in disbelief. He [Tsafendas] made it up to save his skin, no doubt about that. I knew it, I had no doubt about it, I did not even think about it for a second, it was impossible to believe such a thing, impossible.”³⁵⁸³

All the above witnesses are willing to swear under oath in any court that Tsafendas did not talk in the manner attributed to him and that he would never have said any of things attributed to him unless he was pretending to be mad.

Further testimony to Tsafendas’s cleverness came from his half-sister, Eleni Vlachopoulos, who was closer to Tsafendas than any of his siblings. Eleni Vlachopoulos was born in 1936 and thus spent only her first five years in the Tsafendas family situation, but Tsafendas maintained touch with her thereafter through letters and postcards and he spent nine months in 1963-1964 as her neighbour in Pretoria. Vlachopoulos testified to the police in 1966 that Tsafendas never spoke to her or to anyone in the family about a tapeworm. She said exactly the same thing in 2007 in Manolis Dimelas’s documentary about Tsafendas, *Live*

³⁵⁸³ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016.

and Let Live, when she also claimed that her half-brother “was not crazy, he was very, very clever; cleverer than any of us and very able. If he wanted to do something, if he had a target, he would always achieve it.”³⁵⁸⁴

Apart from the witnesses mentioned above, the author read out Tsafendas’s reported words to another forty-seven people who had some kind of contact with him, and all declared he could not have spoken as claimed, or if he did, it was to mislead his interrogators. Further, they never heard him mention a tapeworm. Of this total, the author has not listed those who did not know Tsafendas well or who were very young at the time – Tsafendas’s nephews, for instance. The twenty-nine named here all knew Tsafendas for several months at least, while the *Eleni* seamen knew him for at forty-two days. Some of the crewmen were with Tsafendas for every one of those forty-two days. Brief accounts of the interviews with them follow.

1. Costas Chagios, a Cape Town café owner, got to know Tsafendas on a friendly basis in 1965 when he walked into his restaurant. In the year up to his arrest in 1966, Tsafendas visited the restaurant more than fifty times. Chagios does not believe “even for a moment” that Tsafendas said what is claimed to his defence team. “If he did, he was lying to save himself ... He was very intelligent and this was not the way he talked, he talked very nicely; excellent use of words.”³⁵⁸⁵
2. Irene Michaletos met Tsafendas in 1964 in Beira and associated with him until 1965. She never heard him saying anything about a tapeworm or anything else that might be seen as strange. She does not believe Tsafendas meant what he told his defence team. Tsafendas, she said, was perfectly sane and a “very, very clever man.”³⁵⁸⁶
3. Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott’s boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest. He never heard him say anything “ridiculous” such as what he said to his defence team and has no doubt Tsafendas was perfectly sane. “I remember how he talked and I cannot see these words coming from his mouth. He did not talk like that.”³⁵⁸⁷
4. Peter Protoulis was a supplier of foodstuffs to the tanker *Eleni*. He met Tsafendas on board and in the forty-two days that the vessel was docked in Cape Town, he never heard him say anything to suggest he was insane.³⁵⁸⁸

³⁵⁸⁴ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas’s *Live and Let Live*, 2007. This part is available in the rushes.

³⁵⁸⁵ Costas Hagios in a personal interview, 24 March 2015.

³⁵⁸⁶ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

³⁵⁸⁷ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

³⁵⁸⁸ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 28 May 2016.

5. Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for about six months in Istanbul. She doesn't remember everything they discussed, but she is certain Tsafendas was a "completely normal man ... he never mentioned this tapeworm." Her husband, Father Agathagos Vaporidis, was close to Tsafendas during the six months and Alexandra says he would have told her if he had noticed anything wrong with him.³⁵⁸⁹
6. Nick Papadakis became close to Tsafendas when the latter was in Beira and Gondola. They lived in the same accommodation for two months and worked together for one month at the Hume Pipe Company. He too had heard at the time that Tsafendas had claimed to be Saint Peter while he was in Portuguese custody. He and several other Greeks at the time who had discussed the issue were under the impression that Tsafendas had made it up, as they were with him every single day prior to his arrest and never said anything like this. Papadakis does not recognise Tsafendas's words to his Defence team and to the psychiatrists and he is positive that he was making it up.
7. Panagiotis Peroglou was another who met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965 and kept up with him until his arrest. He never heard Tsafendas say anything crazy and has no doubt that he was quite sane.³⁵⁹⁰
8. Pamela Abrahams met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965. He made a good impression on her due to his politeness and good manners and she never heard him say anything to indicate he might be insane.³⁵⁹¹
9. Stratis Vamvarapis met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott's boarding house. He never heard Tsafendas saying anything like the remarks attributed to him by his lawyers or anything else to suggest he was insane.³⁵⁹²
10. Cleanthes Alachiotis was a member of the crew of the *Eleni* and one of those who became closest to Tsafendas. Tsafendas told him about "pretending to be mad" in order not to not serve in the Portuguese army and Alachiotis believes that his reported speech in custody was another such act since he considered it "completely impossible" that Tsafendas spoke as claimed. "He was either joking or he had a specific reason to do it. Obviously, it was the second, since he wanted to save his head. If the police had asked me to testify in court, I would have sworn that he was making it up. He was nothing like this, but I am not

³⁵⁸⁹ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

³⁵⁹⁰ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

³⁵⁹¹ Pamela Abrahams in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

³⁵⁹² Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

surprised he did it since he had done it before.”³⁵⁹³

11. Nikolas Billis, *Eleni* crewman. He was with Tsafendas every day for the 42 days the tanker was in Cape Town. He is not surprised by Tsafendas’s words to his defence as he has no doubt that he made up the tapeworm story so as not to be hanged. Tsafendas had told him how he pretended to be mad to avoid service in the Portuguese Army. “No doubt he did it again. If you met him, you could tell that this man’s brain was a level above the rest. He could easily manipulate you and convince you of anything. I am not at all surprised that he told this to the police. He definitely made it up. He did not talk like this. He talked very well, like a teacher.”³⁵⁹⁴
12. Nikolas Kambouris, *Eleni* seaman, who was with Tsafendas every day for the 42 days the tanker was in Cape Town and became a very close friend. “I would bet my house that Dimitri did not say these things ... well, if he did, he must have had a reason and he did not really mean them. I am positive about it. These are the words of a madman and Dimitri was an intelligent and cultured man ... he must have been pretending with them as he did with the Portuguese. He was saner than a lot of people I knew ... I don’t believe that he told these people these things. He was a serious man; he was not talking like this. I was with him for forty-two days and he never said anything stupid like these things.” Kambouris states that Tsafendas “did not talk rubbish; he was an idealist; a man with high principles...”³⁵⁹⁵
13. Michalis Vasilakis, *Eleni* seaman, became friendlier with Tsafendas than any of the crew. This was his reaction when I read to him what Tsafendas told his defence:
“A tapeworm? Did Dimitri say that? Are you sure? He couldn’t have said that. A tapeworm? It’s unbelievable. Dimitri was a very clever man; he was not talking nonsense. He knew as much as all of us knew and he was talking better than a professor. I was the one who first called him ‘Professor.’ I have no doubt that if he really said these things to the police he must have done it to save himself. He couldn’t possibly have believed them and I am telling you he did not believe them. He would have told me if there was such thing. He told me a lot about his life and I can tell you this man was one of the smartest people I have ever met. You could see some rare dignity and pride in him. You could see from the way he was talking about politics and the world how politically passionate he

³⁵⁹³ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010.

³⁵⁹⁴ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

³⁵⁹⁵ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

was. You don't meet men like that every day. I don't think that anyone who met him would tell you that he was crazy. This is complete nonsense."³⁵⁹⁶

14. Georgios Kantas, *Eleni* seaman, who spent some time with Tsafendas almost every day during the vessel's stay. Like Billis and Alachiotis, he is not surprised that Tsafendas spoke about a tapeworm, although he never mentioned any such thing to him. However, Tsafendas told him about his act with the Portuguese in order to not serve in the Portuguese army and Kantas firmly believes that this was just another mad act:

"He never spoke in this way and I can't imagine him talking like this, though I believe he did it as he was capable of doing it. You could tell that this man was very able. He did not talk this way. I can't explain it, but I remember that he had a very specific way of talking, using not very common, but absolutely correct words. He was talking like a professor. That is what we used to say and what he called him."³⁵⁹⁷

15. Grigoris Pouftis, *Eleni* seaman, agrees with his crewmates that Tsafendas was putting on another 'mad' act as he did with the Portuguese:

"He was certainly not crazy. He was a little peculiar because of the way he was talking. I mean he was sometimes over polite and it seemed to me that his personality did not fit with his job. We met hawkers all around the world and none was ever like him ... I would describe him as an aristocratic hawker, if such a thing exists! I couldn't believe that a man with his manners and knowledge could be doing this job. That was the only peculiar thing about him."³⁵⁹⁸

16. Manolis Mastromanolis, the *Eleni* boatswain who was involved in procuring a firearm for Tsafendas, spent a lot of time with Tsafendas and never heard him speak in the way he did to his defence team. Mastromanolis does not believe that Tsafendas could have said such things. "He did not talk like that; definitely not," he told the author.³⁵⁹⁹

17. Emanuel Tsabouniaris, *Eleni* seaman who also spent a lot of time with Tsafendas. He considered Tsafendas to be "a gentleman and a very sophisticated man." Like Pouftis, he found it strange that Tsafendas, "such an educated and well-mannered man, could do such job." However, this was the only thing he found strange about him. He believes Tsafendas couldn't possibly talk as he did and mean what he said unless he did it

³⁵⁹⁶ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

³⁵⁹⁷ Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012.

³⁵⁹⁸ Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009.

³⁵⁹⁹ Emanuel Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

- deliberately to get something out of it.³⁶⁰⁰
18. Ioannis Speis, *Eleni* seaman: Tsafendas never said anything to him that bears the slightest resemblance to what he told his defence.³⁶⁰¹
 19. Vasilios Perselis, *Eleni* seaman and a very good friend of Tsafendas. He never heard Tsafendas say anything like his statement and has no doubt that he did so to escape hanging. “He spoke very nicely; not nonsense like that. He knew how to speak and everything he said made sense. He was not crazy.”³⁶⁰²
 20. Dionisis Lallis, *Eleni* seaman. He did not associate with Tsafendas as much as some of the other crew members, but he spoke to him several times and never got the slightest impression of insanity.³⁶⁰³
 21. Panteleimon Aspiotis, *Eleni* seaman. A good friend of Tsafendas, also never thought that he could be insane and could not imagine him saying the nonsense he told his defence.³⁶⁰⁴
 22. Miltiades Kaldis met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965 and kept in touch until his arrest. He never heard Tsafendas say anything close to what he told his defence.³⁶⁰⁵
 23. Antonis Nichas, a supplier to the *Eleni*, met Tsafendas in 1966. He never heard him say anything to suggest he was insane or anything similar to what he told the police.³⁶⁰⁶
 24. George Ananiades met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and described him to his statement to the police “as a normal person with a very high-intelligence.”³⁶⁰⁷ He added in a personal interview with the author that “Tsafendas seemed like a very lucid man. He was definitely not insane.” Upon reading to him the Tsafendas’s comments to his defence team and the psychiatrists, he expressed his complete surprise and cannot believe that Tsafendas might have said such things.³⁶⁰⁸
 25. George Liberopoulos met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and associated with him for a few weeks. He described him to his statement to the police “as a normal person with a very high-intelligence.”³⁶⁰⁹ He added in a personal interview with the author that it

³⁶⁰⁰ Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015.

³⁶⁰¹ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015.

³⁶⁰² Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015.

³⁶⁰³ Dionisis Lallis in a personal interview, 19 June 2015.

³⁶⁰⁴ Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015.

³⁶⁰⁵ Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016.

³⁶⁰⁶ Antonis Nichas in a personal interview, 31 March 2016.

³⁶⁰⁷ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

³⁶⁰⁸ George Ananiades in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

³⁶⁰⁹ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

“never crossed” his mind that Tsafendas “might be a schizophrenic.”³⁶¹⁰

26. Nick Augustides is the son of the owner of Mike’s Outfitters in Cape Town for whom Tsafendas worked on commission. He knew Tsafendas for three-four months and never heard him say anything to suggest he was insane. He told the author that Tsafendas “definitely did not look or sound insane.”³⁶¹¹

27. Marina Tsihlakis. She met Tsafendas in Beira in 1964. Her father was good friend of Tsafendas. She never heard him speak in the way his defence statement conveyed.³⁶¹²

28. Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis met Tsafendas in Germany at different times in the 1950s and never heard him saying anything that would indicate that he might not be sane. He also visited him in the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital. Although Tsafendas was admitted supposedly because of the tapeworm, he did not tell Father Efthimios anything about it. The priest does not remember what Tsafendas told him was the reason for his hospitalization, but he is certain that he did not mention the tapeworm.³⁶¹³

29. Dimitris Skoularikis met Tsafendas in prison in the early 1990s. He never got the impression that Tsafendas was insane. One day he asked him, “How is the tapeworm Dimitri?” Tsafendas replied, “I don’t have one; they [the prison guards] think I have one.”³⁶¹⁴

The author includes here three witnesses who did not meet Tsafendas personally but were close to people who did. The author considers the statements they were told, though second hand, to be entirely reliable.

1. Advocate George Bizos. His mother-in-law was the best friend of Tsafendas’s step-mother and knew Tsafendas very well from childhood. She told Bizos that he was perfectly sane.³⁶¹⁵
2. Dr. Costas Gazidis’s³⁶¹⁶ first cousin Rika Nikolatos was a social worker and visited Tsafendas in prison and then in Sterkfontein Hospital. In total, she spent some ten years

³⁶¹⁰ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

³⁶¹¹ Nikos Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

³⁶¹² Marina Tsihlakis in a personal interview, 3 April 2015.

³⁶¹³ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

³⁶¹⁴ Dimitris Skoularikis in a personal interview, 26 April 2015.

³⁶¹⁵ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

³⁶¹⁶ A prominent anti-apartheid activist, member of the Communist Party of South Africa, the Pan Africanist Congress, and of the South African Congress of Democrats (COD). He was arrested in 1964 and spent the next two years in prison. He was released in 1966, only to be banished shortly afterwards for two years (Makgale *IOL*) 13 November 1999, ‘The white doctor in the PAC.’ Retrieved from <https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/the-white-doctor-in-the-pac-19558>). ??? move up

meeting Tsafendas and they were extremely close. She told Dr. Gazidis, “He is completely sane, there is nothing wrong with him.” Tsafendas never said anything to her to suggest he might be insane and she always maintained that he was “completely sane.” Dr. Gazidis is willing to sign an affidavit and swear under oath that this is exactly what he was told by Nikolatos.³⁶¹⁷ Nikolatos’s statement is also confirmed by Father Minas Constandinou and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis. She had discussed his case extensively with them both and she and Father Minas had often visited Tsafendas together.³⁶¹⁸

3. Janet Gazidis, Costas’ wife is also willing to sign an affidavit and swear under oath that this is exactly what Nikolatos, too, was told.³⁶¹⁹

Finally, valuable testimony comes in the form of Tsafendas’s medical report from Grafton State Hospital, which states that while in the United States in 1943 “he faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings (sinkings) of ships.”³⁶²⁰

How convincing was Tsafendas’s play-acting and was he capable of putting on an authentic display of insanity? All evidence says he was, including Judge Jacques Theodore van Wyk of the Commission of Enquiry. In his final report, the judge said that Tsafendas is “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders—he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him... and therefore adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act...”³⁶²¹

Finally, Tsafendas’s file at the Prison Service, File: A5078, described him as, “A person of Colour, an extremely resourceful and cunning individual who is physically and mentally able to plan and execute escape.”³⁶²²

³⁶¹⁷ Dr. Costa Gazidis in a personal interview, 10 April 2015.

³⁶¹⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

³⁶¹⁹ Janet Gazidis in a personal interview, 10 April 2015.

³⁶²⁰ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

³⁶²¹ Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³⁶²² Marais, 1992: 208.

STATEMENTS

ALFRED EDWARD GRAY³⁶²³

K/S/Sergeant in the S.A. Police stationed at Epping and serve under the command of the District Investigation Officer, Athlone.

During November 1965 to March 1966 I often went to friends of mine in Roy Road, Lansdowne. I then also always went to a Muslim store in Delhi Road, Lansdowne. I kept the owner, Parker, company. During these times I found a male with a Jewish appearance in the store about three or four times. The man always bought foodstuffs. I have never seen the man previously. Parker did not tell me that he knew him. On one of those occasions, I stood outside the store when the man came to me. He was alone. He asked me what he should do to procure a Coloured person identity card because he had a white person identity card. I referred him to the Department of Coloured Affairs. He was pleased and walked off.

About 3 to 4 weeks after that I encountered the man in Yorke Road, Lansdowne. He was alone and so was I. He told me that he was unhappy because he was unsuccessful at the Department of Coloured Affairs. He continued and also said that he does not like the police, but that I will be shocked when I saw what he was going to do to one of our big chiefs. I said nothing back to him. I did not take him seriously as many Coloureds had such an attitude. He then walked off. I was aware that he was boarding at a Coloured teacher, O’Ryan, in Westminster Street, Lansdowne. I’ve seen the man go in to the mentioned address.

The man always spoke to me in English. On Thursday, 15/09/1966, I saw the picture of Tsafendas in the Herald as well as the house where he lived. I immediately recognised the man as the man I met in Lansdowne. I am not mistaken about identifying him. On 24/09/1966 I reported the matter to Captain van Niekerk, Athlone.

(SGD) G.A.G van Zyl. NR. 34069 S/A/O.

³⁶²³ Alfred Edward Gray statement to the police, 26 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

SAREL JOHANNES VENTER³⁶²⁴

A major in the South African Police Force attached to the staff of the Divisional Commissioner, SA Police in Cape Town.

Major Venter was the officer in charge of police services at the Parliament Building. He described in his statement the disposition of officers and the extent of their authority. He said the police were not informed of new staff appointments, had no control over messengers and that he did not know of the employment of Tsafendas. Had he done so, he would have had him investigated because of his name and the fact that he was a stranger. Nothing else about Tsafendas or the assassination is mentioned in his statement.

³⁶²⁴ Sarel Johannes Venter statement to the police, 26 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: verklaring deur Majoor S.J. Venter, NASA.

TUESDAY, 27 SEPTEMBER 1966

STATEMENTS

ELIZABETH MAGDALENA GROVES³⁶²⁵

Owner of a boarding house for elderly people in Observatory, Cape Town.

Demitrio Tsafendas stayed at my lodgings for about 6-7 weeks from about April to May 1966. He had two roommates, one a Mr. Fisher who disappeared, and the other a young traffic cop, Jacobus Bornman from the Cape Traffic Department. D. Tsafendas was a very good eater. He mastered many languages and behaved properly. Besides his rough table manners, I have nothing against him. He was completely normal. I was a nurse and worked in lunatic institutions. He was a normal person to the best of my knowledge. I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners. For the sake of my other tenants, I asked him to leave my place. He was referred to me by Mrs. Beeslaar, a social worker from Grootte Schuur Hospital. When he left me, I knew he went to another part of Observatory and later at Woodstock, but I never got his address.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

REGINALD ROBERT MAILE³⁶²⁶

Shipguard for Larpente Agency, Cape Town.

On 24th July 1966 the Greek ship ELENI docked at the mole in Cape Town Docks. I was informed that the ship was in for repairs due to having lost its rudder. I did the day-shift guard duty to this ship (7 a.m. to 7 p.m.) for the period it remained in harbour, i.e. for 42 days.

³⁶²⁵ Elizabeth Magdalena Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶²⁶ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

When I saw the photographs of Dr. Verwoerd's assassinator in the local papers, I realised that I knew the man. He was a regular visitor to the ship, and I knew his face quite well, and have also spoken to his, though I have not been introduced to him. During the ships stay the accused came on board approximately every day. He had the captain's permission to come aboard. This ship was not under police protection as it was not discharging or tokening on cargo. I had my meals on the boat in the general crew messroom. I had my own table. The accused also had his meals on this ship. He was easting with the crew, at their table.

The crew of the Eleni were approximately 100% Greek, The accused could speak their language very fluently. I of course could not follow their conversations. On one occasion the accused requested me to call on him if I wanted to tell the crew anything - as they could not understand English and he could then interpret. On the first occasion I asked him to tell the crew that there was a circus in Town, which would be worthwhile to see. On another occasion he asked me if there was a telephone on board. On one occasion he wanted to know if the second engineer was on board - he said this man owed him some money. This happened about 5 days before the ship left. The ship left on Saturday night the 3rd of September 1966.

The accused was on very friendly relations with the crew. It struck me though as very peculiar that on the day when he called for the second engineer, the bosun told me that the accused was mad, I should not let him onto the ship. I got the definite impression that there was some ill feeling from the bosun towards the accused. The bosun was usually eating at my table (also the ships carpenter). I cannot remember that the bosun had contact with the accused in my presence. Apart from my meals, I kept to my office which was on the ship at the telephone. The time when the accused used the phone, I went outside. I never listen to other people's phone conversations. The accused never had personal discussions with me. The times I saw him with the crew, and also when he spoke to me, I never got the impression that he could be mentally defective. He was sober, polite and perfectly normal.

On 3rd of September, 1966, when the ship left, I was on duty. It was about 5 p.m. – 5.30 p.m. The accused came to see the ship off. He joined two Greek women and a gentleman who were also waiting for the ship to depart. These people were also frequent visitors to the ship. I got the impression that they were husband, wife and daughter. I have an idea that one of the crew members was their nephew. They have also visited the captain's office, but mostly spent their time with the crew - also had meals with the crew.

When the gangway was already up I recollected that they were also at the ship in the morning when I arrived. At that time in the morning, the ship was shifted from the top of Jackson Wall to the bottom. The gangway was lifted before my arrival. The three Greeks were waiting, and we all moved down slowly with the ship. I had a Cape Times under my arm. The older woman asked me if "DR. VERWOERD WAS DEAD." I opened the Times quite surprised, and said there was nothing like that in the paper.

Witness: (1) J. Oliver. D/H/CONST. (Railways).

(2) D.J.V. Troost. 23505 D/Sergt.

MARIA KOKKINIDOU³⁶²⁷

Visitor of the Eleni. Sea Point. 12. p.m.

I know the captain of the Greek ship Eleni. He is Michaelos Fondudos,³⁶²⁸ who is from Kilimnos, Greece, my place of birth. When I arrived in Cape Town (from Pretoria³⁶²⁹) on about the 26th of July, 1966, I heard that the Eleni had been docked about 3 days earlier. I went to the boat with a lady Mrs. Vyanos, and upon arrival at the ship, was introduced to the captain. I however recognized him as an old acquaintance - though he did not recognize me. I brought my son and daughter with me to Cape Town. My son was out of work trying to find a job in Cape Town. He also visited the ship where he met a young friend (old school mate) of his from Greece. This friend asked him why he did not join the merchant navy. As result I had a chat with the captain and my son was signed on as a crew member on 1st August, 1966.

During the delay of the ship in Table Bay, I went to the ship every day. I had my meals with the crew upon their invitation - this being a friendly Greek Custom. I went there with my daughter, and a male friend Mr. Nicolaou Christodoulos³⁶³⁰. During my visits to the boat, I got to know that two persons who were not members of the crew, were also having meals there. One was a watchman who had his meals at regular mealtimes, twice daily,

³⁶²⁷ Maria Kokkinidou statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

³⁶²⁸ The correct spelling is Michalis Fountotos.

³⁶²⁹ Note of the author

³⁶³⁰ Christodoulos is the first name, Nicolaou is the surname.

lunchtime and suppertime. The other man came at odd times. He was a tall man with a beard. He looked a real tough customer and had fair hair. I got to understand that he was from another ship docked nearby. I have seen photo's in the local newspapers allegedly of the man Tsafendas. I do not recognize having seen him on the ship.

On the 3rd of September 1966 when the ship was due to leave, I went to the ship again in the morning about 8.30 a.m. That time the ship was to be moved from its moorings to another anchor place. I was on the ship with Mr. Christodoulos, before it was moved. We did not know that the ship was going to be moved. We left about 10 a.m. to fetch my daughter. The ship was still not moved. The three of us went onto the boat upon our return. After lunch it was cold and Mr. Christodoulos left to fetch coats for myself and my daughter. Whilst he was gone, the boat moved with me and the daughter on board. Mr. Christodoulos walked along till the ship docked again. He came aboard and all three of us remained on board till 4.30 p.m. before the ship finally moved off. Then we waved goodbye to my son. That time we were joined by a Mr. Nichas (i.e. the man from Vacuum Dry Cleaners, Sea Point). A lot of other people were around but only the four of us were together.

In the morning when I arrived at the boat, the drawbridge was pulled up. I stood with Mr. Christodoulos on the ground. There were a lot of people waiting for the bridge to come down. The same time the ship's crane was defective and people were trying to repair it, and there were more than one person in uniform. There was one man near us with a newspaper. My son Costa and another man wearing a blue uniform were on the ship. My son called down to me "Did you hear the news - Dr. Verwoerd is dead." I asked who said so? He pointed to the man next to him, saying that this man said that the man with the newspaper had told him so - pointing down to the man next to us. I asked this man for the newspaper. He said there was nothing. (I have asked him if Dr. Verwoerd was dead). He laughed and said the man upstairs had understood him wrong. I recognized the man who was the watchman on the ship, as one man eating upstairs, but I cannot say he was the same man as the person with the newspaper. He might have been the same person, but I am not sure.

I am also not sure who had started the rumour about Dr. Verwoerd being dead. The man standing with my son upstairs, was not a Greek. He was in a blue uniform. Apart from them, there were about 5 other workmen in overalls. These were joined and mingling with other people filling the boat with fuel. In general, there were quite a few people walked about upstairs. I deny that I have on my own account said anything about Dr. Verwoerd being

dead. I spoke Greek to my son. I asked for the newspaper trying to speak English. I can understand English, but have difficulty to speak it. Three days after this Dr. Verwoerd was in fact murdered. I got to know this through newspapers. I did not even refer to the incident at the boat, as I have completely brushed this aside as nonsense. I never gave the incident a second thought.

Above statement taken by me. Translated from Greek to English by Mr. Elias Constantoras³⁶³¹ of Louis fruiterers, Sea Point.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

JAMES SUMMERS³⁶³²

Owner of the "Barlings Tea Lounge." Woodstock. 6.55 p.m.

About the beginning of July, 1966, I got to know Demitrio Tsafendas. He came into the Tea Lounge and had tea and smoked snoek. After that he came in more regularly - practically every day. He started telling me about his travels, mentioning that he had been to 57 different countries and could speak 7 or 8 languages. He never had personal or political conversations. Ha once showed me two passports - one Portuguese and one Turkish. On the latter passport he had s beard.

He frequented the place for about 6 weeks. On the last regular occasion he came in about 6 p.m. He ordered tea and cake which I served. I told him I was closing and had to leave in half hr's time, as I was going out. Ha said it was all right, but was reluctant to leave. He was doing his latter writing at the table. I had to push him out eventually. It was his habit to do his correspondence at the table in my tea lounge. I did not really mind. He was no nuisance and appeared to be a quite normal innocent type.

Whilst I know him, I never had reason to even suspect that he could be mentally

³⁶³¹ The correct spelling is Constantaras.

³⁶³² Herbert James Summers statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

unbalanced. He acted quite normal. After the night I had to ask him to leave, he stayed away for two weeks. The Sunday morning before the assassination, at about 10.30 a.m. he walked into my Tea Lounge. He then asked as if I was cross with him and if he could have a cup of tea and cake. Next I heard of him was through the reports in the newspapers. When he visited me, he always had his Bible with him. I took him for a religious parson and never queried him about the bible.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

COMMENTS ON SUMMERS'S STATEMENT

Summers was interviewed on September 7 by the *Cape Argus*, when he claimed that he had ordered Tsafendas out of his shop because he called South Africa a "bastard country."³⁶³³ However, as we see here, he did not mention any such incident to the police.

ALICE MARY THEYSER³⁶³⁴

Housewife and shop-assistant at the O.K. Bazaars, Woodstock. 7.35 p.m.

On the first of July, 1966, Demitrio Tsafendas came to my house. He said that Mrs. De Vos had told him that I had a room to let. I have previously advertised the room, I knew Mrs de Vos as a member of our Trade Union. I let the room to Tsafendas, not supplying him any meals. After a very short period I found him to be an untidy character. I decided that I would not keep him so at the end of July I told him that I was not satisfied with him as a lodger, and gave him notice in writing. He chucked the notice on the floor. He left on the 30th of August 1966. During his stay with us he was very quiet, and being a lodge only, we did not have much conversations. He kept to his room most of the time. I knew that he went to some church on Sundays - he mentioned Pinelands. He said his faith did not have any church or temple, but that they attend house gatherings. I did not question him on his faith, though.

³⁶³³ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966, 'Tsafendas seen as a bitter, withdrawn man.'

³⁶³⁴ Alice Mary Theyser statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

I never got the impression in any way that he might be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared a quite normal person. He did not greet for the last two weeks that he lived here, but I took it to be, that he was annoyed because I had given him notice. He never received visitors. When he came to me he was not working. He went out every day and mentioned not having been able to find work. He did mention later that he thought he would get fixed up with a job at Parliament House, where he had been supplied with some form to fill in for a messenger's Job. He later confided that he got the job. After he left ay place, I first saw the reports about him in the papers.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

WEDNESDAY, 28 SEPTEMBER 1966

STATEMENTS

REGINALD ROBERT MAILE³⁶³⁵

Shipguard for Larpen Agency, Cape Town.

Reginald Robert Maile further states:

I have now been shown a statement of one Maria Kokkinidou. It is obvious that she is the person to whom I have referred in my original statement.³⁶³⁶ I want to stress the following:

- (a) *She was already at the Eleni on the quay-side upon my arrival at 7 a.m.*
- (b) *The person referred by her as standing on the boat with her son, must have been the night watchman, because the drawbridge was drawn up - he could not get off the boat, same as I could not get up to take over from him.*
- (c) *She must have known Tsafendas, as she had frequent meals with him at the same table.*
- (d) *She originated the approach to me with the words "Is Dr. Verwoerd dead." Nobody had mentioned Dr. Verwoerd before that. I shouted up to the nightwatch asking if Dr. Verwoerd was dead. She spoke English to me and I am sure I did not misunderstand her.*
- (e) *I am also sure that when the boat was due to leave, Tsafendas was one of the people to see it off.*
- (f) *I know the following people who came off approximately the last, i.e. Old Mr. Faros, Captain Lamb who had to go to England by plane, the agent for supplies, a young man of whom I do not know the name, and also the agent for the ship working for J.T. Rennie. The latter is an elderly man who brought the wages for the crew and officers. I now emphatically remember that the nightwatch could not get off the ship for 2 hours - this time he wanted to claim later on as overtime from our office.*

³⁶³⁵ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

³⁶³⁶ This was the second statement by Maile, who had given a statement the day before, September 27.

(SGD.) R.R. MAILE.

Statement taken by me. (SGD.) D.J.V. TROOST. 23505 D/Sergt.

HULSE³⁶³⁷

Student at UCT – SRC member. Rondebosch.

Mr. Hulse knew Tsafendas met him while he was working Marine Diamond Corp during holiday December 1965-12th March ...³⁶³⁸ Tsafendas was a machine operator. As far as he can remember, Tsafendas was still working there when he left. Tsafendas was very talkative and always expressed his ... (indecipherable word). Mr Hulse can't remember him (?) keen on the Bible. After Tsafendas started work at Parliament, Mr Hulse met him there when visiting a MP. It was approximately two weeks before 6.9.66. He chatted with him on that occasion. He again saw him at the Houses of Parliament on Friday 2.9.66

Tsafendas informed him that he left MD as the work was too hard for an old man like him although the pay was "a ..." He did not appear to be ... disturbed at any stage. Mr Hulse got the impression that Tsafendas was a wanderer. He always ... about everything. He was surprised to see him working in Parliament. When he heard the news 6.9.66, Mr Hulse immediately ... about Tsafendas and asked the police whether the messenger concerned was a man with silver capped teeth. He made a statement to the police.

PETER PROTOULIS³⁶³⁹

E/M/A, manager of Hermes Ship Chandlers, Cape Town.

I know the Greek ship the Eleni since its breakdown and call at Cape Town harbour. A few days prior to the ship's arrival, as result of a message at my office, I went to the Grand

³⁶³⁷ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Hulse's first name is not given in this statement, but in Henk van Woerden's *A Mouthful of Glass* the name is given as John.

³⁶³⁸ These queries are missing because the edge of the document was not copied, so words are missing.

³⁶³⁹ Peter Protoulis statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

Hotel where I met Captain Lamb from Brays Shipping Co., London. He requested me to attend to the ship upon arrival for attending to their supplies. The ship arrived on Sunday, July 24, 1966. I went down with Mr. Nichas (a friend) and we met the Captain of the ship — Michaelos Fountotos (pronounced phonetic Fondontos). Since that day I have been in regular contact with the ship and often visited it - every day.

I got to be very well acquainted with the Captain and his wife as also the Chief Officer John N. Toutountsolou and his wife. They often went out with me and Nichas and we took them on picnics, to bioscope and on drives, suppers and dancing. We also dined on the ship and in fact had a few parties with them. I saw who is now known as Dr. Verwoerd's assassinator (Tsafendas) on the boat. The first time I saw him, was on the first Monday after the boat's arrival - i.e. the 25th July, 1966. I went down with my driver to the ship. I looked for the chief steward in process. I went into the ship's kitchen where I saw Tsafendas in conversation with the kitchen staff. They were all attentively listening to him. They were speaking Greek. When I entered he accosted me, asking who I am, also asking if I was from Faros (another ship chandler agency). I did not confirm but said "No I am the other fellow." He said "anyway it makes no difference to me, I am not prejudiced." By that time he spoke English to me. I left him in the kitchen, ignoring him.

Upon my subsequent visits I had no dealings with the crew and do not recollect seeing him until the day the ship sailed. Then I was there with my girl-friend, Nichas and his wife and children. Mrs, Nichas asked the Chief Officer's wife who that man was, indicating Tsafendas. The latter replied that he was a merchant of clothing of sorts. Later I was standing in the Captain's corridor where the latter was busy with the Port and Immigration officials, Tsafendas came to the small inter-leading passage to the Captain's office. He stood diagonally across from me impatient, as someone in a hurry to see the Captain. The Captain's door was open and he later shouted to the Captain - "I want to see you." I thought this very rude, but did not comment. I do not know what happened to him as the Captain later came over to talk to me.

Sometime later I saw Tsafendas talking to a man who I think was the ship's bosun. This man was tall, dark-haired and dark complexioned. I have previously seen him in the Chief Officer's quarters. I did not see him leave the ship. I left the ship at about something past three p.m. for the last time. All of my company left together though Mr. Niohas said that he would return to say good-bye. The next I saw Tsafendas's photos in the local newspapers.

I know the shipguard, an elderly short man, by sight. I have often spoken to him, but do not know his name.

I know that a Greek woman who had a son joining the ship, was also a visitor. I was present on the occasion when she first boarded the ship. She told the Captain in my presence that she was from his native origin: - mentioned the island Kalimnos. He stated that he couldn't recollect her, but she started mentioning names of his relatives which probably convinced him. On the day of the ship's departure she came to thank the Captain for certain courtesies he had done for her. There was also another young man on the ship whom this woman knew. I remember that she kissed him twice when greeting him. I saw her taking pictures of a baby from her bag, which she showed to us, and also to this young man. She was Mrs. Kokkinidou.

(SGD.) D.J.V. TROOST. 23505 D/Sergt

COMMENT OF PROTOULIS TO THE AUTHOR REGARDING HIS STATEMENT

Peter Protoulis remembers being questioned at his place of business by two or three policemen.³⁶⁴⁰

³⁶⁴⁰ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 28 May 2016.

FRIDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER 1966

STATEMENTS

DR. C. BEEN³⁶⁴¹

Pretoria.

This is to certify that Mr D. Tsafendas consulted me during 1963 or 1964 for burns on his body whilst employed at Poole's. I also examined him for permanent residence and a certificate was issued.

J. BOISKIM³⁶⁴²

Representative of a Tobacco Company. Cape Town.

Took cigarettes to ... (Indecipherable word) Building. Few days before the opening of Parliament. Nobody questioned me. Wrote down room numbers. Thought "this is funny." Started off with Prime Minister. Had no idea was so easy to get to Private Secretary. Surprised to note that there was no security measures.

JACOBUS JOHANNES DE KOKER³⁶⁴³

Assistant Master of the High Court in Pretoria.

De Koker's declaration talks about the estate and distribution of the personal effects of the deceased Michalis Tsafandakis who died on 14 February 1962. The only mention of Dimitri Tsafendas is on paragraph 10: "according to my records, neither Tsafendas nor

³⁶⁴¹ Dr. C. Been note to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁴² J. Borskim statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4. NASA.

³⁶⁴³ Jacobus Johannes De Koker statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

anyone else, except Marika Tsafandakis, received any amount or benefit from the above-mentioned estate.”

IAN JAMES MURDOCK BOSWELL³⁶⁴⁴

Administrative assistant at the Department of Labour, Cape Town.

I came to know Demetrio Tsafendas in my official capacity as employment officer for the unskilled European Male section of the above department. The abovenamed was originally registered with the skilled section of the department but as he could not produce a certificate of fitness or any documents or testimonials that could prove his claims of being a tradesman, he was transferred to the unskilled section and classified in the category for caretakers or supervisors.

Mr. Tsafendas shortly after produced a certificate to the effect that he had been treated for a nasal complaint at Groote Schuur Hospital. This was accepted as a certificate of fitness and an application for Unemployment Benefits taken by myself. As the applicant had already exhausted all his benefits in a previous claim, the above mentioned application was refused by the claims officer in terms of the relevant section of the Unemployment Act. On informing me that he was fit and willing to commence work as an operator-welder (unqualified welder), I contacted the Chrysler Motor Co., at Elsie's River and was told that they required such a person. I gave the applicant a card (Lab. 141) of introduction to the Chrysler Motor co.

Some days later Mr. Tsafendas returned to the office and informed as that he had not been accepted by the above- mentioned company. This was the last time I interviewed him as a Lab. 23 card issued to him was returned to the employment section by post, informing the office that he had obtain employment in the capacity of messenger in the House of Assembly. (Lab. 23 cards are issued to all persons registering for employment. They are requested to return these cards when obtained employment in order to record the number of unemployed persons obtained employment.)

³⁶⁴⁴ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

I did not and would not have sent him to the houses of Parliament, as the vacancies for messengers were always given to the better class of active pensioners. I can only remember this person through originally having difficulty both in spelling and pronouncing his surname. He was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being over talkative he showed no symptoms of abnormality, during his interviews with me.

MONDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1966³⁶⁴⁵

COLONEL E.G. MCINTYRE'S REPORT ON TSAFENDAS³⁶⁴⁶

THE HISTORY OF THE PERSON HAD INFLICTED THE FATAL WOUNDS TO THE LATE

DR. VERWOERD

DRAFTED BY COLONEL E.G. MCINTYRE:

1. *The following details of the person, Demetrio Tsafendas, was compiled after examining the following documents: -*
 - a) *A voluntary statement he made to major D.J. Rossouw of the Security Police, Cape Town, on 11 and 12 September 1966.*
 - b) *An examination of the same person by major Rossouw on 09/19/1966.*
 - c) *Statements of persons who came into contact with him.*
 - d) *Secret documents from reliable contacts in other countries.*
2. *Where the subject was vague or uncertain about certain dates, names and places, the dates, names and places were determined from documents in 1(c) and (d) above.*
3. *Where subject's version of his history and relevant events differed from the documents in 1(c) and (d) above - his as well as the witnesses or reports are set out from documents in 1(d).*
4. *All the data is, where possible, confirmed by statements or documentary evidence.*
5. *All the documents and statements are available for inspection, but some documents are of a secret nature and disclosure will not be in the public interest and will likely be an embarrassment to the Government of the Republic of South Africa as the documents are from official sources of other countries and are provided on condition that this fact is not publicly disclosed.*

LIFE HISTORY OF DEMETRIO TSAFENDAS:

³⁶⁴⁵ No evidence from October 1 and 2 were found in the archives.

³⁶⁴⁶ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA.

1. *Subject is known by the following names and surnames in different countries by different persons:*

Surname: Tsafendas alias Tsafendakis, Tsafantakis, Tsafendos, Tsafendis, Tsafantakis and Williams.

Names: Demetrio alias Dimitrio, Dimitro.

2. *He is born on 14.01.1918 in Lourenço Marques out of wedlock and is the child of:*

Father: Michaelatos alias Michael alias Miguel Tsafendakis or Tsafandakis, a Greek citizen to Candia, Crete, born in 1885.

Mother: Amelia William aka Amelia Williams, a colored woman, citizen of Portuguese East Africa region of Mozambique. Her birth date is not confirmed.

3. *Subject's father died in Pretoria on 14.02.1962.*
4. *His mother died in Lourenço Marques on 12.01.1927 according to him. He is in possession of a note on which his mother's first and last name is written and says that he had confirmed the date at the Registrar of Births and Deaths in Lourenço Marques.*
5. *He never knew his mother because when he was too young to remember, his father took him to Egypt where he lived until the age of about 8 years with his grandmother - his father's mother.*
6. *In the meantime, his father married Marika Sakelis, a Greek of Port Said, and during 1926 his father had him return home to Lourenço Marques to stay with him and his wife, as a member of the family.*
7. *Subject was then placed in an Anglican Missionary School, but according to him, he and his stepmother could not get along, and therefor his father sent him as a boarder to the English medium Primary school in Middelburg (Transvaal). He then went home twice a year with the school holidays.*
8. *According to him his father landed in financial difficulties during the depression years and could no longer afford to keep him in school in Middelburg. In 1930, when he was in standard three, he was sent back to the Anglican Missionary School in Lourenço Marques until 1933.*
9. *According to his stepmother, he then refused to continue school and he started work as an assistant in a shop. According to him he was doing evening classes at a Portuguese Missionary School and he passed st. V in English and st. IV in Portuguese in 1935.*

10. *In 1936 he went to the Transvaal alone where he worked in Pretoria and Johannesburg in various cafes. For some reason he never worked at a place for longer than two or three months.*
11. *In 1939, he ran evening classes at the “Progress College”, Johannesburg, where he only learned for three months to do welding and then got a job at the British Mining Supply Co. in Johannesburg.*
12. *He worked there until 1942 and then went to Cape Town... [The rest of the sentence is cut off the page.]*
13. *He was in possession of a Greek passport nr.27 dated 18.05.1942, issued by the Greek consulate in Johannesburg under the name of Demetrius Tsafantakis and valid for one year. He was also in possession of a Portuguese passport nr.143 dated 05.03.1942, also valid for one year.*
14. *When the ship arrived in Canada, he absconded and was detained by Canadian Immigration authorities. However, he escaped and entered the United States of America by walking across the ice of the St.Croixriver.*
15. *He went to Bangor, Maine, USA and was arrested in December 1942 for the breach of US Immigration Laws and was then detained.*
16. *During his detention, he showed symptoms of mental illness and was admitted into the Boston Psychopathic Hospital and from there transferred on 23.04.1943 to the Metropolitan State Hospital. Here his illness was described as “Psychoneurosis-mixed type”.*
17. *He was released from hospital on 14.08.1943 and placed on the American ship “Pillory”. He was also issued with American documents that allowed him to perform military service on the said ship.*
18. *He did service on several US ships but from time to time he was admitted into different hospitals, including an US Army hospital in England.*
19. *From the latter hospital, he returned to America in 1944 and was then admitted into a hospital in Charleston, South Carolina. However, he ran away from this hospital but was arrested in Boston and sent to the Ellis Island Hospital, New York.*
20. *On 25.02.1945 he was placed on the Greek ship, “Maria Nicolao”, but on 03.12.1945 he returned to New York as a waiter on the ship “Robin Locksley.”*
21. *He was arrested again and charged under the US Immigration Laws.*

22. *On 10.02.1946 he was placed on the ship "Hood Victory" for deportation, but on 10.03.1946 he returned with the same ship. He showed symptoms of mental illness again and was admitted to the Grafton State Hospital where he remained until 27.09.1947. His illness was then described as "Schizophrenia Hebephrenic"³⁶⁴⁷ Type".*
23. *On 27.09.1947 he was placed on the ship "Marine Jumper" and deported to Greece.*
24. *During 1950, 1953 and 1954 while he was in Europe, he applied to be admitted into the United States but his applications were dismissed every time.*
25. *Previously he has never been in Greece and at first could not find a job, but later found work as a foreman and interpreter at the American Reconstruction Mission. He indicates that he worked there until 1949, when the work was finished... [The rest of sentence is cut of at end of page.]*
26. *In Greece he could not get other work, but managed to gain a refugee-passport from the Greek Immigration Authorities. He was however obligated by them to hand in his original Greek passport.*
27. *He then went to France by ship, but because he was not able to find any work, he went to Portugal.*
28. *The Portuguese authorities did not want to accept his refugee passport and when he explained that he had lost his Portuguese passport, they did not believe him. Consequently, he was detained there for about six months before being allowed to seek work in Lisbon. He could not find a job but later made an existence by selling embroidery, postcards, watches and costume jewellery to travellers.*
29. *During 1953, he tried to leave Portugal but was arrested by the Portuguese authorities and detained for about one year.*
30. *Thereafter a Portuguese passport was issued to him and he went to Germany, Sweden and Denmark. In Germany, he fell ill again and spent about 6 months in Oxensoll Krankenhaus Hospital. He worked at different places, but because he could not find a suitable, rewarding job in the various countries mentioned he returned to Portugal in 1958 and continued his peddling business.*
31. *The same year, however, he returned to Germany and again worked at different places until 1939 when he decided to go to England.*

³⁶⁴⁷ On one document, the word is spelled "Hebephrenic" and on another it is spelled "Hebephremic."

32. *There he could not find work and the English Immigration authority deported him back to Germany. He then worked in a tractor factory in Germany for about 6 months.*
33. *He then went to Egypt but was immediately arrested for violating the country's immigration laws.*
34. *When he was released, he was put on a ship to Beirut.*
35. *From there he went to Palestine and Turkey where he got work as a teacher of English in Istanbul. He held this job only for two months.*
36. *He then went through the Balkan states and back to Greece.*
37. *From there he went to Crete during 1962 to visit his father's family. He only spent a few days and because the family could not house him, he first travelled to Italy and then back to Portugal.*
38. *In August or September of 1963, he set off to Lourenço Marques and stayed with an uncle for a short while. His stepmother in Pretoria was informed of his arrival and she fetched and took him to Pretoria.*
39. *From 09.12.1963 to 03.02.1964 he worked at the City Engineering and Carron Company in Pretoria as a fitter... [The rest of the sentence is cut off at the end of the page.]*
40. *On 07.02.1964 he got work again as a welder at Pool Engineering, Pretoria. However, on 10.07.1964 he was fired because of shoddy work and the trouble he caused among the other employees. When his foreman, Mr. Albert Vercuil, notified him that he was dismissed, he pointed his finger in Mr. Vercuil's face as if he wanted to assault him and said: -*

"You are just like your bloody Government. I will kill your Prime Minister yet."
41. *Shortly afterwards he left Pretoria by train and on 19.07.1964 he arrived in Bulawayo, Rhodesia. He then travelled with a Portuguese passport nr.6511/63 issued on 02.11.1963 at Lourenço Marques. He listed his race as white, his marital status as single and his nationality as Portuguese.*
42. *He had R100 with him and declared that the reason of his travel was to visit his sister, in fact his stepsister, Catherine Harlanbos of Marandellas. It is now established that his stepsister's married surname is Pneuma and her husband has a business in Marandellas.*
43. *He was then issued with a stranger tourist permit by the Immigration Officers of Rhodesia, valid until 09.08.1964.*

44. *It has now been established that he had visited his stepsister in Marandellas, but according to her, she told him that he could not stay and that he immediately left.*
45. *He had to have left Rhodesia in some way without reporting to any immigration officials because on 27.07.1964 he arrived by plane in Salisbury. It has thus far not been established from where he came. His contact address was then given as O.E. Bottle Store, Avondale.*
46. *He immediately sought work, including at the Public Service Board of Rhodesia, and according to him also at various other towns in Rhodesia and Malawi.*
47. *When the Rhodesian Immigration Department realized that the subject had not left the country on 09.08.1964, they wrote to him at his contact address at Avondale on 19.08.1964 and ordered him to report to their office immediately.*
48. *He arrived on 21.08.1964 and asked to be allowed to stay longer and seek work. This request was refused and he was told to leave immediately. On 22.08.1964 he travelled by train to Mozambique.*
49. *On 09.10.1964, however, he again entered Rhodesia from Umtali. The Immigration Officers issued him a temporary visitor's permit, valid for 14 days, but on 10.10.1964 they received notice of his previous visits and they declared him an illegal immigrant and gave him instructions to immediately leave the country. According to official records he departed on the same day, but according to a Mr. Galamakis, a Greek priest, Contos - and a Mrs. H Crispos, all of Umtali, he only departed on 11.10.1964. He visited many Greeks in Umtali, but as far as known, there is nothing... [The rest of the sentence is cut off at end of page.]*
50. *He then went to Beira where he got a job after some time near Gondola at the Central African Construction Corporation. He worked there for about a month when he made certain statements one night in a bar in the presence of non-whites and as a result of which he then was arrested by the Portuguese East African Police.*
51. *According to himself he was arrested: "Because I criticised the Portuguese Government for their policy in regard to petrol distribution. I was detained for 90 days." According to Portuguese Police, he (Tsafendas) said the following: "This country is not Portugal. It is called the United States of Mocambique. Its flag is of a blue colour with a rainbow. That rainbow represents all the colours. We already have money, and any day now all this will come to an end because what is necessary is not to be fooled into saying we are*

Portuguese because we are Africans. Long live our country, the United States of Mozambique.”

52. *According to the Portuguese police, he admitted that he made the remarks. Also, according to the police, he said that he had said this in response to his own ideas of independence of Mozambique separate from Portugal.*
53. *After he was released, he travelled by ship and arrived in Durban during February or March 1965.*
54. *On 15.03.1965 he found accommodation in room 166 of the home E.R. Corney, Fairwood, Durban, and on 16.03.1965, he accepted work as a Shed Attendant in Umbilo, Durban at the South African Railways and worked there until 07.04.1965. On this date he was on a night shift. He worked from 6pm on 06.04.1965 and had to remain on duty until 6am on 07.04.1965. While he was lying on a bed during the aforementioned night, another employee drenched him with a paper bag full of water. He did not see which person did it, but rose, was very angry and said that he could not work with wet clothes. So he walked off and never again returned to this work.*
55. *During this period he was used as a temporary interpreter in court at Durban on different occasions.*
56. *On 19.04.1965 he accepted work as a fitter at the company Fraser and Chalmers in Mandeni.*
57. *On 07.05.1965 he had an argument with another employee in the mess hall and in the fight that followed, he was inflicted a serious knife wound on his right arm and was admitted to the hospital. He reported the incident to the police and the person who inflicted the knife wounds, appeared in the court, but was acquitted. This person cannot be found now. He however said to the other employees on the afore-mentioned date that the subject is a dangerous Communist.*
58. *In the hospital, he underwent surgery and the scar is still visible on the right arm.*
59. *After his discharge from the hospital he found accommodation in the “Durban Men’s Home” on 31.06.1965. There he... [The rest of sentence is cut of at end of page.]*
60. *During his stay in Natal, he didn’t contact, as far as could be established, any undesirable, restricted or communist people.*
61. *He however told a Roman Catholic priest whom he met in Mandeni that the Portuguese Government in Mozambique have no sense and do nothing for the non-white population. When he came to know that the priest belonged to the Roman Catholic*

Church, he started swearing and said that the Roman Catholic Church should be wiped out and that the Roman Catholic nurses in the hospital injected poison into non-Whites so that they die like flies and they do so with the knowledge and approval of the Mozambique Government.

- 62. He then travelled with a yet unknown person by car from Durban to Port Elizabeth and from there by train to Cape Town, where he arrived on 28.08.1965 and went straight to the home of a coloured family, Daniels, at 1 San Sousie Street, Belville.*
- 63. He went there because a daughter of the Daniels family, namely Hellen Dorothy, 36 years old and unmarried had written to him in Durban after she attained the subject's address from friends in Boksburg. The Daniels family, as well as the friends in Boksburg, all belong to the same religion as the subject - and while he was in Durban – they exchanged letters.*
- 64. The Daniels family took him in to their home and he immediately started looking for a job.*
- 65. On 13.09.1965 he got a job at the Cape Town Municipality as a fitter in the Table Bay Power Station, Cape Town.*
- 66. On 25.10.1965, however, he received seven days' notice of termination of his employment. He then resigned on the same day to avoid dishonourable discharge. The service he rendered was unsatisfactory.*
- 67. After he got the job in September 1965, Helen Daniels's father told subject that since he is now employed and earns money he has to pay rent. He was angry but remained there until 16.10.1965.*
- 68. He himself claimed that he got accommodation in a boarding house near the traffic-department in Green Point, Cape Town, and stayed there until about the middle of November 1965. The place where he boarded is not yet determined.*
- 69. Around this time he went to the house of a certain Patrick Henry O'Ryan - a coloured teacher - at 9 Westminster Way, Lansdowne, Cape Town, with all his belongings. He met the O'Ryans during a church conference of his faith on a farm near Durbanville, Cape Town. The O'Ryans gave him a place to stay, although they did not have a room for him. He had to share a room with the children of the O'Ryans.*
- 70. Another parishioner of the same faith, namely Richard Poggenpoel of "Rosedene" Walnut Street, Lansdowne, had a spare room that he offered.*

71. *The subject then lived with them for 2 weeks during December, 1965. When Poggenpoel informed the subject of the contents of the letter, he (Tsafendas) immediately returned to the O'Ryans.*
72. *During the period he lived with these people, he daily went for job interviews. He also wrote numerous letters to try and find work.*
73. *It was established that he was at some company on probation as bus conductor but he told O'Ryan that he was too fat and could not climb the stairs up and down and was therefore not employed.*
74. *He was without work for about two months and stayed at the O'Ryans for free when he finally found work during February 1966 at the Marine Diamond Corporation on the company's barge "Colpontoon".*
75. *This job he held for only about two months and claimed that he had to abandon the work because it was too demanding for him because of his poor health.*
76. *To others he said that he had to abandon the work because he found it too dangerous when he had to get from the tow boat with a rope ladder onto a small boat to go to the transport ship "Marina".*
77. *To O'Ryan he said that another employee on the Colpontoon is jealous of him (Tsafendas) and thus does not want to teach him (Tsafendas) the job.*
78. *When he started earning money again, he got accommodation at Milton House, Milton Road, Observatory, and then departed from the O'Ryans.*
79. *He stayed there for about two months and then again moved to 5 Wrench Way, Observatory, where he rented a room from a Mrs. Vos. The latter, however, shortly thereafter gave him notice and on 01.07.1966 the subject rented a room from a Mrs. Theyser at 48 Devon Street, Woodstock. He had his meals at a Mrs. Scott at 42 Chamberlain Street, Woodstock. On 30.08.1966 he left.*
80. *On 31.08.1966 he moved to room 7, Elnor Apartments, Rustenburg Road, Rondebosch, and was arrested there for the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd.*
81. *Subject admits that before the outbreak of the Second World War he became a member of the Communist Party of South Africa in Johannesburg and that he regularly paid his monthly subscription of 25 cent per month until he left Johannesburg in 1942 and went to Canada. He expressly denies that afterwards he ever had anything to do with the Communist Party or contacted any Communists in South Africa or elsewhere.*

82. *He does admit however, that while in England he attended various political meetings in connection with:*
- a) Committee of African Organisations*
 - b) Anti-Colonial:*
83. *Subject stated that the following speakers were present at the said meetings:*
- a) Barbara Castle*
 - b) Fenner Brockway*
 - c) Callaghan*
84. *Above-mentioned persons are all Communists and members of the British Labour party.*
85. *In the presence of Mrs. Scott, referred to in paragraph 79 above, he told the other tenants that he can get a good job in S.W. Africa, but that he could not go there because there is a certain task in Cape Town that he first must perform.*
86. *Mrs. Popkiss, manageress of Eldor Apartments announced that she encountered the subject in the garden on the afternoon of 05.09.1966. She noticed that he looked very worried and talked to him. She asked him if he saw her cat and told him that she is very concerned about the animal. He replied: "I am also very worried. I have some thing on my mind."*
87. *According to most people in the Republic of South Africa with whom the subject came into contact with, other than those already mentioned above, the subject did not talk about politics. However, he said to several people that he was upset because he was not classified as a colored.*
88. *To Patrick O’Ryan, mentioned above, he also said that the Republic’s apartheid policy was unfair and that these policies often frustrate him.*
89. *Subject’s stepmother claimed that he always asked for money; others said that he usually tried to get meals from others and always gave the impression that he is needy.*
90. *Subject belongs to a religion called the Christian Church, which does not have any solid building which serves as a church. Services are held from house to house. It seems that only non-whites belong to this faith.*
91. *No members of this faith in the R.S.A. has drawn unfavourable attention to them, and fans of this belief are not suspected of subversive activities.*
92. *As far as has been established, the subject himself has never before been guilty of any criminal offense other than the offenses under the Immigration Laws of different countries.*

93. *Subject is a total abstainer of strong drink and does not smoke.*
94. *From 24.07.1966 to 03.09.1966, the Greek ship "Eleni" was in the Cape Town docks for repairs. The subject visited the ship daily. He befriended the crew and often enjoyed meals with them on... [The rest of sentence is cut off at end of page].*
As a result, one of them offered him a revolver, which he bought. Later he found that the weapon was in fact not a revolver, but only a gas pistol. He tried to get his money back but did not succeed. The seller told him that he had spent all the money.
95. *This gas pistol was found among his property when he was arrested for the assassination.*

COMMENTS ON COL. MCINTYRE'S REPORT

The report follows Tsafendas's life from the day he was born until his arrest for the murder of Dr. Verwoerd. It includes his hospitalizations, his travels to and within several countries, and some of his arrests and imprisonments. The report is accurate about his travel and his various jobs, but it misses many important aspects of his life, especially Tsafendas's political ideas and activities in Mozambique. Col. McIntyre and the South African police were not given Tsafendas's complete file by the Portuguese authorities and therefore were presumably unaware of some of his arrests and political activism there. Nevertheless, the report comprehensively downplays Tsafendas's politics, including crucially the fact that he was a Communist. That he was a member of the South African Communist Party before the Second World War is mentioned (par. 81), as is the fact that Nikolas Vergos characterised him as a "dangerous Communist," (par. 57) but little else.

Facts known to Col. McIntyre which are omitted include that Tsafendas was fired from a job in Lourenço Marques and banned from re-entering Mozambique due to his Communist ideas, plus that several witnesses testified that he had Communist ideas. More importantly, the report says in paragraph 87 that "according to most people in the Republic of South Africa with whom the subject came into contact, other than those already mentioned above, the subject did not talk about politics. However, he said to several people that he was upset because he was not classified as a Coloured." As to the first part of the sentence, seven witnesses testified to the contrary:

- Kenneth Ross said Tsafendas was “very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in politics. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government and was definitely pro-Russian.”³⁶⁴⁸
- Robert Smith testified that Tsafendas was “definitely pro-Communist. Tsafendas was in my opinion a fanatic on politics and seldom spoke of anything else.”³⁶⁴⁹
- Gladstone Dunn testified that Tsafendas discussed politics with him.³⁶⁵⁰
- Horacio Ferreira also said Tsafendas discussed politics with him.³⁶⁵¹
- In addition, Johannes Jacobus Botha had informed the police that Tsafendas was described by Nick Vergos as “the biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa.”³⁶⁵²
- Father Hanno Probst also characterised him and reported him to a security officer as a “Communist and a dangerous person.”³⁶⁵³

Also omitted is the fact contained in the report of the South African embassy in Lisbon that Tsafendas “has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances including shouting pro-Communist and anti-Portuguese slogans.”³⁶⁵⁴ Nothing about Tsafendas’s criminal record in Mozambique is mentioned by Col. McIntyre, but this could be because the Portuguese authorities did not reveal such information to the South African police.

The McIntyre report does not give an opinion on whether or not Tsafendas was insane, but merely records the diagnoses from some of the hospitals where he was treated, including the Grafton State Hospital (par. 22). However, McIntyre omits important information regarding this latter hospital. Although he had access to the Grafton’s document,

³⁶⁴⁸ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁴⁹ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁵⁰ Gladstone Dunn statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁵¹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

³⁶⁵² Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁵³ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁵⁴ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

he omits the reference to Tsafendas admitting he “faked mental illness”³⁶⁵⁵ when he was arrested for violating American immigration laws. Also omitted is the statement by the South African embassy in Washington, based on US Immigration Department documents, that Tsafendas was “unstable but not insane.”³⁶⁵⁶

ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S MEMORANDUM

The same day, the Attorney-General of Cape Town, Willem M. van den Berg, who had been appointed to lead the case for the State in the forthcoming summary trial of Tsafendas, released the following memorandum:

Detailed Information for a Memorandum Regarding Demetrio Tsafendas³⁶⁵⁷

Paragraphs 1 and 2:

Michael Tsafendakis and his common law wife Amelia Williams separated shortly after the birth of Demetrio. On 5 December 1920 Michael Tsafendakis and Maria Sakellis were married in Port Said, Egypt. Demetrio was in the care of his paternal grandmother in Alexandria, Egypt, until around the age of 6.

He was then returned to his father in Lourenço Marques, where he received his first school education at a mixed race school, the “English Mission School.” Next he was sent by his father to the Middelburg Primary School, English, in the Transvaal. He possibly stayed there until 1933 and he seems to have passed Standard 6 there (the first year of high school). Thereafter he returned to Lourenço Marques when for 6 years he worked at the “Vulcan Iron Works”, General Engineers, as an Oxy-Acetylene electrical welder. According to testimonials from this firm, he had performed his duties in a satisfactory manner. These testimonials were included with his application for permanent residence in South Africa.

Three daughters and one son were born out of the marriage of Michael and Maria, (now known as Marika). They are Victor, Evangeline, Helen and Catherina. Except for

³⁶⁵⁵ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demetrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

³⁶⁵⁶ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

³⁶⁵⁷ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

Catharina, who is married and lives in Salisbury, Rhodesia, they have all been living near Pretoria, South Africa, for many years. It would seem that Demetrio was estranged from them.

Paragraph 3:

It is not known whether the following kiosk still exists. According to a letter from Demetrio to the Secretary of Home Affairs on 31 December 1935 requesting permanent residence in South Africa:

“Chai et Kiosk,

Praca 7 da Marco,

P.O. Bos 702,

LOURENÇO MARQUES.

Prop. P. Sideris”

Demetrio Tsafendas' Communist activities were at that time restricted to the distribution of Communist propaganda. Up to 1942, when he left South Africa, no further information in this regard has been found. In a statement to the South African Police on 19 September 1966, Demetrio Tsafendas admitted that he had joined the Communist Party shortly before World War II. He also attended their meetings and paid the fees but denied that he had any further association with the Communists after he left South Africa in 1942; except that whilst in England he attended meetings in Hyde Park and Caxton Hall; he furthermore stated that the participants were Leftist members of the Labour Party and not Communists.

Paragraph 4-7:

Demetrio Tsafendas was found guilty of contravening Article 2(a) of Act 1 of 1937 in the Johannesburg Magistrates' Court on 6 August 1941. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a fine of 12 pounds 10 shillings or a one month jail term. He paid the fine. However, he was not deported, but freed, as a temporary residence permit had been issued to him on the

grounds that he had performed important war production work at the “British Mining Supply Company. At that time he worked for the firm as a welder in the transport department. It is not clear whether or not he lost his job there because of malingering. The Secretary of Home Affairs is in possession of a testimonial from the above firm which reads as follows: “During this period (from 7 May 1940 until the date of the testimonial, 8 August 1941) of service we have found his work to be perfectly satisfactory and his conduct good.”

Paragraph 8:

On 8 June 1942 Tsafendas applied for a permit to travel to England to join the British Army.

This request was refused in June 1942 as England refused entry to Tsafendas. His temporary residence permit was nearing the expiration date. He was unemployed and travelled to Cape Town, from where he boarded the “Eugenie Livanos” on 13 June without a permit, with the help of the Greek Consul in Cape Town, who was unaware of the fact that Tsafendas was not permitted to leave the country. He never turned up in Lourenço Marques.

The first news of him is the letter from Boston, Massachusetts, as found in paragraph 7, in connection with the 3 pound deposit received for his expired temporary residence permit. As no notification was received from Tsafendas to his father to authorise this amount, it was declared to be forfeited on 21 July 1955. From various sources, including his own declaration, Tsafendas travelled on the Eugenie Livanos from Cape Town to St. John on the east coast of Canada. He and a friend left the ship there and were sent by the Canadian authorities to Halifax where they were detained. However, they escaped and walked over the frozen St. Croix River near Calais, Maine, in the U.S.A., where they were again arrested and sent to Boston, U.S.A. Tsafendas appeared before the U.S.A. Immigration officials on several occasions for transgression of the time limits given to sailors for temporary residency. During this period he worked on several American ships. During World War II he mainly served on “Liberty” ships. He described this as “risking my life on submarine infested seas.”

Between 1942 and 1947 Tsafendas received treatment in various hospitals for “Psychosis, Psychosis undetermined, Schizophrenia” and nervous breakdowns. The U.S.A. refused to grant him permanent residence rights and in 1947 he was deported to Greece where he started work at the American Reconstruction Mission. This had something to do with the Marshall Aid Plan. He also worked as interpreter for three months for Messrs. Steers-Grove in Piraeus Harbour in Greece. This was also an American firm whose HQ was

in New York. After this Tsafendas was again unemployed in Greece which led to the request mentioned in para. 8. It is not known how Tsafendas got to London in 1950.

Paragraphs 9 and 10:

Demitrio Tsafendas between his requests to Internal Affairs departments in 1950 and 1959 from Athens and London respectively, are not known. According to him, he was mostly in Portugal from 1950 to 1958, and was again imprisoned there for several years. He declared that he sold clothes in Lisbon and that he also visited West Germany and Brussels. In 1959 he reached England from West Germany and to which he was once again deported by the British in whose hospitals he had also been treated for his nervous breakdowns. In his application to Internal Affairs in SA from London, he named his former employers as "The American Reconstruction Mission, Greece and U.S. Army, Germany." The nature of the work he did for the U.S.A. Defence Force is unknown. He also declared that for 6 months he was treated in the Oxensoll Krankenhaus, but that he absconded and went to friends in Hamburg. Before he went to England in 1959 he also travelled in Sweden and Denmark. After he left England he worked for a while in a tractor factory in Munich.

Then he decided to return to Egypt and travelled by train through the Balkans to Piraeus, Greece and thence by boat to Alexandria, Egypt. In Cairo he was jailed for 6 months. Then he travelled by boat to Beirut and thence by plane to Jerusalem. He roamed around along the Jordan River for 4 months. Then he travelled to Ankara and Istanbul, in Turkey, then returned to Athens, but en route also visited Sofia in Bulgaria. From Athens he visited his father's family on the Island of Crete. He said that he also returned to Portugal and from there decided to return to Africa. He maintained that the Portuguese Social Services gave him a ticket to return by boat to Lourenço Marques in September 1963.

Paragraphs 11 and 12:

From 1935 to 1959 all requests from Demitrio Tsafendas to Home Affairs to grant him permanent residency were dismissed out of hand. But on 2 November 1963 he received a temporary permit from the South African Consul-General in Lourenço Marques to enjoy a holiday in the Republic. It is not known to me who was responsible for issuing this permit, but it was done without reference to the HQ in Pretoria. Tsafendas soon accepted work in

Pretoria. Permission was also granted to him to hold the position while waiting for the result of his application to the Immigration Board in Pretoria for permanent residence in SA.

On 20 January 1964 his request for permanent residence was approved. He also received his Identity Document soon thereafter. In March 1964 he wrote to the Dept. of Internal Affairs to complain about corruption amongst the Public Servants and accused them of demanding large amounts of money for obtaining an Identity document. These complaints were investigated by the Police but were dismissed as unfounded.

Paragraphs 13-16:

In June-July 1964 Tsafendas again left the country and travelled to Salisbury, Rhodesia and from there to Malawi. According to him he went there to look for work. He returned to Umtali in Rhodesia and from there he went to Beira. He worked for a while on the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline but was arrested by the Portuguese police and placed in detention for 90 days. Friends of Tsafendas then rallied round him and gave him passage by boat to Durban. He stayed there for a while and worked for Fraser & Chalmers in Mandini for a while. He was dismissed after involvement in fighting. Then he returned to Cape Town where he worked for a while for Marine Diamond Corporation. In Cape Town he stayed in various places for short periods. According to a statement in my possession there was never any question of a marriage between him and the coloured woman Helen Daniels from Bellville South. Information from Home Affairs files indicate that he applied for reclassification as a coloured because he wanted to apply for a business license in a coloured area. Investigations continue, especially overseas and any further developments will be provided as soon as I receive information.

W.M. van den Berg

Attorney-General

Cape Town. 3 October 1966.

COMMENTS ON VAN DEN BERG'S MEMORANDUM

A great deal of information about Tsafendas, some of it very important and known to the South African police, does not appear in van den Berg's so-called "detailed" account of Tsafendas's life. That this information is absent does not mean van den Berg deliberately omitted it, perhaps because he deemed it unimportant or wanted to downplay Tsafendas's Communism and political activities. A possible explanation is that he was not given all the information held by the South African police.

We cannot know with certainty what was provided to van den Berg, but the content of the memorandum suggests that he had access to Tsafendas's affidavit from 1964, perhaps the PIDE reports given to the South African authorities, the Department of Interior reports concerning Tsafendas's applications for permanent residency, plus letters from Tsafendas to the Department of the Interior seeking permission to enter South Africa. He does not seem to have the statements given to the police by Tsafendas during his interrogation, or statements by people who knew Tsafendas, including his family. The secret telegrams from the South African embassies in Washington and Lisbon are also absent. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that van den Berg had access to these documents and chose not to use them.

The memorandum does not cover Tsafendas's political past, including several of his arrests. Analytically, it is surprising that the memorandum does not mention the reason for Tsafendas's arrest in Beira in 1964: that he was accused of "making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses."³⁶⁵⁸

Van den Berg must have known the reason as it was given in the PIDE's reports and various other documents in the possession of the South African police. Either he considered it unimportant to mention why Tsafendas was arrested and spent ninety days in prison or he did not want to politicise the arrest. Tsafendas's second arrest by the Portuguese police in February 1965 is omitted altogether. Even though there was no mention of it in PIDE's reports, the South African press had referred to two arrests, not one.³⁶⁵⁹ Despite the

³⁶⁵⁸ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demetrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demetrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

³⁶⁵⁹ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, 'Tsafendas het vir V.V. in Persie gewerk.'; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man''; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 8 September 1966: 1, 'The killer: Five passports and a record of subversion'; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin said to have been

omission, one would have expected the South African police to be aware of it since it was reported in South Africa's newspapers, and then to make inquiries about it.

The memorandum states that Tsafendas's Communist activities in Mozambique in the mid-1930s were "restricted to the distribution of Communist propaganda." Although the Sideris Kiosk is mentioned, the fact that Tsafendas was fired from his job there for conducting Communist propaganda is not; nor is the fact that while in Mozambique he was twice officially suspected of Communist activities. These incidents were well known to the South African authorities. They were the reason Tsafendas's early requests for permanent residency in South Africa were turned down, and they were mentioned in several documents held by the South African authorities. The reason Tsafendas's applications for permanent residency in South Africa were "dismissed out of hand" is also not given.

The South African embassy report that Tsafendas "has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances including, shouting pro-Communist and anti-Portuguese slogans," is not included. Also missing are the facts that Tsafendas was not allowed to enter Mozambique in 1951 because of his "past," his arrest that followed, and his subsequent twelve years of enforced exile.

Van den Berg's memorandum states that Tsafendas appeared before US immigration officials "on several occasions for transgression of the time limits given to sailors for temporary residency." It also mentions the medical treatment Tsafendas received in the United States between 1942 and 1947 plus what the diagnosis was. However, that Tsafendas was regarded by American immigration officials as "unstable, but not insane" and the fact that he was caught "faking mental illness" are also not included. Naturally you would have expected the police to provide all these documents regarding Tsafendas to the Attorney-General who was handing the case. However, it seems that they either did not do it or van den Berg did not think that these information were important to include them in his memorandum. We will get back to this issue shortly.

The memorandum contains two evident errors. It says Tsafendas went to London in 1950 when the year was 1959. It also says Tsafendas seemed to be estranged from his family. It is a fact that Tsafendas did not see his relatives between 1941 and 1963. However, he kept

deported from P.E.A. for Communist connections.' *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, 'Assassin had five passports.'

in touch with them across those twenty-two years, especially with his father and his half-sister Eleni, and later with his step-mother. They exchanged letters frequently and Tsafendas would send postcards from wherever he was, informing them of his whereabouts. Tsafendas had a loving, life-long relationship with his father. After he died, his step-mother Marika, his half-brother Victor and his half-sister Eleni helped Tsafendas to reunite with them in South Africa. They drove from Pretoria to Lourenço Marques to meet him and then brought him back. Of course, van den Berg was not to know that they went so far as to bribe a South African immigration official to overlook the fact that Tsafendas was on the Stop List of the Department of Interior.

On reaching Pretoria, the family gave Tsafendas a rent-free apartment. Tsafendas's relations with his other two half-sisters, Evangelia and Katerina, were not as warm, but in no sense was he "estranged" from them. It is important to note that Tsafendas's family sought to distance themselves from him after the assassination, a natural reaction in the emotional frenzy of the time and knowing what the apartheid authorities were capable of.

Costas Michaletos, who knew Tsafendas from infancy, told the police that "Dimetrios Tsafantakis grew up with his half-brothers and sisters and was always treated as part of the family."³⁶⁶⁰ Guglielmo Conte, a friend and business partner of Tsafendas's father, who also knew Tsafendas from the day he was born, denied that Dimitri was estranged from his family and stated that except for his school years in Middleburg, he always stayed with his father and stepmother and their family.³⁶⁶¹

The strangest section of the memorandum concerns Tsafendas's relationship with Helen Daniels and questions of his racial classification. Van den Berg says that, "According to a statement in my possession, there was never any question of a marriage between him and the Coloured woman, Helen Daniels, from Belleville South. Information from Home Affairs files indicates that he applied for reclassification as a Coloured because he wanted to apply for a business licence in a Coloured area." The Home Affairs files which van den Berg referred to were not found in the archives. Nor was anything discovered relating to Tsafendas's application regarding his reclassification. As already stated, the author has not been able to establish why Tsafendas applied to be reclassified as a Coloured person.

³⁶⁶⁰ Costas Michaletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁶¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 September 1966, Tsafendas timid and puny as a boy.'

However, that is not the issue here. What is important is that van den Berg appears not to be in possession of the statements which Tsafendas and Helen Daniels gave to the police.

In those statements, Tsafendas³⁶⁶² and Daniels³⁶⁶³ stated clearly that there was a question of marriage between them. In his statement of September 11, 1966, Tsafendas said he applied for reclassification in order “to marry a Coloured woman named Helen Daniels.”³⁶⁶⁴ Helen Daniels testified to the police on September 15 that she wrote to Tsafendas with the intention of meeting and marrying him. Tsafendas replied to her letter that he was willing to visit, but he wanted to meet her first before agreeing to marry. Daniels also stated that after they met, Tsafendas appeared to have no interest in marrying her since he made no effort to establish a relationship with her.³⁶⁶⁵ Caroline Barbeau also testified that Tsafendas wanted to be reclassified in order to marry Helen Daniels.³⁶⁶⁶

Van den Berg was either not given these statements - two by Tsafendas and one by Daniels - by the police or he chose to ignore them. As Attorney-General, he was entitled to all statements taken during police interviews, especially those of the accused.³⁶⁶⁷ Had he received them, he must have included them in his memorandum and his failure to do so suggests the police did not provide them. The question therefore is why he not given these statements? Since the marriage question was relatively unimportant, the assumption must be that the documents contained other information which the police did not wish to reveal. That this was indeed the case became obvious during Tsafendas’s summary trial.

As we will see, the three statements, especially the two by Tsafendas, flatly contradicted his portrayal as an insane, apolitical man who killed Dr. Verwoerd because his tapeworm told him to. Tsafendas declared in his statement that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was “disgusted with his policies,” that Dr. Verwoerd “did not represent all the people of South Africa,” and he believed that by killing him a “change of policy will occur.” He also testified that he was a former member of the Communist Party of South Africa, that

³⁶⁶² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁶⁶³ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File VDSO 17/64, NASA.

³⁶⁶⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁶⁶⁵ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File VDSO 17/64, NASA.

³⁶⁶⁶ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁶⁷ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016; Judge Gerald Friedman in a personal interview, 11 April 2016; Judge Robin Marais in a personal interview, 3 June 2016.

he was against apartheid and colonialism, and that he had participated in anti-apartheid meetings in London. More importantly, there was nothing in his statements to suggest that he was insane, and not once does he mention the tapeworm that would become so central in his summary trial and would be associated with him for the remainder of his life.

It is important to mention here that the report of the Commission of Enquiry flatly contradicts van den Berg's report. It states that, "On 30th August, 1965, he applied as Demitrio Tsafendas to the Regional Representative of the Department of the Interior to be reclassified as a Coloured person. He gave the reason that he regarded himself as a Coloured and that he wished to marry a Coloured. On 1st September, 1965, he made a sworn statement in support of his application."³⁶⁶⁸ Clearly, the Commission and van den Berg had different information about the issue and the author is not in position to know for certainty which version is correct. The likelier guess is that the Commission is right since Tsafendas also regarded himself as a Coloured man.

We cannot rule out the possibility that van den Berg was in possession of these statements and deliberately did not use them. However, it seems in the highest degree unlikely that his motive was to cover up such an unimportant issue as Tsafendas's reclassification. In building a case for Tsafendas's insanity, the information that would pose the greatest danger to such a line of argument was that concerning Tsafendas's political activities and beliefs. Therefore the likelier scenario is that the police withheld the Tsafendas and Daniels statements from van den Berg. If so, this would not be the first time the police sought to block important evidence regarding Tsafendas's background, character and motives.

That said, the Attorney-General's role in the case is quite strange, even suspicious, and will be examined in detail in the Summary Trial Chapter. It should be mentioned here though that as we saw in his memorandum, van den Berg mentioned that Tsafendas had told the police he was a former member of the South African Communist Party and that he had participated in distribution of Communist propaganda. None of this would become known during the summary trial and the word "Communist" would never even be heard in the court. However, on October 30, twenty-seven days after van den Berg wrote his memorandum, *The Post* revealed that Tsafendas was a former member of the South African Communist Party. Van den Berg was interviewed by the newspaper and when asked whether he knew about

³⁶⁶⁸ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 39. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

Tsafendas's membership, he lied, saying, "This is news to me – I certainly had no knowledge of it until this very moment when you brought it to my notice."³⁶⁶⁹ This was twenty-seven days after he had written about it in his memorandum.

STATEMENTS

MIKE JOSIAS GERMISHUYS³⁶⁷⁰

White male, 29 years old, sergeant in the South African Police, Mandini.

I was stationed at Nyoni from 02/05/1965 to 06/30/1966 when I took my dismissal. I remember there being received a call at Nyoni during 1965, about an assault at Mandini. As far as I can remember, Constable J. Fourie and I went to give the complaint attention. When I arrived at Mandini, I found that a certain Vergos and Tsafendas, two whites who were employed by Frazer and Charles, during duty, was involved in the case. Tsafendas was the plaintiff in the case. Tsafendas claimed that he was assaulted with a razor by Vergos. Tsafendas had lacerations on one of his arms. As far as I can remember, his shirt was also cut across the chest, but he had no cuts on his chest. Vergos was arrested and charged with assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Vergos made no report to me that Tsafendas was a dangerous communist. I also know Mr. J.J. Botha, a security officer at Sappi, Mandini, he also never reported to me that Tsafendas was a dangerous communist. Vergos was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the arrest. I cannot furnish the dates, however if I were granted permission to view the registers, I will find it.

JOHANNES JACOBUS BOTHA³⁶⁷¹

White male, 51 years. Security officer at South African Pulp and Paper Industries, Mandeni.

Further to my statement I made on 15/09/1966, I wish to add, that Vergos told me that

³⁶⁶⁹ *The Post*, 30 October 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas: I was a communist.'

³⁶⁷⁰ Mike Josias Germishuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁷¹ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Tsafandos is the biggest communist in the R.S.A. I think it was during May, 1965 when he said it to me. Vergos and Tsafandos were both still in the employ of Frazer and Chalmers at Mandeni. I can remember that I told a member of the South African Police, Nyoni, that I heard from Vergos that Tsafandos is the largest communist in South Africa. But I cannot remember who the member is to whom I said it.

Affidavit by J.J. Botha witnessed by ... (Indecipherable name) Nr. 19026 (V) S/SGT at 12.59 p.m.

JACOBUS CHRISTOFFEL SNYMAN³⁶⁷²

Nr. 25817 Sergeant in the South African Police, stationed at Nyoni.

Tsafendas, Vergos, M.J. Germishuys and J.J. Botha are known to me. During May 1965, I was stationed at Nyoni. During that time neither Vergos, M.J. Germishuys nor J.J. Botha gave me report that Tsafendas was a dangerous communist. Neither afterwards did any of the three of them report such things to me.

Affidavit by J.C. Snyman Nr. 25817 'V' Sgt at 5 p.m.

NEVILLE JUDSON³⁶⁷³

Salesman at Mike's outfitters. Woodstock.

During about July 1966 I got to know Demitrio Tsafendas. I met him at the shop where he came to introduce himself. The proprietor (Mr. Mike) asked me to take Tsafendas to the boats as he said he could make business contacts there. I went there about 3 occasions and in fact got some customers, some of whom I brought by car to the shop. Some came in on

³⁶⁷² Jacobus Christoffel Snyman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁷³ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

their own. We only went to one boat, the Greek ship Eleni. During my conversations with the accused I got to know from him about his travels abroad.

I never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers. He appeared to be an unsuccessful kind of person. He mentioned being the black sheep in his family. He said nothing detrimental against this country or the people. On the other hand, he said this country was on the right track, especially when buying the new oil tankers. He seemed very impressed by this move.

Accused appeared to have a very friendly way of talking to the sailors at the Eleni. To me he also mentioned that he wanted to married, that is why he had applied for and obtained a job with the Government as an interpreter. He did not mention to me who that woman was he wanted to marry. He mentioned that he had been to the Eleni on his own, apart from our trip there. He mentioned having had lunch and supper on the boat.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

JAN JOHANNES ALBERTUS FOURIE³⁶⁷⁴

Sergeant of the South African Police, Newcastle, Natal. 2 p.m.

I remember during 1965, I cannot remember the date, Mr. Nick Vergos working at Congella Erection, c/o. South African Pulp and Paper Industries assaulted a certain person, Tsafendas who was working at Fraser and Chalmers, c/o. South African Pulp and Paper Industries.

The case, which was assault with intent to cause serious bodily harm was reported at the Nyoni police station by Tsafendas, I investigated the case. The accused Nick Vergos was later found innocent on the charge by the magistrate in Nyoni. I cannot remember exactly, but it must have been before the court case, Vergos one day told me that Tsafendas was a "Communist Bastard." I cannot remember whether anyone else was present. Vergos said

³⁶⁷⁴ Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

nothing further about Tsafendas. I did not take notice of the comment because Tsafendas and Vergos were angry at each other. I did not ask Vergos why he made such an accusation. I did not report the accusation made by Vergos to my Station Commander. I do not know if Vergos has made any similar statements about any other person. Tsafendas who was the complainant at Nyoni in the assault case was the same person who murdered the late Honourable Dr. Verwoerd. I saw photos of Tsafendas in the newspapers after the murder of late Honourable Dr. Verwoerd.

Statement taken by Captain N.J. Rossouw.

WILHELMINA SOPHIA DE VOS³⁶⁷⁵

White female, manager of "American Maid," Woodstock Observatory.

On 04/06/1966 the Demitrio Tsafendas came to my house to rent a room I advertised. I gave him the room rental. He said he is from the "Marine Diamond Corp." in South West Africa and currently here for treatment in Groote Schuur Hospital to his nose. After a few days he said that he (as outpatient) was dismissed at Groote Schuur and he need not return. I asked if he was going back South West Africa, he said no. I asked whether he should go back, he then said the men there told him if he does not "fit" in with them, then they will throw him overboard. To this I said it does not exist and that I do not believe him, because there is tight security at such places. He gave me the impression that he is work-shy. I have in the meantime discovered that he was dirty and had bad habits and his house manners were poor.

He later sought work, which he told me about. He said he was looking for messenger or caretaker jobs or as messenger at a bank or something. I asked if he did not have a trade, on which he said he was a "fitter and turner." I told him to look for work in his trade, but he had all kinds of excuses. I told him directly that he was strong and healthy and he had to work. He also said that he applied for a welfare pension. Later he said that if he cannot find work, he will join the Navy which lies in Mozambique. He was talking about the British Navy who was doing the oil blockade. I said to him how can you go against your own people (the

³⁶⁷⁵ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Portuguese) with another superpower, then he is a traitor - he then kept quiet and walked away.

After three weeks (late June) I notified him to leave immediately, because I could not endure his messy ways any longer. He went off to Mrs. Theyser whom I saw was advertising a room. He was boastful, but I could see that he had an inferiority complex and his upbringing was not good. I considered him to be a completely normal person.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. 23505 D/Sergt.

FRED FEINAUER³⁶⁷⁶

I am a messenger in the Assembly and I am the senior messenger in the press gallery. I am aware that the press annually holds a function in the parliament house. Many dignitaries get invited to this annual event. The prime minister is usually invited to this annual event. As far as I know, Dr. Verwoerd was invited to the press function which was held on Friday, 02.09.1966. I was in charge of the messengers serving drinks at the press function. Altogether there were seven messengers that helped to serve drinks that evening. Tsafendas was one of the messengers who helped to serve drinks. Tsafendas was one of the messengers who worked under my supervision on the press gallery. I requested Tsafendas to help on 02/09/1966 at the press function. I asked him about two days prior to this function to serve at the function. He arrived that night and helped serve at the press function. Dr. Verwoerd did not attend the function on 02/09/1966.

Statement taken by Major D.J. Rossouw

³⁶⁷⁶ Fred Feinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

CORNELIUS FRANCOIS FERREIRA³⁶⁷⁷

Sergeant in the South African Police, stationed at Nyoni Station as Commander.

On 07/05/1965 at 1.45 pm. Sergeant Germishuis and I were out on duty. We returned at 9.5 pm. the same day. At my return to the station, I saw that there was a complaint from Mandeni in the incident register, it was about an assault by a white on a white. Sergeant Germishuis was instructed to investigate the matter. He left at 9.20 pm the same day investigate the matter at Mandini. I have no further knowledge of what happened on 07/05/1965 in connection with this assault.

On Saturday, 08/05/1965 at 9.45 I resumed service. In the registers, I noticed that a white man, called Nicholas Vergos, was charged and detained. The white man was released on 08/05/1965 at 8.55 am on bail. I never saw said white man at any time, nor had any conversation with him. At the time of the trial I saw both Vergos and Stafendas, but I had no conversation with them. Raa 14/5/65 refers to the relevant case - Assault with intent to inflict serious injury. Mr. J.J. Botha, a security officer at Sappi, Mandini is known to me. At no time did he report anything to me regarding Stafendas. On 03/10/1966 I had access to the Raa register at Nyoni Police Station. Raa 14/5/66 refers to accused Bantu man Mbotenzi Ngwenya who was charged for failing to show pass book.

Statement taken by ... (Indecipherable name) 19026 S/Sergt at 3.45 p.m.

MICHAELIS AUGUSTIDES³⁶⁷⁸

White male, owner of Mike's Outfitters, Woodstock

I know the man Demitrio Tsafendas. He was having meals in Woodstock with a Mrs. Scott where some of my assistants also reside and have their meals. He came to the shop about July, 1966. He said he could make contacts with people at the ships in Cape Town docks and could bring some customers to my shop. I said O.K. if he brought any customers to

³⁶⁷⁷ Cornelius Francois Ferreira statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁶⁷⁸ Michaelis Augustides statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

my shop I would give him a commission. I know in fact that some customers were brought to my shop and that I have paid him about R10 commission. I never had other dealings with him. One of my salesmen accompanied him to the boats. I got to know he was Greek and heard that he has been abroad, but did not have personal conversations with him. He appeared to be an unsettled type. He mentioned to me finding a job at court as interpreter.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

BAREND BUYTENDAG³⁶⁷⁹

Lt. Col at the South African Police and Dr. Verwoerd's bodyguard.

Buytendag explained at length the measures taken to ensure the security of the prime minister, including the dispositions of his motorcades, the routes his car would use, arrival arrangements at Parliament and searches in contiguous areas. Buytendag stated that Dr. Verwoerd's appointments were made available to him and if there were doubts about any planned visitors, the local security police would be contacted. The PM's office was constantly searched for hidden microphones and his telephones were checked for espionage efforts. Dr. Verwoerd never handled post or packages. A special police guard unit was formed consisting of 82 officers and men. Nothing in Col. Buytendag's statement was directly relevant to Tsafendas.

SYBIE BARENDILLA³⁶⁸⁰

Coloured female, 28 years, Shop Assistant at Astoria Stores, Woodstock.

I belong to the Christian fellowship of which Demitrio Tsafendas was a member. During November, 1965, I attended a meeting (church) at Abrahams, 112 Kipling Street,

³⁶⁷⁹ Barend Buytendag statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Verklarings van Lt. Kol. B. Buytendag. NASA.

³⁶⁸⁰ Sybie Barendilla statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

near my house. After I have been in the house, Tsafendas arrived. He was also attending our meeting and had a bible with him. After the service he introduced himself to me.

During about May, 1966 I again met him on a bus when I was returning to work after lunch. He remembered me, spoke to me and said he was on his way to Town to buy a pair of shoes. He enquired how my uncle was in America. I do not know how he came to know that I had an uncle in America and I did not ask him. The next day after this incident he walked past the shop where I was employed. He paused in the door, waved to me and walked on. The following day he came into the shop and bought a chocolate. I got the impression that he wanted to talk to me, but I cut him short and carried on with my work.

On a public holiday, I think the 11th of July, 1966, he came to my house and enquired for me. My sister opened the door and spoke to him. He was insistent to see me, but my sister put him off. I heard the conversation and told my sister that I did not want to see him. That was the last time I have any knowledge of him. After that I saw his picture in the local papers in connection with the assassination of Hr. Dr. Verwoerd.

JACOBUS JOHANNES BORNMAN³⁶⁸¹

White male, 22 years old, Traffic officer at Tramway Company, Cape Town.

I lived at 57 Milton Road, Observatory during May to July 1966. Living with me in the same room was Demitrio Tsafendas. When I started living together with him, I found him to be a friendly and plausible person. He left the impression that he really liked me. On one occasion I had no money and then Tsafendas gave me five cents. I later wanted to return the money to him, but he would not take it.

Tsafendas read his bible late into the night and I got the impression that he was a great Christian. He also told me that he was a Christian. He went to church four or five times. It was usually during the night. I do not know what denomination he belonged to, but I believed him to belong to the Catholic Church. This, however, was of little importance to me. On one occasion he told me that he met a woman who attended the same church as he did. As

³⁶⁸¹ Jacobus Johannes Bornman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

far as I know, Tsafendas loves women, he talked a lot about women and I believed that he attended church services so often to make contact with the woman he met there.

There was also a person, a German, whose name I do not remember, sharing the room with us. I remember that one day Tsafendas told us that if he should marry one day and have children, those children would be either genius or mad because of all the feelings in him over the years and what he has experienced over the years. I want to mention the following incident, which I found odd, to be put on recorded. On Tsafendas's wardrobe were paper bags and on top of the paper bags were three of his hats. I reached up to a paper bag to put in certain items of clothing. When I reached for the paper bag on top of his closet, he leaped swiftly from where he lay on his bed reading. When I saw, Tsafendas stood beside me. It surprised me to see how quickly he can move since he had a big and clumsy posture and I believed that he was a lazy person. I asked him why he so quickly jumped up and he said he was afraid I would knock his hats from the closet. I have often noticed that Tsafendas removed his wallet and personal belongings at night from his pockets and place it under his pillow instead. I often saw that he placed his wallet under his pillow. Maj. Rossouw today showed me a wallet which I know belongs to Tsafendas.

As I said, Tsafendas read Bible late into the night. We had an argument because he left the light burning while I wanted to sleep. After that, he did not talk to me much, but he talked a lot with the German. Tsafendas's conversations were always about women and politics. He never talked about anything else. Tsafendas was dissatisfied with conditions in R.S.A and he has often criticized the government, his exact words I don't remember, but it seemed to me that he had a grudge against Dr. Verwoerd. He stood up a lot for the Coloureds. On a day a Bantu woman brought food for Tsafendas while he was in bed from his illness with his nose operation. He said he would like to have intercourse with her. This he said after she left the room. I rebuked him by saying that it is not allowed in the R.S.A. He said it did not bother him.

During the time I lived with Tsafendas, his behaviour was normal. He did not drink or smoke. I regarded him as a normal and very intelligent person. He told me that he was a sickly person and therefore cannot do very hard work. He told me that he was an interpreter by profession. According to my observation, Tsafendas was a gentle person. He was neat on his person, but his eating habits were not up to scratch. He was messy.

Tsafendas said he was born in Lourenço Marques, he went to school in Middelburg and that he visited many foreign countries. I know that he could speak several languages. Of Germany he talked a lot and he also spoke of the Russians, but not that he had ever visited Russia. He and the German spoke German. What was remarkable was that Tsafendas always told everyone that he is a Christian. As far as I know he just read his Bible in his room. Tsafendas never received any visitors, but he walked around a lot. I got the impression that Tsafendas was very secretive in his actions.

Statement taken by Major D.J. Rossouw and Troost

PIETER BENJAMIN GELDENHUYS³⁶⁸²

White male, employment officer at the Department of Labour, Cape Town.

On 05/25/1966 I was working at the department as employment officer when a white man, Demitrio Tsafendas came to seek assistance for work. At that time he was unemployed and wanted to register for work. Because he was on sickness benefits and staying in a nursing home "The Milton Convalescent Home", I insisted on a medical certificate which states that he is suitable for work. On 06/06/1966, he again came to the office, but was not in possession of the required medical certificate. On this day he was very talkative and blamed everyone except himself for the fact that he was unemployed. Because he could not produce the necessary medical certificate, I did not refer him to any work.

I got the impression that this man was eager to find work and according to his physical appearance, he appeared to be a person who is able to do work. He was neatly dressed. Because he did not have the necessary certificate, I did not take note at that time of what kind of work he can do. He did report to me that he could speak several languages and stated that he would like to be an interpreter.

³⁶⁸² Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

I spoke with this man twice and I never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally. The first time I spoke with him, I completed the record report cards with the necessary information.”

Statement taken by J.P.F. van Wyk S/SGT.

ROSENBERGH³⁶⁸³

Demitrio Tsafendas (he has a brother and sister in Pretoria who are classified as whites) has applied to the Dept. of the Interior to be classified as Coloured because his intention was to marry a Coloured woman. Information given by Mr Rosenbergh to Coetzee in the Detective Dept.

WILLIAM MARE VOLBRECHT³⁶⁸⁴

I am an adult white male, vice principal and chief psychologist associated to Porters Reform School, Tokai. I am also known as Billy.

I was born in Middelburg, Transvaal, where I began my schooling at the “English Medium Primary School”. I was a pupil from 1929 and stayed there until St. VI, that is to say more or less until 1935. The principal at that time was Mr. J. C. Cox.

I can remember that while I was a student, there were a group of Greek and Portuguese students who studied there mainly with the aim to improve their English. When they studied there, they were sent to a lower standard to learn the basics first. These students usually created the impression that they were at a higher level in certain subjects and we regarded them as very intelligent.

³⁶⁸³ Rosenbergh statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150. Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/7, Subject: Department van Immigrasie. NASA; Rosenbergh’s first name is not given in the statement.

³⁶⁸⁴ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Verklaring deur Majdor Venter. NASA.

As I can remember very well, Demitrio Tsafendas was during that time, one of the group of Portuguese and Greek students.

This school was well known for its healthy atmosphere where personal interests in the children are given which is most important for a child in his forming years. This also applies to the residence - Nelson House - where they were living.

At that stage Tsafendas was seen as white and there was never anything that pointed to someone regarding or treating him as a non-white or to him being discriminated against. He participated in the school activities and sports, for example, without excelling.

I cannot remember any case where he was ever guilty of misconduct. He was as far as I can remember, never a loner and freely mingled with us. There were no noticeable deviations. If there are cases of which I am unaware, it is possible that it may be recorded in the punishment book.

It was clear to us during those years that this group of Portuguese and Greeks who were a bit older than us and more often mixed with each other, made a habit of sodomy.

From the time I was in Standard III, I never saw him again.

According to my knowledge Mrs. Looock was the standard II teacher who, if she is still alive, will have a very thorough knowledge of him. A certain Miss. Peters, later Mrs. Verryn and later Mrs. Piking, now residing in Middelburg, was the Grades-teacher and she should remember him very well. The housemaster at Nelson House and later a principal of a school in Potchefstroom, Mr. J. Martindale, is another person who will know him very well.

Statement taken by J.P.F. van Wyk S/Sgt.

TUESDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1966

STATEMENTS

MELDON TILLEK³⁶⁸⁵

Coloured man, Reiger Park, Boksburg.

I was born on 17/4/1941 in Benoni. I am married and live with my parents.

Approximately in 1963, on a Sunday morning, I answered the telephone in my parents' home at 100 Montague Street, ACTONVILLE, BENONI. The person on the phone said he was at Benoni station and that he desired to attend the morning church service in our home and that he needed me to give him directions to find the house. A few minutes after the phone call that person arrived alone at our house and introduced himself as DEMETRIO TSAFENDAS and said that he was a member of our Church, which is called "The Way." Our Church is also known as "Two by Two" and "True Saints of Christ." I was also a member of this Church at that time. My Father, Harry Tillek, is an Elder in this Church and he conducts a service in our home every Sunday.

Tsafendas attended the service which my father conducted that morning. We talked together after the service. Tsafendas told me that he worked at ISCOR in Pretoria. He never gave me his home address. He said that he had travelled in many different countries in the world. However, he said that he had experienced many difficulties in the Republic of South Africa because of the strict Apartheid Policies because he had a dark complexion and was regarded as a Coloured person. He added that he had applied to be registered as a Coloured, but that he had been classified as a white person instead. He said that the white people always looked down on him and that consequently he felt more at home amongst Coloured people. He attended the morning service, had lunch with us and also attended the afternoon service. He departed from Benoni Station late that afternoon.

About a month after his visit at my parents' home, Tsafendas again pitched up on a Sunday for a service which was led by my father. He left directly after the service and I do not know what happened to him after that. We did not converse on that occasion. Tsafendas

³⁶⁸⁵ Meldon Tillek statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

never mentioned the name of Dr. Verwoerd in my presence and he never made any other comments about politics. His behaviour and conversations with me were normal and I never noticed anything unusual about him. I do remember that on the occasion of his first visit to my parental home, that one of the fellow residents suggested to him that as there were many Coloureds in our Church in Cape Town, he would probably find it easier to mix with the people there. I know a Coloured woman named Helen Daniels who is from Cape Town. I met her when she attended Church Conferences in Benoni and she often stayed at my parental home on those occasions. I cannot recall that any of our residents ever mentioned her name to Tsafendas.

Although Tsafendas never made any comments other than those previously mentioned, he gave the strong impression that he was very unhappy here as a result of the Government policies regarding separate development. I have read that a person named Demetrio Tsafendas has been detained in connection with murder of the late Dr. Verwoerd. I should definitely be able to identify the Tsafendas who visited my parents' house. I am prepared to testify about the facts contained in this declaration in any Court.

The declaration was taken by me in Benoni on 4/10/1966 at 10.15a.m.

Signed by Captain Pretorius.

Witnessed by Sergeant van der Merwe.

WALTER HARRY TILLEK³⁶⁸⁶

Coloured man, Reigers Park, Boksburg.

I was born on 29/12/1908 in Johannesburg. I am married and live with my family at the above address. I am a member and Elder of the "TRUE CHURCH OF CHRIST." I have been living at the above address for approximately the last 18 months. Previously I lived for 38 years at 100 Montague Street, ACTONVILLE BENONI. While I live in Actonville, Benoni,

³⁶⁸⁶ Walton Henry Tillek statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

we held communal Church Services at my home every Sunday. We did not have a Minister and I conducted the services as an Elder.

In about 1963, one Sunday morning, before the Church Service, a person who appeared to be a white person, arrived alone at my home, which was situated in a Coloured area. He introduced himself as Demetrio Tsafendas. He said that he had come to attend the morning Church Service in my home. He said that he was from Pretoria. He did not give me his address or any other personal details. He said that he simply was very interested in the church and that he wanted to attend the service. He never discussed either any church or government policies. I did not notice any abnormal behaviour by him and he behaved in a normal way. I led the service.

As far as I can remember Tsafendas was the only white person present at the service. The rest of the congregation were Coloureds, Bantu, and Indians. After the service which lasted about an hour, all the congregation left, including Tsafendas. About a month after the first service, Demetrio Tsafendas again arrived alone for a service. On that occasion we again did not discuss anything and he left after the service conducted by me. On both occasions Tsafendas stated that he had travelled per train from Pretoria. Tsafendas said that he had been given my address by one of our church's preachers. I know a Coloured woman named Helen Daniels and all I know about her is that she lives in Cape Town. I do not know her areas. I met her in Putfontein, Benoni, about ten years ago, at the time of a conference of our Church.

After that, I saw often saw her at Church Conferences. We never corresponded and I do not know her address. She is unmarried and a preacher in our Church. I am sure that I never gave the name or address of Helen Daniels to Demetrio Tsafendas, or discussed her with him. My church only spreads the good news of the Bible. I have been a member of this church since 1936. This church does not possess any buildings. I have no idea for how long Tsafendas has been a member of this church and do not have any knowledge of his personal details. After the death of the late Dr. Verwoerd I read that Tsafendas was being detained in this connection.

Declaration taken by me at Benoni on 4/10/66.

Signed: Captain Pretorius

Witness: Sergeant van der Merwe, 30849.

KEITH TERRENCE BERTRAM MARTINCICH³⁶⁸⁷

E/M/A. Lansdowne.

I am employed with Marine Diamond Corporation on the Colpontoon. When I signed on, on the 8th February, 1966, I found Tsafendas employed there as a pump operator. We were on the same shift, in adjoining cabins, and enjoying the same facilities on the boat. He spoke to me every day and I got the impression that he was sociable type. He mentioned to me that he has been to various countries. He did not have much clothing with him, and I got the impression that he was a poor man. I stood him a few drinks. When we were off and to Cape Town I stood him a meal at Cape Town station. After that we had some drinks at the buffet. He could not drink much and usually talked nonsense when he had been drinking.

On quite a few occasions he had discussed politics with me. He said he did not like the Government and that he was given a hard time in South Africa. He said the Government won't reign very long. He always referred to we don't like the Government. I asked him who was 'we'. He said "silence is Golden" and dropped the subject, and walked away. On various occasions he had said that he was staying with a coloured or Malay family in Lansdowne. He also said the coloureds were better than the Europeans. He said they were more friendly, and had more sense than the Europeans, and showed more understanding. When I said he was talking nonsense, he got cross and lifted himself as though he wanted to tackle me. I lifted myself as if I was going to defend myself, in doing so pointed my fingers pressed stiff together towards him. He immediately asked me if I was going to use Karate on him. I said yea, he was a bigger man than myself. He then sat down and asked me pardon.

I noticed that he was very familiar with the coloured crew on the boat, about which I reprimanded him. He mentioned to me about belonging to a gang or crowd of coloured people who were enjoying themselves in Cape Town. He never mentioned the church or that he was a Christian or a religious person. Mentioning the gang, I got the impression he meant a number of people. When off duty on shore leave I saw him travel the train to Lansdowne. He got off towards the coloured area. When I have been with him about 2 or 3 trips he said I

³⁶⁸⁷ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

must not say anything, as he was not coming back. He said he was expecting a large amount of money and is a big business man and that he was wasting his time with the firm on the boat.

He appeared fit, and I never got the impression that he was sick. He never complained that he was sick. I often watched him at his work. He appeared to be one of the laziest persons that I have ever seen. The only complaint he ever had, was about climbing the stairs and the rooking of the boat, and I used to see him walk in the passages as if he had all the time in the world. He was definitely lazy. The dredge pumps sucked up crawfish quite often. He was more interested to catch the crawfish than in his work. I chased him on a few occasions away from the gravel screen on account that diamonds came up there, though it would be very difficult to get to the gravel. The crawfish come on top, and can be caught by hand. He was often saying he wished he found himself a girlfriend for the night.

He said he was against the colour bar in the country. He spoke against the Government, but never against any individual. In many ways he had very childish manners. His table manners were very bad. He had a good appetite at all meals and enjoyed his meals in a messy way. I have watched him at times from behind, and noticed he was mumbling to himself. I overheard him mentioning that he had dived-from our boat to save people, like a hero in a dreamworld. He even clapped hands by himself, and jumped up and down like a child. I found this very amusing, thinking that there was something mentally wrong with him. When he noticed me, he carried on with his work. Once he said he would not mind getting a couple of diamonds. I told him he could try if he wanted to land in gaol.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

WEDNESDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1966

STATEMENTS

CAREL SEBASTIAAN VAN HEERDEN³⁶⁸⁸

Senior security officer of the Colpontoon, diamond boat of Marine Diamond Corporation, Wynberg.

Around January or February 1966, Demitrio Tsafendas made his first appearance on the same shift as I on the Colpontoon. We were transferred from the Marina with a small outboard boat to the Colpontoon. It was terrible rough seas, so much so that almost all of us old hands got seasick. It struck me that Tsafendas adapted well. He was one of the few who were not sick. With landing he filled the mess-basin on the lower deck with water and started shaving. His calm way struck me that he must know the sea.

Tsafendas was employed as a pump-or engineer operator and did not work under my direct supervision. I introduced myself to him and talked to him. He was friendly, outgoing, and was not aloof.

I noticed that his eating was messy. Otherwise he was completely normal. It was notable that he never slept as long as the others slept after his shift on duty. The shifts are 12 hours on and 12 hours off. Usually the night shift sleeps until about 6 pm. Tsafendas was very often already awake by 3 or 4 pm. He then came across as fit and rested. He never complained to me that the work bored him or made him weary. I have never conducted personal conversations with him with regards to his origin or background.

My shift was 10 days on and 10 days off. He had 20 days on and 10 off with the result that afterwards we were not often together on duty. I was later transferred to another boat and lost contact with him, with the result that I do not know what has become of him. As far as I know he did not drink.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

³⁶⁸⁸ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

HENDRIK JOHANNES MULDER³⁶⁸⁹

White male, accountant at Tecosa Knitting Mills, Claremont.

I am an expert in the field “Kung Fu” or better known as Chinese karate. I’m also an expert in the field of firearms, explosives and manufacturing of bombs. From 1944-1950 I was a professional deep sea diver in South America. I learned karate here. During this period I visited Argentina with friends and was arrested and detained, because it was alleged that I and others tried to kill Juan Peron, then the president of Argentina. We escaped and returned via a torpedo boat to Venezuela where I worked. January 1951 I returned to South Africa. I worked in Port Elizabeth for six years and then moved to Cape Town.

During 1960 or 1961, an article in the supplement to “Die Burger” appeared which discussed my skill with firearms, etc. There were also pictures of me with the article. Shortly after the article appeared, three men came to my house one night. All three were white. They did not introduce themselves to me. One person asked me: “do you like money,” I replied, “of course, who does not?” He then said that they wanted me to perform an assignment of theirs. It is dangerous yet easy. I wanted to know what they want me to do. They then told me that I had to shoot Dr. Verwoerd and I will receive £20,000 in compensation. I would receive £10,000 as soon as I sign a document stating that I will do the shooting and £10,000 to me or my wife as soon as the job is done. The people spoke English and seemed to be Jews. I made them understand that I was not interested in such a thing at all. The next day I called the Security Police. The same day, two members of the Security police came to see me and took the statement. The one was Erasmus (I’m not sure, but I know he is now in diamond research), the other one was van Wyk. I gave all details and the description of the three persons.

During April the following year, Dr. Verwoerd was shot by Pratt. Before this incident, the people called me several times and asked if I would not accept their offer. I cannot remember well, but I doubt that the Security Police came to see me after the shooting. I also gave the Security Police information about the South African Freedom Movement. About a year ago, a person called me one night. I do not have a phone in my house, but my

³⁶⁸⁹ Hendrik Johannes Mulder statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

neighbours Mrs. Christian, receives phone calls for me and called me to the phone. It happens often so she will not be aware of this particular case. A male person referred to the earlier offer made to me and then said that it could be arranged that I get a job in the Parliamentary house and then I will be near Dr. Verwoerd and can "reach him easier." I once again said that I was not interested in it. I phoned the Security Police the next day and reported the incident. I think I spoke with Captain. Rossouw. It was by telephone. He thanked me and said everything is being done to protect our Prime Minister and I don't have to worry at all. This conversation was a roughly a year before the murder of the late Dr. Verwoerd occurred.

About 14 days ago, someone called me at work and told me that they have someone in the Parliamentary House for their work and that Advocate Vorster will be First minister for exactly six months before he will be killed. After a notice appeared in the press that an investigation will occur and where people were invited to provide information I telephoned and stated my willingness to give a statement. I gained my knowledge about explosives and time bombs in my course as deep-sea diver. The incident about Advocate Vorster I did not report to the Security Police, because I felt that I was making a fool of myself.

COMMENTS ON MULDER'S STATEMENT

On October 6, the police interviewed Petrus Gerhardus Loubser,³⁶⁹⁰ a former Security Police officer, in connection with Mulder's statement (his statement made on the day in question is included later in this chapter). Subsequently, on October 14 the Commission of Enquiry interviewed Mulder and Loubser again, along with Det. Sgt. Johannes Petrus Francois van Wyk, who was also involved in the case. Mulder's testimony to the Commission is similar to his statement here and is given in the following chapter, in the section titled "The Mulder Case."³⁶⁹¹

Loubser testified to the Commission (his testimony is given in the following chapter, see "The Mulder Case") and to the police that he interviewed Hendrik Mulder after he told police he had been offered a large sum of money to blow up the *Die Burger* newspaper by

³⁶⁹⁰ The surname in his statement to the police is given as Loubser, while in his testimony to the COE it is given as Laubser.

³⁶⁹¹ Hendrik Johannes Mulder testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

planting a time bomb, but he could not describe the men who made the offer. On another occasion, he said he was working as a mechanic at a garage when a customer tried to persuade him to shoot Verwoerd. He said he could not describe the customer and the garage itself was by now closed. Laubser said, “My opinion is he has a fantastic imagination.”³⁶⁹²

Detective van Wyk testified to the Commission (his testimony is available in the following chapter, see “The Mulder Case”) that after Mulder reported the alleged offer to blow up the *Die Burger* newspaper building, the police secretly observed his house. Mulder later told him the two men had returned during this period, but the police watchers said no-one visited. The detective said Mulder claimed a man at his workplace held Communist meetings, an allegation police found to be false. As for the blindfolded visit to a block of flats, van Wyk said the police considered it “altogether too fantastic and entirely implausible.”³⁶⁹³

By reading the two policemen’s testimonies about Mulder, we may note the inconsistencies in his far-fetched story (for example he was asked to kill Dr Verwoerd in 1959, but he reported it to the police only in 1962); his inability to describe any of these contacts with precision; and his two clear lies (the alleged Communist meetings and his claim that someone visited him while the police secretly had his house under observation). This strongly suggests that both men had every right to think that Mulder was lying. As to his connection with Tsafendas, the only remote connection was when Mulder claimed his contacts told him they could arrange access to Dr Verwoerd by securing a position in Parliament.

That Tsafendas had reached Dr. Verwoerd by just such a method, as a Parliamentary messenger, had been all over the newspapers for more than a month. It is well within the bounds of possibility that an evident fantasist such as Mulder could have made up such a claim retrospectively to strengthen his story.

³⁶⁹² Petrus Gerhardus Laubser testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

³⁶⁹³ Johannes Petrus Francois van Wyk testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

THURSDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1966

TSAFENDAS'S HEARING

As instructed by the September 8, 1966 remand order of Chief Magistrate C. Willman, Tsafendas appeared on Thursday, October 6, 1966 before a specially constituted court in Caledon Square police station. The hearing lasted for four minutes and fifty seconds and Tsafendas was remanded for summary trial on October 17 at the Criminal Sessions, Cape Town, on an allegation of murder.³⁶⁹⁴ The proceedings took place before Mr. Willman in a room measuring some fifteen feet by fifteen feet and containing seven policemen and four reporters, as well as court officers. Willman presided, Bloomberg appeared on behalf of Tsafendas, (though Wilfrid Cooper was named as defence counsel), and Mr. H. Jacobs appeared as senior prosecutor. Tsafendas wore a crumpled brown suit and white shirt without a tie; he was not handcuffed and stood with his hands clasped behind his back; he had no waist belt and hitched up his trousers from time to time.

At 10.30 am, Willman was ushered into the room and Jacobs asked that the preparatory examination opened on September 9, 1966 against Tsafendas be remitted for trial. He said the indictment had been served on Tsafendas and advocate Cooper had been informed of today's proceedings.³⁶⁹⁵ The indictment read: *That DEMITRIO TSAFENDAS is guilty of the crime of MURDER IN THAT upon the 6th September, 1966, and at Cape Town, in the District of the CAPE, he did wrongfully, unlawfully and maliciously Kill and murder DR. THE HONOURABLE HENDRIK FRENSCH VERWOERD, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa.*³⁶⁹⁶

Willman told Tsafendas he was being committed for summary trial and meanwhile would be detained in the cells at the police station. Tsafendas spoke for the first and only time. According to the South African Press of the time, Tsafendas, leaning forward slightly, said, "My lord, I do not understand the word summary." Willman replied, "It means that you will be tried without preparatory examination." Tsafendas responded, "Yes, my lord," and the court adjourned.³⁶⁹⁷ According to Bloomberg, Tsafendas asked him and not the magistrate

³⁶⁹⁴ *The Cape Argus*, 6 October 1966:1, 'Tsafendas: Question to Court.'

³⁶⁹⁵ *The Cape Argus*, 6 October 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas: Question to Court.'

³⁶⁹⁶ Bloomberg, 2007: 80-81.

³⁶⁹⁷ *The Cape Argus*, 6 October 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas: Question to Court.'

what “summary trial” meant.³⁶⁹⁸ With policemen holding onto his jacket sleeves, Tsafendas was escorted across a narrow passage to a lift giving access to the cells.³⁶⁹⁹

STATEMENTS

PETRUS GERHARDUS LOUBSER³⁷⁰⁰

White male, former Security Police officer, Bellville.

From September 1961 to 1963 I was involved in the security section of the SA Police in Cape Town. Then I left the police. A white man, Mr. Hendrik Mulder, is known to me. I met him in connection with work that I had done for the security police while I was still in the service. I cannot remember exactly, but it was during 1962 when Mulder telephoned the Head of Safety of that time, Colonel Van der Westhuizen. I was then instructed to meet with him. That same evening I went to see him. He then said to me said that three unknown persons paid him a visit. They told him they had seen a report in a supplication of “Die Burger” reporting his skill with firearms. They would say to him that they could use him. He would have asked them what they wanted to use him for and they would say that they want him to bomb the offices of “Die Burger.” They proposed to him that he return to the offices of “Die Burger” and give a further story about his skill with firearms. He had to take a package with him that contained a time bomb. He had to leave the package somewhere in an office.

Mr. Mulder said he wanted the people to return, therefore he had told them that he would reflect on the matter and that they can come and see him again. He wanted to, in fact, use the time to inform the police, which he did afterwards. Arrangements were made with Mr. Mulder to inform the Security Police when the men arrived again, but he never did that. I was scouting for a long period, but no one was ever noticed at his home. On a second occasion, a few days later, I spoke to Mulder again and he said that when the three persons came to see him, they also told him that they wanted to establish a “Task Force”, that they already have 20,000 members and that they wanted to use to him as an instructor. I found it strange that he didn’t give such an important report to me before. A time later I saw Mr. Mulder again at

³⁶⁹⁸ Bloomberg, 2007: 81.

³⁶⁹⁹ *The Cape Argus*, 6 October 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas: Question to Court.’

³⁷⁰⁰ Petrus Gerhardus Loubser statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

a shop in Woodstock. He told me that he took his car to a garage in District Six for repairs and that the owner, a Jew, had requested an absurd amount for the repairs, he could not pay the amount. The Jew then offered him an absurd amount of money if he would kill Dr. Verwoerd. Mulder said that the incident happened a few years ago, just after Dr. Verwoerd became prime minister. He could not give the Jew's name and could not give the address where the garage was. He said the garage no longer exists. Mr. Mulder was usually very vague and could give no direct information that could be followed up. I deny that Mulder ever reported to me that three Jews approached him to shoot Dr. Verwoerd. I never took a statement from him.

Statement taken by J.P.F. van Wyk S/SGT.

REDVERS QUINTIN WAKFER³⁷⁰¹

I am an adult white male employed by the Cape Town City Council at the Power Station, Dock Rd., Cape Town and reside at 25 Forth Ave., Fish Hoek. On 10/09/65, Mr. D. Tsafendas applied for a job as a fitter at the Power Station. I interviewed him and subsequently he was taken on as a fitter in the ash plant. This was on the 13th of September, 1965. He appeared to be quite normal and was neatly dressed. I never worked with him but received a report that he was not a good worker and I have instructions that he should be dismissed. He was then dismissed on 25/10/65. To avoid dismissal he resigned.

(SGD.) R.Q. Wakfer

Statement taken by me – (SGD.) J.P.F. van Wyk D/Sgt.

Cape Town 6/10/66.

³⁷⁰¹ Redvers Quintin Wakfer statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub File: 1/5, Subject Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

OWEN SMORENBURG³⁷⁰²

White male, employed at the Power Station, Dock Hd., Cape Town.

The person Tsafendas is known to me. He worked with me during September/October, 1965. He worked with me for about five weeks. At that time I was doing work in the Cape Town docks. Mr. Tsafendas was assisting me with rough engineering fitting. During that time I got the idea that he was very headstrong. He did not want to work according to instructions but wanted to do things his way.

Mr. Tsafendas was very talkative and gave the impression that he was very friendly. He wanted to talk to everybody and it became known to me that he was able to speak different languages. While working there one day he spoke to people on a boat but he was speaking in a strange language and I could not understand him. The job we did in the docks was about 40 ft. underneath the ground and he was obviously scared of working there because it was too dangerous he said. Sometimes Mr. Tsafendas acted childish and did things which you wouldn't expect from a man of his age. One day for instance he loosen a bolt which was rusted. He asked whether he should put on a new one and when told to do so, he went along and put the rusted one back again.

He never discussed politics with me, but one day I told him laughingly that the place where we work was an ideal place for Min. Vorster to put his political prisoners. In a short discussion that followed he mentioned that Min. Vorster was the right man in that job and also said something to the effect that the then Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, was the right man to be in that position. Mr. Tsafendas was never satisfied with his salary. He always complained that it was not enough. He was no good as a fitter and was dismissed for that reason, but instead of dismissing him, he was given the opportunity to resign. On the day when he was dismissed he said that he worked all over the world but now that he was working for a stupid place like the Cape Town City Council, he was told that he was not good enough.

Statement taken by J.P.F. van Wyk S/SGT.

³⁷⁰² Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

HARRY HALL³⁷⁰³

European male, lift technician at the Cape Town Medical School.

About during March, 1966 I first met Demitrio (now known as Tsafendas). I am a member of the Christian Church and as such meetings are held at my house for members of the faith. We have evening meetings on Wednesdays and Sundays as well as a morning meeting on Sundays. Demitrio came to my house on advice from one of the elder preachers - Mr. Johnson - who had directed him to my house. I accepted him as such. He did not attend regularly, but about 2/3s of the meetings. He participated at times in our Bible readings and discussions. I got the definite impression that he had no proper understanding at the meaning of the Bible. We could not look upon his as an enlightened person as far as the teaching of the Bible was concerned.

After meetings people never stay socially, so I had very few discussions with him. He told me he had been in the American Merchant Marine during the last war, also that he had been to many places. He never discussed anything political, I did not even know where he worked. He said he was living in Observatory, and after been missing for some time, he said he had moved to Woodstock and that it was out of the way. I regarded him as a sub-standard intellect but otherwise found him to be reasonably normal.

On Sunday 3/9/66 he attended both services at my house. I have on occasions noticed that when he sat with his hands on his knees, his legs would tremble quite violently. I cannot remember if I had noticed anything peculiar about him the very last Sunday. During the following week I learnt through the newspapers that he had been detained in connection with the assassination of the Prime Minister (Dr. Verwoerd).

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost D/Sergt. 23505

³⁷⁰³ Harry Hall statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

VICTOR RIBTON³⁷⁰⁴

White male, proprietor of Victor Ribton Agencies Camps Bay.

On the morning of the 6th September, 1966 I was on my way to George. I stopped at the General Post Office Cape Town opposite the Darling Street entrance to post letters and to clear my post box, the time being approximately 9.15 a.m. On passing the telephone booths on the right hand side I noticed a white men whom I immediately recognised as one Carrol who served with me in the South African Naval Forces during World War 2. I did not get a full view of his face but, although I only saw him side faced I am 90% certain that it was Carrol. He did not see or recognise me.

I then noticed that he was waiting outside the centre booth, all the booths being occupied at the time. He appeared restless and agitated which I thought at the time was due to the fact that the booths were all occupied. Later on in the day, on the National Road just past Riversdale when I heard the news of the Prime Minister's death on the car radio, I had given Carrol's presence at the Post Office some thought but had not been suspicious until the following day when the newspapers reported that the assassin had left the Houses of Parliament earlier that morning to go to town and I knew that Carrol was employed at the Parliament. When I later read that all information, however trivial, should be reported, I decided to report this incident.

Statement taken by ... (Indecipherable name) D/W/Officer, S.A. Police. Commissioner of oaths.

GILLIAN CLAIRE LIEBERMAN³⁷⁰⁵

White female, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation. Cape Town.

About during March 1966 I got to know Demitrio Tsafendas. He came into my office at M.D.C. as an employee with a query. He said that he had some trouble with his ears and

³⁷⁰⁴ Victor Ribton statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 3, Sub File: 1/5. NASA.

³⁷⁰⁵ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

nose and wished to see a doctor. I questioned him to ascertain whether his complaint was private or due to an injury on duty. He mentioned that the vibration and noise in the pump room (on the Colpontoon) were effecting his ears. I made an appointment with the Co. Doctor (Dr. Lazzard. It later came to my notice that he had been referred to Mr. Breme Goldman (ear and nose specialist) in Medical Centre, CT. After this, he came into my office on more than one occasion. I had various discussions with him. I got quite interested in him as an individual. He mentioned that he was well-travelled; he mentioned having been to Portugal, England and the Continent. I think he also mentioned the East. He said he could speak the language of the countries he had been to. He mentioned Portuguese, and I think German. He spoke to me quite good English but with an accent.

He complained about the type of man we had employed — meaning the people who worked with him. He mentioned particularly the Afrikaans co-workers as being intolerant of the white South African people. I asked him how can he generalize, as no person is the same. He inferred that he was a lone person and with no ties or family or friends. He also mentioned that he would like to have his meals alone on the boat. He complained about the stops and ladders which he had to climb as also again about the noise of the pumps. He was a very dissatisfied person. I told him we could not arrange separate facilities for him, and inferred that as he is so very dissatisfied, it would be better for him to resign. He said that would be the best.

About his intolerance of the South African white people, he probed me for my political opinion. By his talks he gave me the impression that he does not agree with authority (Governmental or other). I cut him short, saying that in my capacity of my work I do not discuss politics. I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange type of person, a unique character. Apart from him being well travelled etc. I got the impression that he was physically different in dress and appearance. He was a big man, with a particularly striking big hat, stainless steel teeth, sloppy dirty clothing.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505. Commissioner of oaths.

JAMES JOHNSTON³⁷⁰⁶

Coloured male. Minister of the Christian Church. Plumstead.

We have no church building but we gather together for worship in the homes of members of our denomination. The Christian Church caters for both European and non-European races. We are not multi-racial but we do gather with coloured members of the church during our annual Christian Church conference. We, however, obey the apartheid laws. By this I mean that members of different races eat and sleep separately. We go out in two's and we receive no salary whatever. Our needs are met by voluntary contributions from the members of our church. The Christian Church organisation is worldwide. I am not sure of the membership for the whole of the Republic but membership for the Western Province is in the vicinity of 800. Our church does mission work. The function of the organisation consists of missionary work and evangelistic meetings. We adhere strictly to the teaching and example of Christ. We spread no literature of any kind and members are encouraged to abide strictly by the scriptures. Our members of the church gather together in their respective organs every Sunday morning and evening and Wednesday evening for the study of the scriptures. Members residing in the various suburbs gather together in an appointed home in the. Suburb. We have no collections. Mr. H. Hall residing at 3 Glenroy, Pinelands, is one of the members in whose home church gatherings are held.

I know Mr. Demitrio Tsafendas. I met him during last year i.e. shortly after he arrived in the Caps. He told me he was residing at Mr. Daniels in Bellville and attending services that were held in the coloured homes in Bellville South. I then asked him seeing he was s Greek or Portuguese, whether he considered himself a European or a coloured men. He told me he classified himself as coloured. I asked him if he had his identity card and he said this was being attended to in Pretoria. I saw Tsafendas periodically after that, but I had no discussions with him.

In the early part of 1966 Tsafendas came to see me at Mr. Slater's home. He then told me that he has work on the Marine Diamond Corporation boats. The subject of his race came up again and he then showed me a small slip of paper, which was typed, with his name and address and identity number. I told him then that it appears that he was classified as a European and that he must on that account withdraw from worship gatherings in the

³⁷⁰⁶ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

coloured homes. He told me he had a room in Observatory and I then asked him to attend services in Mr. Hall's house in Pinelands.

I do not know Tsafendas very well and the longest discussion I had with him was for about 10 minutes at each occasion. He told me he was anxious to get married especially to some coloured girl. I told him he could not do that whilst classified as a European. He told me this could be done by going to Lourenço Marques or Basutoland. I told him it was entirely against the law and advised him strongly against it. Tsafendas never discussed politics with me. He did tell me about his travels and his knowledge of different languages.

After he had left Marine Diamond Corporation, Tsafendas came to see me and said that he would be seeking other employment but did not mention seeking employment in the House of Assembly. He never discussed his reasons for moving among the coloured people, nor did he give me to understand that he was more sympathetic towards the coloureds than towards the Europeans.

The Sunday night before the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd I saw Tsafendas at a service in Mr. Hall's home in Pinelands, but he did not discuss anything or take part in the service that night. He appeared to be perfectly normal. I must say I did not speak to him, apart from saying good night. I did think Tsafendas to be slightly unbalanced and that he seemed to have a mysterious background but otherwise he appeared to be all-right.

Statement taken by Maj. D.J. Rossouw.

FRIDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1966

STATEMENTS

FELIX GEORGE MILES³⁷⁰⁷

European male, 56 years, Messenger at the House of Assembly, Parliament House, Cape Town.

States:

I have been in the employ of the House of Assembly as a messenger since the 1st of August, 1966. I applied for a messenger's position at the House of Assembly in person about a month prior to the 1st of August, 1966. I received a written notification on 29/7/66 to the effect that I must be available on 1/8/66 for an interview.

I arrived at the House of Assembly at about 8 am on 1/8/66. There were about 6 or 7 of us who waited to be interviewed that morning, amongst others TSAFENDAS. We applicants were having a general conversation among ourselves whilst we were waiting for our turn to be interviewed. I never spoke to TSAFENDAS. I do remember him saying to someone or other that he is able to speak seven languages and that he expects to get a position as an interpreter. Both Tsafendas and I were accepted that morning and commenced duties that same day. Tsafendas and I were put to perform duties at the main entrance. I never spoke to him on that day.

The next day I was sent to work at Mr Burger's office, where I still am to this day. I do not know what happened to Tsafendas after this or what his duties entailed. I saw him occasionally after this but never bothered to talk to him. Between 2.10 and 2.15 pm on 6/9/66 I was standing in Mr Burger's office. The bell had just started to ring notifying the members that the House is about to start. I saw Tsafendas entering the office. I do not know where he had come from. He started talking to me and said that he had not seen me for a long time. I told him that I had been away for the long week-end. I was under the impression that he had come to collect newspapers. It was the usual time for various messengers to collect the newspapers for the individual members. I told him that the newspapers have not been

³⁷⁰⁷ Felix George Miles statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 2, File: 1. NASA.

delivered yet. At that moment, one of the members entered my office to collect the money for a cheque I had cashed for him.

Tsafendas must have left the office when the member entered. I cannot say where Tsafendas went after he left Mr Burger's office. After I had given the member his money, the phone rang. I had been on the telephone for about a minute and had just put the receiver down when I heard people shouting at the door leading to the chamber. People were shouting that an ambulance should be requisitioned. I tried to get through to the ambulance but all the lines were engaged. I learned afterwards that Dr. Verwoerd had been stabbed by Tsafendas. When Tsafendas had been with us in Mr Burger's office I did not notice anything unusual about his clothing or behaviour. I consider it rather strange that Tsafendas should have talked to me that day. I have never spoken to him before except to greet him.

Statement taken by ... (Indecipherable signature) Comm. of Oaths

EDMUND GEORGE STOLLENKAMP³⁷⁰⁸

White, Male. 7 Allgate Street, Woodstock.

I'm a night watchman employed by the Larpens Agency. I serve at the ships in Table Bay docks and remember the ship Eleni. The last night of my service, I remember well. I served from 7am on Sunday 04/09/66 until 9am Monday, 05/09/66. My shift was over at 7am, but that morning I could not come down from the ship because the gangplank (drawbridge) was disabled and was drawn up. The ship was also moved and I had to wait until the bridge was lowered. The day guard, Maile, arrived shortly after 7am and waited below. He had the morning newspaper with him. After waiting below for a long time, he talked to me. He told me that Dr. Verwoerd is dead. Next to me stood a young man who worked on the ship. This man's mother was on the quay below. I told Maile he should not say everything. (I thought he made a joke.) He said Dr. Verwoerd - the Prime Minister. I asked the young man next to me if he had heard that Dr. Verwoerd is dead. The young man then spoke with his mother in Greek and I could not understand what he was talking about. I

³⁷⁰⁸ Edmund George Stollenkamp statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

forgot the incident and later went home. Maile did not tell me that the woman said that Dr. Verwoerd is dead. He made me understand he read it in the newspaper. I am convinced that I understood correctly. I cannot say at what time the woman came there. The young man pointed to a man who was with his mother and said his father was dead and that man is going to become his father. There was no other woman with them.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505. Commissioner of oaths.

MONDAY, 10 OCTOBER 1966

STATEMENTS

REGINALD THOMAS ARTHUR DANIELS³⁷⁰⁹

Adult European male, Cape Town.

I am a European male resides at above address. I am not in possession of a Passport and have never been outside the Union of South Africa, since my date of birth. Demetrio Tsafendas is unknown to me, and I have never seen him before. I don't know any doctor by the name of Ahlhelm and also never received letters from outside the RSA.

(Signed) R. Daniels

Cape Town. 10³⁷¹⁰/10/66. 11 am.

Statement taken by me (Indecipherable signature.)

³⁷⁰⁹ Reginald Thomas Arthur Daniels statement to the police, 10 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁷¹⁰ The date could also be the 18th of October as the number is handwritten and it is not very clear.

WEDNESDAY, 12 OCTOBER 1966

THE *ELENI*

This was a crucial day for the investigation, when, exactly one month and six days after the assassination, the South African police finally interviewed the crew of the tanker *Eleni*. The vessel had arrived in Cape Town on the 24th of July 1966 and remained docked there until the 3rd of September 1966, sailing out just three days before Dr. Verwoerd's assassination.³⁷¹¹ Tsafendas visited the ship daily and became very friendly with the crew.³⁷¹²

Tsafendas had testified to the police, as seen in his two statements of the 11th and the 19th of September, that he visited the *Eleni* every day while she was docked in Cape Town. The crew's testimonies were therefore important in determining Tsafendas's movements in the days before the assassination. Tsafendas had bought a gun from two members of the crew and was planning to escape on board the *Eleni*. Perhaps more importantly, Reginald Robert Maile, a ship guard, had testified to the police that three days before the assassination he was asked by Maria Kokkinidou, a woman who often visited the *Eleni*, where her son had been hired on a temporary basis, if "Dr. Verwoerd is dead?" Edmund George Stollenkamp, the ship's night watchman, had also participated in the conversation. As we will see in the chapter on the *Commission of Enquiry*, the *Eleni* would have a prominent role in the investigation. The *Commission of Enquiry* had a file specifically on the *Eleni* and the Report contains a big section of ten long paragraphs about it.

The report of the Commission of Enquiry declared that the statements by crew members (four of which are appended below) were taken on October 12, 1966, in Venice, Italy. Twelve of sixteen crew members interviewed by the author confirmed that they, along with all other *Eleni* crewmen, were questioned by the South African police in Venice (The reason the other four were not questioned will be discussed shortly), though no-one remembers the exact date. However, only four statements (plus one sheet of testimony by Dimitrios Zafiriadis) from the thirty-eight men interviewed, were found in the National Archives of South Africa.

³⁷¹¹ Michael N. Fountotos statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

³⁷¹² Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA; Peter Protoulis statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

The report of the Commission of Enquiry talks extensively about the importance of the *Eleni*. About that specific incident, it states: “*It is impossible to establish with any certainty exactly what was said (in the Eleni about Dr. Verwoerd’s death). However, there is no doubt that Dr. Verwoerd’s death was mentioned on that morning three days before his death. What makes these incidents more than a coincidence is the fact that this was said at the ship which was visited daily for almost 40 days by the man who killed Dr. Verwoerd, where he bought a pistol and tried to buy a knife which he wanted to use —according to at least one statement made by him subsequently— to kill Dr. Verwoerd. The fact that Dr. Verwoerd’s death was mentioned at that ship was probably more than pure coincidence.*”³⁷¹³

In reference to the above incident, the Commission of Enquiry asked Major Rossouw:

COMMISSION: Another thing is that there is a lot of evidence that on the Friday morning BEFORE the murder people had been running back and forth screaming to one another that Dr. Verwoerd had been murdered – are you aware of this?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes I am aware of that ...³⁷¹⁴

Taking all the above under consideration, it is logical that the police would interview all the crew and fifteen of the sixteen members of the crew interviewed by the author declared that the entire crew was indeed interviewed by the South African police in Venice. The sixteenth sailor interviewed by the author, Dionisis Lallis, met Tsafendas in Cape Town, but he does not remember being questioned by the police nor even of being in Venice at the time. It is very possible that he was not questioned, as he was almost certainly one of those crew members who were replaced by other Greek seamen after the *Eleni* left Cape Town. Lallis remembers Tsafendas clearly, but has no recollection of anything else.³⁷¹⁵

Two men, Vasilis Perselis, a steward and a cousin of Emanuel Perselis who was already working on the *Eleni*, and Ilias Kokkinos, assistant cook, were with the *Eleni* in Venice at the time, but they were not questioned by the police because they were not present in Cape Town. They joined the *Eleni* in Venice as crew replacements. However, they do remember their shipmates being questioned by the police over several hours.³⁷¹⁶ Emanuel

³⁷¹³ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 86. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³⁷¹⁴ Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

³⁷¹⁵ Dionisios Lallis in a personal interview, 19 June 2015.

³⁷¹⁶ Ilias Kokkinos in a personal interview, 30 August 2014; Emanuel Perselis in a personal interview, 30 November 2015.

Sakellaridis was captain of the *Eleni* up to April 1966, when Michael N. Fountotos took over and was very familiar with the crew. He was not present in Venice or in Cape Town, but said in a personal interview with the author that he was told by Captain Fountotos and several members of the crew that everyone who met Tsafendas in Cape Town was questioned in Venice.³⁷¹⁷ The fact that the police recorded the few remarks made by Dimitris Zafiriadis, a member of the crew who refused to give a formal statement, suggests that the police must have recorded all the other crewmen's answers or remarks, too. However, as stated before, only four of these statements were found.

THE ELENI AFTER CAPE TOWN AND BEFORE VENICE

According to thirteen of the thirty-eight men who were on board the *Eleni* in Cape Town, a radio message was transmitted to the ship from the Greek Ministry of Shipping a few days after they left Cape Town and while they were still at sea, though no one remembers the exact date. The message said that the South African police wanted to speak to them urgently regarding the South African Prime Minister's assassination by someone who had visited the *Eleni* and bought a gun from a member of the crew. The Ministry asked everyone to cooperate to the utmost with the South African authorities. According to Grigoris Pouftis, the *Eleni's* radio operator, the South African police appeared desperate to speak to the crew and the Greek Ministry even asked the captain to return to Cape Town, so the police could question them there. After consulting with the tanker's owners, Captain Fountotos suggested to the Ministry that it made more sense to meet with the police in Mina Al-Ahmadi port in Kuwait, which was the tanker's destination, as it would take half as long to get there as to return to Cape Town.³⁷¹⁸

According to the thirteen seamen, everyone panicked when they heard about the assassination. The captain gathered the crew together and told them they were going to be questioned by the South African police in Kuwait. He urged them to be truthful and tell the police everything they knew about Tsafendas, adding that Tsafendas himself, under questioning, would have disclosed all of his activities, including his association with them.

Fearing that the ship would be searched, Kambouris and Vasilakis retrieved the

³⁷¹⁷ Emanuel Sakellaridis in a personal interview, 19 January 2014.

³⁷¹⁸ Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009.???

banned books about apartheid which Tsafendas had given them and threw them overboard. Zafiriadis thought they were overreacting and just hid his books.³⁷¹⁹ Zafiriadis also urged his crewmates not to co-operate with the police since this would be tantamount to supporting apartheid and also could incriminate Tsafendas, who he admired for what he had done. Captain Fountotos, though he opposed apartheid, told Zafiriadis and the crew that they would be in trouble if they did not co-operate and he urged Zafiriadis to stop trying to influence his colleagues. Captain Fountotos reminded the crew that many civilians were on board *Eleni* while they were docked in Cape Town and that the police would already know about Tsafendas's relationship with them.³⁷²⁰

Every day until they reached Kuwait, the crew discussed what they would tell the police. They believed that Tsafendas would have told everything under torture. Kambouris, Vasilakis, Kantas and Zafiriadis did not want to testify to the police at all, seeing them as representatives of apartheid. The crew held several meetings to decide what should be said and to agree a joint approach.³⁷²¹ Vasilis Perselis and other crew members teased young Mavronas about selling a gun to Tsafendas, even though they knew he could not have killed him with it. At the time, they were not aware that Dr. Verwoerd had been stabbed to death.³⁷²²

Alachiotis, Aspras, Kantas, Billis, Pouftis and Zafiriadis decided not to reveal that they sang Communist songs with Tsafendas, since this would expose them as Communists and possibly cost them their jobs. Captain Fountotos knew that some of his crew were Communists, but did not care and probably did not know about their singing with Tsafendas. According to Alachiotis, Billis, Vasilakis, Kantas, Perselis, Mastromanolis and Pouftis, the majority of the crew were left-wing and quite a few were Communists. Most of those who were not left wingers had no interest in politics and only three-four were rightists or royalists. The Communists knew who the royalists were; they were very careful with them and never

³⁷¹⁹ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

³⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁷²¹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

³⁷²² Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015.

discussed politics with them.³⁷²³

That period, late-1966, was a tense one in Greek politics. The wounds of the Greek Civil War were still open and the nation was only months away from a military coup that would herald a seven-year military dictatorship. Most important, the Greek Communist Party was illegal and Communists were watched and prosecuted. Informers were everywhere, spying on political suspects and reporting their activities to the police. The singing of Communist songs had taken place on an evening where none of the right-wingers was on board and it involved only the Communists. Since it would have been impossible for the police to know that such thing occurred, they decided not to reveal it.

The other seamen who had discussed politics with Tsafendas, decided not to reveal the fact, or at least to downplay it. They thought this would be better for them, and many knew little about politics anyway. Billis, Kantas and Zafiriadis decided to say nothing about the books Tsafendas gave them unless they were asked directly. Zafiriadis was adamant that he would not testify because he did not want to incriminate Tsafendas.³⁷²⁴

An important issue was whether they should tell the police that Tsafendas had taken them to the township in Cape Town. Tsafendas himself had said the police had informers in most of these places. Captain Fountotos, who was aware of their visit, said they should mention it to the police. What's more, most of the crew knew about it and keeping it secret would have been next to impossible. They therefore decided to be open about their visit, saying they just wanted to see how Africans lived and perhaps buy some African souvenirs. There was also the question of sex; some seamen had slept with African women, which was forbidden by apartheid. Tsafendas had warned them against that, since the police had "ears and spies everywhere." The crew decided to take their chances and not mention it.³⁷²⁵

A crucial issue for those who had taken part in it was the discussion about justifiable homicide. On his last night aboard the tanker, Tsafendas had proposed that it was morally justifiable to kill a tyrant and that Dr. Verwoerd came into that category. Whether or not to tell the police about this discussion divided opinion. A lot of the men had been present,

³⁷²³ Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; ??? Emmanuel Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

³⁷²⁴ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

³⁷²⁵ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

including some civilians. Aspras, Kantas and Pouftis believed they should mention it because it was important and the chances were Tsafendas had already told the police. Alachiotis and Billis disagreed, fearing such a topic might get them into trouble and considering it was only a theoretical discussion. The issue was argued about for days. As for Tsafendas's revelation about "playing the fool" to avoid service in the Portuguese army, this was not discussed. No one thought of it as they considered it to be unimportant and irrelevant.

By the time the *Eleni* reached Mina Al-Ahmadi, opinion was still divided. However, this proved irrelevant since the South African police were not there. After the ship left Kuwait, they did not return to the issue, thinking the police would no longer want to see them. Fifteen of the men interviewed by the author said they were not told they would be interviewed in Venice.

None of the crew remembers the exact date of the interviews, but according to the report of the Commission of Enquiry, it was October 12.³⁷²⁶ Early that morning, while the tanker was docked in Venice, South African policemen went on board. They wore civilian clothes and were accompanied by an official from a Greek consulate somewhere in Italy³⁷²⁷ who translated for those who did not speak English. He was perhaps also intended to demonstrate the Greek Government's willingness to assist in the matter. Captain Fountotos told his crew that he had only just been informed and asked them to co-operate with the police. Some of the crew believed the police deliberately kept them in the dark so they could not prepare their answers.³⁷²⁸

The number of policemen involved in the questioning was probably three, though this is not certain. Six of the men said three while the remaining nine could not remember. However, all say the interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis, that is, three policemen simultaneously interviewed three witnesses. As soon as the interview with one man was completed, another took his place.

The consular officer advised the crewmen to tell the truth and disclose everything they knew about Tsafendas. He repeatedly stated that the case was almost closed and the investigators knew everything about Tsafendas anyway. He said Tsafendas had told them

³⁷²⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 78. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³⁷²⁷ None of the sailors remembers from which Consulate he came from.

³⁷²⁸ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Emmanuel Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

about his time on the tanker, and warned that the men they would get into trouble, possibly charged as accessories, if they lied or held anything back. He said the Greek Government was co-operating fully with the South African authorities and the Government was asking them to do the same. Some of the men said their consular representative looked more “threatening” than the policemen.³⁷²⁹ He said Tsafendas was not Greek, but Mozambican, but that he had caused Greeks in South Africa to be attacked by South Africans who considered them responsible for Dr. Verwoerd’s death.³⁷³⁰

According to the sailors interviewed by the author, every crewman who was on the *Eleni* in Cape Town had met Tsafendas, including the captain, and was therefore questioned. Two men, Emanuel Perselis and Elias Kokkinos, were not interviewed because they were not on the ship in Cape Town, having joined in Venice. Dionisis Lallis who had met Tsafendas was also not questioned, probably because he was not present in Venice.

The crew said everyone was asked some standard questions, such as, “How did you meet Tsafendas? What did he do? What did he talk about? What was your impression of him? Did he discuss politics? Did he say anything about the Prime Minister? When did he come to the tanker and why? Did you notice anything strange about him?” They wanted to know everything Tsafendas had said to them and they asked about the sale of the gun. According to the sailors who were interviewed by the author and the police, the policemen used pens to make notes, unlike the police in South Africa, who used portable typewriters. Some of the men remember being asked to sign their statement. According to the sailors, the interviews started early in the morning and lasted until late in the afternoon and lasted between twenty and thirty minutes each.³⁷³¹ This is confirmed by the fact that the statements carried times between 10.30 a.m. and 4.10 p.m.

³⁷²⁹ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

³⁷³⁰ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

³⁷³¹ Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 13 January 2015; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emmanuel Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

THE STATEMENTS FOUND

The following are the statements from the *Eleni* crew found in the archives:

EMANUIL MASTROMANOLIS³⁷³²

White male, 37 years, Kasos Island, Greece.

I am the bosun on the Eleni. The Eleni was docked at Cape Town from 24th July, 1966 to 3rd September, 1966. While in Cape Town Harbour a man Demitri Tsafendas came on board to have lunch and to take the crew to a shop in town I did not go with him to town. He was accompanied by a man about 37 years, thin build, with bold hair, little hair on top of his head with a strip of hair in the middle, already grey.

Demitri came on board almost every day. About a week before sailing from Cape Town he asked us on board if we can sell him a pistol or knife. I knew that Nicolas had a pistol which I considered as a toy. I got the pistol from Nicolas and sold it to Demitri for 30 dollars and gave Nicolas 20 dollars.

The day 3rd September, 1966 we left Cape Town, Demitri came on board and—worked to get his money back because he claimed that the pistol did not work. We did not give his money back and he left with the pistol. It is a black pistol with a white handle. The companion of Demitri is unknown to me. I cannot say of what Nationality he is.

10.30 a.m. 12.10.1966.

EMANUIL MASTROMANOLIS IN A PERSONAL INTERVIEW³⁷³³

As we see from his statement, the police interview with Mastromanolis appeared to focus solely on the gun, but he told the author that discussion of the pistol lasted less than five minutes and the rest of the time was spent answering questions about Tsafendas's character and activities. Mastromanolis said he was questioned by a South African policeman for "around twenty-thirty minutes." He was first asked how he met Tsafendas and about his time

³⁷³² Emanuil Mastromanolis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

³⁷³³ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

with him. He then brought up the matter of the gun without being asked since he was aware the police knew about it.

Mastromanolis acknowledged that his statement is accurate and was what he told the policeman. He claims, however, that he lied in saying he thought the gun was a toy, because he was actually “under the impression that Mavronas’s pistol was a real one.” He had heard from Perselis that Mavronas had just bought a gun while in Cape Town and he was given the impression that it was real since Perselis also assumed it was real. Mavronas, who was only seventeen, had boasted about buying the gun and believed it was authentic, although some of the crew considered he had been fooled by the seller.

Mastromanolis thought that Mavronas might be willing to sell it to Tsafendas for a quick profit and only found out that the gun was fake when he suggested this to the boy. Mavronas proposed selling the gun to Tsafendas anyway, since Tsafendas had told everyone he needed a pistol to “scare people off,” not to kill anyone, and it could do such a job. Mastromanolis agreed reluctantly, considering it would meet Tsafendas’s requirement for a weapon just “to scare people off.” Mastromanolis claims that he could not have told the police he was willing to sell Tsafendas a real firearm, which was why he called it a toy while hiding his impression that it was real.

After the *Eleni* left Cape Town for Kuwait, according to Mastromanolis and Perselis, they and Mavronas discussed the issue of the gun’s sale to Tsafendas. Their initial thought was to tell the police that they believed Tsafendas was looking for a fake gun since he had told them that he wanted to “scare people off.” Eventually, they decided to say they intended to play a joke on Tsafendas as they believed he would not be able to tell whether or not the gun was real.

Mastromanolis was surprised and relieved when he realised that the policemen were less interested in the gun than in Tsafendas’s activities and character. Very early in the questioning, he was asked about a comment which Tsafendas attributed to him in his statement, that “the South Africans need a good whipping.” Mastromanolis was surprised and concluded that Tsafendas must have talked extensively to the police since this was something he had said after Tsafendas took some of the seamen to the township in Cape Town. He denied to the policeman making such a remark, but he admitted to the author that Tsafendas had told the truth to the police and that he did make such a statement after they left the

township. Mastromanolis does not remember if he was asked or if he told the police about the visit to the township.

Mastromanolis said the rest of the questioning was about the sort of person Tsafendas was, and realising that the police knew all about his frequent visits to the tanker and what Tsafendas talked about, he told them everything he knew. He does not remember everything he told the police, but he described Tsafendas as being a “normal, intelligent person.” He remembered Tsafendas as “a kind man, very much into politics and very well-informed about what was happening around the world,” and he believes this is what he told the police. He is certain that he was not asked whether Tsafendas had mentioned a tapeworm and is adamant that Tsafendas was sane. “I’ve met many men, all around the world, and some of them were mad. I can say for sure that this man was not insane. There was nothing ever to make me believe that he might be insane. It was impossible for him to have been insane.” He clearly remembers the police asking if Tsafendas had said anything about killing Dr. Verwoerd. Mastromanolis replied, “No, never. If he had said such thing, I would have gone to the police.”

During his interview with the author, Mastromanolis recognised his signature on the hand-written statement found in the archives. This statement was later typed out and the typed copy was found in the archives attached to the hand-written statement. However, Mastromanolis is adamant that his interview with the police lasted about “twenty-thirty minutes,” and that he said much more than appeared in his statement, although he can no longer recall precisely what else he told his interrogator. However, he is certain that he referred to Tsafendas’s state of mind and his sanity, and to the “good whipping” comment which Tsafendas attributed to him.

Given that the transcription of the interview focussed almost exclusively on the gun, which may have taken a maximum of five minutes, the questions that require answers are: What other topics were discussed and why were they omitted? Since Mastromanolis is not sure what exactly he told the police, it is difficult to establish why this information was omitted. It is also possible that the policeman who questioned him did not consider Mastromanolis’s opinion about Tsafendas’s sanity and his denial of Tsafendas’s attribution of the “good whipping” remark to be of sufficient importance to be included.

NICOLAS MAVRONAS³⁷³⁴

White male, 17 years, Sinies Village, Corfu Island, Greece.

I am a Galley boy working on the Eleni. Eleni was docked in Cape Town from 24.7.66 to 3.9.66. I was in possession of a small pistol which I considered as a toy. I got it from a young man which I met in Cape Town namely Mr. D. Ravell, Phone 779820 (friend of his), 25 Haroldene Rd., LANSDOWNE, CAPE.

A man Dimitrio came to our ship almost every day while in Cape docks. He took some of the crew to a shop on shore. I did not go with him. About the 26 - 27 August, 1966 Dimitrio talked to some of us on board and said he wanted to buy a pistol or a knife. He told us that he get a job at a Hotel and will be paid £2000 (two thousand pounds) at this job. He needed a weapon for his protection. We considered him foolish and decided to joke with him. So we sold this pistol to him for 30 dollars. The bosun took 10 dollars and I got 20 dollars. The last day on 3.9.1966 Dimitrio came on board and told me that the pistol is not working and I must give back his money. I refused. He then asked me to sell him an automatic knife. I told him that I don't have a knife to sell. He then asked the bosun to sell him an automatic knife the bosun said "Oh leave me alone, do you think I am a Cowboy." Dimitrio then went to the galley to eat. The ship left the same day and I did not see Dimitrio again. He took the pistol with him. When he complained to me about the pistol he said, I am a poor man. I work a week to get this 30 dollars, do you expect me to lose it. He told us that he joined the Greek army during the war and that he is an expert shot.

1.20p.m. 12.10.1966.

COMMENTS ON MAVRONAS'S STATEMENT

According to Vasilis Perselis, who was good friend of Mavronas, Tsafendas told them that he was working at a hotel and that he needed a firearm for protection and to "scare people off." Michael Vasilakis confirmed Perselis's statement to the author. Mastromanolis does not remember Tsafendas saying anything about a hotel, but he remembers him saying he needed a gun to "scare people off." Mastromanolis claims that he did indeed tell Tsafendas "Do you

³⁷³⁴ Nicolas Mavronas statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

take me for a cowboy!” when Tsafendas asked if he could find him another pistol or a knife.

Billis, Kantas, Kokkinos, Vasilakis, Kambouris, Mastromanolis and Perselis all says that Mavronas’s claim that they “decided to joke” with Tsafendas was inaccurate. They were all initially under the impression that Mavronas’s gun was real, as this is what he told them. They said Mavronas, was showing off his gun unaware that it was fake. Kambouris was the first to find out that the gun was not real. Kambouris believes, though he is not 100 per cent sure, that Mavronas bought the gun under the impression that it was genuine and was fooled by its owner. Mastromanolis claimed that he only realised the gun was fake when he asked Mavronas to sell it to Tsafendas. Mavronas then admitted that the gun was not real, but still offered to sell it to Tsafendas, believing that it would be “good enough to scare people off.”

During his questioning, Mavronas said Tsafendas told him he had joined the Greek army and was an expert shot, though he does not state which war. The last war in Greece was the Civil War. According to six of the *Eleni* crew interviewed by the author, Tsafendas told them he had joined the Democratic Army of Greece during the Greek Civil War, not the “Greek army.”³⁷³⁵ The South African policeman who questioned Mavronas seems to have misunderstood him, probably unaware that there had been a civil war in Greece and thought he was referring to the Second World War. The full name of the DSE was Democratic Army of Greece. During the Second World War it was called ELAS and some people continued to refer to the DSE as ELAS, since it was basically the same force. ELAS in Greek means Greece, so when Mavronas said the Greek Army, he would have meant ELAS or the DSE, certainly not the regular Greek Army. The six seamen who participated in the conversation remember clearly that Tsafendas told them that he had served with U.S. Liberty Ships during the Second World War and with the DSE during the Greek Civil War.³⁷³⁶

The witnesses interviewed by the author do not remember Tsafendas telling them he was “an expert shot,” though they could not swear that he did not say it. The fact that Mavronas mentions the Greek Army is nevertheless important as other seamen said they were asked if Tsafendas had served in any army or if he had any military training. It is thus likely that Mavronas was questioned on this matter rather than volunteering the information.

³⁷³⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

³⁷³⁶ *Ibid.*

MICHAEL N. FOUNTOTOS³⁷³⁷

Athens, Greece

I am the Captain of the Eleni. The Eleni lost its rudder and was docked in Cape Town for repairs from 24.7.1966 to 3.9.1966. I saw this man Dimitrio Tsafendas on board of Eleni in Cape Town. He often came on board to eat and took some of the crew to town. He came to me to enquire what was wrong with the ship. He suggested that he will get an engineer to repair the rudder. I thought that he must be foolish because it is not a simple repair but a major repair to fix a rudder. So I merely dismissed him.

The last day on 3rd September, 1966 he came to me and complained that he bought a pistol from one of the crew and the thing is not working and now he wanted me to give him the money and deducted it from the boys pay. I was very busy and he was a nuisance to me, so I told him to go and arrange with the boy because I had nothing to do with their business. So he left. I considered this man as childish. His conversation is normal but very childish. How can he come and tell me that he will get an engineer to repair a rudder, which in the dry dock costs me £30.000. He must be joking. He did not appear to me to be a criminal, his appearance was friendly.

COMMENTS ABOUT CAPTAIN FOUNTOTOS

According to Peter Protoulis, a food supplier to the *Eleni* while she lay in Cape Town, Captain Fountotos was a “real gentleman, an exceptional and dignified man.”³⁷³⁸ The crew also characterised him as a “gentleman, a compassionate, good, quiet man,” who was very attentive to his crew and cared about them.³⁷³⁹ None of the crew knew his political stance, but they believed that he was leaning towards the right-centre. However, he was a democratic man and strongly opposed apartheid, and when he discovered what Tsafendas had done, he said, “I feel so sorry for him. Who knows what they are doing to him right now! God help him ...”³⁷⁴⁰ However, he insisted that his crew must tell “the truth and everything they knew

³⁷³⁷ Michael N. Fountotos statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA. Michael Fountotos has died.

³⁷³⁸ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 28 May 2016.

³⁷³⁹ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Dionisios Lallis in a personal interview, 19 June 2015.

³⁷⁴⁰ Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009.

about Tsafendas as they might get into trouble if they didn't."³⁷⁴¹

DIMITRIOS ZAFIRIADIS³⁷⁴²

Donkeyman, Eleni.

This man did not want to make a statement. However, he said the following:

Dimitrio Tsafendas said that he wanted to buy a pistol or knife because he travels through a Bantu area to get to his house. He needed the weapon for self-protection. He laughed at Tsafendas and said that he should get a knife from the chef because it is a good weapon. He handed a ticket over of the business to which Tsafendas took him and other members for shopping. Tsafendas was always accompanied by a man who acted as driver. About 35-40 years old, slender, slightly bald with a line of hair in the middle of his head, slightly grey, wearing glasses. They drove a grey Volkswagen station wagon. They never talked politics.

NEW INFORMATION REGARDING ZAFIRIADIS

Zafiriadis died a few years ago and was not interviewed by the author. However, he was a close friend of crew members Nicolas Billis, George Kantas and Panteleimon Speis, all of whom were interviewed by the author. According to these three, Zafiriadis was a Communist and a very good friend of Tsafendas. Zafiriadis was almost always present when Tsafendas was on board and was certainly there when Tsafendas told the crew about pretending to be mad in order to not serve in the Portuguese Army, when he made the spitting gesture towards Dr. Verwoerd and when he said that it would be justifiable to kill Dr. Verwoerd because he was a tyrant.

Zafiriadis was one of the few seamen who agreed with Tsafendas's belief in a justified assassination and strongly supported his argument. Zafiriadis was also the one who

³⁷⁴¹ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

³⁷⁴² Dimitrios Zafiriadis testimony to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

was most affected by the visit to the township.³⁷⁴³ He supported Tsafendas's suggestion that they should not buy anything while in South Africa, apart from absolute necessities, so as not to contribute the country's economy. Zafiriadis clearly admired Tsafendas and urged his crewmates to refuse to talk to the police in order not to incriminate him.³⁷⁴⁴

According to Billis, Kantas, Speis and Vasilakis, Zafiriadis refused to answer any questions about Tsafendas. The South African police interrogator informed the Greek Consul and the Consul tried to change his mind. However, Zafiriadis held to his position and refused to give a statement. The Consul was unhappy and asked Captain Fountotos to intervene, but the captain declined, stating that what he chose to do was up to Zafiriadis.³⁷⁴⁵

Eventually, Zafiriadis agreed to comment about the pistol and the knife since his name had been mentioned by Tsafendas with regard to the pistol. Zafiriadis claimed in this statement that he and Tsafendas never talked politics, a claim that was rejected by Vasilakis, Kambouris, Alachiotis, Kantas, Speis, Pouftis and Billis, who said Zafiriadis was always present when Tsafendas and the crew discussed politics. These men assumed that Zafiriadis lied in order not to incriminate Tsafendas by stating that he was Communist and anti-apartheid. Zafiriadis also kept a book about apartheid which Tsafendas gave him. After the questioning in Venice ended, some shipmates joked with him that he might make a lot of money in a few years by selling Tsafendas's book.³⁷⁴⁶

CONSTANTINOS KOKKINIDIS³⁷⁴⁷

I am a Greek born. My mother is Maria Kokkinidis Olympic CRT. 14, Green Point, Cape Town. My sister is Themis Zagorauou, Grape Vine, 204 Esselen Street, Sunnyside, Pretoria. My mother went to South Africa in 1964. I joined my mother in South Africa July, 1964. I

³⁷⁴³ None of the sailors remembers the name of the places or whether it was a township. The sailors are referring to it as 'village' and 'area' where Black South African lived.

³⁷⁴⁴ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 November 2013; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012;

³⁷⁴⁵ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 November 2013; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

³⁷⁴⁶ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 November 2013; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

³⁷⁴⁷ Constantinos Kokkinidis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

stayed with my mother in Pretoria for 2 years. My mother and I left for Cape Town, July, 1966. My mother is a widow. I lost my father in 1961.

I was looking for work and so it came that my mother and I went to the Eleni in Cape Town docks. Mrs Vogianou - Caretaker of the flats at Olympic CRT. 14, Green Point, Cape Town, took my mother and myself with her car to the Eleni to introduce us to the Captain because she knows the Captain and told us that he is from our country. We met the Captain and he invited us for dinner at a later date. The three of us came later and had dinner with the Captain and some other people. The Captain asked my mother whether I make enough money, she said that I make good money but I spend it all because of bad friends. He suggested that I came with him on the ship so I can save my money.

I came on board on the 1st August, 1966 and started work on the 2nd August, 1966. I am still on the Eleni. On the 3rd of September, 1966 the day when we left, I was on the ship when the night-watchman told me "Do you know what." I said no. He said "Dr. Verwoerd has been killed." I asked him who said so, he actually pointed to the day watchman and said "He told me." I turned around and spoke to my mother who was standing on the harbour, and told her that "Dr. Verwoerd has been killed." She was upset, and I asked the night-watchman, how did Dr. Verwoerd got killed, he asked the day-watchman again who answered in Afrikaans, the night-watchman said to me, no I did not hear properly nothing happened. So I told my mother that it is not true. Shortly after this the ship left Cape Town.

While in Cape Town docks I saw this Dimitrio Tsafendas he came on board but I never saw how he came to the docks. I did not see anybody coming with him. I did not take much notice of him and neither did I speak to him. My mother don't know him either. I don't know if Mrs. Vogianou knows him. I don't think that they know each other. My mother went to Pretoria in August by train to fetch my sister and Mr. Christos Chistodulu a friend of us. They came to Cape Town during August with Christos' car. I met this friend Christos in Katanga in the Congo. I am sure that Christos and Tsafendas don't know each other.

4.10 p.m. 12.10.1966.

COMMENTS ON KOKKINIDIS'S STATEMENT

Alachiotis and Billis told the author that Kokkinidis strongly urged the crewmen to tell the truth about Tsafendas, warning them of the brutality of the South African police and claiming they would already have made him tell them anything they wanted. He said, "You will go back to Greece, but I have to go back to South Africa."³⁷⁴⁸ Kokkinidis was not present when the crew and Tsafendas sang Communist songs, or when Tsafendas made his spitting gesture when shown Dr. Verwoerd's photo and he was probably unaware of their visit to the township. However, though no one remembers for sure, it is very possible Kokkinidis was at the table, or nearby, when the conversation regarding justifiable assassination took place and this is how the question of Dr. Verwoerd's death being discussed on board began. We will examine his participation in the conversation regarding Dr. Verwoerd's death in the chapter on the *Commission of Enquiry*.

INTERVIEWS OF *ELENI* SAILORS WITH THE AUTHOR

This is what the sailors the author interviewed had to say about their questioning:

CLEANTHES ALACHIOTIS

Alachiotis clearly remembers being interviewed in Venice. He was aged twenty-three and was terrified by the experience. On conclusion, he signed the record of his interview. At the start of questioning, he was asked to provide his address in Greece, which made him feel uncomfortable, thinking the police might want to talk to him again. This convinced him to be as accurate as possible.

Alachiotis says he remembers "that day very well." He was, "like everyone else, taken by surprise," because after Kuwait, he thought they had got away and were not going to be questioned. Alachiotis says the policeman who interviewed him was "a tough-looking guy," but he turned out to be "very friendly and relaxed." He says he told him the "truth and everything that had happened," apart from singing Communist songs and the fact that Tsafendas had asked them to spend as little money as possible in South Africa. He explained how he met Tsafendas, described how he took the men to Mike's Outfitters and to a church,

³⁷⁴⁸ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

and he mentioned the visit to the township. The policeman wanted to know more about this township, but Alachiotis did not remember its name and said they only went there to meet some friends of Tsafendas and buy some souvenirs from them. He did say that they had tea in a black family's home.

Alachiotis also told the policeman that Tsafendas often spoke about his travels and about politics, but he did not understand what he was talking about since personally he had no interest in politics. He said he did not understand exactly what apartheid was, and he praised South Africa for its beauty. When asked if Tsafendas had said anything about the Prime Minister, Alachiotis replied that Tsafendas "did not like him much and called him 'Hitler's best student.'" Alachiotis was ready to mention the 'Hitler' remark because he believed, as they all did, that the police must have known about it since Tsafendas used the expression so often and so widely. Alachiotis clearly remembers being asked if Tsafendas had said anything about killing Dr. Verwoerd. He assumed that the policeman was referring to the conversation on the *Eleni*'s last night in Cape Town when Tsafendas argued that it would be justifiable to kill Dr. Verwoerd because he was a tyrant, while the murder of Prince Rwagasore was to be condemned because he was a democratically elected President. Therefore, Alachiotis told the whole story to the policeman, who showed great interest in it.

Asked for his opinion about Tsafendas, Alachiotis could not remember exactly what he told the police, but believes that he must have told them he was a "harmless man, good-hearted, a quiet man ... very polite and well-mannered," as this is the way he remembered him. When the policeman asked if he had noticed anything wrong with Tsafendas or that he might have been unbalanced, Alachiotis was surprised by the question and said, "No; he seemed 100 per cent normal."

Alachiotis also said Tsafendas told the crew that "he had played the fool with the Portuguese army in order not to serve his military duty... I wasn't going to mention that, but they asked me, 'What were you talking about all these times?' So I said that we often told stories from our army days and the policeman asked me if Tsafendas had served in the Greek army. I then told him what he had told us, that he had joined the Communists in the Civil War but had not served in the proper Greek Army, and that he had pretended to be mad in order to not serve in the Portuguese Army. I remember him laughing about it." Other seamen told Alachiotis they were asked specifically whether Tsafendas had served in any army or if he had any military training.

As for the tapeworm, Alachiotis is certain that he was not asked about it. He was questioned about the gun, but he said that he had nothing to do with it and had only found out about it much later from the other guys. He remembers the policeman keeping notes while they were talking. At the conclusion of the interview, the policeman asked him to read over his statement, but he said that was “not necessary” and just signed it. Alachiotis says he was one of the first to be interviewed. When the interview finished, the policeman approached his two colleagues, who were interviewing other men, took them aside and told them something.³⁷⁴⁹

PANTELEIMON ASPIOTIS

Aspiotis remembers that every member of the crew was questioned in Venice and he himself was interviewed for about twenty twenty-five minutes. He does not remember whether he signed his statement or if he was asked for his address in Greece. He recalls that it took the police several hours to interview everyone, that there were probably three policemen and that a Greek consular officer acted as translator.

Aspiotis had a very good relationship with Tsafendas and remembers him taking the crew to a Greek shop and to a church in Cape Town. He recalls Tsafendas singing Greek songs with them and teaching them how to fish for lobster. He was not among the group taken by Tsafendas to the township. He does not remember the details of what he told the police but presumes he told them most of what he remembered about Tsafendas. What he did not mention was fishing for lobster because Tsafendas had told them “not to tell anyone because it was illegal.” He remembers the issue about the gun, but he had nothing to do with it.

Aspiotis was certainly not asked about the tapeworm; “I would have remembered that. I never heard about it before.” One thing he remembered because he found it “a little strange,” was being asked “if I had noticed anything strange about Tsafendas or if I thought that he might have been mad. I said no, he was perfectly fine. He was like any other person. He was definitely not insane. Him? Insane? No, definitely not! I wasn’t expecting such a question because the man was not mad.” He was also asked if Tsafendas had said anything

³⁷⁴⁹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010.

about Dr. Verwoerd and Aspiotis said “No.”³⁷⁵⁰

NIKOLAOS BILLIS

Billis remembers that he was interviewed in Venice by a South African policeman, that there were three policemen and that everyone in the crew was questioned and required to sign their statements. The questioning lasted from early morning until late afternoon. “I remember everything ... I told them everything I knew. I was terrified. This was a serious case. You couldn’t mess around with it.” He remembers the Greek consul as being “pushy” and pressing them repeatedly to tell everything and to hide nothing. He thought that “Captain Fountotos was a little irritated with him as he was treating us like children, though we were all just in our early twenties ...”

Billis told the police that Tsafendas was a Communist and against apartheid, though he does not remember the details of what he said. He told them that Tsafendas frequently talked about politics, but he did not understand him since he had no knowledge or interest in the subject. Billis also mentioned the trip to the township in Cape Town and claimed they had gone there for touristic reasons, to see where the Black people lived. He does not remember being asked whether Tsafendas had served in any army, but he definitely told them about his mad act with the Portuguese, “I did not think much of this then. They wanted to know what he was telling us, so I told them about it. I thought it was not important, but I remember they wanted to know more about it.” He also told the police that Tsafendas had told them that he had fought in the Greek Civil War with the Communists. Billis believed that the Greek authorities must have known about this and told the South Africans. Billis also told the police about their discussion regarding justifiable assassinations.³⁷⁵¹

NIKOLAS KAMBOURIS

Kambouris remembers being interviewed in Venice and asked to sign his statement. Although he gave his statement reluctantly, he told police “practically everything that had happened with Dimitri. The only thing I did not say was that we sang Communist songs ... I told them that he spat towards the Prime Minister’s picture ... yes, I certainly mentioned the

³⁷⁵⁰ Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015.

³⁷⁵¹ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

‘Hitler’s best student’ comment - this is something almost every one of the crew had heard.” Kambouris was asked to explain what Tsafendas meant with the remark about Hitler and Dr. Verwoerd but he pretended that he did not understand the reference. He eventually said “perhaps Tsafendas meant that Dr. Verwoerd had studied in Germany and Hitler was his tutor,” avoiding any further supposition.

When the policeman asked if Tsafendas had said anything about killing the Prime Minister, Kambouris assumed, like Alachiotis and as we will see Kantas, Pouftis and Vasilakis, that he was referring to Tsafendas’s claim that killing Dr. Verwoerd would be tyrannicide. Kambouris had to explain in detail to the policeman what tyrannicide was and Tsafendas’s theories about it. “I had to explain the whole thing and how it was in ancient Greece ... the policeman was very interested in this. I told him though that Tsafendas did not say he was going to kill the Prime Minister; just that it would have been justifiable if someone does.”

Kambouris was also asked if he had noticed anything abnormal about Tsafendas. “I was surprised by the question. We were all surprised by this question and we later discussed it. We were all asked this question. I said that he did not look mad to me and certainly did not act like a madman. He never said or did anything to make me think he was a madman, he seemed perfectly fine.” Kambouris does not remember being asked about the tapeworm but he was asked about the gun. He replied that Tsafendas had asked him if he had a gun or if he knew anyone among the crew who had one and that he referred him to Vasilis Perselis. He believes that he must also have told the police that Tsafendas had expressed his wish to go and live in Cuba. He described how Tsafendas told them he had fought in the Greek Civil War with the Communists and thinks this arose from a question about whether Tsafendas had mentioned serving in the army or receiving military training. What he did not mention was Tsafendas urging them to avoid spending money in South Africa, that they fished for lobster and sang Communist songs.

Kambouris said the policeman wrote everything down and he signed the statement without reading it. His statement “must have been the longest. It was three-four pages long ... we all discussed the length afterwards.” Kambouris also said:

“I remember being asked about my address in Greece at the beginning of the questioning ... that scared me a lot and I know it did the same to everyone. I thought that they might want to talk to me again or ask me to testify in court. That’s why I couldn’t lie; none of

us could. We had to tell everything. We knew that if we missed anything which they knew we knew, it would look bad for us. We were all very young, almost children; if our name was involved in anything bad, we would never have worked on a ship again. Those were hard times ...”³⁷⁵²

GEORGE KANTAS

Kantas remembers being interviewed in Venice and asked for his address in Greece, which frightened him, thinking the police might want to get in touch with him again. He signed his statement without reading it. “I was petrified,” he recalled. “The policeman who interviewed me was massive and looked quite mean. I remember him very well. He was a tall, blond guy; he did not smile at all; he was deadly serious. I thought he was German. He looked like a German, like a Nazi, and I remembered Tsafendas calling White South Africans Nazis. I told him everything I knew. We all told them everything, everything. We couldn’t take a chance and hide something. We did not tell them we were singing Communist songs together because it was only five or six of us and no-one else knew about it.”

According to Kantas, the policeman wanted to know “what kind of man Tsafendas was, what he told us and what he did with us.” Kantas told him how Tsafendas came to the tanker and how he helped them with their shopping. “I did not tell him that Tsafendas asked us to boycott South Africa and not spend any money there. Was I crazy to say it?” He does not remember what exactly he said about Tsafendas’s personality, but he remembers him as a “very well-read and well-mannered man who knew a lot about politics and history,” and he presumes this is what he told the police. When the policeman asked Kantas if he thought Tsafendas was “normal,” he replied, “Yes, perfectly normal.”

He is certain that he mentioned the Tsafendas’s mad act to dodge the Portuguese Army, and that he had joined the DSE during the Greek Civil War. He does not remember if he was asked about this or volunteered it. Like everyone else, Kantas was asked if Tsafendas had said anything about the Prime Minister. He is sure he said that Tsafendas called Dr. Verwoerd “Hitler’s best student,” and that he believed it would be justifiable for someone to kill him because he was a tyrant. He does not remember telling the policeman about the spitting incident, which he had forgotten until was mentioned to him by the author, but he

³⁷⁵² Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

presumes that he did. He remembers going to the township and he assumes he told the police but he cannot be certain. Kantas had nothing to do with the gun and he remembers saying so. He was not asked about the tapeworm. He remembers Tsafendas saying he wanted to live in “socialist Cuba,” but he doesn’t remember if he mentioned this to the police.³⁷⁵³

ELIAS KOKKINOS

Kokkinos was present in Venice but was not interviewed, as he was not present in Cape Town. He clearly remembers that all those crew members who were in Cape Town being interviewed.³⁷⁵⁴

DIONISIS LALLIS

Lallis was a crew member of the *Eleni* in Cape Town but was replaced later and was not with the tanker when it docked at Venice. He had no contacts with the crew and knew nothing about the questioning until now. However, he remembers Tsafendas well from Cape Town, although he did not associate much with him. He remembers him as being “perfectly fine. I never noticed anything or thought that he could be crazy or dangerous. I remember he was very polite. It looked like he had a good upbringing. He generally looked like a good man. I did not speak to him much and had no dealings with him, but he was very talkative and very friendly with some of the other guys on the *Eleni*.”³⁷⁵⁵

EMANUIL MASTROMANOLIS

We have seen what Mastromanolis told the author regarding his statement earlier in this chapter. In addition, he remembers that everyone on board was interviewed by the police, everyone was asked for his address in Greece and everyone had to sign his statement.³⁷⁵⁶

³⁷⁵³ Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012.

³⁷⁵⁴ Elias Kokkinos in a personal interview, 30 August 2014.

³⁷⁵⁵ Dionisios Lallis in a personal interview, 19 June 2015.

³⁷⁵⁶ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

EMANUIL PERSELIS

E. Perselis was present in Venice and remembers the entire crew being questioned by the South African police. However, he was not questioned as he had just joined the tanker as a replacement for another man and had not been on board at Cape Town. He remembers that the questioning lasted “many hours.”³⁷⁵⁷

VASILIS PERSELIS

V. Perselis remembers being interviewed by the South African police in Venice, stating his address at the start of questioning and signing his statement at the end. Perselis remembers, “I was asked about the gun and told them he asked me for a pistol for self-protection because he lived in a rough area, so I referred him to Manolis (Mastromanolis) and to Nikolakis (Mavronas). I told them I had nothing else to do with the gun issue after that.”

Perselis says he was asked if he thought “there was something wrong with him (Tsafendas).” He does not recall his exact answer, but he remembers Tsafendas as being “a very clever man, not mad at all, one hundred per cent normal.” He remembers Tsafendas telling him that he had got a job which was not paying him well and he had to wear a uniform. Perselis thought that it was in a hotel, not in the Parliament. Tsafendas had told him that he wanted to save money to go and live the rest of his life in Cuba, though he does not remember if he told the police this. He remembers Tsafendas being a Communist and considered him to be well-informed about Greek and world politics and history. Perselis did not go with Tsafendas to the township and never heard him say anything regarding Dr. Verwoerd’s death and presumes that he told the police so. He is certain that he was not asked about the tapeworm. He does not remember telling the policeman about the spitting incident, which he had also forgotten until was mentioned to him by the author, but he presumes that he did.³⁷⁵⁸

GRIGORIS POUFTIS

Pouftis remembers being interviewed in Venice, along with the rest of the crew. He thinks there were two or three policemen, each conducting interviews. He remembers signing his

³⁷⁵⁷ Emanuil Perselis in a personal interview, 30 November 2015.

³⁷⁵⁸ Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015.

statement, but not being asked about his address in Greece. The policeman who conducted the questioning was “very polite and friendly. It was more like a conversation than a police questioning. Very relaxed.” The policeman wanted to know everything that had happened with Tsafendas. Pouftis described how they met and that Tsafendas visited every day. He is certain that he told the policeman about his mad act with the Portuguese Army and that Tsafendas served in the DSE during the Greek Civil War. “I and the rest of us did not know at the time why they wanted to know more about it. I said Greeks were playing the fool all the time to avoid the army.”

Pouftis also told the policeman that Tsafendas was a Communist who despised the South African Prime Minister and mentioned both the spitting gesture and the remark that Dr. Verwoerd was Hitler’s best student. However, he did not reveal that they had sung Communist songs together. “I would have lost my job if the company had found out about it.”

Pouftis remembers being asked if Tsafendas said anything about killing the Prime Minister. “I told him ‘God no; he never said anything like this.’” As for the “justifiable killing” conversation, he remembers it vaguely but cannot remember whether or not he told the policeman. He also remembers going to the township, but doesn’t remember if he told the police. Pouftis does not remember being asked about Tsafendas’s mental state, but his own memory is of “an ordinary man, soft-spoken, knowledgeable and passionate about politics.” He was certainly not asked about the tapeworm. He remembers Tsafendas telling him he wanted to go and live in Cuba, but he doesn’t remember if he said that to the police.³⁷⁵⁹

IOANNIS SPEIS

Speis did not associate much with Tsafendas but he spoke to him from time to time and saw him every day on the *Eleni*. He remembers that he and the entire crew were questioned in Venice by three South African policemen; each conducting his own interview with the help of a Greek consular officer for those who’s English was not good. He remembers his interrogator taking notes and being asked to sign his statement.

Speis does not remember everything he was asked but he recalls being questioned about Tsafendas’s character and asked his opinion of him. He believes that he told the police

³⁷⁵⁹ Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009.

approximately the following: “I never noticed anything wrong with him; he was very talkative and friendly.” Speis considered Tsafendas to be “a proper gentleman.” He was familiar with hawkers selling their wares on ships but thought Tsafendas “did not look like other hawkers.” He saw him as “a proud, intelligent man with lots of dignity. He never asked for anything from the crew and was always prompt with our financial dealings.” Speis knew that Tsafendas had taken some of his crewmates to the township, but he had not gone along. However, he was one of those to whom Tsafendas demonstrated how to fish for lobster, but he did not reveal that to the police. He was certainly not asked about the tapeworm.³⁷⁶⁰

DIMITRIOS STAVRIANOS

Stavrianos remembers being questioned in Venice along with the rest of the crew but does not remember exactly what he was asked and what he told the police. He remembers Tsafendas, but he did not associate with him very much and therefore thinks he could not have told the police a lot about him. He remembers Tsafendas as a “normal man; very well-dressed and well-mannered” who “did not show any signs of being mentally disturbed. He never behaved like a mad man or said anything to suggest that something might be wrong with him. None of us ever thought that he could be mad.”³⁷⁶¹ Although Stavrianos had little to do with Tsafendas, he was still interviewed by the police, confirming the crew’s claim that everyone who met him was interviewed.

EMANUIL TSABOUNIARIS

Tsabouniaris remembers being interviewed in Venice with all the other *Eleni* crew. He remembers a policeman questioning him and keeping notes and he recalls signing his statement, but he does not remember exactly what he told the police. He remembers being asked whether Tsafendas asked him for a gun or a knife. He said that, “Tsafendas had seen I had a knife and asked me to sell it to him. I did not do so because I liked it and it was a souvenir.” The policeman then asked, “Do you still have it?” and he replied, “Yes.” Tsabouniaris said it was in his suitcase and offered to bring it for him, but the policeman replied, “No, that won’t be necessary.”

³⁷⁶⁰ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015.

³⁷⁶¹ Dimitris Stavrianos in a personal interview, 18 January 2015.

Tsabouniaris remembers being asked his opinion about Tsafendas's state of mind. Although he does not remember exactly what he said then, he presumes he told the police what he remembers about Tsafendas to this day, that he was "a very funny and good hearted man, a very friendly, talkative and polite person, a true gentleman. Always very well-dressed and always very courteous. Everyone liked him. He was certainly perfectly fine, impossible to have been insane. Impossible! This man was definitely not insane. I could swear to God that he was not insane."

The first day Tsafendas came to the tanker, Tsabouniaris gave him money to buy him a few things ashore. He was the only who handed over cash and the other men made fun of him, saying he could forget his money because Tsafendas would not be back with it. However, the next day, Tsafendas brought everything he had asked for and the change from the money he gave him. "He was always very prompt with our financial dealings, not like other hawkers who I or the other guys had met. He was completely different; he talked more like a teacher than a hawker. He used nice words and had excellent command of the vocabulary. He seemed like a very well-educated and knowledgeable man; a sophisticated man."

Tsabouniaris told the author:

"The only thing I found strange was that his profession of a hawker did not match his character. He was very educated and very polite for a hawker. I always believed that something must be going on with this man, that he couldn't be just a hawker. I am sure he could have found a much better job. I thought that perhaps he could have a reason for doing this job; as a cover for something else, so he could walk freely around the harbour and aboard the ships. We discussed this with some of the guys and they also thought that there must be something happening with him... The thing that impressed me more was that he was very proud. He was doing the job with pride, not like a beggar or trying to make you buy in a sleazy way. He was a true gentleman."

Tsabouniaris remembers Tsafendas teaching him how to fish for lobsters, but he did not mention this to the police because Tsafendas had warned him that it was illegal and he would pay a fine if caught. Tsabouniaris does not remember Tsafendas talking politics with him, but he remembers him singing Greek traditional songs with everyone on board. He was

definitely not asked about the tapeworm.³⁷⁶²

MICHALIS VASILAKIS

He remembers being interviewed along with all the others. He did not speak good English and the Greek consular officer acted as translator. He was one of the oldest of the crew and had been very close to Tsafendas. He remembers the Greek official asking him questions that were not asked by the policeman, things which the Greek had heard from the other men during the interviews, and this annoyed him. He remembers telling “pretty much everything” he knew about Tsafendas. “The only things I remember not telling him for sure is that he sang partisan songs with us and he gave me this anti-apartheid book. None of us mentioned these things, not even those who had not participated in the singing but just knew about it.”

Vasilakis remembers telling the police that Tsafendas took them to the township but not whether that they had tea in a Black family’s house. He told them that Tsafendas was a Communist who had also fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War and he is pretty certain that he also told the policeman and that he had “played the fool” so as not to serve in the Portuguese army.

Vasilakis remembers mentioning that Tsafendas had spat at Dr. Verwoerd’s photograph – it was Vasilakis who showed him the picture - and called the prime minister “Hitler’s best student.” The most difficult part of the interview was when he had to explain to the policeman what tyrannicide was after telling him about Tsafendas’s belief that Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination would be justifiable because he was a tyrant. The interview lasted about thirty minutes and he spent at least half of it explaining the philosophy of tyrannicide as understood by the ancient Greeks. The most surprising thing, in the view of Vasilakis, was that the policeman was unaware of the assassination of Prince Rwagasore and he had to tell him about it, although he only knew what he had heard from Tsafendas. He does not remember being asked about Tsafendas’s mental state, but his own opinion is that he was “surely one hundred and ten per cent sane. There is absolutely no way Dimitri to have been mad. He definitely played the mad again to not be executed.”³⁷⁶³

³⁷⁶² Emanuil Tsabouniaris in personal interview, 14 June 2016.

³⁷⁶³ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS

With the exception of Kantas, who said his interviewer was mean-looking and he was scared, the crewmen who were interviewed by the author said the atmosphere at the interviews was relaxed and often felt more like a discussion between friends than an interrogation. The South African officers were polite and often smiled. Every man was asked if he wanted the Greek translator to read out his statements, but no one did. One reason was they felt it was unnecessary, but more importantly, they did not want to look as if they did not trust the policemen. They wanted the whole business out of the way as soon as possible.

The crew said they all discussed their interviews after the policemen were gone. They concluded that all were asked approximately the same questions and everyone had told the truth and volunteered everything that had happened with Tsafendas. The only information withheld was that Tsafendas sang Communist songs with some of them and gave banned books to three of them. They discussed the fact that they were asked about Tsafendas's mental state, but paid little attention to it at the time.

Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas, Perselis, Pouftis and Vasilakis told the police that Tsafendas described Dr. Verwoerd as "Hitler's best student." They are sure others testified to this since that was how Dr. Verwoerd was sometimes jokingly termed between them. By the time they were interviewed by the author, several of the men, had forgotten Dr. Verwoerd's name, but all remembered Tsafendas describing him in those words.

Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Pouftis and Vasilakis told the police about Tsafendas's spitting gesture. Kantas and Perselis remember the gesture but are not sure if they told the police.

Thirteen sailors were asked their opinion of Tsafendas. All told the author they never thought he could have been insane and that is what they told the police. They said the entire crew was asked the same question and all gave the same answer.

That Tsafendas was a Communist was stated by at least six men - Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas, Pouftis and Vasilakis. These men also told the police that Tsafendas had joined the DSE, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party during the Greek Civil War.

As we have seen, a significant item of information given to the police by the crew was Tsafendas telling them that he had "played the fool" in order to evade service in the Portuguese Army. At least six men testified to this: Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas,

Pouftis and Vasilakis, while it is very likely Vasilis Perselis did so, too. These crewmen also stated in personal interviews with the author that some of the men were asked if Tsafendas had served in an army or had any military training. According to his statement, Mavronas mentioned that Tsafendas had served in the Greek Army. This was wrong. Either Mavronas misunderstood what Tsafendas had told him or the policeman misunderstood Mavronas. Nevertheless, it shows that he, too, was asked the question. The South African police could easily have checked with the Portuguese Army whether Tsafendas was exempted from military service because he was insane.

The visit to the township was disclosed by at least five men - Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas and Vasilakis. Mastromanolis and Pouftis, who had gone on the trip do not remember if they told the police about it but believe they most probably did.

Perhaps the most important information was that given by Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas and Vasilakis that Tsafendas had characterised any killing of Dr. Verwoerd as morally justifiable because of his tyranny. Tsafendas had used the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, that it was “a democratic man’s duty to remove the tyrant from power.” Pouftis was also present during this conversation but does not remember whether he mentioned it to the police. Aspras who was also in on the conversation, probably testified likewise.

According to the crew, Tsafendas’s theory regarding justifiable homicide, his mad play-acting, their visit to the township and the fact that Tsafendas called Dr. Verwoerd “Hitler’s best student” seemed of more importance and interest to the police than the sale of the gun by Mastromanolis and Mavronas. Men who were unaware of the four issues above were asked about them.

THE ISSUE OF THE MISSING STATEMENTS FROM THE *ELENI*

It is undisputable that statements have gone missing from the National Archives of South Africa. According to the Commission’s Report, “one hundred and five persons, including Tsafendas himself, gave oral evidence before the Commission.”³⁷⁶⁴ However, only forty-one of their statements were found in the archives and the missing statements included the records of Tsafendas’s two testimonies before the Commission. The important question is when these

³⁷⁶⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter I, Paragraph 4. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

statements went missing, plus were they were available at the time to the Commission and to the Attorney-General?

It is inconceivable that fifteen men, although now aged in their late 60s to early 80s, could be mistaken about being questioned by the South African police. Mastromanolis's statement was found, but he insists that a statement was taken from everyone on board the *Eleni*. Even Emanuel Perselis and Ilias Kokkinos, who were not interviewed by the police, but were present in Venice, testified to the author that they clearly remember *everyone* being interviewed. Furthermore, most of these men have not seen or spoken to each other since 1966, yet all described to the author similar situations, comments and incidents from fifty years ago. The Tsafendas affair would have been the most memorable event in their seamen's lives and if some of the details had gone, the main issues remained in their minds.

The time differences between the statements also suggest that more men were questioned than those whose statements were found. The first recorded interview, according to the archives, was at 10.30 a.m. and was of Emanuil Mastromanolis, and the last was at 4.10 p.m. of Constantinos Kokkinidis. The other two were at 11.20 a.m. of Nikolaos Mavronas and at 2.30 p.m. of Captain Michalis Fountotos. The short statement of Dimitrios Zafiriadis does not have a time. Clearly, there is a big gap between each interview and according to the archived statements, the policemen took almost six hours to interview four people, or one hour and thirty minutes per person. However, it is abundantly clear from the length of the statements that the interviews could not have lasted more than twenty minutes each. That there were thirty-eight sailors to be interviewed makes perfect sense, starting early in the morning and finishing late in the afternoon, as testified by several of the men interviewed by the author.

The fact that South African policemen, probably three, were dispatched to Venice to do the interviews supports the argument that all the *Eleni* crew were interviewed. Would it have taken even one policeman six hours to question four people? There is also a three-hour gap between Mavronas's statement at 11.20 am and Captain Fountotos's at 2.30 p.m. Mavronas' statement is so short, his interview could not possibly have lasted more than ten-fifteen minutes. There is also a long gap – two hours - between Fountotos's 2.30 p.m. statement and that of Kokkinidis at 4.10 p.m. Fountotos's statement is also very brief and it is not possible that a policeman needed an hour and forty minutes to take it.

It stands to reason that the South African police would question everyone on the tanker who had been in contact with Tsafendas because of the many important issues relating to the *Eleni*, especially the fact that Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed there three days before the assassination. From those statements found in the archives it appears that only Kokkinidis was asked about that issue. The police questioned people with minimal contact with Tsafendas, such as James Johnston who had spoken to him for twenty minutes in his life and had nothing significant to say. They also spoke to people who had known Tsafendas two, three and more years ago, so would they not have questioned everyone who was in constant contact with him for almost one and half months up to just before the assassination? Even more so when Tsafendas had attempted to buy a gun, intended to escape with this tanker and more importantly, had discussed Dr. Verwoerd's possible death with them.

The fact that the police went all the way to Venice to question the *Eleni* witnesses shows their importance, yet only four statements were found in the archives. It is inconceivable that they then only interviewed four people out of the thirty-eight who were in contact with Tsafendas. Serious police work required that every single person be interviewed who had been in touch with Tsafendas shortly before the assassination, especially since Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed among the crew. Apparently this is exactly what the South African police did, but there are no references to any of the other sailors apart from the four whose statements mentioned before. The question then is what happened to these statements.

They could have gone missing by chance, which is not impossible since evidence can go missing in any archives by accident. However, this creates the question, if they went missing by chance, why they were not used by the Commission, since if they went missing accidentally, that must have surely happened sometime after the conclusion of Tsafendas's case and not during it. It seems highly unlikely, if not impossible, that the police would lose some thirty-five statements soon after they took them. However, if they were in the possession of the Commission or the Attorney-General at the time, why they were not used? Nowhere in the Commission's Report or during the summary trial is there any reference to any of the information in these statements.

However, the fact that there is no mention of this evidence in the Commission's Report or that they were not used by the Attorney-General does not necessarily mean that they were not in their possession. Other evidence which evidently was in their possession was not used. This includes the fact that Tsafendas was exiled by Mozambique for twelve years,

also that he was arrested by the Portuguese on two occasions in addition to those mentioned in the Report; namely in Lisbon in 1952 and in Beira in 1965. Also, the Commission for sure and probably the Attorney-General, too, were in possession of several statements by witnesses showing Tsafendas as a completely different person to the one described in the summary trial and in the Commission's Report. However, they were not used by any of them. Therefore, it is also possible that the statements were suppressed by these two bodies and not by the police.

A further question concerns the *Eleni* statements found in the archives. None contains the name of the policeman who conducted the interviews. All other statements are signed by the policeman who questioned the person concerned. The author is not in position to know why the policemen who conducted these interviews did not sign them. The issue of the missing statements will be discussed in detail later in this chapter and in chapter Six.

CONCLUSION REGARDING THE *ELENI*

As we have seen, the crew of the *Eleni* gave important information to the police about Tsafendas.

- He despised Dr. Verwoerd. He spat at a picture of him and denounced him as "Hitler's best student" because of the similarities between his national policies and those of Adolf Hitler.
- Three days before the assassination, Tsafendas told the sailors that a hypothetical killing of Dr. Verwoerd would have been justifiable because he was a tyrant and a dictator.
- He was a Communist and had fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War.
- He spoke about politics constantly and unreservedly opposed apartheid.
- He took a group of seamen to a township in Cape Town to show them the hardships caused to non-Whites by apartheid.
- The sailors believed Tsafendas was perfectly sane; none had noticed anything wrong with him.

All the above information would have been important to the police, but Tsafendas's remark about justifiable homicide was of paramount importance, given that the police and the Commission of Enquiry were trying to establish how Dr. Verwoerd's death was being

discussed three days before the assassination. As we have already seen, the gossip about Dr. Verwoerd's reputed death was subject to intense speculation by the police and the Commission. Extraordinarily, none of the *Eleni* crew's statements taken in Venice would play any role in the case; neither in Tsafendas's summary trial nor the Commission of Enquiry. Why and how we will examine in the Commission chapter.

As for the fact that only four of the *Eleni* statements, plus Zafiriadis's short comment, out of thirty-eight statements taken, were found in the National Archives, this could mean only one thing: the statements were mislaid, either deliberately or by accident, the first more likely due to their importance and the fact that the South African police and General van den Bergh had withheld evidence from the judiciary before. It cannot be ruled out though that the statements were given to the Commission and to the Attorney-General and they did not use them and they then disappeared from the archives. Both the Attorney-General and the Commission had evidently suppressed important evidence about Tsafendas, as we will see.

Even if the statements disappeared accidentally through the passage of time, the fact remains that when they were available, they were ignored and not used. We will see in the next two chapters where and how these statements could have been used by the Attorney General and the Commission. The conclusion must be that they were either provided to the Attorney-General and the Commission and were suppressed by them or they were withheld from them. However, the most important issue here is not who withheld the information, but the fact that they were withheld and contributed to a distorted picture of Tsafendas and the assassination.

OTHER STATEMENTS FROM THIS DAY

CHARLES NISSIOTIS³⁷⁶⁵

I am the owner of Protea Dry Cleaners and Domestic Appliances, Pretoria. My wife, Evangeline, is the stepsister of Demitrio Tsafendas, who is alleged to have murdered Dr. Verwoerd.

During 1964 I met Tsafendas for the first time. He was unemployed at that time. I asked him to assist my wife in the cafe we owned at that time. He was however so lazy that

³⁷⁶⁵ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

my wife told him to leave within the first two days. I afterwards heard that he took up employment with Poole's Engineering, Pretoria. After that he never visited me and my wife again. My brother-in-law, Nick Vlachopoulos, sold some furniture of Tsafendas for R40 and gave the money to my mother-in-law. My mother-in-law sent the money to me in two instalments of R20 each to get bank drafts to be sent to Beira.

To the end of 1964 or the beginning of 1965 I took out a bank draft for R20 at Volkskas Bank, Bosman Street, Pretoria and handed it to my mother-in-law, who forwarded same to Tsafendas in Beira. About two to three months later I took out another bank draft for R20 at the same bank. This draft was sent to Tsafendas in Beira. I cannot remember the address in Beira, but I think the address given by Tsafendas was c/o some Greek businessman there. In both cases Tsafendas wrote to my brother-in-law and requested the money to be sent to the address he furnished. As I knew Tsafendas he looked stupid but he was always friendly and happy. He used to talk a lot about the Bible and used to carry a Bible on him. I never saw him to be aggressive towards anybody. To me he appeared to be very absentminded. He was very fond of reading the daily English newspapers and could spend hours in doing so. He never discussed politics in my presence. As far as I could establish he never mentioned the tapeworm story to any of the family.

Statement taken by J.W. Strumpher.

COMMENTS ON NISSIOTIS'S STATEMENT

Nissiotis was one of those family members who appeared before the Commission. They all testified that "Tsafendas never talked to the family about his tapeworm. According to them, he was definitely not insane. He always had proper accommodation in Pretoria."³⁷⁶⁶ Nissiotis had also told the police, "As far as I could establish he never mentioned the tapeworm story to any of the family."³⁷⁶⁷

Tsafendas was indeed employed for a very short time at Nissiotis's café, but laziness

³⁷⁶⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

³⁷⁶⁷ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

was not the reason he was dismissed. Upon his return to South Africa, Tsafendas stayed at Nissiotis's house, where his step-mother was also staying at the time. The family soon discovered that Tsafendas remained a passionate Communist and a critic of apartheid who was not afraid to declare his views. Worse, they discovered that he had brought with him a large amount of banned literature. Nissiotis had no problem with this, but his wife and Marika were terrified and pleaded with Tsafendas to throw it away. Tsafendas refused and was then asked by Evangeline (Evangelia) to leave her house. The same time, he was also asked by Evangelia to stop working at the café shop because she was afraid that sooner or later he would argue with a customer over politics and get them into trouble.³⁷⁶⁸

Nissiotis lied to the police about meeting Tsafendas for the first time in 1964. Tsafendas was a guest at his wedding to his half-sister in 1941 and gave them the gift of a coffee table which remained in Evangelia's possession until she died in 2016. He also lied when he said that Tsafendas never discussed politics in his presence. According to family members like Fotini Gavasiadis, Katerina Pnema and Mary Eendracht, the exact opposite was the case. Unlike his wife, Nissiotis was sympathetic to Tsafendas's political views, although he avoided making this public. However, like everyone else in the family, Nissiotis could not admit the truth, that Tsafendas was a committed Communist and diehard opponent of apartheid. Nissiotis liked Tsafendas and had a good relationship with him; much better than the one Evangelia had with her half-brother.

JOHANNES CHRISTIAAN OOSTHUIZEN³⁷⁶⁹

Cape Tramway, Tollgate, Cape Town.

I am an instructor at the above firm and live in No. 3 St. Michaelshof, Bond Street, Tamboerskloof.

On 12/29/65 Demitrio Tsafendas started as my apprentice conductor. He had to attend lectures and study certain bus routes in Deep River Depot. I keep a register of my observations to record the personal progress of each apprentice conductor. I remember

³⁷⁶⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁷⁶⁹ Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Tsafendas well. My registry shows an entry to his name and number, 10236. Every Tuesday pupils should report to me at 9.30 am. On such occasions I ask some questions to see how they progress. The entry show as follows: "Trainee is slow and it seems lazy too. He won't last long if he passes out. Slow in uptake. Will not last. Mind seems blank at times." The entry is in abbreviated form. I meant that he responds slowly to things that are explained to him, and had to be repeated over and over. His mind seemed to wander and he didn't concentrate on what he learned. It seemed as if he was lazy to learn the routes. I believed that he would not stay long if he did pass the test. I also believed that he may not pass the test at all.

Before he left, he said - "This is too much for me I cannot do it and I will resign." Other than his slow response, I did not at all get the impression that mentally anything was wrong with him. He is mentally normal. There are many rejected applicants because they are found to be of a bad standard. Tsafendas resigned from us on 1/12/66. He could not make the standards. He never had any political discussions or let him out against the State in my presence.

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

EDWARD CHARLES FURNESS³⁷⁷⁰

Duncanville, Vereeniging.

I was born at Vyffontein, Vanderbijlpark on 30.4.1910. I was employed at various mines as a miner, fitter and turner. I have no family and divorced. During 1949 I left for England Where I resided until 10.6.1966 when I returned to the R.S.A. Before I left for England I was granted a disability pension. While in England I occupied myself with small scale farming on hired ground. I was an honorary member of the North Middlesex Cricket Club in Hornsey, London North 8.

While being a member of the mentioned Club I met with so-called Neo-Labour

³⁷⁷⁰ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Political party members. The club itself had nothing to do with politics but members of the Neo Labour Party frequented this club. I met several South Africans who emigrated to Britain who are or were members or supporters of that Political Party. I recollect the names of two of them i.e. Tennisson and David Gardener. The latter was an elected councillor of Hornsey, London. He was a member of the Neo Labour Political Party. Gardener is a European but Tennisson is an African.

The Neo-Labour Party frequently held political meetings and was more concerned with South African affairs than local politics in England. They were against the policies of the present Government in South Africa and made sure that their views were published in London Newspapers. I attended several meetings of this party and on each occasion they spent a lot of time condemning South Africa. The following persons are also members of the Party and I have seen them addressed meetings: Canon Collins, Barbara Castle, Ted Castle (Husband of Barbara), F. Brockway (Lord), Ian Me Kardo (M. P.), Ken Robertson (M.P.), Harold Wilson (M.P. Private member) George Brown (M.P.) Frederick Messenger (Sir) (M.P.) Tennisson, David Gardener. Tennisson and David Gardener were often the main speakers at these meetings.

About a week after the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd I saw the picture of the assassin in the newspapers. I identified the photo, as that of Tsafendikis whom I met during about 1960 at the stated club. Although his name was given in the newspapers as Tsafendas, I knew him as Tsafendikis, the name by which he was known by the Neo-Labour Party. I cannot say whether he was a member of this party but he was a regular visitor to the offices of the party and I have seen him in company of several members of the party, including David Gardener, I never saw him at any of their meetings, but I attended only some of these meetings.

The first time I met Tsafendas was during 1960 at the club. That was during the day and I was alone at the club. He came to me and introduced himself as Tsafendikis and as a Cape Coloured. The way he pronounced "Coloured" was clear to me that he was not a coloured from South Africa. I asked him what the object of his visit was, on which he replied that he requires my help to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned Civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power. I asked him who gave him the idea to come to me, and his reply was that members of the Neo Labour Party advised him to approach me. He mentioned names, such as Levy, Baily, Phillips, Jelley and Wilson. The latter is not the Prime Minister. They were all local members

of the Party. I then told him to go whereupon he became aggressive, but left after a few harsh words. The conversation lasted only about five minutes and that was the last and only conversation I had with this man. The only thing that struck me about Tsafendikis were, that he was obviously not a coloured but rather an Assyrian. He was well dressed and appeared to be wealthy. I do not know when he arrived or when he left Britain, but after that incident I saw him on numerous occasions for several weeks hanging around the offices of the Neo Labour Party which are situated only about half a mile from the Club and on route to places I frequented.

At the time when Pratt endeavoured to assassinate the late Dr. Verwoerd at the Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg. When they received the news, the Neo Labour Party held a meeting in London at which it was decided to collect money for the defence of Pratt. I was approached for a donation but refused. I cannot say whether Tsafendikis was a member of the Neo Labour Party in England, but can say without hesitation and beyond doubt that he associated with that Party.

Statement taken by me at Vereeniging on 12.10.66 at 11 a.m.

(Indecipherable name) ... Capt.

(Indecipherable name) ... Nr. 20365 D/Sgt.

COMMENTS ON FURNESS'S STATEMENT

The person named here as Tennyson by Furness was the ANC representative in London, Tennyson Xola Makiwane. Tsafendas spoke extensively to Father Minas Constandinou about a member of the ANC he had met in London with whom he had a very good relationship. Father Minas does not remember the name, but Tsafendas also told him that the man was assassinated. Makiwane was assassinated in 1980. Tsafendas was surprised that the South African police knew so much about his activities outside South Africa, especially in London. It seems clear that most of this information came from Furness's statement.³⁷⁷¹

³⁷⁷¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

DONALD NEVILLE MACKAY³⁷⁷²

E/M/A, City Tramways, Tollgate, Cape Town.

I am the personnel officer of City Tramways at above address, and I reside at 101 Costa Brava, Beach Road, Sea Point. On 12.11.1965 I interviewed D. Tsafendas, who approached me for employment as a conductor. He filled in form P.W. 1 in his own handwriting. Certain red writing in my own on this form. He had to be medically examined which examination he attended on 19.11.1965 and was found to be fit. He was to report for training on 24.11.1965, which he failed to do. He did however report on 29.12.1965, from which date he is considered to be a learner conductor. Then he was passed to the instructor Mr. Oesthuizen. Apart from signing him on, I merely asked him the essential question for Company records. I have noted his identity White – i.n. 963 081129 W, also Registration Certificate 203461, personal description and reasons for leaving previous employments –

(a) Table Bay Power Station – declared redundant, and

(b) Frazer and Chalmers – resigned. He resigned from us 12.1.66.

I remember that this man had a set of peculiar front teeth. They looked filed off and built up with silver or stainless steel.

Cape Town 12.10.1966

Statement made to me. (SGD.) D.J.V. Troost. 23505 Sergt.

PRESS REPORTS OF THE DAY

With a trial date fixed, newspaper coverage of Tsafendas diminished, though on October 12, the big story of the day was the fact that Nikolas Vergos, the man who had fought with Tsafendas at Mandini and a sought-after witness, was finally located. “KEY WITNESS FOUND” announced the front page of the *Daily Dispatch*,³⁷⁷³ while *The Cape Times*³⁷⁷⁴ front-paged “IMPORTANT WITNESS TRACED.” Mr Justice J.T. van Wyk, chairman of the Verwoerd Enquiry, had appealed to the media earlier for help in locating the sixty-one-year-

³⁷⁷² Donald Neville Mackay statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁷⁷³ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Key witness found.’

³⁷⁷⁴ *The Cape Times*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Important witness traced.’

old Greek-born Vergos, who was thought to have “vital information” regarding Tsafendas. Six hours later, Vergos walked into the office of the *Rand Daily Mail* in Johannesburg.³⁷⁷⁵ The *Daily Dispatch* and *The Cape Times* also reported that the scope of the Dr. Verwoerd inquiry had been widened to include the circumstances in which Tsafendas was granted permanent residence.³⁷⁷⁶

Regarding Vergos, even though he was labelled such an important witness by the Commission who had “vital information” regarding Tsafendas and the Commission got into a lot of trouble locating him, he was not asked to testify during Tsafendas’s summary trial. He gave a statement to the police and gave evidence before the Commission, but he was not asked by either the defence or the state to testify in the summary trial. The question is, why such an important and witness, according to the Commission, was not asked to testify in the summary trial. Of course we cannot tell for sure what the reason was, especially by looking at this incident independently. However, by looking, as we will do in the next chapter in the Summary Trial, and by placing this case together with many similar ones, we can see why Vergos was not asked to testify. Vergos was the man who asked his superior to fire Tsafendas as he was a communist³⁷⁷⁷ and denounced him to his superiors and to a security officer as “the biggest communist in the Republic of South Africa”³⁷⁷⁸ and a “communist bastard.”³⁷⁷⁹ In addition Vergos had argued with Tsafendas after Vergos had refused to pay two African workers he had illegally employed. Tsafendas had defended them and asked him to pay them and this is how the fight began.³⁷⁸⁰ The reason of their fight was not given by neither Tsafendas nor Vergos. However, given the fact that the police had questioned several workers at the canteen where the fight took place on September 9,³⁷⁸¹ it seems unlikely, but not of course impossible, that no one told them about it.

³⁷⁷⁵ *The Cape Times*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Important witness traced.’

³⁷⁷⁶ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Key witness found’; *The Cape Times*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Important witness traced.’

³⁷⁷⁷ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁷⁷⁸ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁷⁷⁹ Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁷⁸⁰ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

³⁷⁸¹ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, ‘Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.’

THURSDAY, 13 OCTOBER 1966

STATEMENTS

ROELOF ERASMUS SWIEGERS³⁷⁸²

White Male, Sidwell, Port Elizabeth.

I am employed at General Motors, Port Elizabeth at the testing department. Until 20/09/66 I lived in Durban and then came to Port Elizabeth. During my stay at Durban I met a Greek named Sideri. This person is already elderly. He was unemployed and stayed in Glen Ashley, Durban, but I do not remember his home address. He lives with his son.

The morning after the murder of the late Dr. Verwoerd, Mr. Sideri told me that he knew Tsafendas well. He knows his parents since he (Sideri) stepped ashore in Lourenço Marques during 1915 or 1917. He knows that Tsafendas is the son of a Greek and a black woman. That Tsafendas's father later married a white woman and Tsafendas then stayed with his father and the white woman in Pretoria where his father worked at Iscor. Tsafendas went to Middelburg later on, where he went to school. Tsafendas then left the country and he (Sideri) did not see him for 30 years until he ran into him about 18 months ago in Durban. Tsafendas then told him that he had travelled the world, and he also was in Russia. When Sideri ran into him in Durban, Tsafendas was staying at the "Old Man's Home" in Durban. Tsafendas did not speak with him about politics, but he is of the opinion that Tsafendas leaned towards the communist side. Tsafendas experienced lots of trouble during his travels because he was not in possession of a passport. The latter then went to Lisbon to get a passport since he was born in Lourenço Marques and thus qualifies for a Portuguese passport. There he also encountered a lot of trouble and the Portuguese government took him to Lourenço Marques to make sure that he was born there before they issued him a passport. In total, he stayed in Lisbon for three years.

Statement taken at my presence ... (Indecipherable name)

Port Elizabeth. 13.10.1966. 12 p.m.

³⁷⁸² Roelof Erasmus Swiegers statement to the police, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

FRIDAY, 14 OCTOBER 1966

STATEMENTS

MICHAEL DAVID ERNEST NORTON³⁷⁸³

European male.

I am a journalist on the Cape Town staff (Cape Branch Editor) of the Post (Tel 3 26 73) and I reside at 30 Hancock Road, Steurhof, Cape Town (Tel 774567).

On the morning of 14.10.66 I accompanied Mr Gordon Winter to Thomas Boydell Buildings where he had to give evidence before the Commission of Mr Justice van Wyk. While waiting in the passage on the second floor, I came across Isaac Vallie, who is referred to in the article in the Post. I knew him. Vallie was accompanied by his brother Suleiman Vallie, to whom Mr Winter introduced me. After Mr Winter had gone to give evidence, the two Vallies came over to me and we started chatting, mainly about Tsafendas. Isaac seemed to be worried about the story in the Post about Tsafendas which was given to us by the Vallies. After a while it came out that his friends were upset and cross with him for having talked about Tsafendas. It was a casual chat and I did not question him. He mentioned no names and I did not ask him for any. Suleiman mentioned that in 1964 Tsafendas had come to his father and on that occasion posed as an Egyptian. This is all I have to tell.

(Signed) M.D.E. Norton

Taken by me at Cape Town this 14.10.66 at 4.10 pm.

(Indecipherable signature).

³⁷⁸³ Michael David Ernest Norton statement to the police, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12. File: Die post aangelegenheid, NASA.

MONDAY, 17 OCTOBER 1966

STATEMENTS

JOHN PATRICE LEACH³⁷⁸⁴

I am an adult white male employed by Thomson, Watson & Co, Thibault House, Cape Town. On 24/7/66, the "Eleni," which is owned by Brays Shipping Co., London, called at Cape Town for repairs to the rudder. The vessel was on her way to the Persian Gulf but broke down and was brought in from High Seas by the tug Praia Grande, which left again on 27/7/66 for Luanda. My firm was asked to act as agents and if it was not for these repairs, she would not have called at Cape Town. She did not discharge anything here.

When the Eleni left Cape Town on 3/9/66 she went to the Persian Gulf where she called at Mina Al Ahmadi for orders. She left there again on 23/9/66 for Venice where she called on or about the 12th October, 1966. On her way to Venice, she also called at Suez on 5/10/66. At this stage I am unable to say whether she will ever call at Cape Town again. The "Eleni" was bound to call at Dubai, just for bunkers (?), stores (?) and water, but because of the needed repairs, she was brought to Cape Town. While at Cape Town, the crew members were allowed to go ashore and receive visitors.

(Signed) J.P. Leach

Statement taken by me ... (Indecipherable signature) D/Sgt. 17/10/66 10.10 am.

WILLEM NEL VISSER³⁷⁸⁵

No.29097 Sergeant.

I am a sergeant in the South African Police stationed at Durban Central where I was in charge of the Immorality section. On a date before the 11th of September I was spoken to

³⁷⁸⁴ John Patrice Leach statement to the police, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

³⁷⁸⁵ Willem Nel Visser statement to the police, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

by Mr. Brian Rudden who is connected to the Sunday Times as a reporter. Mr. Rudden wanted to know if I knew the alleged assassin - Mr. Tsafendas - of Mr. Dr. Verwoerd. I shared that I knew Tsafendas simply as an interpreter in the Regional Courts of Durban where he (Tsafendas) worked as interpreter in a fornication case I handled. Mr. Rudden wanted to know what Tsafendas's attitude towards the Immorality Law was and I notified him the following: "That Tsafendas have asked what people say when I arrest them under the Immorality Law and whether I catch a lot of these cases. That Tsafendas was interested no more and no less in such business than a normal member of the public is interested when they hear what kind of cases I deal with."

Mr. Rudden also wanted to take a portrait of me to publish in the "Sunday Times" which I refused to allow, because of Captain du Toit, my commanding officer, had not given permission. The report of Mr. Rudden is mere sensation-ism and untrue.

Durban. 17/10/66. 4.35 p.m.

Statement taken by (Indecipherable signature) ... 29097 Sgt.

JAN ABRAHAM SWANEPOEL³⁷⁸⁶

I'm a Lieutenant in the South African Police and in charge of the Diamond Division, Cape Town.

On 20/01/1966 I received a completed application form from the Marine Diamond Corporation, Cape Town in respect of Demitris Tsafendas, in which he applied for employment at the company. Records were checked in my office and it was found that he was not listed as an illegal diamond trade suspect. After that, the records in the office of the Investigation division, Cape Town, were also checked and it was established that there is no such a person registered with criminal records and that there is no such a person being sought for any criminal offenses. On the same day the Head Protection Officer of Marine Diamond Corporation was advised that there is no objection in employing him (Tsafendas).

³⁷⁸⁶ Jan Abraham Swanepoel statement to the police, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Durban, NASA.

Details about Demitris Tsafendas, along with a list of other employees, was sent to the South African Criminal Bureau, Pretoria, for inquiry and on 21/02/1966 I was notified in writing that there is no criminal convictions registered against Demitris Tsafendas.

Applicants for employment with diamond companies are not seen nor spoken to in person by members of the Diamond Division. After confidential inquiries locally, a copy of a report is sent to any company, also the headquarters of the Diamond Division in Kimberley, where records of illegal diamond trafficking suspects are held for the entire Republic. In cases where it is suspected that an applicant may pose a security risk, inquiries are then also extended to the Security Police.

Cape Town. 17.10. 1966.

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY THE POLICE

STATEMENTS WITH NO DATES

The following statements were taken by the police, but they bore no dates. The first is by Albert Vercueil. This particular statement was definitely taken by the police as he was also interviewed by the Commission of Enquiry and the statement containing his evidence to the Commission was found. Thus it is safe to assume that this is the one taken by the police. The statement was taken in Pretoria, but it is undated, while the name of the Commissioner of Oaths is also missing.

ALBERT VERCUEIL³⁷⁸⁷

I work at F. A. Poole, Pretoria as foreman and reside at 669 17th Avenue, Rietfontein, Pretoria.

I know Demitrio Tsafendas. He began working at FA Poole on 7.2.64, in Pretoria as a welder and was in the firm's service to 10.7.64. His salary was 77 cents per hour. During the period he worked here he was absent from the service for 3 full days and 3 half days. I did not find the accused as a very good worker, but will say that he was an intelligent worker mainly because he quickly grasped when work was entrusted to him. However, I found him very sloppy in his work. I found him to be very friendly, but very opinionated. He would not, for example work according to the assignment, but as he decides.

The accused worked with several other people, but he could not agree with one of them. Accused was well-built and strong, and bullied the other Portuguese workers. He had fights with several white workers. I often admonished him about his sloppy work and because he always quarrelled with the other workmen. He was then usually very cocky and always placed the blame on the other party.

On July 10, 1964 I beseeched him for the sloppy work he performed, and when he began to mumble again, I told him to come to my office. In my office I told him: "Demetri you are no good to me. You are always causing trouble in the shops, and your work is no good. You must leave today. "He became extremely angry and put his finger in my face and it

³⁷⁸⁷ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

looked like he was going to attack me. He then said "You are just like your bloody Government. I will kill your Prime Minister yet." I told him to go or I'll call the police to remove him. Thereafter I never saw him again.

During the period he worked here he showed no signs of mental disorder or any other abnormality. Personally I would say that he is an intelligent person and completely mentally balanced. I now show some tools and work produced by the accused personally and performed to give you an idea of the degree of initiative he laid to the day.

MARTINHUS PETRUS VAN WYK³⁷⁸⁸

Proclamation Hill, Pretoria.

I am an adult, white male residing at the above address. For the past 37 years I have been employed at "F.A. POOLE" Engineering works, Pretoria West. During 1964, Dimitrio Tsafendas was also employed at the firm. He was a fitter and also did welding. He was quiet by nature and did not easily talk to us employees. He often spoke to the Bantu people. On a certain day he had a quarrel with one of the Bantu. I do not know which Bantu it was. I heard that the accused told the Bantu he would stab him with a knife, or words to that effect. The accused came across normal. He told me that he mastered various languages and that he travelled abroad extensively. After a few months I noticed that the accused no longer worked with the firm. I have never seen him again.

AUGUST KAREL OESTRICH³⁷⁸⁹

I am employed at F.A. POOLE, Pretoria as a machine shop foreman. I know Dimitrio Tsafendas, who also worked for this firm. Dimitrio used to speak to me in German and I found him very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. On one occasion he told me to complain about another man who

³⁷⁸⁸ Marthinus Petrus van Wyk statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁷⁸⁹ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

interfered with his work. He then spoke with a raised and excited voice. This was the only time I saw him in a rage and excited. He never spoke to me about any politics.

I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease. The day when he left our firm he told that he had a sister in Lourenço Marques and that he was going to see her. I never saw him again.

BERNARD MICHAEL GREENBERG³⁷⁹⁰

E/M/A. Assembly Hotel, Main Rd. Green Point.

I am the manager of the above Hotel. On the 7th of July 1966 Dimitrio Tsafendas answered to an advert I had in the papers for a receptionist. He called on me, filled in a form half-way but I decided not to take him on and told him that he would not serve my purpose. The half-filled in form I now hand over to the police. I had a bit of conversation with him. He mentioned that he had been in some kind of embroidery business in Portugal or Spain, and also in Lourenço Marques! He also mentioned that he was a teacher of sorts. He said he spoke various languages of which I have jotted down on his application form i.e. "English, French, Italian, Portuguese + Greek." He dated his form the 6th - I had to change it to the 7th, which was the day of the interview. I think that he had ...³⁷⁹¹

NICK VLACHOPOULOS³⁷⁹²

I am the owner of the Proclamation Hill Store, Pretoria West and married to the stepsister of DEMETRIO TSAFENDAS. During 1964 TSAFENDAS left the following articles at a second hand furniture shop in Pretoria West to be sold: 1 table, 4 chairs, 2 Big chairs, 1 Divan, 1 Bed. In the meantime TSAFENDAS disappeared from Pretoria and we lost trace of him. To

³⁷⁹⁰ Bernard Michael Greenberg statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁷⁹¹ The document ended in that manner stating s.r.s (see reverse side), but there was nothing further.

³⁷⁹² Nick Vlachopoulos statement to the police, October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

the end of 1964 I received a letter from him in Beira requesting that the money for which his furniture was sold be sent to him. He gave his address in Beira as c/o Olimpia Court. At this time only the table and 4 chairs had been sold for R20. I gave the money to my mother in-law to forward to him. During the beginning of 1965 the rest of the furniture was sold for R20.00 and I also handed this money to my mother in-law. TSAFENDAS also left a locked pedal cycle at my shop which is still in my storeroom. I never associated with TSAFENDAS and know very little about his associations and activities.

Statement taken by ... Indecipherable name ... Commissioner of Oaths

Date: 2 ... (Indecipherable number) /10/66. Place: Pretoria

COMMENTS ON VLACHOPOULOS'S STATEMENT

Nick Vlachopoulos was also questioned by the Commission of Enquiry on October 21, 1966. He stated that Tsafendas “habitually ate a huge amount of food but never mentioned a tape worm.”³⁷⁹³ According to Vlachopoulos’s sister Fotini Gavasiadis and son Mike, as well as Tsafendas’s half-sister Katerina Pnema and first cousin, Mary Eendracht, Vlachopoulos had lied, for obvious reasons, stating that he “never associated with Tsafendas and knew very little about his associations and activities.” On the contrary, Vlachopoulos had a very good relationship with Tsafendas. He had heard about him from his wife, Eleni, Tsafendas’s half-sister, long before and was very anxious to meet him. That was why he had followed Marika, Victor and his wife to Lourenço Marques in 1963.³⁷⁹⁴

It was Vlachopoulos who gave money to J.J. van den Berg, an official of the South African embassy in Lourenço Marques, to turn a blind eye to the fact that Tsafendas was on South Africa’s Stop list and to give him an entry visa. Furthermore, Vlachopoulos gave Tsafendas a rent-free apartment in Pretoria for eight months and Tsafendas regularly worked voluntarily in his café. Vlachopoulos often discussed politics with Tsafendas, as he

³⁷⁹³ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

³⁷⁹⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

sympathised with his ideas, but he never discussed issues in public and insisted that Tsafendas do the same.³⁷⁹⁵

MISSING STATEMENTS

As already stated, several statements and other documents have gone missing from the National Archives of South Africa regarding Tsafendas's case. They include statements by Patrick O'Ryan (discussed earlier in this chapter), Eleni Vlachopoulos and Evangelia Nissiotis, Tsafendas's half-sisters, Tsafendas's statement to General van den Bergh, Tsafendas's two testimonies to the Commission of Enquiry into Verwoerd's death etc.³⁷⁹⁶

Of course we are not in position to know which other ones have disappeared because there are no references to any other statements. It must also be noted that evidence relating to the Tsafendas case are not the only ones missing from the NASA. Important evidence has disappeared in several other cases, such as for example the Ahmed Timol original inquest, where 600 pages have gone missing.³⁷⁹⁷

This suggests that there was a systematic removal of documents from the archives. Researcher and filmmaker Liza Key and Dr. James Sanders, journalist, author and researcher specialising in South African affairs and history, told the author that in the early 1990s, with apartheid on the verge of collapse, the South African Security Police burned piles of documents in order to destroy evidence contradicting official verdicts, as well to protect themselves, their witnesses and their secret informants.³⁷⁹⁸

Liza Key said about the missing documents from the National Archives:

“Access to government archives in South Africa is a frustrating business. Researchers are subjected to restricted access to the archive by, for example, the Department of Justice and have to go through lengthy bureaucratic manoeuvrings to find - when they are finally

³⁷⁹⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

³⁷⁹⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁷⁹⁷ Nicolson (*Daily Maverick*), 12 October 2017, 'Timol Inquest: He was murdered but culprits are dead, court rules.'

³⁷⁹⁸ Liza Key in a personal interview, 6 November 2016; Dr. James Sanders in a personal interview, 4 June 2016.

given permission to view the holdings - that vital documents are missing, have been redacted or intentionally destroyed. Literally tons of top secret security police documents were incinerated in the early 1990's. Housed in government diesel they smouldered away for days on the police rugby field in Johannesburg. According to former security branch members, the order to destroy was given by then Minister of Police, Heunis Kriel to protect the names of their informers. The few police files that survive are in the National Archive but names and reference numbers on flimsy dust covers that promise to unlock secrets of the past, are empty inside."³⁷⁹⁹

Piers Pigou, International Crisis Group's Senior Consultant for Southern Africa and TRC Investigator, told Liza Key about the destruction of police documents and the state of the South African National Archives: "... we've also seen significant numbers of records being destroyed... Records that were found by the TRC's own archival investigation team have subsequently gone missing [from the National Archives of South Africa] - records of the security establishment and so forth."³⁸⁰⁰

Yasmin Sooka, a TRC Commissioner, told Liza Key, "The Truth Commission in South Africa did have quite extraordinary powers. It had the power to search and seize information and of course in the South African case that was really necessary because the shredding machines were very, very busy as the former State was destroying records."³⁸⁰¹

Simanga, head of Soweto Security Branch and former MK rebel, told Liza Key about the destruction of the police documents by the police:

"The Security Police and the Bureau of State Security, which was called BOSS at that time, destroyed thousands and thousands of documents that they had in their possession. They used to keep meticulous records of activists in the country. But now towards the formation of the Transitional Executive Council they destroyed all the documentation. And it's not a thousand pages or five thousands of pages, its millions of pages that they destroyed...

Well, they were trying to hide the systematic ways of their operation. The systematic way that they used to kill people. There were people who just disappeared. And they have records of who they killed. That is what they were hiding. They operated exactly like Nazi

³⁷⁹⁹ Liza Key in a personal interview, 6 November 2016.

³⁸⁰⁰ Piers Pigou to Liza Key, n.d. Liza Key's Personal Collection.

³⁸⁰¹ Yasmin Sooka to Liza Key, n.d. Liza Key's Personal Collection.

Germany. Remember, towards the end of World War 2, when Hitler saw that Berlin was about to be taken over, the concentration camps and all these places where people were kept, he ordered them destroyed. That's exactly what they did, to hide evidence."³⁸⁰²

General Johan van der Merwe, Former Head of the Apartheid Security Police and Chief of Police, told Liza Key about the destruction of police files:

"Well... you know... you know... it was such a problem to us when the amnesty hearings started because we had no records at our disposal... and the reason why that was done [the destruction of police files] was only to protect our informers...because in all these files, information, reports... were filed in the files. Although they used code-names for the informers the circumstances were such that any person reading the files would immediately have recognized that this can only be that that person was present. And we were afraid that should that [information] fall into the hands of the ANC many of our informers would have been exposed and that would have been the end - not only their careers - but in many cases their lives."³⁸⁰³

Asked by Liza Key "who gave the order for the destruction of files?" General van der Merwe replied, "That order actually came from the Minister Adriaan Vlok. He was not a Minister at that time. It was Heunis Kriel who was Minister at that time. Heunis Kriel last Minister of Law and Order."³⁸⁰⁴

Paul Erasmus, former Security Branch policeman, told Liza Key about the destruction of police files:

"Political events overtook us. There was a big destruction of the entire filing system at John Vorster Square [+ 1989/90] which was something like nine hundred thousand personnel files, weighing tons, tens of tons maybe more. Huge steel filing cabinets... In the mid-80s, in fact, that filing system became an engineering problem and they had to bring government PWD engineers in because it looked like the filing system was going to fall out of the building. That a side of the building was going to collapse, which would have meant that the public of Johannesburg would have been subjected to something like nine hundred thousand personnel files of top secret documents lying on the M1 highway..."

³⁸⁰² Simanga to Liza Key, n.d. Liza Key's Personal Collection.

³⁸⁰³ General Johan van der Merwe to Liza Key, n.d. Liza Key's Personal Collection.

³⁸⁰⁴ General Johan van der Merwe to Liza Key, n.d. Liza Key's Personal Collection.

In 89/90 the main filing system at John Vorster Square as I mentioned was destroyed. It took days, if not weeks. The filing system was sanitized but some of it remained intact. Probably ninety percent was gutted out by hard labour prisoners were brought in from Johannesburg prison. They parked the trucks in the Security Branch basement and the documents went... hundreds of thousands of files, sub files, all top secret. Secret or top secret files went to the Police Sports grounds at Arthur Bloch Park and were burnt with government diesel. Literally took days. I personally witnessed it.

Well as I mentioned these documents were taken to the police rugby field at Arthur Bloch Park which is still the Police Rugby field in Newlands. They [the docs] were burnt next to the rugby which took days. Tons and tons of documents. The reason that so much documentation existed was - apart from an obsession to document everything - we didn't have computers. One can only imagine the fear of these documents becoming public, because it wasn't only what was happening on the one side, this was a record of what was happening on the other side. Amongst these documents would have been details of who were the informers in the ANC head office, in Lusaka or London or whatever. Going all the way to the right-wing on the other side because we were investigating the right wing as well."³⁸⁰⁵

In addition, Paul Erasmus told Liza Key about the treatment of documents he lent to the TRC:

"I am just amazed to find that I have got anything original left, the way it's been pillaged and plundered by the TRC. I had to go down to Cape Town to fetch them and it was just a disaster. We got ten times more stuff back than what I actually gave them but it was hundreds of unnecessary photocopies. Documents disappeared. I don't know who the TRC worked with and what they did with the papers but I certainly registered my extreme discontent. I gave them an inventory of documentation- original documentation and things that I had written which is quite considerable and I got back literally as you can see, this now is how I got it back."³⁸⁰⁶

Another possibility is that this evidence in Tsafendas's case was suppressed by General van den Bergh and the police and was never given to the Commission or to the Attorney-General. This would not be surprising since it is something that the police and van den Bergh himself had repeatedly done. That General van den Bergh, who was in charge of

³⁸⁰⁵ Paul Erasmus to Liza Key, n.d. Liza Key's Personal Collection.

³⁸⁰⁶ Paul Erasmus to Liza Key, n.d. Liza Key's Personal Collection.

the investigation, attempted to downplay and omit from the Commission Tsafendas's Communist beliefs and political activities seems to be in line with the disappearance of the statements. Since he had already withheld information about Tsafendas's Communism, it seems logical he would seek to withhold other important information. It would not have been the first or last time that the general withheld evidence from the judiciary. For a detailed account of General van den Bergh's possible role with the missing evidence, see chapter Six, *The Commission of Enquiry*, page 1875.

Another person who was very probably questioned by the police, although no statement was found in the NASA, is Dr. E.L. Fisher, a psychiatrist and a United Party MP. Dr. Fisher was the first doctor to treat Dr. Verwoerd after Tsafendas's attack in Parliament. We know this because the doctor gave a detailed account of his actions to the South African press. He told the *Daily Dispatch*, "We did everything we could to stop the bleeding. We gave mouth-to-mouth breathing and tried artificial respiration... we kept on treating him and trying respiratory treatment ... but by then he had no pulse at all. It was hopeless."³⁸⁰⁷ Other doctors who rushed to help Dr. Verwoerd, like Dr. Venter, Dr. Radford and Dr. van der Verwe, were questioned by the police and their statements were found in the archives. However, it should be noted that no statements were found in the Archives from two other doctors who were present, G. de V Morrison and Maud Clark, which could mean that not all doctors at the assassination scene were questioned or that statements made by these two doctors also went missing.

What makes Dr. Fisher's possible statement of some importance is what he told *Die Vaderland* the day after the assassination. He said, "It was clear that the assassin must have received training in the art of handling a knife. Each time, the knife slipped through the ribs, showing that it was not handled haphazardly as a usual stabbing would be carried out."³⁸⁰⁸ Later the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd's death wrote in its final report:

"The doctor who carried out the post-mortem examination informed the Commission that there were no grounds for the rumour that the wounds had been inflicted by an expert stabber. He described them as quite ordinary. The Commission had the opportunity of

³⁸⁰⁷ *Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd assassinated.'

³⁸⁰⁸ Crowd and Revo, 1967: 20.

*inspecting all the photographs showing the position and extent of the wounds and is in agreement with this opinion.”*³⁸⁰⁹

The author agrees with the Commission’s conclusion and the issue of whether Tsafendas was an “expert stabber” is discussed later on the Commission of Enquiry Chapter. However, it seems most unlikely that the police would fail to question a doctor and an MP who was present at the assassination and had rushed to help Dr. Verwoerd, particularly after the doctor’s reported comments on the knife handling.

Finally, Panagiotis Peroglou and Elias Constantaras stated to the author that they were questioned by the police, but their statements were not found in the archives. This is what they remember telling the police:

PANAGIOTIS PEROGLOU

Peroglou met Tsafendas in Mary Scott’s boarding house where he would take his meals. He remembers being questioned at his shop sometime after the assassination, but does not remember the exact day nor by how many policemen. He does not remember what he was asked by the police nor what he told them, but he believes he must have told them everything he remembered about Tsafendas. His memory is of Tsafendas being “very well mannered, especially with women and elderly people... very talkative and friendly ... he had a lot of respect for women. He would bring them a chair or he would offer his chair ... he was very well educated, especially about Greece’s history and Christianity ...” Peroglou “never got the impression that he might be insane. He never did or said anything to make us think he was insane. He was definitely sane.” Peroglou does not remember Tsafendas talking politics.³⁸¹⁰

ELIAS CONSTANTARAS

Constantaras also met Tsafendas in Mary Scott’s boarding house and became a good friend. He clearly remembers being interviewed by “two or three policemen” who visited him at his work “two or three days after the assassination.” One of the policemen had a portable typewriter and typed his statement, which he signed at the end of the questioning

³⁸⁰⁹ Chapter II D, Paragraph 12.

³⁸¹⁰ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

Constantaras does not remember exactly what he told the police, but says he “must have told them everything” he knew, for instance that Tsafendas talked constantly about politics and that he had fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War.

Constantaras is certain he mentioned that Tsafendas called Dr. Verwoerd “Hitler’s best student.” He said, “I remember saying this because they asked me why he called him that and I said, ‘I don’t know, he did not say, I just overheard him saying it.’” Constantaras said, “I had to say it because there were others present at the time and I knew that they would have told the police about it, so it would have looked bad on me if I had kept it out. He (Tsafendas) had told us that Dr. Verwoerd was doing to the Africans what Hitler did to the Jews, but I couldn’t say this to the police and fortunately they did not ask me anything else about it.” Constantaras remembers talking about Tsafendas’s time in the boarding house, but not the details. He does not remember what else he was asked or said.

Tsafendas had given Constantaras a copy of Jean-Paul Sartre’s “*Anti-Semite and Jew*”, and as for his mental state, he remembers him as being “perfectly fine. He was not insane. None of us ever got the impression that he could be insane ... I was impressed by the way he was talking ... he talked very nicely, he knew how to speak properly. He sounded like an educated man ... he was very friendly and easy-talking with everyone ...” Constantaras does not remember if he told any of this to the police.³⁸¹¹

OTHER DOCUMENTS COLLECTED BY THE POLICE

The archives also contain several letters, memoranda and reports from various institutions, but most of them contain repetition and information we have already seen, or information of no relevance to the case. However, the following are documents of some importance.

THE GRAFTON STATE HOSPITAL REPORT

On September 16, 1966, the US embassy in Cape Town gave to the South African authorities a report on Tsafendas by the Grafton State Hospital, North Grafton, Massachusetts, USA.³⁸¹² This document later became available to the Commission of Enquiry and was mentioned in

³⁸¹¹ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

³⁸¹² Letter of the USA Embassy in Cape Town to the South African Security Branch, 3 October 1966. Correctional Service. Subject: Demitrio Tsafendas. File: 80/0043 A123 Vol. 1. NASA.

its final report. The Grafton document is of major importance since it reveals that Tsafendas had “faked mental illness” in the past, something that was not revealed during the trial and received very little attention from the Commission of Enquiry.

Tsafendas was admitted to this hospital on March 27, 1946 and remained there until July 31, 1947. The five-page hospital report, which has two appendices listing his movements in the United States, stated that when he was first admitted, Tsafendas “thought he had a tapeworm” and was “hardly convinced he hasn’t,” but he was “fairly co-operative and in good contact with the environment.” The report also stated that that Tsafendas had told the US Immigration authorities he would commit suicide if they deported him, and that “he faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings of ships.” Furthermore, according to the report, Tsafendas deteriorated in Grafton as time went on. He became “very agitated, assaultive and showed delusions and had to be put in seclusion at times.” On December 12, 1946, he was diagnosed with “schizophrenia, hebephrenic type, with deterioration: prognosis poor.”

The report also contains extensive references by Tsafendas to a man named Thomas Tuff. According to the report, Tsafendas talked often about this man, who he said was a missionary of the Christian Church and had a big influence on him. Years later, Tsafendas spoke at length to Father Minas Constandinou, Father Spiros Randos, Patrick O’Ryan and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis about a man named Tom, who he said he met at a hospital in the USA. He told these witnesses that Tom was a missionary of the Christian Church and the one who introduced him to the sect. He told them Tom claimed to have a tapeworm inside him which ate his food. Tsafendas did not believe this story and concluded that Tom made it up in order to be found insane and exempted from service in the American military, since this was during the Second World War. Nevertheless, Tsafendas also told these witnesses that he copied Tom’s tapeworm story and used it as his own. Naturally, Tsafendas did not tell the hospital doctors about Tom and the tapeworm and the hospital report makes no mention of it. Tsafendas told the story to O’Ryan and about thirty years later to the priests on separate occasions but with exactly the same details.³⁸¹³

The report concludes with an account of Tsafendas’s “clinical course” at the hospital, stating that he smeared the walls with faces, claimed to hear voices from the radiators, and

³⁸¹³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

was disoriented as to place and situation. It said, “He is wont to assume silly, grimacing expressions and is prone to misidentify the attendants and the examiner.” The last paragraph of the report stated that a course of electric shock treatment had been started and Tsafendas had shown improvement; he was no longer in seclusion and was oriented as to place and person but not as to time. It said “He could safely be deported to his native country, accompanied by one attendant.” The last line of the report said, “Diagnosis: schizophrenia hebephrenic type. Condition: Improved.”³⁸¹⁴

1941 REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ASIATIC AFFAIRS

This is a report about Tsafendas written by the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs in 1941 and sent to the Commissioner of the South African Police, thus clearly it was in the police files. The report concerns Tsafendas’s appearance in court accused of being in South Africa illegally because no permit for permanent residence had been issued to him. A fine was imposed, which he paid. He was then given a temporary permit and released. The report states that Tsafendas’s application for permanent residence was refused after the South African Consul-General in Lourenço Marques advised the police that Tsafendas was a “half-caste” and had been dismissed from employment at a kiosk in Portuguese South Africa (Mozambique) on account of his Communist leanings.³⁸¹⁵

³⁸¹⁴ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

³⁸¹⁵ Report of the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, 14 October 1941. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

CONCLUSION ABOUT THE POLICE INVESTIGATION

In the course of this chapter, we have looked at all the statements taken by the police during their investigation into Dr. Verwoerd's assassination. In total, 116 statements were found in the National Archives of South Africa, although many other witnesses were questioned, such as Patrick O'Ryan and the crew of the *Eleni*, whose statements were not found. Most importantly, we have seen Tsafendas's own words in the two statements he gave to the police while he was in custody. In clear and forthright terms, Tsafendas stated that he killed Dr. Verwoerd for political reasons. He said he was "disgusted" with his policies, considered him not to be "representative of all South African people" and wanted to see someone "who would represent all South African people," and he believed that by killing him "a change of policy would take place."

Several witnesses testified that Tsafendas was a Communist who opposed apartheid and considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator and "Hitler's best student" since he was applying some of Hitler's policies to the non-White South Africans. Tsafendas himself admitted that he had been a member of the South African Communist Party. Witnesses also testified that Tsafendas had joined the Greek Communist Party and fought in the Greek civil war as a member of the party's military wing, the DSE.

Nowhere in either of his statements does Tsafendas mention a tapeworm or say anything that would suggest he was schizophrenic. He stated clearly that it was his own idea to kill Dr. Verwoerd, that no-one asked him to do it, and that he did it because he thought "a change of policy would take place" and "it was the right thing to do." The fact that not one of the 116 people questioned by police mentioned the tapeworm is of major significance since the defence at Tsafendas's summary trial would claim the tapeworm was central to Tsafendas's existence, that he had hosted it since he was a child and that it controlled his life. Tsafendas spoke about the tapeworm to all members of his defence team, plus the psychiatrists for his defence and for the state. Yet he had never mentioned it anywhere else up till then. Not a single person was aware that Tsafendas believed he had a tapeworm, not even his family. Tsafendas told no one all those years but suddenly, while in custody, he started telling everyone about a tapeworm.

Statements made to the police during their investigation portray Tsafendas as a Communist, someone who talks constantly about politics, an opponent of apartheid, colonialism and slavery, who strongly supports the independence of Mozambique. He is

described as intelligent, well-read and knowledgeable. Witnesses say he is compassionate and though poor himself, gives money to people in need, such as poor Whites in Durban and his flatmate, John Bornman. The statements are compatible with what Tsafendas himself told the police and with what was said by witnesses interviewed by the author who were not questioned by the police.

There are also contradictory statements by witnesses. Many described Tsafendas as well-mannered and polite, while others considered him selfish and messy. Since social behaviour is a subjective matter, it is not surprising that different people formed different opinions of the man. Several also testified that Tsafendas discussed politics with them while others claimed that he did not. It is perfectly normal that a person would not talk about politics to every person he met, especially in Tsafendas's case, when his views opposed those of most White South Africans at the time. There were certainly others who talked politics with Tsafendas, but did not tell the police out of fear or to protect him.

A very important issue is what happened to Tsafendas while he was in custody, how he was "punished" brutally and systematically by the South African police. This unprecedented physical and psychological torture is something that has never been discussed before. We also saw in this chapter how Tsafendas, although initially he maintained to the police that he had killed Dr. Verwoerd for political reasons, later told his defence that a tapeworm controlled his life.

A factor of crucial importance concerned PIDE, the Portuguese security police. From Lisbon, the Director of PIDE in Portugal ordered the PIDE office in Mozambique not to reveal to the South African police any information "indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique." It hid the fact that PIDE had held a file on Tsafendas (*Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*) since 1938, containing details of his activities since then, including his five arrests for political reasons and the fact that he was banned from entering Mozambique from 1951 to 1963 due to his Communist and anti-colonial activities.³⁸¹⁶ The fact that PIDE had a file on Tsafendas has remained unknown till now. However, as we have also seen, the South African police were warned of the Portuguese attitude by the South African embassy in Lisbon only two days after the assassination. Stating that Tsafendas was a Communist who had been arrested several times by the Portuguese

³⁸¹⁶ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

police, the embassy told their national police investigators that the Portuguese authorities would attempt to downgrade or hide Tsafendas's political activities.

What puzzled many people about the assassination, both at the time and long after, was how Tsafendas managed to secure and hold onto a job in Parliament if he was "insane." In the first place, as we have seen and we will see later in detail, Tsafendas had three very good references. One was from Limasollu Naci College in Istanbul, one from Fries & Son in Frankfurt and one from Dimitris Apostolidis, a financial supporter and member of the ruling National Party. More germane, but a question that was never asked, was how Tsafendas managed to work for five or six months in a demanding teaching job at Limasollu Naci, the most prestigious private language college in Istanbul. Tsafendas spoke about it in his statement, the police must have had the reference, and his Istanbul employment was also reported in the South African Press.

However, no-one seemed to bother, then or later, –to check on the college and his work there. Had anyone done so, it would have been quickly apparent that six months' teaching foreign languages was much more demanding of any person, whatever his mental state, than carrying messages and bringing meals to newsmen in the Cape Town Parliament. His Istanbul employment, was also a major contradiction to what was stated at his summary trial. Neither the police nor the Press at the time paid much attention to the college and this information was just briefly mentioned.

Important information was also given to the police by the South African embassy in Washington – that Tsafendas had been hospitalised in the United States as unstable but not insane. The South African police were also given Tsafendas's medical report from Grafton State Hospital in Massachusetts, USA, which contained information regarding his time in the United States and his various hospitalisations there. The Grafton hospital's diagnosis of Tsafendas was "schizophrenia-Hebephrenic type. Condition: Improved." However, the report also contained significant information regarding Tsafendas's medical history -- the fact that in 1943 he had "faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings (sinkings) of ships."³⁸¹⁷

What's more, at least six of the *Eleni* crew testified that Tsafendas had also faked mental illness to avoid army service. As we have seen, these statements, along with others,

³⁸¹⁷ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

have gone missing from NASA, but the fact remains that they were taken at the time by the South African police. As we will see in ensuing chapters on the Summary Trial and the Commission of Enquiry, the vast majority of this information gathered by the South African police would not be used in court and would not be publicised. Only a very, very small amount would play a role at the Commission of Enquiry and almost none at all at Tsafendas's summary trial. Why and how will be examined in the respective chapters.

According to Professor John Dugard, based on the evidence presented here, "The picture comes across clearly of Tsafendas as a political person who was not insane when he killed Dr. Verwoerd. The evidence points overwhelmingly in this direction. Tsafendas was a political revolutionary, whose assassination of Dr. Verwoerd was motivated by a hatred of Dr. Verwoerd and all he stood for. He was not an insane killer but a political assassin determined to rid South Africa of the architect of apartheid."³⁸¹⁸

³⁸¹⁸ Professor John Dugard in personal interviews with the author, 31 August 2016 and 8 September 2016.

CHAPTER FIVE

TSAFENDAS'S SUMMARY TRIAL

THE JUDICIARY IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA³⁸¹⁹

The South African legal system was an integral part of the repressive machinery of the apartheid system³⁸²⁰ and was seriously damaged by it. Constitutional law and administrative law were unashamedly used by apartheid in its exercise in racist social engineering, though today are undergoing a process of rehabilitation under a new Constitution.³⁸²¹ The administration of justice under apartheid “systematically favoured the state ... devised rules that turned suspects into convicts ... and moulded the rule of law to serve the law of the legal system in enforcing economic, political and racial oppression.”³⁸²² According to Sydney Kentridge Q.C.,³⁸²³ “In South Africa, one after another, inquests into deaths in detention found that ‘no-one was to blame’ as the security police, the judiciary and district surgeons conspired to keep torture and murder under wraps.”³⁸²⁴ In effect, apartheid suborned the law and used it for its own ends.

Professor John Dugard, a foremost academic critic of the apartheid legal order, has expressed “outrage and shame” about the South African legal system during apartheid,³⁸²⁵ characterising it as “abnormal.” He said: “a legal system that excludes 70% of its population from the franchise, that excludes 70% of its population from owning land in 87% of the country, that arbitrarily deprives 8 million people of their nationality, that has forcibly relocated many millions of people on account of their race, that formally executes some 160 persons per year, that authorizes repression in the name of national security and that permits international aggression, [is] . . . a grossly abnormal one.”³⁸²⁶ Professor Dugard has also characterised it as an “old-fashioned, inquisitorial system modelled upon a code produced by

³⁸¹⁹ For some of the most important political trials of the 1950s and 1960s see Chapter One.

³⁸²⁰ SATIS, 1985: 5.

³⁸²¹ Dugard, 1998b: 111.

³⁸²² Parker and Parker-Mokhesi, 1998: 3.

³⁸²³ (1922-) Leading South African anti-apartheid lawyer and activist. He played a leading role in several very important political trials during apartheid, the two most well-known being the Treason Trial and the Inquest into the death of Stephen Biko (South African History Online. n.d)

³⁸²⁴ Quoted in Bizos, 1998: vii.

³⁸²⁵ Klug, 2000: 660.

³⁸²⁶ Klug, 2000: 659-660.

the Spanish Inquisition, one which bears little resemblance to the enlightened codes of procedure found in modern Western European countries.”³⁸²⁷

In his 1998 article, *The South African Judiciary and International Law During the Apartheid Era*, Professor Dugard set out several instances where the Appellate Division handed down decisions which favoured the State but militated against the interests of justice. These included the court's approval of South Africa's unlawful integration of Namibia and the war which followed, making it culpable in part for thousands of deaths; its brushing aside of human rights treaties in regard to the Group Areas Act, thus permitting the Act to be applied in a racial manner; its failure to consider international human rights provisions in a dispute over the rights of the indigent to counsel; its ruling that South African security forces were permitted to arrest persons in a foreign country, which ran counter to international law.³⁸²⁸

Professor Dugard wrote after examining some cases that “One must therefore assume - an assumption endorsed by the refusal of the court to consult a single international law treatise on a question of international law - that the court did not, quite frankly, give the proverbial damn about international law!” One ruling by the Appellate Division which was hailed as progressive was that South African courts had no competence to try a person abducted from another state. However, this decision was made after the fall of apartheid, showing that the judges were keen to go with the new order.³⁸²⁹

The TRC's report regarding the judiciary during apartheid emphasized that one of the reasons for apartheid's longevity was “the superficial adherence to ‘rule by law’ by the National Party (NP), whose leaders craved the aura of legitimacy that ‘the law’ bestowed on their harsh injustice ... In the intervening thirty years, however, the courts and the organised legal profession generally and subconsciously or unwittingly connived in the legislative and executive pursuit of injustice, as was pointed out by a few at the time and acknowledged by so many at the hearing. Perhaps the most common form of subservience can be captured in the maxim *qui tacet consentire* (silence gives consent). There were, nevertheless, many parts

³⁸²⁷ Dugard, 1978: 273.

³⁸²⁸ Dugard, 1998b: 110-126.

³⁸²⁹ Dugard, 1998b: 110-126.

of the profession that actively contributed to the entrenchment and defence of apartheid through the courts.”³⁸³⁰

As for the role of the judges during apartheid, the TRC concluded:

“In the greatest injustices of all, judges who too easily made sense of the illogical and the unjust in legislative language, and who too quickly accepted the word of the police or official witness in preference to that of the accused. Kathleen Satchwell in her submission deals extensively with the case of Linda Mogale, her client who was assaulted and tortured in detention. Despite evidence to this effect, the judge nevertheless rejected ‘as impossible’ a process of police violence and system of intimidation.”³⁸³¹

However, the criticism of the judiciary by the TRC seems still very mild in comparison to the real extent of the role it played under apartheid, especially with regard to the role of judges in Government-appointed Commissions of Inquiry.

Historically the South African judiciary reflected a largely independent stance. In 1948, when the National Party came to power, most judges supported the old United Party, with a handful backing the NP. The new government lost no time in changing the balance in its favour. Especially during the 1950s and particularly after L.C. Steyn³⁸³² became Chief Justice, political appointments became the rule rather than the exception.³⁸³³ The government appointed judges it knew would support its policies, selecting sympathetic Afrikaner Nationalists in preference to distinguished members of the Bar whose political orientation might lean to the Left. In this way, the ruling party changed the character of the entire judiciary.³⁸³⁴

In 1977, according to an estimate by Professor Dugard, more than half of South Africa's judges favoured the ruling National Party. Furthermore, the same handful of judges heard virtually all political cases between 1978 and 1982. His figures showed that 17% of the

³⁸³⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 4, 1998: 101.

³⁸³¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 4, 1998: 103.

³⁸³² Steyn's appointment was hugely controversial at the time as he was chosen over Justice Oliver Schreiner, a man described as “the greatest chief justice South Africa never had.” The convention at the time was that the position of Chief Justice was given to the longest-serving judge in the Appellate Division. At the time, that person was Schreiner, while Steyn was a much more junior man. However, what Steyn had that Schreiner didn't was his support for the National Party. Due to the fact that Schreiner was not a supporter of the NP, he was twice ignored for the position. (Soggot (*Mail and Guardian*), 20 September 1996, ‘Battle lines drawn over chief justice’).

³⁸³³ Dugard, 1998b: 113; Sachs, 1973: 257.

³⁸³⁴ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016; Sachs, 1973: 257.

judiciary heard 84% of all the political cases, and four judges heard over 50% of them.³⁸³⁵

Although there are no official figures for 1966, Professor Dugard told the author that the situation was even worse then and the figures certainly higher.³⁸³⁶

Thus no eyebrows were raised when Judge Andries Beyers was named to preside at Tsafendas's summary trial and Judge Jacques Theodore van Wyk became the sole member of the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd's assassination. Both judges were NP supporters who favoured racial separation, and both had served the National Party and apartheid in various high-profile cases.³⁸³⁷ Professor John Dugard told the author:

“So, during the 1950s, most political appointments took place. The government was determined only to appoint its supporters and the result was that Beyers and van Wyk were both appointed. But I think, in fairness to van Wyk, he was, intellectually, one of the better judges. And Beyers, too, was intellectually good ... they were intellectual giants, so to speak, amongst the National Party judges. So I suspect that the government was very careful when it came to appointing judges to hear the Tsafendas case, and so that would explain why both Beyers and van Wyk were involved. They were certainly political persons and they owed their appointments to the government.”³⁸³⁸

DEFENCE'S PREPARATIONS³⁸³⁹

After visiting Tsafendas and concluding that he was not right in his mind, his defence team set out to establish a case for insanity and proceeded to appoint psychiatrists to examine him.³⁸⁴⁰ By this time, the media and politicians were already declaring Tsafendas a “madman.”³⁸⁴¹ When his defence team said they were going to contend that he was insane, Tsafendas “sort of shrugged his shoulders... and said, ‘Well, you just do whatever you think is best.’”³⁸⁴²

³⁸³⁵ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986: 141; See also Dugard, J. (1978) *Human Rights in South Africa Legal Order*.

³⁸³⁶ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 29 January 2016.

³⁸³⁷ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

³⁸³⁸ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

³⁸³⁹ Due to lack of other sources, a lot of the information regarding the defence team's preparations is taken from David Bloomberg's memoir, *My Times*. However, we cannot take everything that Bloomberg has stated as unimpeachable, since his account contains some evident inaccuracies.

³⁸⁴⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 78-79.

³⁸⁴¹ Jones, 2000: 64

³⁸⁴² David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

The first specialist physician was Dr. Harold Cooper, a psychiatrist who had worked in psychiatric hospitals in Johannesburg and Cape Town and had subsequently gone into private practice. He was a strange choice, given that in the 1951 case, *Rex v. Kennedy*, the court refused to accept his psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Cooper had declared the accused in this case to be “mentally disordered,” (as he was later to find Tsafendas), but the judge dismissed this opinion as based on improbable evidence and found the accused fit to stand trial.³⁸⁴³ The other two psychiatrists were Dr. James William MacGregor, a specialist psychiatrist and neurologist since 1937 who practised in Cape Town; and Dr. Aubrey Zabow, who was working in a private practice in Cape Town and was also a part-time consultant in psychiatry at Groote Schuur Hospital and the Somerset Hospital.

Dr. MacGregor was the first to examine Tsafendas, on September 29. Tsafendas's responses were similar to those he had given at his meeting with his appointed defence team. After a ninety-minute examination in the presence of Bloomberg, Dr. MacGregor immediately diagnosed him as a paranoid schizophrenic, but requested a further consultation to decide whether he was certifiable. He went on to examine Tsafendas on a further two occasions, on October 4 and 11, for ninety minutes each time.³⁸⁴⁴

Dr. Zabow examined Tsafendas the following day (September 30), also for ninety minutes and in the presence of Bloomberg. He concluded that the accused was psychotic and suffering from schizophrenia and was certifiable, but asked to examine him again. He too examined him on two more occasions for ninety minutes each time, on October 4 and 11.³⁸⁴⁵ Dr. Cooper examined Tsafendas on October 1, again for ninety minutes and in the company of Bloomberg. The doctor declared that he had no doubt Tsafendas was mentally disordered, but needed to see him again before he could offer a final opinion.³⁸⁴⁶ Dr. Cooper would examine Tsafendas again on October 4, 11 and 14, spending a total of six hours with him, and his diagnosis remained unchanged.³⁸⁴⁷ Each psychiatrist examined Tsafendas for the first time in the presence of Bloomberg, and the second time on his own. The third time (October

³⁸⁴³ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters. P: 17. Pretoria: Government Printer. 1967.

³⁸⁴⁴ Dr J.W. MacGregor's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA

³⁸⁴⁵ Dr Aubrey Zabow's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA

³⁸⁴⁶ Bloomberg, 2007: 79.

³⁸⁴⁷ Dr Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966, p. 20. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

11), all the psychiatrists examined him together. Tsafendas's responses will be examined later in this chapter.

The last doctor appointed by the defence to examine Tsafendas was Dr. Hendrik Muller, a specialist physician with nineteen years' experience in private practice, who happened to be Judge Beyers's personal doctor. Dr. Muller's brief was to examine Tsafendas physically to determine whether he had a tapeworm.³⁸⁴⁸ The consultation took place on October 12, but Dr. Muller did not carry out a physical examination as he was supposed to, having concluded from his discussions with Tsafendas that he did not have a tapeworm.³⁸⁴⁹

When Bloomberg became aware that Tsafendas was examined on the night of the assassination by the psychiatrist Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky, he asked for and received a copy of his detailed report. Dr. Sakinofsky diagnosed Tsafendas to be suffering from paraphrenic schizophrenia, mentally disordered in terms of the Act and thus certifiable.³⁸⁵⁰ Bloomberg stated in his memoir, and this is one of his inaccuracies, that Dr. Sakinofsky examined Tsafendas on two more occasions before Bloomberg was appointed as Tsafendas's defence lawyer on September 26, and had come to the conclusion that Tsafendas was schizophrenic. In this he is mistaken. Dr. Sakinofsky testified during the summary trial that after his first examination, he saw Tsafendas for a second time on October 6, one month after the assassination.³⁸⁵¹ Bloomberg was appointed on September 26, ten days before Dr. Sakinofsky saw Tsafendas for the second time, and therefore Bloomberg's claim that the doctor had examined his client three times before September 26 is incorrect.

Dr. Sakinofsky, knowing it was "extremely likely" that he would be called to testify as one of the "medical witnesses," since he had examined Tsafendas on the evening of the assassination, wrote on September 19, 1966, to the Medical Director of the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital in Hamburg, requesting Tsafendas's medical record.³⁸⁵² The hospital would eventually send the record on October 3 and copies would be given to Willem M. van

³⁸⁴⁸ Bloomberg, 2007: 79.

³⁸⁴⁹ Dr. Hendrik Muller's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁸⁵⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 82.

³⁸⁵¹ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky's testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966, p. 132. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁸⁵² Letter of Dr. Sakinofsky to the Medical Director of the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital in Hamburg, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

den Berg, the Attorney-General of Cape Town and prosecutor in the case.³⁸⁵³ Dr. Sakinofsky “wondered what was happening” about his own medical report on Tsafendas and telephoned Judge Beyers. The judge referred him to the office of the Attorney-General³⁸⁵⁴ from whom he learned he and his evidence had been “allocated to the defence.”³⁸⁵⁵

Bloomberg also asked a clinical psychologist, Mr. Reyner van Zyl, who was recommended to him by Dr. Cooper, a friend of van Zyl, to carry out psychological tests on Tsafendas. Van Zyl remembers Bloomberg calling him and “hyperventilating over the telephone” with excitement that Judge Beyers had asked him to defend Tsafendas. Van Zyl was only 31 at the time and admitted in a personal interview with the author that he was not experienced and this was the first time he used the tests which he applied to Tsafendas.³⁸⁵⁶ Van Zyl examined Tsafendas on October 13, for three and a half hours divided into two sessions; the first session lasted two hours and the second ninety minutes. Van Zyl concluded that Tsafendas was undoubtedly schizophrenic, but that his intelligence resulted in his schizophrenia not being as “florid” as was often seen in mental hospitals.³⁸⁵⁷

In the course of these consultations, Tsafendas told Bloomberg that he had recently applied for a disability grant and that he had been diagnosed as schizophrenic. Naturally, he omitted the fact that he was medically examined on ten more occasions since returning to South Africa and was found to be perfectly fit and sane. Bloomberg confirmed from records at the Department of Social Welfare that on a date three months before the assassination, his client had indeed applied for a disability grant and was examined for ten minutes by the District Surgeon of Cape Town, Dr. Ralph Kossew.³⁸⁵⁸ Dr. Kossew had found Tsafendas to be “schizophrenic,” with his degree of disablement as compared with a normal individual as “severe” and listed his incapacity as “permanent.”³⁸⁵⁹

The defence was quick to appoint three psychiatrists and a psychologist to examine their client, but did not seem concerned that Tsafendas had already been in custody for

³⁸⁵³ Letter of Dr. Trost to Mr. Mulder of the South African Embassy in Cologne. 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁸⁵⁴ Bloomberg, 2007: 82.

³⁸⁵⁵ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky's testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966, p. 132. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁸⁵⁶ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

³⁸⁵⁷ Reyner van Zyl's testimony at the trial, 19 October 1966, p. 169. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 17 April 2016.

³⁸⁵⁸ Bloomberg, 2007: 79.

³⁸⁵⁹ Dr. Ralph Kossew's testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966, p. 132. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

twenty days before they saw him for the first time. Although Bloomberg noticed bruises on Tsafendas's face and knew that he was a prisoner of one of the world's most brutal police forces, these considerations were not enough to convince him to appoint a doctor to examine his client.

As with Bloomberg, the psychiatrists and psychologists showed no awareness of the brutal environment in which Tsafendas was kept. The medical experts spent up to six hours with Tsafendas but it did not occur to them to ask how he was treated and what had happened during the past twenty days. Like the lawyers, they could not have been unaware of the methods used by the police with prisoners. Throughout the early 1960s there were widespread reports in the media of detainees being tortured. The lawyers and the medical men seem to have assumed contrary to widespread belief, a civil and proper police force had treated Tsafendas perfectly correctly during the twenty days he was in their care. What seems clear is that the one thing they cared about was Tsafendas's state of mind, unconcerned that his state of mind might have been affected by the conditions of his imprisonment.

Determined nevertheless to save his client's life, and by using only Telex and telephone, Bloomberg and his assistants contacted hospitals and mental institutions in Europe and the United States to locate Tsafendas's medical records. Despite the limited time at their disposal and the limitations of technology at the time, they managed to track down at least four hospitals.³⁸⁶⁰ Bloomberg's team also located several people who knew Tsafendas. However, because their names were on the State's witness list, the defence could not consult them without the State's consent and this was refused by the prosecutor, Attorney-General Willem van den Bergh. The defence team then approached Judge Beyers, who gave the lawyers permission to speak to witnesses on the State's list. The defence thereupon consulted with them without demur from the State.³⁸⁶¹

Several of these witnesses were brought to Bloomberg's office and made detailed statements.³⁸⁶² From all those interviewed, only the following were eventually chosen to testify for the defence: Peter Daniels, Helen Daniels's brother, and his wife Merle Daniels, Patrick O'Ryan and his wife Louisa, Gerald Shaw, James Johnstone, O.J. Smorenberg, Gillian Lieberman and Gideon Cloete. Finding suitable witnesses to support the chosen line

³⁸⁶⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 80.

³⁸⁶¹ Cooper, 2016: 106-107.

³⁸⁶² Bloomberg, 2007: 80.

of defence – insanity – must have been extremely difficult for Bloomberg and his associates, since none of Tsafendas's contacts questioned by the police had testified that he was schizophrenic or that he had mentioned a tapeworm. The criteria by which defence witnesses were chosen would be clear during the trial.

The choice of witnesses shows the clear desperation of the defence team to find suitable witnesses to support their defence line and save Tsafendas's life. At first glance, the strangest choices of witnesses were those of James Johnston and Gerald Shaw. Johnstone, a preacher of the Christian Church, had told the police, "I do not know Tsafendas very well and the longest discussion I had with him was for about ten minutes on each occasion." And how many occasions was that? Two. A man who had talked with Tsafendas for twenty minutes in his whole life was called to testify while people who knew him for years or lived with him in the same house for weeks and months, were not chosen. Why was Johnston chosen? Clearly because of he believed that Tsafendas was "slightly unbalanced" and had said so in his statement to the police, "I did think Tsafendas to be slightly unbalanced and that he seemed to have a mysterious background but otherwise he appeared to be all right."³⁸⁶³ As we have seen from the statements taken by the police, this was the closest a witness came to supporting the defence's line.

Similar is the case of Gerald Shaw, a parliamentary reporter for the *Cape Times*. According to Shaw, he had only a "brief acquaintanceship" with Tsafendas in the Press Gallery and had only spoken to him briefly on three occasions. Shaw had "never found Tsafendas to show signs of insanity," but he believed that he was "rather slow mentally."³⁸⁶⁴ That Shaw did not believe Tsafendas to be insane, only slow mentally, was nevertheless enough for the defence to ask him to testify. The above two witnesses are evidence of the difficulties Bloomberg's team was having difficulty finding anyone to support its defence line. However, probably accidentally and without the defence expecting it, Gerald Shaw would be a vital witness in the summary trial.

Then we have Patrick O'Ryan, the most important defence witness who was Tsafendas's best friend at the time and knew him better than any of the other witnesses. O'Ryan said Wilfrid Cooper asked him if he knew about Tsafendas's tapeworm and he

³⁸⁶³ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁸⁶⁴ Shaw, 2007: 64.

replied hesitantly yes, as he knew the truth behind the tapeworm story. O’Ryan was the only person Tsafendas ever confided to about the tapeworm before the assassination. Determined to save his client’s life, Cooper asked O’Ryan to tell the court about the tapeworm and to exaggerate its importance to Tsafendas, as he put it. Cooper told him that this was the only way to “get Tsafendas free.”³⁸⁶⁵

O’Ryan, who knew that Tsafendas did not believe he had a tapeworm, was put in a difficult position. It was not easy for him to lie to the court. Not only was it an unlawful act, but O’Ryan was very religious and considered lying to be a major sin. Nevertheless, he did not hesitate and agreed to testify as suggested to save his friend. The fact that O’Ryan had not mentioned the tapeworm to the police when he was questioned did not seem to bother the defence. Equally ignored was his statement to the police on September 17 that he “never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind.”³⁸⁶⁶ The situation was easier for O’Ryan’s wife because she believed Tsafendas really had a tapeworm. Patrick O’Ryan stated thirty years later that his testimony at the trial was the only time he ever lied in his life.³⁸⁶⁷

Another witness the defence spoke to was Helen Daniels, the young lady who had written to Tsafendas about a possible marriage and in whose home he had lived, along with her and her parents, for one and half months. However, Daniels was not chose to testify in the summary trial, most probably because she had already told the police on September 15 about Tsafendas that she had not “noticed anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal.”³⁸⁶⁸ The defence then asked Helen’s brother, Peter Daniels, and his wife Merle to testify, as none of them had been questioned by the police. Although they did not know Tsafendas as good as Helen, they agreed to do it in order to save his life.

Chosen to testify was also O.J. Smorenberg,³⁸⁶⁹ who had worked with Tsafendas for five weeks at Cape Town docks. When interviewed by the police, he said nothing about Tsafendas being insane, but stated that “sometimes Tsafendas acted childish and did things which you wouldn’t expect from a man of his age.” More importantly, he referred to an

³⁸⁶⁵ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁸⁶⁶ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁸⁶⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

³⁸⁶⁸ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

³⁸⁶⁹ The name in the statement is given as Smorenburg, however, in the trial transcript is given as Smorenberg.

incident which would later be used falsely to demonstrate that Tsafendas supported apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd.³⁸⁷⁰ We will look at Smorenberg's testimony in detail in the summary trial section.

Another witness interviewed by the defence team was Richard Poggenpoel, also a member of the Christian Church and a very good friend of the O'Ryans and the Daniels.³⁸⁷¹ He had known Tsafendas for about a year and Tsafendas had lived in his house for a few weeks. However, Poggenpoel had also testified to the police, on September 15, that, "There was no mention or impression that he (Tsafendas) was mentally abnormal. He lived a completely normal life."³⁸⁷² Poggenpoel was not asked to testify.

Someone who had known Tsafendas for more than a year was Elias Constantaras. He told the police that Tsafendas was a Communist who opposed apartheid and considered Dr. Verwoerd to be "Hitler's best student." This clearly contradicted the defence case that Tsafendas had no political interest. Constantaras remembers being interviewed by one of Tsafendas's lawyers, but does not remember who it was. He was not asked to testify.³⁸⁷³

It is obvious from the choice of witnesses that the defence, very rightly so, did not chose people who knew Tsafendas well, but those who had a story to tell about his apparent "strangeness." Among all his contacts, there were many who knew Tsafendas much better than the ones who testified. First of all was Tsafendas's family, but none of them was asked to give evidence. Nick Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas's brother-in-law and Eleni Tsafantakis's husband, contacted the defence team to enquire about the case. The author does not know to whom he spoke to, but he was told that neither he, nor any other member of the family was needed to testify.³⁸⁷⁴ As we will see in the following chapter, every member of the Tsafendas family, including his step-mother, was questioned by the Commission of Enquiry. All said that Tsafendas was perfectly sane and that he had never told them about the tapeworm.³⁸⁷⁵ Vlachopoulos said exactly that to Tsafendas's lawyers, which is almost certainly why the

³⁸⁷⁰ Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 Oor Stafendas. NASA.

³⁸⁷¹ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013.

³⁸⁷² Richard Poggenpoel statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁸⁷³ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

³⁸⁷⁴ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

³⁸⁷⁵ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

entire family was ruled out. For how could a man have a tapeworm in his stomach which controlled his life since 1935 and no one from his family knew about it?

Although most of those who knew Tsafendas better, including other family members, were in Pretoria, there were also people in Cape Town who knew him well, certainly much better than some of those chosen to testify. For example, John Bornman, a traffic policeman who shared quarters with Tsafendas for three months; Costas Michaletos a Geek man who had grown up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques; Mary Cathleen Scott, the Greek woman in whose boarding house Tsafendas lived for two months and which he visited frequently afterwards to eat; Ralph Lighton who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks; Elizabeth Groves, Tsafendas's landlady for six to seven weeks; Robert Smith, who lived under the same roof as Tsafendas for ten months; Kenneth Ross, who knew him for two months; Costas Chagios, who knew him for more than a year, James Summers, who knew Tsafendas for six weeks and Alice Theysser, who knew him for two months. We are not in position to know which of them was interviewed by the defence lawyers, but all of them had testified to the police that Tsafendas was perfectly sane and none of them had any strange story to tell about him.

More importantly, some of them had very positive views of Tsafendas while others had declared he was a Communist and against apartheid. Together, they flatly contradicted the picture the defence was trying to build of an insane person without political convictions. However, although all these witnesses were not suitable for the defence, they would have been extremely useful to the State in order to challenge the defence's claims. However, not even one of them was brought as a witness for the Prosecution.

It is important to state here that the police did not give the statements they had taken from Tsafendas to the defence and most likely also not to the State. The reasons are made clear in the summary trial section. According to Bloomberg, the defence also did not ask the police for any statements they might have taken from their client. It seems that neither the defence nor the State wondered what Tsafendas had told the police during the twenty days he was in custody.

After Tsafendas's brief hearing on October 6, confident that Tsafendas was schizophrenic, as diagnosed by the defence psychiatrists, Bloomberg and Cooper decided to show their hand to Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg. According to Bloomberg, van den Berg was convinced that Tsafendas had been dispatched to South Africa by a foreign agency

to murder Dr. Verwoerd.³⁸⁷⁶ However, such claim is completely inaccurate as if van den Berg really believed that he should have used some evidence to support such claim in the summary trial and most importantly to challenge a defence witness who testified that Tsafendas practically supported apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd.

The most important evidence, that could have also challenged the fact that Tsafendas was mentally ill, was the report from the South African Embassy in Washington, on September 9, 1966, only three days after the assassination. This document informed the Secretary of the Foreign Affairs in Cape Town that according to the US Immigration authorities, which had a detailed file on Tsafendas and his hospitalization, Tsafendas had “shown under psychiatric treatment that he was unstable though not (not)³⁸⁷⁷ insane, but type of man who would easily be used as instrument of Communist or hostile organizations. Impression of U.S. Immigration people at the time was that he had been manipulated and was under influence of someone or some organization. He was subsequently deported to Europe.” If van den Berg really believed that Tsafendas was sent by some outside agency, this was perfect evidence for him, which could also have challenged the insanity plea.

In addition, there were the statements by several people who had testified to the police that Tsafendas was a Communist, a former member of the South African and Greek Communist Parties, even a member of the DSE, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party during the Civil War. He was reported to the South African Police as a “dangerous Communist” and “the biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa.” None of this evidence was used at the summary trial and the word “Communist” was never heard.

Although, according to Bloomberg, van den Berg acknowledged that Tsafendas had many strange ways and beliefs, he did not accept that he was insane, or so mentally impaired that he could not understand court proceedings and instruct his lawyers accordingly. To support his view that Tsafendas was fit to stand trial, the Attorney-General gave the defence a copy of a report from a State psychiatrist, Professor Adolph Johannes van Wyk, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pretoria, senior psychiatrist at Pretoria General Hospital and Deputy Commissioner of Mental Health of South Africa. The government had used Professor van Wyk's services in court in the past and he had examined Tsafendas on three occasions

³⁸⁷⁶ Bloomberg, 2007: 90.

³⁸⁷⁷ This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second ‘not’ within brackets.

without the knowledge or consent of the defence team.³⁸⁷⁸

Professor van Wyk's report read:

“He is orientated. He gives a good account of himself. His comprehension is good and his answers are relevant. His emotional responses are adequate and apt. His discourse is coherent. At times he is discursive, but not vague and he never strays from the main point of conversation. The tests indicate that his intellectual abilities are above average. He maintains that he is infested with a tapeworm, and that this influences his life. He denies that he suffers from hallucinations. I have found no indications that he is incapable of following the court proceedings or that he is unable to exercise his rights and privileges and instruct his legal advisers and assist them in the conduct of his defence.”³⁸⁷⁹

According to Bloomberg, he and Cooper wondered whether their three psychiatrists and Professor van Wyk had examined the same man.³⁸⁸⁰ What they did not know was that van Wyk had examined Tsafendas most likely before their client started his act. However, the surprising thing here is that the above diagnosis by Professor van Wyk must have been made on September 23 or 24, as according to his testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, he examined Tsafendas again on October 4 and reached the conclusion that he was schizophrenic. This is what van Wyk testified:

“During the first two observations, on the 23rd and the 24th, I was a little uncertain, because the man was very evasive, and one could not really place him, to determine to what extent there was simulation, and I felt at that time that I definitely would not certify him with the information and with the interviews which I had had with him until then. I wanted to know more about his background; I wanted to know more about the motivation for the act, would he be able to give this? Although he was evasive in that respect, it could also be a schizophrenic symptom. They often say ‘I don't know... It may be...’³⁸⁸¹

However, after examining him twice on October 4, the first time with David Bloomberg present, Professor van Wyk “definitely decided” that Tsafendas was

³⁸⁷⁸ Cooper, 2016: 107.

³⁸⁷⁹ Bloomberg, 2007: 81-82.

³⁸⁸⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 81-82.

³⁸⁸¹ Professor Adolf Johannes van Wyk's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

schizophrenic.³⁸⁸² Therefore, the Attorney-General must have been aware of the new diagnosis by Professor van Wyk when he met with Bloomberg and Cooper after the hearing on October 6. If we assume that Bloomberg is mistaken about the timing of this meeting and that it took place earlier than this, then again, on September 28 and 29, Mr. Jacobus Andreas Johannes Erasmus, a psychologist who was appointed by the Attorney-General and the State, examined Tsafendas. His conclusion was that there were “clear signs of schizophrenia” with Tsafendas.³⁸⁸³

Thus, even if the meeting had taken place before the time Bloomberg claims it took place, then again van den Berg must have been aware that one of the experts he had appointed himself had found Tsafendas to display “clear signs of schizophrenia.” Bloomberg’s claim that van den Berg believed that Tsafendas was sent by a foreign agency appears to be inaccurate. Firstly, the police did not come up with even the slightest evidence to suggest that Tsafendas was sent by a foreign agency.

In addition, van den Berg in his October 3 memorandum regarding Tsafendas did not mention anything of the sort. If he believed that Tsafendas was anything like this, he must have surely mentioned it there. In addition, since the memorandum was written on the 3rd, that was before Bloomberg and Cooper disclose their hand, therefore he could not have made such an absurd claim, unless he was bluffing. Of course the fact that Bloomberg might be mistaken about van den Berg’s alleged claim cannot also be ruled out. As for the supposed claim by van den Berg that Tsafendas’s deed was premeditated, this is something that he could easily have proven by using Tsafendas’s statement to Major Rossouw in which he confessed how he had planned and executed the act.

POLICE AND STATE BEFORE THE SUMMARY TRIAL

South Africa’s ruling circles were in deep shock after Dr. Verwoerd’s killing, stunned that an assassin had penetrated to the seat of power. However, what truly worried them was the nature of the assassin and the possibility that his action was politically inspired, perhaps a

³⁸⁸² Adolph Johannes van Wyk testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁸⁸³ Jacobus Andreas Johannes Erasmus testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

carefully plotted and defiant demonstration of opposition to the rule of apartheid.³⁸⁸⁴ If that was the case, such a damning revelation would surely come out in a trial and world attention would be focussed on the workings of apartheid.³⁸⁸⁵ This was not a scenario that appealed to the men of power.

Thus, as we have seen, within a short time of the assassination the South African press and especially the Afrikaans press, manipulated by the apartheid authorities, had already labelled Tsafendas as a psychopath. On some occasions the manipulation was not necessary as apartheid supporters eager to protect the memory of their beloved leader were quick to speculate with conviction that the assassin was probably a psychopath, as no sane person could have killed such a wonderful and adored prime minister. For example, in the Afrikaans-language *Dagbreek*, on which Dr. Verwoerd was chairman, Lod Spies, an advocate from Johannesburg who had never met Tsafendas, said that “the attack on the Premier was presumably done by a psychopath who was possibly not suffering from an acute form of the abnormality, but possibly shows some characteristics of the abnormality.”³⁸⁸⁶

However, this was not enough for the authorities, who wanted to be certain that nothing damaging to them would come out of the trial. Thus they left nothing to chance. Judge Beyers, the Judge President of the Cape and a supporter of the government, was named to preside over the proceedings, while the prosecution was placed in the hands of the Attorney-General of the Cape, Willem van den Bergh, who, it transpired, was more than willing to aid the government's cause. As we will see, van den Bergh did not hesitate to lie, bluntly and publicly, to protect this aim.

Finally, on September 9, only three days after the assassination, it was decided that Tsafendas would face a summary trial rather than the conventional judicial process.³⁸⁸⁷ During the apartheid years, the Attorney-General was given the right in political cases to order a summary trial without a preparatory examination. This meant that accused persons, such as Tsafendas, were unable to prepare their defence in the normal way, being deprived of opportunities which even a murderer could enjoy in a non-political case.³⁸⁸⁸

³⁸⁸⁴ Morris, 2004: 185.

³⁸⁸⁵ Sifakis, 2013: 645.

³⁸⁸⁶ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, “Tsafendas: Party se psigopaat ...”

³⁸⁸⁷ *The Cape Times*, 10 September 1966:1, ‘Top security for trial of assassin.’

³⁸⁸⁸ “A Distinguished South African Lawyer,” 1965: 8-10.

As far as the author can establish, Attorney-General van den Berg never interviewed Tsafendas and all the information he received about him was provided by the police. He appointed Professor Adolf Johannes van Wyk, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pretoria, and Jacobus Erasmus, a clinical psychologist at Weskoppies Hospital in Pretoria, to examine Tsafendas. Both concluded that Tsafendas was schizophrenic (Their cases are examined in detail later in this chapter as they contained several inconsistencies).

Furthermore, the South African authorities had in their possession more than a hundred and fifty statements by people who knew Tsafendas and none of them had stated that Tsafendas had shown any signs of schizophrenia or mental abnormality or any of the symptoms described by van den Berg's two experts; on the contrary he was characterised as a normal man, very capable and with high intelligence. The authorities were also in possession of at least six statements from people who had testified that Tsafendas had faked mental illness so as to avoid service in the Portuguese Army. In addition, a medical report from Grafton State Hospital revealed that Tsafendas had staged the pretence of madness in the USA. Other medical reports, secret telegrams, documents and PIDE reports stated that Tsafendas was not insane and that his admissions to hospitals were either voluntary or that he was taken there after showing signs of mental illness during interrogation. None of this evidence appears to have been available to the State experts or was simply ignored by them.

As we also saw, the South African police discovered ample evidence that Tsafendas was a committed Communist, that he had been a dues-paying member of the South African Communist Party, was a member of the Greek Communist Party and of the DSE, the party's military wing during the Greek Civil War; that he was fanatically opposed to apartheid, had been a member of the British anti-apartheid movement and that participated in a demonstration in London, holding a placard showing a man in a Ku Klux Klan uniform captioned "Dr. Verwoerd."

Most importantly, Tsafendas had made no secret of the fact that he considered Dr. Verwoerd personally to be a tyrant and a dictator, describing him as "Hitler's best student" who had applied some Nazi policies to South Africa's non-Whites. The assassin was also anti-colonialist and had been arrested by the Portuguese police for promulgating propaganda against the Portuguese government. Finally, the police had also discovered that Tsafendas had characterised a possible assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as morally justifiable on grounds that he was a dictator and a tyrant who oppressed his people. Was there the remotest

possibility that the South African authorities would allow this derogatory portrayal of South Africa and its leader to become known or permit such things to be stated in open court by a man who was demonstrably political?

PRINCIPALS AT THE SUMMARY TRIAL

The Judge President of the Cape, Mr. Justice Andries Beyers was sitting with two assessors acting in an advisory capacity. These were a Cape Town advocate, Peter William Edward Baker S.C., who was well known to Tsafendas's attorney, David Bloomberg, and who later became a judge, and a psychiatrist from Pietermaritzburg, Dr. P.H. Henning. It seemed sensible for the judge to have access to an experienced psychiatrist of his own. The Attorney-General, Willem van den Berg S.C., led for the State, with Donald Brunette as his assistant.³⁸⁸⁹

JUDGE ANDRIES BEYERS (1903-1975)

Andries Brink Beyers known to his friends as Andrew or A.B.,³⁸⁹⁰ graduated from the University of Stellenbosch and was appointed as a lecturer there in 1928. It was at Stellenbosch that he met Dr. Verwoerd, who was also a lecturer there at the time.³⁸⁹¹ He quickly gained a reputation as an outspoken and unorthodox thinker and a sound Roman Dutch Lawyer, laying the grounds for his subsequent characterisation by a Cape Bar chairman as “a legend in his lifetime.” Beyers's introduction to politics came when he served as a secretary to a cabinet minister and came to know many politicians.³⁸⁹² He joined the Cape Bar in 1936 and became Henry Fagan³⁸⁹³'s junior counsel on the government side in *Ndlwana*. In 1938, with a formidable reputation as a criminal lawyer behind him, Beyers took silk and went into politics. He stood as the United Party candidate for Oudtshoorn during the general election that year, but was not elected. He later gave up active politics, but he

³⁸⁸⁹ Bloomberg, 2007: 88-89; Diemont, 1995: 132-133.

³⁸⁹⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 60; Diemont, 1995: 131.

³⁸⁹¹ Diemont, 1995: 132.

³⁸⁹² Diemont, 1995: 131, 136.

³⁸⁹³ Henry Allan Fagan (1889-1963) was one of South Africa's most eminent jurists and loved authors. He served as South Africa's Chief of Justice (1957-1959) and was a member of the Fagan Commission (discussed earlier). He was also critical of apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd's policies calling them “hopelessly impractical” (*TIME*, 29 February 1960: 31, ‘South Africa: Rustle on the veld’).

changed his political trajectory and became an adviser to the National Party.³⁸⁹⁴

Beyers represented the apartheid government in several high-profile trials,³⁸⁹⁵ notably as in the *Harris* case concerning the removal of Coloured voters from the Electoral Roll. Ultimately, the Coloured voters were removed because the government increased the size of the Senate and of the Appellate Division and made a raft of judicial appointments.³⁸⁹⁶ Beyers and his colleague, the above-mentioned van Wyk, had no hesitation in slapping down junior lawyers of the Cape Bar who dared to speak against the removal of the voters.³⁸⁹⁷ The voters' attorney, Pilkington-Jordan, wrote to United Party leader J.G.N. Strauss as follows: "Beyers again treated the Court with scant courtesy and both he and van Wyk were thoroughly rude to Duncan (Graeme Duncan KC was the leader of the legal team for the voters). They really are monkeys in dinner jackets and the sartorial elegance of that garb does not in the least conceal the barbarian beneath ..."³⁸⁹⁸

Nevertheless, it was Beyers's performance at these proceedings which led to his meteoric rise. He was rewarded with an appointment to the Cape bench on October 1, 1955,³⁸⁹⁹ a move held by many to be nakedly political.³⁹⁰⁰ Thereafter, he was promoted in short order, to the Appellate Division in 1958, and a year later as Judge President of the Cape High Court, a position he held until his retirement on July 31, 1973.³⁹⁰¹ This latter appointment proved highly controversial. Beyers had been on the Bench for fewer than five years and was junior to Joseph Herbststein, who had been acting as Judge President for some months and was expected to be appointed as the permanent Judge President.³⁹⁰²

In the early 1950s there was one Black member of the Cape Town bar, Ndhlovu. He could not be accommodated in Temple Chambers because the Group Areas Act had just been enacted barring him from a building in a "white" area. Beyers and van Wyk refused to go to the common room if Ndhlovu was expected to be there.³⁹⁰³

³⁸⁹⁴ Davis and le Roux, 2009: 18; Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 8-9; Loveland, 1999: 208.

³⁸⁹⁵ Francois Marais quoted in Geni.com. Retrieved from <https://www.geni.com/people/Jacques-Theodore-Van-Wyk/6000000008317660124>

³⁸⁹⁶ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016; Dugard, 1978: 31; Sachs, 1973: 143-145.

³⁸⁹⁷ Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 8-9.

³⁸⁹⁸ Davis and le Roux, 2009: 25.

³⁸⁹⁹ Loveland, 1999: 363.

³⁹⁰⁰ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016; Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 25.

³⁹⁰¹ Davis and le Roux, 2009: 18; Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 67; Sachs, 1973: 257-258.

³⁹⁰² Diemont, 1995: 131.

³⁹⁰³ Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 8-9.

According to Judge Wilfrid Cooper (and Tsafendas's advocate):

“[Beyers was] as deeply racist as the ordinary man in the street. He had his own solution to the problem of race-mixing. He said the problem in this country was that the White man didn't understand the Black man ... and he drew a distinction between the Black man and the Coloured man ... and he said 'As far as the Coloured people are concerned, we must fuck them white' ... that was his solution ... The Black man remained an insoluble problem. He didn't understand ... he was at a loss...”³⁹⁰⁴

Despite such racist sentiments as outlined by Cooper and the fact that he was an outspoken government supporter, according to Judge Marius Diemnot and David Bloomberg, Beyers deplored racial segregation in court and with the support of some of his colleagues he managed to keep the Cape Supreme Court free of apartheid notices.³⁹⁰⁵ Bloomberg told the author that Beyers “would not allow apartheid to be practised in his court, and he was quite famous for ensuring that there were no apartheid practices in his court. He wouldn't allow a defendant, White or Black, to be handcuffed or shackled in his court. He was an Africana, and pro-government – which was the apartheid government – but at the same time he was a libertarian. He had liberal instincts as well. I know that sounds a bit of a contradiction.”³⁹⁰⁶ Due to his insistence on keeping apartheid out of his courtroom, some Coloureds called him “Big Boy.”³⁹⁰⁷

Once, when he went on circuit in Stellenbosch, Beyers refused to go into court because a partition separated White and non-White spectators. “Unless that thing is removed, I'll sit and hear all the cases under the oak tree outside,” he said. When an official of the Department for Public Works fixed a notice on the door of a Supreme Court cloakroom saying, “White Judges Only,” Beyers asked the official, “How many Black judges have we got? Take that notice down today.”³⁹⁰⁸

On another occasion, at a luncheon in Grahamstown to commemorate the establishment of the High Court in that city, Minister of Justice John Vorster delivered the keynote speech. He declared that South Africa satisfied all the requirements of a democracy in that it had regular, free and fair elections and an independent judiciary. Beyers told

³⁹⁰⁴ Wilfrid Cooper in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

³⁹⁰⁵ David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014; Sachs, 1973: 258.

³⁹⁰⁶ David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

³⁹⁰⁷ Kahn, 1968: 153.

³⁹⁰⁸ Diemont, 1995: 135.

Vorster, “Yes, John, you say we are a democracy, but you forgot to say non-whites could not vote!” Vorster smiled and shook his head. It was the equivalent of saying, “Who takes Beyers seriously?”³⁹⁰⁹

According to Judge Robin Marais, who had acted as Beyers’s Registrar for some time, Beyers could never understand Black people but had great empathy with Coloureds. He spoke on one occasion to the Stellenbosch University Law faculty about the injustice being done to a Coloured man who came to Cape Town to give evidence. From the railway station to the court and back again he could not find a place where he could have a coffee or use a toilet. This, said Beyers, was “disgraceful.” This story did not go down well with the audience who booed him, and finally he sat down, wondering at his listeners’ insensitivity to something he felt was clearly outrageous.³⁹¹⁰

In 1962, in the *Drakenstein* case, to the embarrassment of many of his peers, Beyers urged a review of prison conditions. Beyers sentenced a Coloured prison warder to ten years’ imprisonment and ten strokes for killing an African prisoner. Beyers commented that it was strange that only the warder was in the dock. The doctor who gave testimony said that except for victims of train crashes, he had never seen a body so mangled. Judge Beyers said he hoped the case would lift the veil from conditions in the prison service and he suggested a judicial inquiry.³⁹¹¹ Such a call from such a quarter made headlines countrywide, but it embarrassed the government, which was forced to explain why it did not feel that such a move was justified. Beyers also encouraged a boycott of the newly-built Nico Malan Theatre which was built with public money but admitted only Whites.³⁹¹²

However, Judge Beyers took a hard line when a question arose concerning conditions for detainees under the 90-day law. In 1964, in *Rossouw v. Sachs*, the argument was whether such a detainee should be allowed reading and writing materials. The detainee in question was Albie Sachs, a Cape Town advocate and anti-apartheid activist. Two senior judges of the Cape Provisional Division, Louis van Winsen and J.J. Banks, ruled that a reasonable supply of such materials should be provided since depriving a prisoner of them amounted to punishment. The judges said, “It would be surprising to find that the legislature intended punishment to be meted out to an unconvicted prisoner.” However, the Appellate Division, in

³⁹⁰⁹ Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 69.

³⁹¹⁰ Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 67-70.

³⁹¹¹ Judge Robin Marais in a personal interview, 3 June 2016; International Defence and Aid Fund, 1967: 1.

³⁹¹² Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 67-69.

a judgement delivered by Judge Ogilvie Thompson, held otherwise. Judge Beyers concurred with this judgment.³⁹¹³

A significant historical case concerned the University of Cape Town. On June 13, 1972, Judge Beyers extended indefinitely an order restraining the police from breaking up meetings on the campus. The decision was welcomed by the students as a step towards their ultimate goal, which was the right to hold peaceful demonstrations. As Judge President of the Cape Province, Beyers ruled that anybody who interfered with students on the steps of Jameson Hall (where police had launched a baton charge) was going beyond the terms of a proclamation issued a week ago which banned open-air political gatherings in 18 university towns. The governing council of the University of Cape Town had applied for a restraining order on the grounds that the campus was not public property.³⁹¹⁴

Beyers was also characterised as a compassionate man of “pronounced personality and sometimes humanity”³⁹¹⁵ who opposed the death penalty.³⁹¹⁶ In a famous case in Cape Town, Beyers clearly dispensed justice from his heart rather than employing the letter of the law. Ronald Cohen, a prominent businessman, was on trial for murdering his wife. It became clear that there was a hidden factor in the case which Cohen refused to address. The suspicion was that his wife had been having an affair and Cohen was too proud to admit it. In what fellow lawyers described as an extraordinary decision, Judge Beyers declared: “There is no mitigating circumstance that the court has heard from Mr. Cohen, but I know Mr. Cohen is lying. I know he is concealing something. And I find that that is a mitigating circumstance.” He was therefore not sentenced to death. There was widespread sympathy for Cohen and public support for the judgment, but in truth, Beyers acted unprofessionally in that there was no evidence of any mitigating circumstance.³⁹¹⁷

In court, Beyers appeared formidable, even frightening, but his colleagues believed he had a big heart and sympathy for “the little man.” He was famous for not taking notes because he had a photographic memory.³⁹¹⁸ David Bloomberg told the author about Beyers’ ability:

³⁹¹³ Dugard, 1978: 333.

³⁹¹⁴ *The Times* (London), 14 June 1972, ‘Ban on Cape Town Police.’

³⁹¹⁵ Davis and le Roux, 2009: 18.

³⁹¹⁶ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

³⁹¹⁷ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

³⁹¹⁸ Bloomberg, 2007: 98; Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 74.

“He was tremendous. In fact, there was one famous case in South Africa where the counsel was appearing before him, and then Judge Beyers closed his eyes, and was slumped over the desk. And the counsel said to him, ‘Judge, I’m afraid it appears as if you are not listening to what I am saying.’ And he came to, and he said, ‘I will repeat to you everything you said in the last three minutes.’ And he rattled off the last three minutes, where he had appeared to be slumped and asleep. So he was a very, very astute judge.”³⁹¹⁹

However, as we will see, this was not the case at Tsafendas’s summary trial, when Beyers seemed not to remember exactly what some witnesses had said.

Although a supporter of Dr. Verwoerd and of the National Party, Beyers was not blind about apartheid and declared, “Dr. Verwoerd is an intellectual giant, but his policy will lead to disaster.” When he was asked by the government to represent the Cape Supreme Court at the State funeral of Dr. Verwoerd in Pretoria, he was in a dilemma. He knew that he had to preside over the trial of Tsafendas and believed that in the eyes of the public his impartiality might be suspect if he attended the funeral. He sent Judge Marius Diemont in his place.³⁹²⁰ In 1975, Andries Beyers was in hospital dying from cancer. By an extraordinary coincidence, just across the corridor, Judge van Wyk was also dying from cancer.³⁹²¹

³⁹¹⁹ David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

³⁹²⁰ Diemont, 1995: 132.

³⁹²¹ Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 77.

DAY 1: 17 OCTOBER 1966**INTRODUCTION**

As we have seen, the defence team, due to the extraordinary efforts of David Bloomberg, who had managed in a very limited time to build a very strong defence line, based on witnesses, medical records and the diagnosis of four psychiatrists and a one psychologist. It was then up to Advocate Wilfrid Cooper, the “tiger” of the courts to use them efficiency in the summary trial. The State, should have been in a much stronger position, especially since knowing what the defence line was going to be and since the South African Police had in its possession overwhelming evidence not only to challenge the Defence’s line, but to easily break it down. However, none of this evidence was going to be used during the summary trial and most probably was never given to the State.

The State’s two experts, obviously unaware of the police’s evidence, had agreed with the Defence’s experts that the accused was schizophrenic. In addition, both sides were in possession of Tsafendas’s medical record which confirmed their diagnosis, so the summary trial should have been a straightforward case. However, this was not going to be so and instead a show (summary) trial took place.³⁹²²

There trial started at 10.00 a.m. when Judge Beyers entered the packed courtroom in his traditional scarlet robes.³⁹²³ Tsafendas wore a double-breasted suit and a light-coloured shirt with a maroon tie.³⁹²⁴ A maximum three hundred spectators plus forty reporters squeezed into the courtroom, which was heavily guarded inside and out. Security was unprecedented. Plain-clothed police officers were posted inside the courtroom as well as around the court building, while police marksmen took up strategic positions on the rooftops of nearby buildings. The precautions were the most stringent for any case heard at the Cape High Court and lasted for the duration of proceedings.³⁹²⁵

Judge Beyers briefly addressed the public: “I wish to say a few words to the public who are here in unusual numbers today. You have a right to be here because in this country we believe that justice be done publically and must also be seen to be done, theretofore it is

³⁹²² Herbstein and Evenson, 1989: 16.

³⁹²³ Bloomberg, 2007: 88-89.

³⁹²⁴ D’ Oliveira, 1977: 208.

³⁹²⁵ Bloomberg, 2007: 83-84; Schoeman, 1975: 4.

right that in a case like this the public must be here. This case might stir up emotions in certain people. These emotions would have to be controlled. If I find any behaviour on the part of the public which will disturb the quiet of this court I will not hesitate for a moment to have you all sent out of the court and continue alone.”³⁹²⁶

Judge Beyers then addressed the press:

“In this country we believe that justice be done publically and should be seen to be done. We realise that only a small proportion of the public can be accommodated in a court of law, and the Press represents all the many others who cannot be here. For this reason the press is welcome in this court. But this case is at the moment *sub judice*. This is a serious business, a man is being tried for his life. The trial is in the hands of myself and my two assessors and our hands alone. There is one thing that will not be allowed and which I hope will never be allowed in this country, and that is trial by newspaper. If the newspapers go beyond the bounds of what is correct in a matter that is *sub judice*, I shall have not the least compunction in refusing that newspaper further access to this court, and if they should transgress at all the lines which the law allows, I shall not have the least compunction in applying the full rigor of the law-not that I believe it will be necessary to do so.”³⁹²⁷

Immediately afterwards, the case was called, Advocate Wilfrid Cooper rose and, addressing the Judge, said that in the view of the defence, the accused was mentally disordered in terms Section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 which states “This section provide that if a court finds a person to be mentally disordered, he must be committed for detention in a mental institution until the State President orders his release” and therefore unfit to plead.³⁹²⁸

Cooper reminded the judge that according to the Act, a person was mentally disordered if he was incapable of managing himself or his affairs, or was a danger to himself or others. Advocate Cooper then stressed that the Act referred to the mental condition of the accused at the time of his arraignment or during his trial, that being now, on October 17; the court was not concerned with his mental condition at the time of the alleged offence. Cooper said, “This, my Lord, is on the basis that this court cannot and will not try an insane person,

³⁹²⁶ *Pretoria News*, 17 October 1966: 1, ‘Press and the public warned.’

³⁹²⁷ *Pretoria News*, 17 October 1966: 1, ‘Press and the public warned.’

³⁹²⁸ *Pretoria News*, 17 October 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas mentally disordered defence contends as trial starts.’

irrespective of his culpability. I accordingly apply to your Lordship at this stage to hold an enquiry into the accused's mental condition."³⁹²⁹

The Attorney-General raised no objection to such an enquiry being held and the judge then ruled that such an enquiry would now take place, a proceeding described by Bloomberg as in effect, "a trial within a trial."³⁹³⁰ Advocate Cooper then outlined the evidence that the defence would offer to argue that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and was mentally disordered. The first witness called was the psychiatrist Dr. Cooper.

THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION IN FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS

Before we consider the testimonies of those who examined Tsafendas, we should take under consideration a very important issue that applies to all those who examined Tsafendas at the time of the judiciary proceedings, namely the collection and evaluation of third-party information (TPI). In "any forensic mental health assessment (FMHA), third-party information is a very important aspect of the assessments in order to provide a more accurate evaluation." This is because it enables the clinician to detect "distortions in self-reported information."³⁹³¹

TPI is defined as "a type of collateral source that is not obtained directly from the individual being evaluated." It serves an essential role in forensic mental health assessment for three primary reasons: greater need for accuracy, issues with response style, and the greater scrutiny that the evaluator's conclusions may receive. TPI may be obtained through interviews with personal and professional collateral informants or through reviews of various forms of written documentation. It may be used to help detect response styles and malingering, making it vital to evaluation of the validity of the examinee's self-report.³⁹³²

TPI is important in forensic criminal cases for five reasons:

- The use of TPI to assess response style is an integral part of a comprehensive approach to FMHA and provides valuable collateral information.

³⁹²⁹ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁹³⁰ Bloomberg, 2007: 85.

³⁹³¹ Heilbrun et al, 2007: 96; Heilbrun et al, 1994: 400.

³⁹³² Hunt and Kimonis, 2015.

- Some measures relevant to FMHA require the forensic clinician to incorporate TPI as part of the assessment and scoring process.
- The use of collateral and corroborative information increases accuracy in detecting deception.
- TPI information can increase the face validity of FMHA and enhance the credibility of the evaluation.
- TPI may be helpful in allowing the forensic clinician to clarify a constellation of symptoms and identify, confirm, and or/disconfirm the various forms of psychopathology.³⁹³³

Forensic clinicians widely recognize the importance and value of TPI, whether in the form of documents and records, third-party interviews, or scientific data produced by researchers.³⁹³⁴ It helps to promote overall accuracy, detects bias from other sources, enhances impartiality, and increases credibility.³⁹³⁵ It also performs the important role of verifying the information collected by the patient. Putting TPI together with information from the patient greatly improves the ability of the clinician to detect the possibility of malingering. In several cases it has been proven that “lying is not accurately detected by mental health professionals and other professional groups” when their opinion is based solely on information from the patient. People such as relatives, friends, workmates, neighbours and flatmates provided the best TPI because they had close and regular contact with the accused.³⁹³⁶

Professor Kirk Heilbrun, one of the world's leading forensic psychologists, renowned for his research on TPI in forensic cases, emphasised, in a personal interview with the author, its importance and the significance of its absence in Tsafendas's case, “an important and complex case like this.”³⁹³⁷ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky, a defence witness in the case who examined Tsafendas, told the author that “in psychiatry, after one has interviewed a patient, it is best practice to seek collateral information from family, friends and medical records.”³⁹³⁸ Mr. van Zyl and Professors Tuviah Zabow, Alban Burke, Robert L. Sadoff, Kirk Heilbrun

³⁹³³ Heilbrun et al, 2002: 220-221.

³⁹³⁴ Heilbrun et al, 2015: 21.

³⁹³⁵ Heilbrun et al, 2015: 38.

³⁹³⁶ Heilbrun et al, 2003: 69-79.

³⁹³⁷ Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017.

³⁹³⁸ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky in correspondence with the author, 30 March 2016.

and Phillip Resnick emphasised to the author that to make an accurate diagnosis, additional information was required from outside sources and agreed to the importance of information held by people who knew Tsafendas.³⁹³⁹ It is standard practice since the lack of input from any one of the three could lead to a wrong conclusion.

The leading forensic psychiatrist Professor John Macdonald, who was renowned for his discovery of the Macdonald triad of sociopathic traits and for his profiling of serial killers, said that “simulation is more frequent when a suspect faces the death sentence.”³⁹⁴⁰

According to Professor Tuviah Zabow, the prime objective in a criminal case where the accused seems to be mentally unstable is to establish whether he is scheming or not. That is why it is important to have his medical records and information from his friends and family.³⁹⁴¹

In an interview with the author, Professor Alban Burke stressed the importance of talking to people who know the patient. He said:

“In forensic cases, and I work at Weskoppies Hospital where we get these kinds of assessments, if you are doing an assessment for legal purposes, you need to speak to as many people as possible. You need to use as many documents as possible, and it is your right to have access to a document whether the police have produced it or not ... the psychologist and psychiatrist should have questioned, and they should have done extensive interviews, because the problem with any psychiatric order is, you cannot make a diagnosis based on what you see and hear alone. It has to be backed up by your psychological tests; it has to be backed up by a wide range of investigations, and with these kinds of observations, you speak to family, you speak to school, you speak to as many people as possible.”³⁹⁴²

Despite all of the above, plus the fact that this was a forensic case and Tsafendas was known to have faked illness at least twice in the past, none of those who examined him spoke to anyone who knew him; not even a single one. What is more, none of the examiners asked for any additional TPI, with the exception of Dr. Sakinofsky, who managed, on his own initiative, to get Tsafendas's medical records from the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital in

³⁹³⁹ Prof. Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016; Prof. Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017; Prof. Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Robert L. Sadoff in a personal interview with the author, 12 August 2015; Prof. Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

³⁹⁴⁰ Macdonald, 1958: 61.

³⁹⁴¹ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky in correspondence with the author, 30 March 2016.

³⁹⁴² Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

Hamburg. None of those who examined Tsafendas was a forensic psychiatrist. Nor were any of them experienced in dealing with similar situations, with the exception of Professor van Wyk. Neither the State nor the Defence found it necessary to call a forensic psychiatrist to examine Tsafendas. Dr. Sakinofsky did tell the court in his testimony that a forensic psychiatrist should have been called to examine Tsafendas, but this was never done. Finally, no-one became aware of the fact that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in the past.

Dr. Sakinofsky cautioned that while “such a maxim certainly holds true as a goal,” it was not always possible in practice:

“Collateral information may not be available when a patient is first seen (as in an emergency room) or may never be available or it may not be available for reasons of confidentiality. Not having such collateral does not necessarily invalidate diagnoses made without such; it depends on the nature of the individual case. Most clinical diagnoses are made in practice on the clinical examination and on the mental state and treatment may be started before collateral information is forthcoming, if available.”³⁹⁴³

Although Dr. Sakinofsky's reservation is valid and certainly applied to the circumstances in which he examined Tsafendas shortly after the assassination, it did not apply to the wider aspects of this case. It would have been very easy to seek additional information about Tsafendas as there were tens of people who knew him in Cape Town and who were interviewed by the defence and by the police. The specialists who examined Tsafendas, both for the State and the defence, could have found and interviewed these people with the help of the defence and the police. However, not one of those who examined Tsafendas spoke to anyone who knew him personally. This was not entirely their fault, however, considering the obstacles in their path. As we will see, Dr. Cooper was discouraged from making outside contacts, and there was a problem of time, since only fifteen days elapsed between the examinations of Tsafendas and the start of his trial.

Further, the experts had no access to any written TPI. Neither Tsafendas's statements to the police nor any other information about him or his past were given to them. The only exceptions were Dr. Sakinofsky as stated before, and Dr. Cooper who was shown by the defence three medical reports on Tsafendas, although this was after he had examined him and diagnosed him as schizophrenic. The other experts did not even have sight of Tsafendas's

³⁹⁴³ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky in correspondence with the author, 16 December 2016.

medical records, being told orally of their contents. They were also advised that this was a straightforward case and that the man they examined was a schizophrenic with a long history of schizophrenia.

Reyner van Zyl, the a clinical psychologist who examined Tsafendas on behalf of the defence and testified in court told the author that he never spoke to anybody who knew Tsafendas, he never received any written information about him and was told verbally about Tsafendas's long mental history and the content of some of the medical reports. Asked whether he saw Tsafendas's medical records or if he had any TPI about him, van Zyl replied,

“No, no, no, we were just told, we were told, or I was told – the group of guys that examined him – that he had been in various mental hospitals all over the world... Yes. Well, you know, we were given this information – that he was a disturbed, schizophrenic man ... And that was the background that we had available, and nothing else. The third part [the medical reports] was given to us almost in summary. He has been to this hospital, that hospital, that hospital... I think three or four were mentioned – various hospitals overseas.”³⁹⁴⁴

It is interesting to compare the Tsafendas case with that of David Pratt, who shot and wounded Dr. Verwoerd in 1960. After his defence team pleaded that he was mentally disordered and unfit to stand trial, Pratt was sent by the judge to a mental hospital for fourteen days' observation under a State psychiatrist, Professor Lamont. In an effort to get a more comprehensive understanding of Pratt, Professor Lamont interviewed five people who had different relationships with him. Two were relatives, one a very good friend, the fourth was his former doctor (a general practitioner) and the fifth was one of Pratt's employees. None of those who examined Tsafendas did anything similar, and because of time pressures, they were unable to double-check what Tsafendas was telling them, simply taking his word for granted. Dr. MacGregor, psychiatrist and defence witness, referring to a problem common to all those who examined Tsafendas, said that due to lack of time, he “had to take shortcuts” and that he “accepted what was given” to him from the accused, without being able to check the information or to seek third-party input.³⁹⁴⁵

Pratt was also examined in the relative comfort of a hospital over a period of fourteen

³⁹⁴⁴ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

³⁹⁴⁵ Dr. James William MacGregor's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

days, seen every day by Professor Lamont.³⁹⁴⁶ Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Cooper for six hours and by the other psychiatrists for four and a half hours each while in custody in Caledon Square police station. This was the place where, as well as being physically tortured, he was forced to sleep for one and half months on the concrete floor with a single, dirty blanket. Prof. Tuviah Zabow believes that the environment where the examination takes place is very important, and that Tsafendas should have been taken to a hospital to be examined.³⁹⁴⁷

TPI is essential not only for psychiatrists involved in FMHA, but also for psychologists. According to *Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists*, a forensic clinician conducting an evaluation actively seeks information “that will differentially test rival hypotheses” (p.661). One of the reasons this is necessary is to determine whether the patient “presents but does not actually experience the symptoms of a mental disorder.”³⁹⁴⁸ None of the psychologists who examined Tsafendas had access to any TPI about Tsafendas, and as we have seen, van Zyl was advised verbally about his medical record and simply told that he was clearly schizophrenic.

³⁹⁴⁶ Prof. Lamont's psychiatric report about David Prat in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, 'Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered.'

³⁹⁴⁷ Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 2 September 2016.

³⁹⁴⁸ Heilbrun et al, 2002: 221.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 1: DR. HAROLD COOPER

DR. COOPER'S PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHY AS RELATED BY HIM TO THE COURT

Harold Cooper graduated as a doctor in 1944, obtained a Diploma in Psychological Medicine in 1950 and with a thesis in psychiatry became a Doctor of Medicine in 1953. He held the following full-time appointments: Three and a half years at Tara Psychiatric Hospital, Johannesburg, six months at Weskoppies Hospital, a mental institution, in Pretoria, eighteen months at Valkenberg Hospital, also a mental institution in Cape Town. Since 1954 he acted as part-time consultant psychiatrist at Groote Schuur Hospital, Cape Town. He was in private practice continuously since 1954, dealing with a large variety of mental disturbances, including the diagnosis and treatment of schizophrenics.³⁹⁴⁹ It should also be noted, though it was not mentioned at the trial, that in a 1951 case, *Rex v. Kennedy*, the court refused to accept Dr. Cooper's psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Cooper had declared a person accused of murder to be "mentally disordered" (as he found Tsafendas to be), but the judge dismissed his diagnosis as based on improbable evidence, and found the accused fit to stand trial.³⁹⁵⁰

DR. COOPER'S EXAMINATION OF TSAFENDAS

Dr. Cooper testified that he examined Tsafendas at the request of David Bloomberg for the first time on October 1, 1966. He saw him again on October 4, then on October 11 along with Dr. MacGregor and Dr. Zabow, and a final time on October 14. The average length of each session was an hour and a half, thus six hours in all.

Dr. Cooper testified:

"I made a diagnosis of schizophrenia on the basis of my interviews with him, but, in order to try and add either supportive or negative evidence towards this diagnosis, I felt it essential to elicit a history from him and try and decide whether the history I obtained from

³⁹⁴⁹ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁹⁵⁰ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters. P: 17. Pretoria: Government Printer. 1967.

him was consistent with my impression of him suffering from schizophrenia.”³⁹⁵¹

What Dr. Cooper is saying, and the same applies to some of the other psychiatrists and psychologists who examined Tsafendas, is that he formed his conclusions in the first place on what Tsafendas told him and instead of seeking confirming or contrary evidence from third parties, he went back and asked Tsafendas himself. Although partly forced on him by circumstances beyond his control, including a shortage of time and a rebarbative attitude by the police, this seems an extraordinary method of forming a diagnosis, particularly in a criminal case of such huge importance. As we will see, Dr. Cooper and the other psychiatrists made many assumptions about Tsafendas, and their testimonies contain inaccuracies about his character and life which could have been avoided had they spoken to friends, acquaintances and kin.

Professor Kirk Heilbrun disagreed with the method used by Dr. Cooper (and subsequently the other psychiatrists, too) to diagnose Tsafendas, and was surprised that the doctor relied only on what he was told by him. He told the author that if he was in Dr. Cooper's position, he “would have sought information from the second and third domains [collateral interviews with people who knew Tsafendas and his medical and criminal record] rather than additional information from the first domain [Tsafendas].” He added he did not believe it possible to make an accurate diagnosis about a patient, especially in a forensic case, simply by listening to him over three ninety-minute sessions without additional, extraneous information.³⁹⁵²

However, the lack of TPI, at least in Dr. Cooper's case, is hardly his fault. When he attempted to collect additional information about Tsafendas's background and activities before the assassination he was discouraged by the police from probing too deeply. This, he was told, was their job. He was also told that Tsafendas was a perfectly straightforward case of a schizophrenic. This led Dr. Cooper to have serious misgivings about the whole procedure and to wonder if the authorities were perhaps covering up their lax security procedures and pressing for Tsafendas to be declared insane so that they could avoid any responsibility for assassination.³⁹⁵³

³⁹⁵¹ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁹⁵² Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017.

³⁹⁵³ Lambley, 1980: 239-240, 273; Dr. Lambley's *The Psychology of Apartheid* (1980) was very well received on the time of its publication and was published by The University of Georgia Press. In addition, the foreword

EXTRACTS FROM DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY³⁹⁵⁴

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Who requested you to interview the accused in this case?

DR. COOPER: The attorney for the defence, Mr. David Bloomberg.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And how many interviews, to date, have you had with the accused?

DR. COOPER: I have had four interviews.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The first interview that you had, when was that?

DR. COOPER: On the 1st October, 1966.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In whose presence did you interview the accused?

DR. COOPER: In the presence of Mr. Bloomberg.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Any other person present?

DR. COOPER: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The second interview?

DR. COOPER: On the 4th October, 1966.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In the presence of anybody?

DR. COOPER: This interview was held jointly with my colleagues Dr. MacGregor and Dr. Zabow.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And the third interview?

DR. COOPER: Was similarly held jointly on the 11th October, 1966, with Dr. MacGregor and Dr. Zabow.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The fourth interview?

DR. COOPER: The fourth interview was on the 14th October, 1966; this interview was individual, without the assistance of my colleagues.

of the book is written by Antony Storr, one of the leading psychiatrists of the previous century and Britain's most literate psychiatrist (*The Guardian*, 20 March 2001, 'Antony Storr obituary').

³⁹⁵⁴ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When you were introduced to the accused at your first interview, was he told what your profession was? How did you introduce yourself?

DR. COOPER: He was told I was a doctor.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: These interviews, could you tell His Lordship how long did they usually last?

DR. COOPER: They varied, but the average length of each interview was an hour and a half.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the purpose of examining the accused?

DR. COOPER: My purpose was to assess this man's mental condition.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did you find the accused when you spoke to him?

DR. COOPER: At all times I found him soft-spoken, polite, co—operative and apparently fully prepared to co-operate with all questions that were put to him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: As regards intelligence, what is your comment?

DR. COOPER: Concerning his intelligence, at an early stage I decided that this man was of normal intelligence, even quite high intelligence and throughout the interviews nothing arose to make me alter that opinion.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What language did you speak to him?

DR. COOPER: I spoke to him in English.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is his fluency in English?

DR. COOPER: His fluency in English is perfectly adequate, and I was careful in this matter, and decided in my mind that he was perfectly able to do himself justice in replying to questions in English,

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What kind of vocabulary has he?

DR. COOPER: Very adequate.

TSAFENDAS'S BEING UNABLE TO FOLLOW A CONVERSATION AFTER FIFTEEN MINUTES

DR. COOPER: This man's difficulty in thinking logically and assessing things and forming reasonable judgments and coming to reasonable conclusions becomes increasingly difficult as the complexity of what he is presented with increased, particularly in respect of time. If one talks to him over quarter of an hour, the first quarter of an hour if one asks him simple questions he gets along quite all right, but as the time goes on his thoughts drift more and more and he tends more and more to lose contact with what is going on around him.

COMMENTS ON TSAFENDAS'S ABILITY TO FOLLOW A CONVERSATION AFTER FIFTEEN MINUTES

Dr. Cooper described Tsafendas as man who is unable to follow a conversation after the first fifteen minutes and "as the time goes on his thoughts drift more and more and he tends more and more to lose contact with what is going on around him." Tsafendas spent one and a half months in police custody and throughout this period was constantly seen by Major Rossouw. Rossouw interrogated Tsafendas for several hours on several occasions and was present in Caledon Square police station throughout the time Tsafendas was held there. He testified to the Commission that Tsafendas "answered all the questions spontaneously" and that he (Rossouw) "never got the impression that he tried to evade any question." He made no mention of Tsafendas's alleged inability to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes or being unable to answer any questions.³⁹⁵⁵

As stated before, Rossouw was not a psychiatrist, but as a very experienced interrogator, he would have noticed whether a prisoner was able to follow his questions and whether he was able to answer them in a satisfactory manner. Furthermore, both of Tsafendas's statements to the police seem to support Maj. Rossouw's testimony since Tsafendas answered all the questions perfectly sensibly while it is obvious from the length of the transcripts that each interrogation lasted far longer than fifteen minutes.

Professor van Wyk, the State psychiatrist appointed by the Attorney-General himself, had examined Tsafendas three times by October 6. He had written in his report, which was in

³⁹⁵⁵ Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

the possession of the Attorney-General, that Tsafendas was “orientated,” adding, “He gives a good account of himself. His comprehension is good and his answers are relevant. His emotional responses are adequate and apt. His discourse is coherent. At times he is discursive, but not vague and he never strays from the main point of conversation...I have found no indications that he is incapable of following the court proceedings or that he is unable to exercise his rights and privileges and instruct his legal advisers and assist them in the conduct of his defence.”³⁹⁵⁶ However, although the Attorney-General had in his possession the report of his own expert-witness, which flatly contradicted Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis, he did not use it to challenge his testimony.

Furthermore, just the following day at the court, Dr. Muller, also a defence witness, would completely contradict Dr. Cooper’s argument. The following dialogue took place between Dr. Muller and the Defence Counsel:

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You had no difficulty in communicating with him?

DR. MULLER: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he have difficulty in expressing himself?

DR. MULLER: None at all.³⁹⁵⁷

In addition, none of the about two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission mentioned anything like this. On the contrary some commented as to the exact opposite:

- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine-ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”³⁹⁵⁸
- Garnet Muller, Tsafendas’s supervisor at South African Railways for three weeks, testified that Tsafendas gave him to understand that he took the job on a temporary basis. He “observed Demitrio Tsafendas to possess intelligence above that of the average

³⁹⁵⁶ Bloomberg, 2007: 81.

³⁹⁵⁷ Dr. Hendrik Muller’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁹⁵⁸ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

person.”³⁹⁵⁹

- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike's Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966, frequently driving him to the tanker *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town. Of Tsafendas, he told the police that he “never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers.”³⁹⁶⁰
- Gillian Claire Lieberman, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation, whose office Tsafendas often visited, “I had various discussions with him. I got quite interested in him as an individual. ... I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation.”³⁹⁶¹
- J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”³⁹⁶²
- Patrick O’Ryan said “he was well-spoken and had good vocabulary.”³⁹⁶³
- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban appointed Tsafendas as a Portuguese and Greek interpreter. Rudolph used him “on several occasions” in a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He testified that “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”³⁹⁶⁴
- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas's landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry that Tsafendas “was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman.”³⁹⁶⁵

³⁹⁵⁹ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁹⁶⁰ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

³⁹⁶¹ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁹⁶² *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

³⁹⁶³ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁹⁶⁴ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁹⁶⁵ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

- Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira “was often in the company of the subject and others had several conversations with him.” He considered Tsafendas to be “a normal and very intelligent person.”³⁹⁶⁶

Furthermore, Tsafendas attended many interviews in his working life and appeared perfectly capable of answering questions or he would not have got the jobs:

- Petrus Schuin, the head messenger at the Parliament and one of the three men who had interviewed him and appointed him told the Commission of Enquiry that “there was nothing out of the ordinary about him. Tsafendas was the same as any other person that had worked there.”³⁹⁶⁷
- Sydney Wiehand, who had also interviewed him at the Parliament, said about Tsafendas, “he was a quiet man. He wasn’t the rough type, or anything like that. He was quiet - quietly spoken, well-mannered.”³⁹⁶⁸
- Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas’s employer at the heavy engineering company Fries and Son in Frankfurt, Germany, characterised Tsafendas “as extremely nice and friendly ... I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman...he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on... we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.” Tsafendas “left on his own wish” although Hartmann “would have liked to keep him.”³⁹⁶⁹
- Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas’s boss at F. A. Poole in Pretoria, said that in the five months he worked with Tsafendas, he found him to be “not a very good worker, but will say that he was an intelligent worker.”³⁹⁷⁰ He also testified to the Commission of Enquiry that he

³⁹⁶⁶ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

³⁹⁶⁷ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

³⁹⁶⁸ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

³⁹⁶⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin.’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

³⁹⁷⁰ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

considered Tsafendas to be “an intelligent man, just untidy and lazy in rounding off his work.” He never got the impression that Mr. Tsafendas was not right in his mind.³⁹⁷¹

- Ian Boswell, administrative assistant at the Department of Labour in Cape Town. He interviewed Tsafendas three times in 1966 and testified to the police that “he was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being over-talkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality, during his interviews with me.”³⁹⁷²
- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He testified to the police that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed” and he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”³⁹⁷³
- Gideon Cloete, also employed at the Department of Labour, interviewed Tsafendas twice. According to Cloete, Tsafendas “had a neat appearance and made a good impression.” He did not notice any “signs of abnormality” and “appeared totally normal” to him.³⁹⁷⁴
- Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen was Tsafendas’s tram instructor in December 1965 and January 1966. He testified to the police that “I did not at all get the impression that mentally anything was wrong with him. He is mentally normal.”³⁹⁷⁵

Tsafendas was also interviewed by Limasollu Naci, owner of the private language college in Istanbul in 1961, and given the position of teacher of English. During a week’s probation, he was under observation. Obviously successful, he remained at the college for some six months before leaving on his own volition. Mrs. Advije Vedia Limasollu, wife of Limasollu Naci, does not remember Tsafendas, but stated firmly that her husband would have never appointed or kept on a teacher who was not able to follow a conversation. Teachers had also to deal with the students’ parents and someone at some point would have noticed if her had problems.³⁹⁷⁶ In fact, Limasollu Naci became a good friend of Tsafendas and spent a lot

³⁹⁷¹ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁹⁷² Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

³⁹⁷³ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

³⁹⁷⁴ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas’s summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

³⁹⁷⁵ Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁹⁷⁶ Advije Vedia Limasollu in a personal interview, 8 January 2016.

of time with him during those six months.³⁹⁷⁷ If Tsafendas had problems, would he not have noticed?

More importantly, Tsafendas was examined and interviewed twice by two state doctors for his South African permanent residency permit and neither of them noticed any “thought-disorder,” though they were not psychiatrists:

- On November 11, 1963, Tsafendas was medically examined by Dr. C. Been for his permanent residence application and was found “not to be mentally or physically defective in any way,” and “generally in a good state of health.”³⁹⁷⁸ Dr. Been would later examine Tsafendas again “for burns on his body whilst employed at Pooles.” Again nothing about his mental state would be noted.³⁹⁷⁹
- On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined again for the permit by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who also wrote “a favourable report” and subsequently a certificate for permanent residence was issued for him.³⁹⁸⁰

In addition to these two doctors, Tsafendas was examined by another ten physicians, none of them psychiatrists, over the course of three years, and no one noticed any inability to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes:

- On March 15, 1965, Tsafendas was examined by a South African Railways’ medical officer whose name is indecipherable in his report. He was found to be perfectly healthy, without any issues and therefore capable of working at the company.³⁹⁸¹
- On September 25, 1965, he was examined by Dr. G.C. Baker, a casualty officer, and nothing was reported about his mental state.³⁹⁸²

³⁹⁷⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 4 November 2015.

³⁹⁷⁸ Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

³⁹⁷⁹ Dr. Been statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁹⁸⁰ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demitrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

³⁹⁸¹ South African Railways Confidential Medical Examination Certificate of Demitrio Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 7, File: S 83708, Tsafendas: D. NASA.

³⁹⁸² Dr. G.C. Baker Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. No date. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4, NASA.

- On November 19, 1965, Tsafendas was medically examined to insure that he was able to work for City Tramways in Cape Town. He was found fit to work and duly hired.³⁹⁸³
- On January 13, 1966, Tsafendas applied for work at the Marine Diamond Corporation and underwent a medical check-up that same day. The doctor who examined him³⁹⁸⁴ found Tsafendas to be perfectly healthy and capable of working for the company.³⁹⁸⁵
- On April 18, 19 and May 3, 1966 Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Goldman, a consultant ear, nose and throat surgeon. He reported nothing about his mental condition.³⁹⁸⁶
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work.³⁹⁸⁷
- Dr. Ralph Kossew examined Tsafendas only half an hour after the assassination. His testimony is highly important due to its timing. Dr. Kossew found Tsafendas “not confused ... he answers questions guardedly but does not appear to be confused ... he didn't appear anxious ... He may have been a little bit nervous but not in any marked degree... He was calm...”³⁹⁸⁸
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work at Marine Diamond Corporation.³⁹⁸⁹

³⁹⁸³ Donal Neville Mackay statement to the COE, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

³⁹⁸⁴ The doctor's name in the medical report is indecipherable.

³⁹⁸⁵ Demitrio Tsafendas's Marine Diamond Corporation Application for Employment, 13 January 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

³⁹⁸⁶ I. Eisenberg Statement. RE: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. N.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁹⁸⁷ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

³⁹⁸⁸ Dr. Ralph Kossew's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

³⁹⁸⁹ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

- Dr. S. Michelson, a specialist physician, examined Tsafendas in the Neurology Department of Groote Schuur Hospital on June 3, 1966 and did not notice Tsafendas's reported inability to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes. Nothing was reported about his mental state.³⁹⁹⁰
- Finally, Dr. Darby, a casualty officer, examined Tsafendas on the evening of the assassination but did not report anything to be wrong about his mental state.³⁹⁹¹

The author asked forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas if they thought Dr. Cooper was right about Tsafendas not being able to concentrate for more than fifteen minutes. Not a single one agreed with the doctor. Here are responses from some who knew Tsafendas over a long period and who spent a lot of time talking with him:

Father Michalis Visvinis, who visited Tsafendas in prison very regularly for five years (1989-1994) and spoke extensively with him, shook his head in disbelief upon hearing Dr. Cooper's comment. He told the author:

"No, no, this is not true. He [Tsafendas] was always very alert. I was actually surprised that his mind was so alert after so many years in prison. Most of our conversations lasted about an hour and a half and he never lost track, nor did I feel that he was struggling to cope with our discussion... I felt that he [Tsafendas] needed to speak, so several times I would just let him speak. He enjoyed speaking and he could speak for hours. He always spoke like a normal man.

I also often asked him questions about his life, and his answers were always logical and what one would expect. He never evaded any question and I never had to repeat myself to him for a second time, nor was his answer ever off the subject... [His speech] was not disjointed or anything else. It was perfectly articulate and logical, always very coherent. He never said anything to suggest he had a mental problem or that he had any difficulty speaking or thinking and expressing himself properly. I am positive that this was not the case [Tsafendas being unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes]. This comment is entirely false."³⁹⁹²

³⁹⁹⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 64. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

³⁹⁹¹ Dr. T.A. Darby. Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. G.S.H. NO. 65/014-181, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

³⁹⁹² Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

Alexander Moumbaris spent in 1972 three months in the cell next to Tsafendas in Pretoria Prison. Moumbaris spoke to Tsafendas for an hour every day during this period, thus, he must have spent at least ninety hours talking to him. Moumbaris dismissed outright the suggestion that Tsafendas was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes. Asked by the author if Tsafendas had any difficulty in following their conversations or understanding his questions, Moumbaris smiled dismissively. He said:

“No, no, it was nothing like this. He was absolutely normal and very serious, he always talked like a normal man, like any other man. I enjoyed talking to him, he was very intelligent and witty. He had things to tell you, you could have a serious conversation with him. He never had any difficulty expressing himself or participating in a conversation. Most times he led the conversations. There were never gaps or pauses in his speech, or anything that would make me think that he was struggling to speak or participate in our conversations.”³⁹⁹³

Moumbaris also told the author that even in March 1996 when he visited him for a couple of hours in Sterkfontein Hospital, they had a perfectly normal conversation, despite the deterioration in Tsafendas's health and hearing. How capable Tsafendas was to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes is also evident from the fact that he asked Moumbaris in 1972 to teach him Algebra. Although the warders stepped in and stopped the lessons not long ago after they started, Tsafendas turned out to be an excellent student and more than capable of following Moumbaris's teaching.³⁹⁹⁴

Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis visited Tsafendas regularly for about a year in Pretoria Prison hospital. He told the author:

“We spoke for hours about politics, religion and history and he was one of the most knowledgeable people I ever met in all these subjects. He never got lost in the conversation and he would never drop a subject until I had agreed with him. He would never give up a conversation if you disagreed. He would bombard you with examples and arguments about the point at question. Sometimes I thought he must be making up some of the examples to convince us he was right. I would then go home and check the example he had used only to find out that he was right! He was incapable of letting you go until he had convinced you he

³⁹⁹³ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

³⁹⁹⁴ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

was right. The doctor's diagnosis is 100% wrong, believe me."³⁹⁹⁵

Fotini Gavasiadis invited Tsafendas to be a guest in the house where she lived with her husband and small son in Pretoria in 1963. After a few weeks, he moved into an apartment next door where he stayed for the following eight months. During this period, he spent much of his time back in her house, almost like flatmates. Throughout these nine months, Tsafendas and Gavasiadis also worked together in her brother's café. Fotini got to know Tsafendas very well and ranked among his closest friends. She smiled and shook her head after she heard Dr. Cooper's comment. "What else am I going to hear!" she exclaimed in disbelief. She told the author:

"This is like a joke, it is ridiculous! This and all the other things you have told me these psychiatrists said are ridiculous and unbelievable. Of course they are untrue. I don't know what type of doctors they were, but I they certainly lost the plot with Dimitri... I told you Dimitris could buy and sell you and he could do that at any time during a conversation, in the first ten minutes, then again after thirty minutes or an hour and then again after two hours. He wouldn't let you get up from the chair until he had made you agree with what he was saying, especially when talking politics...

He was very convincing and persuasive - he could turn black into white! If you disagreed with something with him, he would find a way to convince you that he is right and that you are wrong - even if you *know* that you are right and that he is wrong! If he made a mistake about something, he would turn things upside-down and at the end, he would even make you apologise to him ... In those nine months, I saw him and spoke to him every day and not even once did he appear to have an issue with his speech or his thoughts. He was always the same. We spent hours and hours talking and his speech was never incoherent, disjointed, blocked or whatever else, it was always perfect. He never gave me even the slightest indication that he might be having the issues you mentioned. The doctor's comment is for laughs."³⁹⁹⁶

Katerina Pnema, Tsafendas's half-sister, was very surprised to hear such a comment. "This sounds to me like a comedy... the doctor's comment is entirely false and does not bear any resemblance to the truth. Dimitris was not like this; he was never like this. The doctor is

³⁹⁹⁵ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 2 August 2016.

³⁹⁹⁶ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

talking nonsense.”³⁹⁹⁷

Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas's first cousin, knew him since he was five years old and grew up alongside him in Mozambique and in Egypt. In Pretoria in 1963-1964, she spent a lot of time with him, including two or three weeks when they lived in the same house. She told the author:

“What are you talking about? Is this what the doctor believed about Dimitri? My God, I can't believe it. What type of doctor was this? Of course Dimitris was able to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes; it's laughable to suggest otherwise. He could talk for hours and hours about anything, especially politics, trying to convince you that he was right. He would continue talking to you for hours and hours until he would have convinced you that he was right.”³⁹⁹⁸

Irene Michaletos was visited frequently by Tsafendas in her house in Beira for several months between 1964 and 1965. He even often stayed there. She strongly dismisses Dr. Cooper's claim and states that Tsafendas was “very good with words. Of course he was able to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes; he never lost track or there was never any suggestion that he was not capable of doing so. Never, never. He was talking all the time, he was really good with words, he knew how to talk.”³⁹⁹⁹

In 1951, and between 1963 and 1965, Tsafendas spent a lot of time in his aunt Artemis Michaletos's house (Tsafendas's aunt who brought him up in Egypt) and even slept there on several occasions. John Michaletos, Artemis's son and Tsafendas's cousin, who was always present and spent hours talking to Tsafendas, told the author:

“He [Tsafendas] talked very, very passionately about his political ideas, his cheeks sometimes getting red and sweaty from the passion. He was very self-assured about his ideas and you could not have a political debate with him, he would have cut you into pieces. He was very well read, especially in politics, while he had this ability I haven't seen in anyone to be able to convince you that he is right. He would bring argument after argument and example after example to convince you that he is right. Sometimes, I wondered whether all these [political and historical] examples and facts he was talking about were true. I did not know. I was not aware of any of these. And you couldn't check at the time, there was no

³⁹⁹⁷ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁹⁹⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

³⁹⁹⁹ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

internet, but it all sounded very, very convincing. I used to tell him, and my mother used to tell him too, that he should be a politician or a lawyer.”⁴⁰⁰⁰

It is difficult to believe that Artemis and John Michaletos would have envisaged Tsafendas as a successful politician or lawyer if he was unable to follow a conversation for more than fifteen minutes. Artemis had known him since he was two and a half years old and watched him learn and grow through infancy. John Michaletos also smiled and shook his head in disbelief at Dr. Cooper's comment. Asked by the author to comment, he said:

“What should I tell you? I have told you everything about him. He [Tsafendas] was nothing like this. He [Dr. Cooper] could not have been more wrong. Everything this doctor [Dr. Cooper] has been saying is nonsense, it's not true about Dimitri. He was nothing like this, it's like he had either examined a different person or he was a bad doctor.”⁴⁰⁰¹

Antony Michaletos, Artemis's son and John's brother, was also present in 1951 and in 1963-1965 when Tsafendas stayed at their house. He dismisses outright Dr. Cooper's suggestion that Tsafendas was unable to follow a conversation for longer than fifteen minutes. He told the author:

“He [Tsafendas] spoke fine, like a normal, intelligent man, no disjoint, not gibberish, nothing like this... Are you joking? Of course he was able to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes. We were talking for hours. Hours and hours. Almost every night or every other night he would come to our house; we'll eat and then sit in the living room or the balcony and talk.”⁴⁰⁰²

Ira Kyriakakis, Tsafendas's childhood friend who remained very close to him until his imprisonment. She told the author:

“The doctor is making a mistake. Dimitris not only could follow a conversation for indefinite time, but could also participate in any type of conversation because he was very knowledgeable. He was never as the doctor described. Dimitri was so clever and able that he could convince the devil to buy a Bible. He was like a politician, he would turn things upside-down to make you see things from his point of view. He was talking beautifully; slowly and with authority, like a very important man. No, no, he was not like the doctor said.”⁴⁰⁰³

⁴⁰⁰⁰ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁰⁰¹ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁰⁰² Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016.

⁴⁰⁰³ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

Thirteen of the *Eleni* seamen who were with Tsafendas every day for forty-two days until three days before the assassination, and who were interviewed by the author, also rejected the idea that Tsafendas couldn't follow a conversation after fifteen minutes. The author will include only the more representative of the men's statements:

Michalis Vasilakis told the author that Tsafendas appeared to be "able to convince anyone that his political ideas were right. ... You couldn't disagree with him about anything. He always found a way to convince you that he was right. He was very, very able in reasoning and developing and explaining an argument. He was extremely good with words and arguments."⁴⁰⁰⁴

Nikolas Kambouris, another seaman, was very surprised to hear Dr. Cooper's statement. "I told you he had a very distinctive way of talking. It was slow, but very intelligent and sophisticated ... He was talking like a professor. It was more likely for us to not be able to follow him than him to follow us. We spent hours talking about politics and he was leading the conversation; none of us knew anything about apartheid at the time."⁴⁰⁰⁵ Shaking his head in a negative manner, Manolis Mastromanolis said of Dr. Cooper's comment, "No, no, I never noticed this. He could speak for hours and hours. Always clearly and logically."⁴⁰⁰⁶

Andreas Babiolakis lived with Tsafendas in the same house in Beira for two or three months and knew him since they were children. "No, no, never ... Dimitri was not just able to follow the conversation, most of the times he was leading the conversation, especially when talking about politics."⁴⁰⁰⁷

The following witnesses all strongly dismiss Dr. Cooper's diagnosis about Tsafendas being unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes:

- Reuben O'Ryan lived in the same house as Tsafendas for five months.⁴⁰⁰⁸
- Stanley O'Ryan also lived in the same house as Tsafendas for five months.⁴⁰⁰⁹
- Panagiotis Peroglou knew Tsafendas for about a year in 1965-1966.⁴⁰¹⁰

⁴⁰⁰⁴ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴⁰⁰⁵ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

⁴⁰⁰⁶ Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

⁴⁰⁰⁷ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴⁰⁰⁸ Reuben O'Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁴⁰⁰⁹ Stanley O'Ryan in a personal interview with the author, 9 April 2015.

⁴⁰¹⁰ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott's boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest...⁴⁰¹¹
- Costas Chagios who were Tsafendas's friends in Cape Town for more than a year.⁴⁰¹²
- Nick Papadakis knew Tsafendas for two-three months and lived with him for two months in Gondola and Beira in 1964.⁴⁰¹³
- George Liberopoulos met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and associated with him for a few weeks.⁴⁰¹⁴
- Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for seven months in 1961 in Istanbul.⁴⁰¹⁵
- Miltiades Kaldis met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965 and kept in touch until his arrest.⁴⁰¹⁶
- George Ananiades met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963. They spent several hours talking.⁴⁰¹⁷

Professors Alban Burke, Phillip Resnick, Robert L. Sadoff and Tuviah Zabow believe that it is extremely unlikely, and very close to impossible, that none of the people who knew Tsafendas, some extremely well, ever noticed that he was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes.⁴⁰¹⁸ Reyner van Zyl, who examined Tsafendas for the defence, told the author that it was "highly improbable."⁴⁰¹⁹

⁴⁰¹¹ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴⁰¹² Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015.

⁴⁰¹³ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴⁰¹⁴ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

⁴⁰¹⁵ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁴⁰¹⁶ Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016.

⁴⁰¹⁷ George Ananiades in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

⁴⁰¹⁸ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Robert L. Sadoff in a personal interview with the author, 12 August 2015; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 10 October 2016.

⁴⁰¹⁹ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 17 April 2016.

TSAFENDAS NOT BEING CONCERNED FOR HIS FUTURE AND TALKING IN A DISJOINTED MANNER

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the first thing that struck you when you saw this man, the accused?

DR. COOPER: The first thing that struck me was an abnormality in this man's emotional attitude to his situation and surroundings. I was struck by him reacting rather incongruously. I felt that here was a man who had been charged in a very, very serious matter and he displayed a singular lack of anxiety. He showed no sign of agitation, stress or tension. He was not restless. On each occasion when one came to interview him one never found him pacing up and down; one found him usually sleeping or at least dozing. When one discussed this whole matter with him, he did not show any appropriate emotional reaction that one would expect...

JUDGE BEYERS: Have you had experience of murderers before?

DR. COOPER: Yes. I have never found them climbing walls yet. I have defended quite a lot of them in my life. In the instances where I have gone to various gaols to see murderers, I have found them anxious, I have found them frequently complaining of insomnia, frequently asking and pleading for sleeping tablets. They have been agitated. They have constantly intercepted with questions as to their predicament and as to their fate. These features were, I thought, significantly absent in this man...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I want to put this to you: is the accused concerned about his fate?

DR. COOPER: No. Not as far as I was able to establish.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you probed that matter with him?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: This lack of, I think, or inappropriate emotional response to his present predicament, why is that important? Or is it important, first of all?

DR. COOPER: I felt it was important, firstly, on the basis that I considered this to be abnormal and different from what one had been accustomed to seeing in such cases, different from what one would expect in such a case, and, furthermore, important in that precisely this type of emotional reaction is frequently seen and completely consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia...

... I would describe him, for the most part, as being emotionally flat, except that, again rather incongruously, he would at times smile, at times chuckle at inappropriate moments in the interview, and also one might mention a feature, namely, that he quite frequently tends to grimace rather grossly and extensively during interviews...

... This type of grimacing, one cannot go so far certainly as to say that it is diagnostic of schizophrenia but it does frequently occur in people suffering from schizophrenia ...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: As regards his emotional response, what relevance has that in diagnosing schizophrenia?

DR. COOPER: Simply that this emotional response is commonly seen in schizophrenia and is completely consistent with the diagnosis of schizophrenia.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What does the present emotional state indicate?

DR. COOPER: It indicates to me an indifference to his whole situation,

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And in relation to reality?

DR. COOPER: In relation to reality I found him decidedly disturbed in that, although it was clear to me, because he said so, he knew what he had done, he knew that he was going to be tried, but he was unable to understand the magnitude of the situation. He was unable to fully grasp the serious consequences of the situation. This became apparent, apart from his general attitude and his mode of discussion, in certain remarks which he made, remarks that I am completely satisfied he made in all sincerity, such remarks as at one stage, he paused for a moment and he said: "I do not think that I will be able to live in Cape Town after this because of the public opinion, you know." At another stage, when we were discussing various jobs that he had held, he said that if he was ever offered a job in the House of Assembly again he does not think that he would be able to face up to that job again. These remarks perhaps are small remarks, but to me they had deep significance and confirmed my impression of this man being out of touch with reality, unable to grasp the real nature of the situation in which he now finds himself...

... The next sign or indication of mental abnormality that I detected during my first interview, and at all subsequent interviews, concerned his thinking processes. I have already stated that he is an intelligent man. He is able to make certain quite intelligent statements. He is able to provide one with certain facts in quite an intelligent manner. But if one allows him to give free flow to his thoughts and feelings, one finds that one would be discussing a certain point

or matter with him and he will start perhaps vaguely answering your questions and then gradually ramble along in a completely disjointed manner. He will lose the trend of his thinking. As a listener, one finds oneself losing the trend of what he is trying to tell you, and you end up not quite knowing at all what he is trying to put across to you... this man is an intelligent individual. In fact, I think I am prepared to go so far as to say he is above average in intelligence. And taking into account his intelligence, I find that his inability to express himself in a coherent fashion is in fact significant...

... I have spent considerable time with this man trying to elicit from him whether he has any views regarding his defence, whether he had any idea of what sort of approach his defending counsel would be adopting in this case, whether he had any personal views on how he would try to defend himself, whether he really understood the implications of this whole matter, and I came to the conclusion that he had no notion of these things, that he had no understanding of these things at all.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is he able to make a proper defence?

DR. COOPER: Most definitely not.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is he able to instruct me properly in this matter?

DR. COOPER: I don't think he is able to instruct you at all, usefully.

DR. COOPER: I found myself comparing this case with other murder cases, other murderers who I have examined, and they have always shown a lot of interest and anxiety concerning their defence, and they have always tendered to offer explanations, excuses, reasons and - whether they be worthwhile or not - ideas they had concerning why they may not be guilty. This man had nothing of this type to offer at all."

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you ever get the impression that the accused was concerned about his rights?

DR. COOPER: His rights?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes?

DR. COOPER: He showed a certain amount of concern, but I would say minimal concern and a degree of concern that I thought was completely inappropriate and unusual in circumstances of this sort.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S ABOVE TESTIMONY**TSAFENDAS NOT BEING CONCERNED ABOUT HIS FUTURE**

Asked about Tsafendas's lack of response to his predicament, Dr. Cooper states that "this type of emotional reaction is frequently seen and completely consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia ..." Tsafendas told the police in a statement he made on September 11, 1966, "I did not care about the consequences, for what would happen to me afterwards. I was so disgusted with the racial policy that I went through with my plans to kill the Prime Minister." He repeated this in the same interview, saying, "I did not think I would get away after murdering the Prime Minister. I did not care what happened to me."⁴⁰²⁰ Clearly, his political convictions overrode his certainty that he would be captured and required to face the consequences of his action. That is entirely different from someone being indifferent to his fate as a result of schizophrenia. However, Dr. Cooper did not have access to Tsafendas's statements.

In addition to this, Tsafendas could not have claimed that he was innocent. He had killed Dr. Verwoerd in front of more than a hundred witnesses and could hardly have said, "I didn't do it!" Being aware of the consequences and ready to face them, why would he change his attitude towards Dr. Cooper? He was not the first defendant to follow court proceedings with apathy. In many cases, especially political trials, prisoners are uninterested, either because they don't care about the outcome or they don't recognise the authority of the court. Tsafendas knew what the outcome would be: he was going to be found unfit to stand trial and believed that he would be sent to a hospital.

Thirty years later, Tsafendas told Father Minas Constandinou and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis that it was easy to convince his defence team and everyone who examined him that he was mad. "It was easy because everyone wanted to find me mad, both the government and my defence team."⁴⁰²¹ Hence his apathetic attitude. Defendants who fear death or life imprisonment would demonstrate concern or distress, but Tsafendas did not care about what would happen to him and because he was almost certain about the outcome, he was not

⁴⁰²⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁰²¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

fearful.

An alternative reason for Tsafendas's attitude and one that has never been explored was offered to the author by Father Minas Constandinou: that Tsafendas was seeking personal redemption for what he saw as past acts of cowardice. Tsafendas felt guilty that he had not fought the Nazis during the Second World War; instead, he had repeatedly pretended to be ill so as to remain in hospital and avoid being sent into the Atlantic and exposed to German U-boats. Tsafendas often spoke of the shame these actions caused him and how this became worse when he learned of the Nazis' atrocities. He also regretted that he had not gone to Spain to join the International Brigades against the fascists because he feared dying young. Although Tsafendas never related his guilt for these matters to the assassination, Father Minas got the impression that by carrying out an attack on Dr. Verwoerd without an escape plan and in the certain knowledge that he would be captured, Tsafendas was seeking atonement for his earlier failures.⁴⁰²²

History is replete with examples of men who faced critical situations, including the prospect of death, with an equanimity similar to Tsafendas's. These people were not schizophrenic, indeed they were entirely sane, many were highly intelligent and all were fully aware of their circumstances. Surely the last thirty days of Socrates' life give the lie to Dr. Cooper's conclusions that Tsafendas's "emotional reaction" was "frequently seen and completely consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia." Was Socrates also a schizophrenic?

TSAFENDAS TALKING IN A DISJOINTED MANNER

Dr. Cooper testified that Tsafendas was vague when answering questions and spoke in a rambling and disjointed manner, and the following day three more defence witnesses, Dr. Sakinofsky, Peter Daniels and Patrick O'Ryan, gave similar testimony. However, Patrick O'Ryan had also testified that Tsafendas "was well-spoken and had good vocabulary."⁴⁰²³ In addition, O'Ryan later declared that he had lied and exaggerated some of the things he said about Tsafendas in order to save his friend's life. This was done after Wilfrid Cooper said it was the only way to prevent from being condemned to death. It is also very possible that advocate Cooper gave the same advice to Peter Daniels. We will examine these two

⁴⁰²² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁰²³ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

testimonies and that of Dr. Sakinofsky later.

However, with regard to Dr. Cooper's comment about the accused being vague and talking in a disjointed manner, none of Tsafendas's statements to the police conveyed that impression. His words are coherent and he communicates clearly. Major Rossouw, the head of the Security Police in Cape Town, who interrogated Tsafendas several times and for many hours and who was in constant touch with him while in custody, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas "answered all the questions spontaneously," he "never got the impression that he tried to evade any question" and reported none of the symptoms mentioned by Dr. Cooper.⁴⁰²⁴

Major Rossouw was not a psychiatrist, but he was a very experienced interrogator having also interrogated John Harris, Stephanie Kemp and other ARM members, who had all been tortured during their interrogation,⁴⁰²⁵ and must have been able to detect whether Tsafendas talked in a disjointed manner or presented any of the other symptoms described by Dr. Cooper. Having spent so much time with Tsafendas, he could surely tell if something was wrong with him. Both of Tsafendas's statements to the police support Maj. Rossouw's testimony, since Tsafendas answered all the questions he was asked perfectly ably and judging by the length of the transcripts, it is clear that each interrogation lasted far longer than fifteen minutes, allegedly Tsafendas's maximum concentration span.

None of the two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission or the forty-four who were interviewed by the author, including several people who knew him very well, said Tsafendas ever lost the thread of what he was saying or talked in a rambling or disjointed manner. For example:

- Gillian Claire Lieberman, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation, whose office Tsafendas often visited, "I had various discussions with him. I got quite interested in him as an individual. ... I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation."⁴⁰²⁶
- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he "never got the slightest impression that he was

⁴⁰²⁴ Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁰²⁵ South African Democracy Education Trust, 2004: 362.

⁴⁰²⁶ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁴⁰²⁷

- J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”⁴⁰²⁸
- Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira “was often in the company of the subject and others had several conversations with him.” He considered Tsafendas to be “a normal and very intelligent person.”⁴⁰²⁹
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁴⁰³⁰
- Patrick O’Ryan said “he was well-spoken and had good vocabulary.”⁴⁰³¹
- Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira “was often in the company of the subject and others had several conversations with him.” He considered Tsafendas to be “a normal and very intelligent person.”⁴⁰³²
- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban appointed Tsafendas as a Portuguese and Greek interpreter. Rudolph used him “on several occasions” in a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He testified that “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁴⁰³³
- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas's landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry that Tsafendas, “was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a

⁴⁰²⁷ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁰²⁸ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

⁴⁰²⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁰³⁰ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁰³¹ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁰³² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁰³³ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

good impression. From his general appearance, he appeared to be a businessman.”⁴⁰³⁴

- Johannes Aurets, Tsafendas's supervisor at the South African Railways, told the police Tsafendas “was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature.”⁴⁰³⁵

Furthermore, the author asked forty-four people who knew Tsafendas, some very well, and none ever got the impression that his speech was disjointed: two priests who met him in prison and in the hospital in the 1980s and the 1990s and who spent hundreds of hours with him are positive that Tsafendas did not talk in a disjointed manner.⁴⁰³⁶

Father Michalis Visvinis, who visited Tsafendas in prison very regularly for five years (1989-1994), and spent several hours talking with him, strongly denied to the author that Tsafendas spoke in a disjointed manner, or that there was anything wrong with the way he spoke. He told the author:

“No, no, this is not true; he did not talk like this [in a disjointed manner]. He never spoke like this with me, his speech was always absolutely fine. I felt that he [Tsafendas] needed to speak, so several times I would just let him speak. He enjoyed speaking and he could speak for hours. He always spoke like a normal man. [His speech] was perfectly articulate and logical, always very coherent. He never said anything to suggest he had a mental problem or that he had any difficulty speaking or thinking and expressing himself properly. This comment is also entirely false.”⁴⁰³⁷

Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis who met Tsafendas in 1994 in Pretoria Prison hospital told the author:

“[Tsafendas] could speak for hours, telling you things about his life, his thoughts and his ideology, but he could also participate in a dialogue. We spoke for hours about politics, religion and history and he was one of the most knowledgeable people I ever met in all these subjects. He was very argumentative and insistent, especially about politics. He would never give up a conversation if you disagreed. He never, not even once, seemed to have difficulty

⁴⁰³⁴ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁴⁰³⁵ Johannes Jaonus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁰³⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁰³⁷ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

expressing himself or talked incoherently. Every single time, everything he said made sense and was perfectly stated. I don't believe for a moment that he could have talked in the way described by the psychiatrists unless he did it deliberately. He spoke and argued even better than most people. His speech and thought were perfectly fine."⁴⁰³⁸

Mary Eendracht, his first cousin, who grew up with him in Egypt and Mozambique and was constantly with him for nine months in 1963-1964, said, "Dimitri always spoke very well. He sounded like a very educated man. There was nothing wrong with his speech or thoughts, both were excellent. He could argue with you for hours and hours on politics. He was very good with words and his brain was bigger than most people's."⁴⁰³⁹

Alexander Moumbaris, who spoke to Tsafendas for at least one hour every day for about three months in 1972 in Pretoria Prison, dismissed outright the suggestion that Tsafendas talked in a disjointed manner. He told the author:

"No, this is not true. He was not talking in a disjointed manner. I never heard him talking like this, neither in 1972 nor in 1996. He always spoke absolutely fine... There were never gaps or pauses in his speech, or anything that would make me think that he was struggling to speak or participate in our conversations."⁴⁰⁴⁰

One of the strongest comments comes from Fotini Gavasiadis, who was with him every day for nine months in Pretoria in 1963-1964. She told the author:

"Dimitris could buy and sell you and he could do that at any time during a conversation, in the first ten minutes, then again after thirty minutes or an hour and then again after two hours. He wouldn't let you get up from the chair until he had made you agree with what he was saying, especially when talking politics ... He was very convincing and persuasive, he could turn black into white! If you disagreed with something with him, he would find a way to convince you that he is right and that you are wrong - even if you *know* that you are right and that he is wrong! If he made a mistake about something, he would turn things upside-down and at the end, he would even make you apologise to him.

In those nine months, I saw him and spoke to him every day and not even once did he appear to have an issue with his speech or his thoughts. He was always the same. We spent hours and hours talking and his speech was never incoherent, disjointed, blocked or whatever

⁴⁰³⁸ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁰³⁹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁰⁴⁰ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

else, it was always perfect. He never gave me even the slightest indication that he might be having the issues you mentioned.”⁴⁰⁴¹

Gavasiadis was not the only one impressed by the way Tsafendas spoke. None of the crewmen from the *Eleni* ever got the impression that Tsafendas's speech was disjointed. In fact, they were impressed by the way he spoke.⁴⁰⁴² The seamen called him “Professor” because of his knowledge and mode of speech.⁴⁰⁴³ “We were all wondering how come he knew all these things. How could he be talking like this? He talked like a university professor”, said Nikolaos Billis, one of the crew.⁴⁰⁴⁴ Another crew member, Michalis Vasilakis, said, “I can't explain it, but I remember he had a very specific way of talking, using not very common, but absolutely correct words. He knew how to speak and how to pick up words. He was talking like a professor; this is what we used to say between us and what we called him ... He was a very knowledgeable man. No, his speech was definitely not disjointed, it was excellent.”⁴⁰⁴⁵

In addition, Tsafendas worked in 1961 for six months as teacher at the best private language college in Istanbul, the Limasollu Naci. He worked initially on trial basis, under observation for a week, and then was appointed permanently. He remained in the post for six months, leaving eventually on his own accord. Mrs. Advije Vedia Limasollu, wife of Limasollu Naci, the owner of the college, does not remember Tsafendas, but she is certain that her husband would never have appointed, much less retained for a significant period, a teacher who talked in a disjointed manner.⁴⁰⁴⁶

Furthermore, while in Istanbul, for about seven months in 1961, Tsafendas gave free English lessons to Greek and Turkish children. Alexandra Vaporidis, who knew him throughout this period and conversed with him at length five or six times, told the author, “He talked perfectly well whenever I spoke to him.” Her husband was Father Agathagelos Vaporidis, the priest at Agia Triada Church where some of the lessons took place. He sat in on some of Tsafendas's classes and never mentioned anything being untoward about

⁴⁰⁴¹ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴⁰⁴² Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁴⁰⁴³ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁴⁰⁴⁴ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

⁴⁰⁴⁵ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁴⁰⁴⁶ Advije Vedia Limasollu in a personal interview, 8 January 2016.

Tsafendas's mode of speech. On the contrary, he was very happy with Tsafendas and his wife said he would certainly have told her if there were any speech issues.⁴⁰⁴⁷

Father Nikola Banovic told the author about the way Tsafendas spoke: "the way he spoke was very distinctive ... he spoke good Greek, but he used the grammar in a very different and distinctive way, talking like a teacher or an author, using nice words." Father Nikola also observed some of Tsafendas's teaching in Istanbul and characterised him as a "natural," "born to be teacher."⁴⁰⁴⁸ He would hardly have used these terms about a teacher who spoke in a disjointed manner.

In 1951, and between 1963 and 1965, Tsafendas spent a lot of time in his aunt Artemis Michaletos's house (Tsafendas's aunt who brought him up in Egypt) and even slept there on several occasions. John Michaletos, Artemis's son and Tsafendas's cousin, who was always present and spent hours talking to Tsafendas, told the author:

"He [Tsafendas] was very self-assured about his ideas and you could not have a political debate with him, he would have cut you into pieces. He was very well read, especially in politics, while he had this ability I haven't seen in anyone to be able to convince you that he is right. He would bring argument after argument and example after example to convince you that he is right. Sometimes, I wondered whether all these [political and historical] examples and facts he was talking about were true. I did not know. I was not aware of any of these. And you couldn't check at the time, there was no internet, but it all sounded very, very convincing. I used to tell him, and my mother used to tell him too, that he should be a politician or a lawyer."⁴⁰⁴⁹

It is difficult to believe that Artemis and John Michaletos would have envisaged Tsafendas as a successful politician or lawyer if he talking in a disjointed manner. Artemis had known him since he was two and a half years old and watched him learn and grow through infancy. John Michaletos also smiled and shook his head once again in disbelief at Dr. Cooper's statement on which, again, he refused to comment because he found it absurd; he believes that what he already told the author about Tsafendas was enough to demonstrate how wrong Dr. Cooper's diagnosis was.⁴⁰⁵⁰

⁴⁰⁴⁷ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁴⁰⁴⁸ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴⁰⁴⁹ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁰⁵⁰ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

Nikolas Kambouris, an *Eleni* seamen who spent several hours talking with Tsafendas about politics and history, dismissed Dr. Cooper's diagnosis: "I told you he had a very distinctive way of talking. It was slow, but very intelligent and sophisticated ... He was talking like a professor. It was more likely for us to not be able to follow him than him to follow us. We spent hours talking about politics and he was leading the conversation; none of us knew anything about apartheid at the time."⁴⁰⁵¹

For reasons of space, the study will list only a few of the witnesses who were interviewed by the author, those who knew him best or longest. All insist that Tsafendas did not talk in a disjointed manner:

- His half-sister Katerina Pnefma;⁴⁰⁵²
- Ira Kyriakakis, who also grew up with him and spent a lot of time together in 1964 and 1965;⁴⁰⁵³
- Andreas Babiolakis, who knew him since they were children, lived with him for two months in 1964 and associated with him for about a year then;⁴⁰⁵⁴
- Thirteen crewmen from the *Eleni* who saw him every day for forty-two days in 1966;⁴⁰⁵⁵
- Elias Constantaras, who lived under the same roof for two months in Cape Town in 1966 and knew him for more than a year;⁴⁰⁵⁶
- Irene Michaletos, who knew him for more than a year (1963-1965), when he often visited her house in Beira;⁴⁰⁵⁷
- Antony Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousin and the son of Artemis's (Tsafendas's aunt who brought him up in Egypt), met Tsafendas in 1951 and associated with him in 1963-1965,

⁴⁰⁵¹ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

⁴⁰⁵² Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁰⁵³ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴⁰⁵⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴⁰⁵⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 19 January 2016; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁴⁰⁵⁶ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴⁰⁵⁷ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

getting to know him very well;⁴⁰⁵⁸

- Alexandra Vaporidis, who knew him for about six months in Istanbul in 1961;⁴⁰⁵⁹
- Nick Papadakis, who knew Tsafendas for two-three months and lived with him for two months in Gondola and Beira in 1964;⁴⁰⁶⁰
- Panagiotis Peroglou, Stratis Vamvarapis, Antonis Nichas and Costas Chagios, who were Tsafendas's friends in Cape Town for more than a year.⁴⁰⁶¹

Also, in July 1966, just two months before the assassination, Tsafendas gave a 75-minute interview to a reporter named N.D. Hartford of the *Cape Argus*. They had already met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to the newspaper and enquired whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. Hartford's impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. According to Hartford, Tsafendas spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation.⁴⁰⁶²

Professors Alban Burke, Phillip Resnick, Robert L. Sadoff and Tuviah Zabow believe that it is extremely unlikely, and very close to impossible, that none of the people who knew Tsafendas, some extremely well, ever noticed that he spoke in a disjointed manner.⁴⁰⁶³ Reyner van Zyl, who examined Tsafendas for the defence, told the author that it was "highly improbable"⁴⁰⁶⁴

As for the Attorney-General, it appears that either he did not have Tsafendas's September 11 statement in his possession or he did not think it was important to question Dr. Cooper about what Tsafendas told the police: that he knew he was not going to get away but went ahead and killed Dr. Verwoerd anyway because he was "disgusted" with his race policies and hoped that a change of policy would take place.⁴⁰⁶⁵

⁴⁰⁵⁸ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May April 2016.

⁴⁰⁵⁹ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁴⁰⁶⁰ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴⁰⁶¹ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015; Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016; Antonis Nichas in a personal interview, 31 March 2016; Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016; Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

⁴⁰⁶² Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁰⁶³ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Robert L. Sadoff in a personal interview with the author, 12 August 2015; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 10 October 2016.

⁴⁰⁶⁴ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 17 April 2016.

⁴⁰⁶⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

COMMENT REGARDING DR. COOPER'S EXPERIENCE WITH MURDERERS

Finally Judge Beyers is unaware of the fact that Dr. Cooper has experienced with murderers from the 1951 case, *Rex v. Kennedy*. Therefore and more importantly, he is unaware of the fact that the Court in this case had dismissed his psychiatric evaluation of the defendant as based on improbable evidence.⁴⁰⁶⁶

THE TAPEWORM

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is there any other feature that emerged from your examination of the accused?

DR. COOPER: Yes. This feature that I am coming to is perhaps the most striking feature, or let us call it dramatic feature, of his mental state. This man tells a story that in 1935 or 1936 - I am not quite clear whether it was 1935 or 1936 - he became afflicted with a tapeworm. He describes how initially he tried to rid himself of the tapeworm, how he went to a chemist to get medicines, how he consulted a doctor. He describes, rather luridly, how he sat over a pail of water and how part of the tapeworm emerged but snapped in his hand and part of the tapeworm remained inside him. And he then goes on to explain that he had in fact consulted many doctors about this tapeworm; he has in fact been to hospitals which specialise in tropical medicine and this type of disorder; he has had X-rays; he has had numerous investigations; he has been told that he no longer has a tapeworm inside of him, but he is convinced, he has a fixed belief, that he has a tapeworm inside of him, in spite of all these negative medical investigations.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How does he believe it affects his life?

DR. COOPER: There are many aspects to this tapeworm, and it is important, and I ask the Court to bear with me if I can explain what this man says about his tapeworm. First of all, his description of the tapeworm I feel is significant. I in my mind believe, although I cannot prove it, that in 1935 or 1936 he probably did in fact have a tapeworm. But his description of the tapeworm that he now believes he has and the qualities that he attributes to it are highly significant. Firstly, he describes this tapeworm as being, sometimes he says 1½ ins. in breadth, sometimes he says 2 ins. in breadth. He describes it as having serrated edges like a serrated

⁴⁰⁶⁶ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters. P: 17. Pretoria: Government Printer. 1967.

saw. This is a tapeworm much larger than life. It is a grossly exaggerated description of a tapeworm. He insists that he has the tapeworm in spite of all medical evidence against the fact that he has it. He says that he can feel the tapeworm crawling around in him and that if he passes delicious foods the tapeworms smells the foods and he can feel the tapeworm wriggling up towards his neck. I must explain to the Court that an individual suffering from a tapeworm cannot feel the tapeworm wriggling around him in that manner. Then he attributes a great deal to this tapeworm. He says repeatedly

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What does he call it?

DR. COOPER: He has referred to this tapeworm at different interviews variously as a devil, as a dragon, as a snake. Demon was another one. He feels that this tapeworm has changed his entire life. He believes that it is in fact because of the tapeworm that he has done many things. He believes that the tapeworm influences his thought He insists that on many occasions he has said things which he would not otherwise have said if it had not been for the tapeworm. He insists that the tapeworm influences his behaviour. He said at one stage: "If I did not have the tapeworm I would not have killed Dr. Verwoerd, I would not have wandered round the world, I would not have become involved in a fight with Nicholas Vergos and I would not have been taken in by certain thoughts." He elaborates further on this tapeworm, particularly during my last interview with him, where he says this time that he is not absolutely convinced that it is a tapeworm, it may be some form of human snake, but whatever this demon, this devil, is inside of him. He believes that it may be possible that there may be an element of witchcraft in this whole affair. He explains that as a child - at that time he was living in the Transvaal - his stepmother indoctrinated him against the natives, and he believes that it is possible that the natives have in fact something to do with this tapeworm. Now, apart from what he says about the tapeworm, when one interviews this man one can find oneself talking about almost anything, from employment, travels, friends, the murder, the trial - virtually anything like - and it does not take very long before you are back to the tapeworm. He incorporates the tapeworm in all his thoughts, and it is as if this tapeworm is to a very large extent governing this man's thoughts, governing his feelings, governing his reaction to his environment, governing his behaviour.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: His wandering around the world, to what does he attribute that?

DR. COOPER: His wandering around the world he attributes to his tapeworm. He is vague about it, he can't elaborate on it, but he insists that it is because of the tapeworm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: His inability to hold down a job for any length of time, to what does he attribute that?

DR. COOPER: That is attributed to the tapeworm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: This belief in the existence of a tapeworm in him, which can be medically proved not to be there, what is that?

DR. COOPER: I believe that this is a delusion.

DR. COOPER: "... This man has built around his tapeworm inside of him a delusion system whereby he believes emphatically that this worm is instrumental in controlling his thoughts, in controlling his actions, in ruining his life, and even in killing Dr. Verwoerd... I asked the accused the question: 'If you had been cured of your tapeworm, would you still have killed Dr. Verwoerd?' His reply, his repeated reply, was emphatically 'No, I would not have killed Dr. Verwoerd.' I on more than one occasion asked the accused to explain to me why he killed Dr. Verwoerd, and at this point, relevant to the topic we are now dealing with, I would just like to say that he was extremely vague in his attempts to explain why he killed Dr. Verwoerd. He told me that he had a great deal of difficulty in understanding and explaining why he did, but one thing was quite definite, he said the tapeworm was right in the middle of it. I am quoting his words. I asked him whether the tapeworm actually told him to kill Dr. Verwoerd. He said: 'No, that is not so.' The reason why I asked him this question, quite incidentally, was from the point of deciding whether this man was simulating or not. I virtually invited him to simulate mental disorder, and he did not take up the bait...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you consider - I am sure you did - the possibility that the accused invented this story of the tapeworm?

DR. COOPER: Most definitely I did.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you do to test whether or not he had invented this tapeworm story?

DR. COOPER: Well, this matter tied up with one's general approach in trying to establish whether this man was inventing or simulating as a whole. I was most careful to try and assess whether his story was consistent, whether there were not perhaps any irregularities, any things that didn't fit in with the picture as a whole. I felt very strongly that here was a man who, after all, knew a fair amount about mental disorder, because he had told me that he had

been in several mental hospitals. Patients in mental hospitals inevitably know, particularly the more intelligent ones, that hearing voices is a common symptom in mental disorder and a common symptom of schizophrenia, so I felt, if ever a man was going to simulate, here was his easy, ready opportunity. If this man had told me that he heard voices, and in fact, if he had told me that the tapeworm spoke to him and told him what to do and what not to do, this would have been difficult, let us say, to disprove; this would have been consistent with schizophrenia. I hammered on this particular angle, and at no time did this patient suggest that he heard voices and at no time did he suggest that the tapeworm spoke to him or actually told him what to do...

... Simulating in cases of serious crime, of course, is quite common, and, I might say, usually readily detected, especially if one spends approximately six hours with the individual, as I did. It is extremely difficult to imitate mental disorder and particularly to imitate the group of symptoms, the picture as a whole, in schizophrenia. Patients often try to simulate mental disorder by telling you that they hear voices, they see visions, they can't remember, they are just confused, they say they are just unable to tell you anything. This patient did none of these things.

...He did not blame Dr. Verwoerd for the existence of it directly, but he implies that if it had not been for the tapeworm he would not have killed Dr. Verwoerd, so presumably he interrelates Dr. Verwoerd and the tapeworm in some way...

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: ... no matter what you talked about - you talked about various things; I think you mentioned various things - no matter what you talked about, you finished with the tapeworm?

DR. COOPER: Yes, my Lord, I am not suggesting ...

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: So that it is constantly there, no matter what you talked about?

DR. COOPER: Constant would mean that he talked about the tapeworm and nothing else. I am not suggesting that. He did talk of other things. But I am saying that the tapeworm played a prominent part in his overall conversation.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do I remember correctly that whatever you talked about you finished on the tapeworm?

DR. COOPER: Frequently that was so.

UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

DR. COOPER: He is relating this tapeworm in this instance to something that happened in his early life.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: when his mother put him against the blacks, and the blacks in revenge, by witchcraft, put a tapeworm in him?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Isn't that what I understood you to say? Is that right?

DR. COOPER: Yes, that is right.

DR. COOPER: ... After having examined him for several hours (that is six hours including the joint interview), and, after I knew that fellow psychiatrists had also examined him for several hours (maximum five hours each one of them including the joint interview), during the course of a joint interview with him I noticed him, just in passing, saying "I must thank you very much for all the assistance you are giving me." He rambled on a little bit, and then I took this up and I said to him "In what way do you think we are trying to assist you? In what way are we assisting you?" and he said "Well, the tapeworm is giving me a lot of pain, and you are listening to my difficulties about the tapeworm." And it was clear to me at that time that this man had not grasped the purpose of our examination..."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: There is the bizarre aspect of the tapeworm. Does that necessarily manifest itself in his dealings with people from day to day?

DR. COOPER: Not necessarily, no. I would say that he is quite likely to refer to his tapeworm in his everyday life but not every time he is confronted by anybody, not constantly in conversation.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE TAPEWORM**THE EXISTANCE OF THE TAPEWORM**

According to Dr. Cooper, the tapeworm was central to Tsafendas's existence as it controlled his life and his thoughts. It appeared responsible for everything that was happening with him. However, Tsafendas's alleged belief that he had a tapeworm is as much as a myth as Mamoru Samuragochi's deafness.⁴⁰⁶⁷

The police and the Commission questioned about two hundred people about Tsafendas and not a single one was aware of the tapeworm. Of the sixty-nine interviewed by the author, not one (apart from the four members of his defence team, Bloomberg, Burger, Dr. Sakinofsky and van Zyl), heard Tsafendas mention a tapeworm. Tsafendas did speak of the tapeworm to Fathers Minas Constandinou, Spiros Randos and Ioannis Tsafaridis, but made clear that it was simply a ploy to stop the torture and avoid an undignified death while in custody. He told the priests the whole truth about the tapeworm and its origins in America with Tom Tuff. Fathers Minas and Ioannis would later confirm that Tsafendas was telling the truth about the tapeworm and Tom Tuff when they met Patrick O'Ryan, the only man to whom Tsafendas had confided the whole truth about the tapeworm and how he had used it before the assassination.⁴⁰⁶⁸ The meeting between the two priests and O'Ryan and how it came about is discussed later in this chapter in O'Ryan's testimony.

Dr. Cooper understood Tsafendas to say that the tapeworm was responsible for his killing Dr. Verwoerd, although it did not actually tell him to do so. However, if the tapeworm was primarily responsible, it is strange that Tsafendas failed to say so in his two statements to the police. Instead, he declared openly that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was "disgusted with his policies" and hoped that a "change of policy would take place" after the killing. He never mentioned a tapeworm at all.⁴⁰⁶⁹

According to Dr. Cooper, Tsafendas said he had the tapeworm since 1935 or 1936. At that time and until 1941, excepting for some short absences, Tsafendas lived with his father and step-mother and his step-siblings. The Commission of Enquiry and the police questioned

⁴⁰⁶⁷ Mamoru Samuragochi is a Japanese composer who claimed for many years that, like the German master, Beethoven, he was totally deaf. This extraordinary claim resulted in his being nicknamed "The Beethoven of the Dital Age." Later, however, it was discovered that Samuragochi was a liar and could hear perfectly well.

⁴⁰⁶⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁰⁶⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

all family members, including his step-mother Marika, two of his three half-sisters, his half-brother, his two brothers-in-law and his sister-in-law. They all told the Commission that Tsafendas “never mentioned a tapeworm” and that he “was definitely not insane.”⁴⁰⁷⁰ Charles Nissiotis, Tsafendas’s brother-in-law, also testified that “As far as I could established he never mentioned the tapeworm story to any of the family.”⁴⁰⁷¹

Two more defence witnesses, Dr. Muller, a specialist physician, and Mr. van Zyl, a clinical psychologist, would testify that they were told by Tsafendas that he had the tapeworm since 1935. This is in line with Dr. Cooper saying Tsafendas told him he had the tapeworm since 1935 or 1936. However, the doctors at Ochsensall Hospital in Hamburg said he gave the date 1937. If the tapeworm was so important in his life, one would expect him to know exactly when it first arrived. More importantly, defence witness Louisa O’Ryan would testify that Tsafendas told her he had the tapeworm since he was a “little boy.”⁴⁰⁷² In 1935/1936, Tsafendas was seventeen and eighteen and not a “little boy.” The difference in dates clearly indicated that Tsafendas was making up the story as he went along but the errors were not picked up by anyone during the summary trial.

More importantly, Louisa O’Ryan would testify that Tsafendas’s step-mother, Marika, was aware of the tapeworm, indeed partly responsible for its existence, having removed and destroyed only a portion of it while the remainder stayed inside him.⁴⁰⁷³ However, Marika denied in her testimony to the Commission that such an incident ever took place and even stated that Tsafendas had never mentioned a tapeworm. She, as well as Tsafendas’s entire family, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas never said anything about a tapeworm and that “he was definitely not insane.”⁴⁰⁷⁴ All were convinced that he had made it up to escape the death penalty.⁴⁰⁷⁵

Between 1935/1936 and 1939, Tsafendas was very close to George Grispos, Helen

⁴⁰⁷⁰ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴⁰⁷¹ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁰⁷² Louisa O’ Ryan’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁰⁷³ Louisa O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁰⁷⁴ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴⁰⁷⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

Kavadias-Grispos, Andreas Babiolakis and Ira Kyriakakis, none of whom ever heard him speak of the tapeworm and none of them ever doubted his sanity. They were all certain that he pretended to be mad in order to not be hanged.⁴⁰⁷⁶ Tsafendas was always very close to his first cousin, Mary Eendracht, who was also at the time in Lourenço Marques, and he said nothing to her. She never doubted his sanity and firmly believed that he invented the tapeworm to escape the gallows.⁴⁰⁷⁷ If this tapeworm was so important in Tsafendas's life, and since he spoke so freely about it after the assassination, would he not have mentioned something to someone throughout his life?

In addition, while in South Africa in the three years before his arrest, Tsafendas was medically examined at least ten times by nine doctors, none of whom discovered anything mentally wrong with him. Needless to say, Tsafendas did not mention the tapeworm to any of them, since he wished to be passed physically and mentally sound.

- On November 11, 1963, Tsafendas was examined by Dr. C. Been for a permanent residence application for South Africa and was found “not to be mentally or physically defective in any way,” and “generally in a good state of health.”⁴⁰⁷⁸ Dr. Been would later examine Tsafendas again “for burns on his body whilst employed at Pooles.” Nothing about his mental state was noted.⁴⁰⁷⁹
- On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined, also for purposes of residence, by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who also wrote “a favourable report.” Subsequently, a certificate for permanent residence was issued to him.⁴⁰⁸⁰
- On March 15, 1965, Tsafendas was examined by a South African Railways' medical officer whose name is indecipherable in his report. He was found to be perfectly healthy, without any issues and therefore capable of working at the company.⁴⁰⁸¹

⁴⁰⁷⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴⁰⁷⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁰⁷⁸ Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁴⁰⁷⁹ Dr. Been statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁰⁸⁰ Memorandum re application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁴⁰⁸¹ South African Railways Confidential Medical Examination Certificate of Demitrio Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 7, File: S 83708, Tsafendas: D. NASA.

- On September 25, 1965, he was examined by Dr. G.C. Baker and nothing was reported about his mental state.⁴⁰⁸²
- On November 19, 1965, Tsafendas was medically examined to insure that he was able to work for City Tramways in Cape Town. He was found fit to work and duly hired.⁴⁰⁸³
- On January 13, 1966, Tsafendas applied for work at the Marine Diamond Corporation and underwent a medical check-up that same day. The doctor who examined him⁴⁰⁸⁴ found Tsafendas to be perfectly healthy and capable of working for the company.⁴⁰⁸⁵
- On April 18, 19 and May 3, 1966 Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Goldman, a consultant ear, nose and throat surgeon. He reported nothing about his mental condition.⁴⁰⁸⁶
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epitis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work.⁴⁰⁸⁷
- Finally, Dr. Darby, a casualty officer, examined Tsafendas on the evening of the assassination but did not report anything to be wrong about his mental state.⁴⁰⁸⁸

Nor once during all these examinations did Tsafendas mention the tapeworm and not even once did any physician spot anything strange about Tsafendas's behaviour. What is notable is that when he was in custody, Tsafendas seemed to tell everyone he came across about the tapeworm, especially doctors who examined him, but before that, he did not tell anyone. The police were in possession of the medical reports written by all nine doctors, but none was used in court since presumably they were not given to the Attorney-General. It should be mentioned here that Tsafendas was also examined, in July 1966, by Dr. Ralph Kossew, Cape Town's district surgeon, and was found to be a schizophrenic after an

⁴⁰⁸² Dr. G.C. Baker Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. No date. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4, NASA.

⁴⁰⁸³ Donal Neville Mackay statement to the COE, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁰⁸⁴ The doctor's name in the medical report is indecipherable.

⁴⁰⁸⁵ Demitrio Tsafendas's Marine Diamond Corporation Application for Employment, 13 January 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

⁴⁰⁸⁶ I. Eisenberg Statement. RE: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. N.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁰⁸⁷ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

⁴⁰⁸⁸ Dr. T.A. Darby. Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. G.S.H. NO. 65/014-181, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

examination that lasted “a little bit longer” than ten minutes. However, this was after Tsafendas had applied for a disability grant and had to be found to be unable to do any work in order to qualify for it. This case will be discussed extensively later in this chapter, as Dr. Kossew was one of the defence’s witnesses.

Dr. Cooper also testified that he “is quite likely to refer to his tapeworm in his everyday life but not every time he is confronted by anybody, not constantly in conversation.” However, Tsafendas never mentioned the tapeworm to anyone, not to his family or his friends and not even to one of the about three hundred and fifty people who were interviewed by the police and the Commission at the time and the author later (apart from the three priests who testified to the author who learned about it thirty years after the assassination).

The Attorney-General must have been aware at the time that out of the scores of witnesses questioned by the police, no one mentioned the tapeworm. Having also listened to Dr. Cooper’s statement above and his vivid description of Tsafendas talking about the tapeworm, should van den Bergh not have asked the doctor how nobody had ever heard of it until now? Tsafendas also did not mention the tapeworm to the police – another puzzle. We will examine some of these witnesses’ statements in the section about Tsafendas “being unable to function on a reasonable level.”

During the late-1970s, Father Minas Constandinou was assigned by the Greek Orthodox Church of South Africa to visit all the Greek Orthodox inmates in prisons in Gauteng. Thus, Father Minas had the chance to visit Tsafendas in Pretoria Central Prison. He was the first visitor Tsafendas had had since the one-off visit by David Bloomberg in 1976. Tsafendas immediately recognised the priest, whom he had not seen since 1965. Because of his profession, Father Minas was allowed to speak to Tsafendas in Greek and without any of the warders listening. Father Minas considered Tsafendas at that time to be a “highly intelligent person with very deep political convictions,” and was sure that he had invented the tapeworm in order not to be executed. But to his surprise, when he asked his old friend about the assassination, Tsafendas pointed to his stomach and said “It was the tapeworm, my Father, the tapeworm.” Father Minas understood that Tsafendas was not keen on discussing the issue and dropped the subject.⁴⁰⁸⁹

⁴⁰⁸⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

During his subsequent visits, Tsafendas spoke perfectly normally to him, as he always had done, and never mentioned the tapeworm again. Their conversations in the beginning were about each man's life up till then and memories of the old days in Mozambique. One day Tsafendas saw Father Minas talking to one of the warders. He then asked the priest whether the warders were asking him to reveal what they were discussing. Father Minas replied seriously, "yes." Tsafendas nodded and did not say a word. Father Minas then informed him that he had been telling the warders that he was mad and that he talked constantly about the tapeworm. Some days, he added, he would tell the warders that Tsafendas had said that the tapeworm "was hungry today", or that "it did not let him sleep last night." Tsafendas gave him a restrained smile and Father Minas smiled back, also in a restrained way.⁴⁰⁹⁰

Subsequently, Tsafendas started asking him about politics and current affairs as he had no access to newspapers, magazines or the radio. Thus, Father Minas would always read the day's newspaper before his visit to keep himself up to date. Father Minas kept on visiting Tsafendas for a couple of years. He only asked him once more about the assassination and Tsafendas again pointed to his stomach. It was second and last time Tsafendas spoke to him about the tapeworm.⁴⁰⁹¹

Sometime in 1994, and after apartheid had collapsed, when Tsafendas was in the Pretoria Prison Hospital, he was visited again by Father Minas, who had not seen him since the late 1980s. The priest asked him, "How is the tapeworm Dimitri?" Tsafendas replied (smiling like he knew nothing about it), "What tapeworm my Father?" Father Minas, pretending to be taken aback, asked, "the tapeworm Dimitri, the tapeworm?" and pointed to Tsafendas's stomach, just like Tsafendas had done a few years previously in Pretoria Central Prison. Tsafendas smiled and replied, "I don't believe I have a tapeworm, my Father." He then pointed to the warders and said "They think I have one." A little later he told Father Minas smiling, "If I believed I had a tapeworm, I would have gone to a gastroenterologist, not to a psychiatrist."⁴⁰⁹²

Tsafendas, a completely different person now from the one Father Minas had seen in the high-security prison – relaxed and witty just like the old days in Mozambique – explained

⁴⁰⁹⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁰⁹¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁰⁹² Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

how the tapeworm story had come into being, from Tom Tuff in the 1940s, and how he had taken possession of the story and used it up to his arrest in 1966.⁴⁰⁹³ Tsafendas also repeated this account of the tapeworm's genesis a little later to Father Spiros Randos and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis.⁴⁰⁹⁴ Apart from these three priests who were aware of Tsafendas's play-acting with the tapeworm, none of the other witnesses the author interviewed knew anything about such a ruse.

An important witness is Tsafendas's first cousin, Mary Eendracht, who was born in Egypt in 1923. She knew Tsafendas in Egypt in early childhood and they grew up together in Mozambique. As an adult, Eendracht maintained a friendly relationship with her cousin, who often confided to her. However, he never mentioned a tapeworm or anything else that might suggest he was schizophrenic. Eendracht dismissed out of hand the notion that Tsafendas ever spoke the way his speech was presented by his defence lawyers and Dr. Cooper. She believed he was perfectly sane and made up the tapeworm story so as not to be executed. "I knew him all my life; we grew up together and I think he confided to me everything that ever happened in his life. He trusted me. I was with him every day until 1939, when he went to South Africa. He was like a real brother to me. I don't believe for a moment he really believed he had a tapeworm and that he said these things to these people and meant them. No way!"⁴⁰⁹⁵

As soon as Eendracht heard about the tapeworm, she knew Tsafendas had made it up to save himself. "If there was such thing, I would have probably been the first person Dimitri would tell. He told me everything. If he wanted advice about how to approach or what to say to a girl, he was coming to me. I never believed, and no one will ever convince me, that Dimitri really believed it or really meant these things he told these people." She was referring to the statements he made to Dr. Cooper.⁴⁰⁹⁶

Another important witness is Fotini Gavasiadis, sister of Nick Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas's brother-in-law. Tsafendas lived in Fotini's and her husband's house for a few weeks, then for the next eight months in an apartment next to hers. Throughout this period in Pretoria in 1963-1964, they were very close; she saw and talked to him every day and they

⁴⁰⁹³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁰⁹⁴ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁰⁹⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁰⁹⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

worked together in her brother's café. When the transcription of Tsafendas's halting remarks to his defence team and the psychiatrists were read to her by the author, she laughed and said:

“There is absolutely no way Dimitri would have talked like that. This is a different man speaking. This is not only nonsense, which Dimitri would have never said, but he did not talk in that way. I don't believe he said these things. It's true, he ate a lot, but he never attributed [his appetite] to any tapeworm. He just liked food, he was a big man; it was natural to eat more than most people.”⁴⁰⁹⁷

Gavasiadis never heard Tsafendas mention a tapeworm and she ate with him at least once every day for nine months. She is certain that he was pretending to avoid being hanged, and said, “He was certainly capable of putting on an act like this. He was very, very clever.” She said, “Dimitri could buy you and sell you any time he wanted, and as many times as he wanted to. He was so clever.” Furthermore, according to Gavasiadis, Tsafendas had a very distinctive way of talking and this was not it. She does not believe that Tsafendas could have meant the things he told Dr. Cooper.⁴⁰⁹⁸

Important testimony came also from Father Nikola Banovic. Father Nikola had Tsafendas living with him for four-five months in Istanbul in 1961, saw him there almost every day for another two-three months and kept in touch with him by letter until 1966. He was one of those who became very close to Tsafendas. Like Gavasiadis, Father Nikola laughed when I read Tsafendas's words to him and refused to believe it was Tsafendas talking. Tsafendas “was not talking like that and would never have spoken like that; these are the words of a madman, this is not Dimitri.” He said that if he had been asked at the time to testify before a court, “I would have sworn that he was not insane; there is absolutely no way this man to have been insane. I lived with him in the same house for four months; there was never even the slightest indication that he might be even slightly unbalanced, never ... he was a good-hearted man with high principles.”⁴⁰⁹⁹

Father Nikola believes that the words attributed to Tsafendas “could not possibly have come out of his mouth. The only reason he might have talked in that way would have been to convince the police he was insane.” The priest said Tsafendas never said anything that might suggest he was insane. “I assure you he was not insane. I am positive he made it up in order

⁴⁰⁹⁷ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴⁰⁹⁸ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴⁰⁹⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

not to be hanged.” He too did not believe Tsafendas could have meant the things he told Dr. Cooper.⁴¹⁰⁰

Ira Kyriakakis grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques, having been born in 1927. She was always friendly with him and never heard him say anything about a tapeworm. She is certain he did not believe he had one and was making the story up. If he truly believed he had a tapeworm, he would have told her as they were extremely close. She also does not believe Tsafendas could have spoken in the way described by the defence or the psychiatrists. She told the author:

“Dimitri was a devil since he was child; he was extremely intelligent and capable. If he wanted something, he would find a way to do it. Nothing and no one could stop him. He was not mad, he was very clever. Dimitri was so clever and able that he could convince the devil to buy a Bible. You will never meet anyone who knew him well, apart from these psychiatrists and lawyers you told me about, that will tell you he was mad. He was not.”

Kyriakakis does not believe that Tsafendas could have really believed he had a tapeworm or to have meant the things he told Dr. Cooper.⁴¹⁰¹

Helen Grispos was born in 1930, when Tsafendas was twelve, but she lived in the house next to the Tsafendas family in Lourenço Marques. George Grispos, who became her husband, was three years older than Tsafendas, but they were boyhood best friends in Lourenço Marques. Helen Grispos's mother was the best friend of Tsafendas's step-mother, Marika in Lourenço Marques. Neither Helen nor her husband or mother ever heard Tsafendas talk about a tapeworm and Helen does not believe he would have spoken as claimed. When she and her husband read newspaper trial reports about the tapeworm, they had no doubt Tsafendas was making it up. Because a lot of people knew that Helen's husband was very close to Tsafendas, they often asked about him. According to Helen, George maintained consistently that Tsafendas never spoke about the tapeworm and that he was making it up in order not to be hanged. As for herself, she refused to believe that Tsafendas could have meant the things he told Dr. Cooper. “He was definitely not insane. He never said or did anything to make me think that he was insane. George always maintained that he had pretended to be mad in order that they would not kill him. He had no doubt about that.”⁴¹⁰²

⁴¹⁰⁰ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴¹⁰¹ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴¹⁰² Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

Father Minas Constandinou knew Tsafendas for about thirty-five years. He met him first in 1963 in Lourenço Marques, he visited him in Pretoria Central Prison in the 1980s, and he continued seeing him in the prison's hospital and the Sterkfontein Hospital in the 1990s until Tsafendas died. We have just seen what he said about the tapeworm story based on what he was told by Tsafendas. Father Minas was another who laughed when he read what Tsafendas said to Dr. Cooper. The then told the author:

“Ha, ha, he told me what he did, but not in such detail. Fascinating! If he had not told me that he had deliberately played the fool, I wouldn't have believed that these were his words. Impossible! Even at the beginning, when I asked him why he did it and he pointed with his finger to his stomach, he did not say any of these things. He didn't talk like this even then and he never told me anything like this. His speech was absolutely perfect. Even when he told me about the tapeworm, I was not sure that he was mad because everything else he was saying and the way he spoke did not suggest that he was mad ... later, when he told me that everything about the tapeworm was a lie, it all made sense.”

Father Minas does not believe that Tsafendas could have really meant the things he told Dr. Cooper.⁴¹⁰³

Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis met Tsafendas in 1994 in Pretoria Prison hospital and had three very lengthy conversations with him. Tsafendas confided to him the truth about the tapeworm. As for Tsafendas's form of speaking, the priest said he could easily tell that these words were not naturally spoken by Tsafendas. “He never spoke like this. He never said anything like this, not only about the tapeworm, but generally he never said anything that would make me think this man is not mentally well. He always talked logically. I am certain that he deliberately talked like this to his lawyers and to the doctors.” Bishop Ioannis does not believe Tsafendas could have said what he supposedly said to Dr. Cooper.⁴¹⁰⁴

Artemis Michaletos was Tsafendas's aunt, who helped raise him in Egypt, then lived close to him in Mozambique. The author did not interview her but spoke to her sons, Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins, and to John's wife, Irene Michaletos, all of whom knew Tsafendas. According to them, Artemis knew Dimitri better than anyone but his father. She was devastated when she heard Tsafendas had killed Dr. Verwoerd, fearing he would be tortured and hanged. When she heard about the tapeworm during the trial and that Tsafendas

⁴¹⁰³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴¹⁰⁴ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

was declared insane, she was very happy. "I knew it," she cried. "I knew he would find a way not to be hanged." When asked by some of her friends if he had ever mentioned the tapeworm to her, she had responded, "No! Are you crazy? He is not crazy, he is making it up. He is exceptionally clever." Artemis had known Tsafendas since he was one year old and insisted throughout her entire life that he was perfectly sane and that if he believed he really had a tapeworm, he would have told her. He had no secrets from her. Several relatives asked her if Tsafendas ever mentioned the tapeworm and she always gave the same answer, no.⁴¹⁰⁵

John Michaletos also told the author:

"What a hell of an invention, isn't it [the tapeworm]! How he thought that up I don't know. It was Antony [his brother] who first told me [that Tsafendas had spoken to his defence team about a tapeworm] and I did not believe him. I thought John was making it up, I knew Dimitris would have never said that. He insisted, but I still did not believe him. I honestly thought he was joking. I only believed it later that day when he showed me the newspapers. I burst into laughs when I read it. I remember me reading aloud from the newspaper what he had allegedly told the doctors and everyone laughing about it [his brother, his sister-in-law and his parents]. My mother got a real kick out of it; she really enjoyed hearing it. In our house, after we read the first day [of court proceedings] we couldn't wait for the next one to see what else will be said, and again, we will sit around the table all together and I will read out loud. I remember there was also an old woman who lived next door to our house, she lived by herself, and she knew Dimitri since he was a little child. She could not read and she would ask me to read every single thing that the newspaper was writing about Dimitri. She even understood that he was making it up, but found it very amusing to hear all about it. I remember that when I was reading something that sounded very strange to her, especially about the tapeworm, she would ask me 'Dimitri said that?' and then she would cross herself in disbelief. He [Tsafendas] made it up to save his skin, no doubt about that. I knew it, I had no doubt about it, I did not even think about it for a second, it was impossible to believe such a thing, impossible."⁴¹⁰⁶

Katerina Pnema was Tsafendas's younger half-sister. To this day, she is extremely angry with Tsafendas, believing that he ruined her life. She strongly condemned his murder of Dr. Verwoerd. In 1994, efforts were made under the first democratically elected

⁴¹⁰⁵ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

⁴¹⁰⁶ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

government in South Africa to grant Tsafendas amnesty. He was aged seventy-six at the time and unable to care for himself. Judge Jody Kollapen, and subsequently governmental officials, asked Tsafendas's family to take him into their home and care for him. They refused and Tsafendas spent the remaining years of his life in Sterkfontein Hospital.⁴¹⁰⁷

Despite her anger towards her half-brother, Pnema considers it "impossible" for Dimitri to have spoken as his defence team and Dr. Cooper described. She told the author:

"He would never have said anything like this ... what you read to me, it's nonsense; he never spoke like this and I don't believe he ever said those words ... I don't believe he even said it deliberately to play the fool. He was certainly capable of doing it [pretending to be mad], but to say all this nonsense? No, I don't believe it. Dimitri never spoke like this..."

Pnema does not believe that Tsafendas could have really meant the things he told Dr. Cooper or that he really believed he had a tapeworm.⁴¹⁰⁸

Important testimony comes from Andreas Babiolakis, Nick Papadakis and Ira Kyriakakis. According to these three witnesses, Tsafendas, while in Beira, associated with Dr. Vasilis Tzitzafakos, a Greek general practitioner. The witnesses all discussed Tsafendas's case with him at the time of the summary trial and the doctor had no doubt that Tsafendas was pretending to be mad in order to escape the gallows. According to these three witnesses, although Tsafendas was close to the doctor, he never told him anything about the tapeworm or Saint Peter and the doctor always maintained that Tsafendas was certainly not a schizophrenic.⁴¹⁰⁹ If Tsafendas really believed he had a tapeworm, he would almost certainly have discussed it with this physician, whom he knew well and trusted. Likewise with the Saint Peter story. In addition, Dr Tzitzafakos had spent several months with Tsafendas, while Dr. Cooper had spent just six hours with him.

Further testimony to Tsafendas's cleverness came from his half-sister, Eleni Vlachopoulos, who was closer to Tsafendas than any of his siblings. Eleni Vlachopoulos was born in 1936 and thus spent only her first five years in the Tsafendas family, but Tsafendas maintained contact with her thereafter through letters and postcards and he spent nine months

⁴¹⁰⁷ Judge Jody Kollapen in a personal interview, 16 April 2015.

⁴¹⁰⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴¹⁰⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

in 1964 as her neighbour in Pretoria.⁴¹¹⁰ Vlachopoulos testified to the police in 1966 that Tsafendas never spoke to her or to anyone in the family about a tapeworm. She said exactly the same thing in 2007 in Manolis Dimelas's documentary about Tsafendas, *Live and Let Live*, when she also claimed that her half-brother "was not crazy, he was very, very clever; cleverer than any of us and very able. If he wanted to do something, if he had a target, he would always achieve it. He never mentioned this tapeworm." Eleni Vlachopoulos always believed that her half-brother made up the tapeworm story to escape the gallows.⁴¹¹¹

The author has read Tsafendas's alleged words to forty-four people who had some kind of contact with him, and all declared he could not have spoken as claimed, or if he did, it was to mislead his interrogators. Further, they never heard him mention a tapeworm. Of this total, the author have not listed those who did not know Tsafendas well or were very young at the time – Tsafendas's nephews, for instance. The thirty-three who are named below all knew Tsafendas for more than a month and spent substantial time with him. None of them believes that Tsafendas could have meant what he told Dr. Cooper. Brief accounts of the interviews with them follow:

- Costas Chagios, a Cape Town restaurant owner, got to know Tsafendas on a friendly basis in 1965 when he walked into his restaurant. In the year up to his arrest in 1966, Tsafendas visited the restaurant more than fifty times. Chagios does not believe "even for a moment" that Tsafendas said what is claimed by Dr. Cooper. "If he did, he was lying to save himself ... He was very intelligent and this was not the way he talked, he talked very nicely; excellent use of words."⁴¹¹²
- Irene Michaletos was very close to Tsafendas between 1964 and 1965. She never heard him saying anything about a tapeworm or anything else that might seem strange. She does not believe Tsafendas meant what he told Dr. Cooper. Tsafendas, she said, was perfectly sane and a "very, very clever man."⁴¹¹³
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins and sons of Artemis Michaletos, Tsafendas's aunt and his father's sister who brought him up in Egypt. They first met

⁴¹¹⁰ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴¹¹¹ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007. This part is available in the rushes.

⁴¹¹² Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015.

⁴¹¹³ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

Tsafendas in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique.⁴¹¹⁴

- Alexander Moumbaris came to know Tsafendas in late 1972 in Pretoria Maximum Security Prison while awaiting trial on political charges. He was found guilty of “conspiring with the ANC to instigate violent revolution in South Africa, aiding terrorists, distributing ANC pamphlets in Durban in 1968, and reconnoitring the Transkei to find places for seaborne landings.”⁴¹¹⁵ Moumbaris spoke to Tsafendas for at least one hour every day for about three months. Initially, Tsafendas was cautious and although very talkative, it was obvious to Moumbaris that he did not trust him. However, as time passed, Tsafendas began opening up. Moumbaris told the author that Tsafendas never mentioned a tapeworm to him or said anything to suggest he was insane; all the conversations they had were perfectly normal. One day, Tsafendas told him proudly in Greek about Verwoerd: “I got τον Νταή τους” (“their tough guy” or “their champion,” but in a pejorative sense). Moumbaris found Tsafendas to be “a very intelligent, witty, serious and knowledgeable person.” Tsafendas even asked him to teach him Algebra, but the lesson was short-lived as the warders forbade it. Moumbaris told the author: “I not only regard Dimitri Tsafendas as a sane man but also as the bravest and ill-treated man I have ever met.”⁴¹¹⁶
- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott’s boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest. He never heard Tsafendas say anything “ridiculous” such as his supposed gibberish to Dr. Cooper and has no doubt he was perfectly sane. “I remember how he talked and I cannot see these words coming from his mouth. He did not talk like that. He never said anything about the tapeworm.”⁴¹¹⁷
- Peter Protoulis was a supplier of foodstuffs to the tanker *Eleni* and met Tsafendas on board the ship. In the forty-two days that the vessel was docked in Cape Town, he never heard him say anything to suggest he was less than sane.⁴¹¹⁸

⁴¹¹⁴ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴¹¹⁵ South African History Online. Alexander Moumbaris, n.d.

⁴¹¹⁶ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

⁴¹¹⁷ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴¹¹⁸ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 28 May 2016.

- Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for about six-seven months in Istanbul. She doesn't remember everything they discussed, but she is certain he was a "completely normal man ... he never mentioned this tapeworm or anything else that sounded insane. He was always well-dressed and very courteous." Her husband, Father Agathagos Vaporidis, was friendly with Tsafendas during his stay in Istanbul and Alexandra says he would have told her if he had noticed anything wrong with him.⁴¹¹⁹
- Andreas Babiolakis knew Tsafendas since they were children in Lourenço Marques. Although they embraced opposing political ideologies, Babiolakis is certain that Tsafendas invented the tapeworm. He does not recognise the words quoted by Dr. Cooper and by the other psychiatrists who examined him and is convinced he made them up, too. Babiolakis heard in Beira in 1964/1965 that Tsafendas had claimed to be Saint Peter while he was in police custody. When he later asked Tsafendas about it, Tsafendas just said that he had a nervous breakdown, but he was now ok. Babiolakis believed then that Tsafendas made up the Saint Peter act and later did the same for the tapeworm. "I never heard Dimitri talking like this, this is someone else talking. He couldn't have said these things unless he did it deliberately, which is what I think he did."⁴¹²⁰
- Nick Papadakis, who knew Tsafendas for two-three months and lived with him for two months in Gondola and Beira in 1964. He too had heard that Tsafendas claimed to be Saint Peter while he was in Portuguese custody. He and several other Greeks discussed the issue and concluded that Tsafendas had made it up since they were with him every single day up to his arrest and never heard him say anything strange. Papadakis does not recognise Tsafendas's words when examined by Dr. Cooper and the rest of his defence team and he is positive he was acting.⁴¹²¹
- Panagiotis Peroglou was another who met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965 and kept up with him until his arrest. They were often eating together at Mary Scott's boarding house. He never heard Tsafendas say anything crazy and has no doubt that he was quite sane.⁴¹²²
- Pamela Abrahams met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965 also at Mary Scott's boarding house which she visited with her husband Panagiotis Peroglou. He made a very good

⁴¹¹⁹ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁴¹²⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴¹²¹ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴¹²² Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

impression on her due to his politeness and good manners and she never heard him say anything to indicate he might be insane.⁴¹²³

- Stratis Vamvarapis knew Tsafendas in 1965 as a resident of Mary Scott's boarding house. He never heard Tsafendas saying anything like the remarks attributed to him by Dr. Cooper and his defence team or anything else to suggest he was insane.⁴¹²⁴
- Costas Poriassis met Tsafendas in Beira in 1965. He is certain that Tsafendas was not insane and never heard him say anything absurd.⁴¹²⁵
- Miltiades Kaldis met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965 and kept in touch until his arrest. He never heard Tsafendas say anything close to what he told his defence.⁴¹²⁶
- Antonis Nichas, a supplier to the *Eleni*, met Tsafendas in 1966. He never heard him say anything to suggest he was insane or anything similar to what he told the police.⁴¹²⁷
- George Liberopoulos met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and associated for a few weeks with him. He described him in his statement to the police as "a normal person with a very high-intelligence." He does not believe that Tsafendas was insane and always maintained that he must have been making g up the tapeworm story.⁴¹²⁸
- Nick Augustides is the son of the owner of Mike's Outfitters in Cape Town for whom Tsafendas worked on commission for about two months in 1966. He knew Tsafendas for three-four months and never heard him say anything to suggest he was insane. He told the author that Tsafendas "definitely did not look or sound insane."⁴¹²⁹
- Marina Tsihlakis. She met Tsafendas in Beira in 1964. Her father was good friend of Tsafendas. She never heard him speak in the way his defence statement conveyed.⁴¹³⁰
- Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis met Tsafendas in Germany at different times in the 1950s and never heard him say anything that would indicate that he might not be sane. He also visited him in the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital. Although Tsafendas was admitted

⁴¹²³ Pamela Abrahams in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁴¹²⁴ Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

⁴¹²⁵ Costas Poriassis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁴¹²⁶ Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016.

⁴¹²⁷ Antonis Nichas in a personal interview, 31 March 2016.

⁴¹²⁸ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴¹²⁹ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

⁴¹³⁰ Marina Tsihlakis in a personal interview, 3 April 2015.

supposedly because of the tapeworm, he did not tell Father Efthimios anything about it. The priest does not remember what Tsafendas told him was the reason for his hospitalization, but he is certain that he did not mention the tapeworm.⁴¹³¹

- Dimitris Skoularikis met Tsafendas in prison in the early 1990s. He once asked Tsafendas, “How is the tapeworm, Dimitri?” Tsafendas replied “I don’t have one; they [the prison guards] think I have one.”⁴¹³²

All the above witnesses are willing to swear under oath in any court that Tsafendas did not talk in the manner attributed to him and that he would never have said any of the things attributed to him unless he was pretending to be mad. The following are testimonies from the crew of the *Eleni*, the tanker that was docked in Cape Town from July 26, 1966 to September 3. Their evidence is important since these men saw Tsafendas every day for forty-two days until three days before the assassination:

- Cleanthes Alachiotis developed a warm relationship with Tsafendas. Tsafendas told him about “pretending to be mad” in order not to serve in the Portuguese army and Alachiotis believes that his reported speech in custody was another such act since he considered it “absolutely impossible” that Tsafendas spoke as claimed. “He was either joking or he had a specific reason to do it. Obviously, it was the second, since he wanted to save his head. If the police had asked me to testify in court, I would have sworn that he was making it up. He was nothing like this, but I am not surprised he did it since he had done it before.”⁴¹³³
- Nikolas Billis is not surprised by Tsafendas’s words to his defence as he has no doubt that he made up the tapeworm story so as not to be hanged. Tsafendas had told him how he pretended to be mad to avoid service in the Portuguese Army. “No doubt he did it again. If you met him, you could tell that this man’s brain was a level above the rest. He could easily manipulate you and convince you of anything. I am not at all surprised that he told this to the police. He definitely made it up. He did not talk like this. He talked very well, like a teacher.”⁴¹³⁴
- Nikolas Kambouris became close with Tsafendas. He told the author:

⁴¹³¹ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

⁴¹³² Dimitris Skoularikis in a personal interview, 26 April 2015.

⁴¹³³ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010

⁴¹³⁴ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

“I would bet my house that Dimitri did not say these things ... well, if he did, he must have had a reason and he did not really mean them. I am positive about it. These are the words of a madman and Dimitri was an intelligent and cultured man ... he must have been pretending with them as he did with the Portuguese. He was saner than a lot of people I knew ... I don't believe that he told these people these things. He was a serious man; he was not talking like this. I was with him for forty-two days and he never said anything stupid like these things.”

Kambouris states that Tsafendas “did not talk rubbish; he was an idealist; a man with high principles.”⁴¹³⁵

- Michalis Vasilakis became closer to Tsafendas than any of the crew. This was his reaction when I read to him what Tsafendas told his defence:

“A tapeworm? Did Dimitri say that? Are you sure? He couldn't have said that. A tapeworm? It's unbelievable. Dimitri was a very clever man; he was not talking nonsense. He knew as much as all of us knew and he was talking better than a professor. I was the one who first called him ‘Professor.’ I have no doubt that if he really said these things to the police he must have done it to save himself. He couldn't possibly have believed them and I am telling you he did not believe them. He would have told me if there was such thing. He told me a lot about his life and I can tell you this man was one of the smartest people I have ever met. You could see some rare dignity and pride in him. You could see from the way he was talking about politics and the world how politically passionate he was. You don't meet men like that every day. I don't think that anyone who met him would tell you that he was crazy. This is complete nonsense.”⁴¹³⁶

- Georgios Kantas, like Billis and Alachiotis, he is not surprised that Tsafendas spoke about a tapeworm, although he never mentioned any such thing to him. However, Tsafendas told him about his act with the Portuguese in order to not serve in the Portuguese army and Kantas firmly believes that this was just another mad act.

“He never spoke in this way and I can't imagine him talking like this, though I believe he did it as he was capable of doing it. You could tell that this man was very able. He did not talk this way. I can't explain it, but I remember that he had a very specific way of talking,

⁴¹³⁵ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

⁴¹³⁶ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

using not very common, but absolutely correct words. He was talking like a professor. That is what we used to say and what he called him.”⁴¹³⁷

- Grigoris Pouftis agrees with his crewmates that Tsafendas was putting on another “mad” act, as he did with the Portuguese.

“He was certainly not crazy. He was a little peculiar because of the way he was talking. I mean he was sometimes over polite and it seemed to me that his personality did not fit with his job. We met hawkers all around the world and none was ever like him ... I would describe him as an aristocratic hawker, if such a thing exists! I couldn't believe that a man with his manners and knowledge could be doing this job. That was the only peculiar thing about him.”⁴¹³⁸

- Manolis Mastromanolis, the *Eleni* boatswain who was involved in procuring a firearm for Tsafendas, spent a lot of time with Tsafendas and never heard him speak in the way he did to Dr. Cooper and to his defence team. Mastromanolis does not believe that Tsafendas could have said such things. “He did not talk like that; definitely not,” he states.⁴¹³⁹
- Emanuel Tsabouniaris also spent a lot of time with Tsafendas. He considered Tsafendas to be “a gentleman and a very sophisticated man.” Like Pouftis, he found it strange that Tsafendas, “such an educated and well-mannered man, could do such job (hawker).” However, this was the only thing he found strange about him. He believes Tsafendas could not possibly talk as he did and mean what he said unless he did it deliberately to get something out of it.⁴¹⁴⁰
- Ioannis Speis stated that Tsafendas never said anything to him that bears the slightest resemblance to what he told his defence.⁴¹⁴¹
- Vasilios Perselis spent a lot of time with Tsafendas and stated that he never heard him say anything like his statement and has no doubt that he did so to escape hanging. “He spoke very nicely; not nonsense like that. He knew how to speak and everything he said made sense. He was not crazy.”⁴¹⁴²

⁴¹³⁷ Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012.

⁴¹³⁸ Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009.

⁴¹³⁹ Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

⁴¹⁴⁰ Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 19 January 2016.

⁴¹⁴¹ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015.

⁴¹⁴² Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015.

- Dionisis Lallis did not associate with Tsafendas as much as some of the other crew members, but he spoke to him a few times and never got the slightest impression of insanity.⁴¹⁴³
- Panteleimon Aspiotis, *Eleni* seaman. A good friend of Tsafendas, also never thought that he could be insane and could not imagine him saying the nonsense he told Dr. Cooper and his defence.⁴¹⁴⁴

The author also included here three witnesses who did not meet Tsafendas personally but were close to people who did. The author considers their statements, though second hand, to be entirely reliable.

- Advocate George Bizos's mother-in-law was the best friend of Tsafendas's step-mother and knew Tsafendas very well from childhood. She told Bizos that he was perfectly sane.⁴¹⁴⁵
- Dr. Costas Gazidis's first cousin Rika Nikolatos was a social worker and visited Tsafendas in prison and then in Sterkfontein Hospital. In total, she spent some ten years meeting Tsafendas and they were extremely close. She told Dr. Gazidis, "He is completely sane, there is nothing wrong with him." Tsafendas never said anything to her to suggest he might be insane and she always maintained that he was "completely sane." Dr. Gazidis is willing to sign an affidavit and swear under oath that this is exactly what he was told by Nikolatos.⁴¹⁴⁶ Nikolatos's statement is also confirmed by Father Minas Constandinou and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis. She had discussed his case extensively with them both, and she and Father Minas had often visited Tsafendas together.⁴¹⁴⁷
- Janet Gazidis, Costas' wife is also willing to sign an affidavit and swear under oath that this is exactly what Nikolatos, too, was told.⁴¹⁴⁸

Finally, valuable testimony comes in the form of Tsafendas's medical report from Grafton State Hospital, which states that while in the United States in 1943 "he faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings (sinkings) of

⁴¹⁴³ Dionisios Lallis in a personal interview, 19 June 2015.

⁴¹⁴⁴ Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015.

⁴¹⁴⁵ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁴¹⁴⁶ Dr. Costa Gazidis in a personal interview, 10 April 2015.

⁴¹⁴⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴¹⁴⁸ Janet Gazidis in a personal interview, 10 April 2015.

ships.”⁴¹⁴⁹ Since he play-acted back in 1943 and then did the same several times with the Portuguese police, was it not an easy and natural tactic to use with the South African police in 1966?

Would it have been possible for Tsafendas to believe he had a tapeworm but that he hid it, never telling anyone about it? That, according to Professors Alban Burke, Kirk Heilbrun and Tuviah Zabow, would be almost impossible, or at least “exceedingly unlikely.”⁴¹⁵⁰ Professor Heilbrun told the author that it is “exceedingly unlikely that an individual would have a delusion about a controlling tapeworm for thirty years and nobody around him ever heard or noticed anything to that effect.”⁴¹⁵¹

Professor Alban Burke told the author:

“What you need to remember about schizophrenic people is that the world they live in is a real world for them; they have no realisation that the world they are living in is not a real world, so what would be your motive for hiding that away? I mean, if I see an elephant walking in the room, I would truly believe I see it ... why would I pretend that there is not an elephant in the room? I would say to you, ‘What is that elephant doing here?’ and I would be surprised if you don’t see it, because, remember, the image that I have in my brain is a real one. You would often see with schizophrenic patients that they would touch a lot, to make sure that what they’re seeing truly exists....

So you would see very clearly in their behaviour that there is something strange going on; they would talk to themselves, but not ... all people talk to themselves... but what you would see, if there is a voice in your head, I would be speaking, ‘Go away, stop talking, can you shut up?’ So you would see in the person’s behaviour that they are responding to conversations; you would pick that up. It is not the same as just, merely, talking to yourself whilst you were doing something, it’s totally different, and my question would be, Why would you hide it away? Especially in a case like Tsafendas, where he himself goes to hospitals.”⁴¹⁵²

It is a fact that Tsafendas spoke about the tapeworm before his arrest to some doctors

⁴¹⁴⁹ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴¹⁵⁰ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 10 October 2016.

⁴¹⁵¹ Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 16 January 2017.

⁴¹⁵² Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

in various hospitals, but not to friends and companions. Therefore, one can argue that Tsafendas only mentioned the tapeworm to doctors and not to the people around him, that's why nobody knew about it. However, in this case, why did he also mention it to his defence lawyers before he was examined by the psychiatrists they appointed? If he was happy to tell them, since they were not doctors, should he have not told other people too? The fact that Tsafendas mentioned the tapeworm to them suggests that he was happy to talk about it.

After the trial and while he was imprisoned, Tsafendas talked to the prison warders and to David Bloomberg, who visited him twice, about the tapeworm.⁴¹⁵³ This again suggests that he was willing to talk about it, so to say he only talked to doctors about it is inaccurate. It is noteworthy that he only spoke of it to doctors when he admitted himself to a hospital; he never mentioned the tapeworm to those doctors who examined him for his various job applications or his application for a permanent residency permit in South Africa.

As for how the tapeworm came to feature in the case, please consult the previous chapter.

THE TAPEWORM'S RESPONSIBILITY IN THE KILLING OF DR. VERWOERD

The other important issue with Dr. Cooper's testimony is that he claims the tapeworm was responsible for the killing of Dr. Verwoerd, although he admits Tsafendas told him that the tapeworm did not ask him to do it. Tsafendas told the police on September 11, "I did believe that with the disappearance of the South African Prime Minister a change of policy would take place. I did set myself the task of destroying the Prime Minister. It was my own idea to kill him."⁴¹⁵⁴

In his second statement on September 19, Tsafendas said, "I did not do it at the instigation of anyone. I did it on my own because I thought it was the right thing."⁴¹⁵⁵ On neither occasion does Tsafendas say anything about the tapeworm; indeed he states clearly that it was his own idea to kill Dr. Verwoerd because he believed a change of policy would take place. Again, we not in position to know whether the Attorney-General had access to these statements or if he ignored them, but certainly their existence could at least have

⁴¹⁵³ *The Cape Argus*, 2 October 1976: 1, 'Tsafendas- is no broken man-Bloomberg.'

⁴¹⁵⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴¹⁵⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

challenged Dr. Cooper's testimony about the tapeworm's role in the killing.

Tsafendas informed Dr. Cooper about all the hospitals he had been to, as he did with the police. Also while in custody he spoke freely about the tapeworm and his hospitalizations to two other doctors, Dr. Muller, a specialist physician, and Dr. Kossew, Cape Town's district surgeon, both experts for the defence. However, between 1964 and 1966, while in South Africa, Tsafendas was examined by six physicians and did not say anything to them about either subject. These six doctors were not psychiatrists but examined Tsafendas because of his application for permanent residency in South Africa and for several job applications. Wanting a positive response, Tsafendas told the doctors and wrote on his application forms that he was in perfect health. He was passed fit in each case. If something was wrong with him, probably one or more of the six doctors would have spotted it, the same way Dr. Kossew and Dr. Muller did, who were also not psychiatrists.

Sometime in 1994, when Tsafendas was in Pretoria Prison hospital and apartheid had collapsed, he confessed to Father Minas Constandinou and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis that the tapeworm was an invention. He explained how the story originated with the young seaman, Tom Tuff.⁴¹⁵⁶ He said he decided to use it when he was in custody after the assassination because he "couldn't take the torture anymore" and he also feared that he would be murdered in his cell by the police, who would then claim that he was insane and committed suicide.⁴¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Tsafendas asked Fathers Ioannis Tsafaridis and Minas Constandinou to tell the staff in Pretoria Prison hospital that he still believed he had a tapeworm and he was definitely insane, so they would "leave him alone." When the priests or Rika Nikolatos brought food for Tsafendas, they always brought extra rations at his request; he wanted to share the food with other patients who had no visitors. However, Nikolatos and the priests, at Tsafendas's request, they would tell the staff that he had asked for the extra to feed the tapeworm.⁴¹⁵⁸

For additional information regarding the tapeworm and how it was used in court, see Patrick O'Ryan's important testimony and its analysis later in this chapter.

ABOUT TSAFENDAS SIMULATING

⁴¹⁵⁶ For the incident see Tsafendas's biography, Chapter Two.

⁴¹⁵⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴¹⁵⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

Dr. Cooper seems not to know that that Tsafendas had simulated mental illness in the past and that the Grafton State Hospital report said clearly that Tsafendas had “faked mental illness” in 1943.⁴¹⁵⁹ He also seems to be unaware that he pretended to be mentally ill to avoid service in the Portuguese Army in 1950.⁴¹⁶⁰ Or that he had faked an attack of appendicitis in 1952 when he was not allowed to disembark from the ship that had taken him to Lourenço Marques from Portugal because of his “Communist tendencies.”⁴¹⁶¹ This last incident clearly demonstrates Tsafendas’s tendency to fake illness to get out of trouble. Aware that pretending to be mad would not get him off the ship in Lourenço Marques, he changed tack and staged the appendicitis act, confident that he would then be taken ashore. Of course, he escaped as soon as he entered the hospital where he was taken, proof that it was all an act. All of these deceptions were known to the South African police, but none was brought up during Dr. Cooper’s testimony or indeed throughout the summary trial.

It is possible, though unlikely, that the State was unaware of the simulations. After all, the Grafton State Hospital report was in the possession of the South African Police and the Commission of Enquiry, and it would seem natural for the State to be given this report, too. Certainly, the State was well aware of a time in the past when Tsafendas had “simulated abnormality,” as the Assistant of the Attorney-General put it in his cross-examination of Dr. MacGregor, another psychiatrist and defence witness, the last one to testify at the summary trial.

Although it is not clear from the cross-examination exactly which incident the Assistant was referring to, the fact is that the State was at the time in possession of such information and did not use it with Dr. Cooper. The Attorney-General’s Assistant asked Dr. MacGregor whether he was aware that Tsafendas’s had “simulated abnormality” before.⁴¹⁶² It

⁴¹⁵⁹ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴¹⁶⁰ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴¹⁶¹ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; Henk van Woerden in the *Mouthful of Glass* also describes the same scene (2000: 70), presumably because he was told about it by Tsafendas.

⁴¹⁶² Dr. James William MacGregor’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

was the normal question to ask in the circumstances. However, the State did not find it necessary to ask the same question of the first and most important defence witness. What happened during Dr. MacGregor's examination will be considered later in this chapter, although it should be stated here that the doctor expressed his surprise that Tsafendas had done something like this and stated that he was not aware of it. However, as we will see, nothing much came of this issue and it was easily and quickly brushed aside.

The following incident is a good example of Tsafendas's ability to adjust to a difficult situation. It happened when he was arrested with a suitcase full of "subversive" books and accused of pretending to be a missionary spreading religion while in reality he was preaching "under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence..."⁴¹⁶³ While in custody, Tsafendas was asked by the police if he had "dedicated himself to preach as a missionary and, under the guise of this same religion, advertised in favour of Mozambique's independence." Tsafendas replied that he was "a Christian who considers himself a representative of God on earth, a missionary that wishes he could preach the Christian religion but that he is not allowed to because, on this earth, there is no freedom of expression."⁴¹⁶⁴

Since he faced accusations of pretending to be a missionary and because he carried Bibles and holy books, Tsafendas came up with an idea that neatly fitted the situation. This time, during interrogation, he pretended to be Christ's apostle, Peter, and quoted the Christian scriptures at length. This was easy because he knew much of the Bible by heart and having copies with him made his act convincing. Later, Tsafendas told several witnesses exactly which passages he had parroted from the scriptures.⁴¹⁶⁵ It should be mentioned here that the Saint Peter act was probably not known to the South African police.

Dr. Cooper acknowledges that Tsafendas is well informed about mental disorders as he has spent a lot of time in hospitals. He says that it is common for patients to try to simulate mental disorder by pretending they hear voices, see visions etc. Tsafendas, according to Dr. Cooper, never did any of these things. Dr. Cooper tried a "trick" that would later be used also by Dr. MacGregor; he asked him if he heard "any voices, which is a common thing, for mad

⁴¹⁶³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴¹⁶⁴ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴¹⁶⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

people to hear.” Tsafendas did not fall into the trap, denying any such thing. Why did Tsafendas react in this way? Because about twenty years earlier, he had pretended to hear voices and he was then discovered to be simulating.⁴¹⁶⁶

Tsafendas told Father Minas that initially he was “pretending to be mad,” by pretending to hear “voices like Joan of Arc.”⁴¹⁶⁷ This matches the Grafton State Hospital report which says Tsafendas claimed he heard voices coming from the radiators. However, Tsafendas also told the priest that this pretence did not work and he was found out, so he then started using the tapeworm story. This also agrees with the Grafton report as it states that Tsafendas had “faked mental illness” before he was admitted.⁴¹⁶⁸ Tsafendas was very well aware that “voices” and “visions” were tactics employed by many people simulating schizophrenia, but the tapeworm, as he told witnesses, was a highly original story.⁴¹⁶⁹

The Commission of Enquiry, which had no psychiatrist, noted that Tsafendas is “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders — he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him... and (the Commission) therefore adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”⁴¹⁷⁰ Of course the Commission of Enquiry was in possession of most of the documents gathered by the police, plus others. Dr. Cooper was unaware of anything about Tsafendas except what he heard from him.

What is surprising is that the police and even the Commission were aware that Tsafendas was well read about psychiatry and mental illnesses. The police had found two medical books in his possession, one about insanity and psychiatry, the other concerning intestinal disorders.⁴¹⁷¹ The Commission of Enquiry noted that Tsafendas was “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders — he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him... and (the Commission) therefore adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear

⁴¹⁶⁶ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴¹⁶⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴¹⁶⁸ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴¹⁶⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴¹⁷⁰ Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴¹⁷¹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”⁴¹⁷²

Given that Tsafendas was experienced with psychiatrists, it was to be expected that he did not take Dr. Cooper's bait. It is also evident that Dr. Cooper was not aware of the contents of the Grafton State Hospital report, where it said that Tsafendas had “faked mental illness” and had claimed to hear voices from the radiators.⁴¹⁷³ Naturally, Tsafendas's experience with psychiatrists had increased since 1946 and he did not make the same mistake of claiming to hear voices. Dr. Cooper was not aware of this, unlike the Commission of Enquiry, the South African police and presumably the State. The State must have had this report in its possession as it was given to the South African authorities on September 16.⁴¹⁷⁴

Professors Alban Burke, Kirk Heilbrun and Tuviah Zabow believe the fact that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in the past was extremely important and should have been made known to those who examined him.⁴¹⁷⁵ However, even without it, Professor Heilbrun disagrees with the way Dr. Cooper attempted to find out whether Tsafendas was simulating or not. He told the author that “To draw accurate conclusions under these circumstances, you need three domains of information. The first involves interviewing and direct observations of the individual. The second involves testing, including measures of response style that are sensitive to exaggeration or fabrication. The third is historical information, including both relevant records (particularly mental health and criminal justice records) and collateral interviews. Your conclusions would be drawn based on patterns that you see recurring across these three domains.”⁴¹⁷⁶

TSAFENDAS'S CHILDHOOD AND TRAVELS

DR. COOPER: He explains that as a child - at that time he was living in the Transvaal - his stepmother indoctrinated him against the natives, and he believes that it is possible that the

⁴¹⁷² Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴¹⁷³ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴¹⁷⁴ Letter of the USA Embassy in Cape Town to the South African Security Branch, 3 October 1966. Correctional Service. Subject: Demitrio Tsafendas. Vol. 1, File: 80/0043 A123. NASA.

⁴¹⁷⁵ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 10 October 2016.

⁴¹⁷⁶ Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017.

natives have in fact something to do with this tapeworm.

JUDGE BEYERS: When his mother put him against the blacks, and the blacks in revenge, by witchcraft, put a tapeworm in him?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

DR. COOPER: There was a poor relationship between the accused and his stepmother.

DR. COOPER: He did mention that his stepmother, I think it was, induced a relative to commit sodomy on him when he was a small youngster, and he felt that perhaps this was designed to destroy his masculinity, and he also felt it had something to do with the question of making him unfit for any inheritance. If this be true, of course, it is delusional, but one wondered a little at least whether some relative hadn't in fact committed sodomy here. But the deduction that he drew from this incident would point to him being paranoid and deluded.

DR. COOPER:...and as a result of this disturbed relationship between the accused and his stepmother, he says he was sent to a school in the Transvaal, in Middelburg, Transvaal, where he remained until about the age of twelve, and then he returned to Lourenço Marques. I would like to pause there and say that I am mentioning this aspect of his background in that, if it be proved, if it be true, it would lead one to believe that a man with such a background would be rather more prone to develop mental illness later in life than would the individual with a normal family background. Then comes a story of aimless ramblings, wanderings, around the world, from one country to another, with an apparent inability to find any sort of niche for himself; an inability to adjust himself to any one fixed abode. The number of countries that he has been to is obscure, but he listed at least 25.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

CHILDHOOD

In reference to Tsafendas's relationship with his stepmother and his schooling in South Africa, Dr. Cooper uses the words, "if it be proved, if it be true." He could easily have

discovered if it was true by talking to the family or people who knew Tsafendas. Dr. Cooper also stated that Tsafendas did not have a “normal family background,” especially in relation to his stepmother, and this played a role in his developing a mental illness. This argument has no basis in truth.

Numerous witnesses declared that Tsafendas had a perfectly normal family background. His stepmother said she brought him up “as one of her own children,”⁴¹⁷⁷ and Costas Michaletos, an intimate friend of the family, said Tsafendas “grew up with his half-brothers and sisters and was always treated as part of the family.”⁴¹⁷⁸ Guglielmo Conte, a friend and business partner of Tsafendas’s father, who also knew Tsafendas from the day he was born, denied that Dimitri was estranged from his family and stated that except for his school years in Middleburg, he always stayed with his father and stepmother and their family.⁴¹⁷⁹

Tsafendas did not discover that Marika was his stepmother and not his birth mother until he was seventeen, but his relationship with her was the normal one of mother-son. Tsafendas always referred to Marika as his “mother” and not as his “step-mother.”⁴¹⁸⁰ If Marika was at odds with Tsafendas, she would hardly have travelled from Pretoria to Lourenço Marques to help him return to South Africa, then give him a rent-free house in Pretoria.⁴¹⁸¹

Katerina Pnema, Tsafendas’s half-sister, Mary Eendracht, his first cousin, Advocate George Bizos,⁴¹⁸² Ira Kyriakakis, Andreas Babiolakis, Helen Grispos, Irene, Antony and John Michaletos all stated to the author that Marika brought up Dimitri as her own child and that they had a very good relationship. The only arguments they had were about Tsafendas’s political activities and these started only when he was around eighteen, not in his

⁴¹⁷⁷ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴¹⁷⁸ Costas Michaletos statement to the police, 10 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴¹⁷⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 September 1966, Tsafendas timid and puny as a boy.’

⁴¹⁸⁰ For example: Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015, and several others.

⁴¹⁸¹ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴¹⁸² Advocate George Bizos did not meet Tsafendas but was told about his relationship with his step-mother by his mother in law who was Marika’s best friend in South Africa.

childhood.⁴¹⁸³

Tsafendas spoke highly of his step-mother to several of the witnesses the author interviewed, praising her for caring for him and treating him like her own child. He talked of how she took him to the cinema, helped him with his studies and taught him many things, especially in the fields of literature and poetry. All of these witnesses were surprised to hear that Tsafendas spoke badly of his step-mother to the psychiatrists, claiming that she indoctrinated him against Black people and induced a male relative to commit a sexual act against him. Why did Tsafendas say such things?

The author has not been able to establish this for a fact, as Tsafendas never discussed this issue with anyone. However, it is quite likely, since Tsafendas was knowledgeable about mental disorders and mental institutions, that he made use of her to convince the psychiatrists that he suffered a trauma when a child, knowing that in a lot of schizophrenic conditions, a childhood trauma frequently played a role. Tsafendas himself had told Father Minas Constandinou that two claims were necessary to make an “insane act” look real and convince someone you are mad:

- To have a family history of insanity and
- To have a childhood trauma.⁴¹⁸⁴

As for his schooling at Middleburg, two of his former classmates testified as follows: William Mare Volbrecht, by then a psychologist, said, “At that stage, Tsafendas was seen as white and there was never anything that pointed to someone regarding or treating him as a non-white or to him being discriminated against. I cannot remember whether he was ever guilty of misconduct; he was never a loner and mingled freely with us.”⁴¹⁸⁵ And Dr. Samuel Schmahmann, by then a physician, remembered Dimitri as “a popular boy and not the least introverted.” “I particularly remember him singing a Greek song at a school concert,” he said. “He was very funny and had us all in stitches.”⁴¹⁸⁶

Again here, Dr. Cooper attributes the tapeworm to his childhood and to what

⁴¹⁸³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John and Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴¹⁸⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴¹⁸⁵ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Verklaring deur Majoor Venter. NASA.

⁴¹⁸⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, September 8, 1966, ‘Boyhood days of Tsafendas.’

supposedly happened back then, even though Tsafendas was not a child at the time that Dr. Cooper talks about. If Tsafendas had to create a childhood trauma and problem, he was never going to put the blame to his father whom he worshiped, so presumably he chose the mother.

TRAVELS

Dr. Cooper characterised Tsafendas's travels as "aimless ramblings, wanderings around the world, from one country to another with an apparent inability to find any short of niche for himself; an inability to adjust himself to any one fixed abode." Calling Tsafendas's travels "aimless ramblings" is like calling Odysseus's journeys "pointless wanderings." Tsafendas never travelled aimlessly or for just the sake of it. Wherever he went was for a purpose. Remember he was banned from South Africa and Mozambique and was prosecuted in Portugal. Therefore, he travelled either to find employment (Sweden, Germany, England) or because he was deported there (Greece and Germany again), or because these countries were on the way to his destination (Syria, Lebanon, France, Spain, Denmark, Italy) or simply for a holiday (Bulgaria, Rhodesia, Greece again)

Dr. Cooper seems to be unaware that Tsafendas was forced to spend the years from 1951 to 1963 in exile since he was banned from Mozambique, the country of his birth, because of his pro-Communist and anti-colonialist activities. The same period he was also barred from South Africa because he was a "half-caste" with Communist tendencies. In the years up to 1963, Tsafendas made nine applications for permanent residence in South Africa and all were rejected; he made at least six to be allowed to return to Mozambique, all of which were turned down.

Mozambique was then a Province of Portugal and Tsafendas was officially a Portuguese citizen. However, not only was he banned from Mozambique, he was prosecuted and imprisoned in Portugal. The authorities objected to his past political activism in Mozambique and the fact that he was a Communist who opposed the dictatorship of Premier Antonio Salazar. As for his "aimless ramblings and wanderings around the world," Mozambique and South Africa were the only countries Tsafendas lived in prior to being banned from them, although as a child, he had also lived for a year in Egypt. While serving the Allied cause as a merchant seaman in World War Two, he was stationed in Canada and in the United States. In 1947, he was deported from America to Greece and it was then that his odyssey began. With Mozambique, Portugal and South Africa inaccessible, he tried to find a

place to live.⁴¹⁸⁷

The fact is Tsafendas was travelling because he was not allowed to live where he wished to live, in Mozambique and South Africa. "Forced globe-trotting," he called it.⁴¹⁸⁸ If one of his visa applications had been successful, he would have gone there immediately. As to the extent of his globe-trotting, the twenty-five countries Dr. Cooper mentioned was an exaggeration. Before the war, Tsafendas had lived in Mozambique, Egypt and South Africa, but since he was only a child and taken there by his parents, this could not be considered globe-trotting.

During the war, the ship he worked on docked in Canada (1) and to the USA (2), where after the war, he was deported to Greece (3). He remained there for two years and then in an attempt to reach Portugal and Mozambique, he passed through France (4) and Spain (5). Over the next twelve years, he visited and worked in England (6), Germany (7), Belgium (8), Sweden (9), Denmark (10) and Turkey (11). He passed briefly through Jordan (12), Lebanon (13) and Syria (14), while later, on his way back to Portugal, he went through Italy (15). During his stay in Turkey, he took in Bulgaria (16) then later in Africa, Rhodesia (17) to visit a half-sister he had not seen since 1941.⁴¹⁸⁹ That totals seventeen countries, not "at least 25" that Dr. Cooper guessed at and he travelled through at least half of them only because they were the way to his destination.

It is true that Tsafendas travelled much more widely than most people, but an analysis of his journeys and intentions comprehensively disproves Dr. Cooper's conclusion that he wandered about aimlessly, seeking and failing to find a niche in the world. He spent the first twenty-three years of his life in Mozambique, Egypt and South Africa. He lived in those countries because that was where his family was. From 1941 to 1947, he lived in the United States or, during the Second World War, at sea serving in American Liberty Ships. In 1947, and against his will, he was deported to Greece because of his Greek origins, although he wanted to return to Mozambique.

⁴¹⁸⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴¹⁸⁸ Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴¹⁸⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

While in Greece, he joined the DSE, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party, and fought with them in the civil war. When it was obvious that the Communists had lost and the war was coming to an end, Tsafendas applied for a visa to return to South Africa. In his application he wrote, "I am here a man without a country, living in strange lands with people who have different ways of living, customs and languages."⁴¹⁹⁰ The application was turned down. He decided to try Mozambique, via Portugal. He managed to do this by taking ship from Greece to France, then travelling on foot to Portugal through Spain.⁴¹⁹¹

In Portugal, in November 1949, Tsafendas was arrested because the authorities had questions about his identity. It was discovered that he was indeed a Portuguese citizen, but had not served his compulsory term in the military and that he had been dismissed twice from jobs in Mozambique for Communist activities.⁴¹⁹² Tsafendas spent the next year in prison but was then released and boarded a ship to Mozambique. He arrived there in October 1951 but was refused entry because he was listed in official files as a Communist and suspected of involvement in subversive activities.⁴¹⁹³ This refusal led to his next twelve years being spent in exile. In January 1952, he was back in Portugal and was arrested in Lisbon. The police discovered that he was a Communist and an avowed anti-colonialist who was under suspicion of "unclear activities" during his time in Mozambique and put him in jail again.⁴¹⁹⁴

Upon his eventual release a few months later, with his chosen destinations South Africa and Mozambique unattainable, he decided to go to Sweden, where he had heard he could get a job as a welder. He travelled there through Denmark, and eventually got a job as a carpenter.⁴¹⁹⁵ He did not stay in Sweden long as the weather was too cold and the money too little, so he moved to Hamburg, Germany and found work as a welder. Tsafendas remained in Germany from early 1954 to June 1955. During his time there, he sent off applications to be allowed to return to Mozambique and to South Africa. All were rejected and in mid-1955 he returned once more to Portugal and spent the next three years working as a hawker in

⁴¹⁹⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 17. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴¹⁹¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴¹⁹² PIDE Confidential Report about Demetrio Tsafendas, 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴¹⁹³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁴¹⁹⁴ *Diario Popular*, 9 September 1966, 'E conhesido em Lisboa o assassino do Dr. Verwoerd.'

⁴¹⁹⁵ Ochsensall Hospital report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 6 June 1955. K150. Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub-file: 1/8. NASA.

Lisbon.⁴¹⁹⁶

Being constantly under PIDE supervision and police harassment, in 1958 Tsafendas decided to leave Portugal and he travelled to Brussels to sell embroidery at the international exhibition, Expo 58. From there, he went back to Germany and spent the next year and a half in Frankfurt, working for one and half months at Fries and Son, six months for Anglo-American Fashions and Designers, and then another six months at a US Army printing works.⁴¹⁹⁷ During his time in Germany, he lived on his own but had a relationship with a German girl who was a Communist.⁴¹⁹⁸ Again he applied several times for permission to return to Mozambique or to South Africa, but all of his applications were refused.⁴¹⁹⁹

In May 1959, Tsafendas travelled to Britain, hoping to find a job. He was refused a work permit and took clandestine jobs to survive.⁴²⁰⁰ In London he became politically active with anti-apartheid and anti-fascist organisations. He was discovered to be in the country illegally and in December 1959, the British sent him back to Germany, where he spent the next six months working in a tractor factory in Munich.⁴²⁰¹ In March 1960, he read about the Sharpeville massacre and decided to return to South Africa and “do something” against Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid.⁴²⁰²

Convinced by now that he would not be allowed to enter the country legitimately, he decided on an illegal route, “through the African states south to South Africa.” The first stage took him through the Balkan States to Piraeus, Greece, then he took a ferry to Alexandria, Egypt. There his passport expired and he was unable to renew it or replace it, but with the help of the Red Cross, he managed to get to Beirut and Jerusalem.⁴²⁰³

With his Africa North-to-South plan blocked, Tsafendas decided to return to Portugal. Travelling through Lebanon and Syria by bus, he crossed the Taurus mountain

⁴¹⁹⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴¹⁹⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴¹⁹⁸ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

⁴¹⁹⁹ Report of the COE. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴²⁰⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴²⁰¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁰² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴²⁰³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

range and reached Ankara, Turkey in May 1961. A month later, he arrived in Istanbul, where he worked as a teacher of English at the best private language college in Turkey at the time, the Limasollu Naci College.⁴²⁰⁴ In December 1961, he left to visit a former comrade from the Greek Civil War who lived in Sofia, Bulgaria. His visit lasted two weeks and then he went to Greece to spend Christmas with his good friend John Michaletos and his family.⁴²⁰⁵ In January 1962, he travelled to the island of Crete to meet his relatives and see where his beloved father and his hero great-grandfather were born. From Greece, he travelled to Italy, then took the train to Lisbon, where he arrived in February 1962.⁴²⁰⁶

Tsafendas worked as a welder in Lisbon until July 1962, when he went back to England and again participated in anti-apartheid and anti-fascist demonstrations. In late 1962, he learned that his father had died and he determined to visit his grave in South Africa. After several more unsuccessful applications for a visa for Mozambique and South Africa, in August or September of 1963, after twelve years of exile, the Portuguese government relented. Convinced by an “act” he put that he was mad but harmless, and “reformed” in terms of his political ideology, the authorities gave him amnesty and permission to return to Mozambique.⁴²⁰⁷

In October 1963, he arrived in Mozambique and a month later, with the help of his family, he was back in South Africa in Pretoria. He remained in Pretoria until July 1964, working for five months for F.A. Poole Engineering and the rest of the time at his half-sister's café. He crossed into Rhodesia to visit another half-sister he had not seen since 1941, and from there went again to Mozambique. He remained in Beira from October 10, 1964, until November 16, 1964, working at the Hume Pipe Company,⁴²⁰⁸ before being arrested by the Portuguese police for “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”⁴²⁰⁹

⁴²⁰⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁰⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴²⁰⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁰⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁰⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Demetrio Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁰⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio

After three months in jail in Beira, he left Mozambique for Durban in March 1965. He remained there until October 1965, working off and on as an interpreter at the Durban Court, as a welder at Fraser and Chalmers for two months and for a month for South African Railways. After receiving a letter from a girl who said she wanted to meet and marry him, he travelled from Durban to Cape Town, where he met her. He remained in Cape Town from October 1965 until September 1966.

None of the above travels can be described as aimless. Tsafendas himself characterised them in his affidavit, but also to friends and family as “forced globetrotting”⁴²¹⁰ and he was right. Several countries happened to be on the way to his destination, like France, Italy, Spain, Syria, Lebanon, Denmark and Turkey. Naturally, he spent little time there because he was just passing through. This does not apply to Turkey, where he got a teaching job and stayed for seven months. He visited Greece for the second time, Rhodesia and Bulgaria for holidays. For business and work, he travelled England, Belgium and Sweden, while one of the Liberty ships during the Second World War also took him to Canada. Apart from places where he stayed only weeks or a few months, this is his life story:

- Six years in Egypt, all in Alexandria (1919-1925)
- Seventeen years in Mozambique: 16 years in Lourenço Marques and one in Beira (1918-1919, 1925-1939, 1963-1964)
- Five years in South Africa: approximately two years in Pretoria, one in Johannesburg, one in Cape Town and a eight months in Durban (1939-1941, 1963-1966, plus school in Middleburg)
- Six years in the USA in Boston and New York, a lot of this time at sea (1941-1947)
- Two years in Greece, all in Athens (1947-1949)
- Six years in Portugal, all in Lisbon (1951-1953, 1955-1958, 1962-1963)
- Three years in Germany, all in three cities, Munich, Frankfurt and Hamburg (1953-1955,

Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴²¹⁰ Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

1958-1959)

- Seven months in Turkey in Istanbul (1961)⁴²¹¹

This is not drifting, it is the odyssey of a man who was forced to live in exile from the country where he was born (Mozambique) for twelve years, who for sixteen years was not allowed to enter the country where his family lived (South Africa) and who was prosecuted and imprisoned because of his political beliefs in the country of his official nationality and where, after Mozambique, he spent most of his time (Portugal). Wherever he was, he always applied for permission to return to Mozambique and South Africa. Had he been allowed to return to either country or left in peace in Portugal, this vast Baedeker of travel would never have been opened.

Tsafendas travelled through so many countries mainly for two reasons:

- In search of a better place to stay and work
- He needed to cross through many countries to reach his destination.

Tsafendas's desperate efforts to return to Mozambique or South Africa and find a place to live and work without being followed by the police do not constitute "aimless ramblings." His life, as he said, was "forced globetrotting," peregrinations similar to those of Odysseus, who travelled for ten years through many different places to reach his destination. Tsafendas's odyssey is misunderstood by Dr. Cooper, who is clearly not aware of the circumstances of Tsafendas's travels.

Finally, Tsafendas's travels and their planning and how he managed not only to merely survive, but in some occasions, like in Istanbul, thrive is further proof of Tsafendas's ability to plan and adjust to any situation, something a schizophrenic is most unlikely to do. Professor Burke told the author, "The other thing, as well, that we have to question is how he could plan his behaviour and his trips, so perfectly? What you typically find with schizophrenic patients, is they become homeless people, so they can't find a job, or whatever the case may be, so, in his case, he was very rational and planning in what he did."⁴²¹²

⁴²¹¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²¹² Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

TSAFENDAS'S EMPLOYMENT AND BEING "UNABLE TO FUNCTION ON A REASONABLE LEVEL"

DR. COOPER: Then one tried to go into the question of employment...his employment was again of the same ilk, in the sense that it appears from his story that he was never able to hold down a job for more than a couple of months at a time. And I was particularly interested in his employment recently in Cape Town, because there one could at least have some grasp of what he was talking about. And the fact that here was an intelligent man first of all taking up menial, simple forms of employment was to me significant. And furthermore the fact that, having taken up these menial, simple, jobs, that he was unable to hold down these jobs was also important and indicative of something being wrong...

DR. COOPER: He was usually sacked, I think, but occasionally left on his own accord... The explanation again usually revolves around the tapeworm, that because of the tapeworm he could not hold down the job, and this made him move on...

DR. COOPER: He said the tapeworm had destroyed his entire personality, both mentally and physically. That it made him weak, feeble and infirm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If it is shown that between August 1965 and the 6th of September of this year the accused had five jobs in which he never stayed longer than two months in any one of those jobs, what do you feel about this?

DR. COOPER: This would be consistent with his mental condition as I saw it, in that I would not be able to, I would not expect this man to be able to hold down sustained employment even of a relatively simple type.

JUDGE BEYERS: May I put the opposite to you – the other side? Again it is not unusual - we in these courts know it is not unusual - for people not to hold jobs. It is not unusual for them never to do a stroke of work?

DR. COOPER: I went into this carefully....

JUDGE BEYERS: That is so, isn't it?

DR. COOPER: That is so.

JUDGE BEYERS: You have come across people who won't work and who don't hold jobs, haven't you?

DR. COOPER: Yes, but, when I do, I try and establish the reason therefore, the reason why they don't hold these jobs.

JUDGE BEYERS: You don't believe that they just don't want to work, and are lazy?

DR. COOPER: I am sure that there are those people, but this man did not fall into that category. He was continually seeking employment; he was continually getting employment, but, having sought it, and got it, he was unable to hold it; he was unable to function on a reasonable level. If his story is correct, there is nothing to suggest, from what he told me, that he is a won't-work.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: His inability to hold down a job for any length of time, to what does he attribute that?

DR. COOPER: That is attributed to the tapeworm.

DR. COOPER: I believe that this type of employment record is completely consistent with a man suffering from chronic schizophrenia and I believe that he is suffering from chronic schizophrenia and, therefore, I relate his employment record to this mental illness.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

TSAFENDAS'S EMPLOYMENT

Perhaps the most inaccurate statement of all by Dr. Cooper was that Tsafendas was "unable to function on a reasonable level" and that was why he lost his jobs. More than fifty former colleagues testified to the police about Tsafendas. Only one of them, Owen Smorenberg, who would be produced as a witness for the defence, suggested Tsafendas was any kind of failure. He stated that Tsafendas "was no good as a fitter and was dismissed for that reason, but instead of dismissing him, he was given the opportunity to resign."⁴²¹³ However, Smorenberg said nothing to suggest that Tsafendas was unable to function on a reasonable level. Not

⁴²¹³ Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

being good at your job is not the same thing as being unable to function on a reasonable level. Far from perceiving functional failure in Tsafendas, many of those who worked with him praised his skills, efficiency and intelligence. For example:

- The Attorney-General himself was in possession of testimonials from the Vulcan Iron Works in Lourenço Marques, where Tsafendas had worked for six years, 1933-1939, stating that “he had performed his duties in a satisfactory manner.”⁴²¹⁴ This was during the time when Tsafendas allegedly started believing he had a tapeworm in 1935 or 1936.
- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁴²¹⁵
- Charles Woods, Tsafendas's supervisor at Fraser and Chalmers, characterised him as a “good tradesman,”⁴²¹⁶ “a very good worker, far from being a crank, fairly intelligent, but a violent type.”⁴²¹⁷
- Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden was senior security officer for the Marine Diamond Corporation and worked with Tsafendas for around three months in 1966. He testified to the police:

“We were transferred from the Marina on a small outboard boat to the Colponton. It was terrible, rough seas, so much so that almost all of us old hands got seasick. It struck me that Tsafendas adapted well. He was one of the few who was not seasick. Upon landing, he filled the mess basin on the lower deck with water and started shaving. His calm way struck me that he must know the sea. Tsafendas was employed as a pump, or engineer, operator and did not work under my direct supervision. I introduced myself to him and talked to him. He was friendly, outgoing, and not aloof. I noticed that his eating was messy. Otherwise he was completely normal.”⁴²¹⁸

⁴²¹⁴ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

⁴²¹⁵ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²¹⁶ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²¹⁷ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, ‘Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.’

⁴²¹⁸ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

- Johannes Aurets, Tsafendas's supervisor at the South African Railways, told the police Tsafendas "was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature. During the time he was employed under my supervision, i.e. for approximately three weeks, I did not see him being cross at any time. He was a good worker."⁴²¹⁹
- Garnet Muller, Tsafendas's supervisor at South African Railways for three weeks, testified that Tsafendas gave him to understand that he took the job on a temporary basis. He "observed Demitrio Tsafendas to possess intelligence above that of the average person who is likely to accept a position with the little responsibility which is attached to that of shed attendant."⁴²²⁰
- Hulse, who worked with Tsafendas at Marine Diamond Cooperation from December 1965 to March 12, 1966, stated that Tsafendas "did not appear to be disturbed at any stage."⁴²²¹
- Antonio Teixeira Da Silva, who worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole's engineering works in 1965, testified that Tsafendas "was acting normal and I never noticed anything wrong with him. I have seen an insane person before but I can state that the accused never behaved as an insane person whilst employed here."⁴²²²
- Gillian Claire Lieberman was a personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation who was often visited by Tsafendas in her office. She "found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange type of person, a unique character. I got the impression that he was physically different in dress and appearance. He was a big man, with a particularly striking big hat, stainless steel teeth, sloppy, dirty clothing."⁴²²³
- Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas's boss at F. A. Poole in Pretoria, said that in the five months he worked with Tsafendas, he found him to be "not a very good worker, but will say that

⁴²¹⁹ Johannes Jaconus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²²⁰ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²²¹ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²²² Antonio Teixeira Da Silva statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²²³ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

he was an intelligent worker.”⁴²²⁴ He also testified to the Commission of Enquiry that he considered Tsafendas to be “an intelligent man, just untidy and lazy in rounding off his work.” He said “Tsafendas was a very friendly, social and talkative person but he was always looking to quarrel with the white workers. Mr. Vercueil would usually receive complaints from the other (white) foremen, but never from the Black workers. He never got the impression that Mr. Tsafendas was not right in his mind. F.A. Poole moved from their warehouse and Mr. Tsafendas was tasked with organizing the move and he handled it effortlessly.”⁴²²⁵

- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁴²²⁶
- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban, was approached by Tsafendas offering his services as a Portuguese or Greek interpreter. Rudolph appointed him and said Tsafendas “was in the habit of regularly reporting two or three times a week to ask whether there is any interpretation work.” He used him “on several occasions” over a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He told police, “I spoke with him several times. He seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁴²²⁷
- Nikolaas Nel worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole and told the police that Tsafendas “seemed normal.”⁴²²⁸
- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike’s Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966, frequently driving him to the tanker *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town. Of Tsafendas, he told the police that he “never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning

⁴²²⁴ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²²⁵ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²²⁶ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²²⁷ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²²⁸ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

powers.”⁴²²⁹ Judson later said that Tsafendas was “competent at his job but overly talkative and sociable.”⁴²³⁰

- Michaelis Augustides, owner of Mike’s Outfitters, also found Tsafendas to be “competent at his job but overly talkative and sociable.”⁴²³¹
- Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen, was Tsafendas’s tram instructor in December 1965 and January 1966. He testified to the police that “other than his slow response, I did not at all get the impression that mentally anything was wrong with him. He is mentally normal.”⁴²³²
- Horst Hartmann, a senior officer at the heavy engineering company, Fries and Son, in Frankfurt, Germany, characterised Tsafendas “as extremely nice and friendly ... I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman...he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on... we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.”

Six weeks later Tsafendas left the company voluntarily with a very good reference in his suitcase. Hartmann said, “He left of his own accord ... we would have liked to keep him.” Hartman gave him a reference which Tsafendas used when he applied for the messenger job in Parliament. Would Hartmann have given him a reference and regretted his departure if Tsafendas was not able to function on a reasonable level? Three other colleagues said of Tsafendas that “He was a nice guy,” “He was a good comrade” and “He left me with a good impression.”⁴²³³

- Although he worked at Fries and Son for only six weeks, Tsafendas made a lasting impression on Guenter Haafe, the fifty-seven-year -old factory doorman, who eight years later, still remembered the jovial greeting Tsafendas gave him every morning.

“He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come into my locker to say hi. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met and trust me, in

⁴²²⁹ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

⁴²³⁰ Lambley, 1980: 241.

⁴²³¹ Lambley, 1980: 241.

⁴²³² Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²³³ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin,’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

my twelve years as a doorman I have seen thousands and thousands of faces coming in and out; this man was courteous, they do not make them like that anymore.”⁴²³⁴ Is this the sort of man Dr. Cooper described?

- Tsafendas lived in the house of Fotini Gavasiadis and her husband Markos for several weeks. When he left, he moved into an apartment next to their house, where he stayed for the next eight months, seeing Fotini and Markos every day, and spending a lot of his time their home. Tsafendas and Fotini also worked together for nine months in her brother's café. According to Gavasiadis:

“[Tsafendas] had a quick mind and was very intelligent. He worked out prices in head and was invariably correct... he was very good, very polite and friendly. All the customers liked him and some of them used to come just to chat with him, mostly about his travels around the world. Some old men really adored him. My brother was initially not very keen on having him there because he was told that he would start arguing with customers over politics, but he never argued with anyone as long as he was there.”

Some customers angered him but Tsafendas kept his counsel. Gavasiadis told the author:

“Many times he told me, ‘These people are bloody racists,’ but he never told them anything out of respect for my brother because it was his business. A lot of times he complained about some customers, that they were getting into his head with what they were telling him and the blood was going to his head because of his anger, but still he never said anything and carried on his work.”

Tsafendas worked voluntarily at the café because Nick Vlachopoulos had given him a rent-free apartment. Tsafendas was so good that Vlachopoulos offered him a permanent job with good wages, but Tsafendas refused. He did not want to take any money after accepting the free apartment. He worked full-time at the café when he was unemployed and part-time when he was at F.A. Poole Engineering. Gavasiadis strongly denies the suggestion that Tsafendas was not able to hold down a job because he was unable to function on a reasonable level. She states however, that she was told by Tsafendas

⁴²³⁴ *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

himself and by members of his family, that he had lost jobs in the past because of his outspokenness with regards to politics.⁴²³⁵

- Nick Augustides is the son of the owner of Mike's Outfitters in Cape Town for whom Tsafendas worked on commission. He knew Tsafendas for three-four months and never heard him say anything to suggest he was insane. He told the author that Tsafendas "definitely did not look or sound insane."⁴²³⁶
- In addition, Tsafendas functioned perfectly well in Istanbul where he was able to hold a teacher's job for five or six months. Mrs. Advije Vedia Limasollu, wife of the college owner, Mr. Limasollu Naci, stressed that her husband would not have kept anyone on the teaching staff who was not good.⁴²³⁷ That Tsafendas taught at the college was reported by the South African press⁴²³⁸ and was known to the police,⁴²³⁹ but apparently not to Dr. Cooper and to the Attorney-General.
- Finally, Tsafendas worked for a little over a month in Parliament. None of the five colleagues who worked with him and were questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry mentioned anything being wrong with him.⁴²⁴⁰ Petrus Schuin, the head messenger, was one of the three who interviewed and appointed him. He told the Commission of Enquiry that "there was nothing out of the ordinary about him. Tsafendas was the same as any other person that had worked there."⁴²⁴¹ Sydney Wiehand, also on the interview panel, said, "he was a quiet man. He wasn't the rough type or anything like that. He was quiet, quietly-spoken, well-mannered."⁴²⁴² The evidence of these witnesses

⁴²³⁵ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴²³⁶ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

⁴²³⁷ Advije Vedia Limasollu in a personal interview, 8 January 2016.

⁴²³⁸ *The Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas taught Turks English'; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas taught English in Turkey'; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man.'

⁴²³⁹ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁴⁰ Piet Bester Burger testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA; Fred Feinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Feliz George Miles statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 2, File: 1. NASA; Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA; Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴²⁴¹ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴²⁴² Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

was important because it came from people who had dealt with him recently and in a professional environment.

None of the above statements given to the police or the Commission of Enquiry was used by the Attorney-General to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony. We do not know if the Attorney-General was in possession of these documents or if he ignored them. The fact remains that the statements flatly contradicted Dr. Cooper's testimony, revealing yet another error in his diagnosis. Even if the Attorney-General was not in possession of the above statements, he was certainly in possession of several others from Tsafendas's bosses at the Vulcan Iron Works, where he was employed for six years stating that "he had performed his duties in a satisfactory manner."⁴²⁴³ Still, the Attorney-General did not use this evidence.

Dr. Cooper also said, "I would not expect this man to be able to hold down sustained employment, even of a relatively simple type." This is clearly incorrect and the argument would be contradicted the following day when another defence witness, Dr. Muller, testified that he found Tsafendas to be intelligent and healthy enough to hold down a job with ease. Asked by the Defence Counsel, "With his health and his intelligence, should he be able to hold down a job?" Dr. Muller replied, "Yes. Yes, I would think he could very easily."⁴²⁴⁴

However, at this stage, the State should have been able to challenge Dr. Cooper's argument by itself since the police had ample evidence to contradict it. Firstly, Tsafendas worked in 1961 as a teacher of English for nearly six months at Limasollu Naci, the leading private language college in Istanbul. The State must have been aware of this. Not only did Tsafendas mention it in his statement to the police on September 11, his teaching stint was reported in the South African press,⁴²⁴⁵ it was mentioned in a report by Col. McIntyre of the South African police⁴²⁴⁶ and it was known to the Commission of Enquiry.⁴²⁴⁷ The police also found a separate note stating that Tsafendas worked at this language school.⁴²⁴⁸ However, the

⁴²⁴³ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

⁴²⁴⁴ Dr. Hendrik Muller's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴²⁴⁵ *The Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas taught Turks English'; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas taught English in Turkey'; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man.'

⁴²⁴⁶ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁴⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 37. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria; Report of the COE. Chapter VI, Paragraph 4. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴²⁴⁸ Report of the COE. Chapter VI, Paragraph 4. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

Attorney-General did not mention the Istanbul work.

The obvious question is how could a man as described by Dr. Cooper work as a teacher at a prestigious college for six months? Teaching a foreign language at such a place is not a “menial, simple form of employment.” Tsafendas had to work on a trial basis, under observation by his colleagues for a week, to determine if he was good enough. Professor Burke believes it would have been impossible for a man with schizophrenia as described by Dr. Cooper to hold down an intellectual post for such an extended period: “There would have been symptoms a lot earlier. If it was schizophrenia, why was he able to hold down a job? If his functioning was so impaired, how could he possibly have performed his job?”⁴²⁴⁹ According to van Zyl, it would have been “impossible” for Tsafendas, as described by Dr. Cooper, to have been able to work at the college, “He certainly was bright and intelligent. The person that I dealt with at the time was so beset by symptoms of schizophrenia that that would not have been possible ...”⁴²⁵⁰ However, Tsafendas managed to keep the job for five or six months and then left of his own accord with a glowing reference that he used to get the job in the House of Assembly.

Advocate Cooper’s statement that Tsafendas did not stay longer than two months in any job in the year before the assassination is inaccurate, as he worked for at least four months (December 1965-March 1966) for the Marine Diamond Corporation.⁴²⁵¹ Tsafendas left all his jobs voluntarily except for one in Mandini, where he was dismissed for fighting with a fellow worker, Nick Vergos. Tsafendas said Vergos had refused to pay Black workers he had illegally employed to do some work for him, and when he intervened, they fought.⁴²⁵² As to the level of expertise required in his various jobs, Tsafendas worked as a welder for five months, from February 7, 1964 to July 10, 1964, at F.A. Poole in Pretoria,⁴²⁵³ as a part-

⁴²⁴⁹ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

⁴²⁵⁰ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁴²⁵¹ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²⁵² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 5 August 2011; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴²⁵³ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

time interpreter for seven to eight months at the Court in Durban⁴²⁵⁴ and for nine months at his half-sister's café shop in Pretoria in 1963-1964.⁴²⁵⁵

Tsafendas also worked at several jobs for much longer than two months. The author is not in position to know all the jobs Tsafendas did and has relied mostly on the documents found in the archives. Naturally, not all his jobs are listed there, but here are a dozen:

- For six years (1933-1939) in Vulcan Iron Works, General Engineers, in Lourenço Marques. The Attorney-General was aware of this information as it was contained in his Memorandum about Tsafendas. In addition, he was in possession of “testimonials from this firm” affirming that “he had performed his duties in a satisfactory manner.”⁴²⁵⁶
- For two years (1936-1938) at the Imperial Airways factory in Quilemane.⁴²⁵⁷
- For about two years (1933-1935) at Spanos's bookshop in Lourenço Marques.⁴²⁵⁸
- For about a year (around 1938-1939) as a waiter at Gerry Kyriakakis's restaurant. He was fired after he argued with a German customer who supported the Nazis.⁴²⁵⁹
- For almost two years (May 1940-early 1942) as a welder with the British Mining Supply Company in Johannesburg.⁴²⁶⁰
- While in Athens (October 1947-April 1949), Tsafendas was employed for twelve months as an interpreter and foreman with the American Reconstruction Mission, under the US Marshall Plan.⁴²⁶¹

⁴²⁵⁴ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁵⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

⁴²⁵⁶ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

⁴²⁵⁷ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴²⁵⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴²⁵⁹ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴²⁶⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁶¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

- For about three years (1955-1958), Tsafendas worked as hawker in Lisbon, going “on board ships lying in the Tagus to ply his trade of itinerant vendor of regional articles and embroideries.”⁴²⁶²
- For six months (1958) with Anglo-American Fashions and Designers in Frankfurt.
- For around six months (1958-1959) at a US Army printing works in Hochst, a district of Frankfurt.
- For six months (1959) in a tractor factory in Munich.⁴²⁶³
- For six-seven months (June-December 1961) as teacher of English at Limasollu Naci College in Istanbul.⁴²⁶⁴
- For four months full-time, five months part-time (November 1963-July 1964) at Proclamation Hill Café, Pretoria.⁴²⁶⁵
- For five months (2 February-10 July 1964) at F.A. Poole Engineering in Pretoria.⁴²⁶⁶
- For seven-eight months (March-October 1965) in the court in Durban; although he only worked there when needed, this was on “several occasions.”⁴²⁶⁷
- For three-four months (December 1965-March 1966) at Marine Diamond Corporation in Cape Town.⁴²⁶⁸

Tsafendas liked casual work and being his own boss. In 1951, he requested and received from the Director of the International Police in Lisbon a card which declared him to be a maritime salesman.⁴²⁶⁹ He spent the next three years, then after a break another two, in Portugal and then again in South Africa as a hawker, selling “embroidery, postcards and

⁴²⁶² PIDE report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas or Dimitrie Tsafandakis. 21 February 1962. K150, Vol. 4, Sub-file 1/6. Department of Justice. NASA.

⁴²⁶³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁶⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 4 November 2015; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁶⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴²⁶⁶ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁶⁷ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁶⁸ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966, K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁶⁹ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

watches, mainly to holidaymakers on cruise ships.” He travelled to Belgium in 1958 for the Brussels World Fair (Expo 58) to sell his embroidery.⁴²⁷⁰ Hawking became Tsafendas's favourite work and he would often return to it when he was out of a steady job. He liked running his own life and working whenever he wanted. If it had been more profitable and less tiring, he would have done it permanently, he said.⁴²⁷¹

There is no doubt that Tsafendas was fired from some jobs, but this was usually due not to incompetence but his outspokenness on politics and workers' rights. As we have seen in his biography, this started shortly after Tsafendas became an active Communist. In 1937, he was dismissed from the Sideris kiosk in Lourenço Marques “owing to his Communist leanings.”⁴²⁷² The *Chai et Kiosk*, was owned by P. Sideris, a good friend of his father. Sideris, a conservative Greek loyal to the Portuguese government, often berated his young employee for arguing about politics with his customers.⁴²⁷³

One day, Dimitri crossed swords with a wealthy Portuguese businessman and city councillor. He denounced the man as a “fascist” and accused him of exploiting Mozambicans. Then aged seventeen, Tsafendas said, “One day the Mozambicans will rebel against the Portuguese and take back everything you stole from them.” The businessman reported the incident to Sideris and told him he would inform the police because he considered his employee to be a “dangerous Communist.” Although reluctant to do so, but feeling he had no choice, Sideris dismissed Tsafendas. He knew he would be in trouble with the colonial authorities if he did not do so.⁴²⁷⁴

In 1938, while working at the Imperial Airways factory in Quilemane, Tsafendas came under suspicion by PIDE of “spreading Communist propaganda.”⁴²⁷⁵ Tsafendas had

⁴²⁷⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁷¹ Emmanuel Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

⁴²⁷² Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 16. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴²⁷³ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴²⁷⁴ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴²⁷⁵ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

distributed the Communist Manifesto to some of his colleagues,⁴²⁷⁶ but he was not arrested as the accusation was “never proven.”⁴²⁷⁷ This incident dogged Tsafendas throughout his life since it led to the creation of a file, *Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*, by the International and State Defence Police (PIDE), the Portuguese security police, which would only get bigger with the passage of time.⁴²⁷⁸ A 1961 PIDE report referred to the two above incidents, stating that while Tsafendas was “residing in that Province (Mozambique), he was twice a suspect of Communist activities, but evidence of such activities was never found.”⁴²⁷⁹

Later in 1938 or in 1939, the twenty-year-old Dimitri worked as a waiter at a hotel owned by Gerry Kyriakakis, a friend of his father. Once again, he argued politics with the guests, despite Kyriakakis's threats of dismissal. One day he got into an argument with a German guest about the persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The German asked if he was a Jew himself, whereupon Dimitri replied proudly that indeed he was and the German dropped the argument. News of this dispute and of Tsafendas's Jewish background spread through the Greek community and when the political disputes continued, Kyriakakis decided they were jeopardising business and finally dismissed his young waiter.⁴²⁸⁰

Sometime in early 1965, Tsafendas asked his half-sister Katerina Pnema and her husband Gerry to help him find a job in Mozambique. Gerry Pnema was friendly with the manager of a dock in Beira and persuaded him to hire his brother-in-law as an interpreter. Tsafendas lasted only a few days before being dismissed for urging the Mozambican workers to strike because of their working conditions. Tsafendas denounced the manager and the company as “capitalists exploiting the workers.” The manager told Gerry Pnema about the incident and said the “only reason he did not call the police was that he did not want to cause his family problems.” He urged his friend not to help Tsafendas again because he was a “dangerous Communist.”⁴²⁸¹

⁴²⁷⁶ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴²⁷⁷ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴²⁷⁸ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴²⁷⁹ Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 04 November 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴²⁸⁰ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴²⁸¹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

During his time with the Hume Pipe Company in Gondola in October and November 1964,⁴²⁸² Tsafendas often complained that Portugal was exploiting Mozambique's oil wealth⁴²⁸³ and urged the non-White workers to go on strike because they were mistreated by the Whites.⁴²⁸⁴ During his five months with Poole Engineering in Pretoria in 1965, "Tsafendas bullied the other Portuguese workers and had fights with several white workers",⁴²⁸⁵ but he never argued with Coloureds.⁴²⁸⁶ He was "unpopular among white workers" and "adapted more to the non-whites."⁴²⁸⁷ The reason Tsafendas was unpopular with White workers and bullied the Portuguese workers is perhaps provided by a Portuguese colleague, Antonio Da Silva. He testified to the police that Tsafendas learned that he had served in the Portuguese army in Mozambique and asked him what he thought of Dr. Salazar, the Prime Minister of Portugal. Da Silva claimed that he did not discuss the issue further with Tsafendas, but Tsafendas became aggressive towards him after that.⁴²⁸⁸ In May 1965, while Tsafendas was working for Fraser and Chalmers in Durban, he fought physically with Nick Vergos in an attempt to protect the rights of some African workers, as noted, and was dismissed.⁴²⁸⁹ Finally, Katerina Pnema said that Tsafendas "couldn't keep his mouth shut about politics" and that "he could not keep his mouth shut if he saw something he considered to be wrong."⁴²⁹⁰

TSAFENDAS BEING "UNABLE TO FUNCTION ON A REASONABLE LEVEL"

The South African police and the Commission of Enquiry questioned about two hundred people regarding Tsafendas. Only three raised questions as to his mental stability, one, James Johnston, in a rather confused manner:

⁴²⁸² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Demetrio Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁸³ Demetrio Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴²⁸⁴ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴²⁸⁵ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴²⁸⁶ Albert Vercual statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²⁸⁷ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²⁸⁸ Antonio Teixeira Da Silva statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²⁸⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File Verklarings. NASA.

⁴²⁹⁰ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

- Caroline Barbeau, a member of the Christian Church who met Tsafendas in Durban in 1965, got the impression that he was “not all there,” although she did not state why she got such an impression.⁴²⁹¹
- James Johnston, a minister of the Christian Church, spoke to Tsafendas twice for ten minutes on each occasion. He told the police that “I do not know Tsafendas very well and the longest discussion I had with him was for about 10 minutes at each occasion ... He appeared to be perfectly normal ... I did think Tsafendas to be slightly unbalanced and that he seemed to have a mysterious background, but otherwise he appeared to be all right.”⁴²⁹²
- Keith Martincich, who worked with Tsafendas for two to three weeks at Marine Diamond Cooperation, thought that there “was something mentally wrong with him” because Tsafendas sometimes mumbled to himself.⁴²⁹³

Johnston and Barbeau were members of the Christian Church and Johnston's contradictory statement should be read in that context. The Daniels and O'Ryan families, who would testify as defence witnesses, were also members of the Christian Church and one of them, Merle Daniels, admitted to the Court that she “would like to protect the name of the Christian Church.”⁴²⁹⁴ According to Patrick O'Ryan, Reuben O'Ryan and Richard Poggenpoel, all three friends of Tsafendas and members of the Church, the assassination embarrassed the Church and some of its members tried to distance themselves and their Church from Tsafendas.⁴²⁹⁵

Peter and Helen Daniels had asked Gordon Winter, the *Post* journalist who interviewed them, not to mention that Helen was a preacher in the Christian Church because it “would bring disgrace” on the Church.⁴²⁹⁶ Like the majority of the Greek community, some members of the sect tried to portray Tsafendas as not one of them in order to protect their reputation. In addition, Tsafendas also often clashed with leaders and members of the

⁴²⁹¹ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²⁹² James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²⁹³ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴²⁹⁴ Marle Daniels testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴²⁹⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴²⁹⁶ Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

Christian Church because they advocated obedience to rule, including that of the governing National Party and its policy of apartheid.⁴²⁹⁷ Witnesses did not want to admit to the police that they had discussed various issues with Tsafendas and most likely made their comments so as to persuade the police that they did not respect Tsafendas or hold him in any sort of esteem.

As for Martincich, his conclusion is preposterous. If everyone who talked to himself were to be considered mentally unstable, the world would not be big enough to hold all their asylums. What is more, Martincich was the only one out of some three hundred witnesses who were interviewed by the police, the Commission and the author, who noticed Tsafendas mumbling to himself. This was a man who had known Tsafendas for three weeks, while people who lived with him in the same house or worked with him or socialised with him for many months and even years, failed to spot such a habit.

Others questioned by the South African police about Tsafendas's mental state testified as follows:

- Reginald Robert Maile was the guard on the *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town from July 26, 1966 to September 3, 1966. He saw Tsafendas every day and told the police that he “never got the impression that he could be mentally defective. He was sober, polite and perfectly normal.”⁴²⁹⁸
- Inspector Horacio Ferreira of the Portuguese Security Police was in charge of the cells where Tsafendas was held in custody in Beira in 1964. His statement to the police said he considered Tsafendas to be “normal and regarded him as a very intelligent person.”⁴²⁹⁹
- Lt. Col. P.J.B. van Wyk of the South African police interviewed several people in Rhodesia and in Mozambique, including in Beira and Lourenço Marques, who knew Tsafendas. He stated in his report that Tsafendas, “for all purposes, can be seen as a normal, intelligent person.”⁴³⁰⁰
- Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira “was often in the company of the subject and others had several conversations with him.” He considered Tsafendas to be “a

⁴²⁹⁷ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013.

⁴²⁹⁸ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁴²⁹⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴³⁰⁰ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

normal and very intelligent person.”⁴³⁰¹

- Hendrik van Loggenberg knew Tsafendas and his family well in Pretoria. He told the police that Tsafendas “definitely came across as normal ... he also seemed healthy ...”⁴³⁰²
- Helen Grispos knew Tsafendas from birth and grew up with him, while her husband was Tsafendas’s best childhood friend. She told the police that Tsafendas was “well-mannered and intelligent.”⁴³⁰³ She also told the author that she never thought Tsafendas was insane. “He never did or said anything to make me or George (her husband) think that he was insane.”⁴³⁰⁴
- Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas’s boss at F. A. Poole in Pretoria, said that in the five months he worked with Tsafendas, he found him to be “not a very good worker, but will say that he was an intelligent worker.”⁴³⁰⁵ He also testified to the Commission of Enquiry that he considered Tsafendas to be “an intelligent man, just untidy and lazy in rounding off his work.” He never got the impression that Mr. Tsafendas was not right in his mind.⁴³⁰⁶
- James Summers, owner of the “Barlings Tea Lounge,” which Tsafendas frequented from July 1966 until the assassination, testified that Tsafendas “was no nuisance, and appeared to be a quite normal, innocent type. I never had reason to even suspect that he could be mentally unbalanced. He acted quite normal.”⁴³⁰⁷
- John Gianouris, the Greek Vice Consul at Lourenço Marques, described Tsafendas as “a normal and intelligent person.”⁴³⁰⁸
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except

⁴³⁰¹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴³⁰² Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁰³ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴³⁰⁴ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁴³⁰⁵ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴³⁰⁶ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁰⁷ Herbert James Summers statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁰⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁴³⁰⁹

- Kyriakos Skordis who Tsafendas used to visit at his coffee shop in Durban for several months in 1965, testified that he “appeared to be quite normal and was apparently in a poor financial position.”⁴³¹⁰
- Costas Michaeletos,⁴³¹¹ who knew Tsafendas from birth, stated, “Ever since I knew Dimetrios Tsafantakis, I never, any time observed that he showed any deviations. He also never was an aggressive type person.”⁴³¹²
- John Galanakis, who met Tsafendas in Umtali in 1964, told police that he found Tsafendas to be “an intelligent person.”⁴³¹³
- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He testified to the police that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed” and he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”⁴³¹⁴
- Gideon Cloete, an employee in the Department of Labour, met Tsafendas twice and said he “seemed eager to get employment, was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance.” Cloete said he saw no signs of abnormality, that “he seemed perfectly normal.”⁴³¹⁵
- George Liberopoulos met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and described him to the police as a “normal person with a very high intelligence.”⁴³¹⁶ Liberopoulos also stated to the author that he “never believed that Tsafendas was insane. He was perfectly normal; very clever man.”⁴³¹⁷

⁴³⁰⁹ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴³¹⁰ Kyriakos Skordis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³¹¹ The correct spelling is Michaeletos, not Michaeletos. Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³¹² Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³¹³ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴³¹⁴ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁴³¹⁵ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁴³¹⁶ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴³¹⁷ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

- Harry Hall, a member of the Christian Church, knew Tsafendas from March 1966 until his arrest. He testified to the police that he regarded Tsafendas “as a sub-standard intellect, but otherwise found him to be reasonably normal.”⁴³¹⁸
- George Ananiades met Tsafendas in 1963. He described him to the police as a “normal person with a very high-intelligence.”⁴³¹⁹ He later told the author that Tsafendas “is impossible to have been insane. He was a very intelligent and educated man. He was definitely able to function on a reasonable level.”⁴³²⁰
- Ian Boswell, administrative assistant at the Department of Labour in Cape Town. He interviewed Tsafendas three times in 1966 and testified that “he was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being over-talkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality, during his interviews with me.”⁴³²¹
- John Verghis, owner of a coffee shop in Beira which Tsafendas visited often for several months, said he considered him to be a “normal person.”⁴³²²
- None of Tsafendas’s five colleagues at the Parliament mentioned anything being wrong with him.⁴³²³
- Petrus Schuin, the head messenger at the Parliament, was one of the three messengers who interviewed and appointed him. He told the Commission of Enquiry that “there was nothing out of the ordinary about him. Tsafendas was the same as any other person that had worked there.”⁴³²⁴
- Sydney Wiehand, who was also one of the three messengers who had interviewed him at

⁴³¹⁸ Harry Hall statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³¹⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴³²⁰ George Ananiades in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

⁴³²¹ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁴³²² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴³²³ Piet Bester Burger testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA; Fred Feinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Feliz George Miles statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 2, File: 1. NASA; Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA; Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴³²⁴ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

the Parliament, said about Tsafendas, "he was a quiet man. He wasn't the rough type, or anything like that. He was quiet - quietly spoken, well-mannered."⁴³²⁵

- Mrs. Tsafandakis, Tsafendas's sister in law, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁴³²⁶

Several people lived under the same roof or in close proximity to Tsafendas for substantial periods. None of them noticed anything wrong with him:

- Tsafendas lived in Fotini Gavasiadis's house for a few weeks, then for the next eight months in an apartment next to hers. Throughout this period in Pretoria in 1963-1964, they were very close; she saw and talked to him every day and they worked together in her brother's café. Gavasiadis never noticed anything wrong with Tsafendas and has no doubt that he was perfectly able to function, not just at a "reasonable level" but beyond that, since he was extremely intelligent and lucid. She told the author:

"Dimitris could buy you and sell you any time he wanted and as many times as he wanted to. He was so clever. He was very convincing and persuasive - he could turn black into white! If you disagreed with something with him, he would find a way to convince you that he is right and that you are wrong - even if you *know* that you are right and that he is wrong! If he made a mistake about something, he would turn things upside-down and at the end, he would even make you apologise to him."

Gavasiadis laughed at the suggestion that Tsafendas was "unable to function on a reasonable level":

"In those nine months, I saw him and spoke to him every day and not even once did he appear to have an issue with his speech or his thoughts. He was always the same. We spent hours and hours talking and his speech was never incoherent, disjointed, blocked or whatever else, it was always perfect. He never gave me even the slightest indication that he might be having the issues you mentioned. It must have been the doctor who said it, who was himself not able to function on a reasonable level if this was his diagnosis about Dimitri. Dimitri was not just able, but much more than able to function on a reasonable level. It's absolutely ludicrous for someone to say this about Dimitri and it shows how

⁴³²⁵ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴³²⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

little he knew him.”⁴³²⁷

According to Professor Burke, “if you lived with somebody for nine months, you would know if this person was strange.”⁴³²⁸

- Father Nikola Banovic lived in the same house as Tsafendas for four-five months in 1961, and then for another two-three months, he lived in a house next door. In all this time, he saw him every day. He declares that Tsafendas “was perfectly sane” and he does “not have the slightest doubt about it. It is impossible; Dimitri was not schizophrenic. With God as my witness, he was not crazy. He was more than capable of functioning on a reasonable level; he was a very intelligent and capable man. His brain was a level above most of ours.”⁴³²⁹
- Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas’s first cousin, knew him since he was five years old and grew up alongside him in Mozambique and in Egypt. In Pretoria in 1964, she spent a lot of time with him, including two or three weeks when they lived in the same house. She told the author: “Dimitris unable to function on a reasonable level? Are you sure a doctor said that? I don’t know what kind of doctor he was, but he either examined a different person or he had completely lost the plot with Dimitris. Dimitris was one of the most capable and intelligent persons I ever met. Nobody who knew him is going to agree with what this doctor said.”⁴³³⁰
- John Bornman lived with Tsafendas for six-seven weeks in April and May of 1966. He testified to the police that he found Tsafendas to be “normal, intelligent and friendly. He was neat in his person, but his eating habits were messy.”⁴³³¹
- Patrick O’Ryan hosted Tsafendas in his home for five months in 1965-1966 and was close to him up to his arrest. Tsafendas was described to him by a preacher of the Christian Church as a “highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages.”⁴³³² He formed a “deep liking”⁴³³³ for Tsafendas and considered him to

⁴³²⁷ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴³²⁸ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁴³²⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴³³⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴³³¹ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴³³² Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁴³³³ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

be an “enlightened person.”⁴³³⁴ He also testified that “I had confidence in him and used to like him. He was a very kindly man. In my experience of him he had a good heart... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind,” or that he “was mentally disturbed.”⁴³³⁵ He also found Tsafendas to be “well-spoken and had good vocabulary.”⁴³³⁶

- Reuben O’Ryan lived in the same house as Tsafendas for five months. He considered him “perfectly normal,” saying, “no-one in my family ever thought that he was mad. He couldn’t have been insane.”⁴³³⁷
- Stanley O’Ryan also lived in the same house as Tsafendas for five months and described him as a “very down to earth man, a very quiet man and very friendly. I never suspected, even in the slightest, that he might be unstable. No, never, nothing at all. Perfectly normal.”⁴³³⁸
- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas’s landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry: “it was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means.”⁴³³⁹
- Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas’s landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, “I was a nurse and worked in lunatic institutions. He was a normal person to the best of my knowledge.”⁴³⁴⁰
- Alice Mary Theyser was Tsafendas’s landlady from July 1, 1966 to August 30, 1966, just six days before the assassination. She testified to the police that she “never got the impression in any way that he might be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared a quite normal person.”⁴³⁴¹

⁴³³⁴ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁴³³⁵ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴³³⁶ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴³³⁷ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁴³³⁸ Stanley O’Ryan in a personal interview with the author, 9 April 2015.

⁴³³⁹ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁴³⁴⁰ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴³⁴¹ Alice Mary Theyser statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

- Helen Daniels lived with Tsafendas in her parents' house for six weeks in 1965 and "did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal."⁴³⁴²
- Marika Tsafantakis, Tsafendas's stepmother, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁴³⁴³
- Victor Tsafandakis, Tsafendas's stepbrother, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁴³⁴⁴
- Kenneth Ross was Tsafendas's landlord in Durban for two months in 1965. He did not mention anything to suggest that Tsafendas was unable to function on a reasonable level and even stated that he "was very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well-versed in politics."⁴³⁴⁵
- For two months in 1966 Tsafendas had his meals in Mary Scott's boarding house. She told police that she "never got the impression that he could be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared perfectly normal."⁴³⁴⁶
- Richard Poggenpoel lived with him for two weeks in his house and kept on associating up to his arrest, "there was no mention or impression that he was mentally abnormal. He lived a completely normal life."⁴³⁴⁷
- J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a "sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man."⁴³⁴⁸
- In 1972, Alexander Moumbaris spent three months in the cell next to Tsafendas in Pretoria Prison. They spoke every day for an hour when they exercised together in the prison yard. Moumbaris laughed when the author told him of Dr. Cooper's comment [that

⁴³⁴² Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴³⁴³ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴³⁴⁴ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴³⁴⁵ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁴⁶ Mary Kathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁴⁷ Richard Poggenpoel statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁴⁸ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. 'Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.'

Tsafendas was unable to function on a reasonable level]. He said:

“It’s not true. Tsafendas was highly intelligent and lucid. He was very able and determined, if he wanted to do something, he would do it... The fact that he managed to survive the prison and remain sane after all he went through also shows you how capable and how strong he was.”

Moumbaris also told the author that he found Tsafendas to be “perfectly normal, a very intelligent, witty, serious and knowledgeable person.”⁴³⁴⁹

- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott’s boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest. He, too, disagrees with Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis. “Dimitri was not mad, not even a little. He was an exceptional man, very clever too.”⁴³⁵⁰
- Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos was Tsafendas’s landlady for three weeks in 1966. She testified to the police that she “considered him to be a completely normal person.”⁴³⁵¹
- Andreas Babiolakis lived with Tsafendas in the same house in Beira for two or three months and knew him since they were children. As for Tsafendas being mad, he told the author:

“If he was mad, then the whole world must be mad. He was not even the slightest disturbed. Every single Greek in Mozambique discussed Dimitri after we heard about the tapeworm; not even one from those who had met him believed that he was mad. He was not; we all said the same thing. He made it up, as he did with the Saint Peter act. If someone believes that he was mad, he did not meet him Dimitri, but someone else. Dimitris was ahead of his time. Everything he was saying about Africa and Mozambique was correct and have happened. He was telling us [the Greeks], including me, to take our money and leave as long as there was time, because sooner or later the Portuguese would be kicked out and everything we had ‘stolen’ from the Mozambicans would be returned to them. We should have heard him, but none of us did and I told you what happened ... he was a good and bright man. The things he was saying at the time seemed wrong and

⁴³⁴⁹ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

⁴³⁵⁰ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴³⁵¹ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

maybe stupid, but we couldn't see beyond our noses."⁴³⁵²

- Nick Papadakis also lived with Tsafendas in the same flat for two months in Beira and Gondola. He told the author: "I never believed, not even after I read what happened in the trial, that he was insane. He played the fool and they believed him. It's impossible that he was insane, he was absolutely fine and very clever."⁴³⁵³
- Eleni Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas's stepsister, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁴³⁵⁴
- Evangelia Nissiotis, Tsafendas's stepsister, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁴³⁵⁵
- Irene Michaletos was visited frequently by Tsafendas in her house in Beira for several months between 1964 and 1965. He even spent the night there several times. She never noticed anything wrong with him and was sure that he was perfectly sane. She flatly denied to the author the suggestion that Tsafendas was unable to function on a reasonable level.⁴³⁵⁶
- In 1951 and between 1963 and 1965, Tsafendas slept for several nights in the house of his aunt Artemis Michaletos in Lourenço Marques. Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins and Artemis's sons, who also lived at the same house at the time, spent several hours talking to him. They both strongly denied to the author that Tsafendas was unable to function at a reasonable level. They both consider him to be "a very intelligent and capable person." Furthermore, they told the author that their mother who had brought Tsafendas up in Egypt and lived in Lourenço Marques while he was growing up there, always maintained that he was "perfectly sane and very intelligent." John Michaletos also told the author that he and his mother used to tell Tsafendas that "he should be a politician or a lawyer," on account of cleverness and excellent fluency in talking.⁴³⁵⁷ It is difficult to believe that Artemis and John Michaletos would have envisaged Tsafendas as a successful politician or lawyer if he was unable to function on a reasonable level.

⁴³⁵² Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴³⁵³ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴³⁵⁴ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴³⁵⁵ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴³⁵⁶ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴³⁵⁷ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

Artemis had known him since he was two and a half years old and watched him learn and grow through infancy. It is difficult to believe that Artemis and John Michaletos would have envisaged Tsafendas as a successful politician or lawyer if he talking in a disjointed manner. Artemis had known him since he was two and a half years old and watched him learn and grow through infancy. John Michaletos also smiled and shook his head in disbelief at Dr. Cooper's statement on which he refused to comment because he found it absurd; he believes that what he already told the author about Tsafendas was enough to demonstrate how wrong Dr. Cooper's diagnosis was.⁴³⁵⁸

- Stelios Marangos was Tsafendas's landlord in Beira for six weeks. He did not mention anything to the police about Tsafendas being "unstable" or strange.⁴³⁵⁹

In addition to the above testimonies, the author asked fifty-eight people who knew Tsafendas and none of them believed that Tsafendas was unable to function on a reasonable level. The statements of those who knew him better are listed in the Tapeworm section.

Furthermore, Tsafendas was a frequent babysitter for the sons of his half-sister Elena Vlachopoulos, who were seven and five-years old, and for the three-year-old son of his sister-in-law Fotini Gavasiadis in Pretoria, as well as for the four-year-old daughter of his friend Patrick O'Ryan in Cape Town.⁴³⁶⁰ It is unthinkable that parents would trust a person to look after their children if they thought there was something wrong with him or that he was unable to function on a reasonable level.

Furthermore, Tsafendas's "activities" while in prison after the assassination is further proof of his ability to function and adjust to any given circumstances. While imprisoned on Robben Island and later in Pretoria Central Prison, he spent most of his time in solitary confinement, separated from other prisoners and without access to books, newspapers, radio or magazines. After a few years in Pretoria Central Prison he was allowed to read the Bible and a little later he was allowed to read dictionaries, but nothing else. In both prisons, even the warders were not allowed to talk to him. He was in complete isolation. Sometimes he spent several days without being allowed to come out of his cell. In order to fill his time and

⁴³⁵⁸ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴³⁵⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴³⁶⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

to not go crazy (as he said), resourceful as ever, he found ways of passing the time and having something to do.

Since he had no one to talk to and nothing to do Tsafendas developed a programme of mind activities to do while in the cell; partly to fill his time, but mostly, as he specifically said, to keep his mind active and sharp. He had loved music since he was a child, and there had not been many days when he had not listened to it. Since he was now not allowed access to a radio, Tsafendas started signing inside himself (in his mind and with the back of his mouth, but not out loud) revolutionary songs, such as the *Song of Freedom* and *Bella Ciao*. He believed that the lyrics of the songs gave him strength, but it was also a form of entertainment for him.⁴³⁶¹

Tsafendas believed that in order to keep his mind active and sharp, he had to be creative. Throughout his time in jail, he had created a “reading hour” and a “writing hour” for each day, in which he would read in his mind some of his favourite books and try to recreate them with pictures in his mind, or else create a completely new story. He told Father Minas that it was like watching a movie in his mind. Generally, he tried to sleep as much as possible, so he could dream.⁴³⁶²

Tsafendas said that he was trying to keep his mind constantly busy and thought that the best way of doing it, also because it was helping to beat the boredom, was to create stories. He claimed that he had created thousands of stories in this fashion. He stopped this technique as soon as he was transferred to the Sterkfontein hospital where he had access to newspapers, radio, books and even TV. On other occasions, while he was trying to sleep, he would think of a historical event, for example the Storming of the Bastille, and imagine how it must have happened; how it must have been, how the events had unfolded as he knew them, based on what he had read.⁴³⁶³

Furthermore, in order to keep his mind sharp and active, he even came up with mathematical problems. He would quickly come up with large and complicated numbers, usually dividing them and multiplying them with other large numbers. For example, 2.764 times 23 divided by 8 and things like that. Tsafendas enjoyed this enormously and created each day a “mathematical hour” in which he attempted to solve mathematical problems like

⁴³⁶¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴³⁶² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴³⁶³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

this. Books, fictional stories and mathematical problems were not the only things in his mind. He also dreamt of his life outside the prison once he was released. He hoped that one day he would be released. He was dreaming of another life in Cuba or in a democratic South Africa or Mozambique.⁴³⁶⁴

Sleeping was Tsafendas's favourite activity in prison. He went to sleep, hoping that he would have a pleasant dream. It was during his time in prison that he first started sleeping in the afternoons. Before this, he had generally believed that sleeping was a waste of time and had tried to sleep as little as possible: just enough to give him strength. Usually he slept for six hours every day and eight on Sundays. However, in prison, he slept much more than that. He was desperate to dream and carry himself outside of the prison, and he believed that by making up stories in his mind and revisiting books he had read, he was helping himself to dream better.⁴³⁶⁵

Finally, the Commission of Enquiry questioned all of Tsafendas's closest family, including his step-mother, Marika, two of his three half-sisters, his half-brother, his two brothers-in-law and his sister-in-law. Every one of them told the Commission that Tsafendas "was definitely not insane."⁴³⁶⁶ Furthermore, the Commission of Enquiry reported that persons who knew Tsafendas and his family in Pretoria considered him to be "eccentric, but did not think he was mentally disordered."⁴³⁶⁷

According to Professor Burke it would have been impossible for these people, especially those who lived with him under the same roof, not to notice if Tsafendas was mentally unstable. It would not have been possible for Tsafendas to hide his schizophrenia for so long from so many. He said:

"If Tsafendas's functioning was so impaired, someone would have noticed - all these years and all these people. How would people not have picked this up? His employers, his family members, whatever? Schizophrenia is blatant, you can see it, and there would have been times that he would have been overtly, observably, psychotic, and if you know psychotic people, you see it. Schizophrenic patients, typically, do not look after themselves; they would not bath, they would not shave, they would act in strange ways, you would see

⁴³⁶⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴³⁶⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴³⁶⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴³⁶⁷ Report of the COE, Chapter II C, Paragraph 6. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

that they are hallucinating, so there would be some very clear indicators that there is something wrong with them, in any kind of environment. His family would have picked it up, his employers would have picked it up, those people would have picked it up.

The other thing that we have to question is how he could plan his behaviour and his trips, so perfectly? What you typically find with schizophrenic patients, is they become homeless people, so they can't find a job, or whatever the case may be, so, in his case, he was very rational and planning in what he did. I mean, if the story about the hospital in England is true (about visiting the Isle of Wight and immediately admitting himself to the hospital), that requires a lot of planning: 'I'm going to go there, and I'm going to stay in the hospital, and I'm going to go ...' that, typically doesn't happen. You would see paranoid schizophrenic patients as homeless people, because they drop out of society, they can't think, they can't plan, they can't really care for themselves, and that's the giveaway. So, your first indication of schizophrenia is to what extent personal hygiene is intact, to what extent the person can function properly, because if you have schizophrenia, you can't do any of those things."⁴³⁶⁸

A man who was able to find a job wherever he wanted in almost every country he went to can clearly function on a reasonable level. In addition, Tsafendas was able to plan and find a solution to his financial problem when he was stuck in Istanbul without money. He sold his blood at a hospital in order to earn some money.⁴³⁶⁹ Finally, two examples of Tsafendas's powers of observation and his supposed "inability" to function on a reasonable level:

In August 1976, the British Sunday newspaper *The Observer* published a story which claimed that Tsafendas was a broken, old man, who was being ill-treated by the warders in Pretoria Maximum Security Central Prison. General H.J. van den Bergh, the head of BOSS, the South African intelligence agency, sent Gordon Winter, a journalist employed by the government newspaper *The Citizen*⁴³⁷⁰ and an undercover agent for BOSS, to do a story refuting these claims.⁴³⁷¹

Winter visited Tsafendas accompanied by General Jannie Roux, the Deputy

⁴³⁶⁸ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

⁴³⁶⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴³⁷⁰ *The Citizen* was a government-funded English-language newspaper, launched in 1976. It was a pro-apartheid propaganda sheet designed to counter the liberal political position of the long-established *Rand Daily Mail* and to positively promote apartheid (Hachten and Giffard, 1984: 250-251, 275; Sanders, 2006: 99).

⁴³⁷¹ Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*. 1997; Winter, 1981: 477-479.

Commissioner of Prisons and by Brigadier Gerrie Visser, the Commanding Officer of the Pretoria prison. Speaking in front of the prison officials, Tsafendas denied being ill-treated. However, when Winter found himself alone with Tsafendas for a few minutes, he whispered to him, "Of course, you must have been ill-treated at *some* time, haven't you?" Tsafendas turned to him and said coolly, "You are obviously here to do a denial story for the new government newspaper *The Citizen*, so what's that question supposed to mean?" Winter was stunned. Tsafendas had not only deduced that Winter's instructions were to produce a denial of *The Observer* story, but he had realised that *The Citizen*, which had only recently been launched, was the government's mouthpiece. Winter then said, "I can't write a completely one-sided story saying what a bed of roses you have in jail. I've got to put a few small niggles in to make it look credible." Tsafendas got the point and a little later, when Roux and Visser returned, Winter asked him if he had any complaints. Taking his cue, Tsafendas smiled at Brigadier Visser, "Yes," he said, "there was one warder who was always abusive and tormented me. One day when he pretended to spit in my tray of food I complained to the Brigadier. And you reprimanded him severely, didn't you sir?" Visser was caught off guard by Tsafendas and, flustered, agreed that he had done so. Winter said later that Tsafendas was not just sane, but "a highly intelligent man, seriously highly intelligent, remarkably astute, charming and even witty."⁴³⁷²

The first time Father Minas Constandinou visited him in prison, their guard was walking nervously up and down. Tsafendas said he was trying to decide if the guard was getting a divorce or if his wife was just untidy. When the priest asked what he meant, Tsafendas pointed out that the guard was wearing a wedding ring, proof that he was married. His shoes were always shined but often his uniform was not ironed. While it was easy for a man to clean his shoes, Tsafendas said, many men could not iron their clothes. This suggested to him that either his wife was incompetent or lax in domestic affairs or they were not living together.⁴³⁷³

The very next defence witnesses, next day, Dr. Muller, would contradict Dr. Cooper's testimony. Dr. Muller, although not a psychiatrist, would find Tsafendas "not particularly disturbed", "intelligent and able to understand what was said to him", with "no difficulty at

⁴³⁷² Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*. 1997; Winter, 1981: 477-479.

⁴³⁷³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

all in expressing himself” and with no problem communicating and answering his questions.⁴³⁷⁴

Professors Alban Burke, Phillip Resnick, Robert L. Sadoff and Tuviah Zabow believe that it is extremely unlikely, and very close to impossible, that none of the people who knew Tsafendas, some extremely well, ever noticed that he was unable to function on a reasonable level.⁴³⁷⁵ Reyner van Zyl, who examined Tsafendas for the defence, told the author that it was “highly improbable.”⁴³⁷⁶

TSAFENDAS NOT BEING LAZY

The Court attempted to claim that Tsafendas was probably lazy, but Dr. Cooper dismissed this suggestion. He said Tsafendas “did not fall into that category” and that it was the tapeworm perception which caused Tsafendas to lose all these jobs. What is surprising here is that the police and the Attorney-General were in possession of evidence supporting the argument that Tsafendas was indeed lazy, which was why he had lost several jobs, but none of this evidence was used. The following facts and statements were available:

- On June 12, 1942, the Deputy Commissioner of Witwatersrand Division of the South African Police, informed the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs that when working for the British Mining Supply Company, Tsafendas “was discharged from his employment on account of irregular attendance and loafing.”⁴³⁷⁷
- Keith Martincich told the police that Tsafendas “appeared to be one of the laziest persons that I have ever seen ... He was definitely lazy.”⁴³⁷⁸
- Ralph Lighton told the police: “I got to know that he was lazy and inefficient.”⁴³⁷⁹

⁴³⁷⁴ Dr. Hendrik Muller testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴³⁷⁵ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Robert L. Sadoff in a personal interview with the author, 12 August 2015; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 10 October 2016.

⁴³⁷⁶ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 17 April 2016.

⁴³⁷⁷ Confidential Letter of the Lieutenant for the Deputy Commissioner of Witwatersrand Division to the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs. 12 June 1942. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

⁴³⁷⁸ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁷⁹ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

- Jacobus Bornman told the police: “I believed that he was a lazy person.”⁴³⁸⁰
- Charles Nissiotis told the police: “I asked him to assist my wife in the cafe we owned at that time. He was however so lazy that my wife told him to leave within the first two days.”⁴³⁸¹
- Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg: “the accused was work-shy for hard work.”⁴³⁸²
- Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos He: “he gave me the impression that he is work-shy.”⁴³⁸³
- Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen, Tsafendas's tram instructor, testified to the police that he was “slow” and “lazy.”⁴³⁸⁴
- According to a PIDE report given to the South African police, in 1962 Tsafendas was dismissed for being lazy while working as a welder on a bridge over the river Tejo in Lisbon.⁴³⁸⁵

Because none of this bountiful available evidence was led, Dr. Cooper's misdiagnosis prevailed. What is certain is that his diagnosis would have been entirely different had he been aware of such information. Tsafendas himself admitted to many witnesses that he was lazy. He said that he would work only hard enough to make ends meet and only when absolutely necessary.

His half-sister Katerina Pnema described him to the author as being “bone-lazy.” She said: “If you told him to come and help clean the house, he would tell you, ‘I can't be bothered.’ But if you told him, ‘Let's go to clean the place where a political meeting was going to take place or to distribute political leaflets,’ he would have come immediately.”⁴³⁸⁶ Andreas Babiolakis stated to the author that Tsafendas “was one of the laziest persons I have ever seen. You could tell from the way he was walking he was lazy; he was so slow.”⁴³⁸⁷

⁴³⁸⁰ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁸¹ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁸² Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁸³ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁸⁴ Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴³⁸⁵ Confidential PIDE report regarding Dimitro Tsafendas, 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴³⁸⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴³⁸⁷ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

Generally, he found work boring, except when he liked the job. He said his favourite job was that of a teacher, and said that he could even do it for free, which was one reason why he taught children voluntarily in Mozambique and in Istanbul.

Although Tsafendas's tendency was to indolence, he would often work without pay when he wanted to help people. He taught the children freely in Turkey and Mozambique because he thought it was important for them to learn. He helped an elderly Indian man in Beira to build an additional room to his house for his daughter's wedding, joining in the physical labour.⁴³⁸⁸ He helped the sister of his brother in law in her café in Pretoria. The volunteering jobs, were probably unknown to the State, but his teaching stint in Istanbul and the one with F.A. Poole must have been known and could have been used against the argument that Tsafendas was unable to hold a job, and only simple and menial ones at that - unless the Attorney-General considered college-level teaching to be simple and menial.

During Dr. Cooper's testimony, he refers to something Tsafendas told him, adding "if his story is correct." However he does not check if it is correct when it would have been relatively easy to do so. In fairness, much of the evidence for Tsafendas's laziness would have been unknown to Dr. Cooper. As for the Attorney-General, once again, the author is not in position to know whether he was given all relevant information or chose not to use it.

There is further evidence which contradicts Dr. Cooper's conclusion regarding Tsafendas's employment record and activities. This will be considered in relation to Dr. Kossew as some of it is more relevant to his testimony.

TSAFENDAS'S RELATIONSHIPS

DR. COOPER: In this type of mental illness, the individual tends to be rather isolated from his surroundings in the sense that he tends to not make any close friends, not maintain any close friendships - he does not really concern himself terribly with any intimate relationship and is in fact quite unable to form and maintain any intimate relationships. He tends to be rather untidy, neglectful of his appearance; he tends to have difficulties in concentrating and applying himself consistently; he tends in fact to be a daydreamer, preoccupied with his own inner thoughts which are not in fact directly related to the environment around him; and he

⁴³⁸⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

quite often tends to lead an aimless, almost vagrant, useless sort of life, with very little go, very little ambition, very little achievement, very little worthwhile.”

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S RELATIONSHIPS

a. *“In this type of mental illness the individual tends to be rather isolated from his surroundings in the sense that he tends to not make any close friends, not maintain any close friendships - he does not really concern himself terribly with any intimate relationship and is in fact quite unable to form and maintain any intimate relationships.”*

To relate this condition to Tsafendas and claim that he was “isolated from his surroundings,” unable to form an intimate relationship and that he did not maintain any close friendship is entirely inaccurate. Tsafendas had two very good childhood friends and kept in touch with them all his life.

The first was Manuel, who he knew as a small boy when they played together. After leaving Mozambique, Tsafendas kept in touch with Manuel, corresponding regularly and often sending him gifts from wherever he was in the world at that time. In 1951, when Tsafendas was denied entry in Lourenço Marques, he took refuge in Manuel's house, and when he returned to the city in 1963, they were together almost every day. He also spent a few evenings in Manuel's house. He stayed in touch with Manuel up until his arrest for Verwoerd's assassination.⁴³⁸⁹

Another childhood friend was John Michaletos,⁴³⁹⁰ who corresponded with Tsafendas even while he was in jail; in 1947 he recruited Tsafendas to the Greek Communist Party and its military wing the DSE, and Tsafendas spent Christmas with him in 1961. The two were together consistently from 1926 to 1941 and from 1947 to 1949.⁴³⁹¹

Another friend from school days was George Grispos, who also kept in touch over the years; Tsafendas visited him in Umtali in 1963.⁴³⁹² Another friendship which endured over the years was between Tsafendas and Ira Kyriakakis⁴³⁹³ and he was also very friendly with

⁴³⁸⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴³⁹⁰ Again we do not know whether it is the doctor or the professor.

⁴³⁹¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴³⁹² Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁴³⁹³ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

Irene Michaletos, daughter-in-law of his aunt Artemis Michaletos.⁴³⁹⁴

Tsafendas's best friend was Patrick O'Ryan. Tsafendas lived in his house for five months and then visited him at his home at least once every ten days. He rated him the best person he ever met. Patrick O'Ryan testified openly that he thought very highly of Tsafendas.⁴³⁹⁵ When he died, O'Ryan travelled from Cape Town to Sterkfontein for his funeral.⁴³⁹⁶

Father Nikola Banovic who lived with Tsafendas for four to five months in Istanbul in 1961 also formed a strong relationship with Tsafendas and they kept in touch until Tsafendas was imprisoned. Tsafendas formed a strong bond with Limasollu Naci, the language college owner in Istanbul who hired him to teach English.⁴³⁹⁷ Tsafendas also had a very warm friendship with Fotini Gavasiadis, the sister of Nikos Vlachopoulos, his brother in law. Fotini invited Tsafendas to be a guest in the house where she lived with her husband and small son in Pretoria in 1963. After a few weeks, he moved into an apartment next door where he stayed for the following eight months. During this period, he spent much of his time back in her house, almost like flatmates. Throughout these nine months, Tsafendas and Gavasiadis also worked together in her brother's café. Fotini got to know Tsafendas very well and ranked among his closest friends.⁴³⁹⁸ Finally, he also had a very good friendship with Helen Kavadias-Grispos, Giorgos Grispos's wife, another he had known since they were children.⁴³⁹⁹

The above were all "close friendships." When it came to "intimate relationships," Tsafendas was keen to marry and raise a family, as was testified Helen Daniels,⁴⁴⁰⁰ Caroline Barbeau⁴⁴⁰¹ and Tsafendas himself.⁴⁴⁰² Tsafendas, Helen Daniels and Caroline Barbeau⁴⁴⁰³ told the police that he wanted to be reclassified as Coloured in order to marry Helen Daniels.

⁴³⁹⁴ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴³⁹⁵ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Patrick O' Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁴³⁹⁶ *South African Press Association*, 9 October 1999, 'Small group gather for Tsafendas' funeral.'

⁴³⁹⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴³⁹⁸ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴³⁹⁹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁴⁴⁰⁰ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴⁴⁰¹ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴⁰² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁴⁰³ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Tsafendas also had a special interest in Sybie Barendilla.⁴⁴⁰⁴

It is impossible to know specifics of the love life of a peripatetic person such as Tsafendas, but as an adult, he certainly had at least two long and serious relationships. They were both in the 1950s; with a German woman while he lived in Germany which lasted for at least two years, and with a Portuguese woman while he lived in Lisbon which lasted at least a year. In addition, Tsafendas also had a relationship with a Turkish woman in Istanbul which lasted a few months but ended because neither was willing to accept the other's religion in order to marry, and with a Greek woman in Athens in the late 1940s. In his younger years, he had another two relationships of at least a year each with Stella, a Mozambican woman around 1936-1939, and a Jewish woman in South Africa for a year around 1940.⁴⁴⁰⁵ Jacobus Bornman, Tsafendas's flatmate for two months told the police, "As far as I know, Tsafendas loves women, he talked a lot about women and I believed that he attended church services so often to make contact with the woman he met there."⁴⁴⁰⁶

Dr. Cooper characterised the Tsafendas type as "isolated... a day-dreamer preoccupied with his own inner thoughts." While two witnesses out of around two hundred who testified to the police and to the Commission that Tsafendas "did not mix freely and kept to himself most of the time",⁴⁴⁰⁷ and that he was "not very talkative,"⁴⁴⁰⁸ the vast majority declared the opposite.

- William Mare Volbrecht, a friend and schoolmate at the English Medium Primary School in Middleburg, testified to the police that Tsafendas was "never a loner and freely mingled with us."⁴⁴⁰⁹ Tsafendas's half-sister, Katerina Pnefma, his first cousin who grew up with him in Egypt and Lourenço Marques, and Ira Kyriakakis, Helen Grispos and Andreas Babiolakis, who also grew up with him, said that from childhood Tsafendas was

⁴⁴⁰⁴ Sybie Barendilla statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴⁰⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; van Woerden, 2000: 139.

⁴⁴⁰⁶ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴⁰⁷ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴⁰⁸ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴⁰⁹ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Verklaring deur Majdor Venter. NASA.

sociable, friendly and very talkative.⁴⁴¹⁰

- Johannes Aurets, Tsafendas's supervisor at the South African Railways, told the police Tsafendas "was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature. During the time he was employed under my supervision, i.e. for approximately three weeks, I did not see him being cross at any time."⁴⁴¹¹
- An unnamed "respected member of the Press gallery" in the House of Assembly "who knew Tsafendas well" spoke to Rene MacColl, of the *Daily Express*, about Tsafendas. He said that "far from being a withdrawn sort of man, he seemed to be intent on impressing his personality on one. There was always the big smile, the ready chat and an almost obsessive intention to make you remember him. There couldn't have been a less grey or faceless figure."⁴⁴¹²
- J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a "sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man."⁴⁴¹³
- Keith Martincich who worked with him at the Marine Diamond Corporation testified that Tsafendas "spoke to me every day and I got the impression that he was sociable type."⁴⁴¹⁴
- Hulse, who worked with him at the Marine Diamond Corporation for nine or ten weeks said "Tsafendas was very talkative and always expressed his..."⁴⁴¹⁵
- Ian Boswell of the Department of Labour, in his description of Tsafendas, included the phrase, "aside from being over talkative ..."⁴⁴¹⁶
- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, another employment officer at the Department of Labour,

⁴⁴¹⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁴¹¹ Johannes Jaonus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴¹² *Daily Express*, 9 September 1966: 2, 'Was it murder incorporated?'

⁴⁴¹³ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. 'Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.'

⁴⁴¹⁴ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴¹⁵ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; The edge of the document was not copied, so the word is missing.

⁴⁴¹⁶ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

testified that “he was very talkative.”⁴⁴¹⁷

- Owen Smorenberg, who worked with him for five-six weeks, testified that “Tsafendas was very talkative and gave the impression that he was very friendly. He wanted to talk to everybody and it became known to me that he was able to speak different languages.”⁴⁴¹⁸
- Albert Vercueil, his boss at F.A. Poole Engineering for five months, found him to be a “very friendly, social and talkative person.”⁴⁴¹⁹
- Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden worked with Tsafendas for some three months at the Marine Diamond Corporation and testified that “he was friendly, outgoing, and was not aloof.”⁴⁴²⁰
- Jacobus Bormman, his flatmate for two months, summed Tsafendas up as “a friendly and plausible person.”⁴⁴²¹
- Michaelis Augustides, Tsafendas’s employer for two months, found him to be “overly talkative and sociable.”⁴⁴²²
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁴⁴²³
- Jose Lopez Baltazar a fireman in Beira, testified that “when Tsafendas was in the presence of Whites he said little or nothing, but was friendly and talkative with the Bantu. On one or two occasions Tsafendas, while talking with Bantu, stopped talking when he

⁴⁴¹⁷ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁴⁴¹⁸ Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

⁴⁴¹⁹ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴²⁰ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴²¹ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴²² Lambley, 1980: 241.

⁴⁴²³ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

approached.”⁴⁴²⁴

- Reginald Maile, shipguard on the *Eleni*, testified that Tsafendas was “on very friendly relations with the crew.”⁴⁴²⁵
- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for two months and testified to the police that he had “a very friendly way of talking.”⁴⁴²⁶ Judson later said that Tsafendas was “overly talkative and sociable.”⁴⁴²⁷
- Jose Baltazar, a fireman in Beira, testified to the police that when Tsafendas “was in the presence of whites he said little or nothing, but was friendly and talkative with the Bantu.”⁴⁴²⁸
- Panagiotis Peroglou who knew Tsafendas for about a year, testified to the police but his statements have gone missing, However, in a personal interview, he and his wife Pamela Abrahams, who had also met Tsafendas, characterised him as “very talkative, courteous and friendly.”⁴⁴²⁹
- Peter Pappas said that Tsafendas often ate at his cafe and he found him pleasant. Pappas also stated that Tsafendas was friendly with white down-and-outs and when he had some money he would give them a few cents.⁴⁴³⁰
- Colleagues at Durban Magistrate’s Court described him as the “chatty Greek.”⁴⁴³¹

Perhaps, the most convincing proof that Tsafendas was not “rather isolated from his surroundings in the sense that he tends to not make any close friends, not maintain any close friendships - he does not really concern himself terribly with any intimate relationship,” as Dr. Cooper suggested, comes from Guenter Haafe, doorman at the Frankfurt factory where Tsafendas worked for six weeks in 1958. Haafe was interviewed eight years later, shortly after the assassination, and vividly remembered the jovial greeting Tsafendas gave him every morning. “He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come

⁴⁴²⁴ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁴²⁵ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁴⁴²⁶ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁴⁴²⁷ Lambley, 1980: 241.

⁴⁴²⁸ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁴²⁹ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁴⁴³⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁴⁴³¹ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Algumas versoes sobre a vida de Tsafendas.’

into my locker (room) to say Hi. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met and trust me, in my twelve years as a doorman I have seen thousands and thousands of faces coming in and out. This man was courteous, they do not make them like that anymore.”⁴⁴³² Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas's chief on the Frankfurt job, said Tsafendas was “well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous ... a very pleasant man... he looked like a satisfied, successful businessman we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.”⁴⁴³³

As well as the witnesses questioned by the police, most of the sixty-nine interviewed by the author characterised Tsafendas as very friendly, very sociable and very talkative. None agreed with Dr. Cooper's diagnosis. Their testimonies cannot be listed here for reasons of space, but the words of those reproduced above clearly prove Dr Cooper's diagnosis was wrong.⁴⁴³⁴ Again, none of the statements given to the police was used to challenge Dr. Cooper.

b. *“He tends to be rather untidy, neglectful of his appearance.”*

Wholly or partly inaccurate is the reference to Tsafendas looking untidy and neglected. Four witnesses made statements to the police supporting Dr. Cooper's testimony:

- Helen Daniels testified to the police that when she first saw Tsafendas his “clothes were dirty and neglected.” However, Tsafendas had just arrived in Cape Town from Durban after a twenty-four-hour journey by train but also hitch-hiking. Helen Daniels also testified that Tsafendas had with him a “large bundle of dirty laundry.” All this suggests is that Tsafendas had not been able to wash his clothes. This was confirmed by Merle Daniels, Helen's sister-in-law, who testified that as soon as Tsafendas arrived, he gave her all his clothes to be washed and after that, his clothes were always clean.⁴⁴³⁵
- Nickolas Nel, who had an argument with Tsafendas while they were working at F.A.

⁴⁴³² *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

⁴⁴³³ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin.’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

⁴⁴³⁴ If someone is not satisfied with the evidence presented here, the study can produce all the statements regarding this issue.

⁴⁴³⁵ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

Poole Engineering, testified that he “had a messy and dirty appearance.”⁴⁴³⁶

- Landlady Wilhelmina de Vos testified that Tsafendas was “dirty.”⁴⁴³⁷
- Gillian Claire Lieberman, personnel secretary with Marine Diamond Corporation, told the police that Tsafendas had “dirty, sloppy clothes.”⁴⁴³⁸ But she had only seen Tsafendas at work, where dirty clothes were the norm.

However, the majority who talked to the police said Tsafendas's appearance was neat and clean and that he was very well dressed:

- The report by Police Col. van Wyk, which contained interviews with people from Rhodesia and Mozambique, concluded that Tsafendas “was always neatly dressed.”⁴⁴³⁹
- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas's landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry, “It was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me, he was well-dressed, well-spoken and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means.”⁴⁴⁴⁰
- Ian Boswell, an officer at the Department of Labour, testified that Tsafendas was “at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute.”⁴⁴⁴¹
- Gideon Cloete, an officer at the Department of Labour, testified that Tsafendas “was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance.”⁴⁴⁴²
- Jacobus Bornman testified that “according to my observation, Tsafendas was a gentle person. He was neat in his person, but his eating habits were not up to scratch.”⁴⁴⁴³

⁴⁴³⁶ Marle Daniels testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁴³⁷ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴³⁸ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴³⁹ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁴⁴⁰ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁴⁴⁴¹ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁴⁴⁴² Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁴⁴⁴³ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys of the Department of Labour in Cape Town interviewed Tsafendas twice. He told the police that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed.”⁴⁴⁴⁴
- Redvers Quintin Wakfer, who worked with Tsafendas at the Power Station in Cape Town, testified that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed.”⁴⁴⁴⁵
- Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas “was well-dressed and appeared to be wealthy.”⁴⁴⁴⁶
- Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, testified that Tsafendas “was well-dressed and gave a good appearance” although as far as she could see he had no visible means of support.⁴⁴⁴⁷ She later also stated that Tsafendas was always very well dressed and never saw him wearing dirty clothes except when he was coming back from work. “He was always well-dressed. I remember my poor mother often knitting something for him.” She also remembers Tsafendas being overly clean as a child, refusing to eat without washing his hands first. “When we were playing outside the house and someone had a chocolate or some bread, he would first go to the house, wash his hands and then he would eat it.”⁴⁴⁴⁸
- For two months in 1966 Tsafendas had his meals in Mary Scott’s boarding house. She told the police, “Whilst the accused had his meals with me, I found him to be very poorly mannered - so-much-so that I named him “Vark.” His clothing however was clean and always tidy.”⁴⁴⁴⁹
- Sidney Wiehand, one of the three senior messengers who interviewed Tsafendas for a job in Parliament, said that in order to be hired, one “must always be neat.”⁴⁴⁵⁰ The fact that Tsafendas was appointed suggests that he met the dress criterion.

⁴⁴⁴⁴ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁴⁴⁴⁵ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA; Redvers Quintin Wakfer statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub File: 1/5, Subject Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁴⁴⁴⁶ Edward Furness statement to the police 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁴⁴⁷ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁴⁴⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁴⁴⁹ Mary Kathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴⁵⁰ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

The author asked forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas well about the way he was dressed. Only two of them, Andreas Babiolakis and Costas Poriadis, said that they once saw Tsafendas looking neglected and wearing a torn shirt. However, that was on the day he was released from jail in Beira in February 1965. Having just spent several days in a prison cell, wearing the same clothes every day and being beaten up, he could hardly have appeared otherwise. Both witnesses said this was the only time they saw Tsafendas looking less than perfectly dressed.⁴⁴⁵¹ None of the rest said Tsafendas was of a dirty or neglected appearance. Indeed, the vast majority remembered him as dressing well and looking like a gentleman. It is not possible to reproduce here more than a hundred statements that contradict Dr. Cooper's view. The following are only from those who knew Tsafendas well or saw him very often:

- Father Nikola Banovic, in 1961, lived in the same house as Tsafendas for four months and in a house next door for another two or three months. He saw Tsafendas virtually every day and says he was always a very clean person and well-dressed, wearing a different hat each day.⁴⁴⁵²
- Fotini Gavasiadis invited Tsafendas to be a guest in the house where she lived with her husband and small son in Pretoria in 1963. After a few weeks, he moved into an apartment next door where he stayed for the following eight months. During this period, he spent much of his time back in her house, almost like flatmates. Throughout these nine months, Tsafendas and Gavasiadis also worked together in her brother's café. Fotini got to know Tsafendas very well and ranked among his closest friends, along with Patrick O'Ryan, Manuel and Father Nikola.

Gavasiadis told the author that it is "nonsense" to say Tsafendas was not well-dressed or dirty, that in fact he always very well dressed and clean. "Sometimes it took him longer than it took me to get ready, trying to find a more suitable hat or tie. He adored hats and ties. He never wore the same clothes for two days in a row and when it was hot he would even change twice per day. He adored hats and ties."⁴⁴⁵³

- Reuben O'Ryan lived with Tsafendas in the same house for five months and kept in touch with him for another year. He said Tsafendas "was always very clean and well-dressed,

⁴⁴⁵¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁴⁴⁵² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴⁴⁵³ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

apart from when he was coming home from work. That was the only time I saw him wearing dirty clothes. He always wore nice clothes and he always shaved.”⁴⁴⁵⁴

- Stanley O’Ryan lived with Tsafendas for five months at the same house and kept being in touch for another year. He remembers Tsafendas as “clean and well-dressed person.”⁴⁴⁵⁵
- Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas’s first cousin, knew him since he was five years old and grew up with him in Mozambique. She spent a lot of time with him in Pretoria in 1964, when they occupied the same house for two or three months. She insists that Tsafendas was always well-dressed and clean. She was impressed by his suits and Tsafendas told her that most of them were bought in Europe. “He was always well-dressed, very often wearing a hat, and was a very clean person. He was very fussy with clean hands when he was a child, and I think he was also like this when he grew up, but I can’t remember for sure.”⁴⁴⁵⁶
- Ira Kyriakakis, who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and remained a lifelong friend, described as “absolutely absurd” claims that Tsafendas was not well-dressed and clean. “He was always very well dressed; since he was a child. He looked like a gentleman. He used to wear hats he had bought from all over the world. He loved hats and he must have had tens of them. He came back to Lourenço Marques in the 1960s and brought me a hat for a present from Lisbon.”⁴⁴⁵⁷
- Irene Michaletos was very close to Tsafendas between 1964 and 1965 and remembers him as always well dressed and clean.⁴⁴⁵⁸
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas’s cousins, first met him in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique. They both remember Tsafendas being “always well dressed and clean.”⁴⁴⁵⁹
- Andreas Babiolakis knew Tsafendas since they were children and had lived in the same house as him in Beira for about two-three months. He finds the thought that Tsafendas had a dirty and neglected appearance as “absurd.” He recalls that Tsafendas “had a

⁴⁴⁵⁴ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁴⁴⁵⁵ Stanley O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 9 April 2015.

⁴⁴⁵⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁴⁵⁷ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴⁴⁵⁸ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁴⁵⁹ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

shower every morning when he woke and in the evening when he returned from work. He believed that he sweated in the night, so he had one in the morning.” Apart from the day mentioned before, he never saw Tsafendas with dirty clothes.⁴⁴⁶⁰

- Costas Chagios, a Cape Town café owner, got to know Tsafendas in 1965 when he walked into his restaurant, which thereafter he patronised more than fifty times. Chagios remembers Tsafendas as always well dressed and clean.⁴⁴⁶¹
- Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for about six-seven months in Istanbul in 1961. She was impressed by his many hats and remembers people commenting about how neatly he dressed. “I remember him coming to the church always wearing a tie.”⁴⁴⁶²
- Joyce Dick, one of Helen Daniels’s best friends at the time, stated to the author that whenever she saw Tsafendas, “he was always very neatly dressed.”⁴⁴⁶³
- Peter Protoulis was a supplier of foodstuffs to the tanker *Eleni*. He met Tsafendas on board and says, “I was very impressed by the way he was dressed. He always wore a suit and very often a tie and a hat. I never show him wearing the same clothes two days in a row.”⁴⁴⁶⁴
- Miltiades Kaldis knew Tsafendas for about a year, having met him in 1965 in Cape Town. He remembers him “looking clean and well-dressed.”⁴⁴⁶⁵
- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott’s boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest. He remembers Tsafendas as always well-dressed and clean, often wearing suits and hats.⁴⁴⁶⁶
- Helen Grispos was another who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques, and her mother was the best friend of Tsafendas’s step-mother. “He was always very well dressed, even as a child; his step-mother always looked after him. When he visited us in the 1960s, I remember he wore a big hat he said he had bought somewhere in Europe. I don’t remember what he was wearing, but I remember the hat. It was very distinctive. He

⁴⁴⁶⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴⁴⁶¹ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015.

⁴⁴⁶² Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁴⁴⁶³ Joyce Dick in a personal interview, 6 August 2016.

⁴⁴⁶⁴ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 3 August 2016.

⁴⁴⁶⁵ Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016.

⁴⁴⁶⁶ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

was certainly well-dressed.”⁴⁴⁶⁷

- Peter Peroglou ate at the same place as Tsafendas for several months in 1966. He remembers him being well-dressed and very courteous.⁴⁴⁶⁸
- Pamela Abrahams, Peroglou's wife, also ate at the same place as Tsafendas for several months in 1966. She also remembers him being well-dressed and very courteous.⁴⁴⁶⁹
- Nick Augustides is the son of the owner of Mike's Outfitters in Cape Town for whom Tsafendas worked on commission for about two months in 1966. He knew Tsafendas for three-four months and his memory is of “a well-dressed man.”⁴⁴⁷⁰
- The thirteen *Eleni* crewmen were impressed with the way Tsafendas dressed. He told some of them that most of his suits were bought in Europe a few years ago and that he had not bought any new clothes since he returned to South Africa.⁴⁴⁷¹

In addition, Horst Hartmann, senior personnel officer at the heavy engineering company Fries and Son in Frankfurt, where Tsafendas worked as a welder, said in a newspaper interview in 1966:

“He drove up here in a big, battered American car. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man...he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on... we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.”

Tsafendas “left on his own wish” although Hartmann “would have liked to keep him.”⁴⁴⁷²

A point worth making is that opinions on dress and appearance are subjective. A man who seems dirty and neglected to one person is simply dishevelled or workaday to another. It is important also to remember that Tsafendas was a poor man, often forced to stay in cheap

⁴⁴⁶⁷ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁴⁴⁶⁸ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁴⁴⁶⁹ Pamela Abrahams in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁴⁴⁷⁰ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

⁴⁴⁷¹ Kleanthis Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴⁴⁷² *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin,’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

places without laundering facilities. Plus, his jobs, as a welder or fitter, for instance, were not conducive to smart dressing. The most important point regarding Dr. Cooper's statement, however, is not so much Tsafendas's appearance as the fact that the Attorney-General did nothing to challenge Dr. Cooper's deposition, despite witnesses' testimony to the contrary. Again, we do not know if this happened because of van den Berg's incompetence or because he was not given the necessary information. The result was that Dr. Cooper's diagnosis, much of it inaccurate, went seriously unchallenged.

c. *“He tends in fact to be a daydreamer, preoccupied with his own inner thoughts, which are not in fact directly related to the environment around him; and he quite often tends to lead an aimless, almost vagrant, useless sort of life, with very little go, very little ambition, very little achievement, very little worthwhile.”*

This third part of the psychiatrist's testimony is partly accurate. Tsafendas could be considered a daydreamer insofar as he dreamt that one day the people of South Africa would storm Parliament, as the French revolutionaries did at Versailles, and that apartheid would then collapse and everyone would be allowed to live altogether without any kind of separation. He also dreamt that Mozambique would become independent.⁴⁴⁷³

As for an “aimless... useless sort of life,” Tsafendas taught English without charge for six months to Greek and Turkish children in Istanbul and did the same for poor children in Mozambique. He became an active member of the British anti-apartheid and anti-fascist movements, participated in demonstrations and smuggled anti-apartheid literature into South Africa. By standing up for his political beliefs, he was exiled for twelve years from Mozambique, while in Portugal he was prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned and tortured. He toured villages in Beira trying to raise awareness of the independence cause and for this suffered further imprisonment and torture.⁴⁴⁷⁴ He joined the Greek Communist Party and its military wing, the DSE, during the Greek Civil War and fought for a cause was the achievement of an aim.⁴⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁴⁷³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁴⁷⁴ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁴⁷⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

However his political activities may be viewed by others, they cannot be considered “aimless” and representative of a “useless sort of life.” Many people go through life without really achieving anything or just live a simple life with very little “go” or “ambition.” Are they all schizophrenic? Tsafendas did enough during his lifetime to render significant service to society and far from being, aimless, he had well-defined goals that could never be described as “daydreaming.” He wanted “to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa” and was willing to do “anything that would get the South African regime out of power.”⁴⁴⁷⁶ The removal of Dr. Verwoerd was aimed at a change of national policy.⁴⁴⁷⁷

Tsafendas fearlessly told the PIDE agents who were questioning him that he wanted to see “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother-nation” and that he was strongly in favour of the independence of Mozambique.”⁴⁴⁷⁸ The fact that the Director-General of PIDE in Portugal instructed the Sub-Director of PIDE in Mozambique that “information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of your country should not be transmitted to the South African authorities,”⁴⁴⁷⁹ can also be seen as an achievement for Tsafendas.

Tsafendas worked tirelessly and at a hands-on level to achieve his goals of independence for Mozambique and political change in South Africa. He toured villages in Beira conducting “subversive” propaganda, distributing leaflets and books and telling people of the possibilities of independence for Mozambique, his country, always seeking to raise their awareness. The fact that PIDE considered him to be “a partisan for the independence of Mozambique” and deliberately hid his detailed file from the South African authorities certainly proves that he was far from just a “daydreamer.”

As for South Africa, smuggling anti-apartheid literature into that country, asking visitors not to spend money there which would boost the apartheid economy and finally killing the man he believed had “created apartheid” and was “the brains behind

⁴⁴⁷⁶ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁴⁷⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁴⁷⁸ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁴⁷⁹ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

apartheid,"⁴⁴⁸⁰ hoping that it would bring a change of policy⁴⁴⁸¹ were the actions of a practical man with practical aims, He was no dreamer.

TSAFENDAS'S MEDICAL REPORTS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you been shown a copy of a report from the University College, St. Pancras Hospital, London?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I don't want you to tell the Court what is in that report, but would you describe whether that report relates to the accused's state of mind, mental health?

DR. COOPER: It does relate to his state of mind, and in fact describes the state of mind.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Are the contents of that report relevant to the present enquiry?

DR. COOPER: I believe so, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How important are they to the present enquiry?

DR. COOPER: Very important.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How important will it be for the Court to hear the evidence of the medical practitioners who in fact interviewed the accused and who wrote up these reports?

JUDGE BEYERS: When was that?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: 1959.

DR. COOPER: That would depend on the Court's attitude towards this matter. If the Court would require evidence in addition to what evidence has been presented now, to satisfy or to elaborate on the evidence, then it would be very important.

JUDGE BEYERS: It would be somebody else's opinion on the clinical examination which he held?

DR. COOPER: More than that. It would be somebody else's opinion and the fact that, if this other opinion was to the effect that this man was suffering from schizophrenia at that time, it

⁴⁴⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁴⁸¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

would be very relevant to whether he is suffering from schizophrenia or not.

JUDGE BEYERS: That I follow. I will put it to you again: it will merely be some other person's opinion.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I don't know if it was a psychiatrist or what it was - on certain observations made by that person as to what his opinion is?

DR. COOPER: That is correct. Except - I would like to elaborate on that and explain that when a patient is admitted to a mental hospital, eventually a report may emerge which will almost always be signed by the superintendent, but very often it is in fact the opinion of the group of psychiatrists who have dealt with this particular individual. So it is the opinion of perhaps several people ... I am unable to say whether the individual who wrote this report actually was involved in the examination or not...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Assume the investigators are alive and are able and willing, in London, to give evidence that this man was a paranoid, they diagnosed him to be a paranoid schizophrenic, that he did attribute everything to the tapeworm - assume that - how relevant, and how important would that be?

DR. COOPER: It would be important, very important, from many points of view. It would tend to certainly confirm one's present clinical impressions of the man, and I feel strongly it would obliterate finally and conclusively any question of simulation in this case, malingering.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You have also seen a report from the Whitecroft Hospital, Newport, Isle of Wight?

DR. COOPER: Yes, I have.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is your observation on that report?

DR. COOPER: The general observation is that again there is reference, extensive reference, to the tapeworm, and again there is a diagnosis of psychotic illness. I don't know whether I am permitted to read a line or not....

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Don't read. There is reference, you say, to tapeworm, reference to a psychotic illness?

DR. COOPER: Yes. And there is reference to the fact that he has not recovered, on discharge.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Again, how important would it be if we are able to find the doctor

who did examine the accused, who did make this diagnosis, and I am led to believe that he is available? How important is that, to have that evidence before this Court?

DR. COOPER: It is important. And I must point out that in this report the person who has signed the report said "I found this" and "I found that," so presumably he is reporting on his own findings.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In regard to the White Croft Hospital, there are in fact two doctors, not so, who have signed reports — it is actually a composite report?

DR. COOPER: I have not got the report here.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: We will deal with it at a later stage. Furthermore, you have seen a report from a German hospital near Hamburg?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Does that contain a diagnosis of the accused's mental condition in 1955?

DR. COOPER: Yes. That also refers to him as suffering from a psychotic illness.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Again there is reference to the tapeworm, and that the patient attributed everything to the tapeworm?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How important is that in your opinion?

DR. COOPER: That is very important.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Again, if we are able to get the evidence of the practitioner or practitioners who diagnosed the accused's condition at the time, would that be material evidence?

DR. COOPER: Yes, it would.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And further, you have seen the American report as well, haven't you?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What do they show?

DR. COOPER: There is a report from America in 1946 describing or, let us say, making a

diagnosis of schizophrenia.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Again, would it be relevant and material to this enquiry, if possible, to obtain the evidence and have it before the Court?

DR. COOPER: Yes, it would.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I want you to give us your final assessment?

DR. COOPER: My final assessment of this man's mental condition is that he is suffering from a mental illness known as schizophrenia; that I feel I have good reason to believe that he has been suffering from this mental illness for probably at least twenty years, and that this mental illness is of such a degree as to make him certifiably mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S MEDICAL RECORDS

Advocate Cooper refers to a number of Tsafendas's medical reports which he has in his possession, and which obviously Dr. Cooper saw at one point since he refers to signatory doctors who might be asked to testify. Apparently the purpose of this exhibition of documents is to demonstrate to the court that Tsafendas had a long history of mental illnesses.

Tsafendas had given a detailed account of all the hospitals where he had been treated, including how he was diagnosed each time, in his statement to the police on September 19. However, he only revealed information about the occasions on which he was diagnosed as schizophrenic or psychotic, not the times when he was found to be perfectly healthy. He also hid the fact that he was caught faking mental illness in the United States and that he once claimed to be Saint Peter. That the South African authorities possessed at least some of these records is evident from the fact that some were found by the author in the National Archives of South Africa. Documents reveal that the South African authorities had the reports from the US hospitals from the 16th of September.⁴⁴⁸² There are also references to them in the report of the Commission of Enquiry. However we cannot be sure if they were in the State's possession at the time of the summary trial.

⁴⁴⁸² Letter of the USA Embassy in Cape Town to the South African Security Branch, 3 October 1966. Correctional Service. Subject: Demitrio Tsafendas. File: 80/0043 A123 Vol. 1. NASA.

Reyner van Zyl, the clinical psychologist who examined Tsafendas at the request of the defence, told the author that he never saw any of the medical reports from the hospitals where he was treated, as was the case with others who examined the prisoner. He said he was verbally informed that Tsafendas had been diagnosed as schizophrenic in overseas hospitals and took it for granted. Asked by the author if he and the other psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas had read or seen any of these medical reports, he replied:

“No, no, no, we were just told. We were told, or I was told – the group of guys that examined him – that he had been in various mental hospitals all over the world... Yes. Well, you know, we were given this information – that he was a disturbed, schizophrenic man ... And that was the background that we had available, and nothing else. The third part [the medical reports] was given to us almost in summary. He has been to this hospital, that hospital, that hospital... I think three or four were mentioned – various hospitals overseas.”⁴⁴⁸³

Advocate Cooper's questioning of Dr. Cooper revealed one major issue that is extremely important for the summary trial. Advocate Cooper refers to a “report from America in 1946” where Tsafendas was diagnosed as schizophrenic. This is the report from the Grafton State Hospital and it is entirely true that the diagnosis for Tsafendas was “Schizophrenia – hebephrenic type. Condition: Improved.” However, this report also contains important information that is not mentioned. It states that in 1943, Tsafendas “faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings of ships.”⁴⁴⁸⁴ It is understandable that neither Dr. Cooper nor advocate Cooper mentioned this as it had the potential to cause serious problems for their line of defence.

The author is not in position to know whether Dr. Cooper had actually read all of the Grafton report or if the diagnosis was just conveyed to him verbally, as was the case with his friend van Zyl. Certainly, the report was not available to Dr. Cooper at least during his first two consultations with Tsafendas, on October 1 and 4. Indeed, it was not available to anyone from the defence because on October 3, 1966, the Consul of the US Embassy in Cape Town wrote to the South African Security Branch that “Mr. Tsafandakis's legal representatives have asked permission to see the medical reports in question.” The letter also states that the

⁴⁴⁸³ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁴⁴⁸⁴ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

US authorities discussed the matter and agreed to provide the defence with the files in question. However, they ask the “appropriate South African authorities” to give the reports to the defence representatives if “they deem it appropriate.”⁴⁴⁸⁵

That this letter was written on October 3 suggests that it would have been highly unlikely for the “appropriate authorities” to have discussed the matter and given their permission the same or the following day. Since it was an official request, certainly a written response must have been made to the US Embassy. Even if it had arrived at the Embassy the next day, which would be highly unlikely, still the defence would not have had the records on the 4th as it would have certainly taken at least one day for them to receive them from the Embassy. This suggests the 5th as a more likely date, though that is a very optimistic scenario, given the bureaucracy involved and the fact that mail services at the time were not as fast as today.

If at any point Dr. Cooper had read the complete Grafton report, he would not have mentioned the fact that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in the past since such a claim would have raised serious questions about the defence case. Although it was understandable for the defence to conceal such information, is this not something that the State should have enquired about? The State must have had this report in its possession as it was given to the South African authorities on September 16.⁴⁴⁸⁶ Yet the State did not find it important enough to mention it, assuming that it did have the report among its files. This was the first, but not the only, time that the State overlooked evidence, or was ignorant of evidence, which stated clearly that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in the past.

An equally important issue is the following: Advocate Cooper mentions four medical reports, one from Hamburg, one from the Isle of Wight, one from London and one from America, and states that all agree that Tsafendas is schizophrenic. He also states that the first three (Hamburg, Isle of Wight and London) refer to the tapeworm which Tsafendas blames for everything. Then Advocate Cooper mentions the report from America which also diagnoses Tsafendas as schizophrenic. However, he does not mention the tapeworm and says nothing else about the hospital's diagnostic report. This goes on to say that Tsafendas “is in the habit of smearing the walls in his room with faeces and is hallucinated and suspicious. He

⁴⁴⁸⁵ Letter of the USA Embassy in Cape Town to the South African Security Branch, 3 October 1966. Correctional Service. Subject: Demitrio Tsafendas. File: 80/0043 A123 Vol. 1. NASA.

⁴⁴⁸⁶ Letter of the USA Embassy in Cape Town to the South African Security Branch, 3 October 1966. Correctional Service. Subject: Demitrio Tsafendas. File: 80/0043 A123 Vol. 1. NASA.

hears voices coming through the radiators. He is orientated as to the month but completely disorientated as to place and situation. He has peculiar mannerisms. He is wont to assume silly grimacing expressions and is prone to misidentify the attendants and the examiner.”⁴⁴⁸⁷

This is very important information for a psychiatrist as it shows that Tsafendas, apart from believing that he has a tapeworm, also believed, at least at one point in his life, that he also heard voices from radiators. Dr. Cooper was asked by the Attorney-General in reference to the tapeworm:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: That is the only delusion he had, isn't it, that you discovered? You didn't discover any other delusion?

DR. COOPER: No, but I found other aspects of his mental disorder which in my opinion are equally important to simply his being deluded.

This surely suggests that Tsafendas's delusions from 1946 were gone by 1966, or that Dr. Cooper had not read the Grafton report carefully or he had not seen it at all or that he ignored information which any psychiatrist would consider highly important. Again, the Attorney-General does not raise the issue of the “other delusion.” According to Dr. Cooper, Tsafendas had the tapeworm since sometime in the mid-1930s, thus he still had it in 1946. However, the Grafton report suggests that Tsafendas was hearing voices from the radiators when he also had a tapeworm, meaning he had two delusions at the same time. How possible is it for someone to be doubly deluded?

The information about the radiators takes on extra importance because in 1965, Tsafendas had claimed to be suffering from a third delusion, that he was the Apostle Peter. This diagnosis was made after Tsafendas was arrested by the Portuguese Security Police in Beira accused of pretending to be a missionary for religion, while in reality he was preaching “under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence.”⁴⁴⁸⁸ During interrogation, Tsafendas had claimed to be Jesus Christ's Apostle Peter.⁴⁴⁸⁹ Tsafendas used this act as it fitted nicely with his missionary pretext. Therefore, again Tsafendas had simultaneous delusions involving at any one time, the tapeworm, radiator voices and Saint

⁴⁴⁸⁷ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴⁴⁸⁸ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁴⁸⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Peter.

Then on June 26, 1966, just two months before the assassination, Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Kossew and appeared to have yet another delusional idea, this time of a persecutory nature. He claimed that more than twenty people had died from food poisoning in the house where he was staying.⁴⁴⁹⁰ The author interviewed several people who knew Tsafendas at that time, including two of his flatmates and two others who took their meals there. Tsafendas never told them about this "suspicion," but he continued eating there up to the assassination - for two months taking food he had told the doctor was poisonous!⁴⁴⁹¹

According to Professor Burke:

"There are a lot of contradictions in the story ... let's assume he was schizophrenic, for the sake of this argument, and that in the past, he had the delusion of being one of the apostles, that delusion would have stayed. So why would he, then, have created a new delusion around a tapeworm? It does not make sense, because your delusion stays fixed, so if he really did believe he was one of the apostles, early on, that story would have stuck because the delusions will not have shifted. What happens with delusions is, they can become bigger and they could include more things, but a shift from one delusion to another one is highly unlikely. Why would you go from the apostle and that worked for you ... well, let's say he truly believed he was an apostle, why did that change as he went along? It makes no sense.

Even if the schizophrenia had been treated, and it came back, then the same delusion would have come back, so it's inconsistent in terms of the delusions. You typically have a very fixed delusion, and it becomes bigger, but it doesn't change significantly, so if he had been truly schizophrenic, and he had been admitted to these hospitals previously, based on what he said, that he believed he was an apostle, then he would have killed Dr. Verwoerd based on the delusion that he was an apostle. He wouldn't have changed to say there was a tapeworm, or whatever the case may be. So, there's, already, some kind of inconsistency."⁴⁴⁹²

The Grafton report contains another important piece of information which was not mentioned in court. It states that while in custody in Bangor, Maine⁴⁴⁹³ on charges of

⁴⁴⁹⁰ Dr. Ralph Kossew testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁴⁹¹ Pamela Abrahams and Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

⁴⁴⁹² Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

⁴⁴⁹³ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

contravening US immigration laws,⁴⁴⁹⁴ Tsafendas “showed symptoms of mental disorder” and was admitted to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, Massachusetts.⁴⁴⁹⁵ This perhaps did not sound very important at the time, especially to the defence, but it was very important for the State. There was also, as we will see, a report from a hospital in Lisbon which stated the same thing, that Tsafendas, “during his interrogations, gave signs of having some sort of mental disability, which was confirmed by the Hospital do Ultramar.”⁴⁴⁹⁶

There was also a third report, from the Government Hospital in Beira, which is not in the possession of the author. This must have contained a similar statement about Tsafendas's behaviour, as he was taken there by the Portuguese police after he had claimed to be St Peter.

What makes these reports so important is the fact that Tsafendas had also shown signs of mental illness while in custody for Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, at least the fourth time that something like this happened. Significantly, no ordinary person testified to the police that Tsafendas was unstable or had mentioned the tapeworm to them. When he rambled about the tapeworm and appeared insane was invariably when he talked to the police in custody or to doctors in hospitals where he was taken by the police or to which he had admitted himself. Apart from those hospitals to which he was taken by police, all the others had admitted Tsafendas at his own request, indicating that Tsafendas had a reason of his own for seeking admission. The Grafton State Hospital report also states that Tsafendas voluntarily admitted himself to the Boston Psychiatric Hospital on March 1946 before he was transferred to the Grafton.⁴⁴⁹⁷

The South African embassy in Washington informed the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 9, 1966, just three days after the assassination, that the US Immigration authorities had a file on Tsafendas which contained “full particulars” of his time in the United States. The embassy's letter stated that Tsafendas “is understood to have shown under psychiatric treatment that he was unstable though not (not)⁴⁴⁹⁸ insane, but the type of man who would easily be used as an instrument of Communist or hostile organizations.” It

⁴⁴⁹⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw, 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Report of the COE, Chapter II B, Paragraph 2. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁴⁹⁵ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA; Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴⁴⁹⁶ PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 5 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁴⁹⁷ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴⁴⁹⁸ This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second ‘not’ within brackets.

said the impression of American Immigration officials was that Tsafendas had been manipulated and was “under the influence of someone or some organization.” He had subsequently been deported to Europe.⁴⁴⁹⁹ This information was also not used during the summary trial and most likely was not given to the psychiatrists for consideration.

The Grafton State Hospital report stated that Tsafendas had a paternal uncle who was mentally ill and had died in a mental hospital. According to his close relatives Katerina Pnema, Mike Vlachopoulos, Mike Pnema, John Michaletos and Mary Eendracht, this is a lie.⁴⁵⁰⁰ The Commission of Enquiry pointed out that Tsafendas was knowledgeable about mental disorders and well-acquainted with hospital situations.⁴⁵⁰¹

Presumably Tsafendas claimed there was mental illness in the family to strengthen his own claims. In fact he later said he knew that to appear convincingly mad, it was helpful to invent insanity in the family and suggest suffering a childhood trauma. That Tsafendas lied whenever it was convenient for him is also evident from the fact that on at least one other occasion when he was hospitalised, after an alleged suicide attempt, he stated that there was no history of mental illness in the family.⁴⁵⁰² Whenever he needed to back up his claim that he was schizophrenic, Tsafendas referred to a history of mental illness in the family, an “uncle” who was mentally ill and had died in a mental hospital. However, when he was hospitalised for other reasons, he denied that there was a history of mental illness in the family.

Advocate Cooper also referred to a report from a hospital in Hamburg – clearly the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital in whose psychiatric section Tsafendas stayed from February 11, until June 7, 1955. Tsafendas had admitted himself to the hospital claiming he had taken twenty sleeping pills. This was soon after he was discharged from the Tropen Krankenhaus in Hamburg, where he had admitted himself claiming to suffer from tapeworm trouble. However, nothing was found and he was discharged immediately.⁴⁵⁰³ Advocate Cooper said the Hamburg hospital report referred to a “psychotic illness” and that Tsafendas

⁴⁴⁹⁹ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁴⁵⁰⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁵⁰¹ Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁵⁰² Medical Bulletin of Dimitrio Tsafendas, 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁴⁵⁰³ Dr Bieser's medical report on Tsafendas, Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital, 6 April 1955. K150. Vol. 4, Sub-file 1/8. NASA.

attributed everything to the tapeworm. Both references are correct, but they tell only half of the story.

Advocate Cooper phrased his words carefully and in such a way as to reveal only what was helpful for the defence. There was no mention in the hospital's report of schizophrenia as such, although Tsafendas did refer to the tapeworm. Furthermore, there were two concluding diagnoses made at this hospital: Dr. Bieser, a senior physician, labelled Tsafendas's condition as "*mixed – pictured phasic psychose*,"⁴⁵⁰⁴ and Dr. Nachtwey, a psychiatrist, diagnosed "*endogenous depression, mixed-picture*."⁴⁵⁰⁵ Tsafendas's condition thus appears to be much less serious than that depicted. He was diagnosed as suffering from depression and so treated and not for schizophrenia. Naturally, Advocate Cooper took from the report only what was convenient for the defence's case.

Professor Tuviah Zabow told the author about Tsafendas's condition as it appeared in the hospital's records:

"He was admitted without escort from his residence suggests he came voluntarily to the hospital requesting admission and presented with depression and an account of an overdose suicidal attempt. The impression recorded initially and ultimately concluded as diagnosis was 'depression with hypochondriacally features' or psychosomatic symptoms. He spontaneously presented the 'tapeworm' story mentioning it as present since 1937 and continued to emphasise this at interviews in detail. Was this again the method he uses to gain admission? Supporting a mood disorder rather than a process psychosis such as schizophrenia is the record that his thought processes were normal but slower. This would be again in keeping with depression rather than schizophrenia. Schizophrenia would have been more representative of a syndrome i.e. presenting with a group and other symptoms as well such as disordered thought processes.

Notably if this had been present since 1937 or even since 1955 it would have been expected to have deteriorated in his general function. He recovered rather quickly and was treated with only two shock treatments and left with a sympathetic acquaintance who provided the care he again required or manipulated for. The diagnosis of 'Endogenous Depression – mixed picture' was referring to the old terminology of manic-depression but no

⁴⁵⁰⁴ Dr Bieser and Dr Schmidt-Janssen report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁴⁵⁰⁵ Medical Buletin of Dimitrio Tsafendas, 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

clear note of hypomanic features are recorded. The 'mixed picture' label or the 'phasic psychosis' label also fits this suggested clinical picture and the recovery so rapid."⁴⁵⁰⁶

What is also strange about Dr. Cooper's questioning is that there is no mention of how Tsafendas came to be admitted to the Whitecroft Hospital, on the Isle of Wight. The Isle of Wight is a small island in the English Channel off the country's south coast. No one seemed to wonder how Tsafendas ended up in a hospital there. Patients in such a hospital were either local islanders or were referred from other hospitals in Britain.⁴⁵⁰⁷

Tsafendas was unique in presenting himself in the lobby and being admitted on his own cognisance. Why would he travel all the way to this small island and admit himself to a hospital there? The only logical explanation, and it fits with Tsafendas's impetuous curiosity and love of travel, is what he later said: that he had heard about this beautiful island that it had a hospital which looked like a castle and he decided to visit it. According to Professor Burke, this sort of planning is not something that a schizophrenic can do: "That requires a lot of planning -- I'm going to go there, and I'm going to stay in the hospital, and I'm going to go ... that, typically doesn't happen."⁴⁵⁰⁸

Dr. Cooper, referring to Tsafendas's medical report from the Isle of Wight hospital, states that, "there is reference to the fact that he has not recovered, on discharge." According to the report of the Commission of Enquiry⁴⁵⁰⁹ and to a secret telegram from the South African embassy in London, Tsafendas was given a certificate which described his mental condition as good enough for him to travel to any country.⁴⁵¹⁰

As we have seen before, Tsafendas was medically examined over the previous three years while he was in South African by at least nine doctors on ten separate occasions and none of them noticed anything wrong with him. None of these doctors was a psychiatrist, but then one of the defence's main witnesses was a district surgeon who diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic.

Another fact nobody appeared to notice was that Tsafendas told the police and his defence team the names of all the hospitals to which he was admitted and the exact dates of

⁴⁵⁰⁶ Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 10 October 2016.

⁴⁵⁰⁷ Laidlaw, 1994: 100-103.

⁴⁵⁰⁸ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

⁴⁵⁰⁹ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 33. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁵¹⁰ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

his stays there, as well as the precise diagnosis in every case. However, he concealed all the examinations he had by doctors and hospitals where nothing was reported about his “schizophrenia” and the tapeworm. A fact that also seems to have been overlooked is how Tsafendas managed to avoid being certified and detained in hospital before 1966 if he was as described by Dr. Cooper and later by other psychiatrists. He was admitted in several hospitals and examined by numerous doctors and no one thought he was certifiable or as bad as Dr. Cooper described. Indeed no doctor described him in the way Dr. Cooper did. It is true that his condition could have deteriorated since 1959, when he was last hospitalised because of the tapeworm, if he was really a schizophrenic. However, seven years had passed since then and no change was noted in his behaviour.

More importantly, between November 1963 and September 1966, Tsafendas was examined by ten doctors and he did not mention the tapeworm to any of them, which again suggests that either the tapeworm had not become more important in his mind or that he simply did not use it to his advantage. Finally, if his health had deteriorated, he would almost certainly have admitted himself to a hospital, something he had no problem with. He had admitted himself to all the hospitals claiming a “fixation about a tapeworm.”⁴⁵¹¹ If he had no problem admitting to the tapeworm problem in 1946, in 1955 and in 1959, why would he hide it afterwards, especially since he was not “cured”?

Finally, the medical records mentioned in court told only half the truth about Tsafendas's hospitalizations, with important information, for example from the Grafton State Hospital report, omitted by the defence and not raised by the State. None of Tsafendas's medical records mentioned by the defence would be submitted as evidence during the summary trial and no one will know the detailed contents, apart from the diagnosis. However, as we have already seen, the contents of two of the four records mentioned in court were misrepresented by the defence in order to suit its needs, mentioning only what was convenient for them. It is highly likely therefore the same thing happened with the other two reports that the author did not have access to.

⁴⁵¹¹ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

THE ISSUE OF TSAFENDAS'S HOSPITALIZATIONS

What is interesting about all these hospitalizations is that no-one enquires how or why Tsafendas ended up there. He admitted himself to the mental ward of St Pancras Hospital in London, telling doctors that “he had a fixation about a tapeworm.” Then he did the same on the Isle of Wight.⁴⁵¹² He admitted himself to the Ochsensall Hospital in Hamburg by claiming, falsely, that he had taken twenty sleeping tablets.⁴⁵¹³ The Grafton State Hospital had confirmation that Tsafendas had admitted himself to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, Massachusetts, before he was transferred there.⁴⁵¹⁴

Why did Tsafendas admit himself to these hospitals? He gave a frank explanation to three different witnesses, the priests Minas Constandinou, Spiros Randos and Ioannis Tsaftaridis, when he spoke to them on separate occasions after the assassination. He said he did it when he had no money and needed a place to stay. He said he saw hospitals as “hotels.” At other times, he told the priests, he was taken to hospitals after he “pretended to be mad,” but this was to stop police questioning and sometimes torturing him.⁴⁵¹⁵

The only hospital which Tsafendas named to the priests the Whitecroft on the Isle of Wight. He told two of them on separate occasions that he admitted himself there because he wanted to see the island and he was without money and a place to stay.⁴⁵¹⁶ In all of his travels, Tsafendas admitted himself to hospitals in only three countries, England, the United States and Germany. What is the common factor? Tsafendas was not permitted to work legally in those three nations and sometimes he was there illegally. At the same time, he was jobless, penniless and without a place to stay. In each case, the medical records confirm that Tsafendas himself sought admission and was not taken to the hospitals.

The most obvious example of his hospital ruse was in Britain. In 1959, the first time he visited that country, he was unable to get a work permit and therefore could not work legally. He remained in the country from May until October. His money ran out at some point

⁴⁵¹² Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁵¹³ Dr Bieser and Dr Schmidt-Janssen report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁴⁵¹⁴ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA; Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demetrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴⁵¹⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁵¹⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

and he had nowhere to stay. Tom Fox Pitt, the secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society, who Tsafendas had met on his frequent visits to the Society's office, arranged for him to stay at a hostel in Victoria, London. Concluding that Tsafendas was destitute, Pitt gave him a grey, flannel suit.⁴⁵¹⁷ Tsafendas chose not to stay permanently at the hostel while having his costs met by Pitt or the Society, so he left and admitted himself to the hospital in St. Pancras. He later followed the same pattern at the Whitecroft Hospital, on the Isle of Wight.

Tsafendas made one more visit to Britain, in 1962, although he stayed a shorter time. Still, he was not hospitalized. However, nor did he have any financial concerns, with enough money saved from Portugal to get by or from illegal jobs. Edward Furness, who met him then said Tsafendas, "was well-dressed and appeared to be wealthy."⁴⁵¹⁸ It is clear that when Tsafendas was without money, jobless and on the run from the British police because of his illegal status, he got himself admitted to the two hospitals. When he was financially secure, however, he had no need of free bed and board.

Germany followed the same pattern. Tsafendas was hospitalised in Hamburg in 1955 when he had spent a few months in the city unsuccessfully looking for work. However, in 1958, when he was back in Germany and stayed there for one and a half years, he was not hospitalised anywhere since he was constantly in work. In 1955, after spending a few weeks unsuccessful seeking a job in Hamburg, Tsafendas told his friends that he was going to look for work in Frankfurt. However, it appears that instead he admitted himself to the hospital, where he was discovered by Fathers Damaskinos Doxiartis and Efthimios Eleftheriadis, from the Greek Orthodox church of St Nicholas in Hamburg. They were surprised to see Tsafendas there as they thought he had gone to Frankfurt.⁴⁵¹⁹

According to Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis, Tsafendas "seemed perfectly fine... I can't remember what he told us about why he was hospitalised, but he definitely never told me or Father Damaskinos anything about this tapeworm, not even when we were in the hospital, I would have remembered such thing ... I remember he looked embarrassed when he saw us, but I really can't remember what he told us; why he was there ... he came to the church to see us when he was released from the hospital and he seemed fine ... he never said

⁴⁵¹⁷ *The Guardian*, 30 September 1966: 10, 'Winding back.'

⁴⁵¹⁸ Edward Furness statement to the police 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁵¹⁹ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

or did anything to make me or Father Damaskinos believe that he was insane or even a little unbalanced.”⁴⁵²⁰

Asked by the author if he or Father Damaskinos got the impression that Tsafendas might be faking his illness, the priest said, “He did not give me that impression ... I am not sure about Father Damaskinos, but I think he also did not get such an impression. I certainly did not get the impression that he was faking it, why would he do such thing? But I also certainly did not get the impression that he was mentally ill. Definitely not, he was perfectly normal.”⁴⁵²¹

Tsafendas spent most of his time in Mozambique and in South Africa. Surprisingly, he was not hospitalised in any hospital in these countries for psychiatric problems, apart from when he was taken by PIDE to the hospital in Beira while he had claimed to be Saint Peter during integration. The rest of his time in these countries, he was not only never hospitalised, but examined by several doctors and no one noticed anything. Tsafendas also spent two years in Greece, seven months in Turkey, some months in Sweden and one and a half year in Germany in 1958-1959. He had jobs all these times and he was not hospitalised at any of these places during this time, which again it confirms what Tsafendas told the witnesses, about admitting himself when he was penniless and homeless.

Tsafendas also told several witnesses that he had “pretended to be mad” on some occasions in order to stop being tortured while he was in detention.⁴⁵²² Again, Tsafendas’s medical record seems to confirm this too. Whenever he did not admit himself to the hospital, he was taken there by the police after he had shown signs of mental illness during his interrogation, as happened in the USA, in all the hospitals in Portugal and in Beira.

In addition, the psychiatrists claimed in court that Tsafendas had the tapeworm since 1935. However, he made no mention of such a thing to any of his family or to a doctor, nor did he ever seek treatment in a hospital. The tapeworm made its appearance for the first time in 1946, eleven years later. When he was admitted to a hospital for the first time in 1943, while in detention in a prison in Bangor, Maine,⁴⁵²³ on charges of contravening US

⁴⁵²⁰ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

⁴⁵²¹ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

⁴⁵²² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁵²³ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

immigration laws,⁴⁵²⁴ Tsafendas “showed symptoms of mental disorder.” He was admitted to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, Massachusetts, from where he was transferred on April 23, 1943 to the Metropolitan State Hospital. He was initially diagnosed as having “psychoneurosis – mixed type” plus “many psychopathic traits.”⁴⁵²⁵ However, psychiatrists in this hospital discovered that Tsafendas was play-acting. According to a report by the Grafton State Hospital, Massachusetts, to which he was admitted in 1946, Tsafendas then confessed that in 1943 “he faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings (sinkings) of ships.”⁴⁵²⁶ The tapeworm finally emerged in 1946 while he was in Grafton State hospital in Massachusetts, eleven years after he was allegedly infected and three years after his first hospitalization. If Tsafendas really believed what was stated in court about the tapeworm, he must have told the doctors when he was first hospitalised in 1943 or someone else before that. Furthermore, Tsafendas’s claim that he began talking about a tapeworm only after he was first found pretending to be mad is confirmed by the above.

As stated above, Tsafendas spoke extensively to Fathers Minas Constandinou, Spiros Randos and Ioannis Tsafaridis about his hospitalizations. He said that the first time he ever did it was in the USA when he was arrested and put to jail for being illegally there. He said that it was very tough there and feared for his life, so he pretended to be mad by hearing voices, as he did not know what else to say or do, in order to be taken away from there. Although he was later caught faking it, he then came across Tom Tuff who gave him the idea for the tapeworm and began using it.⁴⁵²⁷ While the time was passing, he developed his “performances” further and he knew what to say and what to do whenever he wanted to be found insane.⁴⁵²⁸

In January 1952, Tsafendas was arrested in Lisbon as security reports from Mozambique told the Portuguese that Tsafendas was a half-caste, a Communist and an anti-colonialist who was under suspicion of “unclear activities” during his time in

⁴⁵²⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw, 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 2. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁵²⁵ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA; Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴⁵²⁶ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴⁵²⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁵²⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Gordon Winter in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*. 1997.

Mozambique.⁴⁵²⁹ Tsafendas spent more a year in a prison cell in the Cascais Fort.⁴⁵³⁰

Tsafendas told several witnesses that at the time he was severely tortured, including been given electric shocks and at one point, he said, he could not take the pain and so played the madman again and the police then stopped torturing him.⁴⁵³¹ He was then taken to the Instituto de Medicina Tropical and then to the Hospital do Ultramar for psychiatric examination. A PIDE report said that “during his interrogations he gave signs of having some sort of mental disability, which was confirmed by the Overseas Hospital.”⁴⁵³²

In 1964, after he was arrested in Beira accused of campaigning for the independence of Mozambique, once again during interrogation he showed signs of mental illness and was taken to the Government Hospital in Beira. Soon, he was declared to be mentally ill and was subsequently released.⁴⁵³³ It must be more than coincidence that Tsafendas showed signs of mental illness to his interrogators, but not to any of the people who came across him. This fact was not picked up by the State although Tsafendas showed signs of mental illness while he was in custody for Dr. Verwoerd's death, as he had done at least three times before in a similar situation; meanwhile, one hundred and fifty people who were questioned by the South African police failed to notice any signs of mental disturbance in Tsafendas.

In 1998, Gordon Winter, a former BOSS agent, journalist and very close friend of General van den Bergh, was interviewed by David Beresford, South Africa correspondent for the British newspaper, *The Guardian*. He said:

“Wherever Tsafendas went, he usually booked himself into a hospital under some pretext, for the simple reason that after having enjoyed a good look round as a tourist, Tsafendas himself admitted to me that he was lazy and hated working, that he always got himself booked into some hospital for a while. He said he loved hospitals because in them, he got a comfortable bed, clean sheets, three meals a day, the company of other patients - and, equally important, the attention of nurses and doctors.

When Tsafendas really liked a hospital (or the country it was in) and he looked as

⁴⁵²⁹ *Diario Popular*, 9 September 1966, ‘E conhesido em Lisboa o assassino do Dr. Verwoerd.’

⁴⁵³⁰ PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 05 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵³¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁵³² PIDE report regarding Demetri Tsafendas to the Minister of Interior. 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; PIDE report regarding Demetri Tsafendas to the Director General of the Civil and Political Administration Overseas Ministry. 18 April 1958. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵³³ Alberto Henriques de Matos Rodrigues conclusion to the Subdirector, 23 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

though he would be thrown out, he would go into his 'mad' mode, which lengthened his stay. If that didn't work he would tell them about his tape worm. That story lengthened his stay so that the doctors could check to see whether he had a tape worm or not. When they discovered he did not have a tape worm inside him, he would act madder and insist that the doctors were part of a conspiracy against him - which also lengthened his stay so that psychiatrists could then examine him. Tsafendas himself, told me in Pretoria Central, that psychiatrists were stupid and that (from their questioning) he had learnt their verbals and was thus able to work out what they wanted him to say - which would fit in with their theories. No, I will never believe Tsafendas was as mad as they say. As I told Liza and Sylvia, Tsafendas loved mind games and he was very clever at playing stupid when it suited him."⁴⁵³⁴

What Winter told Beresford is exactly what Tsafendas later told the three priests. It seems clear that he could only have learned these things from Tsafendas himself. Furthermore, eighteen years after he talked to Beresford, Winter repeated the exact same story of Tsafendas and the hospitals virtually word for word to the author. He added that General van den Bergh had asked Tsafendas when he interrogated him how he came to be admitted to all these hospitals. Tsafendas gave him precisely the same reason he later gave to Winter and finally the three priests; that he saw the hospitals as hotels whenever he was penniless and homeless.⁴⁵³⁵

As for Tsafendas admitting himself to hospital, how common is it for a "deluded schizophrenic" to seek treatment in a hospital, admitting that he has a fixation, a delusion he told no-one else about? According to Professor Burke, it makes no sense: "He admits himself, so why would he want to hide any of this away? I mean, it's paradoxical. If I was scared that I was going to be hospitalised, I would keep this to myself, but here's a man who goes to the hospital, and reports by himself, so why would he hide it away, because he was clearly not scared of a mental hospital, so what would be his motive for hiding it away?"⁴⁵³⁶

In later life, Tsafendas was deeply embarrassed about misusing hospitals as he had in America, Britain and Germany, and he avoided talking about it, simply saying he had wanted a place to stay and found refuge in hospitals.⁴⁵³⁷

⁴⁵³⁴ Gordon Winter's correspondence with David Beresford, 8 September 1998. Liza Key's personal collection.

⁴⁵³⁵ Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

⁴⁵³⁶ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

⁴⁵³⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

MISSING MEDICAL REPORTS FROM MOZAMBIQUE AND PORTUGAL

The defence refers to medical reports from hospitals in the United States, England and West Germany, the most recent being from England in 1959. However, Tsafendas was also admitted to the Government Hospital in Beira sometime in late 1964 or early 1965, when he claimed that he was Saint Peter.⁴⁵³⁸ This was after he was arrested by the Portuguese Security Police accused of pretending to be a Christian missionary while actually campaigning for Mozambique's independence.⁴⁵³⁹

The South African police were aware of this because Tsafendas stated it in his statement of September 19, it was mentioned in PIDEs report given to the South African police on September 7 and Lt.-Colonel P.J.B. van Wyk had mentioned it in his report from Beira on September 20. More importantly, van Wyk had then taken the "necessary steps" and "formally applied" to obtain a copy of Tsafendas's medical report from the hospital.⁴⁵⁴⁰ It must have been a simple formality to obtain it, since the Portuguese authorities had provided all of Tsafendas's medical reports from Portugal, and it must have been by then in the possession of the South African police. However, the author is not in a position to know this for a fact, nor is it in a position to know whether Tsafendas's defence team was aware of this hospitalization. The fact that this was the last time Tsafendas was in a hospital before the assassination, with the exception of his cosmetic nose surgery in Groote Schuur hospital in April/May 1966, makes the Beira admission extremely important.

It is also important because seven years had passed since the last time Tsafendas was hospitalised for a psychiatric condition, according to his defence, and such a report would have strengthened their line that he was still a schizophrenic and diagnosed as such also in 1965. The South African police and the defence team got hold of all of Tsafendas's other medical reports, from hospitals in Europe and the United States going back decades, in the case of the Grafton State Hospital to 1946. A report from Beira was important because it would contain the most recent medical information on Tsafendas and it would surely have been quite easy to get, given the excellent bilateral relationship between South Africa and

⁴⁵³⁸ This report was not found in the archives and therefore the study is not in position to know its content.

⁴⁵³⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵⁴⁰ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

Portugal and their collaboration on Dr. Verwoerd's murder investigation. That the PIDE had deliberately hidden all "information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique" while highlighting that he had been declared mentally disable by their hospitals, demonstrates their willingness to impart such information to the South African police.

Indeed, the PIDE had already included in one of its reports an earlier diagnosis by Dr. Pegado of the Institute of Psychiatric Welfare, who examined Tsafendas in Lisbon and on April 6, 1962 diagnosed him as a psychopath.⁴⁵⁴¹ This is when Tsafendas had pretended to be slightly but harmlessly mad in order to convince the Portuguese to give him amnesty to return to Mozambique. However, still, his detailed medical report is missing and we have only the final diagnosis. The Commission of Enquiry evidently had access to one of Tsafendas's medical reports from Lisbon since it stated that in 1952 he was diagnosed with "intestinal parasitosis, manic-depressive psychosis."⁴⁵⁴² The fact that the above two reports were given to the South African authorities confirms that the Portuguese had no problem in handing Tsafendas's medical records to the South African police. Since, as we have already seen, it would be to their benefit that Tsafendas be found to be insane, the Portuguese were only too happy to co-operate.

The fact is, however, that neither the State nor the defence make any reference to a Beira report of Tsafendas's 1964/1965 hospitalization. If we assume that both the Defence and the South African police got hold of this report, what would they have found? That Tsafendas, apart from believing he had a tapeworm, also believed he was Saint Peter. They were not his only imaginings. When he was examined by Dr Kossew on June 16, 1966, Tsafendas appeared to have a delusion of a persecutory nature, believing that twenty people had been murdered in the house where he lived.⁴⁵⁴³ Over the years, Tsafendas mentioned four different delusions:

- hearing voices from the radiators;
- believing he has a tapeworm inside him;
- believing that he is Saint Peter;

⁴⁵⁴¹ Dr. Pegado's report regarding Dimitrio Tsafandakis, 6 April 1962. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/6, subject: Departement van Verdediging. NASA.

⁴⁵⁴² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 24. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁵⁴³ Dr. Ralph Kossew testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

- having feelings of a persecutory nature and believing that twenty people died in the house where he was staying from deliberate food poisoning.

Chronologically, Tsafendas heard voices from the radiators in the 1940s, later in the following decade he believed he had a tapeworm, then on one occasion in 1965 concluded that he was Saint Peter and in June 1966 expressed illusions of persecution. Since the tapeworm delusion was constant since the 1930s, as Dr. Cooper and the other psychiatrists claimed, then Tsafendas had at different periods, one different and additional delusion.

Psychiatrists say that it is highly unlikely if not impossible for a person to have multiple delusions. That is why as we have seen, the Grafton hospital reference to Tsafendas hearing voices from the radiators is also not mentioned. According to Professor Alban Burke, to have two delusions at the same time or for a delusion to come and go or be replaced by another delusion is not impossible but unlikely:

“It’s not impossible, because the human brain is difficult to understand. It’s not impossible, but it is unlikely. It’s possible but it’s improbable. Let’s assume he was schizophrenic... and, in the past, he had the delusion of being one of the apostles, that delusion would have stayed. So why would he then have created a new delusion around a tapeworm? It does not make sense because your delusion stays fixed, so if he really did believe he was one of the apostles, early on, that story would have stuck because the delusions will not have shifted. What happens with delusions is, they can become bigger, so they could include more things, but a shift from one delusion to another one is highly unlikely, so why would you go from apostle, and that worked for you, let’s say he truly believed he was an apostle, why did that change as he went along?”

Even if the schizophrenia had been treated, and it came back, then the same delusion would have come back, so it’s inconsistent in terms of the delusions. You typically have a very fixed delusion, and it becomes bigger, but doesn’t change significantly, so if he had been truly schizophrenic, and he had been admitted to these hospitals previously, based on what he said, that he believed he was an apostle, then he would have killed Dr. Verwoerd based on the delusion that he was an apostle! He wouldn’t have changed to say there was a tapeworm, or whatever the case may be. So, there’s, already, some kind of inconsistency.”⁴⁵⁴⁴

⁴⁵⁴⁴ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

Reyner van Zyl, agrees that it is almost impossible, “One may disappear, and the other one may then appear, but two at the same time? I don’t think so, because these delusions are usually very powerful.”⁴⁵⁴⁵

Naturally, the defence lawyers, even if they were in possession of this report, were never going to use it as it would have damaged their argument. However, if the State had the report, it could easily have used it and raised the issue of the three different delusions. It was already aware of the tapeworm issue because the defence had “opened their hands” about it two weeks before the summary trial,⁴⁵⁴⁶ but also because Dr. van Wyk, the State’s expert psychiatrist, was also told about it by Tsafendas.⁴⁵⁴⁷

Thus, why did Tsafendas use the tapeworm story and not the more recent one of Saint Peter? Tsafendas never discussed it. However, it seems logical that he would have wheeled out his most “experienced” act, the one he had used often and which always worked. The Saint Peter show was a one-off, which fitted the religion-related Portuguese accusation, and as for hearing voices a la Joan of Arc, this had failed once before, and anyway hearing voices was the most common way for someone to pretend madness. Tsafendas himself said later that “everyone hears voices or pretends to be Napoleon, but who would ever suspect anyone who believes he has a tapeworm?”⁴⁵⁴⁸

Although there is no evidence to confirm that the Beira report was in the possession of the South African police, everything indicates that it must have been. The fact that Tsafendas had claimed that he was Saint Peter, while in custody just two years before the assassination was of major importance for the summary trial and for his psychiatric evaluation. Even though it did not become known at the time, it demonstrates Tsafendas ability to pretend to be “unstable” whenever necessary. That he managed to adjust himself to his circumstances - accused of pretending to be a missionary, but in reality pressing for the independence of Mozambique – and dream up the Saint Peter idea, so fitting to the situation, suggests that Tsafendas was more than capable of pretending to be unstable, improvising according to his needs at each time.

⁴⁵⁴⁵ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁴⁵⁴⁶ Bloomberg, 2007: 90.

⁴⁵⁴⁷ Professor Adolph Johannes van Wyk testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁵⁴⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

TSAFENDAS'S ABILITY TO MANAGE HIMSELF

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is he capable of managing himself?

DR. COOPER: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why? Because of the mental disorder?

DR. COOPER: Why? Because I believe that he is quite incapable of fending for himself. He is incapable of holding down employment. He is dependent all the time on others for help and assistance.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Therefore you say he is incapable of managing his own affairs?

DR. COOPER: And he is incapable of managing his own affairs.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: To what extent is he a danger to himself or others?

DR. COOPER: He has certainly proved himself to be a danger to others. And in schizophrenia the thought processes are so confused and unpredictable that one might say he may well become a danger to himself. I believe that this man has been suffering from schizophrenia for longer than five years, and therefore, on this basis alone, I believe that his outlook is now extremely unfavourable. I am of the opinion that the accused is not able to understand the exact nature of the evidence which will be led here, that he is not able to grasp....

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S ABILITY TO MANAGE HIMSELF

Once again, an entirely inaccurate diagnosis by Dr. Cooper. Here was a man who travelled on his own through a large number of countries, who found employment wherever he went, who, when penniless, sold his blood to earn some money,⁴⁵⁴⁹ who was arrested five times by the Portuguese Police on serious accusations and secured his release each time. Could such a man be incapable of managing his own affairs? Tsafendas was forty-eight years old at the time of his arrest and did not seem to have any problem getting through life up to then.

If we accept for a moment that Tsafendas was indeed schizophrenic, he must have

⁴⁵⁴⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

been extremely good at hiding it from doctors, since he was invariably found sane whenever it was in his interests to be found sane. For example, between 1964 and 1966, a period in South Africa when he was looking for jobs, he was examined by six doctors and no one noticed anything wrong with him. On none of his job application forms did he report any hallucinations or that he had been hospitalised in the past, always claiming to be in exceptional health. Furthermore, he flatly lied when he applied for permanent residency in South Africa, denying anything that might result in a refusal. He wrote in his application that he had “never previously applied for permanent residence in South Africa, had never been found guilty of a criminal or unlawful action, had never been refused entry to any South African harbour and had never been deported from South Africa or any other country.”⁴⁵⁵⁰

He then attended three interviews with three different officers at the Department of Immigration and made a favourable impression on all of them.⁴⁵⁵¹ In addition, on November 11, 1963, he was examined by Dr. C. Been for his permanent residence permit and was found “not to be mentally or physically defective in any way,” and “generally in a good state of health.”⁴⁵⁵² On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined again for the same reason by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who also wrote “a favourable report.”⁴⁵⁵³

If Tsafendas was unable to manage himself, how did he manage to survive the forty-eight previous years of his life? A man who, although penniless most of the time, managed to travel to sixteen countries where he knew no-one yet never spent an evening without a bed. A stranger in all these countries, he always managed to find a job and sometimes he even thrived, as he did in Istanbul, where he worked for almost half a year at the Limasollu Naci College.

Tsafendas always seemed to find a way of achieving his goals. During the Greek Civil War, he managed to join the Democratic Army of Greece, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party, and he survived. Arrested five times by the Portuguese police because of

⁴⁵⁵⁰ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁴⁵⁵¹ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁴⁵⁵² Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁴⁵⁵³ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

his political ideas and political activities, he managed to secure his release each time. Banned from entering Mozambique due to his anti-colonialist beliefs, he convinced the Portuguese that he was harmlessly mad so they allowed him to return. He also attended several job interviews and no one noticed anything wrong with him, and that included three officials at the Ministry of the Interior who interviewed him three times over his application for permanent residency in South Africa.⁴⁵⁵⁴ PIDE would not have held a detailed 130-pages file on Tsafendas and withheld from South Africa information on his political activities if he was a man who was not able to look after himself.

The author asked forty-four relatives, friends and acquaintances if they ever got the impression Tsafendas was not able to care for himself. Not a single one agreed. Again, we list opinions by those who knew him well:

Fotini Gavasiadis, who was with Tsafendas every day for nine months in 1963-4, was shocked and asked, “Are you serious? Are you sure the doctor said this about Dimitri? He must have examined a different man.”⁴⁵⁵⁵ Mary Eendracht, the cousin who grew up with him in Egypt and Mozambique, his half-sister Katerina Pnema, childhood friends Helen Grispos, Ira Kyriakakis and Andreas Babiolakis, Father Nikola Banovic who knew him for seven months in Istanbul and Nick Papadakis, who was close to him for two-three months in 1964 in Mozambique all discounted Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis as, at least, inaccurate. Other comments they used to describe it were “ludicrous” and “for laughs.”⁴⁵⁵⁶

The following are some incidents and statements which are indicative of Tsafendas’s character and ability to manage himself:

- Reuben O’Ryan, Patrick’s son said about Tsafendas: “We all loved him ... he was an adorable man ... he was the answer to our prayers. We were poor and he brought food to our house.”⁴⁵⁵⁷
- Peter Pappas, owner of a Greek café in Durban, said when Tsafendas had some money he

⁴⁵⁵⁴ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁴⁵⁵⁵ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 18 March 2016.

⁴⁵⁵⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁵⁵⁷ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

would give “a few cents to the white down-and-outs of the city.” Furthermore, Pappas said about Tsafendas “When his luck was out, I sometimes gave him a free meal, but when he started work he paid me,”⁴⁵⁵⁸ These are hardly the actions of a man who is unable to look after himself.

- Jacobus Bornman was Tsafendas's flatmate. When he was broke, Tsafendas lent him five cents and when Bornman tried to return the money, Tsafendas refused to take it back.⁴⁵⁵⁹
- On January 25, 1965, Tsafendas was released after three months' imprisonment in Beira for subversive propaganda. Penniless as without a roof over his head, Tsafendas asked if he could sleep at the Beira fire department premises and the fire-fighters agreed. He slept there for ten nights, making sure that “he arrived at mealtimes, when he was invited to share in the food.”⁴⁵⁶⁰
- Tsafendas was penniless when he arrived in Istanbul in June 1961. He went to a hospital and donated blood for money to survive.⁴⁵⁶¹
- When Tsafendas was arrested in Beira by the Portuguese police with a suitcase full of anti-fascist and anti-colonialist books, but also some Bibles, he was accused of pretending to be a missionary spreading the word about religion, while in reality preaching “under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence.”⁴⁵⁶² Questioned in custody, Tsafendas came up with the idea of pretending to be Saint Peter, which fitted perfectly with his story of Christian missionary preaching. The Portuguese thought he was mad and released him.⁴⁵⁶³
- In 1964, in Beira, John Emmanuel Marvis lent him twenty escudos, which Tsafendas paid back a few days later.⁴⁵⁶⁴

⁴⁵⁵⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁴⁵⁵⁹ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁵⁶⁰ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁴⁵⁶¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁵⁶² PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵⁶³ Alberto Henriques de Matos Rodrigues conclusion to the Subdirector, 23 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Conclusion, signed by António Fernandes Vaz, 22 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵⁶⁴ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

- When Tsafendas was ordered to fulfil his duty of compulsory military service in the Portuguese army, he pretended to be mad and got away with it.⁴⁵⁶⁵
- In 1963, Tsafendas managed to convince the Portuguese that he was a “reformed man,” no longer a Communist or a supporter of the independence of Mozambique, but just a little bit mad and harmless, so they granted him amnesty and allowed him to return to Mozambique after twelve years of exile.⁴⁵⁶⁶

We could go on listing evidence to prove how wrong Dr. Cooper’s testimony was, but the author feels that this particular statement is best disproved by reading Tsafendas’s biography, Chapter Two. It is obvious there that he was well able to manage himself.

Dr. Cooper’s statement that Tsafendas depended “all the time on others for help and assistance,” is inaccurate. The author asked forty-four people who knew Tsafendas if this was the case and they all strongly denied it. Twenty-three of these witnesses who knew him very well told the author that this was untrue and that he was not like this. Some of them even characterised him as a very proud man and no beggar. Another forty-two witnesses who met him and knew him reasonably well agreed with the above statement.

However there were people who testified to the police and to the Commission that Tsafendas had asked them for help. For example: His family told the Commission of Enquiry that Tsafendas “only wrote to them when he needed money.” According to his half-sister, Katerina Pnema, this was not true. She said that as far as she could remember, Tsafendas never asked for money. On the contrary, his father continually asked in letters to his son if he needed money or anything else. Michalis was deeply concerned about Dimitri’s welfare while living abroad. Pnema believes her family made that remark in order to explain why Tsafendas wrote to them from overseas and in an attempt to show that they did not have a close relationship. Pnema said Tsafendas corresponded regularly with her father and her sister, Eleni, and often sent presents for everyone in the family from overseas, including his step-mother.⁴⁵⁶⁷ Mary Eendracht and Fotini Gavasiadis also strongly denies that Tsafendas

⁴⁵⁶⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴⁵⁶⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁵⁶⁷ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

wrote to the family asking for money and confirm that he often sent gifts along with his letters from overseas.⁴⁵⁶⁸ Some of the gifts are still in the family's possession.

Two more witnesses are John Gianouris, the Greek Vice Consul at Lourenço Marques, and Jose Lopez Baltazar, a fire-fighter in Beira, who testified that Tsafendas asked for their help. Gianouris told the police that he "met Tsafendas during the beginning of 1965 when Tsafendas called on him for financial assistance. Tsafendas could not convince him that he was a Greek citizen and therefore he did not meet Tsafendas's request. He describes the subject as a normal and intelligent person."⁴⁵⁶⁹ What was not stated here is that Tsafendas had just been released, having spent the previous three months (16 November 1964- 26 January 1965) in police custody.⁴⁵⁷⁰ Tsafendas had asked the firemen for permission to sleep in the fire station and was allowed to do so, sharing in the men's meals.⁴⁵⁷¹ Looking for a bed in a fire station was unusual, but this was also the same day Tsafendas was released from prison, and he was penniless and homeless.

Tsafendas himself had also admitted to the police that he had to borrow money from some Greeks in order to leave Mozambique for South Africa by boat in March 1965. However, he had spent three of the previous five months in solitary confinement in Beira accused of "making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses."⁴⁵⁷² Penniless, homeless, jobless and with PIDE following him closely, Tsafendas needed to leave Mozambique. Some of his friends in Mozambique, including Costas Poriadis and Andreas and Giangos Babiolakis, voluntarily gave him money to travel from Beira to Durban. About a month later, Tsafendas paid back the money, even though they had insisted they did not want it back.⁴⁵⁷³

Another person who had helped Tsafendas was Peter Pappas, a Greek café proprietor in Durban. Pappas said he would "sometimes gave him (Tsafendas) a free meal, but when he started work he paid me." Pappas also said that Tsafendas was friendly with white down-and-

⁴⁵⁶⁸ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁵⁶⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁵⁷⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁵⁷¹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁵⁷² PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵⁷³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

outs and when he had some money he would give them a few cents.⁴⁵⁷⁴ This was not the first time Tsafendas helped poor people, though penniless himself. In Cape Town, he helped his young flatmate, Jacobus Bornman, when he was out of funds, and then declined to take the money back.⁴⁵⁷⁵ He constantly bought food and sweets and toys for the family of Patrick O’Ryan who was hosting him⁴⁵⁷⁶ and he voluntarily helped a colleague in Beira to build a room for his daughter who was to get married.⁴⁵⁷⁷

Regarding Tsafendas being incapable of keeping a job, this is arguable. It is a fact that he was lazy, doing the minimum of work, especially when it did not interest him. However, he was perfectly capable of keeping a job when he wanted to, as he did for six months at the language college in Istanbul, for another six months in the tractor factory in Munich, for six-seven months as part-time interpreter in the court in Durban and when he worked for three years as a hawker in Portugal. He also taught English voluntarily for a year or so in Lourenço Marques in the late 1930s, for six-seven months in Istanbul in 1961 and for five-six months in Beira in 1964.⁴⁵⁷⁸ Tsafendas was always able to find work, even when he was not legally permitted to do so, as happened in England.

Far from being incapable of managing his own affairs, Tsafendas worked all over Europe, as a welder and an engineer in Germany, as a carpenter in Sweden, as a teacher in Turkey, as an interpreter in Greece and as a welder and hawker in Portugal. In England, he was refused a work permit but still managed to find work ‘clandestinely’ and therefore survive.⁴⁵⁷⁹ In Portugal in 1952, he requested and received from the Director of the International Police in Lisbon a certificate which declared him to be a maritime salesman.⁴⁵⁸⁰ Whenever he was jobless, he would return to this form of work, which he liked because he

⁴⁵⁷⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁴⁵⁷⁵ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁵⁷⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁵⁷⁷ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴⁵⁷⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 April 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 4 November 2015.

⁴⁵⁷⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵⁸⁰ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

was his own boss could work whenever and wherever he wanted. Had it been more profitable and less tiring, he would have done it permanently, he said.⁴⁵⁸¹

Dr. Cooper was probably unaware of all this, but the police knew of it and one would have expected the State to be aware, too. However, no effort was made by the Attorney-General to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony with this bountiful evidence that Tsafendas was perfectly capable of managing his affairs. Once more, we are not in position to know whether van den Berg was given this information by the police or that he just did not use it.

DR. COOPER ON WHAT A SCHIZOPHRENIC CAN ACHIEVE

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If you had a man that you found was a schizophrenic - at least you thought he was - you go and find out who he is; you find he is a capitalist, he's got a match factory or something like that, would you then discard your diagnosis?

DR. COOPER: If he was - yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: He is a successful business man?

DR. COOPER: Oh yes, I would say there was something wrong with me because a schizophrenic....

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Can't be a successful business man?

DR. COOPER: No.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING WHAT A SCHIZOPHRENIC CAN ACHIEVE

Dr. Cooper stated that he would disregard his diagnosis of schizophrenia if his patient was found to be a successful businessman. Tsafendas worked for five years as a hawker-salesman and obviously made enough money to meet his living costs. Perhaps this was not enough to characterise him as a successful businessman in Dr. Cooper's eyes, though it is more likely that he was not aware of it. Dr. Cooper believes that a schizophrenic cannot be a successful businessman. Perhaps this was a reflection on Dr. Cooper's knowledge at the time, because

⁴⁵⁸¹ Emmanuel Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

there have been many examples of schizophrenic people who became exceptionally successful in their field. To name a few, Elyn R. Saks, a Law Professor at the University of Southern California⁴⁵⁸²; John Nash, a mathematician who won a Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences; Rufus May, prominent clinical psychologist; Jack Kerouac, the author of *On the Road*;⁴⁵⁸³ Robin Cunningham, successful businessman and scientist.⁴⁵⁸⁴

It is worth mentioning here that in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, a large number of psychiatrists, especially Americans, believed that homosexuality was a psychiatric condition, a mental disease, and it could be treated. The American Psychiatric Association listed homosexuality as a mental disease. Advice often given to those who experienced homosexual feelings was that they should consult a psychiatrist or psychologist. Some psychiatrists even tried to “cure” homosexuals with psychiatric therapy.⁴⁵⁸⁵ As for South Africa, from the mid-1960s to the late-1980s, the apartheid government attempted to “cure” homosexual soldiers under the so-called “Aversion Project” of forensic psychiatrist Dr. Aubrey Levin. Possibly as many as 900 military draftees of both sexes (a rate of about fifty a year for eighteen years), mostly aged 16-24, were subjected to chemical castration, electric shock treatment and “sexual reassignment” surgery, intended to remove their homosexuality, which was seen as a “disease.”⁴⁵⁸⁶

It was only in the early and middle 1970s that attitudes to homosexuality in the areas of medicine and psychiatry began to change. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its official list of mental disorders, giving rise to a series of jokes about the “instant cure.”⁴⁵⁸⁷ However, as late as 1979, the US Public Health Service was carrying out psychiatric examinations of visiting foreigners with a view to diagnosing

⁴⁵⁸² Elyn Saks (*The New York Times*), 25 January 2015, ‘Successful and schizophrenic.’

⁴⁵⁸³ Schizophrenia.com, (n.d.) ‘Famous People and Schizophrenia.’

⁴⁵⁸⁴ HealthCentral.com, (n.d.) ‘Scientist, Businessman, Poet, and Activist, Cunningham Copes with Schizophrenia Daily’; NJ.com, 7 October 2010, ‘Retired businessman living with paranoid schizophrenia to discuss his struggle.’

⁴⁵⁸⁵ Williams, 2013: 104.

⁴⁵⁸⁶ Kaplan, 2001: 216-217.

⁴⁵⁸⁷ Letter from the American Psychiatric Association to President Carter, March 14th, 1977. National Gay Task Force records, Box 145, Folder 47, Cornell University; *It is Time*, National Gay Task Force Newsletter. The National Gay Task Force: Our Past and Future. National Gay Task Force records, Box 145, folder 47, Cornell University.

those who presented as homosexual as having “psychopathic personalities.”⁴⁵⁸⁸ Even so, in South Africa the forced “sexual reassignment” surgeries continued until the late-1980s.⁴⁵⁸⁹

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND THE JUDGE

TSAFENDAS'S MOTIVE, PART I

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If there is evidence that the accused gave other reasons for killing the deceased as well as for his travels, do you still say that this delusion is constant?

DR. COOPER: Yes, but I have not said that the accused gives the tapeworm as an excuse for killing Dr. Verwoerd. All I have said is that the accused has said that the tapeworm was in the middle of whatever that may he identified Dr. Verwoerd as the leader. I think he was fed up with society as a whole, and the obvious man to attack was the man that he considered to be the leader of the society in which he was...

JUDGE BEYERS: I don't quite follow. You told me you think the real reason is that this man found all society was against him?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: This was the leader of society, and he kills him. Aren't you now describing to me a paranoic par excellence? Isn't this a paranoic that you are describing to me, a man who believes the hand of all society is against him at all times. You told me this man only showed very slight paranoic tendencies. I am a layman, I am not an expert. I don't know where I am?

DR. COOPER: I don't regard this as being particularly paranoic, in that I don't think - he doesn't feel that people have been persecuting him or trying to poison him or any of these things that paranoics sometimes do believe. But he believes that his whole life has been hopeless, that he is helpless, that he just can't make any headway, and he is only being paranoic in the sense of being unable to understand that this failure is the product of his own sick mind, and he is rather blaming society for this hopeless and helpless situation he finds himself in.

⁴⁵⁸⁸ Gay Right Advocates Memorandum to the United States Department of Justice and Acting Associate Attorney General John H Shenefield, 1980, Gay/Lesbians, (2/8/79-6/30/80), 02/08/1979 - 06/30/1980, container 7, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library.

⁴⁵⁸⁹ Kaplan, 2001: 217.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Then he should have had a grudge against the doctors?

DR. COOPER: Which doctors?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: The doctors who couldn't kill the tapeworm?

DR. COOPER: Yes, he certainly has a grudge against these doctors, which he expressed.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why didn't he kill a doctor, why did he kill the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: It is very hard. If one could creep into this man's mind one would be able to understand. But I think the Prime Minister was a much bigger and greater authority figure in this man's mind than a doctor.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was that the reason or was that not the reason for killing the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: I believe that the reason for killing the Prime Minister can only be explained on the basis of a very complex, confused, deluded mind; that one cannot say there was any one element and blame that one element for his killing of Dr. Verwoerd. I believe it was a complex, confused, muddled issue, of which the tapeworm played a part, and which other things also played a part.

DR. COOPER: If the Court wishes me to expound on why I think this man killed Dr. Verwoerd, I am afraid it is the only way in which I can answer this question. This is very complicated ground that we are on now, and it is impossible for me just to answer in a simple way, but perhaps just as a preliminary answer I believe that this man has feelings that throughout his life he has been frustrated, that he has been up against it. I believe that he feels that society as a whole is against him. And I believe that he, in his peculiar assessment, assessed Dr. Verwoerd as the head of society, I think he identified Dr. Verwoerd as the leader. I think he was fed up with society as a whole, and the obvious man to attack was the man that he considered to be the leader of the society in which he was.

DR. COOPER: I asked him whether he blamed Dr. Verwoerd for everything. No, he didn't care to go so far as to say that he blamed Dr. Verwoerd for everything.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How far did he go?

DR. COOPER: There was a big pause, there was a big 'or' and a hesitation, as there is in so many of the questions one put to him, but he said no, he cannot blame Dr. Verwoerd directly for what happened to him.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How far did you probe this? You are a trained psychiatrist?

DR. COOPER: I probed it very far.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And did you get anything at all beyond that he didn't kill him because he disliked him? Did you get any idea as to why he did kill him?

DR. COOPER: I spent a great deal of time on this question of "Why did you kill Dr. Verwoerd?" In fact I tried to give him the impression that in fact I was getting fed up. I said to him - this I said to him at my last interview again. - I said "Look, I am going to ask you a simple question: why did you kill Dr. Verwoerd? And I want a simple answer." He said "I don't know. I can't explain. It is complex. Frustrations, you know", and we got no answer to this question. I asked him this question many times. I probed as forcefully as I could, and I could not get him to tell me why he killed Dr. Verwoerd, and, with respect, I came to the conclusion that he doesn't really exactly know why he killed Dr. Verwoerd.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If he killed him as a result of the machinations of a delusion and he was a deluded individual, wouldn't he immediately be able to tell you what his delusion was and why he killed him?

DR. COOPER: My answer is yes, provided that the reason for him killing the man was purely and simply in response to the delusion. Then I would say yes, he would.

JUDGE BEYERS: I am sorry, I do not understand that. I have asked you that before, and I don't understand it now. You did tell me that in his telling you about killing the Prime Minister there was a political motive as well as other things probably. Didn't you tell me that he did not like his politics?

DR. COOPER: He told me that he didn't like his politics.

JUDGE BEYERS: And wasn't that associated with his killing?

DR. COOPER: It was associated with it but only indirectly.

JUDGE BEYERS: Then I cannot understand your giving an answer and saying he didn't give you any reason for doing so. I cannot understand that answer.

DR. COOPER: I say that because I repeatedly asked him to try and explain to me why he killed Dr. Verwoerd, and at no time was he able to offer me any explanation. When I am talking about these political issues, these are things I elicited from him quite apart from this question of: "Why did you kill Dr. Verwoerd?" He did not tell me about his political feelings directly in relation to my question of: "Why did you kill Dr. Verwoerd?" When I asked him that question, at no time was I able to elicit any coherent account of why he thought he did it. He said, in fact, that he doesn't know why he did it. He can hardly believe that he did do it. He knows he did it but he doesn't know why and

JUDGE BEYERS: Again I am having difficulty with this, as you have just told me that at least - according to what he told you - for days, if not longer - at least for a matter of days he was considering and contemplating and premeditating this killing.

DR. COOPER: That is correct.

DR. COOPER: He pointed out to me that there are many people that he hasn't liked in this world, that there are many people that have made him fed up, that he has been resentful towards, and he said that his not liking Dr. Verwoerd, that his dislike of Dr. Verwoerd was not such that he would therefore kill Dr. Verwoerd, and that he in fact couldn't understand really why exactly he killed Dr. Verwoerd.

JUDGE BEYERS: So this really had nothing to do with the tapeworm?

DR. COOPER: It did have something to do with the tapeworm, because the tapeworm has, in his mind, been instrumental in placing himself in a society and having been placed in that situation in society he is resentful of Dr. Verwoerd as an authority figure, and resentful in a personal sort of confused way to his policies... He said that he felt that the reasons underlying his killing of Dr. Verwoerd were far too complex. He couldn't explain to me why. And then he started talking about frustration, frustration, and the tapeworm, and not holding jobs, and having nowhere to live, and the whole thing became jumbled in his mind.

JUDGE BEYERS: I am sorry, I do not understand that. I have asked you that before, and I don't understand it now. You did tell me that in his telling you about killing the Prime Minister there was a political motive as well as other things probably. Didn't you tell me that he did not like his politics?

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JUDGE BEYERS: That is the only delusion he had, isn't it, that you discovered? You didn't discover any other delusion?

DR. COOPER: No, hut X....

JUDGE BEYERS: Except vague ones that "society isn't very nice to me"?

DR. COOPER: No, but I found other aspects of his mental disorder which in my opinion are equally important to simply his being deluded.

JUDGE BEYERS: I must put it again. The fact that he could not give you a definite answer when you pressed him as to why he had killed Dr. Verwoerd shows that he did not kill him as a result of any definite delusion. Am I wrong in that?

DR. COOPER: That is correct. He did not kill Dr. Verwoerd because he believed he had a tapeworm ... I believe delusion did play a role in the killing.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he give you any other considerations that played a role, other than this political side?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What were the others?

DR. COOPER: The other consideration was his own personal feelings - what has happened to him personally. He talked in terms of: "Frustration, frustration, for years frustration, Doctor. You don't understand what it has meant to me this terrible frustration." Then one would say to him: "What frustration"? And he would say: "Well, for years I have just been wandering about. I have never been able to do anything." And then you'd say to him: "What has this got to do with killing Dr. Verwoerd?" "Well, you don't understand, it is frustration and tension building up."

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If there is evidence that the accused killed the deceased for political motives, would this factor strongly suggest that he is responsible for his actions?

DR. COOPER: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You say "No"?

DR. COOPER: That is what I said.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why not?

DR. COOPER: Because I believe that there was at least that there certainly was at least an element of political resentment in this man's mind. This man's background was such that he did in fact talk in terms of being opposed to certain aspects of Dr. Verwoerd's policy. He admitted that quite openly. It was clear to me that he had no liking for Dr. Verwoerd, and I asked him - I told him in fact that it seemed to me that this was a straightforward affair that he didn't like Dr. Verwoerd and therefore he killed Dr. Verwoerd. He pointed out to me that there are many people that he hasn't liked in this world, that there are many people that have made him fed up, that he has been resentful towards, and he said that his not liking Dr. Verwoerd, that his dislike of Dr. Verwoerd was not such that he would therefore kill Dr. Verwoerd, and that he in fact couldn't understand really why exactly he killed Dr. Verwoerd.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused tell you that he may have killed the Prime Minister because he blamed him for his own troubles? The accused's own troubles?

DR. COOPER: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He never said that?

DR. COOPER: No. I put that specifically to him and he said he could not go so far as to say

that.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused perhaps say to you that he didn't know why he killed the deceased?

DR. COOPER: He did definitely say he didn't know why he killed the deceased.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you know that on the night of the day that Dr. Verwoerd was killed, the accused only gave political reasons for the killing of Dr. Verwoerd to Dr. Sakinofsky?

DR. COOPER: I think he gave predominantly political - he spoke about things political in attempting to explain what happened.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you have Dr. Sakinofsky's report there?

DR. COOPER: Yes, I've got Dr. Sakinofsky's report and if I can read just one paragraph that my eye happened to light on to explain why I have difficulty with this political angle. Dr. Sakinofsky reports: "He said that Dr. Verwoerd had been against the ideal of a Cape to Cairo union which he (the patient) identified with the Commonwealth," I don't know what that means and I...

JUDGE BEYERS: I do.

DR. COOPER: If one wishes one can place some interpretations into it.

JUDGE BEYERS: I certainly can.

DR. COOPER: But if that was produced in an English examination it would be sent back as not a completely rational, coherent sentence. This is an intelligent man writing this, and he speaks all the time of these vague concepts.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If I may interrupt, doctor, I don't think you read the whole paragraph. According to this report, it is reported as follows: He said that Dr. Verwoerd had been against the ideal of a Cape to Cairo union which he (the patient) identified with the Commonwealth. He claimed that his mother, from whom he had been separated, was called Von Willem, and that she was a member of an overseas Royal family, and this idea he apparently connected with his concern for the Commonwealth. He stated that he had brooded

over the weekend.

JUDGE BEYERS: Why does that come before me, Mr. van den Berg? If that witness is being called then he can say that that is what he had been told. Now you are putting it to somebody else for what purpose? It does not go in via this witness, I can tell you that.

JUDGE BEYERS: So you mean that he was emphatic that his idea of killing the Prime Minister arose in his mind only after he had taken the job?

DR. COOPER: He spoke in terms of vaguely associating his mind with thoughts of killing Dr. Verwoerd at odd times long before, for instance, when he was in England. He heard people talking and he thought vaguely, he says, about the killing of Dr. Verwoerd. But he is quite adamant that when he took this post it was not in any way related to his wanting to plan to kill Dr. Verwoerd.

JUDGE BEYERS: So in England already - which I presume now puts us not days but possibly years before the event, does it?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: He was already - his mind was on this assassination of the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: Except that it was on the assassination of a lot of people. He says he thought vaguely in terms of killing a lot of people. It was not an isolated thing.

JUDGE BEYERS: That may be. It is a fair correction you make to what you have said. But let me get back again: You said years ago, when he was still in England, he admitted to you that he had formed an idea (you said a vague one) of wanting to kill the Prime Minister of South Africa?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: He then comes to this country and he takes a position in the House of Assembly?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: On the floor of the House, which is only by virtue of that position, he kills the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: He doesn't, you say, relate all this lot together, but I must.

DR. COOPER: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: You say he never did it?

DR. COOPER: No, he said that at the time of taking this post at the Assembly it was not with the intention of killing Dr. Verwoerd. That this final plan to kill Dr. Verwoerd came up in his mind after he took this position.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S MOTIVE FOR KILLING DR. VERWOERD, PART I

Dr. Cooper's testimony and his cross-examination by van den Berg constitute the most persuasive proof that the Attorney-General is incompetent, or unaware of Tsafendas's statements to the police, or deliberately does not use the evidence in his possession in order to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony. According to Dr. Cooper, Tsafendas could not really understand or explain to him why he killed Dr. Verwoerd. Dr. Cooper believed that it was because of his deluded mind, because Dr. Verwoerd was head of a society which was against Tsafendas, that the tapeworm was partly responsible and that he was "frustrated." Nevertheless, Dr. Cooper admits that Tsafendas never said to him that the tapeworm told him to kill Dr. Verwoerd or that it influenced his decision to do it; it is Dr. Cooper's conclusion that the tapeworm delusion played a role in the killing. In addition, Dr. Cooper testified that Tsafendas said he "didn't know why he killed the deceased."

However, Tsafendas knew perfectly well why he killed Dr. Verwoerd, according to the two statements he gave to the police. He explained it very clearly and in detail, with no suggestion that he was deluded or psychotic. Tsafendas told the police that he was "anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist," that he had "a grudge against the South African government on account of its racial policies" and that he was in "sympathy with people fighting racialism." He told the police that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was "disgusted with his policies" and hoped that by killing him "a change of policy would take place." He considered the Nationalist Government not to be "the real representative of all the South African people"

and wanted to see a government that would represent all South Africans.⁴⁵⁹⁰ Tsafendas never said anything to the police about society being against him, or that he was frustrated or that he believed he had a tapeworm which controlled his life. What he told the police was exactly what he told people who knew him, which is what they testified to the police and to the author. Not a single one of those who were interviewed by the police or the author stated that Tsafendas ever told them what Dr. Cooper said that he told him.

The Attorney-General's comments showed that he had knowledge of Tsafendas's plan and his movements prior to the assassination. This information could have only been supplied to him by the police. This could have been done by giving him Tsafendas's statements or perhaps by a precis of them. If the Attorney-General had Tsafendas's statements, he would have seen all of the above and could have very easily used them to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony. Again, we are not in position to know for sure what happened and whether van den Berg was in possession of this evidence.

The most astonishing thing of the cross-examination regarding Tsafendas's motive is the fact that van den Berg claims Tsafendas had given political reasons for killing Dr. Verwoerd and attempts to support his argument by using Dr. Sakinofsky's medical report on Tsafendas instead of Tsafendas's two statements to the police. The report stated clearly that Dr. Sakinofsky had found Tsafendas to be a schizophrenic based on what he was told by him, which were allegedly mostly his "political ideas." Dr. Sakinofsky was the only person in the world who ever heard Tsafendas mention any of these "political ideas" of his. This section from Dr. Sakinofsky's report is extensively analysed in his testimony later in this chapter and therefore it is not included here. However, it would be best for the reader to read the analysis before proceeding further in this section. It is there proven that everything Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky was a deliberate lie, the same way he lied to Dr. Cooper.

Therefore, instead of using Tsafendas's two statements where he had given clear and logical political reasons for the killing of Dr. Verwoerd, van den Berg attempts to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony about Tsafendas's motive by using a report where Tsafendas has also been diagnosed as schizophrenic. A report which, apart from the fact that it states that Tsafendas was diagnosed as schizophrenic, also does not contain Tsafendas's real political ideas as expressed by him to the police and to tens of witnesses! A report whose content's

⁴⁵⁹⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

would appear as the words of a schizophrenic and not as a politically motivated man to anyone who might have heard it; but still van den Berg used it in an “attempt” to challenge Dr. Cooper.

The astonishing thing with this move by the Attorney-General is that while he could have very easily broken down Dr. Cooper's testimony about the motive by using Tsafendas's own words, he used instead a report that contained “confused and deluded ideas,” similar to the ones mentioned by Tsafendas to Dr. Cooper. The result, instead of challenging Dr. Cooper's testimony, was to further reinforce the idea of Tsafendas as a schizophrenic but also, and perhaps more importantly, that he did not have any clear political thought! The damage for the Attorney-General could have been far bigger if he was not stopped from proceeding further with the report by Judge Beyers.

Instead of attempting to challenge the motive by giving Tsafendas's reasons as he told them to the police and which have been much quoted here – disgust with Dr. Verwoerd's racial policies, hopes that his death would change things etc. etc. - van den Berg claims the reasons were that Dr. Verwoerd was against the Cape to Cairo movement etc.! These are ideas that not a single witness ever heard Tsafendas mention while they were the exact opposite of his true ideas.

Van den Berg is shooting himself in the foot, and apparently deliberately. Was there any possibility that van den Berg really believed he could have challenged Dr. Cooper's testimony by using the report of Dr. Sakinofsky, a report where Tsafendas was diagnosed as schizophrenic? This must be unique in the history of law, where an Attorney-General attempts to challenge a diagnosis of schizophrenia by using a medical report that has found the accused to be schizophrenic. In addition, he attempts to challenge Tsafendas's supposedly deluded motive, but only presents more deluded and confused ideas about his motive. All this when van den Berg could have so easily challenged Dr. Cooper's testimony about motive by simply using Tsafendas's own two statements to the police.

None of Tsafendas's “political reasons” in Dr. Sakinofsky's report were really his own. More importantly, there couldn't have been a person who would have heard these reasons and would not have concluded that the person was not schizophrenic, apart from van den Berg. Even if we accept that van den Berg did not have in his possession Tsafendas's statements to the police, still he could surely not have believed he could challenge Dr. Cooper on the motive issue by using Dr. Sakinofsky's report. The above incident should be taught in

a law schools about how to NOT cross-examine someone, although the author serious doubts if anyone in a fair trial in a democratic country would have even done what the Attorney-General did here.

Professor Alban Burke commented to the author about the motive and the 'delusion':

"It doesn't matter what the delusion is, what the content of the delusion is, the fact that he killed Dr. Verwoerd has got nothing to do with the tapeworm, because if he had heard voices, if the voice had said to him, 'kill Dr. Verwoerd', it was an idea that he already had, that was triggered by this hallucination, but he already had the idea that he was going to kill him. If he had been psychotic at the time that he was committing the murder, he would have been psychotic at the time of his arrest, because it doesn't disappear like that, so you would have picked up traces of that already in his statement. His statement [to the police] would not have made sense; you would have had a lot of irrelevant detail in there, so it is, again, not the picture of somebody who committed a crime whilst he was under, or in, a state of psychosis. I just want to give you a counter-argument on this, and it doesn't take anything of this away. The human brain does not create new information out of nothing, so let's say he had been exposed to stories of tapeworms, during a state of psychosis that story would have come out, that he could have blamed this on a tapeworm, but the motive for killing Dr. Verwoerd must have been there altogether, so whether he committed the crime whilst he was psychotic, or not, the motive must have been there. You don't suddenly decide, I don't like someone, when you're psychotic.

Whether he was psychotic or not, the motive was there before he was psychotic, so you can argue it a number of ways, whether he was psychotic or not doesn't really matter, but there was already the plan that he was going to ... or there was enough anger and hostility towards Dr. Verwoerd, for him to have created that. If he was a psychotic person, with murderous intent, there would have been other incidents of him attacking people, 'Don't look at me a strange way, don't follow me, I think you're a spy', whatever the case may be. There would have incidents of him, then, at least assaulting somebody else, which we don't find any evidence of, anywhere. So, if you say that Dr. Verwoerd is a dictator, yes he was; was he oppressing his people, yes, so by saying that Dr. Verwoerd is all these things, does not make him delusional. The fact that he killed Dr. Verwoerd still doesn't make him delusional. Assuming that he had an auditory hallucination that instructed him to kill Dr. Verwoerd, that could maybe have been the trigger for it, but the thinking, the planning, all of those things,

were in place before he got the instruction to do it. He didn't walk into the parliamentary chamber that day and suddenly the voice came up and said, 'I must kill this person.'⁴⁵⁹¹

Furthermore, as we have already seen, the police gathered evidence during their investigation which supported Tsafendas's statements regarding his political ideas. They took statements from people who knew him, declaring that Tsafendas was a Communist and anti-colonialist, politically engaged and a strong opponent of Dr. Verwoerd's policies and of apartheid:

- Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas wanted to "create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power."⁴⁵⁹²
- Tsafendas himself had testified to the police that he was a member of the South African Communist Party from 1937 to 1942, that he was against apartheid and colonialism, that he had joined the British anti-apartheid movement and that he took part in anti-apartheid demonstrations in London.⁴⁵⁹³
- The South African police had FOUR files on Tsafendas because of his Communist beliefs and political activities.⁴⁵⁹⁴
- PIDE held a 130-page file on Tsafendas, the *Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*.⁴⁵⁹⁵ It opened in 1938, when he was just twenty-years old, when he was "suspected of distributing communist propaganda"⁴⁵⁹⁶ and went up to his release from PIDE custody on January 26, 1965 after spending three months in a cell in Beira accused of pretending to be a Christian missionary while in reality preaching "under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence."⁴⁵⁹⁷
- PIDE had withheld from the South African police the fact that they had such a file, along

⁴⁵⁹¹ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁴⁵⁹² Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁵⁹³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁵⁹⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter XI, Paragraphs 4 and 5. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁵⁹⁵ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵⁹⁶ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵⁹⁷ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

with other information “indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique,”⁴⁵⁹⁸ thus hiding the extent of Tsafendas’s political activities. However, the South African embassy in Lisbon was aware of all this and on September 7, the day after the assassination, informed the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Cape Town that Tsafendas “has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances, including shouting pro-Communist anti-Portuguese slogans.” The communication said he had “never been convicted as courts have found him to be of unsound mind” and added, “if information correct, we suspect Portuguese may play down assassin’s previous political activities and we would suggest full details in this connection be sought.”⁴⁵⁹⁹

- Tsafendas was on the Stop List of the Department of Immigration because of his Communist beliefs and activities.⁴⁶⁰⁰ This list was also in the possession of the Security Police.⁴⁶⁰¹
- The Department of Immigration had two files on Tsafendas:
 - a. “On file B.7771 there were, *inter alia*, references to Demitrios Tsafendakis’s alleged communist activities, as well as references to his unsuccessful applications for permanent residence. It is also evident from the file that he had been placed on the stop list.⁴⁶⁰²
 - b. “On file G.8226 there were references to his alleged communist activities, and detailed references to his unsuccessful applications of 1936, 1938, 1941, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1950 and 1959 to enter the Union of South Africa.”⁴⁶⁰³
- It was known to the South African police that Tsafendas was deported and exiled from Mozambique due to his Communist and anti-colonialist beliefs and activities.⁴⁶⁰⁴

⁴⁵⁹⁸ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁵⁹⁹ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶⁰⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter IV, Paragraph 19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁶⁰¹ General H. J. Den Bergh memorandum to the COE, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File VDSO 17-64, NASA.

⁴⁶⁰² Report of the COE. Chapter IV, Paragraph 19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁶⁰³ Report of the COE. Chapter IV, Paragraph 20. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁶⁰⁴ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas: Mystery man of parliament’; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 8 September 1966: 1, ‘The killer: Five passports and a record of subversion’;

- It was known that Tsafendas was arrested in Mozambique by the Portuguese Public Security Police on November 16, 1964 and subsequently handed to PIDE accused of “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.” It was also known that he had spent three months in custody being interrogated because of the accusations.⁴⁶⁰⁵
- It was known to the South African police that while he was in South Africa from 1939 to 1942 Tsafendas was “engaged actively in Communistic propaganda.”⁴⁶⁰⁶
- It was known that in 1938 in Mozambique he was dismissed from a job “owing to his Communist leanings” and that he was suspected of being “engaged in disseminating Communistic propaganda.”⁴⁶⁰⁷
- It was known that Tsafendas supported Mozambique’s independence from Portugal and wanted to see “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother-nation.”⁴⁶⁰⁸
- It was known to the police that Tsafendas, while in London, had associated with Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt, the secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society and one of the leading figures in the modern anti-slavery movement.⁴⁶⁰⁹
- It was known to the police that Tsafendas, while in London, had associated with prominent anti-apartheid activists David Gardener, Solly Sachs and Rev. Canon Collins.⁴⁶¹⁰
- Although PIDE had concealed important information about Tsafendas’s political activities, it confided in a report which it gave to the South African police that Tsafendas had admitted after being arrested on one occasion that he was “a partisan of the

Pretoria News, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dimitrio a Red, they alleged’; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Assassin said to have been deported from P.E.A. for Communist connections.’

⁴⁶⁰⁵ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁶⁰⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter I A, Paragraph 23. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁶⁰⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 16. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁶⁰⁸ PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁶⁰⁹ *The Guardian*, 30 September 1966: 10, ‘Winding back’; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁶¹⁰ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

independence of this province.” The same report also stated that “although, as above mentioned, TSAFENDAS is mentally deficient, the truth is you find in him an obvious spirit of rebellion against the Portuguese Administration, and a clear adhesion to the independence of Mozambique.”⁴⁶¹¹

- Kenneth Ross was Tsafendas's landlord in Durban for two months in 1965. He told the police that Tsafendas “was very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in politics. Tsafendas objected to the Communists being banished to Robin-Island because of their political opinions and actions. In general, Tsafendas opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government, and was definitely pre-Russian.”⁴⁶¹²
- Patrick O’Ryan told the police that Tsafendas “was against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal” and that he “labelled the apartheid policies as unfair.”⁴⁶¹³ Later O’Ryan described Tsafendas as getting “excited” when he talked about politics and saying that Dr. Verwoerd was a tyrant who was oppressing his people, that he was ‘Hitler’s best student’ and if he (Tsafendas) ever get hold of him “he would bash his skull.” He did not tell the police about Dr. Verwoerd being a tyrant as he believed it would be bad for Tsafendas.⁴⁶¹⁴
- Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren, a security officer at the Mandini Paper Factory in Zululand, told the police that Nick Vergos said Tsafendas “was not Greek, but a kaffir and a Communist.”⁴⁶¹⁵
- Robert Smith was a night clerk at the Durban Men’s Home where Tsafendas stayed for two months in 1965. He testified that Tsafendas was a Communist, “a fanatic on politics and seldom spoke of anything else” and had described “United Party and National Party

⁴⁶¹¹ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁶¹² Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶¹³ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁶¹⁴ Patrick O’Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁶¹⁵ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

officials and members as capitalistic roughs.” Tsafendas had told him that the “South African Government’s policy was “rotten” and often compared conditions in South Africa with those of Russia, stating, “Look at all the poor people in South Africa... such conditions don’t exist in Russia because Russia is a Communistic state.”⁴⁶¹⁶

- Albert Vercueil said Tsafendas told him, “You are like your bloody government, but I will get you, and I will get your Prime Minister too.”⁴⁶¹⁷
- Johannes Botha, a security officer, told the police that Nick Vergos characterised Tsafendas in a remark to him as the “biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa.”⁴⁶¹⁸
- Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie, a sergeant of the South African police, testified that Nick Vergos reported Tsafendas to him as “Communist bastard.”⁴⁶¹⁹
- Father Hanno Probst reported Tsafendas to a security officer as a “communist and a dangerous person.”⁴⁶²⁰ He suspected Tsafendas of stirring up disaffection among young non-whites in the Mangete Reserve. “I say this because during the period Demetrios Tsafendas stayed at Mandini, the youngsters in the Mangete Reserve became unruly and aggressive. This, however, is only suspicion, because since the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd everything became quiet again and the youngsters controllable... He started swearing at the Mozambique government, saying it did nothing for the black people.”⁴⁶²¹
- Roelof Swiegers testified that Tsafendas “leaned towards the communist side.”⁴⁶²²
- Jacobus Bornman testified that Tsafendas “stood up a lot for the Coloureds” and “often criticised the South African government and seemed to have a grudge against Dr.

⁴⁶¹⁶ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶¹⁷ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶¹⁸ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶¹⁹ Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶²⁰ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶²¹ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶²² Roelof Erasmus Swiegers statement to the police, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

Verwoerd.”⁴⁶²³

- According to Inspector Horacio Ferreira, of the Portuguese Security Police in Mozambique, Tsafendas was “intense anti-White” and told him that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-Whites.”⁴⁶²⁴
- Keith Martincich testified that Tsafendas “on quite a few occasions he had discussed politics with me. He said he did not like the Government and that he was given a hard time in South Africa. He said the Government won’t reign very long.”⁴⁶²⁵
- Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas’s landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, “I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners.”⁴⁶²⁶
- Antony Maw testified that the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique did not allow Tsafendas to enter the country on grounds of suspected Communist tendencies.⁴⁶²⁷
- A report by of Col. van Wyk of the South African police characterised Tsafendas as being “intensely anti-white.”⁴⁶²⁸
- A 1941 report from the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs said that Tsafendas was “dismissed from employment at a kiosk in Portuguese South Africa (Mozambique) on account of his Communist leanings.”⁴⁶²⁹
- Peter Pappas, whose café in Durban Tsafendas often visited, said Tsafendas “spoke angrily about the Salazar regime in Portugal and about the Mozambique police.”⁴⁶³⁰
- In July 1966, just two months before the assassination, Tsafendas gave a seventy-five-minute interview to a reporter named N.D. Hartford of the *Cape Argus*. They had already

⁴⁶²³ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶²⁴ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁶²⁵ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶²⁶ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶²⁷ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

⁴⁶²⁸ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁶²⁹ Report of the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, 14 October 1941. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

⁴⁶³⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to the newspaper and enquired whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as an “anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship.”⁴⁶³¹ Hartford’s impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. According to Hartford, Tsafendas spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation.⁴⁶³²

- Reports from Mozambique which emerged after the assassination said that Tsafendas was “violently anti-Portuguese.”⁴⁶³³
- Jorge Perestrelo, who met Tsafendas in Lisbon, told *Diario Popular* that “one could see how anxious he was to oppose the authorities.”⁴⁶³⁴

Nine witnesses told the author that Tsafendas believed the Whites in Mozambique, South Africa and Rhodesia had commandeered the land from its rightful owners. Thus these territories were “occupied lands” ruled by “occupiers” such as Dr. Verwoerd and Ian Smith. However, Tsafendas considered that Whites who accepted majority rule and opposed colonial government had the right to live there.⁴⁶³⁵

Eight more witnesses, Cleanthes Alachiotis, Nikolaos Billis, George Kantas, Nickolas Kambouris, Vasilis Perselis, Grigoris Pouftis and Michalis Vasilakis, Elias Constantaras, the first seven of them from the *Eleni* tanker, whose statements were not found in the NASA, maintained that they were interviewed by the South African police and testified that Tsafendas was a Communist, opposed apartheid and considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant and a dictator. They also testified that Tsafendas joined the military wing of the Greek Communist Party during the Greek Civil War.⁴⁶³⁶

Six of the *Eleni* crew, Alachiotis, Billis, Kantas, Kambouris, Pouftis and Vasilakis,

⁴⁶³¹ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.’

⁴⁶³² Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁶³³ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘180-day prison for Tsafendas?’

⁴⁶³⁴ Cuttings from the *Diario Popular* of 9.9.66. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶³⁵ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁶³⁶ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nickolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

said they told the police that Tsafendas had characterised a possible assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as justifiable because he was a tyrant and the oppressor of his people; exactly the same thing Tsafendas repeated thirty years later to the three priests.⁴⁶³⁷ The fact that Tsafendas said this just three days before the assassination adds strength to their claim. These six witnesses had also testified to the police, as Elias Constantaras had done,⁴⁶³⁸ that Tsafendas described Dr. Verwoerd as “Hitler’s best student” and that he spat at his photograph in a newspaper. None of the above statements was used by the Attorney-General to challenge Dr. Cooper’s testimony, although they were in the possession of the police.

Several other witnesses who knew Tsafendas very well like Ira Kyriakakis, Father Nikolas Banovic, Katerina Pnema, Helen Grispos, Fotini Gavasiadis, Nick Papadakis, Mary Eendracht, John and Antony Michaletos, Nick Augustides and Andreas Babiolakis stated to the author that Tsafendas was a passionate Communist who considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator, and “Hitler’s best student.”⁴⁶³⁹ Tsafendas kept characterising Dr. Verwoerd with those words as long as thirty years after the assassination.⁴⁶⁴⁰ Andreas Babiolakis told the author that Tsafendas made no attempt to hide his detestation for colonialism and apartheid. Tsafendas told Babiolakis one day that “Verwoerd and [Portuguese Prime Minister] Salazar are fascist dictators and should be executed like Mussolini.”⁴⁶⁴¹ Six years after the assassination, Tsafendas proudly told anti-apartheid activist and Umkhonto we Sizwe fighter Alexander Moumbaris, a fellow prisoner in Pretoria Maximum Security Prison, “I got τον Νταή τους” (“their tough guy” or “their champion,” but in a pejorative sense).⁴⁶⁴²

The vast majority of witnesses, some 90% of the forty-four who were interviewed by the author, testified that Tsafendas talked constantly about politics and that he was strongly against apartheid and a Communist. The rest had not discussed politics with him. Several witnesses, including Katerina Pnema, Mary Eendracht, Ira Kyriakakis, Antony, Irene and

⁴⁶³⁷ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴⁶³⁸ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴⁶³⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁶⁴⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁶⁴¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴⁶⁴² Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

John Michaletos, Andreas Babiolakis and Mike Vlachopoulos characterised him as a “political animal.”⁴⁶⁴³ Nick Augustides, for instance, remembers Tsafendas “talking violently about politics and about the apartheid system ... he was very passionate about politics.”⁴⁶⁴⁴

Father Minas Constandinou told the author:

“Dimitris was the most political person I ever met. He lived and breathed politics. Most of his conversations were about politics... he was very Communist, very, very Communist. But you know he was not one of those Communists who just say they are Communists. Dimitris had read a lot about Communism and he practised and preached Communism, he did not just claim to be one... he was also anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid. I think above all, he was that. He was very much for the independence of Mozambique and actually, not just Mozambique, but all the colonies in Africa.

Dimitris used to say that apartheid was like colonialism, because a few Europeans were ruling a land which belonged to Blacks because their ancestors had invaded and conquered it. I remember he used to call the Portuguese in Mozambique and I think the whites in South Africa too, ‘conquerors’ and ‘occupiers;’ he considered Mozambique and South Africa to be ‘occupied lands,’ conquered by foreigners. He used to say that Verwoerd was Hitler’s best student, because he had learned from him some of his methods and laws and he was applying them to the Blacks.”⁴⁶⁴⁵

Another issue is the disclosure that Tsafendas formed the idea of killing Dr. Verwoerd while in England. This might be correct, or partly correct. Tsafendas told Father Minas Constandinou that he decided to “do something against apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd” upon reading about the Sharpeville massacre.⁴⁶⁴⁶ The massacre took place on March 1960 and Tsafendas was deported from England to Germany in December 1959, so presumably and according to his statement to the police he was in Germany at the time and not in England. However, he also mentioned to the police in his statement that while in England in discussions he had with anti-apartheid activists and leftists it was argued that the “South

⁴⁶⁴³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁶⁴⁴ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

⁴⁶⁴⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁶⁴⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

African Prime Minister deserves to be shot.”⁴⁶⁴⁷

All the witness statements gathered by the police flatly contradicted Dr. Cooper's testimony, indeed challenged it at many points. Tsafendas never spoke to any of them about Dr. Verwoerd being responsible for his troubles, or that society was against him or that he was frustrated. Most importantly, Tsafendas, according to the witnesses, had a clear political mind and would have had no difficulty explaining why he acted as he did. Although several witnesses testified to the police that Tsafendas was a Communist, the word Communist was never heard during Dr. Cooper's testimony. Indeed, it was not to be heard throughout the entire summary trial and the fact that Tsafendas was deeply political would be concealed.

The Attorney-General could easily have challenged Dr. Cooper's statement and conclusions simply by reading Tsafendas's statement or by using some of the evidence mentioned above. However, he did nothing. Whether this was because of incompetence or because he was unaware makes no great difference to Tsafendas. The fact is that the evidence which would have proved Dr. Cooper wrong, or at least raised serious doubts, was not used. Instead van den Berg's cross-examination, though sounding aggressive, did not lead anywhere.

In 1994, when Tsafendas was in Pretoria Prison Hospital and apartheid had collapsed, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis asked him, “Why did you do it, Mr. Tsafendas [kill Verwoerd]?” Tsafendas told the priest that he considered Verwoerd to be “a dictator and a tyrant” and that because he was the “brains behind apartheid,” he hoped his death would lead to the collapse of that racist policy. He knew everything would not be transformed overnight, but he hoped Verwoerd's “removal” would be a stepping stone towards the end of apartheid.⁴⁶⁴⁸

Tsafendas denounced the slain Prime Minister as a “monster” and an “evil person,” and set out in detail the steps Verwoerd had taken to establish his iron rule and earn his title, “the architect of apartheid.” Tsafendas told Bishop Ioannis that “Verwoerd was a dictator and a tyrant who oppressed his people. People were like slaves. He created apartheid... Even if you had lived here, you would not have been able to tell of its real extent [of apartheid] unless you had lived with Coloureds and Blacks. People were like slaves, they were only living to serve the Whites. Verwoerd did that. He was a monster, almost as bad as Hitler. I

⁴⁶⁴⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶⁴⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

call him 'Hitler's best student' because he copied some of Hitler's Nurnberg Laws and applied them to the Blacks here... Verwoerd would have done to the Blacks what Hitler did to the Jews if he did not need them to serve the Whites."⁴⁶⁴⁹

Tsafendas then argued that his act was "an act of profound moral principle," morally justifiable because Verwoerd was a tyrant and a dictator. He quoted at length from the works of Frantz Fanon, the Martinican revolutionary, philosopher and psychiatrist, who had argued that violence against colonialism was not only necessary in order to free the people, but also legitimate. Tsafendas spoke at length of his admiration for Fanon and urged both priests to read his works. He then said that since he had the opportunity to rid the world of such monster, it was his "duty," his "social responsibility" to do so, a "tyrannicide." Tsafendas also argued that if he had not acted, his guilt would have equalled that of Verwoerd, because any person who is aware of a crime and does not intervene, or worse allows it to continue when he has the power to end it, is as guilty as the criminal himself. Father Minas disagreed with all this and reminded him that he had killed a man and that was unacceptable and a mortal sin, no matter who the person was and what he had done. Tsafendas then put this question to Bishop Ioannis and Father Minas:

"Every day, you see a man you know committing a very serious crime for which millions of people suffer. You cannot take him to court or report him to the police, because he is the law in the country. Would you remain silent and let him continue with his crime, or would you do something to stop him?"⁴⁶⁵⁰

Both priests replied that they would have wanted to stop the crime but they would not have killed a person to stop it. Tsafendas said, "Then you would have been as guilty as Dr. Verwoerd. You are guilty not only when you commit a crime, but also when you do nothing to prevent it when you have the chance." The debate went on and on but Tsafendas refused to accept that he was wrong, producing arguments and counter-arguments to support his contention. He even used examples from history where tyrants and dictators were executed by the people. He characterised the lynching of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and the

⁴⁶⁴⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁶⁵⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

killing by partisans of Reinhard Heydrich, Gestapo chief and one of the architects of the Holocaust, as justifiable and as tyrannicides.⁴⁶⁵¹

Father Minas refused to accept that such acts were morally justifiable and asked Tsafendas if he would also have killed Hitler to save the people. Tsafendas replied “Yes” without hesitation. The priest then asked if he could travel back in time whether he would have killed Hitler or Dr. Verwoerd as babies, so that they would never grow up to become the monsters they became. Tsafendas replied, “no” and justified it with an answer that took both priests by surprise. He told them that if he was able to go back in time, instead of killing the infant Hitler and the infant Verwoerd, he would have tried to raise the two babies in a different environment so that they would have been protected from the influences of the time which helped turn them into the monsters they became. Tsafendas then used Jan-Jacques Rousseau’s observation that “all people are good by nature, but corrupted by society.”⁴⁶⁵²

Father Minas had asked Tsafendas exactly that question (the infant Verwoerd) when he first visited him in prison the mid-1980s. He was so impressed by the answer, that when he first spoke to Bishop Ioannis about Tsafendas, the first thing he mentioned was his answer to the infant Hitler and infant Verwoerd question. When Bishop Ioannis put the identical question to him many years later, Tsafendas again gave him the same answer.⁴⁶⁵³ Tsafendas’s answers to the priests hardly fit with the way he was described by Dr. Cooper.

Sometimes, Tsafendas, in the presence of the priests, would proudly make a stabbing gesture and denounce Dr. Verwoerd yet again as “Hitler’s best student.” He told them that at first, he intended to kidnap the Prime Minister and offer to exchange him for political prisoners. When he realised that this was not possible, he considered placing a bomb in Parliament to kill all the MPs. However, he dismissed this idea because journalists and other innocent people and the only “good” MP, Helen Suzman, could also have died.⁴⁶⁵⁴ Tsafendas always referred to his killing of Dr. Verwoerd as “the execution.” He refused to use the word

⁴⁶⁵¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁶⁵² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁶⁵³ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁶⁵⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

assassination. When the priests referred to “the assassination,” Tsafendas would invariably correct them, saying, “the execution!”⁴⁶⁵⁵

Tsafendas also always maintained to Liza Key that he had killed Dr. Verwoerd for political reasons; because he was an “immoral man” and “disagreed with his policies” as he specifically told her.⁴⁶⁵⁶ Over the four years that she visited him in the Sterkfontein Hospital (1995-1999), he never told her anything to make her think that he could have been insane. She never doubted his sanity.⁴⁶⁵⁷

It should be noted here that on October 9, 2015, the sixteenth anniversary of Tsafendas's death, Rev. Ioannis Tsafaridis, then Bishop of the Greek-Orthodox Church in Mozambique (now Bishop in Zambia and Malawi), described Tsafendas as “the Greek Che Guevara.” The bishop was laying the foundation stone for the church of Saint Dionysius, also to serve as a Greek Orthodox missionary centre, at Murakela village in Nangoma Murumbi, North Mozambique. Reminding the congregation that it was Tsafendas's anniversary, Bishop Ioannis went on to describe him as the “man who killed apartheid,” as “a modern Greek hero who wanted to set the people of Mozambique and South Africa free,” “a man who wanted to liberate South Africa and Mozambique from the oppressors,” “an idealist,” “a concerned man about the people's sufferings,” and as “a humble man, a man with dignity,” while he described Verwoerd's assassination as “tyrannicide.” Finally, the bishop said that the new church was “in the memory of the revolutionary Dimitri Tsafendas.”⁴⁶⁵⁸

Furthermore, nine days later, on October 18, 2015, Rev. Ioannis Tsafaridis, led a memorial service for Tsafendas in the Greek Orthodox Church in Maputo. The service was announced in the Press and by posters distributed throughout the city in which Bishop Ioannis heralded Tsafendas as “The Idealist.” During the service, Bishop Ioannis declared that Tsafendas was “was not an ordinary man, but a man who gave up his life for a principle and for the good of his fellow citizens... an idealist who removed a tyrant ... a freedom-fighter who struggled for the independence of Mozambique and against apartheid.” He said that Tsafendas “laid a stepping stone towards the end of apartheid” and that his actions “were

⁴⁶⁵⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁶⁵⁶ Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

⁴⁶⁵⁷ Liza Key in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁴⁶⁵⁸ Dimelas (*Times of Change*) (2015) “Ο πρώτος ναός στη μνήμη του Έλληνα «φονιά του απαρτχάιντ»” (The first church in memory of the Greek “assassin of apartheid”). Retrieved from: <http://www.thetoc.gr/koinwnia/article/o-prwtos-naos-sti-mnimi-tou-ellina-fofia-tou-apartxaint>; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 18 October 2015.

borne out of selflessness and for the public good.” He also said that although he never got the recognition he deserved, Tsafendas did not care that he was not hailed as a hero; according to his conscience, he did the right thing, regardless of what others might think. The bishop quoted Tsafendas as saying, “Do a good thing and then throw it in the sea; when you do a good thing, you don’t go around advertising it.” Bishop Ioannis concluded by saying that Tsafendas opened the “door of freedom” in South Africa and that “Mozambique and South Africa should recognise his efforts and stop believing apartheid’s lies.”⁴⁶⁵⁹

Finally, Rev. Seraphim Kykkotis, currently Bishop of the Greek Orthodox Church in Zimbabwe and Angola and former Archbishop of Johannesburg and Pretoria, never met Tsafendas. However, he was very impressed from what he heard about him from the priests who were visiting him in prison and in the hospital, as well as Greeks who knew him in South Africa and elsewhere. Thus, Bishop Seraphim, in his 2013 book about Nelson Mandela (*Αναφορές στο Νομπελίστα Νέλσον Μαντέλα*), praised Tsafendas and his act. He characterised Tsafendas as “A Greek soul, a brave Cretan who raised in his stature the dignity of humanity against apartheid” and described his act as “heroic.” He concluded about Tsafendas that “people in his time called him a murderer, while others thought that he was crazy... However, his motives were absolutely pure: he was a selfless fighter for people’s dignity who acted only out of love, to protect people’s rights.”⁴⁶⁶⁰

TSAFENDAS’S MOTIVE, PART II: DR. VERWOERD’S MEETING WITH CHIEF JONATHAN

JUDGE BEYERS: There was the political motivation; is there anything else that made up this complex of his intention to kill?

DR. COOPER: Yes. Well, again, this was, if you like to call it, a political thing again, but in my mind it was an irrational political thing. I recall that the question of Dr. Verwoerd’s meeting with Jonathan, he says, came into it. Now, when one asks him exactly in what way it came into it, how it came into it, what this meeting had to do with his killing Dr. Verwoerd, one is again confronted with a very vague account, but one gathers that his idea concerning that meeting was that he felt that Dr. Verwoerd was not truly representative of the White

⁴⁶⁵⁹ Press Release of the Orthodox Metropolis of Mozambique, 18 October 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 18 October 2015.

⁴⁶⁶⁰ Bishop Seraphim Kykkotis, 2013: 47.

population in this country, and he felt that Chief Jonathan was not truly representative of the non-European population in this country, and in some rather muddled perplexed way that seems to upset the accused and in his words, he says, that might have had something to do with it. But one cannot from that deduce that the accused killed Dr. Verwoerd because of that meeting. But his thoughts revolving around this meeting further muddled his mind, further confused his feelings and ideas about the political situation, and apparently contributed in some way to the mass of irrational thinking that collected in his mind and eventually burst forth in this aggressive act.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S MOTIVE FOR KILLING DR. VERWOERD, PART II

The above short but crucial testimony from Dr. Cooper is a good example of what was happening in the summary trial. Dr. Cooper said Tsafendas told him that "he felt that Dr. Verwoerd was not truly representative of the White population in this country." That is a very, very important statement.

What Tsafendas told the police in his statement of September 11, 1966 was that he believed "Dr. Verwoerd and Jonathan were, to my mind, not the real representatives of their countries. I wanted to see a government representing all the South African people. I do not think the Nationalist Government is representative of the people and I wanted to see a different government." Tsafendas did not say that Dr. Verwoerd was not truly representative of the White population of South Africa, but that he was not representative of all the people of South Africa. He also said that the Nationalist Government, formed from Dr. Verwoerd's party, was not representative of all the South African people.

The first important point here is that the Attorney-General again does not make any attempt to challenge Dr. Cooper's statement, which has a completely different meaning from what Tsafendas told the police. The Attorney-General could easily have challenged Dr. Cooper's statement just by reading out Tsafendas's statement. There is a massive difference between someone who is representative of the white population and someone who is representative of all the population. The Attorney-General either is not aware of Tsafendas's police statement or chose to ignore it and let Dr. Cooper's version pass unchallenged. A statement such as Dr. Cooper's, along with many that will follow, including some in the media, portray Tsafendas as completely different to the person he really is. They show him as

a man who supported apartheid or disagreed with it for the wrong reasons, a man with confused political ideas.

What Tsafendas said in his statement, that Dr. Verwoerd was not representative of all South African people, clearly states his opposition to Dr. Verwoerd and to his government. What Dr. Cooper said, that Tsafendas believed Dr. Verwoerd did not truly represent South Africa's Whites, suggests Tsafendas accepted racial divisions. Tsafendas's statement to the police on this matter is compatible with statements taken by the police, and separately by the author, from people who knew Tsafendas's thinking. Tsafendas called Dr. Verwoerd a "dictator" long after the assassination to people like Fathers Minas Constandinou, Spiros Randos and Ioannis Tsafaridis, but also before the assassination to Patrick O'Ryan, Father Nikola Banovic, Andreas Babiolakis, Elias Constantaras, Nick Papadakis, Cleanthes Alachiotis, Nikolaos Billis, George Kantas, Nikolaos Kambouris, Katerina Pnema, Michalis Vasilakis and many others.

As for the statement which Dr. Cooper alleges Tsafendas made, we do not know what Tsafendas's exact words were. It is possible that he said what Dr Cooper claimed he said, perhaps in an attempt to mislead the psychiatrist about his true political ideas. It is also possible that Dr. Cooper misunderstood what Tsafendas said. Finally, it is possible that Dr. Cooper changed Tsafendas's statement and replaced his words "all South African people" with the "the White population" to support the defence's line. The author is not in position to know what happened for sure, but the fact is that another inaccurate statement by Dr. Cooper regarding Tsafendas's character and political ideology was accepted by the State when it would have been easy not only to challenge it, but to break it down.

It is also worth raising the possibility that Tsafendas is lying about the meeting in question being a motive. He told the police that the "idea of destroying Dr. Verwoerd entered my mind a few days after I started work as a messenger in the House of Assembly."⁴⁶⁶¹ Tsafendas also told two witnesses that he decided to assassinate Dr. Verwoerd as soon as he got the job in the Parliament.⁴⁶⁶² The author is not in position to know whether Tsafendas was aware at the time of the forthcoming meeting, but it is likely that he was not. However, it is possible that he was aware of the meeting in advance since he read the newspapers every day

⁴⁶⁶¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶⁶² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

but also because he was working at the Parliament. It is a fact though, that Tsafendas never mentioned this meeting as a motive to any of the witnesses he spoke to about the assassination.

Although the police had ample evidence to prove that Dr. Cooper's statement was inaccurate, the Attorney-General did not use it. Again, we are not in position to know whether this was from incompetence, or a deliberate attempt to conceal Tsafendas's real political ideas, or because he did not have the information. The result was that another false statement by Dr. Cooper was accepted by the court and subsequently by the public.

TSAFENDAS'S PLANNING OF THE ASSASSINATION

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was it weeks before he did it that he conceived the intention of committing this crime?

DR. COOPER: I gathered from him it was at least several days.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: From what he told you, when did he say he wanted to kill the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: I can't answer that. I just got from him that he had vaguely in his mind planned to kill him, and then, on that particular day he decided that this was now going to be the time he was going to do it.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't he tell you that he wanted to kill the Prime Minister on the 3rd September?

DR. COOPER: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he tell you that he originally wanted to shoot the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: Yes, he told me that he had originally tried to buy a revolver and that he had bought some sort of gas pistol but that it did not function properly.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he tell you that he arranged to buy a Beretta pistol?

DR. COOPER: I don't recall the name Beretta, no.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't he say that he had arranged to buy a Beretta pistol from a seaman on the tanker *Eleni*?

DR. COOPER: He did give me a vague, garbled account of his thoughts and the happenings on that vessel. He did talk vaguely in terms of references made on that boat to ill-feeling concerning the political policies of Dr. Verwoerd, and he did tell me of thoughts crossing his mind concerning the killing of Dr. Verwoerd.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't the accused say that he waited for his salary at the end of August, 1966, before buying the pistol?

DR. COOPER: No. He didn't tell me that.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't he tell you that he intended escaping on the tanker *Eleni* after shooting the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: Yes, he did tell me, again in vague terms, of how he contemplated escaping on this ship. This was when he was thinking in terms of the shooting, not when he was apparently thinking in terms of the stabbing. He was very adamant that he had no plan of escape although thought of escape after committing this act.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he tell you that he had obtained American dollars at the bank in order to purchase the pistol?

DR. COOPER: Yes, I do recall him saying something about American dollars.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused say that he changed his plans after he had purchased the gas pistol, which was not suited to his purpose?

DR. COOPER: No, he didn't really talk to me in terms of plans; when he discussed the eventual stabbing with me he didn't really know why he did what he did.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't the accused tell you that he...

JUDGE BEYERS: I am sorry, I do not understand that. I have asked you that before, and I don't understand it now. You did tell me that in his telling you about killing the Prime Minister there was a political motive as well as other things probably. Didn't you tell me that he did not like his politics?

DR. COOPER: He told me that he didn't like his politics.

JUDGE BEYERS: And wasn't that associated with his killing?

DR. COOPER: It was associated with it but only indirectly.

JUDGE BEYERS: Then I cannot understand you are giving an answer and saying he didn't give you any reason for doing so. I cannot understand that answer.

DR. COOPER: I say that because I repeatedly asked him to try and explain to me why he killed Dr. Verwoerd, and at no time was he able to offer me any explanation. When I am talking about these political issues, these are things I elicited from him quite apart from this question of: "Why did you kill Dr. Verwoerd?" He did not tell me about his political feelings directly in relation to my question of: "Why did you kill Dr. Verwoerd?" When I asked him that question, at no time was I able to elicit any coherent account of why he thought he did it. He said, in fact, that he doesn't know why he did it. He can hardly believe that he did do it. He knows he did it but he doesn't know why and...

JUDGE BEYERS: Again I am having difficulty with this, as you have just told me that at least - according to what he told you - for days, if not longer, at least for a matter of days, he was considering and contemplating and premeditating this killing.

DR. COOPER: That is correct.

JUDGE BEYERS: I think you told me that he went and bought the knives on that morning?

DR. COOPER: That was what he told me.

JUDGE BEYERS: Then I don't follow why he told you that he does not know why he killed him, because he must have been thinking about it for days.

DR. COOPER: I know, but this is the point, he premeditated it apparently from what he said, and he did it. But when one asks him why he did it, he cannot gather a coherent system of ideas in his mind to explain why he did it. He thought of doing it apparently, he planned to do it, he did it. But why he did it, what was in his mind concerning the doing of it, this he was unable to tell me despite repeated interrogations.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S PLANNING OF THE ASSASSINATION

The surprising thing here is not Dr. Cooper's testimony, but the cross-examination by the Attorney-General. Van den Berg demonstrates knowledge of Tsafendas's movements prior to the assassination, information which could only have come from Tsafendas himself and

presumably from the statements he gave to the police. However, up to this point, van den Berg seemed not to have access to the Tsafendas's statements since he did not use any of the information in them to challenge Dr. Cooper's statements, especially with regards to his motive and the tapeworm.

The question therefore is, where did he get the information from? If it was from Tsafendas's statements to the police, why did not he use the rest of the information to challenge Dr. Cooper? Of course, there could be other explanations as to how van den Berg got the information, perhaps from the police but possibly only on specific areas, the rest being withheld. It is also conceivable of course that van den Berg only used those parts from the statement he wanted and deliberately did not mention the rest in an attempt not to reveal Tsafendas's real motive. Whatever the explanation, the fact that van den Berg used only parts of Tsafendas's statements is secondary to the main issue, being why he failed to challenge Dr. Cooper by citing Tsafendas's statement with regard to why he killed Dr. Verwoerd.

TSAFENDAS'S "NEW RACE" THEORY AND BEING UNSYMPATHETIC TOWARDS COLOUREDS AND NATIVES

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused perhaps say to you that he didn't know why he killed the deceased?

DR. COOPER: He did definitely say he didn't know why he killed the deceased

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: he tell you that he may have killed the deceased because he blamed the deceased for all his troubles - the accused's troubles?

DR. COOPER: No, he did not word it in that way.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't the accused tell you that he believed, as he called it, in evolution?

DR. COOPER: Evolution? Yes, he did talk in terms of evolution.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And didn't he explain that by this he meant that members of all the races in South Africa should be free to intermarry so that a new race could develop?

DR. COOPER: Well, he gave me an exposition on evolution and its relation to the...

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Please reply to my question?

DR. COOPER: But he didn't tell me the job properly.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes. Did the accused explain that members of all races in South Africa should be free to intermarry so that a new race could develop?

DR. COOPER: He put forward that view, as well at another time putting forward a view that he felt unsympathetic towards the Coloureds and natives.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And didn't he tell you that he was against the Immorality Act?

DR. COOPER: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't he say that he thought that Dr. Verwoerd was standing in the way of this evolution?

DR. COOPER: I don't recall him saying that in so many words but I accept that he implied something of that sort.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused tell you that he may have killed the Prime Minister because he blamed him for his own troubles the accused's own troubles?

DR. COOPER: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He never said that?

DR. COOPER: No. I put that specifically to him and he said he could not go so far as to say that.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

TSAFENDAS BEING UNSYMPATHETIC TOWARDS COLOUREDS AND NATIVES

Here Dr. Cooper makes the most extraordinary of his statements - that Tsafendas was unsympathetic towards South Africa's Coloureds and natives. Firstly, the Attorney-General himself is aware that Tsafendas applied to be reclassified as Coloured since he had included this information in his memorandum of October 3, 1966, regarding Tsafendas.⁴⁶⁶³ Tsafendas had given as one of the reasons for his application the fact that he regarded himself as a

⁴⁶⁶³ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

Coloured.⁴⁶⁶⁴ This was hardly the act of a man who did not like such people.

In addition, Tsafendas testified to the police that he was anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist, anti-slavery, that he had “a grudge against the South African government on account of its racial policies,” that he was in “sympathy with people fighting racialism” and that he had participated in anti-apartheid demonstrations.⁴⁶⁶⁵ He also wanted to “create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power”⁴⁶⁶⁶ and he “opposed every decision taken by the South African government.”⁴⁶⁶⁷ For a more detailed account of Tsafendas’s political ideas and preferences, see the references in Dr. Cooper’s testimony regarding his motive for killing Dr. Verwoerd.

Out of approximately two hundred people who were questioned by the police and the Commission, not one said anything to agree with Dr. Cooper’s statement. On the contrary, several people told the police that Tsafendas was friendlier to Coloureds than to Whites and that he supported them:

- Patrick O’Ryan testified that Tsafendas was “favourable towards the Coloureds and he repeatedly applied to be classified as a Coloured.”⁴⁶⁶⁸
- Jacobus Bornman testified that Tsafendas “stood up a lot for the Coloureds.”⁴⁶⁶⁹
- A report by Col. van Wyk of the South African police characterised Tsafendas as being “intensely anti-White.”⁴⁶⁷⁰
- Col. McIntyre of the South African Police wrote in his report regarding Tsafendas on October 3 that Tsafendas told “several people that he was upset because he was not

⁴⁶⁶⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 39. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁶⁶⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶⁶⁶ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶⁶⁷ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶⁶⁸ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁶⁶⁹ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶⁷⁰ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

classified as a Coloured.”⁴⁶⁷¹

- According to Inspector Horacio Ferreira, of the Portuguese Security Police in Mozambique, Tsafendas was “intense anti-White” and told him that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-Whites.”⁴⁶⁷²
- Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas’s boss at F.A. Poole Engineering, testified that Tsafendas “bullied the other Portuguese workers. He had fights with several White workers”⁴⁶⁷³ but he never argued with Coloureds.⁴⁶⁷⁴
- Jose Baltazar told police that when Tsafendas “was in the presence of Whites he said little or nothing, but was friendly and talkative with the Bantu. On one or two occasions Tsafendas, while talking with Bantu, stopped talking when he approached.”⁴⁶⁷⁵
- Gladstone Dunn testified that Tsafendas had told him that the South African Government “was not playing fair with the non-Whites. He said that the wages paid to non-Whites was very unsatisfactory, as well as the political situation.”⁴⁶⁷⁶
- Meldon Tillek said Tsafendas told him that “the White people always looked down on him and that consequently he felt more at home amongst Coloured people.”⁴⁶⁷⁷
- Ralph Lighton testified that Tsafendas “used to mix with the Coloureds rather than with the Europeans.”⁴⁶⁷⁸
- According to Nikolaas Nel, Tsafendas “was certainly unpopular among White workers” and “adapted more to the non-Whites.”⁴⁶⁷⁹
- Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas’s landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired

⁴⁶⁷¹ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶⁷² Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁶⁷³ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶⁷⁴ Albert Vercual statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶⁷⁵ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁶⁷⁶ Gladstone Dunn statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶⁷⁷ Meldon Tillek statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶⁷⁸ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶⁷⁹ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, "I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners."⁴⁶⁸⁰

- Keith Martincich testified that Tsafendas "said the coloureds were better than the Europeans. He said they were more friendly, and had more sense than the Europeans, and showed more understanding. When I said he was talking nonsense, he got cross and lifted himself as though he wanted to tackle me. I noticed that he was very familiar with the coloured crew on the boat, about which I reprimanded him."⁴⁶⁸¹

The next day in the summary trial, Peter Daniels, a defence witness, testified in court that Tsafendas "preferred to be amongst the Coloured community" and that "he would like to be among the Coloured community, make himself a Coloured man."⁴⁶⁸² Although all this evidence gathered by the police proved that Dr. Cooper's statement was inaccurate, the Attorney-General made no attempt to challenge it. Again, we do not know if this was through lack of access to the information or incompetence or if he decided it would be better for Tsafendas to appear "unsympathetic towards the Coloureds and the natives."

The author asked forty-four people who knew Tsafendas well about Dr. Cooper's statement that he was unsympathetic towards the Coloureds. No-one agreed, indeed all stated that the reality was the exact opposite. These are some of the responses from people who knew him best:

- Katerina Pnema said Dr. Cooper "does not know what he is talking about. Dimitri always defended the Coloureds and the Blacks from the Whites. He was fired from jobs because he supported them."⁴⁶⁸³
- Father Michalis Visvinis told the author that Dr. Cooper "could not have been more wrong."⁴⁶⁸⁴
- Alexander Moumbaris characterised the comment as "absurd" and a "lie."⁴⁶⁸⁵

⁴⁶⁸⁰ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁶⁸¹ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁶⁸² Peter Daniels testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁶⁸³ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁶⁸⁴ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁴⁶⁸⁵ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

- Antony Michaletos laughed at the suggestion and said “What!” in disbelief when he heard about it. He described the suggestion as “preposterous.” He added, “This is real slander. Dimitris was teaching here in Lourenço Marques English to Black children for free, for free, because he wanted to, he wanted to help them because they were poor.”⁴⁶⁸⁶
- Father Nikola Banovic told the author: “Everything this doctor [Dr. Cooper] has been saying is inaccurate; it’s not true about Dimitri. He was nothing like this, it’s like he had either examined a different person or he was a bad doctor.”⁴⁶⁸⁷
- Father Minas Constandinou told the author: “I would not say that Dimitris was more or less sympathetic towards a race, for him all the people were the same and he believed they should all have equal rights. He was very much against the injustices, he wanted to correct them if he could. If, let us assume, apartheid was the other way around and the Blacks were treating the Whites they way were treated by them during apartheid, Dimitris would still have opposed it and fought against it.”⁴⁶⁸⁸
- Fotini Gavasiadis called the statement “ridiculous,” stating that Tsafendas was “the exact opposite.”⁴⁶⁸⁹
- Mary Eendracht said she was completely surprised to hear such a statement. “Are you serious? I never heard that. It can’t be true. No one would have said that about Dimitri.”⁴⁶⁹⁰
- Andreas Babiolakis said, “These people [Dr. Cooper and Smorenberg] must have been hallucinating, not Dimitri, if this is what they said about him.”⁴⁶⁹¹
- Ira Kyriakakis told the author that Tsafendas was “an idealist. He was very passionate about politics; he despised racism and colonialism and wanted Mozambique to get rid of the Portuguese; he was very strong in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”⁴⁶⁹²
- Michalis Vasilakis said Dr. Cooper’s statement was “one of the biggest nonsense I have heard in my life.”⁴⁶⁹³

⁴⁶⁸⁶ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016.

⁴⁶⁸⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴⁶⁸⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁶⁸⁹ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴⁶⁹⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁶⁹¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴⁶⁹² Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴⁶⁹³ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

It should also be noted that even David Bloomberg told the author that Tsafendas “felt Coloured, and he was more comfortable with the Coloured people, and he had been living with Coloured people in Cape Town.”⁴⁶⁹⁴ In addition, Tsafendas got into a fight with Nick Vergos after he supported two Black workers who were exploited by Vergos.⁴⁶⁹⁵ Finally, Tsafendas took some of the *Eleni* seamen to a township in Cape Town where Blacks lived in an effort to show them at first-hand how some people lived under apartheid. He had also urged the seamen to spend as little money as possible while in Cape Town in order not to contribute to South Africa’s economy.⁴⁶⁹⁶ These are hardly the attitudes of someone who was unsympathetic towards Coloureds. It seems unlikely that Dr. Cooper was right of Tsafendas’s ideological and political beliefs after six hours of discussion with him rather than people who knew him all his life, or who lived with him for many months.

TSAFENDAS’S “NEW RACE” THEORY

Regarding Tsafendas’s “new race” theory, Dr. Cooper and van den Berg talked about it as if Tsafendas had an insane idea about creating a new race of humans. In fact, what he meant is not clear from what he told the police and the genesis of the statement was published in the Press in a distorted form. John Marvis also spoke about it in his statement to Col. van Wyk on September 20, 1966, but did not give all the details.⁴⁶⁹⁷

Tsafendas spoke about a “new race” one evening in the Scala Café in Beira.⁴⁶⁹⁸ According to Nick Papadakis and Andreas Babiolakis, who were present, they were all discussing politics. Tsafendas believed that the world would become a better and safer place if there were no countries, no religions, and all people were the same colour. When asked how the last of the three could be achieved, Tsafendas had jokingly said that “everyone should have sex with someone of a different colour so a new race will be created where everyone will be the same colour or at least they will all be mixed! Only then will there be no

⁴⁶⁹⁴ David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

⁴⁶⁹⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 5 August 2011; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴⁶⁹⁶ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 5 August 2011; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴⁶⁹⁷ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁶⁹⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

racism and discrimination anymore!”⁴⁶⁹⁹ It was clear to them that Tsafendas said the sex part as a joke but that he was serious about the rest of his theory.⁴⁷⁰⁰ Many a serious idea has been told in such a way as to indicate it is intended as half-truth and half-joke. When Barack Obama was asked by Stephen Colbert why he got the Nobel Peace Prize, he replied, “to be honest, I still don’t know.”⁴⁷⁰¹

Tsafendas would later repeat broadly the same theory and comment about sex in the same conversational context, still half-serious and half-joking, to several people. He repeated the same idea about the three things that, according to him, needed to be done for the world to become a better place; he never told anyone only about the sex part (the sex part was always a part of the three and not a separate issue). He truly believed that the only way to eradicate racism was to dismantle barriers such as colour, religion and national borders; he believed this until he died.⁴⁷⁰² It was hardly an insane notion. Sir Antony Sher, the British-South African actor and playwright, considered Tsafendas’s idea a “rather wonderful ideal for the future.”⁴⁷⁰³

It is worth mentioning here that in 1998, the American actor and film director Warren Beatty produced, wrote, directed and starred in a film titled *Bulworth*. The movie’s hero, US Senator Bulworth, played by Beatty, declared that in order to eradicate racism, “[we should] eliminate white people, black people, brown people, yellow people...get rid of ‘em all! All we need is a voluntary, free spirited, open-ended program of procreative racial deconstruction. Everybody just gotta keep fuckin’ everybody till they’re all the same colour.” This is effectively what Tsafendas said thirty-five years earlier. Audiences laughed and no-one questioned Warren Beatty’s sanity. The film was described by the *New York Times* as a “political satire with jubilant wit and energy,”⁴⁷⁰⁴ and the prominent critic Roger Ebert said, “You realize that if all politicians were as outspoken as Bulworth, the fragile structure of our

⁴⁶⁹⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴⁷⁰⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴⁷⁰¹ Saul, H. (*The Independent*), 18 October 2016, “Barack Obama on Stephen Colbert: ‘To be honest, I still don’t know what my Nobel Peace Prize was for.’” Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/barack-obama-stephen-colbert-nobel-peace-prize-a7367321.html>

⁴⁷⁰² Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴⁷⁰³ Unsworth (*Sunday Times*), 21 September 2003, ‘A play about assassination, a tapeworm and notions of madness.’

⁴⁷⁰⁴ Maslin (*The New York Times*), 15 May 1998, ‘White bread senator turns homeboy.’

system would collapse, and we would have to start all over again ... It's better when Bulworth abandons political correctness and says what he thinks, however reckless, as when he theorizes that the solution to racial difficulties is for everybody to bleep everybody else until we're all the same colour."⁴⁷⁰⁵ People applauded the line when it was delivered by Beatty, but Tsafendas was ridiculed for saying the same thing thirty-two years earlier.

Furthermore, Tsafendas's comment was taken out of context. Even worse, the rest of his thinking, the eradication of countries and religions, was removed and only the part about the "new race" was kept, in order to present his theory as the product of lunacy. It is possible that Tsafendas did not explain his beliefs to Dr. Cooper in detail and did not include the other two "necessities" for a better world, and that was why the doctor only mentioned this. However, Tsafendas never told anyone about the race issue as a separate issue, always mentioning it as part of his wider beliefs.

We should remember here that Tsafendas had told the police in his statement that he considered Dr. Verwoerd not to be the representative of all South Africans. He had repeated the same to more than fifty witnesses and had repeatedly called Dr Verwoerd a dictator. Nevertheless, Dr. Cooper told the court that Tsafendas had told him that he considered Dr. Verwoerd not to be the real representative of the *White* South Africans. None of the witnesses questioned by the police, the Commission or the author mentioned that Tsafendas ever said anything like this, while more than fifty testified that he had told them the same thing he told the police. Although it is possible that Tsafendas made such comments to Dr. Cooper, the possibility that the doctor deliberately slightly paraphrased Tsafendas's words or took them out of context in order to support the defence's line cannot be excluded.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S EFFICIENCY AS MESSENGER

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If I put it to you that he performed his work in the House of Assembly normally and efficiently, would you agree with that?

DR. COOPER: I would like to know details of that. I would say that a highly intelligent man performing as a messenger in court may well be able to perform fairly reasonably, but I would suspect in this man that he didn't in fact perform all that reasonably. I would be

⁴⁷⁰⁵ Roger Ebert, 22 May 1998, '*Bulworth*.' Retrieved from: <http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/bulworth-1998>

surprised, in fact, that he performed altogether satisfactorily.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But he was a messenger in the Press Gallery, and if he didn't perform his duties efficiently wouldn't he have been dismissed?

DR. COOPER: I understand that he was only there for a short time.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He was there from the 1st August to the 6th September?

DR. COOPER: Yes. I must draw a conclusion from this that he wasn't completely and obviously hopeless and inefficient in his duties.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But if there is evidence that he performed his duties normally and efficiently, you won't deny that?

DR. COOPER: If the evidence is such, I must accept it.

COMMENTS ON THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S STATEMENTS REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S EFFICIENCY AS MESSENGER

The Attorney-General here does something strange. He suggests that Tsafendas's work in the House of Assembly was efficient and normal. He seems to know this for a fact, but he doesn't adduce any evidence and leaves the issue hanging. This might not look quite odd until we see what happens the next day. With the topic now introduced by van den Berg for debate and discussion, the defence took full advantage. Gerald Shaw, a defence witness and parliamentary correspondent for the Cape Times, testified that Tsafendas's work was not satisfactory. Even though this contradicted the Attorney-General's reference to Tsafendas's efficiency, van den Berg did nothing to support his claim and the evidence he mentioned never made an appearance in court. We will look at this case in greater detail in the following day's proceedings.

Going back to the evidence of efficiency that van den Berg referred to, five messengers from the Assembly testified to the police and the Commission of Enquiry. They were Piet Burger⁴⁷⁰⁶ the Chief Messenger, senior messengers Sydney Wiehand⁴⁷⁰⁷ and Petrus

⁴⁷⁰⁶ Piet Bester Burger testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁷⁰⁷ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

Schuin,⁴⁷⁰⁸ all three of whom interviewed and appointed Tsafendas, and another two messengers, Fred Feinauer⁴⁷⁰⁹ and Felix Miles.⁴⁷¹⁰ None of the five stated that Tsafendas was not efficient or that they had noticed anything wrong with him. On the contrary, Schuin described Tsafendas as an ordinary man and “same as any other person that had worked there.”⁴⁷¹¹ Sydney Wiehand said that for a person to be appointed as a messenger, “he must be of sober habits. He must be always neat, and then also we ask him if he’s got any sickness, or anything like that, then he must tell us. If so, then he must get a report from the doctor that he is fit for duty.”⁴⁷¹² Since he was appointed, Tsafendas must have fulfilled all of these conditions.

Wiehand testified that he never received any complaints about Tsafendas’s work, but he was told by fellow messenger, Pienaar, that Tsafendas was eating a lot, then sitting and sleeping. However, Wiehand did not see this as a complaint, testifying that most messengers, including himself, ate and then slept until they were required to work again. In fact, Pienaar’s comment had more to do with his observation of Tsafendas’s eating habits; he thought he was overeating.⁴⁷¹³

The messengers’ statements should have been known to the Attorney-General, but none of them was used to support his argument that Tsafendas’s work was efficient. More surprisingly, none of Tsafendas’s colleagues at Parliament was asked to testify at the summary trial. The State could certainly have used their testimonies to support its argument about Tsafendas’s efficiency and challenged Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis. It would also have been useful also for all those who examined Tsafendas to speak to the messengers, not only to find out what type of man he was, but to hear their opinions as to his mental state shortly before the assassination. After all, the messengers had seen him virtually every day for five weeks.

⁴⁷⁰⁸ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁷⁰⁹ Fred Feinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁷¹⁰ Felix George Miles statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 2, File: 1. NASA.

⁴⁷¹¹ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁷¹² Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁷¹³ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

TSAFENDAS'S NO ESCAPE PLAN

ASSESSOR: You mean he never planned an escape?

DR. COOPER: He not only never planned an escape, he says he gave no thought to escape. The question of escape, in fact, did not enter his mind, and from what he did and the way he did it, it does seem to support that. It seems to me that anybody who had given it any thought should have realised that there was no possible hope of escape.

JUDGE BEYERS: But a lot of rational people have done things with no hope of escape. Every Kamikaze pilot who went down on an American warship had no hope of escape, and he wasn't a madman.

DR. COOPER: Yes. This is related to a fanatical patriotic drive that some of these people had during the war. But I don't believe that this is applicable in this case at all.

ASSESSOR: You said a little while ago in your opinion the accused has never given the eventualities of this crime a thought. I think you said that as a fact he never got as far as thinking about it. Did you perhaps ask him whether he had thought about escape?

DR. COOPER: Oh yes. I asked him in some detail as to whether he thought about the escape; whether he thought he had a chance of escape; what sort of plans of escape he visualised, and he was persistent - apologetically I may say - he quite apologetically said: "I am sorry, my mind is blank about that. My mind was blank about that. I just never gave the question of escape any thought at all, I just didn't think one way or the other about escaping," Following on this, I said to him: "Then does this mean that you decided to sacrifice yourself, because I assume that if a man decides that he is not worried about escape, this means that he is going to sacrifice himself? He was adamant. He said: "No, there was no question of sacrifice." He says his mind was blank. He did not think one way or the other.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S NO ESCAPE PLAN

The above testimony is another example that the Attorney-General was either not in possession of Tsafendas's statement or incompetent. Again he makes no attempt to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony, even though Tsafendas's statement to the police plainly contradicts it. Tsafendas did give thought to his escape and told the police about his plan: "I was going to find refuge on the tanker, the *Eleni*, which I knew was sailing to South America. My plans

were, however, upset when I could not get the right pistol. The boat sailed on the Saturday before Tuesday when I stabbed the Prime Minister ... I never thought about hiding. If I had to do the job with a knife, I didn't have much of a chance of getting away when using a knife. I didn't care much and didn't give it a second thought that I would be caught." In another statement to the police, Tsafendas said "I did not care about the consequences, for what would happened to me afterwards. I was so disgusted with the racial policy that I went through with my plans to kill the Prime Minister."⁴⁷¹⁴

Dr. Cooper also seems unable to understand that a man with deep political convictions would proceed to such a desperate act without having an escape plan. The Court's example about Kamikaze pilots is not irrelevant to Tsafendas's case, although it is not identical. Tsafendas, too, wanted to kill the enemy without regard to the personal consequences. Professor Dugard said that Tsafendas's remarks showed him as a "politically informed person, angry with apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd, determined to make a change, with nothing to lose personally."⁴⁷¹⁵

History is full of people committing desperate acts out of deep political conviction; to raise awareness of their cause, to make a visible protest or simply to carry forward their fight. In 1936, Stefan Lux, a young Czechoslovakian Jew, committed suicide inside the League of Nations in Geneva while the members were in session. His aim was to raise awareness of the early persecution of Jews in Germany and to warn that Hitler must be stopped. He was not schizophrenic. In 1970, Kostas Georgakis, a Greek student of geology in Genoa, set himself on fire in protest against the dictatorship in Greece. He was not schizophrenic; a statue of him has been erected in Corfu and he was honoured by a commemorative postage stamp. Several Shaolin monks have publicly burned themselves to death over the years for their cause. None of them was schizophrenic. In 74 CE, during the First Jewish-Roman War at the Siege of Masada, 960 Jews committed suicide in order not to be enslaved by the Romans. No-one ever characterised them as schizophrenic.

Many have chosen to fight a battle in the full knowledge that there was no escape and certain death was awaiting. Salvador Allende in 1973 was given the chance by Pinochet to surrender and leave Chile. He refused and remained in the besieged Presidential Palace

⁴⁷¹⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁷¹⁵ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

knowing that his death was inevitable, as proved to be the case. Constantine Palailogos XI was the last Byzantine emperor. In 1453, he was given the chance of surrendering Constantinople, then capital of the Byzantine Empire, or of fighting and losing the city and his life. Palailogos refused the surrender offer, fought and lost the city and died in the fighting. Jozef Gabcik and Jan Kubis, the two Czechs who assassinated Reinhard Heydrich in Prague in 1942, fled afterwards to a church. The SS surrounded the church and the two men, knowing there was no escape, chose to fight rather than surrender and lost their lives.

In 1994, twenty-eight years after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, Fathers Ioannis Tsafaridis and Minas Constandinou asked Tsafendas why he chose to stab Dr. Verwoerd in Parliament, knowing he could not possibly escape. Tsafendas replied that when he first conceived the idea of killing Verwoerd, he planned that he would have a chance of escape. He gave the priests a detailed account of how he would shoot Verwoerd, then flee the building and take refuge in the *Eleni*. He had rehearsed the scenario several times. It was when he was unable to get hold of a reliable firearm that he considered the alternative of a knife attack. He knew that if he stabbed Verwoerd there would be no escape and he debated the issue mentally for two or three days. In the event, he decided to go ahead with the knife because he did not care what would happen to him. This is exactly what he told the police twenty-eight years earlier. After all, he explained to the priests, he had no wife or children or responsibilities for anyone else, so he chose to act confident that there would be no human collateral damage while fully aware of what awaited himself.

Father Minas likened the act to a suicide mission and suggested that it could have been better planned. Tsafendas said there were time pressures in that his House of Assembly work terms were temporary and he feared he would never find a gun before possibly being redeployed. Minas asked if he had planned in advance to use the tapeworm to escape the death sentence. Tsafendas insisted that he never planned such a course and always wanted to claim "political responsibility" for his act. This was borne out by his two statements to the police after his arrest. Minas suggested it was madness to kill Verwoerd knowing he would be caught, a remark that angered and upset Tsafendas. He turned to Minas and said, "*If I don't burn, if you don't burn, if we don't burn, how will the light vanquish the darkness?*" He explained immediately that these were not his words, but a verse from Nazim Hikmet's poem *Like Karem (Kerem Gibi)*. Had he failed to try, he would have regretted it for the rest of his life. "Freedom demands virtue and courage," he then told the priests. He then cited Andreas Kalvos's poem, *Eis Samon (To Samos)*, saying, in part: "*Those who feel fear's unbending*

*hand weighing on them may bear the yoke of bondage. Freedom demands virtue and courage...*⁴⁷¹⁶

The priests asked him if he regretted his act, since it cost him more than thirty years in prison and took almost as long for apartheid to collapse. Passionately, Tsafendas declared, “No, never!” He said he would have regretted not doing it. He said he believed apartheid would have collapsed earlier with Dr. Verwoerd out of the way and did not expect it to last so long without him. Still, he maintained that he did not regret his action. He insisted that it was worth it, as apartheid after Verwoerd was never as strong and stable as it was when its so-called architect lived. Even though it took so many years for the system to collapse, killing Verwoerd alone was justifiable because of his crimes, he said. “Look at Vorster, look at Botha,” he told the priests. “Just like Verwoerd they were responsible for the enslavement of twenty million people and the death and torture of thousands and they were not punished for their crimes. At least Verwoerd got what he deserved.” After this, the priests never asked him again about the assassination.⁴⁷¹⁷

DR. COOPER ON TSAFENDAS'S STATEMENT THAT HIS ACT WOULD BE JUDGED BY HISTORY AND TSAFENDAS'S FEELINGS REGARDING DR. VERWOERD'S DEATH

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused say that he must have been abnormal when he killed the deceased because no normal person would have done it? Yes or no?

DR. COOPER: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused tell you that history will judge whether he was right in killing the deceased?

DR. COOPER: Words to that effect. It is very difficult for me to remember his exact words. Whether he said he was abnormal when he killed the deceased or whether he said that he was out of his mind, I cannot recall the exact words, but I do recall him saying something to the effect that history will prove whether he is right or wrong.

⁴⁷¹⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁷¹⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What are the accused's feelings about the death of the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: I find the question difficult to answer because this man's feelings show a characteristic emotional blunting, which was referred to from the text book a short while ago. He doesn't seem to show any depth of feeling one way or another about Dr. Verwoerd, himself or, in fact, anybody else. He is emotionally flat concerning this matter.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is he proud of the fact?

DR. COOPER: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is he happy that he has killed the Prime Minister?

DR. COOPER: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he indicate to you that he has achieved something of which he should be proud?

DR. COOPER: No. He doesn't seem to, in his mind, now at this stage be able to put together in his mind really why he did it at all, what purpose he was going to achieve.

JUDGE BEYERS: I can't take this answer in the light of history going to prove whether he was right or wrong. He becomes an historical figure; he has told you that and you told me what he told you. If history is going to prove him right or wrong, he must have a feeling of pride or achievement about this thing?

DR. COOPER: I don't know what he means. It is a funny sort of answer to give, that history is going to prove whether he is right or wrong. Those are his only views. He hasn't got any views, in fact, on whether he is right or wrong, or what this was all about. He just says he must wait for history to prove that. He has got no feelings or real thoughts about the matter at all.

COMMENTS ON DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S STATEMENT THAT HIS ACT WOULD BE JUDGED BY HISTORY AND TSAFENDAS'S FEELINGS REGARDING DR. VERWOERD'S DEATH

Through this testimony we learn something important: that Tsafendas told Dr. Cooper that history would judge whether or not he did the right thing. What is surprising here is that Dr.

Cooper does not appear to understand the statement and even finds it “a funny sort of answer to give.” On the contrary, it is an intelligent response. Tsafendas is well aware that his deed would find only condemnation in South Africa under the current regime, but believed it would be hailed when apartheid fell.

This is a conviction that has been widely used by people defending an action or decision they have taken. For example, Fidel Castro made a similar statement from the dock when he was tried in 1953 for his revolutionary activities against the Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista. Castro concluded his testimony by saying “history will absolve me.”⁴⁷¹⁸ Dimitris Koufontinas, a member of the Revolutionary Organization 17 November, told the court that history would judge whether or not its victims were rightly targeted.⁴⁷¹⁹ The British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the American President George W. Bush both said “history will judge” whether they were right to go to war in Iraq,⁴⁷²⁰ obviously believing that they were right. Tsafendas, too, believed he did the right thing. In his September 19 statement to Maj. Rossouw, he said that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he “believed it was the right thing to do.”⁴⁷²¹

Dr. Cooper also claims that Tsafendas does not have any views, feelings or real thought regarding the killing. However, Tsafendas told the police that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was “disgusted with his racial policies” and hoped that “a change of policy would take place.” Most importantly, he believed that “he did the right thing.” Even more importantly, on October 14, three days before the trial began and Dr. Cooper testified, Maj. Rossouw gave evidence before the Commission of Enquiry and the following dialogue took place:

COMMISSION: “How does he feel about his deed? Does he regret it, or is he indifferent about it or did he not show any obvious emotion about it?”

MAJOR ROSSOUW: “When I originally questioned him I accused him of being a horrible murderer. To which he answered, ‘That is what you think, but the world thinks differently!’ At a later stage I asked him whether he regretted his deed yet and he answered that he did feel

⁴⁷¹⁸ Bourne, 1986: 101.

⁴⁷¹⁹ Τα Νέα, 25 July 2003, ‘Η απολογία του Δημήτρη Κουφοντίνα.’

⁴⁷²⁰ Ashley, J. and McAskill, E. (*The Guardian*), 1 March 2003, ‘History will be my judge’; CNN, 25 April 2013, ‘Bush: History will ultimately judge ... I am a content man.’

⁴⁷²¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

remorse and that he was very sorry about what he had done.⁴⁷²²

However, according to the report of the Commission of Enquiry, when Tsafendas was questioned by the Commission, which was after the summary trial had ended, “he showed no signs of remorse.”⁴⁷²³ Tsafendas also told the police officer that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he “thought it was the right thing to do,”⁴⁷²⁴ and hoped that “a change of policy would take place,”⁴⁷²⁵ which reflects the same mind-set. Tsafendas’s replies showed that far from being emotionally blunt, as Dr. Cooper claimed, he was fully aware of the situation. They also demonstrate that he had no regrets, indeed was proud of what he did. These statements were not used by the Attorney-General to challenge Dr. Cooper’s testimony. As for Tsafendas appearing to change and showing some remorse at a later stage, this would surely be expected in someone who has brutally tortured, both psychologically and physically, for at least three weeks.

What is also important here is not so much that Tsafendas had told Dr. Cooper history would prove whether he was right or wrong for killing Dr. Verwoerd, as the fact that the Attorney-General refers to it. During his examination of Dr. Cooper, the Attorney-General referred to several things Tsafendas told the police and asked the psychiatrist if he was told the same. For example, van den Berg asked Dr. Cooper, “Did he tell you that he originally wanted to shoot the Prime Minister?” This question, and others along the same line, were based on what Tsafendas had told the police. This suggests that Tsafendas had also told the police at some point that history would prove whether he was right or wrong for killing Dr. Verwoerd. As we have seen, not all of Tsafendas’s statements during his interrogation were recorded. For example, when Major Rossouw “originally questioned him,” he “accused him of being a horrible murderer.” Tsafendas’s answer, “That is what you think, but the world thinks differently,”⁴⁷²⁶ is not in any of the recorded statements found in the archives. We know of it because of Major Rossouw’s testimony at the Commission of Enquiry.

Sometime in 1994, at Pretoria Prison hospital, twenty-eight years after the

⁴⁷²² Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁷²³ Report of the COE. Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁴⁷²⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁷²⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁷²⁶ Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

assassination, Tsafendas was asked by Father Minas Constandinou and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis whether he regretted killing Dr. Verwoerd. He replied: “No, never. It was the right thing to do, he was a tyrant and a dictator,” “the monster who created apartheid.” When the priests suggested he might have come to regret his act, Tsafendas replied, “No, no, no, not even for a moment, never, never. I did the right thing. He was a dictator, he created apartheid; it was him who did everything. You did not live then to see how it was, people were like slaves ...Verwoerd had taken away their dignity.”⁴⁷²⁷

When asked by the two priests whether it was worth it, since apartheid continued for another twenty-eight years and his action seemed like a failure and a lost cause, Tsafendas said, “I hoped things would change ... I had the chance to kill this monster... if I had not done it, I would have regretted it all my life ... there is no such thing as a lost cause, any cause can be won ... no cause or battle is ever lost until it is fought. If you fight, you always have a chance to win ...” He then quoted Jan-Paul Sartre, saying “A lost battle is a battle one thinks one has lost.” He maintained that he had done the right thing and it was worth it because apartheid never again reached the heights and strength it enjoyed before Dr. Verwoerd’s death. He said he never expected apartheid to collapse overnight, though he admitted that he did not expect it to last as long as it did without Dr. Verwoerd.⁴⁷²⁸

When asked by the two priests about his posthumous fame and how he would like people to remember him, Tsafendas said he did not care about it, that he felt he had done his duty, the right thing and his conscience was clear. When Fathers Ioannis and Minas told him that they were going to tell his story to the world Tsafendas urged them not to do so. Tsafendas said, that “when you do a good thing, you can’t go around advertising it. You do it because it is the right thing to do, not to be applauded by the others. Do a good thing and then throw it into the sea⁴⁷²⁹ ... I believed it was my social responsibility, my duty, to do it when I had the chance and I did it... I had the chance to kill the tyrant.”⁴⁷³⁰ Tsafendas also told the priests that he feared that White racists would kill him if they found out he was not insane

⁴⁷²⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁷²⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁷²⁹ “Do a good thing and then throw it into the sea” is an old Greek adage.

⁴⁷³⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

and had killed Dr. Verwoerd for political reasons. He believed that he had remained alive all these years because everyone thought he was mad.⁴⁷³¹

COMMENTS ON THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. COOPER

It appeared through the cross-examination that both Judge Beyers and the Attorney-General were highly sceptical of Dr. Cooper's testimony. The defence team found the Judge to be so hostile to Dr. Cooper that they decided to speak to him and ask him to be less aggressive towards their witnesses. When Beyers adjourned the proceedings for lunch, Wilfrid Cooper and Willie Burger went to see him in his office and told him of "the impression of bias and hostility he was creating." The Judge did not accept their view.⁴⁷³²

However, it is the Attorney-General's attitude throughout the duration of the testimony of Dr. Cooper which is surprising, given that his own two experts who had examined Tsafendas (Professor van Wyk and Mr. Erasmus), had already found him to be schizophrenic, thus agreeing with the defence witness's diagnosis. If the Attorney-General believed Tsafendas was sane, thereby disagreeing with the two experts he had himself appointed, the logical thing to do was to bring in more psychiatrists to examine Tsafendas. In challenging Dr. Cooper, he was also challenging his own expert witnesses.

Furthermore, the Attorney-General was aware of the defence's line since October 6. According to their testimonies in the court, Professor van Wyk had found Tsafendas to be schizophrenic, thereby agreeing with the defence's line from October 4, while Erasmus had also diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic since September 29. The Attorney-General had another two weeks to find new psychiatrists to examine Tsafendas. Even David Bloomberg and Wilfrid Cooper were puzzled. Bloomberg wrote: "One presumed that the Attorney-General knew what evidence his psychologist and psychiatrist would be giving. If that was the case, why did he challenge, in cross-examination, the evidence of the defence witnesses, when he knew that his own witnesses agreed with them, and allow Dr Harold Cooper, in particular, to be tested so vigorously and sceptically by the judge?"⁴⁷³³

⁴⁷³¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁷³² Willie Burger in a personal interview, 9 April 2015; Cooper, 2016: 115-116.

⁴⁷³³ Bloomberg, 2007: 98.

Advocate George Bizos and Professor John Dugard who discussed the issue with the author of the author also found it puzzling and believe that it is almost impossible for the Attorney-General to not have been aware of the diagnosis of his two expert witnesses.⁴⁷³⁴ Professor Dugard said that he is “quite sure” that van den Berg, although he did not know him personally, knew what to do, as most prosecutors did at the time, with the case and characterised as “possible” the suggestion that this could have been a charade laid on for public consumption, stating that the prosecutors during apartheid “were never very independent.”⁴⁷³⁵

Since both sides had come to the conclusion that Tsafendas was a schizophrenic, the summary trial should have been a straightforward case, but as can see from its beginning, this was not the case and it was becoming something of a show trial. If the Attorney-General really wanted to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony, many of his conclusions had been refuted in the depositions of the two hundred-plus witnesses and other evidence gathered by the South African police and the Commission of Enquiry at the time. None of this evidence supported Dr. Cooper's testimony, but it was never used against his conclusions.

A very important issue of Dr. Cooper's testimony was Tsafendas's motive. Both the Attorney-General and judge Beyers cross-examined Dr. Cooper intensively about it. The Attorney-General could have easily gone beyond challenging Dr. Cooper's testimony, and could have broken it down. However, instead of using Tsafendas's statements in order to do so, he used Dr. Sakinofsky's medical report from his interview with Tsafendas where he had also diagnosed him as schizophrenic based on Tsafendas's delusional and confused alleged “political ideas.” The result was not only that the Attorney-General did not challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony, but he reinforced it as more “delusional and confused ideas” supposedly held by Tsafendas became publicised. It is hard to believe that the Attorney-General was so incompetent or so naïve as to think that he could challenge Dr. Cooper with such a report. The alternative must be that he wanted to underline the theory that Tsafendas was indeed a schizophrenic.

It is also surprising that the Attorney-General does not seem to use the medical reports from the various hospitals where Tsafendas was treated, although we are not in position to

⁴⁷³⁴ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁴⁷³⁵ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

know whether they were in his possession. These reports had all been tracked down and assembled by the police. Since Professor van Wyk, the State's expert witness, was instructed to examine Tsafendas, one would have expected the police or the State to provide him with these records. Had he seen them, Professor van Wyk could have attacked the defence's line because of the various contradictions they contain; for instance, that Tsafendas had three different delusions, that he had faked mental illness at least twice in the past, and that nine South African doctors had examined him the last three years and had found him to be perfectly sane. If this information was known to the State, then one would have expected the Attorney-General to use it after it was evaluated by his two expert witnesses. However, this did not happen.

We cannot exclude the possibility that the State was in possession of all the above evidence but deliberately did not use them it so that Tsafendas would be found insane, which would be more convenient for everyone. Knowing how some of the judiciary worked during apartheid, this should not be ruled out and as Professor Dugard highlighted the prosecutors during apartheid "were never very independent"⁴⁷³⁶ and van den Berg was a supporter of apartheid and of the National Party.⁴⁷³⁷

OTHER ISSUES IN DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY

Dr. Cooper arrived at his diagnosis exclusively by talking to Tsafendas for six hours in a room in the police station. Although he wanted to get more information about Tsafendas, he was unable to do so due to the lack of co-operation from the police and the shortage of time, He was also fobbed off by both the defence and the police, who stated that this was a straightforward case.⁴⁷³⁸

It was important for Dr. Cooper to know Tsafendas's emotional and mental state in the days preceding the assassination. This should not have been difficult since witnesses like the *Eleni* crew, his colleagues at the Parliament and Patrick O'Ryan, who were with Tsafendas at that time, had testified to the police. However, Dr. Cooper did not receive any of this information. It was not the police's duty to provide Dr. Cooper with their statements but

⁴⁷³⁶ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁴⁷³⁷ Judge Gerald Friedman in a personal interview, 11 April 2016.

⁴⁷³⁸ Lambley, 1980: 239-240.

it would not have been difficult for him to find such information since David Bloomberg had located many who were around Tsafendas in the days before September 6.

A vitally important issue that was not picked up by the Attorney-General was that in the case of Dr. Verwoerd, Tsafendas used exactly the same *modus operandi* he had employed with PIDE, just a year and a half earlier. On November 16, 1964, Tsafendas was arrested in Mozambique and accused of “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”⁴⁷³⁹ The following day, after anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist and Communist books were found in his suitcase, along with several Bibles, Tsafendas was handed in to PIDE and was transferred to a police substation in Beira for interrogation.⁴⁷⁴⁰ He was accused of pretending to be a religious missionary while in reality preaching “under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”⁴⁷⁴¹

At first in custody, Tsafendas gave clear and valid political reasons for his actions. He told the police that he supported “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother Nation,” and “clearly stated he was in favour of the independence of Mozambique.”⁴⁷⁴² Furthermore, Inspector Horacio Ferreira, who was in charge of the cells where Tsafendas was held for the first fourteen days, testified to the South African police that Tsafendas was “intense anti-white and went as far as to tell him that the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-whites.” He characterised Tsafendas as “normal and he regarded him as a very intelligent person.”⁴⁷⁴³

Sometime later, Tsafendas changed his stance and began claiming he was Saint Peter. At some point during his detention, Tsafendas was taken to the Government Hospital in Beira for examination because of his Saint Peter act. On January 23, 1965, PIDE in Lisbon informed its counterparts in Lourenço Marques that “having seen the archives, it is remarked

⁴⁷³⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁷⁴⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁷⁴¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁷⁴² PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁷⁴³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

with a minimal margin of error, that the defendant Demitrio Tsafendas (*id.* a fls. 10), is mentally ill and therefore not chargeable at a juridical or penal level. Given this, it seems to us a pure waste of time to continue working on these archives, since we already know what their end will be. Therefore, considering the probable fact that the defendant cannot be charged, and he is not at all dangerous, I propose the release of the defendant, and closure of the archives.”⁴⁷⁴⁴

Tsafendas was subsequently released, whereupon he was perfectly normal again with everyone he met. Indeed, he admitted proudly that he had pretended to be Saint Peter so that the PIDE would release him. Precisely the same thing happened with Dr. Verwoerd. Tsafendas initially gave clear and valid political reasons for the killing, and then, obviously after the torture and threats he sustained in custody, he changed his stance and started claiming that a tapeworm had taken control of him. However, the Attorney-General failed to see the similarities in the two cases and did not bring up the issue.

Another important issue which was not raised during Dr. Cooper's testimony is that whenever Tsafendas was admitted to a hospital, he either presented himself or was taken there by the police while in custody. He was never referred by a doctor or taken there with an illness or a suspected nervous breakdown. Why did Tsafendas admit himself to hospitals? He said he did it only when he was penniless and had nowhere to stay. He said he saw “hospitals as hotels.”⁴⁷⁴⁵

Perhaps the most important issue with Dr. Cooper's testimony is that it is incompatible with the statements Tsafendas made to the police when they questioned him, the statements by about two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry and the statements of forty-four people who were interviewed by the author. All the witnesses' statements are compatible with Tsafendas's statements to the police, but they are not compatible with Dr. Cooper's diagnosis and description of Tsafendas. Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky, Mr. van Zyl and Professors Alban Burke, Kirk Heilbrun, Tuviah Zabow and Phillip Resnick also emphasised that to make an accurate diagnosis, additional

⁴⁷⁴⁴ Alberto Henriques de Matos Rodrigues conclusion to the Subdirector, 23 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁷⁴⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Gordon Winter's correspondence with David Beresford, 8 September 1998. Liza Key's personal collection.

information was required from outside sources.⁴⁷⁴⁶ Professor John Dugard and Advocate George Bizos stated to the author that Tsafendas's statements, along with all the other evidence collected by the police, should also have been given to the State.⁴⁷⁴⁷

Van Zyl was "surprised" to read Tsafendas's statements and the depositions the police and the Commission of Enquiry took at the time from some two hundred people. He felt that they showed Tsafendas as a completely different man to the one he examined and to the way he was described in court. The perceptions were so different he found it "hard to believe" that Tsafendas said what he did to the police and that all those people described Tsafendas in the way they did. Van Zyl agreed that this evidence should have been available to the specialists who examined Tsafendas since it would have played an important role in each one's diagnosis. He told the author:

"Yes. Look, obviously that is important information, and information that influences one's findings in the end. There is no doubt about it ... the fact that those sentiments [that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was disgusted with his policies and believed a change would take place with his death] expressed in the statement that he made to the police weren't ever mentioned to any of the psychiatrists."⁴⁷⁴⁸

Professor John Dugard agreed that the statements should have been made available to the State. Of Tsafendas's statement, he said it: "completely confirms the view that Tsafendas was not insane. It reads like a very normal story of a politically informed person, angry with apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd, determined to make a change with nothing to lose personally. Really an incredible statement which was carefully concealed."⁴⁷⁴⁹

⁴⁷⁴⁶ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016; Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky in correspondence with the author, 30 March 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁴⁷⁴⁷ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁴⁷⁴⁸ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁴⁷⁴⁹ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

TSAFENDAS FAKING MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE PAST

As we have seen, there were at least two occasions when Tsafendas faked mental illness and this was known to the South African police. However, neither was mentioned during Dr. Cooper's testimony or indeed throughout the summary trial:

- The Grafton State Hospital report stated clearly that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in the past.⁴⁷⁵⁰
- At least six men from the *Eleni*, Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas, Pouftis and Vasilakis, testified to the police that Tsafendas "played the fool" to avoid serving in the Portuguese Army.⁴⁷⁵¹

In addition to the above, just three days after the assassination a secret telegram from the South African embassy in Washington was sent to the South African Foreign Minister in Cape Town. It informed him that that the US Immigration Department, which had dealt with Tsafendas often during his time in the United States and was aware of his hospitalizations, had a file on him which contained "full particulars" of his time in that country. In telegram form, it said, "He is understood to have shown under psychiatric treatment that he was unstable though not (not)⁴⁷⁵² insane, but type of man who would easily be used as instrument of Communist or hostile organizations. Impression of US Immigration people at the time was that he had been manipulated and was under influence of someone or some organization."⁴⁷⁵³

According to Professor Alban Burke:

"In these kinds of cases, any kind of legal cases, the first thing you want to eliminate is malingering, so is this person lying or not? That's your first thing that you have to decide, because, obviously, especially in those days, it was a decision between life and death, so 'I'm going to lie so that I don't get hanged, so I've got a very strong motive to lie, to malinge.' If I was the consulting psychologist or psychiatrist at that point in time, I would want to

⁴⁷⁵⁰ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁴⁷⁵¹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁴⁷⁵² This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second 'not' within brackets.

⁴⁷⁵³ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

eliminate the malingering thing, and if there was evidence that he had used this in the past, already it puts a lot of doubt on whatever conclusion I'm going to arrive at.

So, even in those days, malingering was something you wanted to look at because, I mean, the malingering can ... it's not an unknown thing, because for years now, especially during World War One, a lot of people malingered, so that they wouldn't have to go to the army; the same thing with World War Two. So, the malingering was always there, and if you're dealing with a forensic case, where there could be a death penalty, you would want to eliminate that.⁴⁷⁵⁴

All the above information was known to the South African police, but with the possible exception of the Grafton State Hospital report, was not given to the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas. Mr. van Zyl and Professors Burke, Heilbrun, Resnick and Tuviah Zabow agree that it was extremely important that such information should have been made available to the psychiatrists.⁴⁷⁵⁵

⁴⁷⁵⁴ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁴⁷⁵⁵ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

REACTION OF THE PEOPLE WHO KNEW TSAFENDAS AFTER THE FIRST DAY OF THE SUMMARY TRIAL

Katerina Pnema, Tsafendas's step sister who lived in Rhodesia at the time, had not gone outside her house or even smiled since the assassination. "We were barely talking to each other," she said about the climate of deep depression in her house. "We were like zombies." However, after the first day of the summary trial, her husband came running into the house, waving some local newspapers. "Look," he shouted, "look what he said ..." Pnema picked up the newspapers, scanned the trial stories and burst out laughing, "I couldn't believe it," she said, "it was the first time I laughed in a month, our house was like a graveyard before."⁴⁷⁵⁶

Pnema said of Tsafendas:

"He was always very, very smart, a devil, but how on earth he thought of this tapeworm story? I couldn't control myself and laughed. It was then I felt sorry for him for the first time, thinking what was going to become of him now. I was very angry before, I knew he had ruined my life, but after that, I felt very sorry for him ... after that I began reading everything in the newspapers about the trial. I had stopped reading before as most of the things they were saying about him were complete lies. What was said in the trial were lies too, but it was amusing, as he had told them! It was really amusing, even though I felt sorry for him that he had to say such things ..." Katerina Pnema had no doubt then and has no doubt now that her half-brother invented the tapeworm story to escape the gallows.⁴⁷⁵⁷

Mary Eendracht and Fotini Gavasiadis said that the whole's family reaction was similar to Pnema's; Tsafendas's step-mother, his other two half-sisters and his half-brother were all convinced he had made it up.⁴⁷⁵⁸ Eleni Grispos, who knew Tsafendas since he was a child, and her husband, who was Tsafendas's best friend in Lourenço Marques, were also certain that he had made up the tapeworm story. Ira Kyriakakis and her sister Alik, who also knew him from childhood, thought the same.⁴⁷⁵⁹

Others convinced that it was a ploy to avoid the death penalty included Father Nikolas Banovic, who lived under the same roof as Tsafendas for four months in Istanbul in 1961 and

⁴⁷⁵⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

⁴⁷⁵⁷ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

⁴⁷⁵⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴⁷⁵⁹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

who prayed for him after hearing about the assassination, Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins in Lourenço Marques, Irene Michaletos, John's wife, Artemis Michaletos who had brought him up in Egypt, his first cousin Mary Eendracht who also knew him since Egypt, Nick Papadakis who associated with Tsafendas in Beira and Gondola and became close friends of his, and his childhood friends Andreas Babiolakis and George Grispos.⁴⁷⁶⁰ Not one of the forty-four people the author interviewed who met Tsafendas had believed that he was telling the truth about the tapeworm; every one believed he made it up, just as he pretended to be insane in order to escape the gallows.

⁴⁷⁶⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 May 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

CONCLUSION: DR. COOPER'S TESTIMONY AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S RESPONSE

Dr. Cooper found Tsafendas to be unable to function on a reasonable level, unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, talking in a disjointed manner and isolated from his surroundings in the sense that he could not make and keep good friends. However none of some two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry noticed any of these characteristics. Not even one. The same applies to the forty-four people who knew Tsafendas well and were interviewed by the author. On the contrary, Tsafendas was described several times as being the direct opposite of the person described by Dr. Cooper.

Professors Alban Burke, Phillip Resnick, Robert L. Sadoff and Tuviah Zabow believe that it is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that none of the people who knew Tsafendas, some extremely well, ever noticed that he spoke in a disjointed manner or that he was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes.⁴⁷⁶¹ They must have been very unobservant, unless the symptoms were simply not there; because Tsafendas made them up when talking to the doctors. Reyner van Zyl, who examined Tsafendas for the defence, conceded to the author that it was “highly improbable” that none of those who knew Tsafendas ever spotted any of the symptoms mentioned by Dr. Cooper, especially the issues of concentration and disjointed speech.⁴⁷⁶² Professor Phillip Resnick told the author that such a scenario is “extremely unlikely.”⁴⁷⁶³

Father Nikola Banovic told the author: “Everything this doctor [Dr. Cooper] has been saying is inaccurate; it’s not true about Dimitri. He was nothing like this, it’s like he had either examined a different person or he was a bad doctor.”⁴⁷⁶⁴ Fotini Gavasiadis told the author:

“Everything you have been telling me [as to what Dr. Cooper and the other doctors said] is gibberish. Everything that they were saying is gibberish. Everything. I don’t know how they came to these conclusions and how they managed to get away with it. It’s

⁴⁷⁶¹ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Robert L. Sadoff in a personal interview with the author, 12 August 2015; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 10 October 2016.

⁴⁷⁶² Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 17 April 2016.

⁴⁷⁶³ Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 7 May 2017.

⁴⁷⁶⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

absolutely gibberish. Dimitris must have had a lot of fun sitting [in the court] and listening to all this gibberish about him. I can imagine him [in the court] laughing inside him ... I am sure he must have had enjoyed it ... especially since he succeeded in fooling them and getting away with it.⁴⁷⁶⁵

Dr. Cooper diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic based on what the accused told him and without getting any information about him from other sources. He therefore could not compare different avenues of information and so judge that what Tsafendas told him was true or not. Instead of attempting to confirm or reject what Tsafendas told him by checking other sources, he simply asked Tsafendas again. As we have seen, Reyner van Zyl and Professors Tuviah Zabow, Kirk Heilbrun, Alban Burke and Phillip Resnick have all highlighted the importance of third-party information in order to make an accurate diagnosis in such cases, assessing information taken from people who know the patient, as well as his medical and criminal records. This is standard practice in criminal cases.

However, Dr. Cooper did not speak to even one person who knew Tsafendas. He was told by both the defence and the police that it was a straightforward case and the only information he had about Tsafendas was most probably given to him verbally, as was the case with van Zyl, and this was after he had already diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic. If Dr. Cooper was given the statements gathered by the police or if he had spoken to people who knew Tsafendas, he would have seen immediately that this information did not accord with what he had heard from the accused. If he had read the medical reports, he would have seen the inconsistencies and, most importantly, the fact that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in the past. However, Dr. Cooper seems to have been discouraged to seek outside information about his patient by the police and was led to believe that Tsafendas was a clear-cut case of schizophrenia.⁴⁷⁶⁶

The most striking thing about Dr. Cooper's evidence, however, was not the fact that he diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic, but that the Attorney-General did very little to challenge the diagnosis, and much more to reinforce it. The police had gathered a vast amount of information. The author cannot know whether the Attorney-General was in possession of all this information, but none that could have broken down Dr. Cooper's testimony was used.

⁴⁷⁶⁵ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 22 April 2016.

⁴⁷⁶⁶ Lambley, 1980: 239-240.

The most important evidence should have been Tsafendas's statements to the police. In them, Tsafendas testified that he had killed Dr. Verwoerd for political reasons: because he was against apartheid, because Dr. Verwoerd was not the real representative of all the South African people, because he was disgusted with his policies and he hoped that a change would take place by removing him. These statements clearly showed Tsafendas as a well-informed, opinionated person with a lively interest in national politics. Professor Dugard said about the statement:

“(It) completely confirms the view that Tsafendas was not insane. It reads like a very normal story of a politically informed person, angry with apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd, determined to make a change, with nothing to lose personally. Really an incredible statement, which was carefully concealed.”⁴⁷⁶⁷

The evidence gathered by the police and the Commission from some two hundred interviewees along with reports from agencies and organizations around the world demonstrated that Tsafendas was far from the hopeless, helpless individual without any political thought described by Dr. Cooper. However, none of these statements, reports or interviews was used to contradict Dr. Cooper's views. We are not in position to know the reasons, but the fact remains that the Attorney-General did very little to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony generally, even though the police had gathered considerable information.

Although the court heard much discussion of Tsafendas's possible motives for killing Dr. Verwoerd, what was never mentioned was Tsafendas's statement to the police that he murdered the Prime Minister because he was disgusted with his policies, considered him a dictator and hoped a change of policy would take place by killing him. Also not mentioned were the statements of several witnesses that Tsafendas called Dr. Verwoerd “Hitler's best student” and a tyrant and dictator. Instead, Tsafendas appears to have no idea why he killed Dr. Verwoerd and was unable to explain his reasons. However, thirty years later Tsafendas was able to explain his reasons for the assassination, as he had done to the police, which again suggests that he deliberately told Dr. Cooper all this.⁴⁷⁶⁸

The Attorney-General appeared to “attempt to challenge” Dr. Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's motive, by using Dr. Sakinofsky's medical report. The astonishing thing with

⁴⁷⁶⁷ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁴⁷⁶⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

this move is that van den Berg could have very easily broken down Dr. Cooper's testimony about the motive by using Tsafendas's own words, but he used instead a report that contained "confused and deluded ideas," similar to the ones mentioned by Dr. Cooper. The result, instead of challenging Dr. Cooper's testimony, was to further reinforce the idea of Tsafendas as a schizophrenic but also, and perhaps more importantly, that he did not have any clear political thought.

Much was said about the tapeworm, but what did not become clear was the gulf between those who heard about it and those who did not. Tsafendas made sure to mention the tapeworm to every single person connected with his defence or the State, but up to then he had never mentioned it to friends and family. Dr. Cooper came back time and again to the tapeworm, but statements to the police by Tsafendas and witnesses contained not a single reference to it. Also not mentioned was that Tsafendas did not speak of the tapeworm to at least nine doctors who examined him in the three years prior the assassination, all of whom declared him, as he wished to be declared, perfectly healthy, both physically and mentally. It could hardly be clearer that in telling Dr. Cooper, the police and his defence team about the tapeworm he wanted to be considered insane, while hiding it from the nine doctors he wished to be declared mentally fine so he could get jobs and the permanent residency permit he had applied for.

Several other life issues were inaccurately presented and wrongly interpreted, for example his supposed inability to care for himself, to make friends, to function properly, to live a meaningful life, as well as his relationship with his step-mother. Tsafendas was presented as a man without any political ideology or concerns. That he was a member of the South African Communist Party and the Greek Communist Party and its military wing (the DSE) and that he participated in the Greek Civil War were not mentioned. Nor was the fact that he was reported at least twice to the South African police as a "dangerous Communist." The court did not hear that he was exiled from Mozambique for twelve years and arrested several times by the Portuguese police because of his Communist and anti-Portuguese activities. In fact, the word Communist was never heard in court, although several witnesses told the police that Tsafendas was a passionate Communist and was even described as the "biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa"⁴⁷⁶⁹ or simply as a "dangerous

⁴⁷⁶⁹ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Communist.”⁴⁷⁷⁰ The fact that PIDE had a very detailed file on Tsafendas since 1938 was also not mentioned, but this was perhaps not known to the South African authorities as PIDE had withheld from the South African police all the information “indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique.”⁴⁷⁷¹

Dr. Cooper seemed not to know that Tsafendas had faked mental illness, although it was stated in the Grafton State Hospital medical report, which was in the hands of both the police and the defence. At least six witnesses told the police that Tsafendas pretended to be crazy to avoid serving in the Portuguese Army. None of this came up in court.

Importantly, Dr. Cooper was also apparently unaware that Tsafendas spoke not of one delusion but three. The tapeworm, according to Dr. Cooper, made its first appearance in the mid-1930s and was still there up to his trial. However, in 1946, Tsafendas had claimed to hear voices from radiators and at one point in 1964 or 1965 he “believed” he was Saint Peter, while in 1966, just two months before the assassination, he “believed” that people were murdered by poisoned food in the house where he lived. Thus since the 1930s, Tsafendas at least had two simultaneous delusions - the tapeworm and the radiator voices in 1946, the tapeworm and Saint Peter in 1965 and the tapeworm along with the people being murdered by poisonous food in 1966. Tsafendas was later to remark, “Everyone hears voices or pretends to be Napoleon, but who would ever suspect anyone who believes he has a tapeworm?”⁴⁷⁷²

Speaking of having two delusions at the same time, Professor Burke said, “It’s not impossible, because the human brain is difficult to understand. It’s not impossible, but it is unlikely. It’s possible but it’s improbable.”⁴⁷⁷³ Mr. van Zyl agreed, “One may disappear, and the other one may then appear. But two at the same time? I don’t think so, these delusions are usually very powerful.”⁴⁷⁷⁴

None of the statements taken from the *Eleni* sailors was used, not even those found in the archives. These statements were particularly important since many of these men were

⁴⁷⁷⁰ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁷⁷¹ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁴⁷⁷² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁷⁷³ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁴⁷⁷⁴ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

with Tsafendas every day for forty-two days up to three days before the assassination and were cognisant of Tsafendas's behaviour and state of mind at a crucial time. Tsafendas had bought a gun from one of the crew and was planning to escape by hiding aboard the tanker. Even more important, he told the crewmen that any assassination of Dr. Verwoerd would be morally justifiable because he was a tyrant and a dictator. Dr. Cooper and Tsafendas's defence team did not know about these statements and could not talk to the men because the *Eleni* left Cape Town on September 3, but the police had heard from the seamen's own lips. One would have expected the Attorney-General to have knowledge of such statements, but there was no mention of them.

A very important fact of Tsafendas's life was never raised at the trial. Although there was considerable discussion of his employment record and apparent inability to hold down a job, Tsafendas's six months teaching English at the best private language college in Turkey passed without mention. The teaching stint was reported in South African newspapers,⁴⁷⁷⁵ the Commission also found out about it, Tsafendas told the police about it and he used his reference from the college to get the job in Parliament. Dr. Cooper found Tsafendas to be unable to hold down a job, care for himself, function on a reasonable level and follow a conversation after fifteen minutes while he was also talking in a disjointed manner.

Professors Burke and Zabow and Mr. van Zyl agreed that it would have been impossible for a man with his reported level of schizophrenia to hold down such a job, especially for an extended period. Furthermore, this was not the only job Tsafendas kept for a substantial length of time; he worked for six years at the Vulcan Iron Works, General Engineers, for two years at the Imperial Airways factory in Quilemane, for almost two years as a welder with the British Mining Supply Company in Johannesburg, five months at F.A. Poole Engineering in Pretoria and six months at a tractor factory in Munich and none of his fellow workers noticed anything odd about him. He also worked satisfactorily as an interpreter for another five-six months, although part-time, at Durban Court, being recruited periodically as the need arose. He worked off and on for nine months at his brother-in-law's coffee shop, the Proclamation Hill Café in Pretoria. Colleagues praised Tsafendas for his

⁴⁷⁷⁵ *The Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas taught Turks English'; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas taught English in Turkey'; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man.'"

work and character. Finally, none of his superiors or colleagues at Parliament mentioned anything being wrong with Tsafendas's ability to perform his duties.

It is possible that the Attorney-General was unaware of some of the information gathered by the police and therefore did not bring it up in court, despite the fact that most of it had been published in the newspapers. However, the same could not be said of Tsafendas's employment record and ability to hold down a job. The Attorney-General himself wrote in October 3 in his Memorandum for Tsafendas that in 1933 Tsafendas returned to Mozambique and "for 6 years he worked at the Vulcan Iron Works, General Engineers, as an oxyacetylene electrical welder. According to testimonials from this firm, he had performed his duties in a satisfactory manner. These testimonials were included with his application for permanent residence in South Africa."⁴⁷⁷⁶ This important evidence directly contradicted Dr Cooper's testimony, yet the Attorney-General did not use it to challenge it.

At least twice, Dr. Cooper seemed to misunderstand or manipulate Tsafendas's words, although Tsafendas might well have lied to him. One of these instances concerned Tsafendas's statement to the police that he did not consider Dr. Verwoerd representative of all South African people. Dr. Cooper's version was that Tsafendas considered Dr. Verwoerd was not the real representative of the White population. What is important here is not whether Dr. Cooper misunderstood Tsafendas or if he was lied to, but that the Attorney-General did not challenge him when the police had ample evidence to break this down.

Tsafendas's "globetrotting" is also misunderstood. That he was forced into exile for twelve years from Mozambique, persecuted and imprisoned in Portugal and banned from entering South Africa is not mentioned. Neither are the more than twenty applications he made to be allowed back into these countries. Ignored, too, is that most of the countries he visited were on the way to his destination and he had to pass through them to get there. Missing also is the fact that Tsafendas was forced to travel through some of these countries in a desperate attempt to get back to Mozambique by illegal means since he was officially banned. Tsafendas's travels are those of a man desperate to return to his home and family, but prevented from doing so because of his political beliefs, and so he was forced to spend much time living in "strange lands," as he put it himself.⁴⁷⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁷⁶ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

⁴⁷⁷⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 17. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

It is also a fact that the police possessed sufficient evidence not only to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony but to break it to pieces. None of it was used. The fact that the Attorney-General wrote a memorandum about Tsafendas on October 3, 1966 which contained misinformation regarding his reclassification application, strongly suggests that van den Berg was perfectly competent but was not given all relevant information by the police. However, we are considering a case which took place under apartheid and we cannot exclude the possibility that the Attorney-General was indeed in possession of all the information but deliberately did not use it, assuming or being "advised" or simply knowing what he had to do in such case, that it would be better for everyone if Tsafendas were to be found insane. As Professor Dugard said, the prosecutors during apartheid "were never very independent" and knew what they had to do each time.⁴⁷⁷⁸ The fact that he attempted to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony without trying very hard while his own witnesses had already come to the same conclusion as those of the defence, strengthens the suspicion that the whole thing was a charade intended to secure a verdict of insanity.

Tsafendas spoke at length about the assassination and his life while he was in prison and in the hospital where he ended his days, but only to people he trusted. He never mentioned any of the things he told Dr. Cooper but repeated what he told witnesses prior to the assassination and which some of them told the police. For example, that Dr. Verwoerd was a dictator and not the real representative of ALL the South African people, that he was a tyrant oppressing his people, that he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be Hitler's best student because he copied some of his Nuremberg Laws concerning Jews and applied them to the non-whites, and that he hoped that his death would bring a change of policy in South Africa or at least provide a stepping stone towards it, as he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be the "brains behind apartheid."

If Tsafendas was really schizophrenic when he was examined by Dr. Cooper, he must still have been schizophrenic when he was in the prison and then in the hospital. His situation must even have deteriorated, given that he had been in solitary confinement for twenty-three hours per day for about twenty years, deprived of contact with his fellow prisoners, systematically assaulted and kept in a room next to the execution chamber, often forced to watch those who were going to be executed passing in front of his cell, possibly a reminder of

⁴⁷⁷⁸ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

what to expect if he ever became “sane” again. All this was still happening when Tsafendas was seventy.⁴⁷⁷⁹

According to Professor Tuviah Zabow, if Tsafendas was really a schizophrenic, his condition, because of these conditions and the fact that he received no treatment, should have remained at least the same or more likely worse.⁴⁷⁸⁰ However, Tsafendas appeared to be perfectly sane to those who met him, he remained faithful to the ideas and philosophy he had before the assassination until he died and never repeated to anyone any of the things that Dr. Cooper said he told him.

A trained psychiatrist should be able to understand whether a person is schizophrenic more authoritatively than a lay person. However, psychiatry does not deal with wounds and conditions that can be touched and seen, are broken and can be healed. It deals with aspects of a personality upon which there may be differing opinions. Dr. Benjamin Chesler, a specialist psychiatrist, who examined David Pratt in 1960, admitted to the court that his diagnosis “could have been wrong.” He added, “I was not certain that I was correct. Psychiatry is not a factual science, a lot of it is subjective interpretation.”⁴⁷⁸¹

That is also why it is very important to have as much additional third-party information as possible. John J. Broderick, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Law at Notre Dame University, said that in an important murder trial, where the defence is insanity, it is not uncommon for psychiatrists of equal eminence to be lined up on opposite sides of the case. It was the same when the issue being contested was a will.⁴⁷⁸² This implies that the psychiatrists from one side or other misdiagnosed the accused. There are several well-known cases where prominent psychiatrists got their diagnoses wrong:

- Issei Sagawa murdered and ate a girl in Paris in 1981. He was examined by several French psychiatrists and was found to be legally insane and unfit to stand trial. He was later deported to Japan and committed to a mental hospital. However, when examined by

⁴⁷⁷⁹ Beresford (*The Guardian*), 9 June 1989: 12, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s insane killer being brutalised on SA Death Row: Cell next to gallows for 71- year old prisoner.’

⁴⁷⁸⁰ Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016.

⁴⁷⁸¹ Dr. Chesler’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁴⁷⁸² Broderick, 1960: 517.

Japanese psychiatrists, they declared him perfectly sane and he was released. He still lives free.⁴⁷⁸³

- Joseph Paul Franklin was an American serial killer. A forensic psychiatrist for the defence testified that he was a paranoid schizophrenic and unfit to stand trial. However, the court found him fit to be tried and he was executed in 2013.⁴⁷⁸⁴
- Leopold and Loeb murdered a boy in the United States in 1924. Several prominent psychiatrists of the time testified that they were insane, while other equally prominent psychiatrists testified that they were perfectly sane.⁴⁷⁸⁵
- In October 2016, in the Spalding murders trial, Dr. Indranil Chakrabarti, a psychiatrist, testified that the fifteen-year-old accused girl was suffering from a mental disorder. However, consultant forensic psychiatrist Dr. Philip Joseph gave as his opinion that Dr. Chakrabarti's diagnosis was wrong and the accused was not suffering from a mental disorder. At the time of writing, the trial is still ongoing.⁴⁷⁸⁶
- In February 1965, Professor Lewis A. Hurst,⁴⁷⁸⁷ Professor of Psychology at the University of Witwatersrand, diagnosed John Harris, who planted a bomb in the Johannesburg railway station, as unfit to stand trial. His opinion was that Harris "was suffering from a mental disease which rendered him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong" and that he harboured "paranoid traits of a nature sufficient to impair his judgment." On the other hand, Professor van Wyk, who also examined Tsafendas, disagreed with that diagnosis and found Harris perfectly sane. The Court accepted Prof. van Wyk's diagnosis and dismissed Prof. Hurst's.⁴⁷⁸⁸

In the above-mentioned cases and very many more, psychiatrists disagreed about the mental state of a person. One side must be wrong, which means that some of the psychiatrists misdiagnosed the person concerned. Clearly, a psychiatrist's diagnosis, especially when unaccompanied by third-party information, cannot be taken for granted. In addition, in the cases mentioned above, the psychiatrists had far more information available about their

⁴⁷⁸³ Morris, 2007. Retrieved from:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20110714172725/http://www.newcriminologist.com/article.asp?nid=17>; *Murder in Mind* (1997) *The Japanese Cannibal*.

⁴⁷⁸⁴ Gladwell (*The New Yorker*), 24 February 1997: 132-47, 'Damaged.'

⁴⁷⁸⁵ *Illinois v. Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb*. Retrieved from:

<http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/leoploeb/leopold.htm>

⁴⁷⁸⁶ BBC, 12 October 2016, 'Spalding murders: "Toxic relationship" behind killing of mum and daughter.'

Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lincolnshire-37631891>

⁴⁷⁸⁷ Incidentally, Prof. Hurst was also one of the psychiatrists who examined David Pratt.

⁴⁷⁸⁸ *State v. Harris* (Appellate Division), 11 February-1 March 1965: 340-341.

patient than the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas. In large part, a diagnosis depends on what the patient tells his examiner and Dr. Cooper and the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas relied on what he told them. However, Tsafendas told his psychiatrists stories he never told anyone else, most of them clearly lies, as witnesses told the police, the Commission and the author. Furthermore, he talked and behaved in a manner that none of the witnesses described or recognised.

Was Tsafendas capable of convincing Dr. Cooper that he was schizophrenic? That he had done so in the past with the tapeworm story and the Saint Peter fixation suggests that he could. Judge Jacques Theodore van Wyk of the Commission of Enquiry said in his final report that Tsafendas was “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders—he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him—and therefore (the Commission) adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”⁴⁷⁸⁹

The unavoidable conclusion concerning Dr. Cooper's evidence is that his portrayal of Tsafendas was a travesty of the truth. A long list of Tsafendas's actions and opinions which would have provided an entirely different picture of the man went unmentioned throughout the summary trial. They included: that Tsafendas considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator, an evil man, the brains behind apartheid and Hitler's best student; that Tsafendas hoped killing him would bring about a change of policy; that he wanted to do everything possible to get the ruling regime out of power and see a government representing all the South African people in its place; that philosophically he detested apartheid, slavery, colonialism and racism; that he was a partisan for the independence of Mozambique, was arrested and imprisoned five times by the Portuguese Police because of his anti-Portuguese and Communist activities, and that PIDE had a 130-page file on him from 1938. None of these facts came to light and Tsafendas was presented as a schizophrenic who believed he had a tapeworm which controlled his life, who did not like Coloureds and who assassinated Dr. Verwoerd because he was frustrated. This became the public perception of Tsafendas and has remained so to this day.

Professor Kirk Heilbrun believes that Dr. Cooper's diagnosis would not have been seen as credible in an American court today. He told the author:

⁴⁷⁸⁹ Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

“It [Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis] would not be given much credibility in a U.S. court. Many of the points we have discussed [above] would be incorporated into cross-examination to challenge the credibility of the opinions based only on self-report.”⁴⁷⁹⁰

Professor Zabow also agrees with the author’s analysis of Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis. He said:

“Just a few comments further to our interesting discussion this afternoon where we seem to concur on the issues of psychiatric expert testimonies. I have read the information with interest particularly the collateral background provided. Much of this was not available at time of psychiatric assessments or in the Court. Of interest is the Tsafendas statement which was done early on the investigation and much of the information he must have been able to provide or a least agreed upon if coerced to sign. If he was psychotic and unable to marshal his thoughts, this would not have been possible. This is significant in relation to the expert testimonies which are so central to the discussion that all these were provided without background factual information at than stage. The focus should have been on mental state examination in its ‘form’ and not therefore dependent on the content. The uncertainties expressed as to conclusions in relation to the nature of the disorder and the features are evident.

As mentioned previously in discussion with you, the evaluation should consist of supportive history as available and observation of behaviour and functioning. Forensic assessments are undertaken in hospital-like setting where function and behaviour outside of the consulting room are observed. I am also concerned as to when the examinations took place relevant to other activities and interrogations. Many appear to have taken place under some pressure of time and in various environments such as the EEG laboratory etc. The time of the assessments clearly were during the severe and ongoing torture and abuse so this effect on his mental status in the ‘sample’ period needed consideration. The observed symptoms may be explained somewhat in other ways due to the above.”⁴⁷⁹¹

Tsafendas’s file at the Prison Service, File: A5078, while imprisoned in Pretoria Central Maximum Security Prison described him as:

“A person of Colour, an extremely resourceful and cunning individual who is

⁴⁷⁹⁰ Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017.

⁴⁷⁹¹ Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 3 September 2016.

physically and mentally able to plan and execute escape."⁴⁷⁹²

This description hardly fits the Tsafendas described by Dr. Cooper as someone unable to function on a reasonable level, unable to care for himself and unfit to stand trial. However, the description fits perfectly with the way Tsafendas was described by people who knew him well and according to a plethora of evidence gathered by the South African police. Finally, Advocate George Bizos found the evidence showing Dr. Cooper's testimony as wrong to be "overwhelming and unquestionable."⁴⁷⁹³

⁴⁷⁹² Marais, 1992: 208.

⁴⁷⁹³ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 3 September 2016.

DAY 2: 18 OCTOBER 1966

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 2: DR. HENDRIK MULLER

Dr. Muller, a Cape Town physician, was appointed by David Bloomberg to examine Tsafendas and offer an expert opinion on whether or not he harboured a tapeworm. It was an astute appointment since Dr. Muller was not only well known and widely respected, he was also the personal doctor of Judge Beyers.⁴⁷⁹⁴

EXTRACTS FROM DR. MULLER'S TESTIMONY⁴⁷⁹⁵

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When did you examine the accused?

DR. MULLER: On the 12th October.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where did you examine him?

DR. MULLER: At Caledon Square.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you ask the accused?

DR. MULLER: I asked him if he suffered from any physical illness. I explained to him that it was my purpose to examine him physically.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was his reply?

DR. MULLER: He said that his only trouble was this worm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did he tell you about the worm?

DR. MULLER: He first became conscious of the worm in 1936. He stated that for some two to three months he had been feeling irritable and unwell and during this period he had noticed that he was passing segments of worm by rectum; segments which passed spontaneously and would fall into his trousers, and he described them as being like macaroni, which nevertheless moves spontaneously, and this led him to believe that he had a worm. This had happened while he was in Lourenço Marques, and he went to a chemist there who told him how to treat

⁴⁷⁹⁴ Bloomberg, 2007: 79; Cooper, 2016: 105.

⁴⁷⁹⁵ Dr. Hendrik Muller's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

this condition.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: From his description did you form the impression that, in fact, in 1936 he did have a worm which?

DR. MULLER: Yes, I was fully convinced about that, especially when he described the result of taking this treatment.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Shortly, what was the result?

DR. MULLER: He passed a long length of the worm, but he felt that he had not passed the whole worm, that part of it still remained in his rectum. It broke off when he pulled on it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is his present complaint about?

DR. MULLER: He says that the worm has changed his whole character and his whole physique, whereas before he was thin and wiry, he has now become fat and flabby. It has made him irritable, changed his nature; that he can no longer be friendly with people, he was bad-tempered. It has made him eat excessively and made him put on weight to a great extent. He states he can feel the worm moving about inside him, causing severe pain at times, and generally making him feel thoroughly miserable and unwell.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How does he describe the worm? What does he call it?

DR. MULLER: He referred to it on two or three occasions as an abominable thing inside him, and as a worm, but he didn't use any other terms.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you tried to ascertain from him whether he has passed any segments since taking medicine in 1936?

DR. MULLER: Yes, I asked him that on two occasions, whether he had again passed any segments of the worm or whether he had passed a long length of the worm, and he was quite sure that he had never again passed a segment or a length of the worm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you ascertain from him whether he had had any treatment for this worm since 1936?

DR. MULLER: Yes, he stated he had had many treatments, some of them very severe. In fact, one of the treatments, he says, almost killed him but in spite of this he never again passed any part of the worm. And no treatment at any time made him feel better.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Does he presently believe that he still has the tapeworm?

DR. MULLER: He appears to be quite convinced about that.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What impression did you form as to the veracity; does he genuinely believe in the existence of this worm?

DR. MULLER: Yes, I believe that is so. I think he really does feel that he still harbours this worm and that it still is affecting him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Your examination was directed to - obviously after this worm story - find out whether he still had a worm?

DR. MULLER: Well, I didn't do anything more extensive. I examined him clinically, palpated his abdomen, examined the heart, lungs and nervous system generally. I did not have stool examinations or other examinations to demonstrate whether the worm is still present.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is your opinion?

DR. MULLER: I am quite convinced he does not have a worm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If evidence is led that in May, 1959, the accused received treatment at the University College Hospital, that is, St. Pancras Hospital, to ascertain whether or not there was a worm and that no tape-worm was produced, how important would that evidence be to you as a physician?

DR. MULLER: Well, it would confirm my feeling that he just does not have a worm. It is a very reputable hospital and I am sure that they must have done the job properly.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If they came to the conclusion that there was no worm in 1959, you would not quarrel with that?

DR. MULLER: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the overall physical condition of the accused?

DR. MULLER: Physically he is fat and rather unfit but there is no organic disease demonstrable. He is as healthy as most people of his age are.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You had no difficulty in communicating with him?

DR. MULLER: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he have difficulty in expressing himself?

DR. MULLER: None at all.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How was the accused during your examination? Was he in a state of anxiety?

DR. MULLER: It was difficult to say. He appeared vague in his manner and almost, one could say, detached. It is difficult to describe exactly how he was.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I just want to ask the doctor this, what impression did the accused make upon him?

DR. MULLER: He appeared an ordinary enough man, certainly not exceptional, particularly not ill, not particularly disturbed, you know; not anxious or upset; intelligent and able to understand what was said to him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I just want to ask you finally: With his health and his intelligence should he be able to hold down a job?

DR. MULLER: Yes. Yes, I would think he could very easily.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I am talking about his physical health?

DR. MULLER: Yes.

COMMENTS ON DR. MULLER'S TESTIMONY

According to Dr. Muller, Tsafendas was able to understand what was said to him, had no problem communicating with him and was not particularly disturbed. More importantly, Dr. Muller contradicted Dr. Cooper's beliefs that Tsafendas was not able to hold down a job and unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes.

Tsafendas spoke to Dr. Muller at length about the tapeworm and its origins. As we will see, it is something he does with any doctor who examines him in custody. Tsafendas also spoke about the tapeworm in most of the hospitals where he was treated, saying roughly the same things he told Dr. Muller. However, these were hospitals to which Tsafendas himself sought admittance or to which he was taken by police who believed they had noticed "something wrong with him" during interrogation. Tsafendas was never taken to a hospital or recommended to one by anyone other than the police.

Significantly, Tsafendas was examined by at least nine physicians during the three years up to the assassination and did not tell any of them anything about a tapeworm. They

were not psychiatrists, so Tsafendas may have felt it was an irrelevance, however, Dr. Muller is not a psychiatrist either and Tsafendas told him clearly that “his only trouble was this worm.” If Tsafendas really believed he had a tapeworm and always told the medics who examined him in custody, would he not also have told the other nine doctors? After all, he said that this was his only health problem.

Surprisingly, although Dr. Muller was appointed to discover if Tsafendas had a tapeworm, he did not carry out any of the relevant physical examinations, including rectal investigation, as he appeared to be convinced simply by listening to Tsafendas that the worm was a figment of his imagination. However, his remit was to discover the truth of the tapeworm, not by talking to Tsafendas - that was the psychiatrists' task - but by examining him, and this he did not do. He produced no physical evidence, either pro or con, and his conclusion was based on an assessment of Tsafendas's words, upon which, not being a psychiatrist, he was not qualified to pronounce. What was the point of Dr. Muller testifying that Tsafendas did not have a tapeworm when he did not examine him? For all anyone knew, he could very well have had one. It is germane that the nine physicians who examined Tsafendas over the previous three years did so after he applied for permanent residence in South Africa and in connection with several job applications. In every case, he was found to be perfectly sane, capable of doing the work he applied for and fit for permanent residence. Not only did Tsafendas remain silent on the tapeworm, he also concealed his previous hospitalisations.

Dr. Muller stated that Tsafendas had the tapeworm since 1936. At that time, Tsafendas was still living at his parents' home, yet everyone in his family stated in their testimony to the Commission that Tsafendas never mentioned a tapeworm to them and that he was “definitely not insane.”⁴⁷⁹⁶ Charles Nissiotis, Tsafendas's brother-in-law, told the police, “As far as I could established he never mentioned the tapeworm story to any of the family.”⁴⁷⁹⁷ Tsafendas's half-sister Katerina Pnefma and his first cousin Mary Eendracht also were never told by Tsafendas about the tapeworm. Eendracht had grown up with Tsafendas in Egypt and then in Mozambique and was very close to him. The private conclusion of all the family members was that Tsafendas made up the tapeworm story to save himself from the

⁴⁷⁹⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁴⁷⁹⁷ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

gallows.⁴⁷⁹⁸ Family apart, three good friends of Tsafendas from that time, Ira Kyriakakis, Helen Grispos and his schoolmate George Grispos, never heard Tsafendas say anything about a tapeworm.⁴⁷⁹⁹

The most surprising thing about Dr. Muller's testimony is that he contradicts Dr. Cooper's evidence on a number of points and no attempt is made by the Court or the Attorney-General to clarify these issues. Dr. Cooper had found Tsafendas "unable to function on a reasonable level," "incapable of holding down employment" and unable to "express himself in a coherent fashion." Dr. Muller found no communication issues with Tsafendas, he believed that he could "very easily" hold down a job and did not report anything regarding his being "unable to function on a reasonable level."

It is important to remember that Dr. Muller is not a psychiatrist with the necessary expertise to comment on Tsafendas's state of mind, therefore Dr. Cooper's is the expert opinion. However, the next defence witness is Dr. Kossew, a district surgeon, who is also not a psychiatrist and therefore not an expert; he will diagnose Tsafendas as schizophrenic and his testimony will prove vital for Judge Beyers to reach his verdict in the end.

⁴⁷⁹⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁷⁹⁹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 3: DR. RALPH KOSSEW

Dr. Kossew, the District Surgeon in Cape Town, although not a psychiatrist, was an important witness for the defence because he had diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic three months before the assassination. Judge Beyers would state in his verdict how much he valued and gave weight to Dr. Kossew's testimony. However, as we will see, it is by far the weakest evaluation of Tsafendas by any of the doctors who examined him.

EXTRACTS FROM DR. KOSSEW'S TESTIMONY⁴⁸⁰⁰

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The accused, have you seen him before?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you see him during June, 1965?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: On what date?

DR. KOSSEW: On the 17th of June.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where did you see him?

DR. KOSSEW: At our offices - the District Surgeon's offices.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was it 1965 or 1966?

DR. KOSSEW: 1966.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why did the accused come to you?

DR. KOSSEW: He was referred to us by the Department of Social Welfare for a disability grant.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And tell me, doctor, did you examine him then?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you fill in a form as a result of your examination and the

⁴⁸⁰⁰ Dr. Ralph Kossew's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

opinion that you formed?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you a carbon copy of that form before you?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes. I have typed copies for the benefit of the Court, M' Lord. This will be R.S.C.A.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you read out this document?

DR. KOSSEW: The name was given as Dimitrio Tsafendas, born on the 14th January, 1918. He was not at work at this time I examined him, and he had last worked in March, 1966, and was a handyman at that time at the Engineering Works, Marine Diamond Corporation.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the applicant's complaint?

DR. KOSSEW: Well, I had to

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Read out what you have written down?

DR. KOSSEW: I found that he was vague and did not give a coherent account of himself, and that he was hypochondriacal. I have a note here that he talks about nothing else but his complaints and has ideas of a persecutory nature. He says that in his boarding-house they deliberately give certain food to people to cause their deaths. And he says that 20 people had died in a year that way. His memory was defective, I noted.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was this what you put in under the heading "Applicant's complaints - (history, symptoms and previous treatment)"?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In your general examination, what did you find his general physical and nutritional state to be?

DR. KOSSEW: I found nil abnormal in all his systems.

JUDGE BEYERS: In "General physical and nutritional state" you've got "Good."

DR. KOSSEW: Yes. His respiratory system was normal. His cardiovascular system was normal. His blood-pressure was 150/100. His genito-urinary system was normal, and so was his alimentary and other abdominal systems. His musculo-skeletal system was normal, as was his central nervous system.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And his mental condition?

DR. KOSSEW: I put down "Schizophrenic."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you put down for a prognosis for 'Schizophrenic'?"

DR. KOSSEW: I put down: "Prognosis - Poor."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you say was his degree of disablement?

DR. KOSSEW: I put the degree of disablement as compared with a normal individual as: "Severe."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: So where you have whether the disablement is slight, moderate or severe, you put it in a high class?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: His present incapacity, do you find it to be temporary or permanent?

DR. KOSSEW: Permanent.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you consider that medical treatment would improve or cure his schizophrenia?

DR. KOSSEW: I put: "No."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What labour did you find him suitable for?

DR. KOSSEW: I suggested that he would be a suitable candidate for subsidised labour.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: As regards the open market, what was your opinion?

DR. KOSSEW: I said he is not suitable for the open market.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: As regards sheltered employment?

DR. KOSSEW: I put: "No."

CROSS-EXAMINED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Were you busy on that particular day in June, 1966?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes, we are normally very busy in the mornings.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Were you very busy?

DR. KOSSEW: I can't remember if I was very busy. I suppose an average morning's work.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And normally you are very busy, not so?

DR. KOSSEW: In the mornings, yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How long were you with the accused?

DR. KOSSEW: Between a quarter of an hour to 20 minutes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Weren't you only busy with him for 10 minutes?

DR. KOSSEW: Well, I can't say exactly how long I was busy with him but I...

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You may have been busy with him for only 10 minutes?

DR. KOSSEW: He presented himself without any form of certificate or reference from anybody. He just came in as a person, I had to start from scratch, so that would have taken me a little bit longer.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Have you any qualifications in psychiatry?

DR. KOSSEW: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you agree that there is a difference between ideas of a persecutory nature and of a persecutory delusion?

DR. KOSSEW: Well, I don't think I can - my psychiatric knowledge is not so detailed that I can make these intricate definitions or distinctions.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you agree that many people are preoccupied with their health?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Don't many people exaggerate the poor quality of boarding-house food?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Wasn't the accused fabricating?

DR. KOSSEW: Well, I had no idea of verifying his statements, and no means of verifying his statements, I'd say.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What test did you apply to find that the accused was vague?

DR. KOSSEW: Well, not actually any tests, but I got the impression that he was not able to remember things clearly and he was sort of uncertain. My questions actually were mostly

concerned with his physical condition and the type of work he had previously done in order to assess his degree of disability.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Normal people also often forget these things?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What test did you apply to find that the accused's memory was defective?

DR. KOSSEW: Well, the defective memory I got as a general picture; I remember questioning him about the type of work he did and the nature of his complaints. Well, he was very uncertain as to some details of his complaints and his previous working habits, and that induced me to put down that his memory may be defective.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What test did you apply to find that he was vague?

DR. KOSSEW: A similar thing applies to the fact that he was vague. I got the impression that he didn't remember things very clearly and he was often very uncertain.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Isn't this also a normal phenomenon?

DR. KOSSEW: It could be, yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You didn't consider it necessary to have the accused sent for treatment or observation?

DR. KOSSEW: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why didn't you certify the accused when you saw him in June, 1966?

DR. KOSSEW: Well, in my opinion he wasn't certifiable. To me he appeared to be a person who could take care of himself. He didn't look as if he needed care and attention, and I did not get the impression that he was dangerous to himself or to others.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He did not complain to you that he was not capable of doing his work at the Marine Diamond Corporation?

DR. KOSSEW: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he ever mention to you that he was suffering from a tapeworm in June, 1966?

DR. KOSSEW: He didn't mention it in June, 1966, but I did see him subsequently when he

made some mention of it.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: When did you see him subsequently?

DR. KOSSEW: I saw him about - I can't remember the exact date - it was about two weeks ago when I was asked by Major Rossouw to come and see him, as he was complaining of some ailment.

JUDGE BEYERS: This is rather interesting because you did fill in "Alimentary and other abdominal systems: nothing abnormal detected." Now, I suppose a tapeworm would fall under that heading wouldn't it?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: It would certainly be intestinal, so you must have enquired, made some enquiry into his intestinal condition?

DR. KOSSEW: I did.

JUDGE BEYERS: And he didn't tell you anything about this?

DR. KOSSEW: He never mentioned a tapeworm.

JUDGE BEYERS: He told you about the tapeworm only after the alleged murder?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You saw the accused at 2.50 p.m. on the 6th September, 1966?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You then also examined him?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he then mention anything about this so-called tapeworm?

DR. KOSSEW: That examination was at the request of the Police, to ascertain his injuries that he sustained, and I was asked to fill in form J.88 which - I don't know the exact wording - for examination of a person who alleges he's been assaulted.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Is this the form that you filled in? (R.S.C.B).

DR. KOSSEW: Yes, this is the form.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What exactly did you find on that occasion?

DR. KOSSEW: Must I read this form?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: No. You can refresh your memory from it.

DR. KOSSEW: Must I read this form in its entirety?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But on that occasion you found that he was not confused?

DR. KOSSEW: No, he was not confused.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And that was only 35 minutes after the murder had been committed?

DR. KOSSEW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Then he was not confused?

DR. KOSSEW: He was not confused. I did add in my remarks that he answers questions guardedly but does not appear to be confused.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You have already said that he never mentioned a tapeworm to you on that occasion?

DR. KOSSEW: No.

Re-Examined by the DEFENCE COUNSEL: When you examined the accused at 2.50 on the 6th September, 1966, was he anxious?

DR. KOSSEW: No, he didn't appear anxious.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he appear?

DR. KOSSEW: Well, he was quiet. He may have been a little bit nervous but not in any marked degree.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Generally he was calm?

DR. KOSSEW: He was calm.

COMMENTS ON DR. KOSSEW'S TESTIMONY

Even though he was not a qualified psychiatrist, Dr. Kossew was able to determine, after an examination which lasted "a little bit longer" than ten minutes, that Tsafendas was a schizophrenic and unable to work in the "open market" or in "sheltered employment." Dr. Kossew also admits that he had no intention and "no idea" and "no means" of verifying

Tsafendas's statements and he obviously took as truth whatever Tsafendas told him. The fact that he was not a psychiatrist must have made it even more difficult for Dr. Kossew to understand whether the patient was lying. He stresses, however, that his intention was mostly to make a determination of his physical condition and not his mental condition.

Dr. Kossew did not consult any medical reports on Tsafendas and did not get any information about him from anyone who knew him; he took his words for granted. After examining Tsafendas for the first time, Dr. Sakinofsky and Dr. Cooper, both psychiatrists, shared the impression that he was schizophrenic, but both wanted to examine him again before reaching a conclusion. For the non-psychiatrist Dr. Kossew, a very brief consultation was enough to diagnose him as schizophrenic and find him eligible for a disability grant. However, we should also note the circumstances under which Tsafendas was examined. The psychiatrists examined a man who had murdered the Prime Minister and were naturally very thorough, while Dr. Kossew examined an applicant for a disability grant on a very busy morning.

What is extraordinary about Dr. Kossew's role in the case is that no-one raises the fact that Tsafendas was seeking a disability grant, having been referred to Dr. Kossew by the Department of Social Welfare. In order to qualify for such a grant, an applicant had to be found "unable, owing to infirmity of mind or body, to undertake regular work."⁴⁸⁰¹ This is exactly what Tsafendas was found to be; had he been found sane, he would not have qualified for the grant.

During the previous two and half years, however, whenever Tsafendas needed to prove he was perfectly healthy and sane, in order for instance to secure a job or a permanent residence permit, all five doctors who examined him found him to be so. Tsafendas did not tell any of these doctors about the tapeworm. We should not forget that Tsafendas did not tell Dr. Kossew about it either, at least during their first two meetings, but mentioned it in the third, which was four weeks after the assassination while he was in custody.

These are the five doctors who examined Tsafendas:

- On November 11, 1963, Tsafendas was examined by Dr. C. Been for his permanent residence application and was found "not to be mentally or physically defective in any

⁴⁸⁰¹ House of Assembly, Question No. 17. 3 February 1967. K150, Vol. 12, File: Social Welfare and Pensions, NASA.

way,” and “generally in a good state of health.”⁴⁸⁰² Dr. Been would later examine Tsafendas again “for burns on his body whilst employed at Pooles.” Again nothing about his mental state was noted.⁴⁸⁰³

- On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined again in reference to his residence application by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who wrote “a favourable report.” A certificate for permanent residence was subsequently issued.⁴⁸⁰⁴
- On March 15, 1965, Tsafendas was examined by a South African Railways’ medical officer whose name is indecipherable in his report. Tsafendas was found to be perfectly healthy, without any issues and therefore capable of working for the company.⁴⁸⁰⁵
- On November 19, 1965, Tsafendas was examined to assess his fitness to work for City Tramways in Cape Town. Again, he was found to be fit to work and duly hired.⁴⁸⁰⁶
- On January 13, 1966, Tsafendas applied for a job at the Marine Diamond Corporation and was medically checked that same day. The doctor who carried out the examination⁴⁸⁰⁷ found Tsafendas to be perfectly healthy and capable of working for the company.⁴⁸⁰⁸

In addition, the previous three years Tsafendas was also examined by another five doctors who also did not discover anything being wrong with him and he did not tell them anything about the tapeworm. They were:

- On April 18, 19 and May 3, 1966 Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Goldman, a consultant ear, nose and throat surgeon. He reported nothing about his mental condition.⁴⁸⁰⁹
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum

⁴⁸⁰² Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁴⁸⁰³ Dr. Been statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁸⁰⁴ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demitrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁴⁸⁰⁵ South African Railways Confidential Medical Examination Certificate of Demitrio Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 7, File: S 83708, Tsafendas: D. NASA.

⁴⁸⁰⁶ Donal Neville Mackay statement to the COE, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁸⁰⁷ The doctor’s name in the medical report is indecipherable.

⁴⁸⁰⁸ Demitrio Tsafendas’s Marine Diamond Corporation application for Employment, 13 January 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

⁴⁸⁰⁹ I. Eisenberg Statement. RE: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. N.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work.⁴⁸¹⁰

- Finally, Dr. Darby, a casualty officer, examined Tsafendas on the evening of the assassination but did not report anything to be wrong about his mental state.⁴⁸¹¹
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the care of Dr. Leon Solomon, a medical practitioner at Groote Schuur Hospital, was suffering from a “deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent an operation on his nose. Dr. Solomon did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas fit to return to his work.⁴⁸¹²
- On September 25, 1965, he was examined by Dr. G.C. Baker, a casualty officer, and again nothing was reported about his mental state.⁴⁸¹³

All of the above medical reports were in the possession of the South African police but none of them was used to challenge Dr. Kossew's testimony. None of these doctors was a psychiatrist, but neither was Dr. Kossew and if Dr. Kossew was acceptable as a witness, surely the ten doctors who examined Tsafendas over the previous three years should also be acceptable. However, they were not asked to testify and their diagnoses were not used in court.

The obvious reason Tsafendas did not mention the tapeworm to the ten doctors is that questions would have been raised about his mental state and he would have been refused a residence permit and turned down for the jobs he was seeking. Importantly, Dr. Goldman, a consultant surgeon, who examined Tsafendas just one month before Dr. Kossew did not report anything about his mental state or his ideas of a persecutory nature. Then, why did Tsafendas eventually tell Dr. Kossew? Obviously because he wanted to qualify for the grant. Tsafendas admitted openly to several witnesses in later life that “wherever I had to be found

⁴⁸¹⁰ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

⁴⁸¹¹ Dr. T.A. Darby. Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. G.S.H. NO. 65/014-181, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸¹² Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

⁴⁸¹³ Dr. G.C. Baker Statement RE: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. No date. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4, NASA.

insane, I was found to be insane; wherever I had to be found sane, I was found sane.”⁴⁸¹⁴

Furthermore, Tsafendas never appeared to be a schizophrenic to Dr. Vasilis Tzitzafakos, a Greek general practitioner he became friendly with in Beira in 1964. The doctor always maintained that Tsafendas was a very intelligent person and certainly not a schizophrenic.⁴⁸¹⁵

The Attorney-General raised the issue of the ten-minute examination, but did not make much of it or of Dr. Kossew's professional status as a physician and not a psychiatrist. We do not also know if the Attorney-General was aware of Tsafendas's many medical examinations over the previous three years or their resulting decisions with regard to residence and employment. However, the South African police and the Commission of Enquiry were well aware of them and one would have expected the Attorney-General to know about them, too. Once again, it seems van den Berg was either not aware of certain facts or did not think it was important to raise them. The fact remains that Tsafendas was never found to be unhealthy or disturbed when he needed to be found healthy and sane; but he was invariably found unhealthy and disturbed when that was the condition he wanted.

Another aspect of the case which nobody seemed to notice was that Tsafendas told the police and his defence team not only the names of the hospitals and exact dates of his various hospitalisations, but also his exact diagnosis in each case. However, he concealed all the examinations where nothing was reported about his schizophrenia and the tapeworm. For instance, he mentioned the examination by Dr. Kossew when he was declared schizophrenic but was silent on all those ten mentioned above when he was pronounced healthy.

Dr. Kossew said when he first saw Tsafendas he seemed unable to give a coherent account of himself, which was not something any of the ten doctors who examined him ever noticed. The Attorney-General, as mentioned earlier, was in possession of a report by his own expert psychiatric witness, Professor van Wyk, which contradicted Dr. Kossew's assessment. The report said that Tsafendas “is orientated. He gives a good account of himself. His comprehension is good and his answers are relevant.”⁴⁸¹⁶ However, just as in Dr. Cooper's case, the Attorney-General did not use it to challenge this testimony either.

⁴⁸¹⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁴⁸¹⁵ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴⁸¹⁶ Bloomberg, 2007: 91.

Dr. Kossew also considered Tsafendas's memory defective because he could not give details about his previous work. However, Tsafendas had no such problem when he spoke to the police about his employment record, and Dr. Cooper characterised Tsafendas's memory defect as "negligible" and said that "on the whole his memory was satisfactory." In further contradiction of Dr. Cooper's diagnosis, Dr. Kossew found Tsafendas "to be a person who could take care of himself."

An extremely important issue that is not mentioned at all is the fact that Tsafendas did not mention the tapeworm when he was first examined by Dr. Kossew and instead appeared to have ideas of persecutory nature. Dr. Kossew examined Tsafendas twice, on June 17, 1966 and then on the day of the assassination. On neither occasion did Tsafendas mention the tapeworm, only doing so when he met Dr. Kossew a third time, some two weeks before the trial commenced. This would have been around the first week of October, a time when Tsafendas was telling everybody he met about the tapeworm. Again, if Tsafendas believed he had a tapeworm, why did not he mention it to him before, as he did with the rest of the doctors and lawyers?

Dr. Cooper testified that Tsafendas attributed his inability to work and stay in a job to the tapeworm. However, Tsafendas did not give the same excuse to Dr. Kossew, indeed he did not even mention the tapeworm when he was examined for the disability grant. Instead he made up a preposterous story about the people in his boarding house being murdered. It is difficult not to assume that for Tsafendas, the tapeworm act was something like the "flavour of the month," alternating with his other tricks such as pretending he was Saint Peter and hearing voices like Joan of Arc. He could have used the tapeworm on this occasion with Dr. Kossew, but it may have sounded rather complicated and with possibly serious ramifications for himself than just a persecution complex. If he believed that a tapeworm was responsible for his inability to work but also to find work, then almost certainly he would have told Dr. Kossew, too, as it would have fitted perfectly with his claim for his alleged inability to work. The important point here is that Dr. Kossew was not asked to comment on the fact that Tsafendas blamed the tapeworm for his job problems to Dr. Cooper but made no such claim to him.

More importantly, no one questioned the fact that Tsafendas, two months after Dr. Kossew first examined him, did not repeat any of the things he told the doctor then about people being murdered in the house where he lived. If Tsafendas believed that then, would

not have believed it two months later? Since it was clearly a “delusion,” would it have just come and go so easily or he had two delusions in September and October 1966? Is it possible Tsafendas to not have believed he had a tapeworm at the time of the June 16 examination by Dr. Kossew if he really believed he had one? That would have meant that the tapeworm delusion had gone and a new one was created. Then, two months later, the tapeworm reappeared again and the persecutory ideas disappeared.

The same thing appeared to have happen again in 1964 when he was arrested by the Portuguese. In 1959 he was diagnosed as schizophrenic because of the tapeworm and in 1964 he was diagnosed again as schizophrenic but this time because he believed he was Saint Peter. This also suggests that the tapeworm delusion had gone and was replaced at the time by the belief that he was Saint Peter. Then, in June 1966, Saint Peter disappeared and the poisonous food appeared. In September 1966, the tapeworm re-appeared and the poisonous food disappeared.

According to Professor Burke, to claim two delusions at the same time or to have delusions coming and going as they were supposedly doing with Tsafendas, stretches credulity. He said:

“It’s not impossible, because the human brain is difficult to understand. It’s not impossible, but it is unlikely. It’s possible but it’s improbable. Let’s assume he was schizophrenic, for the sake of this argument, and, in the past, he had the delusion of being one of the apostles; that delusion would have stayed, so why would he, then, have created a new delusion around a tapeworm? It does not make sense, because your delusion stays fixed, so, if he really did believe he was one of the apostles, early on, that story would have stuck because the delusions will not have shifted. What happens with delusions is, they can become bigger, so they could include more things, but a shift from one delusion to another one is highly unlikely, so why would you go from apostle, and that worked for you ... well, let’s say he truly believed he was an apostle; why did that change as he went along?

It makes no sense. Even if the schizophrenia had been treated, and it came back, then the same delusion would have come back, so it’s inconsistent in terms of the delusions. You typically have a very fixed delusion, and it becomes bigger, but doesn’t change significantly, so if he had been truly schizophrenic, and he had been admitted to these hospitals previously, based on what he said, that he believed he was an apostle, then he would have killed Dr. Verwoerd, based on the delusion that he was an apostle; he wouldn’t have changed to say

there was a tapeworm, or whatever the case may be. So, there's, already, some kind of inconsistency."⁴⁸¹⁷

Reyner van Zyl agrees that it is next to impossible, "Yes, one (delusion) may disappear, and the other one may then appear. But two at the same time, I don't think so, because these delusions are usually very powerful."⁴⁸¹⁸

At the time of the June 17 examination by Dr. Kossew, Tsafendas lived at Wilhelmina de Vos's boarding house, presumably the house he referred to in his remarks to Dr. Kossew about murders. De Vos testified to the police that she "considered him to be a completely normal person."⁴⁸¹⁹ At the same period Tsafendas also had his meals at Mary Scott's boarding house. Scott testified to the police that she "never got the impression that he could be mentally unbalanced," indeed she thought that he "appeared to be perfectly normal."⁴⁸²⁰ These are the two boarding houses that Tsafendas visited at the time.

Tsafendas was extremely close at the time to Patrick O'Ryan, Richard Poggenpoel, Costas Chagios and Elias Constantaras. Constantaras, Panagiotis Peroglou and his girlfriend, Pamela Abrahams, took their meals, together with Tsafendas, in Mary Scott's boarding house. He never told any of them anything about his "suspicion" that twenty people died because of "certain food." All the above witnesses laughed when they heard this claim.⁴⁸²¹

Constantaras, Chagios and Poggenpoel have no doubt that Tsafendas would have told them if he believed such a thing since they discussed many things, including De Vos's and Scott's boarding houses and the way they ran them. Tsafendas also loved the cooking of both his landladies and ate at both houses throughout June 1966 – hardly something to do if you believe people are dying from the food there. Constantaras has no doubt that Tsafendas made up the story.⁴⁸²² Again, Tsafendas seems to be telling a doctor more than he ever said to his friends and certainly it was not because he trusted him.

Another significant issue is that Tsafendas got a job in the Parliament after he was

⁴⁸¹⁷ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

⁴⁸¹⁸ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁴⁸¹⁹ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸²⁰ Mary Cathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁸²¹ Pamela Abrahams and Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016; Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016; Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015.

⁴⁸²² Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016; Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

examined by Dr. Kossew and found to be schizophrenic. According to Sidney Wiehand, a senior messenger who was present at Tsafendas's interview, a person seeking such an appointment "must be of sober habits. He must be always neat, and then also we ask him if he's got any sickness, or anything like that, then he must tell us. If so, then he must get a report from the doctor that he is fit for duty."⁴⁸²³ Tsafendas said nothing about the tapeworm or the mysterious deaths he had mentioned to Dr. Kossew just a month ago, and he was duly appointed. A second senior messenger who was also present at the interview, Petrus Schuin, described Tsafendas as an ordinary man, the "same as any other person that had worked there."⁴⁸²⁴

In addition, in July 1966, just two months before the assassination, Tsafendas gave a seventy-five-minute interview to a reporter named N.D. Hartford of the *Cape Argus*. They had already met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to the newspaper and enquired whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as an "anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship."⁴⁸²⁵ Hartford's impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. According to Hartford, Tsafendas spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation.⁴⁸²⁶

Dr. Kossew also found Tsafendas unable to work either in the "open market" or in "sheltered employment" and capable only of subsidised labour. However, five of Tsafendas's colleagues at Parliament were questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry and none of them said he was inefficient or incapable. Gerald Shaw, a reporter for the *Cape Times*, would testify the following day that he found Tsafendas's work as a messenger not good enough. However, he would later state that he had only a "brief acquaintanceship" with Tsafendas and that he did not think he was insane. Interestingly, the incidents which made Shaw think that Tsafendas's work was not good occurred on September 2 and September 6, both days when Tsafendas had planned to kill Dr. Verwoerd, to shoot him at a party on the 2nd then to stab him in Parliament on the 6th. We will examine both incidents in detail in his testimony that follows.

⁴⁸²³ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁸²⁴ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁸²⁵ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, 'Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.'

⁴⁸²⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

Tsafendas also worked as interpreter for the court in Durban for six-seven months. However, the overriding single fact that contradicted Dr. Kossew's diagnosis regarding Tsafendas's working abilities was that he worked for nearly six months as a teacher of English at the Limasollu Naci, the most prestigious private language college in Turkey. Equally important is that Dr. Kossew examined Tsafendas just twenty minutes after the assassination and found him to be "calm" and not confused. Tsafendas did not mention the tapeworm again and Dr. Kossew did not make any note of Tsafendas being a schizophrenic.

CONCLUSION

Dr. Kossew's testimony persuades us like no other testimony that Tsafendas could be found sane or insane whenever he wanted. He was examined at least three times by doctors to determine if he was healthy enough to be hired for a job and he was found to be healthy. He was examined twice by state doctors to assess if he was healthy and capable of working in South Africa in order to get permanent residence and he was found healthy and capable. On the other hand, when Tsafendas deemed it necessary to be found mentally or physically unable to work, he was duly found unfit. Since he was always perfectly well physically, Tsafendas could not pretend otherwise, and therefore had to demonstrate mental defects, which is precisely what he did.

Dr. Kossew stated that he came to his conclusions after an examination that lasted "a little bit longer than ten minutes," and even though he was not a psychiatrist and therefore not an expert on the subject, still he declared Tsafendas to be schizophrenic. His diagnosis was accepted by the court and was taken seriously and accepted by Judge Beyers.

It is also noteworthy that Tsafendas told his defence team about Dr. Kossew's examination, but not about the other ten examinations where he was found to be perfectly healthy. However, the South African police were aware of these examinations but none of them was used to challenge Dr. Kossew's testimony.

Dr. Kossew diagnosed Tsafendas's condition as permanent and his prognosis for him as "poor," but how seriously can his testimony be taken? Here is a district surgeon and not a psychiatrist who examined a patient for "a little bit longer" than ten minutes and found him to be a schizophrenic; who came to his conclusions without looking at the patient's medical records or receiving any other information about him; who admitted that he was not able to verify his patient's words and therefore took them for granted. Is there any possibility that

such a diagnosis would be taken seriously today in any modern courtroom? Or even being brought before such a court in the first place? However such a diagnosis was given serious consideration in apartheid South Africa.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 4: PETER HENRY DANIELS

INTRODUCTION

The fourth defence witness was Peter Daniels, Helen Daniels's brother. Although Helen lived in the same house as Tsafendas for fifty days, while her brother did not, Helen was not chosen as a defence witness while Peter Daniels was. Helen had written to Tsafendas when he was in Durban asking him to meet and marry her. She wrote five letters to him and sent a photograph of herself. Tsafendas travelled from Durban to Cape Town at her invitation, having replied that he wanted to meet her but to wait before making any commitment.

The defence lawyers spoke to Helen but she was not asked to testify to the court, presumably because she had told the police on September 15 that she had "not noticed anything abnormal" about Tsafendas and "there was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal."⁴⁸²⁷ Instead, they asked Peter Daniels and his wife, Merle to give evidence, as neither of them had been questioned by the police. They agreed to do so in order to save Tsafendas's life. Peter Daniels's testimony was followed by that of his wife, Merle. Peter Daniels had also been interviewed by the *Post* and the *Sunday Times*, on September 18, 1966, and had lied about his sister's relationship with Tsafendas. He said it was Tsafendas who pursued Helen, writing to her and asking her to marry him,⁴⁸²⁸ while in reality it was the other way around.

PETER DANIELS'S TESTIMONY⁴⁸²⁹

MEETING TSAFENDAS AND HIS STAY IN HIS MOTHER'S HOUSE

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When did you see Tsafendas for the first time?

P. DANIELS: On the 28th August, 1965, Tsafendas knocked at my mother's door and in her kitchen the first time I saw Tsafendas.

⁴⁸²⁷ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴⁸²⁸ *The Post*, 18 September 1966: 1, 'I jilted Tsafendas, says Coloured girl'; *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

⁴⁸²⁹ Peter Daniels's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you know he was coming?

P. DANIELS: I did not know that he was coming.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: But did you know about him?

P. DANIELS: I had never heard of him before.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he come to your place?

P. DANIELS: He had a correspondence with my sister, Ellen, who is at present in this great ministry.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In which part of the house did he live?

P. DANIELS: He stayed in the front room in my mother's house.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you charge him any lodging?

P. DANIELS: We never charged him any lodging until the day that he went to work. From then on my dad spoke to him, but before that he never paid a penny.

IN CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And did I understand correctly that he never paid for board and lodging?

P. DANIELS: Not while he was not working. But when he started to work my dad spoke to him, and then he contributed something towards the house, towards the family.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Were you satisfied with his contribution?

P. DANIELS: My dad was.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you have much to do with him? Did you see him often?

P. DANIELS: All his free time he spent in my house. Most of his free time, shall I say.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I want you to make one thing clear to the Court. Your religious group, do you believe in putting up members who come to visit a town?

P. DANIELS: We fully believe if a brother is a brother, irrespective of his race, we fully

accept him as a brother, because we believe that was from the beginning in the Lord Jesus.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

Peter Daniels testified that he was not aware of Tsafendas coming to his mother's house and that he had never heard of him before. He refers to Tsafendas's correspondence with his sister, but does not reveal anything else about it. Furthermore, the exchanges between himself and Advocate Cooper imply that Tsafendas was uninvited and accepted into the house for humanitarian reasons. That is entirely inaccurate. Helen Daniels, had testified to the police on September 15, 1966, that:

“During April 1965 I was visiting friends in Boksburg. There I learned of Demitrio Tsafendas. It was told to me that they would want me to meet him, he's a nice man. I never met him and later returned to Cape Town. When I was in Cape Town, I thought to correspond with him and wrote to my friends to find out his address... Other friends of mine went on holiday to Durban and I then wrote a letter to Tsafendas and asked my friends to give this to him. Our preacher is in Durban and I hoped to trace Tsafendas through the church. ... I wrote my letter during the June holidays in 1965 and received a reply from him on July 10, 1965. I wrote in my letter that I would like to meet and wanted to marry him. His answer was that he wanted to meet me first before giving me a positive answer. I wrote to him again - four letters – all of which he answered. I sent him a picture, but he did not send me one in return. He sent word that he would come to Cape Town for our church conference - it would be in November 1965. I lived with my parents and on August 28, 1965 - he arrived at my parents' house ... We had a spare room and gave him lodging.”⁴⁸³⁰

Peter Daniels made no mention of the fact that his sister wrote five letters to Tsafendas, sent him her picture and asked him to meet and marry her. The fact that Tsafendas replied that he wanted to meet her first, as most sensible men would do, he also omitted. Is it possible that Peter Daniels was unaware of these facts? It is not impossible, but must be highly unlikely. First, Peter and his sister lived next door to each other and the whole family was very close. Patrick O’Ryan and Richard Poggenpoel, good friends of the Daniels family, were aware of the situation,⁴⁸³¹ so one would expect a brother to be, too. Even if he was

⁴⁸³⁰ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴⁸³¹ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013.

ignorant of the truth before the assassination, he must have become aware of it after Helen's interview by the police, when she freely set out the facts. After the police interview, Helen Daniels went into seclusion with friends and did not appear in public up to the trial.

Why, if he knew about it, would Peter Daniels not mention the marriage proposal? Most likely because he felt it would be embarrassing for his sister if the world learned that she wanted to marry the man who assassinated Dr. Verwoerd, and that it was she and not Tsafendas who initiated the relationship. This was not the first time that Daniels concealed the truth about his sister's relationship with Tsafendas. On September 18, 1966, in interviews with the *Post* and the *Sunday Times*, he declared wrongly that it was Tsafendas who had pursued Helen, writing to her several times after obtaining her address from a fellow member of the Christian Church.⁴⁸³² As we have seen, the reality was the exact reverse. It should also be mentioned here that Peter and Helen Daniels had asked Gordon Winter, the *Post* journalist who wrote the article to not mention the fact that Helen was a preacher of the Christian Church because it "would bring disgrace" on the Church.⁴⁸³³

Daniels also erred in the interview by saying Tsafendas came from Johannesburg when he had travelled from Durban. He said Tsafendas was accepted in the house because he had nowhere to stay and because he was a member of their Church, with again no mention of Helen's proposal. He also claimed that their meeting "did not result in a great friendship... Helen was not interested in marriage."⁴⁸³⁴

It is understandable that Peter Daniels would try to protect his sister's reputation. However, his concealment of the facts and the exchanges between Daniels and Advocate Cooper gave the impression that Tsafendas had turned up at the house out of the blue and was allowed to stay for reasons of Christian charity. That his sister asked to meet Tsafendas and even proposed marriage is not revealed at all during the trial. The Helen Daniels-Tsafendas connection has further significant implications. Daniels was a highly respected minister in her Church and the way she heard about Tsafendas suggests that he was held in high esteem by the Church members who recommended him. The fact that Daniels went to considerable trouble to get in touch with him, attempting to find his address, sending him a letter with a

⁴⁸³² *The Post*, 18 September 1966: 1, 'I jilted Tsafendas, says Coloured girl'; *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

⁴⁸³³ Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

⁴⁸³⁴ *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

friend of hers and then sending him four more letters and a picture of hers, implies that she expected to meet a good man who was warmly recommended by her friends in Boksburg. Patrick O'Ryan, too, had heard good things about Tsafendas, having heard him praised by fellow Christians as a "highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages."⁴⁸³⁵

That the Attorney-General would make no attempt to challenge Peter Daniels's testimony by using his sister's statement suggests that he was not in possession of it or that he simply allowed a lie to prevail in order to miserably portray Tsafendas.

TSAFENDAS'S APPEARANCE

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How was Tsafendas dressed when you saw him for the first time?

P. DANIELS: He impressed me as a man shabbily dressed, poorly dressed.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Describe his clothing.

P. DANIELS: I can remember fully the day he arrived he had on a brown suit, a black jersey with a hole right in front, a big brown hat. He was shabbily dressed.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What impression did it make upon you, his appearance?

P. DANIELS: He impressed me as a poor man.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Tell us what his habits were. Was he a clean man, a neatly dressed man?

P. DANIELS: Well, during the weeks he impressed me as a shabby man. He never impressed me as careful about his way of dress. He never impressed me as a man who was careful about himself.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S APPEARANCE

Tsafendas was indeed a poor man, but the majority of witnesses questioned by the police stated that he was nevertheless clean and neatly dressed. Only four witnesses out of two

⁴⁸³⁵ Patrick O' Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

hundred who were questioned by the police and the Commission testified in negative terms about Tsafendas's way of dressing. One of them was Helen Daniels: "I lived with my parents and on August 28, 1965, he arrived at my parents' house. When I saw him, his clothes were dirty and neglected and I had a very bad impression of him. However, I received him with friendliness. He said he was in Cape Town looking for work and his belongings are at the station. My brother went to fetch his belongings from one of the Cape stations. When the belongings came, (there were two suitcases and a bunch of pots and pans and a large bundle of dirty laundry) I was very disappointed when I saw the state of his property."⁴⁸³⁶

Three other witnesses made similar statements. Nickolas Nel, who had an argument with Tsafendas when they worked at F.A. Poole Engineering, testified that he "had a messy and dirty appearance,"⁴⁸³⁷ landlady Wilhelmina de Vos described Tsafendas as "dirty,"⁴⁸³⁸ and Gillian Clare Lieberman, personnel secretary at the Marine Diamond Corporation, told the police that Tsafendas had "dirty, sloppy clothes."⁴⁸³⁹ However, she and Nel had only seen Tsafendas at work, where rough clothes would be normal. Although Lieberman described Tsafendas's clothing as sloppy and dirty, she said, "I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange type of person, a unique character. Apart from him being well-travelled etc., I got the impression that he was physically different in dress and appearance. He was a big man, with a particularly striking big hat, stainless steel teeth, sloppy, dirty clothing."⁴⁸⁴⁰ She characterised him as "different" not mad.

Most of the witnesses questioned by the police said Tsafendas was neat, clean and well-dressed. They included:

- South Africa Police Col. van Wyk, who reported from Rhodesia and Mozambique on interviews with people in those countries who knew Tsafendas. His report stated that Tsafendas "was always neatly dressed."⁴⁸⁴¹

⁴⁸³⁶ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴⁸³⁷ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸³⁸ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸³⁹ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁴⁰ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁴¹ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas's landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry about Tsafendas: "It was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means."⁴⁸⁴²
- Ian Boswell testified that Tsafendas was "at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute."⁴⁸⁴³
- Gideon Cloete, an official at the Department of Labour, testified that Tsafendas "was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance."⁴⁸⁴⁴
- Jacobus Bornman, a one-time flatmate of Tsafendas, observed that "according to my observation, Tsafendas was a gentle person. He was neat in his person, but his eating habits were not up to scratch."⁴⁸⁴⁵
- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He testified to the police that Tsafendas was "neatly dressed" and he "never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally."⁴⁸⁴⁶
- Redvers Quintin Wakfer worked with Tsafendas at the Power Station in Cape Town and he was 'neatly dressed.'⁴⁸⁴⁷
- Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas "was well-dressed and appeared to be wealthy."⁴⁸⁴⁸
- Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, testified that Tsafendas "was well dressed and gave a good appearance," although as far as she could see, he had no visible means of

⁴⁸⁴² Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁴⁸⁴³ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁴⁸⁴⁴ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁴⁸⁴⁵ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁴⁶ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁴⁸⁴⁷ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA; Redvers Quintin Wakfer statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub File: 1/5, Subject Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁴⁸⁴⁸ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

support.⁴⁸⁴⁹ She later stated that Tsafendas was always well dressed and she never saw him wearing dirty clothes except when he was coming back from work.⁴⁸⁵⁰

- Mary Scott was Tsafendas's landlady in Cape Town for two months in 1966. She told the police, "His clothing however was clean and always tidy."⁴⁸⁵¹
- Sidney Wiehand, a senior messenger at the House of Assembly was one of three messengers who interviewed Tsafendas. He said that in order to be hired, a messenger "must always be neat," indicating that Tsafendas fitted that description.⁴⁸⁵²

The author asked forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas well about the way he was dressed. Only two of them, Andreas Babiolakis and Costas Poriadis, said that they once saw Tsafendas looking neglected and wearing a torn shirt. However, that was on the day he was released from jail in Beira in February 1965. Having just spent several days in a prison cell, wearing the same clothes every day and being beaten up, he could hardly have appeared otherwise. Both witnesses said this was the only time they saw Tsafendas looking less than perfectly dressed.⁴⁸⁵³ None of the rest said Tsafendas was of a dirty or neglected appearance. Indeed, the vast majority remembered him as dressing well and looking like a gentleman. It is not possible to reproduce here forty-four statements that contradict Dr. Cooper's view. The following are only from those who knew Tsafendas well:

Without quoting everyone's statement about Tsafendas, the study offers these words from people who knew him well:

- Father Nikola Banovic in 1961, lived in the same house as Tsafendas for four months and in a house next door for another two or three months. He saw Tsafendas virtually every day and says he was "always a very clean person and well-dressed, wearing a different hat each day."⁴⁸⁵⁴
- Joyce Dick, one of Helen Daniels's best friends at the time, stated to the author that

⁴⁸⁴⁹ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁸⁵⁰ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁸⁵¹ Mary Kathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁵² Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁸⁵³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁴⁸⁵⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

whenever she saw Tsafendas, “he was always very neatly dressed.”⁴⁸⁵⁵

- Reuben O’Ryan lived with Tsafendas in the same house for five months and kept in touch with him for another year. He said Tsafendas “was always very clean and well-dressed, apart from when he was coming home from work. That was the only time I saw him wearing dirty clothes. He always wore nice clothes; he was a clean person and always shaved.”⁴⁸⁵⁶
- Stanley O’Ryan lived with Tsafendas for five months at the same house and kept being in touch for another year. He remembers Tsafendas as “clean and well-dressed person.”⁴⁸⁵⁷
- Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas’s first cousin, knew him since he was five years old and grew up with him in Mozambique. She spent a lot of time with him in Pretoria in 1964, when they occupied the same house for two or three months. She insists that Tsafendas was always well-dressed and clean. She was impressed by his suits and Tsafendas told her that most of them were bought in Europe. “He was always well-dressed, very often wearing a hat, and was a very clean person. “He was very fussy with clean hands when he was a child, and I think he was also like this when he grew up, but I can’t remember for sure.”⁴⁸⁵⁸
- Tsafendas lived in Fotini Gavasiadis’s and her husband’s house for a few weeks, then for the next eight months in an apartment next to hers. Throughout this period in Pretoria in 1963-1964, they were very close; she saw and talked to him every day and they worked together in her brother’s café. She told the author that it is “nonsense” to say Tsafendas was not well-dressed or dirty, that in fact he always very well dressed and clean. “Sometimes it took him longer than it took me to get ready, trying to find a more suitable hat or tie. He adored hats and ties. He never wore the same clothes for two days in a row and when it was hot he would even change twice per day. He adored hats and ties.”⁴⁸⁵⁹
- Ira Kyriakakis, who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and remained a lifelong friend, described as “absolutely absurd” claims that Tsafendas was not well-dressed and clean. “He was always very well dressed; since he was a child. He looked like a gentleman. He used to wear hats he had bought from all over the world. He loved

⁴⁸⁵⁵ Joyce Dick in a personal interview, 6 August 2016.

⁴⁸⁵⁶ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁴⁸⁵⁷ Stanley O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 9 April 2015.

⁴⁸⁵⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁸⁵⁹ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

hats and he must have had tens of them. He came back to Lourenço Marques in the 1960s and brought me a hat for a present from Lisbon.”⁴⁸⁶⁰

- Helen Grispos was another who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques, and her mother was the best friend of Tsafendas's step-mother. “He was always very well dressed, even as a child; his step-mother always looked after him. When he visited us in the 1960s, I remember he wore a big hat he said he had bought somewhere in Europe. I don't remember what he was wearing, but I remember the hat. It was very distinctive. He was certainly well-dressed.”⁴⁸⁶¹
- Irene Michaletos met Tsafendas in 1964 in Beira and saw him often until 1965. She remembers him being always well dressed and clean.⁴⁸⁶²
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins, first met him in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him well between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique. They both remember Tsafendas being “always well dressed and clean.”⁴⁸⁶³
- Andreas Babiolakis knew Tsafendas since they were children and had lived in the same house as him in Beira for about two-three months. He finds the thought that Tsafendas had a dirty and neglected appearance as “absurd.” He recalls that Tsafendas “had a shower every morning when he woke and in the evening when he returned from work. He believed that he sweated in the night, so he had one in the morning.”⁴⁸⁶⁴
- Costas Chagios, a Cape Town café owner, got to know Tsafendas on a friendly basis in 1965 when Tsafendas walked into his restaurant. In the year up to his arrest in 1966, Tsafendas visited the restaurant more than fifty times. Chagios remembers Tsafendas being always well dressed and clean.⁴⁸⁶⁵
- Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for about six months in Istanbul. She was impressed by his many hats and remembers that a lot of people commented about how neatly Tsafendas dressed. “I remember him coming to the church always wearing a

⁴⁸⁶⁰ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴⁸⁶¹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁴⁸⁶² Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁸⁶³ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁸⁶⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴⁸⁶⁵ Costas Hagios in a personal interview, 24 March 2015.

tie.”⁴⁸⁶⁶

- Peter Protoulis was a supplier of foodstuffs to the tanker *Eleni*. He met Tsafendas on board and says, “I was very impressed by the way he was dressed. He always wore a suit and very often a tie and a hat. I never show him wearing the same clothes two days in a row.”⁴⁸⁶⁷
- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott’s boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest. He recalls Tsafendas being well dressed and clean, often wearing suits and hats.⁴⁸⁶⁸
- Peter Peroglou and his wife Pamela Abrahams ate at the same place as Tsafendas for two or three months in 1966 and they remember him as always well dressed and very courteous.
- Nick Augustides is the son of the owner of Mike’s Outfitters in Cape Town, for whom Tsafendas worked on commission for about two months in 1966. He knew Tsafendas for three-four months and remembers him as “a well-dressed man.”⁴⁸⁶⁹
- Miltiades Kaldis knew Tsafendas for about a year, having met him in 1965 in Cape Town. He remembers him “looking clean and well-dressed.”⁴⁸⁷⁰
- The thirteen *Eleni* crewmen were impressed with the way Tsafendas dressed. He told some of them that most of his suits were bought in Europe a few years ago and that he had not bought any new clothes since he returned to South Africa.⁴⁸⁷¹

In Europe, Horst Hartmann, senior personnel officer at the heavy engineering company Fries and Son in Frankfurt, where Tsafendas worked as a welder, said in a newspaper interview, “He drove up here in a big, battered American car. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman ... he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on...

⁴⁸⁶⁶ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁴⁸⁶⁷ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 3 August 2016.

⁴⁸⁶⁸ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴⁸⁶⁹ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

⁴⁸⁷⁰ Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016.

⁴⁸⁷¹ Kleanthis Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.” Tsafendas “left on his own wish” although Hartmann “would have liked to keep him.”⁴⁸⁷²

Personal appearance is a subjective matter. What is sloppy and dirty to one person may be casual and comfortable to another. It is germane that Tsafendas was a poor man, who often lived in basic lodgings, possibly without the facilities to wash his clothes. In addition, the kind of jobs he did, welder and fitter, would require rough working attire. The fact is only the four people noted above – Helen Daniels, Nel, de Vos and Lieberman - out of the two hundred the police and the Commission of Enquiry interviewed and another forty-four interviewed by the author, testified that Tsafendas was dirty. The vast majority not only disagreed, but stated that Tsafendas was neatly dressed.

TSAFENDAS'S “STRANGE” HABITS AND SOME “STRANGE” INCIDENTS

TSAFENDAS AND HIS HAT

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Can you remember any incidents, any things that happened, in which he featured?

P. DANIELS: Are you talking about his strange habits now?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Yes.

P. DANIELS: I can remember Tsafendas, seeing him sitting at my dad's table, coming from work one day, with a hat on. He still had his overcoat on. He was reading his paper at the table with his hat on. And I can remember me taking him to my mother-in-law in Woodstock, and in this particular instance, as we walked down the passage I myself took off my hat, hanged it on the hanger, but he (Tsafendas) walked straight down the passage into my mother-in-law's kitchen. He never took his hat off.

Then we came back into the lounge and sat down in conversation, and he was now telling about his travels all over the world, and he never took his hat off yet. Then, as the conversation went on, tea was served, and at this time I thought that Tsafendas would now take his hat off, but as tea was served he rather adjusted himself much better in his seat, pulling the collar of his coat up, and pulling his hat further down on to his head, which gave

⁴⁸⁷² *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin,’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

me a very poor impression of the man. Shall I say that to my mind I now thought this man was mentally affected.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you normally with your friends, etc., behave normally and take your hat off when you are inside?

P. DANIELS: We respect our friends with great diligence, and as a body of Christians we respect each other very highly.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S HAT

According to P. Daniels, Tsafendas was mentally affected because he did not take off his hat inside his mother-in-law's house in Woodstock. Daniels had referred to this incident when he was interviewed by Gordon Winter of the *Post* on September 18. He said that Tsafendas was "a genuinely religious man who did not smoke, drink or use bad language," but behaved "very oddly" at times, though he did not suggest that he was mad or "not at all there," as his wife would soon claim in court. What did Tsafendas do which was very odd? "Normally well-mannered," Tsafendas had "astounded the family when he once wore his hat throughout a tea party at a friend's home."⁴⁸⁷³

For a man to wear a hat in someone's home would be considered rude in most cultures, but few would describe a person who committed such a breach of etiquette as mentally affected. According to several witnesses, Tsafendas always wore a hat. Johanna Hendrieka Mulrenan, Tsafendas's landlady said he "never removed his big hat and wore a coat all the time." However, she did not take it as a sign of mental deficiency.⁴⁸⁷⁴

Hats were a Tsafendas trademark. He had many and would wear a different one each day. According to Katerina Pnema, Tsafendas began wearing hats when he was a teenager after Russian sailors in Lourenço Marques gave him one which was supposed to be similar to the hat worn by Vladimir Lenin. Tsafendas would buy a hat from each country he visited. He even bought a *bonnet rouge*, the soft red cap associated with the French Revolution, though he never wore it.⁴⁸⁷⁵ According to Father Nikola Banovic, Katerina Pnema, Ira Kyriakakis, Andreas Babiolakis and Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas often wore a hat, especially on those

⁴⁸⁷³ *The Post*, 18 September 1966: 1, 'I jilted Tsafendas, says Coloured girl.'

⁴⁸⁷⁴ Johanna Hendrieka Mulrenan statement to the COE, 26 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁴⁸⁷⁵ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

occasions when his hair would not succumb to control by brush and comb. However, none of them ever remembers him wearing a hat indoors.⁴⁸⁷⁶ Also, none of the two hundred or so witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission referred to anything of the sort, suggesting that this occasion was a one-off and Tsafendas might have had a good reason for keeping his hat on.

The following incident described to the police by his flatmate Jacobus Bornman demonstrates Tsafendas's concern for his headgear: "On Tsafendas's wardrobe were paper bags and on top of the paper bags were three of his hats. I reached up to a paper bag to put in certain items of clothing. When I reached for the paper bag on top of his closet, he leaped swiftly from where he lay on his bed reading. When I saw, Tsafendas stood beside me. It surprised me to see how quickly he could move since he had a big and clumsy posture and I believed that he was a lazy person. I asked him why he jumped up so quickly and he said he was afraid I would knock his hats from the closet."⁴⁸⁷⁷

Tsafendas is not the only person who wore a hat indoors. It is generally considered to be impolite to do so, however a lot of people are doing it, mostly because of stylistic issues. For example British MP and Respect Party leader George Galloway is famous for constantly wearing a fedora hat, even indoors, and it is considered to be his trademark style. Galloway has worn hat in indoor public speeches, public lectures etc.⁴⁸⁷⁸ Johnny Depp and Steven Spielberg often wear a hat indoors, as can be seen in their publicity photos. A long-established British strip cartoon character, Andy Capp, a typical working man, wears his cap at all times, including in bed, and Thomas Magnum, from the 1980s television series, *Magnum p.i.*, wears a baseball cap indoors. None of these characters, real or fictional, ever succumbed to mental illness. It could be argued that manners change over the years. However, whatever the strictures of the time, wearing a hat indoors could be considered a sign of rudeness, but certainly not of insanity.

However shocked Peter Daniels may have appeared, Helen Daniels did not say anything about the hat incident, since presumably she did not find it strange. In fact, she

⁴⁸⁷⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁸⁷⁷ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁷⁸ Freeman, H. (*The Guardian*), 1 June 2015, 'A man refusing to take his hat off indoors? This once, I doff my cap to George Galloway'; Perraudin, F. (*The Guardian*), 28 May 2015, 'George Galloway tweets his intention to run for London mayor.'

testified that “besides his messy ways, I did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal.”

Once again, the Attorney-General could have challenged this testimony since Daniels's sister had not noticed “anything abnormal” and “there was never any indication” that Tsafendas was “mentally abnormal.” The fact that Daniels had lived under the same roof as Tsafendas and knew him better than her brother adds value to her testimony.

P. DANIELS ON OTHER “STRANGE” INCIDENTS BY TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Any other strange incidents that you recall?

P. DANIELS: There are many instances that we can recall of Tsafendas. There is an instance now where one hot day he tried to cool the fowls off, which proves to me that he was also mentally deranged.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he try to cool the fowls off?

P. DANIELS: He got hold of the hosepipe and tried to cool the fowls down, because he thought that they were hot, too. (Laughter in Court.)

JUDGE BEYERS: One does it with fowls when it gets hot. I keep fowls. When it gets very hot you may have to do it. They die if you don't, sometimes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Any other strange incidents?

P. DANIELS: There are instances when in our meetings, as we worship in our homes, he was one of the members in the gathering, and we as a rule each give our testimony as Christians, discussing the word of God, and he (Tsafendas) after he had said something, would put his Bible and hymn book down and be unconcerned about his surroundings, which impressed me too that this man is a strange man.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY REGARDING OTHER “STRANGE” INCIDENTS

The Court's response to Tsafendas spraying water on the family chickens highlights the desperation of Peter Daniels's attempt to portray Tsafendas as mentally unbalanced. To his surprise and no doubt that of the defence team, the judge intervened to say that he kept chickens and it was sometimes necessary to cool them off in very hot weather. Thus what Tsafendas did, far from being insane, was the right thing to do and may have saved the lives

of the birds.

The second incident, concerning Tsafendas's demeanour at a prayer gathering, defies analysis. That Tsafendas appeared "unconcerned about his surroundings" is neither here nor there and certainly in no way strange, even in a context of meditative prayer. The likelihood is that Peter Daniels knew perfectly well that none of these incidents meant Tsafendas had mental problems, but he did not have much else to say to support the defence's insanity claim. Patrick and Louisa O'Ryan were asked by Advocate Cooper to exaggerate stories about Tsafendas to "get him free."⁴⁸⁷⁹ It is very likely that Peter Daniels was asked to do the same, especially since Helen, who knew Tsafendas better, was not asked to testify.

TSAFENDAS'S EATING HABITS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Can you tell us anything about his eating habits?

P. DANIELS: Yes. There is a very incident that will go down with me in all my life. This was the day of the morning when Tsafendas left us. It was round about 7 o'clock the morning when this knock came at our door. My wife and myself got up. As a matter of fact, she got up before me. And here was Tsafendas with a parcel under his arm, a parcel of meat, eggs and some other victuals, and blood dripping down his coat. He was unconcerned about that. The next thing he was looking for a stove and a pan. The wife handed it over to him, showed him the stove, gave him the pan. He started, without washing this meat that he had - just gave it a shake, and into the pan it went. And before it was even done, Tsafendas got a plate from the wife and settled down to this big meal. We surmised it was approximately two to three pounds of T-bone steak. On this particular morning I can well remember

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was it just meat, or what else did he have?

P. DANIELS: There were meat and eggs and tomatoes and onions. It was all in one dish. And then Tsafendas settled down to this great plate of meat, and I was sitting next to the table, looking at the man, and as he dug into it, I could hear him chewing away.

JUDGE BEYERS: What did you expect him to do except chew at his T-bone steak? Did you expect him to swallow it whole?

⁴⁸⁷⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Patrick O'Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

P. DANIELS: The way he settled down to it - he settled down to it like a dog.

JUDGE BEYERS: He really enjoyed this T-bone steak?

P. DANIELS: He really and thoroughly settled down to this meat. (Laughter.)

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You say he settled down to it like a dog?

P. DANIELS: Really and truly getting his teeth into it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Had you seen a human being behave like this before?

P. DANIELS: Not in all my life.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he eat it - with a knife and fork?

P. DANIELS: He first started off with knife and fork, after he was finished he dugged in, two hands and all. And he was dirty as far as of the mouth here (indicates down outer edges) and then he told me personally - my wife was present - "Pete", he told me, "I am making a pig of myself", and I told him I could see it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did he say, why was he eating this?

P. DANIELS: He said he had to feed the worms.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How many could have fed off this food that he consumed in this way?

P. DANIELS: Easy two people.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: On any other occasion did he bring food?

P. DANIELS: There was an occasion in my dad's house. I saw the half a sheep that Tsafendas brought in there, and I believe the family said that on this day also blood was dripping from the meat on to his clothes, which he was unconcerned about. There was another occasion when he came with approximately half a cheese and a full liver poloney. And all these things were queer to the family, because we are not accustomed to things like that.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S EATING HABITS

Peter Daniels claimed that Tsafendas had messy eating ways and that he ate a lot. This is something that several witnesses told the police, including his sister, but no one found

anything sinister about that, including Helen Daniels, who said, “besides his messy ways I did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal.” Many people can eat sloppily and consume enough for two without being insane. Actor Marlon Brando and actor-writer-director Orson Welles famously ate hugely and messily. They were not mad.

What Peter Daniels did not mention about the morning that Tsafendas arrived in their house at seven o'clock, and subsequently cooked and ate such a big meal, was that Tsafendas had just come back from his night shift and therefore this was his dinner and not his breakfast. Naturally, when he worked on the night shift, he always used to eat his dinner after he finished work, which was very early in the morning; then he would go to sleep. He did exactly the same thing when he was at the O'Ryans' house, the Poggenpoels' and elsewhere. None of them thought it an act of madness or anything strange.⁴⁸⁸⁰ When was he supposed to eat his dinner, when he was working from six in the afternoon until six in the morning? People tend to eat after they finish work, no matter what time it is.

Daniels also fails to explain adequately is that Tsafendas also brought food for the whole family, something his family was not accustomed to. Neither was the O'Ryan family when Tsafendas lived there but they saw it differently. Reuben O'Ryan told the author: “He was the answer to our prayers. We were poor and he brought food to our house.”⁴⁸⁸¹ That Tsafendas did not wash his meat did not point to a lack of hygiene. The UK Food Standards Agency states that “washing raw meat is not recommended. Bacteria in raw meat and poultry juices can be spread to other foods, utensils, and surfaces.”⁴⁸⁸² Tsafendas probably knew that, but even if he did not, many people do not wash meat because, they believe all the bacteria dies in the cooking. Whatever the reason for not washing a chicken before you cook it, it certainly cannot be taken as a sign of insanity.

The strangest line in Daniels's testimony is his reference to “worms,” not to a “worm,” but to “worms,” plural. The five psychiatrists, one district surgeon, one specialist physician and two psychologists who testified at the summary trial all said Tsafendas told them about a worm, one worm not many worms. The author is not in position to know why Daniels said worms and not worm. It could have been a slip of the tongue, or Daniels

⁴⁸⁸⁰ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013; Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁴⁸⁸¹ Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁴⁸⁸² UK Food Standards Agency, 2014, 'Don't wash raw chicken.'

misheard Tsafendas, or Tsafendas misspoke saying worms when he meant worm, or Daniels mention the word in order to support the defence's line, as Patrick O'Ryan would do. It is possible, though highly unlikely, that Tsafendas mentioned "worms" to Peter Daniels but not to the other members of the family.

It is also possible that Peter Daniels might have heard about the tapeworm at Patrick O'Ryan's house, when Tsafendas joked with him as he had done with Louisa O'Ryan. A further possibility exists, that Patrick O'Ryan asked Daniels, who was a good friend, to mention the word in court in the same way that he was urged to do by Advocate Cooper. It is also equally possible that Advocate Cooper himself asked Daniels to refer to it in his testimony, as he had the O'Ryan's to do. Tsafendas often made play of the tapeworm with the O'Ryan children, demonstrating what happened when it became hungry, and as we have seen, he staged such a performance once after a prayer gathering,⁴⁸⁸³ when the Daniels must have been present.

TSAFENDAS'S INTEREST IN WOMEN

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you know if he was interested in any woman while he was staying with you?

P. DANIELS: Yes. Not with us, but we learned afterwards that he was.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he discuss his matrimonial problems with you?

P. DANIELS: Not with me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: He is not married, is he?

P. DANIELS: He is not married.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S INTEREST IN WOMEN

Again, Peter Daniels does not mention anything regarding his sister's proposition to Tsafendas regarding marriage. He must surely have known about his sister writing letters to

⁴⁸⁸³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Tsafendas, who then arrived at the Daniels house specifically to meet her. Daniels's parents naturally knew about it.

TSAFENDAS'S RACIAL PREFERENCES

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Whose company did he prefer, Coloured or white, while he was staying with you?

P. DANIELS: He preferred to be amongst the Coloured community.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was there any discussion about the identification card?

P. DANIELS: Yes. He said he would like to be among the Coloured community, make himself a Coloured man, so that he can easily be accepted, because he said he was really never accepted among the white folk, and for that reason he make application to be made a European, but that was refused him, and afterwards he told ...

JUDGE BEYERS: You mean to be declared a non-European?

P. DANIELS: A non-European.

JUDGE BEYERS: To be declared a Coloured man?

P. DANIELS: He preferred to be a non-European. But that was refused, because it was told him that there are more privileges on the other side.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S RACIAL PREFERENCES

Peter Daniels here directly contradicts the conclusion Dr. Cooper arrived at after examining Tsafendas, that he was "unsympathetic towards the Coloureds and the Natives." If he was unsympathetic towards the Coloureds and the Natives, he would hardly have preferred to live with them and even apply for reclassification as Coloured.

TSAFENDAS'S INTENTION TO START A BUSINESS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: He was unemployed. Did he ever discuss with you starting any businesses or anything like that?

P. DANIELS: Yes. He discussed with me of putting up such a tremendous business where all could have - in other words, what can I term this - do-it-yourself workshop, where people can come to him and they can either fix their cars or make their furniture or do anything, and make it your own shop. He had that in mind. And the next thing he would tell us he is going away. That to me was very strange, that a man talking about settling down in a place and the very next moment talk about going away. That also proves to me that this man was not altogether.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S INTENTION TO START A BUSINESS

The fact that Tsafendas suddenly changed his mind about starting a business suggested to Peter Daniels that Tsafendas "was not altogether." There are many reasons why Tsafendas may have considered such a move then changed his mind. He may have thought things might work out between him and Helen and that a do-it-yourself workshop would support them in married life. Perhaps he decided that it would not work with Helen and it was best to put the episode behind him. He could then hardly stay on in the Daniels household when no relationship eventuated with Helen. What seems most plausible is that Daniels was aware of all this and was just trying to find support for the notion that Tsafendas "was not altogether."

P. DANIELS'S OVERALL IMPRESSION OF TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What then is your overall impression that you have of Tsafendas?

P. DANIELS: Well, my own words at one time were "This man is mad."

JUDGE BEYERS: I am interested. When did you have occasion to say this, and why?

P. DANIELS: Because this man, the accused, would talk about doing a business, doing something, and never really getting to the actual thing. He would even start making a thing. I can remember at one instance he was very zealous in doing something for us - he even had the thing - and he just left it and never touched it again.

JUDGE BEYERS: When you used the words to yourself - did you say it to somebody or did you say it to yourself?

P. DANIELS: I said that to my brothers.

JUDGE BEYERS: “This man is mad”?

P. DANIELS: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: I am very interested. The reactions of the ordinary man may be very helpful. Did you mean mad in the sense of queer, off his rocker, or did you mean something else?

P. DANIELS: I meant that he was half off his rocker. He wasn't altogether there, because a man in his full and true senses would never discuss nor would he have done the things which the accused has done.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How was his flow of speech?

P. DANIELS: He used to speak in a manner - he would speak a few words, then break off, and then continue with some other subject rather than the one he was talking about at the first.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In conversation, would Tsafendas stick to the point?

P. DANIELS: No. He would often wander from what he would say and he would oftentimes have ended up with, before he would finish a verse, “You know, Pete”, or “You know.” He used to get a blank spot in his mind. That was very often.

COMMENTS ON P. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY REGARDING HIS OVERALL IMPRESSION OF TSAFENDAS

Peter Daniels concluded that Tsafendas was mad because a “man in his full and true senses would never discuss nor would he have done the things” which Tsafendas did. However, from he has said, none of the things he mentions are things that a sane man would not do. That he kept his hat on in the house, had bad table manners and suddenly changed his mind about something do not suggest that he was insane.

Daniels also fails to explain what the “thing” was that Tsafendas was going to make for them, and neither the judge, the Attorney-General nor his own advocate asked him to clarify it. At the same time, Helen Daniels, who knew Tsafendas better than he did, flatly contradicted his view of Tsafendas's sanity, saying that “besides his messy ways, I did not

notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal. His stories about travelling abroad was interesting.”⁴⁸⁸⁴

Regarding Tsafendas's flow of speech and the blank spots, this seems to be something that only Peter Daniels noticed. None of the two hundred people questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry mentioned anything like that. On the contrary, several people were impressed by the way Tsafendas talked:

- Gillian Claire Lieberman, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation, whose office Tsafendas often visited, “I had various discussions with him. I got quite interested in him as an individual. ... I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation.”⁴⁸⁸⁵
- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁴⁸⁸⁶
- J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”⁴⁸⁸⁷
- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike's Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966, frequently driving him to the tanker *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town. Of Tsafendas, he told the police that he “never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers.”⁴⁸⁸⁸
- Patrick O’Ryan said “he was well-spoken and had good vocabulary.”⁴⁸⁸⁹
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria in 1964. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except

⁴⁸⁸⁴ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴⁸⁸⁵ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁸⁶ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁸⁷ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

⁴⁸⁸⁸ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁴⁸⁸⁹ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁴⁸⁹⁰

- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban appointed Tsafendas as a Portuguese and Greek interpreter. Rudolph used him “on several occasions” in a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He testified that “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁴⁸⁹¹
- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas’s landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry that Tsafendas “... was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman.”⁴⁸⁹²
- Johannes Aurets, Tsafendas’s supervisor at the South African Railways, told the police Tsafendas “was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature. During the time he was employed under my supervision, i.e. for approximately three weeks, I did not see him being cross at any time. He was a good worker.”⁴⁸⁹³
- Helen Grispos grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and her mother was Tsafendas’s step-mother best friend there described him to the police as “well-mannered and intelligent.”⁴⁸⁹⁴
- Lt. Col. P.J.B. van Wyk of the South African police interviewed several people in Rhodesia and in Mozambique, including in Beira and Lourenço Marques, who knew Tsafendas. He stated in his report that Tsafendas, “for all purposes, can be seen as a normal, intelligent person.”⁴⁸⁹⁵
- Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira “was often in the company of the

⁴⁸⁹⁰ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁸⁹¹ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁹² Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁴⁸⁹³ Johannes Jaonus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁸⁹⁴ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁸⁹⁵ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

subject and others had several conversations with him.” He considered Tsafendas to be “a normal and very intelligent person.”⁴⁸⁹⁶

None of the forty-four witnesses interviewed by the author also mentioned anything like that. Two priests who met and talked with Tsafendas in prison and in hospital in the 1980s and the 1990s and who spent hundreds of hours with him are positive that he did not suffer from thought blocking, that he did not talk in a disjointed manner and that he was able to participate perfectly in a conversation with others.

Father Michalis Visvinis, who visited Tsafendas in prison very regularly for five years (1989-1994), and spent several hours talking with him, strongly denied to the author that there was anything wrong with the way Tsafendas spoke. He told the author:

“No, no, this is not true; he did not talk like this [in a disjointed manner]. He never spoke like this with me, his speech was always absolutely fine. I felt that he [Tsafendas] needed to speak, so several times I would just let him speak. He enjoyed speaking and he could speak for hours. He always spoke like a normal man. [His speech] was perfectly articulate and logical, always very coherent. He never said anything to suggest he had a mental problem or that he had any difficulty speaking or thinking and expressing himself properly. This comment is entirely false.”⁴⁸⁹⁷

Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis told the author:

“[Tsafendas] could speak for hours, telling you things about his life, his thoughts and his ideology, but he could also participate in a dialogue. We spoke for hours about politics, religion and history and he was one of the most knowledgeable people I ever met in all these subjects. He was very argumentative and insistent, especially about politics. He never got lost in the conversation and he would never drop a subject until I had agreed with him. He would never give up a conversation if you disagreed. He never, not even once, seemed to have difficulty expressing himself or talked incoherently. Every single time, everything he said made sense and was perfectly stated. I don't believe for a moment that he could have talked in the way described by the psychiatrists unless he did it deliberately. He spoke and argued even better than most people. His speech and thought were perfectly fine.”⁴⁸⁹⁸

⁴⁸⁹⁶ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁴⁸⁹⁷ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁴⁸⁹⁸ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Mary Eendracht, his first cousin, who grew up with him in Egypt and Mozambique and was constantly with him for nine months in 1963-1964, said “Dimitri always spoke very well. He sounded like a very educated man. There was nothing wrong with his speech or his thoughts, both were excellent. He could argue with you for hours and hours about politics. He was very good with words and his brain was bigger than most people’s.”⁴⁸⁹⁹

Alexander Moumbaris spoke to Tsafendas for at least one hour every day for about three months in 1972 in Pretoria Prison. He flatly denied to the author that there was anything wrong with the way Tsafendas spoke. He told the author: “No, this is not true. He was not talking in a disjointed manner. I never heard him talking like this, neither in 1972 nor in 1996. He always spoke absolutely fine.”⁴⁹⁰⁰

One of the strongest comments comes from Gavasiadis, who was with him every day for nine months in 1964. She said about Tsafendas:

“Dimitris could buy and sell you and he could do that at any time during a conversation, in the first ten minutes, then again after thirty minutes or an hour and then again after two hours. He wouldn’t let you get up from the chair until he had made you agree with what he was saying, especially when talking politics ... He was very convincing and persuasive - he could turn black into white. If you disagreed with something with him, he would find a way to convince you that he is right and that you are wrong - even if you *know* that you are right and that he is wrong. If he made a mistake about something, he would turn things upside-down and at the end, he would even make you apologise to him...

In those nine months, I saw him and spoke to him every day and not even once did he appear to have an issue with his speech or his thoughts. He was always the same. We spent hours and hours talking and his speech was never incoherent, disjointed, blocked or whatever else, it was always perfect. He never gave me even the slightest indication that he might be having the issues you mentioned.”⁴⁹⁰¹

Gavasiadis was not the only one impressed by the way Tsafendas spoke. None of the crewmen from the *Eleni* ever got the impression that Tsafendas’s speech was disjointed. In fact, they were impressed by the way he spoke.⁴⁹⁰² The seamen called him “Professor”

⁴⁸⁹⁹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁹⁰⁰ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

⁴⁹⁰¹ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁴⁹⁰² Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016; Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17

because of his knowledge and mode of speech.⁴⁹⁰³ “We were all wondering how come he knew all these things. How could he be talking like this? He talked like a university professor”, said Nikolaos Billis, one of the crew.⁴⁹⁰⁴ Another crew member, Michalis Vasilakis, said, “I can’t explain it, but I remember he had a very specific way of talking, using not very common, but absolutely correct words. He knew how to speak and how to pick up words. He was talking like a professor; this is what we used to say between us and what we called him ... He was a very knowledgeable man. No, his speech was definitely not disjointed, it was excellent.”⁴⁹⁰⁵

In addition, Tsafendas worked in 1961 for six months as a teacher at the best private language college in Istanbul, the Limasollu Naci. He worked initially on trial basis where he was under observation for a week before he was appointed permanently. Obviously he successfully passed this stage as he remained as a teacher in the college for about six months. Mrs. Adviye Vedia Limasollu, wife of Limasollu Naci, the proprietor, does not remember Tsafendas, but is positive that her husband would never have appointed or retained a teacher who talked in a disjointed manner.⁴⁹⁰⁶ In fact, Mr. Naci became a very good friend of Tsafendas and spent a lot of time with him during these six months.⁴⁹⁰⁷

For reasons of space, the study will list only a few of the witnesses who were interviewed by the author and stated that there was nothing wrong with Tsafendas’s speech:

- His half-sister Katerina Pnefma;⁴⁹⁰⁸
- Father Nikola Banovic who lived with him at the same house for four months in 1961 and then lived right next to his house for another three;⁴⁹⁰⁹
- His first cousin Mary Eendracht, who grew up with him and was constantly with him for nine months in 1964;⁴⁹¹⁰

January 2014; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁴⁹⁰³ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁴⁹⁰⁴ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

⁴⁹⁰⁵ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁴⁹⁰⁶ Adviye Vedia Limasollu in a personal interview, 8 January 2016.

⁴⁹⁰⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 4 November 2015.

⁴⁹⁰⁸ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁴⁹⁰⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴⁹¹⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

- Ira Kyriakakis, who also grew up with him and spent a lot of time together in 1964 and 1965;⁴⁹¹¹
- Andreas Babiolakis, who knew him since they were children, who lived with him for two months in 1964 and associated with him for about a year then;⁴⁹¹²
- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott's boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest;⁴⁹¹³
- Irene Michaletos, who was close to him for more than a year (1964-1965) and whose house he often visited;⁴⁹¹⁴
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins, who first met him in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him well between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique.⁴⁹¹⁵
- Costas Poriassis who met him in 1965 in Beira;⁴⁹¹⁶
- Alexandra Vaporidis, who knew him for about six months in Istanbul in 1961;⁴⁹¹⁷
- Nick Papadakis, who lived under the same roof for two months and associated with him for another two months in Mozambique in 1964;⁴⁹¹⁸
- George Liberopoulos met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and associated with him for a few weeks.⁴⁹¹⁹
- Panagiotis Peroglou and Costas Chagios who were Tsafendas's friends in Cape Town for more than a year.⁴⁹²⁰

Finally, in July 1966, only a few weeks, after he was examined by Dr. Kossew, Tsafendas gave a seventy-five-minute interview to a journalist named N.D. Hartford on the *Cape Argus*. They had met earlier in the year when Tsafendas enquired whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as an “anti-

⁴⁹¹¹ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴⁹¹² Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴⁹¹³ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴⁹¹⁴ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁹¹⁵ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁹¹⁶ Costas Poriassis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁴⁹¹⁷ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁴⁹¹⁸ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁴⁹¹⁹ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

⁴⁹²⁰ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015; Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship.”⁴⁹²¹ Hartford’s impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective and stated that Tsafendas spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation.⁴⁹²²

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: The accused came from Durban, not so?

P. DANIELS: The accused told me he came from Durban by way of hitchhiking and by train from Port Elizabeth

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he come alone?

P. DANIELS: He came all alone.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I believe he had four suitcases with him?

P. DANIELS: Not four.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How many?

P. DANIELS: I can remember him having one or two suitcases. He had with him a bundle of dirty washing and he had a bundle of tools with him. His welding kit he had with him,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you ever see him use the tools?

P. DANIELS: I never saw him use the tools.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Just give us the date again when he arrived at your home?

P. DANIELS: He arrived approximately Saturday midday, the 28th of August, 1965.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: It was not the 10th of July?

P. DANIELS: It was not on the 10th of July.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: The 28th August?

P. DANIELS: The 28th August, 1965.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And he lived in your house until the 16th of October?

P. DANIELS: October.

⁴⁹²¹ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, 'Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.'

⁴⁹²² Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And did I understand correctly that he never paid for board and lodging?

P. DANIELS: Not while he was not working. But when he started to work my dad spoke to him, and then he contributed something towards the house, towards the family.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Were you satisfied with his contribution?

P. DANIELS: My dad was.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: For how long was he out of employment?

JUDGE BEYERS: Three weeks, the witness said.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he receive letters while he lived with you?

P. DANIELS: Yes. He received letters from - I think from Greece, this man John Micheletos,⁴⁹²³ whom he knew so well, and from other correspondents which I don't know.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What was his address in Greece, do you know? Was it Athens?

P. DANIELS: I would not know what his address was.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You don't know whether he lived in Athens?

P. DANIELS: That I can't say, whether he was in Athens.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused also write letters?

P. DANIELS: He used to write letters himself.

COMMENTS ON THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S CROSS-EXAMINATION

Van den Berg's cross-examination of Peter Daniels sheds no new light on the case and does not attempt to challenge his testimony in the slightest. It demonstrates either his incompetence or ignorance of the information gathered by the police and therefore his inability seriously to challenge Daniels's testimony. One cannot help but wonder what was the purpose of this cross-examination and line of questioning. None of the points Daniels made was challenged. Instead, the Attorney-General asked about statements Daniels had already made, a point which the Court highlighted, or asked him irrelevant or unimportant

⁴⁹²³ This John Michaletos, Tsafendas's childhood friend who recruited him to the Democratic Army (DSE) during the Greek Civil War and spent the Christmas 1961 in his house in Athens.

questions such as how many suitcases Tsafendas had, whether he used his welding kit and if he received and wrote letters. Daniels twice said that Tsafendas arrived on August 28, 1965, but the Attorney-General still asked if it was July 10. What was the purpose of this question? Helen Daniels had testified to the police that Tsafendas arrived on August 28, 1965. Van den Berg did not suggest that August 28 might have been the wrong date, so why press this? Even if the date was wrong and Tsafendas had stayed for a longer or shorter period with the family, what difference would that have made to the case?

What highlights the pointlessness of this cross-examination is that the Attorney-General could easily have broken it down by using Helen Daniels's testimony to the police on September 15, 1966. Not only did she not mention any of the things which Peter Daniels mentioned, but she stated clearly that Tsafendas's behaviour was normal and that she had not "noticed anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal."⁴⁹²⁴ Nothing at all would have changed in Peter Daniels's testimony if the cross-examination had not taken place, and it would have saved everyone some time.

TSAFENDAS AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DANIELS FAMILY

Peter Daniels and his family were not happy with Tsafendas, primarily because of his failure to form a relationship with Helen Daniels with a view to marriage. Helen had initiated the contact, stating frankly that she wanted to marry him. His first response, she said, was that "he wanted to meet me first before giving me a positive answer." When he did meet her, he clearly decided that he did not want to marry her. As she said in her statement to the police, "He also did not try to establish a relationship with me ... and he never discussed our relationship, thus I was happy that my earlier proposal died a silent death."⁴⁹²⁵

Tsafendas appears to be logical and calculating in this business. He was careful to meet Helen Daniels in the flesh before deciding whether or not to marry her; deciding he did not wish to do so, he made no effort to establish a relationship with her. This seems perfectly sensible behaviour, perhaps beyond the reach a man who was "not altogether there." Nevertheless, Tsafendas always spoke well of Helen Daniels and her family and never made

⁴⁹²⁴ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴⁹²⁵ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

reference to the marriage issue. He was grateful to them and in later years acknowledged the part he believed they played in saving his life by exaggerating the stories about him.

CONCLUSION

There are three major points:

- Daniels conceals the fact that his sister pursued Tsafendas, writing to him and asking him to meet and marry her.
- Daniels claims that Tsafendas is mad because of some things he said and did, although all of these things could have been done by any normal man.
- The Attorney-General could have easily challenged, indeed broken down, Daniels's testimony, just by using the statement his sister gave to the police, but he did not do it.

Peter Daniels omitted from his testimony the fact that his sister wrote five letters to Tsafendas, including one with her picture, asking him to meet and marry. It was not the first time he had lied. In two interviews with the *Post* and the *Sunday Times* on September 18, 1966, he claimed that it was Tsafendas who pursued his sister, writing to her several times and that their meeting "did not result in a great friendship... Helen was not interested in marriage."⁴⁹²⁶ It is understandable that Daniels tried to protect his sister from the inevitable negative reaction had it become known that she wrote letters to the man who assassinated the country's Prime Minister, asking him to meet and marry her.

However, there are wider implications as to the way Tsafendas is portrayed, since Daniels offers a picture of a homeless person who practically forced himself on the family or was offered bed and board for humanitarian reasons or because he was a fellow member of their Church. If Tsafendas was mad or even strange, Helen Daniels's friends would not have told her about him with the suggestion that she should meet him and marry him. Helen was a minister in their Church and her friends were also very religious and their view was that Tsafendas would be a good and suitable husband, indicating how highly they thought of him.

Some of the strange things Peter Daniels imputed to Tsafendas turned out not to be strange at all. The perfect example concerned Tsafendas spraying the family chickens with

⁴⁹²⁶ *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 18: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed'; *The Post*, 18 September 1966: 1, 'I jilted Tsafendas, says Coloured girl.'

water to cool them in hot weather. Daniels believed Tsafendas was insane for doing so and Judge Beyers had to explain to him that this was a necessary procedure sometimes to save the birds' lives and that he personally did that, too.

That Tsafendas's actions during his stay with the Daniels family were perfectly normal is supported by Helen Daniels, who lived in the same house at the same time and later told the police that she had not "noticed anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal. His stories about travelling abroad was interesting."⁴⁹²⁷ If she thought Tsafendas was acting as a mad person, she would have told the police. What is more, she lived under the same roof as Tsafendas, which her brother did not.

What is most likely is that Daniels himself did not believe that the things Tsafendas said and did were crazy, and he was merely supporting the defence's line to get Tsafendas "free." Patrick O'Ryan and Louisa O'Ryan said they were asked by advocate Cooper to exaggerate some stories about Tsafendas and to "make sure to mention the tapeworm." The Daniels family, close friends of the O'Ryan, may well have been asked to do the same by Advocate Cooper. The fact that Helen Daniels, who knew Tsafendas better than her brother and played a more important role in his life, was not asked by the defence to testify while her brother and his wife were, also suggests that the defence's aim, and rightly so, was not to find someone who knew Tsafendas well, but someone who could support their line of argument.

Although Helen Daniels was not a suitable witness for the defence, she surely was for the State. She had lived in the same house as Tsafendas for about fifty days, she had corresponded with him and she had asked him to marry her. In addition to this, she had testified to the police that Tsafendas was perfectly sane, a complete contradiction to her brother's testimony. The Attorney-General should have been aware of her statement and he could have easily used it to challenge her brother's testimony. He could even have asked her to testify as a witness for the prosecution to challenge the defence's line that Tsafendas was insane. However, not for the first time, evidence that could have challenged or broken down the case for insanity was not used.

It is important to remember here that Attorney-General van den Berg had made a mistake regarding the reclassification issue in his memorandum about Tsafendas on October 3, 1966, making it obvious that he was not, even then, in possession of Helen Daniels's

⁴⁹²⁷ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

statement. It seems more likely that van den Berg was never in possession of her statement rather than choosing not to use it to challenge Peter Daniels's testimony. Despite the fact that none of the things mentioned by Peter Daniels could really be considered as actions of an insane man, Judge Beyers, as we will see in his final verdict, found it as very convincing as to the fact that Tsafendas was mad.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 5: MERLE DANIELS⁴⁹²⁸

EXTRACTS FROM MERLE DANIELS'S TESTIMONY⁴⁹²⁹

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The man before Court here, Demitrio Tsafendas, when did you see him for the first time?

M. DANIELS: The first time I saw him was on the 28th August.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Of which year?

M. DANIELS: 1965.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where did you see him?

M. DANIELS: I saw him in my mother-in-law's home.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you see much of him, did you talk often to him?

M. DANIELS: Well, in his free time he used to come in there, you know, and speak to us a little, about his travels.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was he also a member of your religious persuasion?

M. DANIELS: Yes, well, we accepted him as a brother of our faith, that is how we took him in.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you expect him to pay for his lodgings when he arrived at your home?

M. DANIELS: When he first came there he wasn't working, so my father-in-law did not expect anything from him until he started to work.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When he arrived there, what impression did he make on you?

M. DANIELS: Well, he seemed to be a strange person. I mean, he was shabbily dressed, and to me he seemed strange the first day I saw him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: His shabby dress, did that make/him strange? Anything else?

M. DANIELS: No, well, just because of the way he was dressed and he started speaking to

⁴⁹²⁸ Merle Daniels is the wife of Peter Daniels and sister-in-law of Helen Daniels.

⁴⁹²⁹ Marle Daniels's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

us of the different preachers he had met all over the world from the same faith.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Were there any strange incidents that you can remember in connection with the accused?

M. DANIELS: Yes. I can very well remember one afternoon. This particular day he had gone out to look for work, and this particular afternoon when he came home - it was about mid-afternoon - and I asked him to come over and have a cup of tea with us, because my mother and aunt had visited me that day, and I asked him to come and have tea with us this day. He said that he would, he was first going to take his coat off as it was a hot day and he had his big overcoat with him. And he went next-door, but before he left I asked him to tell us a little about his travels and where he has been all over the world, and he said that he would come and tell my mom and aunt a little about it. He went next-door and he came back and he brought his bible along with him, which seemed such a strange thing, because I had asked him to speak about his travels. I spoke to him at the table and I said: "Well, Demitrio, tell us a little about your travels", and he looked at me but he was unconcerned about the question I had asked him, and he was reading about the experiences of Paul and relating it, telling me a bit about the life of Paul. He said that his own life, when he examined himself, he felt that he came so far short when he thought of the life of Paul. And after that he just left. He asked us to excuse him and he went home, still with his bible under his arm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: On this occasion, after he started talking about Paul, did you try to bring him back to talking about his travels?

M. DANIELS: Yes. I said to him: "Well, Demitrio, tell us a bit about your travels. That is the purpose-that I asked you", and he wasn't concerned about the question that I had asked him. He was just reading his bible and speaking about the travels of Paul.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Can you think of any other incidents?

M. DANIELS: Well, there was a time in my mother-in-law's home that he would lie on the bed with his boots on, on her clean quilt, and he would not think of removing them before he would go and lie down.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I don't want to go into the other incidents that the Court knows of, but what is your overall impression of this man, Demitrio Tsafendas?

M. DANIELS: Well, I often said, we even said amongst ourselves, surely Demitrio is not all there; by the things that he did and the strange way that he acted sometimes we felt that he

wasn't all there.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S ASSISTANT

BRUNETTE: Was he a bit eccentric?

M. DANIELS: Could you explain that word to me?

BRUNETTE: Well, I mean he did strange things here and there, but it wasn't anything in particular.

JUDGE BEYERS: It was something particular. He spoke about St. Paul when he should have been speaking about himself, and he lay with dirty boots on the clean coverlet. That is what I have got at the moment - particulars.

BRUNETTE: When you asked him to come and tell about his travels, could he perhaps have misunderstood you?

M. DANIELS: No, I don't think he could, because I spoke to him quite a few times. I said to him "Demitrio, tell us about your travels" and he looked at me and said "Yes, Merle", but he wasn't concerned about the question of us asking him.

BRUNETTE: Did he perhaps read to you about the travels of Paul?

M. DANIELS: That is right. He sat at table with his Bible and just pushed the cake plate aside and he started telling us about the travels of Paul.

BRUNETTE: Did he pay to stay with you, or what was the arrangement?

M. DANIELS: He did not stay with me.

BRUNETTE: With your father? Do you know?

M. DANIELS: Well, after the first few weeks he did not work and my father did not expect him to pay anything, but when he started work my father-in-law spoke to him and asked him if he would contribute something towards the family, towards the home.

BRUNETTE: Was he willing to do that?

M. DANIELS: Yes, he was.

BRUNETTE: Do you know whether he paid after that? Did he pay for any boarding or lodging after that?

M. DANIELS: While he stayed in my father-in-law's house?

BRUNETTE: Yes?

M. DANIELS: Yes, well, he did. After my father-in-law spoke to him he did pay, because then he worked.

BRUNETTE: Are you perhaps worried that a member of your Church is in trouble?

M. DANIELS: Well, when we heard about it we were shocked. We were upset about it, and in a way felt sorry that he could have done such a thing.

BRUNETTE: Is it worrying you?

M. DANIELS: It has to a certain extent. I mean, we accepted him as a brother of the Faith and it is not of us people to do any violence of that sort.

BRUNETTE: Did you ever have anything to do with his washing?

M. DANIELS: Well, the first day he came there he asked me to wash shirts for him for the meeting of the Sunday, and I said I would, but then he came with a big bundle of washing, dirty washing, which I did do for him the first day. But after that he stayed with my mother-in-law, so she did the rest of his washing. But the first day I did his washing.

BRUNETTE: So as far as you know he generally had his clothes washed, and he wore clean clothes?

M. DANIELS: Yes, well, my mother-in-law kept him clean. I mean, she did his washing and ironing for him.

BRUNETTE: Would you like to protect the name of your Church in this matter?

M. DANIELS: Yes, well, I would.

COMMENTS ON M. DANIELS'S TESTIMONY

Before we analyse this testimony, we should consider the issue of Tsafendas's clothes. Helen Daniels testified to the police that Tsafendas was wearing dirty clothes when she first saw him and he had dirty laundry with him. According to Merle Daniels, the day Tsafendas arrived at their house, he immediately asked her to wash his clothes, which suggests that he was aware of their condition and was not habitually a dirty person.

As with Peter Daniels's testimony, there is nothing in Merle's statements to indicate

that Tsafendas was schizophrenic. The word eccentric is unknown to her and the incidents she describes as “strange” are things that any normal man might do. Albert Einstein had several habits which could be described as “strange” by some people, for example playing as an adult with a toy telescope, wearing shoes with holes and having his wife cut his hair because he was parsimonious. He was also absent-minded, often forgetting his own address.⁴⁹³⁰ Einstein was not mad, but if Merle Daniels had come across him, it is very likely that she would have also considered him very strange and perhaps “not all there.”

TSAFENDAS WAS “STRANGE” BECAUSE OF THE WAY HE WAS DRESSED

One of the reasons Tsafendas seemed strange to Merle Daniels was the way he dressed – “shabbily,” she said. None of some two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry thought Tsafendas was strange because of how he dressed. The only person among those interviewed who found Tsafendas’s style of dressing to be “different” was Gillian Claire Lieberman, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation, whose office Tsafendas often visited. “I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange type of person, a unique character. I got the impression that he was physically different in dress and appearance. He was a big man, with a particularly striking big hat, stainless steel teeth, sloppy dirty clothing.”⁴⁹³¹ Still, she found him “different,” not mad. Tsafendas never had much money, so dressing for fashion might not have been a priority. Nonetheless, several witnesses referred to his frequent purchases of stylish headwear.

In addition, several testified that Tsafendas was neatly dressed. For example:

- The report of Col. van Wyk from Rhodesia and Mozambique which contained interviews with people who Tsafendas in these two countries, stated that Tsafendas “was always neatly dressed.”⁴⁹³²
- Ian Boswell testified that Tsafendas was “at all times neatly dressed and never gave the

⁴⁹³⁰ Chilton (*The Telegraph*), 19 April 2016. ‘Albert Einstein: he really was an egghead.’

⁴⁹³¹ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁹³² Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

impression of being destitute.”⁴⁹³³

- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas's landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry that Tsafendas paid for a serviced room, “but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means.”⁴⁹³⁴
- Gideon Cloete, an employer at the Department of Labour testified that Tsafendas “was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance.”⁴⁹³⁵
- Jacobus Bornman testified that ‘according to my observation, Tsafendas was a gentle person. He was neat on his person, but his eating habits were not up to scratch.’⁴⁹³⁶
- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town interviewed Tsafendas twice. He testified to the police that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed” and he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”⁴⁹³⁷
- Redvers Quintin Wakfer who worked with Tsafendas at the Power Station in Cape Town testified that Tsafendas was ‘neatly dressed.’⁴⁹³⁸
- Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas ‘was well dressed and appeared to be wealthy.’⁴⁹³⁹
- Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, testified that Tsafendas ‘was well dressed and gave a good appearance although as far as she could see he had no visible means of support.’⁴⁹⁴⁰
She later also stated that Tsafendas was always very well dressed and never showed him

⁴⁹³³ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁴⁹³⁴ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁴⁹³⁵ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁴⁹³⁶ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁹³⁷ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁴⁹³⁸ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA; Redvers Quintin Wakfer statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub File: 1/5, Subject Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁴⁹³⁹ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁹⁴⁰ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

wearing dirty clothes except from when he was coming back from work.

- Sidney Wiehand, a senior messenger at the Assembly who was one of the three messengers who interviewed Tsafendas. He said that in order to be hired, he “must always be neat” and suggested that Tsafendas was like this.⁴⁹⁴¹
- Mary Scott was Tsafendas's landlady in Cape Town for two months in 1966. She told the police, “His clothing however was clean and always tidy.”⁴⁹⁴²
- Horst Hartmann, senior personnel officer at the Fries and Son in Frankfurt, where Tsafendas worked as a welder, said about him, “He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man...he made a good impression.”⁴⁹⁴³

Furthermore, none of the forty-four witnesses interviewed by the author said that Tsafendas had a dirty or neglected appearance. Two of them, Andreas Babiolakis and Costas Poriазis, said that they once saw Tsafendas looking neglected and wearing a torn shirt. However, that was on the day he was released from jail in Beira in February 1965. Having just spent several days in a prison cell, wearing the same clothes every day and being beaten up, he could hardly have appeared otherwise. Both witnesses said this was the only time they saw Tsafendas looking less than perfectly dressed.⁴⁹⁴⁴

In addition, all the witnesses remembers him as being always very well-dressed and that he looked like a gentleman. For example, the thirteen sailors of the *Eleni* tanker who spent forty-two days with him told the author that Tsafendas had a clean appearance and was always very well dressed. They were all surprised by the fact that he was so well-dressed while he seemed to be a poor man because of the job he was doing. Again, in order to not include everyone's statement about Tsafendas appearance, the study includes here the statements of people who knew him more:

⁴⁹⁴¹ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁴⁹⁴² Mary Kathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁴⁹⁴³ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin,’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

⁴⁹⁴⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

- Father Nikola Banovic lived at the same house with Tsafendas for four months in 1961 and for another two-three in one right next to his, practically seeing him again every day all this time. According to him, Tsafendas was a very clean person and was always very well dressed, each day wearing a different hat.⁴⁹⁴⁵
- Reuben O’Ryan, Patrick O’Ryan’s son. He lived with Tsafendas in the same house for five months and kept in touch with him for another year. Tsafendas had moved to his house immediately after he had left the Daniels’s house. He said Tsafendas “was always very clean and well-dressed, apart from when he was coming home from work. That was the only time I saw him wearing dirty clothes. He always wore nice clothes; he was a clean person and always shaved.”⁴⁹⁴⁶
- Stanley O’Ryan, another of Patrick O’Ryan’s sons also remembers Tsafendas being “neatly and nicely dressed” and a “clean person.”⁴⁹⁴⁷
- Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas first cousin, knew him since he was five years old and grew up together in Mozambique. She spent a lot of time with him within a year while he was in Pretoria in 1964, while he also lived at the same house as her for two-three months. She insists that Tsafendas was always well-dressed, very often wearing a hat and was a very clean person. “Since he was a child, he would never eat anything without washing his hands. Even when we were out playing, he would pump into the house to wash his hands before eating something. He was very fussy with clean hands when he was a child, and I think he was also like this when he grew up, but I can’t remember for sure.”⁴⁹⁴⁸
- Fotini Gavasiadis saw and talked to Tsafendas every day for a period of nine months. She told the author that “it is nonsense” that Tsafendas was not well-dressed or a dirty person and she is surprised from this comment. She maintains that he was always very well dressed and clean. “Sometimes it was taking him longer than it was taking me to get ready, trying to find the more suitable hat or tie. He adored hats and ties.”⁴⁹⁴⁹
- Ira Kyriakakis who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and remained a very good friend of his until his arrest believes that the statement that Tsafendas was not well-

⁴⁹⁴⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁴⁹⁴⁶ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁴⁹⁴⁷ Stanley O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 9 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁴⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁴⁹⁴⁹ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

dressed and clean is absolutely absurd. “He was always very well dressed; since he was a child. He used to wear hats he had bought from all over the world. He loved hats and he must have had tens of them. He came back to Lourenço Marques in the 1960s he brought me a hat for present from Lisbon.”⁴⁹⁵⁰

- Helen Grispos grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and her mother was Tsafendas's step-mother best friend there. “He was always very well dressed, even as a child; his step-mother always looked after him. When he visited us in the 1960s I remember he wore a big hat he said he had bought somewhere in Europe. I don't remember what he was wearing, but I remember the hat. It was very distinctive. He was certainly well-dressed.”⁴⁹⁵¹
- Joyce Dick, one of Helen Daniels's best friends at the time, stated to the author that whenever she saw Tsafendas, “he was always very neatly dressed.”⁴⁹⁵²
- Irene Michaletos met Tsafendas in 1964 in Beira and closely associated with him until 1965. She remembers Tsafendas being always well dressed and clean.⁴⁹⁵³
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins, first met him in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique. They both remember Tsafendas being “always well dressed and clean.”⁴⁹⁵⁴
- Andreas Babiolakis knew Tsafendas since childhood and lived with him in the same house in Beira for about two-three months. He remembers Tsafendas having a shower every morning, being very well dressed and with clean clothes.⁴⁹⁵⁵
- Costas Chagios, a Cape Town café owner, got to know Tsafendas on a friendly basis in 1965 when he walked into his restaurant. In the year up to his arrest in 1966, Tsafendas visited the restaurant more than fifty times. Chagios remembers Tsafendas being always well dressed and clean.⁴⁹⁵⁶
- Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for about six-seven months in Istanbul. She was

⁴⁹⁵⁰ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁴⁹⁵¹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁴⁹⁵² Joyce Dick in a personal interview, 6 August 2016.

⁴⁹⁵³ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁹⁵⁴ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁴⁹⁵⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁴⁹⁵⁶ Costas Hagios in a personal interview, 24 March 2015.

impressed with the many hats Tsafendas was wearing and remembers that a lot of people she knew were commenting about how neatly Tsafendas was dressed. "I remember him coming to the church always wearing a tie."⁴⁹⁵⁷

- Peter Protoulis was a supplier of foodstuffs to the tanker *Eleni*. He met Tsafendas on board and in the forty-two days that the vessel was docked in Cape Town and remembers him being always very well dressed.⁴⁹⁵⁸
- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott's boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest. He remembers Tsafendas being always well dressed and clean, often wearing suits, ties and hats.⁴⁹⁵⁹
- Peter Peroglou and his wife Pamela Abrahams were eating at the same place as Tsafendas for two-three months in 1966. They remember him being always very well dressed and very courteous.⁴⁹⁶⁰
- Nick Augustides is the son of the owner of Mike's Outfitters in Cape Town for whom Tsafendas worked on commission for about two months in 1966. He knew Tsafendas for three-four months and remembers him always being "a well-dressed man."⁴⁹⁶¹

Albert Einstein who was a little stingy with money wore old, worn clothes and even his shoes had holes in them and kept on wearing them even if they were no longer watertight. "He would wear them until it was no longer possible," said Herta Waldow, who was his live-in housekeeper for six years. The way he was dressed often suggested that he was a poor man.⁴⁹⁶² So, we could safely assume that if Merle Daniels had come across Einstein, she would have thought that he was "not all there."

TSAFENDAS WAS STRANGE BECAUSE HE TOLD THEM ABOUT THE PREACHERS OF THEIR FAITH HE HAD MET ALL OVER THE WORLD

Merle Daniels also testified that Tsafendas seemed strange to her because he told them about the preachers of their faith he had met all over the world. All the Daniels family were very

⁴⁹⁵⁷ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁴⁹⁵⁸ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 28 May 2016.

⁴⁹⁵⁹ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁶⁰ Pamela Abrahams and Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁴⁹⁶¹ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

⁴⁹⁶² Chilton (*The Telegraph*), 19 April 2016. 'Albert Einstein: he really was an egghead.'

religious and members of the same Christian sect as Tsafendas, therefore what could be strange about Tsafendas talking about the preachers he met? Helen Daniels was a preacher, therefore it seemed perfectly natural to mention others he met. She had also told the police that Tsafendas's "stories about traveling abroad were interesting."⁴⁹⁶³

TSAFENDAS WAS "STRANGE" BECAUSE ON ONE OCCASION HE DID NOT SPEAK TO THEM ABOUT HIS TRAVELS, BUT ABOUT SAINT PAUL'S TRAVELS

Another reason Tsafendas seemed strange to Merle was that when she asked him to talk about his travels, he insisted on speaking about the travels of Saint Paul, the Christian Evangelist. Helen Daniels testified to the police that Tsafendas's "stories about travelling abroad were interesting"⁴⁹⁶⁴ and several others said he spoke widely about his travels. The fact that on this occasion, he chose not to talk about them, hardly seems sufficient to characterise him as strange.

TSAFENDAS WAS STRANGE BECAUSE HE LAY ON THE BED WITH HIS BOOTS ON

Finally, according to Merle Daniels, Tsafendas was "not all there" because he lay on her mother-in-law's clean quilt with his boots on. This might argue that Tsafendas was inconsiderate and maybe even rude, but does it mean that he was mentally strange? He may have been exhausted after work or simply thoughtless. In the finale of Steven Spielberg's movie, "Bridge of Spies," which is based on fact, the leading character, played by Tom Hanks, stretches out on his clean bed with his shoes on. I doubt if any movie-goer thought that the Tom Hanks character was therefore "not all there."

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH AND TSAFENDAS

Merle Daniels admitted she wanted to protect the name of the Christian Church. Patrick O'Ryan⁴⁹⁶⁵ and Richard Poggenpoel⁴⁹⁶⁶ said the assassination brought embarrassment on the

⁴⁹⁶³ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴⁹⁶⁴ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁴⁹⁶⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁹⁶⁶ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013.

Church and several members tried to distance themselves and their Church from Tsafendas. As with most members of the Greek community, some from the Christian Church tried to portray Tsafendas as not one of them, in order to protect their reputation.

CONCLUSION

Merle Daniels, who makes no mention of the tapeworm, found Tsafendas to be “strange” and “not all there” because of how he acted and the way he dressed. However, the examples she gives are actions which any normal person could perform. She seems not to know about eccentricity (at least she needs the word explained to her) and that people may behave in ways unfamiliar to her.

We must also consider the possibility that she portrayed Tsafendas as strange in order to support the defence's insanity argument and save his life and that she did not really find all these things strange. Just as Patrick O’Ryan and his wife were asked by advocate Cooper to exaggerate some stories about Tsafendas, Merle and her husband, who were good friends of the O’Ryans, may have been asked to do the same. By any modern standards, Merle Daniels's testimony would never be accepted as proof that a man who acted as Tsafendas did was therefore out of his mind or, as she put it, “not all there.” Yet, extraordinarily, Judge Beyers would state in his verdict that her testimony was among those that convinced him Tsafendas was mad.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 6: PATRICK O'RYAN**INTRODUCTION**

Patrick O'Ryan was the key defence witness from among those who knew Tsafendas because he was able to speak at length about the tapeworm - testimony that was crucial for the defence line. Tsafendas considered O'Ryan to be his best friend and the nicest person he ever met.⁴⁹⁶⁷ He was a Coloured teacher and a member of the Christian Church sect. He first heard of Tsafendas from a minister of their sect who described Tsafendas as a "highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages."⁴⁹⁶⁸ When O'Ryan met Tsafendas he invited him to stay with his family in his home.⁴⁹⁶⁹ Tsafendas lodged there for five months, then visited regularly until his arrest.⁴⁹⁷⁰

Patrick O'Ryan formed a "deep liking"⁴⁹⁷¹ for Tsafendas, someone he saw as an "enlightened person."⁴⁹⁷² Tsafendas returned the affection and respect. Upon hearing of the assassination, the O'Ryan family, including the oldest children, were devastated since they had grown to know and love Tsafendas. There was much weeping in the family household, including by Patrick and his wife. Patrick was the most deeply affected and asked his wife and children to pray for Tsafendas. He also led prayers for him at many gatherings of the Christian Church, although not all the members were happy about this.⁴⁹⁷³

EXTRACTS FROM PATRICK O'RYAN'S TESTIMONY⁴⁹⁷⁴**P. O'RYAN'S MEETING WITH TSAFENDAS**

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How big is your family?

⁴⁹⁶⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁹⁶⁸ Patrick O' Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁴⁹⁶⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁴⁹⁷⁰ Patrick O' Ryan's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 7 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁷¹ Patrick O' Ryan's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁹⁷² Patrick O' Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁴⁹⁷³ Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁹⁷⁴ Patrick O' Ryan's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

P. O'RYAN: We are nine.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How big is your house?

P. O'RYAN: We have three bedrooms, a lounge, kitchen, bathroom, outroom, and a garage.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is your profession, your occupation?

P. O'RYAN: I teach.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What subjects do you teach?

P. O'RYAN: English and Art.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: For how many years have you been a teacher?

P. O'RYAN: Thirty years.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When did you meet Demitrio Tsafendas for the first time?

P. O'RYAN: The actual acquaintance that I made first was while in prayer at a conference. I heard...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where was this conference?

P. O'RYAN: This conference was held out at Durbanville.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What month, and in which year?

P. O'RYAN: It was towards the end of November 1965.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was this conference, this congress of? Which people?

P. O'RYAN: It was an assembly, a conference of delegates, Christian delegates I may call it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Were you present at that assembly?

P. O'RYAN: I was present.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And the accused, was he there?

P. O'RYAN: The accused was there.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Tell us - you say the first time that you saw him...?

P. O'RYAN: When I heard the accused praying, or rather repeating the Paternoster, I opened my eyes and looked to see who it was, because never had anything like that happened that an individual parroted a prayer.

JUDGE BEYERS: That he did what?

P. O'RYAN: He said the Our Father.

JUDGE BEYERS: In what language?

P. O'RYAN: In English. None of us ever makes repetitions in praying.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How do you deliver your prayer at your assemblies, and how do the other delegates?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Every member of this faith prays in spirit and in truth from the heart.

BY THE COURT: A silent prayer?

P. O'RYAN: Audibly.

ASSESSOR: You don't repeat a well-known prayer, is that what you mean?

P. O'RYAN: No prayer - we repeat no prayer.

JUDGE BEYERS: I am not following. The unusual feature of this man, which made you open your eyes and look who this was, was that he was saying a well-known ritual Pater-noster, and that was not according to your ...?

P. O'RYAN: Not according to the teachings of Jesus.

ASSESSOR: In other words you pray spontaneously?

P. O'RYAN: That is right.

ASSESSOR: You make up your prayer as you pray?

P. O'RYAN: It flows spontaneously.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he also speak at this assembly?

P. O'RYAN: Normally there is an opportunity of open testimony, in which he participated.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Does everybody have an opportunity at this assembly?

P. O'RYAN: Everyone has an opportunity to give a testimony.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: At the assembly. What do the members usually talk about, or give testimony about?

P. O'RYAN: We usually give testimony of our experiences on Christian lines and the work of God in our own personal lives.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When you heard the accused speak, what did he speak about?

P. O'RYAN: When the accused spoke he cited a passage of scripture, and thereafter, normally, one refers, or tries to interpret this passage of scripture. In his case, however, he continued, shall I say, at a tangent, or he spoke of his travels, which were not relevant to the chapter at all.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did this strike you as being odd, strange conduct?

P. O'RYAN: It struck me that the individual concerned, the accused, was not, in my opinion, born of the spirit of God.

JUDGE BEYERS: Did you sense something false in it, do you mean?

P. O'RYAN: Whosoever is born of the spirit of God can discern spiritually, and the context....

JUDGE BEYERS: It didn't ring true?

P. O'RYAN: Not at all.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When he had finished this talking, did you know what he was trying to tell you?

P. O'RYAN: He got nowhere. Just a string of incoherent or disjointed sentences mostly.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did the other delegates to the assembly react to his speech?

P. O'RYAN: Quite a few with whom I discussed it felt the way I did, that his, could I say, discourse lacked in spiritual content.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: At that time did you speak to the accused at that assembly?

P. O'RYAN: I did speak to the accused.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was he employed then? Did he have a job?

P. O'RYAN: He was unemployed at that time.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where was he living?

P. O'RYAN: He was on the verge of terminating his residence at a particular place in the Gardens.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And did he ask you whether he could come and stay with you?

P. O'RYAN: I had been approached by a member of the faith with the object of arranging

accommodation for the accused.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And did you then make arrangements and give the accused accommodation?

P. O'RYAN: I told him to call at my place, which he did the day after conference.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When did he arrive at your home?

P. O'RYAN: That was at the beginning of - I am not very sure of my dates - at the beginning of December. Immediately after the conference.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Of which year?

P. O'RYAN: 1965.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: For how long did he stay with you?

P. O'RYAN: He stayed with me for about close to five months.

COMMENTS ON P. O'RYAN'S TESTIMONY REGARDING HIS FIRST MEETING WITH TSAFENDAS

In 1997, two years before Tsafendas's death, O'Ryan was interviewed by Liza Key as part of her television documentary about Tsafendas. He was asked by Key to explain how he met Tsafendas. He said that he heard about him from a minister of his church who said that a "highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages" was looking for accommodation.⁴⁹⁷⁵

Three-four years later, O'Ryan said the same thing to Fathers Minas Constandinou and Ioannis Tsafaridis when they visited him. However, when advocate Cooper asked him in court to describe how he met Tsafendas, Cooper cut him off after the words, "I heard ...". What was O'Ryan going to say? It is a fair assumption that he was about to repeat the description he had heard of Tsafendas as "highly cultured" and "very refined" and a speaker of seven languages. Why was he stopped? He was asked by the defence team not to praise Tsafendas since that would invalidate its portrayal of him as odd and moronic.⁴⁹⁷⁶

⁴⁹⁷⁵ Patrick O' Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

⁴⁹⁷⁶ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

O'Ryan appeared surprised that Tsafendas recited the Lord's Prayer at an assembly of his Church. This suggests that Tsafendas was not well acquainted with the Church's modes, which favoured spontaneous prayer, when a person feels moved by the Spirit, rather than the recitation of established formulae, as in the established Christian churches.

THE TAPEWORM

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he try to find any employment while he was staying with you?

P. O'RYAN: Regularly. He wrote a number of applications. He went for interviews. And on one occasion he managed to land a job at the City Tramways, which lasted only a few days. He was issued with a uniform however. Thereafter he was unemployed again, and thence he was engaged at the Diamond Marine Corporation, I think, South West Africa.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: While he was with you, was he a lazy man?

P. O'RYAN: While he was with me, very often he would remain in bed, and would apparently do so for the day. But with us, we believe that every individual should have solid and permanent work. Then I would speak to him and tell him it is very unsavoury for a healthy man like him to remain in bed. Then he complained of this, of a worm that he mentioned of enormous proportions. In this case he mentioned that six foot of the worm had once come down, and the head remained behind, and the width was two inches wide. And more than one evening, after a late evening, he would ask my wife for a hunk of bread, he said, just to feed the worm, or demon, or the snake, which he most frequently termed it. Then there were other occasions when I had to speak to him, but not necessarily about his being inactive or lazy.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In what way further did he say that this worm affected his life?

P. O'RYAN: He told me about this worm, and that it sapped him or that it robbed him of his energy with the result that he could not hold a job very long. He also mentioned among other things that this worm affected him in many ways, so much so that his finances were always very low, since I had told him he could stay free of charge, and at that time, then he need not pay me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he ever go and try to get treatment for this worm? Medical attention?

P. O'RYAN: He went to the local hospital, I think Groote Schuur. Some of our friends saw him there. He went for treatment down at the Foreshore. And my wife also gave him a sort of treatment. She was very sympathetic in his case, whereas I told him the worm only existed in his mind, and then he was very disappointed and he told me I was like the doctors who wouldn't believe him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he say what this worm did, how this worm behaved inside him?

P. O'RYAN: Well, at night he said this worm used to crawl about in him when it was hungry, and irritate him and so on.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you think about this worm?

P. O'RYAN: Well, I candidly told him, as I do in many cases, that he should try to get his mind above matter, and that the worm was a figment of his imagination, purely.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he react to that, when you told him?

P. O'RYAN: He was most disappointed, and told me that I was just like the medical men whom he had seen, or medical opinion that he had got, who disbelieved him, and that my wife was much more sympathetically inclined towards him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: So he used to pour out his troubles about the worm to your wife then, is that correct?

P. O'RYAN: That is right.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Tell us, what was the overall impression that Demitrio Tsafendas made upon you?

P. O'RYAN: I formed a conclusion that he was not in truth one of our faith.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I understand that, in truth. What did you think about his mental state?

P. O'RYAN: I never actually doubted his mental state, since to me he had a mind that the majority of people have.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The fact that he believed in the tapeworm, what impression did that make upon you?

P. O'RYAN: That, however, made me feel that he believed in the tapeworm very strongly.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was he a strange man?

P. O'RYAN: No, it had never occurred to me.

COMMENTS ON P. O'RYAN'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE TAPEWORM

Although Patrick O'Ryan speaks at some length during his testimony about the tapeworm, he also states clearly that he "never actually doubted his mental state" and that Tsafendas's mind was similar to the one "the majority of people have." This is what he really believed and he could not have said otherwise because he had already testified to the police on September 17, 1966 that Tsafendas's "spiritual view seemed confused, but he was not spiritually or mentally disturbed ... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind." What is more, his testimony to the police did not include any mention of the tapeworm.⁴⁹⁷⁷

About thirty years later, O'Ryan repeated to Liza Key while she was filming him for her documentary exactly the same phrase he had used to the police, "I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind."⁴⁹⁷⁸ He also testified to the Commission of Enquiry that "Tsafendas always behaved like a normal person, except that his interpretations of the Bible differed from mine."⁴⁹⁷⁹ Therefore, why did he bring up the tapeworm at the trial?

Tsafendas later told Father Spiros Randos and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis that O'Ryan lied to the court about the tapeworm in order to save his life. He explained to the priests that O'Ryan was the only person to whom he had told the truth about the tapeworm and the origin of the story prior to the assassination. This happened because of his close friendship with O'Ryan. Tsafendas talked to many people but confided certain things only to O'Ryan. One of these was about Tom Tuff, the preacher of the Christian Church he met in an American hospital and who introduced him to the Christian Church. Tsafendas told O'Ryan about Tom's tapeworm story, describing how he copied it and used it to convince the Portuguese he was mad so as to receive amnesty and return to Mozambique, but also to make then stop

⁴⁹⁷⁷ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁹⁷⁸ Patrick O' Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

⁴⁹⁷⁹ Patrick O' Ryan statement to the COE, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

torturing him when he was imprisoned.⁴⁹⁸⁰

A few months before his death, Tsafendas was visited by Father Spiros Randos and Ioannis Tsafaridis, who asked if there was anything they could do for him, as they always did. Tsafendas had never asked them for anything, but then he said he believed he was dying and begged them to do something for him. Tsafendas wanted to apologise to Patrick O'Ryan for putting him in a situation that required him to lie in court about him and the tapeworm to save his life. Tsafendas, clearly stricken, said he had never had the chance to apologise personally; he pleaded with the priests to find O'Ryan and apologise on his behalf and thank him for what he did. Weeping, Tsafendas said he knew O'Ryan was very religious and lying was a major sin for him. Tsafendas guessed it must have been extremely difficult for O'Ryan to go through with his performance in court and he felt bad about putting him in such a difficult position. He said the only regret he had about killing Dr. Verwoerd was putting his best friend in such a position.⁴⁹⁸¹

Several months after his death, Fathers Minas Constandinou⁴⁹⁸² and Ioannis Tsafaridis visited Patrick O'Ryan in his home and told him what Tsafendas had said. O'Ryan wept and praised Tsafendas as the "kindest man I ever met." He told them how Tsafendas confided to him about the tapeworm story and he confirmed everything that Tsafendas had already told the priests, including its origins with Tom Tuff.⁴⁹⁸³

O'Ryan told the priests that he did not pay much attention when Tsafendas first told him the tapeworm story in 1965 and later he joked about it with his wife and children. It was only after the assassination and he was asked about the tapeworm by the defence lawyers, that he realised its importance. He said he had never told anyone the truth – that the tapeworm was fake, – not even his wife, and he had not intended ever to do so, but he could confirm it now that the priests had heard the story from Tsafendas himself.⁴⁹⁸⁴

O'Ryan said this was the only time in his life that he lied and that he had been praying about it ever since. He believed God would forgive him because he did it for a noble cause.

⁴⁹⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁸¹ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁸² Father Spiros Randos was unable to travel and Father Minas Constandinou went instead.

⁴⁹⁸³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁸⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

O'Ryan also told the priests that he was asked by Tsafendas's lawyers whether he was aware of the tapeworm and he had replied "yes?" unsure initially if he meant the truth about it or the jokey situation surrounding the tapeworm which he had created. However, he also remembered that Tsafendas had used the tapeworm story with the Portuguese when he was arrested and thought that he might be using it again. What he regretted was telling the police that Tsafendas was sane. It had not occurred to him then that he might pretend to be mad.⁴⁹⁸⁵

O'Ryan told the priests how, after Tsafendas confided in him, he turned the tapeworm into a "family joke." He said that one day when Tsafendas was starting on a second or third plate of food, one of the O'Ryan children, who was not eating, asked him how he managed to eat so much. O'Ryan joked that it was because Uncle Dimi "has a tapeworm inside him which eats his food." He added that if his son did not eat his own food, Uncle Dimi would take it and give it to the worm. Fascinated and a little frightened, the boy plied Tsafendas with questions, whereupon Tsafendas opened his eyes wide and breathed heavily, saying that was what happened when the tapeworm ate. After that, the children often asked about the tapeworm and Tsafendas would repeat his performance.⁴⁹⁸⁶

Upon hearing about the tapeworm, Louisa, Patrick's wife, told her husband, "that figures!" She was referring to Tsafendas's appetite. Patrick did not tell her about Tom Tuff or that the tapeworm was imaginary and he enjoyed joking with Tsafendas about it.⁴⁹⁸⁷ Tsafendas built a very good relationship with Louisa O'Ryan because she sympathized with his "problem," unaware it was a joke.⁴⁹⁸⁸ According to O'Ryan his wife had spoken to some other members of the Church about Tsafendas's "problem" and that made him feel bad as he considered himself responsible for starting this "story." O'Ryan apologised to him, but Tsafendas did not seem to care and on the contrary seemed to enjoy the charade.⁴⁹⁸⁹

O'Ryan also told the priests that one time at a prayer gathering in a church member's house, Yvette O'Ryan, his four-year-old daughter and youngest child of the family, asked Tsafendas to show their friends how the tapeworm acted. Embarrassed, Patrick said this was not the right place for it, but Tsafendas, evidently untroubled, staged his act. When some

⁴⁹⁸⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁸⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁸⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁴⁹⁸⁸ Louisa O'Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁴⁹⁸⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

parents inquired about the tapeworm, Louisa O'Ryan and Tsafendas said it was true, he had a tapeworm, but Patrick said he was just joking. Tsafendas appeared perfectly relaxed about the tapeworm business and put on his act when he was with the O'Ryan children or their friends' children. O'Ryan told the priests that this was everything that ever happened with the tapeworm and nothing else.⁴⁹⁹⁰

In 1997, Patrick O'Ryan told Liza Key, as he would tell the two priests, three or four years later, that advocate Cooper asked him to speak about the tapeworm in court and to exaggerate it as the only way to prevent Tsafendas from being hanged. He told Key that he "wouldn't have done it ordinarily," if Cooper had not asked him. O'Ryan also said that Cooper asked him to exaggerate other stories about Tsafendas in order to support the insanity plea.⁴⁹⁹¹ Cooper, by then a judge himself, watched the documentary and told Liza Key that he enjoyed it. As for Patrick O'Ryan's statement, he made no comment to Key⁴⁹⁹² nor to his son, Gavin Cooper.⁴⁹⁹³ If O'Ryan had lied to Liza Key about Cooper and his "advice", would Cooper not have protested? However, far from complaining, he praised the programme.

Professor John Dugard finds Wilfrid Cooper's actions to be perfectly logical and admits he would have done the same in that position:

"I could understand it ... I can understand very well, if I had been in Wilfrid Cooper's position, and I heard that there was some problem with a tapeworm, I would have done exactly the same. In South Africa at that time, the law was that murder was a capital crime, and it was compulsory for a judge to impose sentence of death unless there were mitigating circumstances. That meant that lawyers – and I was a practicing lawyer at that time too – went out of their way to find mitigating circumstances ... Often, the mitigating circumstance was very far-fetched, and sometimes ridiculous.

So, if I was in that situation, and I heard that there was some story about a tapeworm that troubled my client, and it was the only mitigating circumstance that I had, I would have done exactly what Wilfrid Cooper did. I would have expanded the tapeworm story because it was my only chance to save his life. I mean, I don't think that I behaved unprofessionally, but

⁴⁹⁹⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁹¹ Patrick O'Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁹² Liza Key in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁴⁹⁹³ Gavin Cooper in a personal interview, 16 June 2015.

I can remember doing similar things... Because we used to look very hard for mitigating circumstances.”⁴⁹⁹⁴

It is important to mention here that at first O’Ryan was not sure whether the defence lawyers knew the truth behind the tapeworm or if Tsafendas had used it with them as he had used it with the Portuguese. He was therefore cautious and spoke of it only when he realised Tsafendas had indeed gone the same route as with the Portuguese. O’Ryan told the priests that Tsafendas’s lawyers seemed desperate because they could not find anyone else who knew about the tapeworm, which seems clear from the fact that none of the two hundred or so people who were questioned by the South African police and the Commission of Enquiry ever mentioned it.

O’Ryan also told the priests that he and his wife were asked by advocate Cooper to exaggerate some “strange” stories about Tsafendas and to claim that he was “crazy.” O’Ryan could not – and did not – make such claim as he had testified to the police that Tsafendas was perfectly sane and that he “never got the impression that there was something wrong with his brain.”⁴⁹⁹⁵ Thus, why did he lie to the court about the tapeworm? Because, as he told the priests, he considered Tsafendas to be the “kindest man he ever met.” He “took a deep liking” to him and considered him “very kindly man ... he had a good heart” and wanted to save his life.⁴⁹⁹⁶

NOTE: O’Ryan stated that Tsafendas went to Groote Schuur hospital for treatment for his tapeworm problem, but this is inaccurate. There is no such medical report and the only time that Tsafendas went to this hospital was for an operation on his nose. O’Ryan perhaps spoke as he did to support his testimony further.

TSAFENDAS BEING RELIGIOUS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he read his Bible often?

P. O’RYAN: He read his Bible regularly.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he attend meetings of the movement?

⁴⁹⁹⁴ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁴⁹⁹⁵ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁴⁹⁹⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

P. O'RYAN: He most frequently accompanied me, because he and I attended the same Sunday morning meetings.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How many meetings do you have, does your movement have, every week?

P. O'RYAN: We have meetings regularly every Sunday morning where we break bread, Sunday evenings and Wednesday evenings.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: At these meetings, how did he fit in?

P. O'RYAN: Into the form of the meetings he fitted perfectly, but when it came to the substance of the meetings, he again, as I would put it, lacked spiritual depth. He was always superficial in his little discourses.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is that what you mean by spiritual depth, that he was superficial in his discourse?

P. O'RYAN: That is right, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he appear to understand the Bible, from what you could see?

P. O'RYAN: He seemed to have not the slightest notion of what he usually cited in scripture, or passages that he tried to interpret.

TSAFENDAS'S WAY OF SPEECH

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In conversation, how would he answer a question, a simple question?

P. O'RYAN: He was always very hesitant before he replied, and, after he had started, then he would hesitate again and very often when he continued there was no logical sequence again.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How was his concentration?

P. O'RYAN: He had a very poor power of concentration, which I would say was manifested by the way in which he spoke. One could gather that.

JUDGE BEYERS: Would I summarise what you have just said if I say that his conversation was disjointed? Would that be a way of saying it?

P. O'RYAN: That is it, it was disjointed.

JUDGE BEYERS: Can I put it down like that?

P. O'RYAN: That is right.

JUDGE BEYERS: That his conversation was disjointed and didn't seem to flow one from another?

P. O'RYAN: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: How was he spoken? How would you describe him? How did he speak?

P. O'RYAN: He was very well spoken, soft spoken, and his disposition was very meek. He was a very kindly man. In my experience of him he had a good heart.

COMMENTS ON P. O'RYAN'S STATEMENT REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S WAY OF SPEECH

The author cannot be certain, but it seems fair to suggest that O'Ryan's initial comment about Tsafendas's disjointed speech was intended to support the defence's line. No other witness testified that Tsafendas spoke in a halting fashion and O'Ryan himself did not mention it to the police when he was questioned. He told the police that he "never got the impression that there was something wrong with his brain;" he also said, "... even though I did not consider him to be particularly intelligent, he was well-spoken and had good vocabulary."⁴⁹⁹⁷

The fact that Tsafendas was well-spoken and soft-spoken has been stated by several other witnesses as we have already seen. None of the witnesses questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry (about two hundred of them) mentioned anything about Tsafendas's mode of speech. In addition, not one of the forty-four witnesses the author interviewed agreed that Tsafendas spoke in the way he was presented. All said he spoke perfectly normally. The issue has been discussed extensively, especially at Dr. Cooper's testimony, so it would not be discussed here again.

DISCUSSING POLITICS TOGETHER

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In these conversations, did you ever canvass political topics?

P. O'RYAN: No.

⁴⁹⁹⁷ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is it correct then that during the whole period of five months that he stayed with you, he did not discuss politics with you?

P. O'RYAN: He might have discussed politics in the way that I, or rather, say, any Coloured man, would discuss. We may discuss say - I have no specific case, but I would not deny that he might have discussed general politics with me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: But any topic that he may have discussed made no impression on you?

P. O'RYAN: Never. Mostly the Bible - scripture.

COMMENTS ON P. O'RYAN'S STATEMENT REGARDING NOT DISCUSSING POLITICS WITH TSAFENDAS

After the tapeworm, the biggest lie that Patrick O'Ryan told the court was that he and Tsafendas did not discuss politics in any serious way, although he had told the police that they did. As we will see shortly, the Attorney-General's cross-examination revealed that O'Ryan had told the police that Tsafendas "was against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal" and that he "labelled apartheid policies as unfair."

Years later, O'Ryan added that Tsafendas became "excited" talking about politics and had told him Dr. Verwoerd was a tyrant. He said Dr. Verwoerd oppressed his people, was "Hitler's best student" and if he ever get hold of him "he would bash his skull."⁴⁹⁹⁸ However, O'Ryan did not tell the police of these remarks as he believed they would count against Tsafendas. O'Ryan said he was advised by advocate Cooper not to reveal the political discussions he had with Tsafendas.⁴⁹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, as we will see, the State was in possession of O'Ryan's statement to the police and in cross-examination would mention the fact that he told the police that they had discussed politics, though not what he revealed thirty years later.

⁴⁹⁹⁸ Patrick O' Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁴⁹⁹⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015

P. O'RYAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was the accused married?

P. O'RYAN: No, as far as we knew, he was unmarried.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you know whether he took out any women while he was staying with you?

P. O'RYAN: No, but he was interested in some of our friends.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he manage to strike up some association, friendship with a woman while he lived with you?

P. O'RYAN: He was unfortunate.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he tell you about his wanderings, his travellings all over the world?

P. O'RYAN: Ad nauseam.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he tell you whether he had been subjected to any treatment in any part of the world?

P. O'RYAN: He told me that in some Portuguese territory - it might have been Portugal, it might have been somewhere down Lourenço Marques way - this brainwashing that I read about in the paper. But before it appeared in the paper he told me all about it. He described it to me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What had they done to him? What did they do to him?

P. O'RYAN: He mentioned that they slapped him on the temples of the head, regularly, until he fell down, and then they would pour water on him and so on, and on one occasion he mentioned that they carried away a corpse, someone to whom this third degree had been applied. He mentioned that to me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Could you form a close attachment, friendship with this man, Demitrio Tsafendas?

P. O'RYAN: I took a deep liking to the man.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you form an attachment? Did you discuss your personal problems with him?

P. O'RYAN: As a rule we don't discuss much of our personal problems.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he behave towards your children?

P. O'RYAN: He was very attached to the children, and very often my wife used to say "This man has never had the opportunity to know a little about home life. This most probably is the first home where he is at home." And we tried to make him at home as much as we could.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he discuss with you and tell you any of his background, of his home life as a child?

P. O'RYAN: Most of that he told my wife. He did not speak sentimentally to me at all, much.

P. O'RYAN: ... He was a very kindly man. In my experience of him he had a good heart.

COMMENTS ON P. O'RYAN'S STATEMENT REGARDING HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH TSAFENDAS

O'Ryan clearly states that he liked Tsafendas. He also trusted him to babysit his children.⁵⁰⁰⁰ Although sometimes unemployed, Tsafendas often bought sweets for the young ones and when he was in work, he came every day with sweets, toys and food. Reuben O'Ryan, the closest to Tsafendas of all the children, said, "We all loved him ... he was an adorable man ... he was the answer to our prayers. We were poor and he brought food to our house."⁵⁰⁰¹ Another child, Stanley, remembers Tsafendas as a "very down-to-earth man, very friendly. I never suspected, even in the slightest, that he might be unstable. Nothing at all. Perfectly normal."⁵⁰⁰²

Patrick O'Ryan testified in court that Tsafendas told him he was tortured and brainwashed in Portugal. No exploration was made of this, therefore it is important to state here what Tsafendas meant by brainwashing. He perceived it as an attempt by the Portuguese forcefully to change his pro-Communist and anti-colonial ideology, which included support for the independence of Mozambique. Tsafendas used the same word, "brainwashing," when

⁵⁰⁰⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁰⁰¹ Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁵⁰⁰² Stanley O' Ryan in a personal interview, 9 April 2015.

he described his torture by the Portuguese to several witnesses the author interviewed. He was not tortured to reveal something, but to change his political ideas.

O'Ryan stated openly that he liked Tsafendas and had confidence in him, even letting him to babysit his children. It seems unthinkable that he would have allowed a man who was unstable to do that. Perhaps conclusive proof of O'Ryan's affection for Tsafendas is the fact that he and his wife were the only friends who attended his funeral. With just one day's notice, they flew from Cape Town to Johannesburg to see Tsafendas interred in the cemetery next to Sterkfontein Hospital. O'Ryan was not a rich man and two last-minute plane tickets must have been costly. This demonstration of grief and loyalty says a lot about their relationship. "We do feel his death. He was dear to us," Patrick O'Ryan said the day of the funeral and characterised him as "pleasant and highly intelligent."⁵⁰⁰³

CROSS-EXAMINED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused show any feelings for your children?

P. O'RYAN: He was very fond of them.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And you took a deep liking to the accused?

P. O'RYAN: I had confidence in him and used to like him.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you think that he felt the same about you?

P. O'RYAN: Yes. Only that I didn't sympathise with him about the worm.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What made you conclude that he was not one of your faith?

P. O'RYAN: Among other things, number one he mentioned to me that a friend of ours in Greece had baptised him by means of a triple immersion; in the name of the Father he was immersed; in the name of the Son he said he was immersed; and in the name of the Holy Spirit he was immersed. That was most unusual to me, and unscriptural. To us a baptism is symbolic of a burial, a natural burial. And when a man is buried naturally he is just buried once and not exhumed again and so on. Then, secondly, he was surprised when I told him about Jesus having existed before the earth....

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I don't think we need go into that any further. Didn't you gain

⁵⁰⁰³ *South African Press Association*, 9 October 1999, 'Small group gather for Tsafendas' funeral.'

the impression that the accused was sponging on you?

P. O'RYAN: Quite a few friends of mine told me that, but I believe in hospitality so I overlooked it.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: When did the accused tell you about this so-called worm?

P. O'RYAN: When I told him to get out of bed and not to be too inactive, and not to surrender to a thought like that. But to him it was real.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Can you remember the date?

P. O'RYAN: It would have been very shortly after - I would say it was in December.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: December?

P. O'RYAN: 1965 already.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: On how many occasions did the accused tell you about this so-called worm?

P. O'RYAN: Very very frequently.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Very very frequently?

P. O'RYAN: It became common in the home, so much so that the remedy they used for him, well, there was quite a quantity of it in the home already.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You made a statement to the Police on the 17th September 1966, is that correct?

P. O'RYAN: Most probably. Yes, the date must be.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You can have a look at the statement?

P. O'RYAN: I did make a statement. Correct.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why didn't you mention anything about this worm to the Police in your statement?

P. O'RYAN: The Police mentioned, number one, that that was not necessary, I must just leave it.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: So you say that you mentioned this worm to the Police?

P. O'RYAN: Yes. Not necessary, they mentioned. And I also made a statement about this treatment, and the Police said it is common in the papers.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: This gentleman here, Mr. Troost, (pointed out) took the statement, not so?

P. O'RYAN: That is right.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: So you tell me that you told Mr. Troost about this worm?

P. O'RYAN: Yes, I said he mentioned the worm.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And Mr. Troost said it was not necessary to make any mention of it?

P. O'RYAN: No, he just brushed it away.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What exactly did you say to Mr. Troost?

P. O'RYAN: I just said he mentioned the worm and also the third degree.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Just give us your exact words that you used to Mr. Troost?

P. O'RYAN: Mr. Troost spoke to me in the form of questions, which I answered, but in between I mentioned these two things that I noted were not noted.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You told Mr. Troost that this man has on many occasions mentioned to you...

P. O'RYAN: No, no, I did not say on many occasions.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What exactly did you say to Mr. Troost?

P. O'RYAN: I said he mentioned a worm, and the brainwashing.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What did Mr. Troost say to that?

P. O'RYAN: Well, in writing - he just continued to write and...

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: So in spite of the fact that you mentioned something about the worm, he did not take that down in writing?

P. O'RYAN: No.

JUDGE BEYERS: Am I going to be allowed to see that statement?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Certainly my lord.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: With respect, I don't think your lordship can read it. It must be put to this witness first of all, and say that he made this statement and he admits the contents.

JUDGE BEYERS: I thought that he had admitted.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: He admits that he has made a statement, but he has not identified this statement yet.

JUDGE BEYERS: It is not all that important. (Statement not read by the Court).

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you say in this statement - I quote what is written down in this statement: "He (that is the accused) stayed with me for approximately 3 months, 2 weeks of which he stayed at Poggenpoel, but afterwards returned to me?"

P. O'RYAN: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: "He read the newspaper and it was apparent that he was against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal." Did you say that?

P. O'RYAN: Yes

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: "He made the impression with me that he was favourable towards the Coloureds and he repeatedly applied to be classified as a Coloured." Did you say that?

P. O'RYAN: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: "He said that he had a blank identity card, in other words his race was not recorded on it."?

P. O'RYAN: That is correct.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: "He labelled the apartheid policies as unfair"?

P. O'RYAN: Yes

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: "His reasoning was not very intelligent"?

P. O'RYAN: Correct.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Is that right?

P. O'RYAN: That is right, yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: "I did not encourage him, because we advocate the Biblical idea of subservience to a Government." Is that right?

P. O'RYAN: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I will not be much longer you honour.

JUDGE BEYERS: You are not boring me. I am quiet interested.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: “His spiritual view seemed confused, but he was not spiritually or mentally disturbed.” You said that?

P. O'RYAN: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: “On the contrary, even though I did not consider him to be particularly intelligent, he was well spoken and had good vocabulary”?

P. O'RYAN: That is right.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you say that?

P. O'RYAN: Yes

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: “I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind”?

P. O'RYAN: That is correct, yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you say that?

P. O'RYAN: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why then did you not say anything about the worm in the statement?

P. O'RYAN: It was so commonplace, most likely, that I did not want to draw any more attention to it. I only mention it casually.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You said you told Mr. Troost?

P. O'RYAN: Casually, yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You told him about the worm?

P. O'RYAN: Yes.

COMMENTS ON THE CROSS-EXAMINATION

The most important aspect of the cross-examination is that van den Berg, for the first time, challenged a witness on the basis of evidence given in a statement to the police. This suggests that the Attorney-General was given at least some witness statements and probably would have challenged the other witnesses, too, if he had the relevant statements. Still, though he

challenged O'Ryan with questions which anyone could have asked, he did not do enough to break down his testimony.

An obvious question would have been, how was it that O'Ryan "never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind" when he heard Tsafendas talking about the tapeworm? Could anybody hear a man say he had a greedy tapeworm in his stomach and believe such a man to be sane?

The tapeworm creates a paradoxical situation: although Tsafendas does not talk about the worm to the Daniels family, they think he is insane; however, he does speak to O'Ryan about it and he believes that he is perfectly sane. O'Ryan lived for five months with Tsafendas in the same house and they then kept in regular touch for another year. The Daniels family spent some time with Tsafendas, though not in the same house, over forty-two days, then never saw him again. How is this dichotomy resolved? Both were asked by the defence to "exaggerate" some stories suggesting Tsafendas was strange, in particular to mention the tapeworm. O'Ryan had not spoken of it to the police, indeed had said Tsafendas was perfectly sane, therefore he could not now change. However, since he and his wife were the only witness who was aware of the worm, the defence used them to strengthen this angle.

The most important of the questions asked by the Attorney-General was why O'Ryan did not tell the police about the tapeworm, since Tsafendas spoke so frequently about it? O'Ryan seems a little unsure about what to say. He replied that he mentioned it "causally" and Sgt. Troost, the policeman who took the statement, did not write it down. O'Ryan did not comment about this particular incident to the two priests or to Liza Key, but he did state that he had not told the police about the tapeworm. The obvious conclusion is that he lied in court when he said he mentioned it "casually." Very likely he thought that the policeman would probably not remember whether he had said it or not.

However, since Sgt. Troost was present in the trial and was pointed out by the Attorney-General, he could have been asked whether he remembered O'Ryan mentioning it. In addition, it seems that O'Ryan is aware that there is nothing about the tapeworm in his statement as he stated that Troost "just continued to write." O'Ryan could not have been in position to know what Troost was writing, unless he was asked specifically about something he had just said and Troost wanted a clarification. Therefore, he was not in condition to know whether it was written or not, unless he was given to read the statement in the end, as Troost had had done with all the statements he took. It is possible that O'Ryan did not bother at the

time reading his statement as some of the witnesses did not. In this case, he would not have been able to know whether it was written or not. On the other hand, if he had read the statement, he would have seen that the tapeworm is not there, so he could have told Sgt. Troost that he forgot to include it.

O'Ryan was asked whether Tsafendas was sponging on him and he answered in an ambivalent fashion, that "quite a few friends of mine told me that, but I believe in hospitality so I overlooked it." The author is not in position to know how O'Ryan really felt, however his two sons are positive that their father did not believe Tsafendas was sponging on him. On the contrary, they said their dad was often embarrassed because Tsafendas brought food to the house and toys and sweets for the children. When O'Ryan asked Tsafendas not to do this because he thought it made him look bad, Tsafendas continued to bring food and sweets but told the children they were bought by their dad and himself. Young Reuben O'Ryan said about Tsafendas, "We all loved him ... he was an adorable man ... he was the answer to our prayers. We were poor and he brought food to our house."⁵⁰⁰⁴

The Attorney-General's above question also supported the defence's line and not the State's, so it is a strange kind of question. This was the sort of question you would have expected from the Defence Counsel and not from the Attorney-General. The Defence was trying to prove that Tsafendas was the kind of helpless man who was taking advantages of others and the State was supposedly trying to prove otherwise. This question only helped the defence.

O'Ryan's statement to the police that Tsafendas was "favourable towards the Coloureds and he repeatedly applied to be classified as a Coloured" contradicts Dr. Cooper's testimony from the previous day when he said that Tsafendas was unsympathetic towards Coloureds. In addition, through the cross-examination we also hear for the first and last time in the court, Tsafendas's real political ideas: that he was "against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal" and "labelled the apartheid policies as unfair" - again in contradiction to Dr. Cooper's testimony. Importantly, these statements are not from a witness's courtroom testimony, but from a witness's statement to the police.

⁵⁰⁰⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

CONCLUSION

Patrick O'Ryan was the defence's main witness with regard to the tapeworm and spoke extensively about it, although he also stated clearly that he "never actually doubted his (Tsafendas's) mental state." How is it possible to believe that a person who claims to host a massive and voracious tapeworm is sane? The fact is O'Ryan had already told the police in his statement that he believed Tsafendas "was not spiritually or mentally disturbed ... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind",⁵⁰⁰⁵ therefore he could not go back on this position in court. He spoke about the tapeworm because he was asked to do so by advocate Cooper since he was the only defence witness who was aware of it.

The fact that O'Ryan did not tell the police about the tapeworm, although it was so important to Tsafendas, was raised by the Attorney-General. O'Ryan replied that he had mentioned the tapeworm but the policeman taking his statement brushed it aside. O'Ryan later claimed that he had not told the police about it and then spoke openly about it in court because he had been told by advocate Copper that this was the only way to "get him free." In reality, as O'Ryan himself admitted to the priests and as Tsafendas had already told them, he was aware that the tapeworm was a fiction which Tsafendas had used in the past to stop the Portuguese torturing him. O'Ryan knew the origin of the tapeworm story and he could have become aware of it only from Tsafendas himself.

It is not surprising that O'Ryan lied to the court since, as he admitted in his testimony, he had taken a "deep liking" to Tsafendas, whom he considered to be a kind person with a good heart, his best friend and the kindest person he ever met. Upon hearing of Tsafendas's death, O'Ryan and his wife bought airline tickets at short notice and flew to the funeral at Sterkfontein, his only friends to do so. This must have involved financial sacrifice for a poor man and testified to the genuine affection that existed between them.

It is important to note that the Attorney-General's intervention was the first time he used a statement taken by the police to challenge a defence witness's testimony. This suggests that the police gave him at least some of the witness statements, raising the likelihood that if he was in possession of all the statements, he might have challenged other witnesses, too. That he reads extracts aloud confirms that the police did indeed take a statement from O'Ryan, something that might have raised doubts because no statement by

⁵⁰⁰⁵ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

Patrick O'Ryan was found in the National Archives. Accordingly, we are not in position to know its contents, apart from the excerpts read out in court. By reading out parts of the statement, the court heard, for the first and last time, Tsafendas's real political ideas: he was "against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal" and "labelled the apartheid policies as unfair."

Patrick O'Ryan's testimony would play an important role in Judge Beyers's verdict, though the judge seemed to have poor recall of part of it. Judge Beyers stated, "I should also mention, briefly, that the ordinary people, the ordinary everyday people with whom he (Tsafendas) came into contact did not take long before they could see that this man was mentally affected... It was obvious to O'Ryan and his wife." While O'Ryan might have testified to the lunacy of the tapeworm, he did not state that Tsafendas was mentally affected. On the contrary, he said clearly "I never actually doubted his mental state, since to me he had a mind that the majority of people have." The court also heard O'Ryan's statement to the police where he said that Tsafendas "was not spiritually or mentally disturbed ... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind."⁵⁰⁰⁶ This the judge also seems to have overlooked.

⁵⁰⁰⁶ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 7: LOUISA O'RYAN

INTRODUCTION

Louisa O'Ryan, Patrick O'Ryan's wife, was urged by defence advocate Cooper to highlight the tapeworm in her evidence. However, unlike her husband, she was under the impression that the worm was real. Patrick had joked that Tsafendas's voracious appetite was caused by a tapeworm.⁵⁰⁰⁷ She replied, "That figures!" However, Patrick did not tell her about Tom Tuff and that the tapeworm was imaginary and he joked with Tsafendas about it.⁵⁰⁰⁸ Tsafendas himself built a good relationship with Louisa because she sympathized with his "problem," unaware it was all a fiction.⁵⁰⁰⁹

LOUISA O'RYAN'S TESTIMONY⁵⁰¹⁰

L. O'RYAN'S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you know the accused?

L. O'RYAN: I know Demitrio.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where did you meet him for the first time?

L. O'RYAN: At our convention in Durbanville.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he behave on that occasion?

L. O'RYAN: Well, quite normal.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you hear him speak?

L. O'RYAN: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he preach?

L. O'RYAN: Well, not actually preach. We just each give our testimony.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he give his testimony?

⁵⁰⁰⁷ For more about the incident see Chapter Two.

⁵⁰⁰⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁰⁰⁹ Louisa O'Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁵⁰¹⁰ Louisa O'Ryan's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

L. O'RYAN: Well, he started off with the way he got away from Cape Town half a century ago, or a quarter century he mentioned, and then how he got on to the boat, peeling potatoes. Then he spoke a little of his travels, and then he cited a verse in the Bible, but I could not sort of get a grasp of what he was trying to explain at the time.

ASSESSOR: You mean the verse had no relation to what he was talking about?

L. O'RYAN: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: But after this convention he came to live at your house, did he?

L. O'RYAN: Yes.

THE TAPEWORM

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he ever discuss any of his complaints with you?

L. O'RYAN: Well, he spoke to me about his stomach, and he explained to me that it was because of a tapeworm which was an inch and a half wide, and he told me that a while back, when he was a little boy, about six feet of it came down. The doctor gave him something and six feet of it came down. He was sitting on a bucket. And then he fainted on the bucket, and his mother removed it and she destroyed it, and since then nothing has ever come down.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he speak often about this worm?

L. O'RYAN: Quite often he spoke to me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did he call this worm?

L. O'RYAN: He called it a snake, or a demon.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he tell you whether it moved, or what it did inside him?

L. O'RYAN: He told me that this snake, or this worn, sort of cones up at night and then it sort of hunts for food. He seemed that it put it down that way, that it hunts for food late at night while he was asleep; it sort of woke him up; and this thing was hunting for food.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he ever ask for food for this worm?

L. O'RYAN: Yes, he asked me quite a few times if he could just have a piece of bread to feed the worn.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he take medicine for this worm?

L. O'RYAN: He took medicine. He once went to the Groote Schuur Hospital, and then he went again to the Foreshore to the Medical Centre there and they gave him a bottle of white stuff, I think it was some sort of a line mixture.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was he very energetic?

L. O'RYAN: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did he do?

L. O'RYAN: Well, he told me that in spite of his big body he always felt tired, and he reckoned that it was the worm, because of the worm sort of devouring the food that his body should have.

JUDGE BEYERS: A most wonderful worm. You don't have to work, and you eat at night in order to feed him. One of the best pets I have heard of. Anyway, he can't work because of the worm, but the worm has got to be fed.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION TOOK PLACE

COMMENTS ON L. O'RYAN'S TESTIMONY

Louisa refers to Tsafendas's mother, but she means his step-mother. She was aware that Tsafendas had lived with his birth mother for about only eighteen months. Tsafendas referred to Marika as "mother," and not as step-mother. As far as the author can establish, he only referred to Marika as step-mother in his statements to the police. As stated before, several witnesses interviewed by the author stated that he referred to Marika as his mother, not his stepmother.

What is important here is the story Louisa O'Ryan tells about the origin of the tapeworm. It is this story that would be remembered afterwards. According to Louisa, Tsafendas told her that his (step) mother removed six feet of tapeworm which Tsafendas excreted as a boy and destroyed it. Tsafendas does not mention anything about witchcraft, as he did with Dr. Cooper and with Dr. Sakinofsky. According to Louisa, Tsafendas was a "little boy" when it happened, not a teenager as claimed by Dr. Cooper and Dr. Muller. Dr. Cooper

has stated that it was in 1935 or 1936, while Dr. Muller had stated that it was after 1936.⁵⁰¹¹ In 1935 and 1936, Tsafendas was seventeen and eighteen, not a little boy. No-one noticed this and it was left unchallenged.

However, it is highly significant that Tsafendas's (step) mother, Marika, in her testimony to the Commission, flatly denied that such an event ever took place and swore that she never heard about the tapeworm until now. Exactly the same thing was stated to the Commission by the rest of the family.⁵⁰¹² Katerina Pnema, Tsafendas's half-sister, had never heard Tsafendas say anything about a tapeworm and did not remember such an incident taking place, but upon reading about it, she asked her mother to double-check it.⁵⁰¹³ Marika denied all knowledge of the incident and of the worm and told her daughter that Tsafendas was making it up. Fotini Gavasiadis's brother, Nick Vlachopoulos was married to Helen Tsafantakis, another of Tsafendas's half-sisters. She and other long-time family members and friends all questioned Tsafendas's step-mother and she gave them the same answer as she gave to the Commission: "It never happened."⁵⁰¹⁴

Ira Kyriakakis, who had grown up with Tsafendas and Mary Eendracht who was his cousin and had also grown up with him were certain that he had made it up as they were extremely close to him at the time the alleged incident took place as he never told them anything about it and they were both certain that he would have told them if such thing had happened. Still though, they both asked Marika who once again denied that this story ever took place. Throughout her life, Marika vigorously denied that such a thing ever happened and insisted that Tsafendas had made it up.⁵⁰¹⁵ As for Louisa O'Ryan, despite her belief in the reality of the tapeworm, she strongly believed that Tsafendas was perfectly sane.⁵⁰¹⁶

⁵⁰¹¹ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Dr. Hendrik Muller's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁰¹² COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁵⁰¹³ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁰¹⁴ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁵⁰¹⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵⁰¹⁶ Louisa O'Ryan in Liza Key's *A question of Madness*, 1997; Reuben O'Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Stanley O'Ryan in a personal interview with the author, 9 April 2015.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 8: OWEN SMORENBERG

INTRODUCTION

Owen Smorenberg was an important witness for the defence. Although he knew Tsafendas for only five or six weeks, he was chosen to testify rather than others who had known him or lived with him for many months. Smorenberg was questioned by the police on October 6, 1966.⁵⁰¹⁷

EXTRACTS FROM OWEN SMORENBERG'S TESTIMONY⁵⁰¹⁸

MEETING TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is your occupation?

SMORENBERG: I am employed as maintenance foreman at the Cape Town City Council Power Station.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And for how long have you been working there?

SMORENBERG: Eight years.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you know the accused?

SMORENBERG: Yes I know him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When did you meet him for the first time?

SMORENBERG: He came to work for us as a fitter on the 13th September, 1965.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: But how long did he stay with you?

SMORENBERG: Approximately six weeks.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: During this period did you work with him?

SMORENBERG: Yes, I did work with him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What kind of work did he have to do?

⁵⁰¹⁷ For his statement to the police see page

⁵⁰¹⁸ Owen Smorenberg's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

SMORENBERG: Mainly rough engineering. Fitting.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you have to check his work?

SMORENBERG: Yes, every day.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The work that he had to do, was it difficult work? Was it involved work?

SMORENBERG: Not really. I would say it is the easiest type of fitting that there is.

JUDGE BEYERS: Was he taken on as a fitter or as a labourer?

SMORENBERG: As a fitter.

JUDGE BEYERS: Did he claim to "be a fitter?"

SMORENBERG: He claims to be a fitter, yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: Did he have papers?

SMORENBERG: That I couldn't say. I never employed him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the type of work that he was doing? Rough engineering work?

SMORENBERG: Rough engineering fitting.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was your first impression about Tsafendas?

SMORENBERG: The first impression was that he was a friendly type of man.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he talk freely with you?

SMORENBERG: Fairly freely.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Had he travelled extensively?

SMORENBERG: He claimed to have travelled extensively, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he form any close friendship with any person on the job?

SMORENBERG: Not really. Perhaps myself, and maybe one other fellow. We were about the friendliest with him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was that a close friendship?

SMORENBERG: Not really.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he claim that he could speak more than one language?

SMORENBERG: He did claim so, and I actually heard him speak in more than one language.

COMMENTS ON SMORENBERG'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

Smorenberg was called as a defence witness rather than many who knew Tsafendas longer and better. He worked with Tsafendas for six weeks one year before the assassination (although he said five weeks in his statement to the police twelve days earlier) and he described their relationship as "not really" close. However, not one of Tsafendas's Parliamentary messenger colleagues was asked to testify when they worked with him a year later, just before the assassination, and for the same length of time. The choice of Smorenberg is understandable since he was the only one of the one hundred and fifty or so witnesses questioned by the police who could support specific aspects of the defence's line. Precisely why Smorenberg was chosen we will see shortly.

TSAFENDAS AND THE COLOURED PEOPLE

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he like Coloured people?

SMORENBERG: The impression I got is that he didn't like them.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why did you get that impression? Was there an incident that you can relate?

SMORENBERG: Yes. There are one or two incidents. The first time, they normally have a labourer working with them, and on this particular occasion the labourer had come to complain that he did not wish to work with the fitter any longer. I asked why, so he said that when he offered him a little bit of advice the fitter had turned round and told him that he is the boss on the job and he is not taking any advice or any backchat whatsoever from any Coloured.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Any other incident that you can recall?

SMORENBERG: Yes, the second time that I formed an opinion that he didn't like them was the statement he had made to me while we were working down at the Docks.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the occasion? What were you working on?

SMORENBERG: We have down at the Docks a cooling water intake for the Power station.

We have gone down there to do some overhaul work, and we were about 40 feet down in the ground.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is it like down there?

SMORENBERG: It is quite a big tunnel. It reminds one of, shall we say, a 15th century castle, the torture chambers or the dungeons. It is dripping with water, and quite dirty and dark. It is generally an eerie place. We had gone down there to do some work, and while we were working I said to him jokingly that this is a good place for Mr. Vorster to keep his political prisoners, to which he replied, and I was quite shocked at the time - I suppose I generally didn't expect any political conversation from him - he replied "Yes, they should put them all down here; in fact they should put all the Coloureds here, open the doors and drown the lot."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In what tone of voice did he make this remark?

SMORENBERG: Well, it wasn't sort of overbearing; it was just as a sort of general discussion.

COMMENTS ON SMORENBERG'S IMPRESSION THAT TSAFENDAS DID NOT LIKE THE COLOURED PEOPLE

Of the many absurd statements about Tsafendas that were heard during the summary trial, Smorenberg's remarks regarding Tsafendas's attitude to Coloured people are the hardest to comprehend. They stretch belief to breaking point, but even if they are true, and the author has no way to be certain, mountains of evidence is available to demonstrate that they do not represent Tsafendas's true feelings. Out of the about two hundred people who were questioned by the police and the Commission and the forty-four the author has interviewed, not one said anything that would support Smorenberg's claims. Indeed witnesses stated the exact opposite:

- Perhaps the most decisive refutation is the fact that Tsafendas applied to be classified as Coloured himself, hardly the act of a man who did not like such people. Furthermore, Tsafendas had given as one of the reasons for his application the fact that he regarded himself as a Coloured.⁵⁰¹⁹

⁵⁰¹⁹ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 39. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

- For five months, Tsafendas lived with the Coloured family of Patrick O’Ryan, who testified before Smorenberg that Tsafendas was “favourable towards the Coloureds and he repeatedly applied to be classified as a Coloured.”⁵⁰²⁰
- Jacobus Bornman, Tsafendas’s flatmate for three months in Pretoria in 1965, testified to the police that Tsafendas “stood up a lot for the Coloureds.”⁵⁰²¹
- Col. McIntyre of the South African police wrote in a report dated October 3 that Tsafendas told “several people that he was upset because he was not classified as a Coloured.”⁵⁰²²
- Albert Vercoueil, who was Tsafendas’s supervisor for five months at F. A. Poole in Pretoria, told the police that Tsafendas “bullied the other Portuguese workers (and) had fights with several White workers,”⁵⁰²³ but he “never argued with Coloureds.”⁵⁰²⁴
- According to Inspector Horacio Ferreira of the Portuguese Security Police in Mozambique, Tsafendas was “intense anti-white” and told him that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-Whites.”⁵⁰²⁵
- Keith Martincich said Tsafendas told him that “Coloureds were better than the Europeans”⁵⁰²⁶
- Jose Baltazar testified that when Tsafendas “was in the presence of whites, he said little or nothing, but was friendly and talkative with the Bantu. On one or two occasions Tsafendas, while talking with Bantu, stopped talking when he approached.”⁵⁰²⁷
- Gladstone Dunn said Tsafendas told him that the South African Government “was not playing fair with the non-whites. He said that the wages paid to non-whites were very

⁵⁰²⁰ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁰²¹ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰²² *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰²³ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰²⁴ Albert Vercual statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰²⁵ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵⁰²⁶ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰²⁷ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

unsatisfactory, as well as the political situation.”⁵⁰²⁸ Tsafendas himself was classified white, so why would he care about mistreatment of non-whites, especially if he was said not to like them?

- Meldon Tillek testified that Tsafendas told him that “the white people always looked down on him and that consequently he felt more at home amongst Coloured people.”⁵⁰²⁹
- Ralph Lighton who had worked with Tsafendas for 9-10 weeks testified that Tsafendas “used to mix with the Coloureds rather than with the Europeans.”⁵⁰³⁰
- Nikolaas Nel: Tsafendas “was certainly unpopular among white workers” and “adapted more to the non-whites.”⁵⁰³¹
- Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas’s landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, “I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners.”⁵⁰³²
- Peter Daniels testified to the court only minutes before Smorenberg that Tsafendas “preferred to be amongst the Coloured community” and that “he would like to be among the Coloured community, make himself a Coloured man.”⁵⁰³³
- Keith Martincich testified to the police that Tsafendas “said the coloureds were better than the Europeans. He said they were more friendly, and had more sense than the Europeans, and showed more understanding. When I said he was talking nonsense, he got cross and lifted himself as though he wanted to tackle me ... I noticed that he was very familiar with the coloured crew on the boat, about which I reprimanded him.”⁵⁰³⁴

The author read Smorenberg’s court statement to forty-four people who knew

⁵⁰²⁸ Gladstone Dunn statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰²⁹ Meldon Tillek statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰³⁰ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰³¹ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰³² Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰³³ Peter Daniels testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁰³⁴ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Tsafendas very well, such as Tsafendas's half-sister Katerina Pnema, Fotini Gavasiadis, the three priests who visited him in hospital and in prison, Costas Poriadis, Helen Grispos and Ira Kyriakakis, Father Nikola Banovic and to thirteen of the *Eleni* crew who were with him for forty-two days prior to the assassination. Every one of the above witnesses believes that Smorenberg's statement is either a lie or a false impression. Several of them simply laughed when they heard what Smorenberg said.

These are some of the responses from people who knew Tsafendas best:

- Katerina Pnema said Smorenberg “does not know what he is talking about. Dimitri always defended the Coloureds and the Blacks from the Whites. He was fired from jobs because he supported them.”⁵⁰³⁵
- Fotini Gavasiadis called the statement “ridiculous,” stating that Tsafendas was “the exact opposite.”⁵⁰³⁶
- Mary Eendracht said she was completely surprised to hear such a statement. “Are you serious? I never heard that. It can't be true. No one would have said that about Dimitri.”⁵⁰³⁷
- Andreas Babiolakis said, “These people [Dr. Cooper and Smorenberg] must have been hallucinating, not Dimitri, if this is what they said about him.”⁵⁰³⁸
- Ira Kyriakakis told the author that Tsafendas was “an idealist. He was very passionate about politics; he despised racism and colonialism and wanted Mozambique to get rid of the Portuguese; he was very strong in favour of Mozambique's independence.”⁵⁰³⁹
- Michalis Vasilakis said Dr. Cooper's statement was “one of the biggest nonsense I have heard in my life.”⁵⁰⁴⁰

We should also remember that Tsafendas lived not only with the O'Ryan family but in the same house as other Coloured people such as Richard Poggenpoel and the Daniels family. He was willing to meet and consider marriage to the Coloured woman, Helen Daniels, while he also wanted to marry Sybie Barrendila a young lady of Coloured-Indian

⁵⁰³⁵ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁰³⁶ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵⁰³⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵⁰³⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁵⁰³⁹ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵⁰⁴⁰ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

ancestry. His first serious relationship, which lasted for more than a year in the late 1930s, was with a Black Mozambican girl named Stella. Tsafendas described himself to the police as being against apartheid and in “sympathy with the people fighting racialism.”⁵⁰⁴¹

David Bloomberg told the author that Tsafendas “felt Coloured, and he was more comfortable with the Coloured people, and he had been living with Coloured people in Cape Town.”⁵⁰⁴² Tsafendas also took some of the *Eleni* seamen to a township in Cape Town where Blacks lived in an effort to show them at first-hand how some people lived under apartheid. He had also urged the seamen to spend as little money as possible while in Cape Town in order not to contribute to South Africa’s economy.⁵⁰⁴³ Finally, Tsafendas got into a fight with Nick Vergos after he supported two Black workers who were exploited by Vergos.⁵⁰⁴⁴ All these are hardly the attitudes of someone who was unsympathetic towards Coloureds.

It is not impossible that Tsafendas made the comments attributed to him by Smorenberg, but we do not know the background to the incident, whether Smorenberg may have misunderstood what happened or misheard what was said, or whether Tsafendas was being sarcastic or ironic, as he often was according to several witnesses the author interviewed. Alternatively, he might have said what he did because he simply did not want to argue with the Whites around him. What is a fact is that he was not antagonistic towards the Coloured community, indeed he was strongly opposed to apartheid as several witnesses testified. The Attorney-General could have used all the witness statements which were in the possession of the police, to challenge Smorenberg’s comments, but he chose not to do so. For a more detailed account of Tsafendas’s’ racial “preferences,” see Dr. Cooper’s testimony (the part: Being unsympathetic towards Coloureds and Natives) and his biography in Chapter Two.

⁵⁰⁴¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰⁴² David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

⁵⁰⁴³ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 5 August 2011; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁵⁰⁴⁴ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 5 August 2011; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

**REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S OPINION ABOUT VORSTER AND
VERWOERD**

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he make any comment on Mr. Vorster?

SMORENBERG: Yes. He said he thought that Mr. Vorster was the right type of man for the Minister of Justice's job. And he went on to say that he thought the Prime Minister was a clever man and he held the right position. In other words, he was the right man for the job as well.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And who was the Prime Minister then?

SMORENBERG: Dr. Verwoerd.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What impression did you get, was he a supporter of the Government or an opponent or a critic of the Government?

SMORENBERG: Well, I got the impression that he was a supporter.

**COMMENTS ON SMORENBERG'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S OPINION ABOUT
VORSTER AND VERWOERD**

If Smorenberg's claim that Tsafendas disliked Coloured people was the most absurd statement made at the trial, then the second most absurd must be that he "got the impression" Tsafendas was a supporter of Dr. Verwoerd and his government. Both came from the same man, a man who stated that Tsafendas "never discussed politics with me."⁵⁰⁴⁵

It is possible that Tsafendas was being sarcastic, especially with his comment about Vorster. That he characterised him as "the right type of man" for the job does not mean that he agreed with or supported him. Indeed, it could have implied that Vorster's character was such that he was right for some sort of dirty work involving his responsibility for police and prison. Judging a person as the "right type of man" does not imply he is a "good type of man," merely that he has the appropriate skills for a designated task. It is like saying that Heinrich Himmler was the right type of man to orchestrate the Holocaust, meaning that he was able to do it because he was monstrously evil. Arguably, Himmler was indeed the right man for a job which could only be performed by a monster but which required administrative

⁵⁰⁴⁵ Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

abilities, too. Jack the Ripper was also a monster but might not have been the “right type of man” to organise the Holocaust, but was obviously the “right type of man” to murder women.

As for the comment about Dr. Verwoerd, again the fact that Tsafendas described him as “clever” does not imply approval or even that he agreed with him. It is an objective statement. Someone may comment that Hitler was a vegetarian, but this would not be taken as a statement of support for Hitler.

Let us first look at what people told the police concerning Tsafendas's opinion about Dr. Verwoerd and the government:

- Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas wanted to “create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power.”⁵⁰⁴⁶
- Kenneth Ross told the police that Tsafendas “was very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in politics. Tsafendas objected to the Communists being banished to Robin Island because of their political opinions and actions. In general, Tsafendas opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government, and was definitely pre-Russian.”⁵⁰⁴⁷
- Patrick O’Ryan told the police that Tsafendas “was against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal” and that he “labelled the apartheid policies as unfair.”⁵⁰⁴⁸ Later O’Ryan described Tsafendas as getting “excited” when he talked about politics and saying that Dr. Verwoerd was a tyrant who was oppressing his people, that he was ‘Hitler’s best student’ and if he (Tsafendas) ever get hold of him “he would bash his skull.” He did not tell the police about Dr. Verwoerd being a tyrant as he believed it would be bad for Tsafendas.⁵⁰⁴⁹

⁵⁰⁴⁶ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁴⁷ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁴⁸ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁰⁴⁹ Patrick O’Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes. Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

- Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren, a security officer at the Mandini Paper Factory in Zululand, told the police that Nick Vergos said Tsafendas “was not Greek, but a kaffir and a Communist.”⁵⁰⁵⁰
- Robert Smith was a night clerk at the Durban Men’s Home where Tsafendas stayed for two months in 1965. He testified that Tsafendas was a Communist, “a fanatic on politics and seldom spoke of anything else” and had described “United Party and National Party officials and members as capitalistic roughs.” Tsafendas had told him that the “South African Government’s policy was “rotten” and often compared conditions in South Africa with those of Russia, stating, “Look at all the poor people in South Africa... such conditions don’t exist in Russia because Russia is a Communistic state.”⁵⁰⁵¹
- Jacobus Bornman testified that Tsafendas “stood up a lot for the Coloureds” and “often criticised the South African government and seemed to have a grudge against Dr. Verwoerd.”⁵⁰⁵²
- Albert Vercueil said Tsafendas told him, “You are like your bloody government, but I will get you, and I will get your Prime Minister too.”⁵⁰⁵³
- Johannes Botha, a security officer, told the police that Nick Vergos characterised Tsafendas in a remark to him as the “biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa.”⁵⁰⁵⁴
- Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie, a sergeant of the South African police, testified that Nick Vergos reported Tsafendas to him as “Communist bastard.”⁵⁰⁵⁵
- Father Hanno Probst reported Tsafendas to a security officer as a “communist and a

⁵⁰⁵⁰ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁵¹ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁵² Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰⁵³ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁵⁴ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁵⁵ Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

dangerous person.”⁵⁰⁵⁶ He suspected Tsafendas of stirring up disaffection among young non-Whites in the Mangete Reserve. “I say this because during the period Demetrios Tsafendas stayed at Mandini, the youngsters in the Mangete Reserve became unruly and aggressive. This, however, is only suspicion, because since the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd everything became quiet again and the youngsters controllable... He started swearing at the Mozambique government, saying it did nothing for the black people.”⁵⁰⁵⁷

- Roelof Swiegers testified that Tsafendas “leaned towards the communist side.”⁵⁰⁵⁸
- According to Inspector Horacio Ferreira, of the Portuguese Security Police in Mozambique, Tsafendas was “intense anti-White” and told him that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-Whites.”⁵⁰⁵⁹
- Keith Martincich testified that Tsafendas “on quite a few occasions he had discussed politics with me. He said he did not like the Government and that he was given a hard time in South Africa. He said the Government won’t reign very long.”⁵⁰⁶⁰
- Antony Maw testified that the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique did not allow Tsafendas to enter the country on grounds of suspected Communist tendencies.⁵⁰⁶¹
- One day after the assassination, a secret telegram from the South African embassy in Lisbon informed the South African police that Tsafendas “has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances, including shouting pro-Communist and anti-Portuguese slogans.”⁵⁰⁶²
- A report by of Col. van Wyk of the South African police characterised Tsafendas as being

⁵⁰⁵⁶ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁵⁷ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁵⁸ Roelof Erasmus Swiegers statement to the police, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

⁵⁰⁵⁹ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵⁰⁶⁰ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁶¹ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

⁵⁰⁶² Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

“intensely anti-white.”⁵⁰⁶³

- Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas's landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, “I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners.”⁵⁰⁶⁴
- A 1941 report from the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs said that Tsafendas was “dismissed from employment at a kiosk in Portuguese South Africa (Mozambique) on account of his Communist leanings.”⁵⁰⁶⁵
- Also, in July 1966, just two months before the assassination, Tsafendas gave a 75-minute interview to a reporter named N.D. Hartford of the *Cape Argus*. They had already met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to the newspaper and enquired whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as an “anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship.”⁵⁰⁶⁶ Hartford's impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. According to Hartford, Tsafendas spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation.⁵⁰⁶⁷

For a more detailed account of Tsafendas's political ideas, see earlier in Dr. Cooper's testimony regarding his motive killing Dr. Verwoerd.

More importantly, Tsafendas himself had told the police that he was “disgusted” with Dr. Verwoerd's racial policies, that he did not believe he was the real representative of all South Africans and wanted to see a government that would represent all the South African people. He even said he had hoped that by killing him a “change of policy would take place.” The police also had in their possession photographs from the demonstrations in London where Tsafendas was holding a placard depicting a man in a Ku Klux Klan uniform and underneath it the words, Dr. Verwoerd and another one where he had pinned the Yellow Star

⁵⁰⁶³ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵⁰⁶⁴ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰⁶⁵ Report of the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, 14 October 1941. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

⁵⁰⁶⁶ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, 'Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.'

⁵⁰⁶⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

of David to his coat.⁵⁰⁶⁸

Nick Vergos had characterised Tsafendas as the “biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa,”⁵⁰⁶⁹ while Kenneth Ross,⁵⁰⁷⁰ Robert Smith, Roelof Swiegers⁵⁰⁷¹ and many others testified that he was a Communist. Stronger language came from such witnesses as Cleanthes Alachiotis, Elias Constantaras, Nikolaos Billis, George Kantas, Nickolas Kambouris, Vasilis Perselis, Grigoris Pouftis and Michalis Vasilakis, all of whom testified to the police that Tsafendas considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator, and “Hitler’s best student,” and that he made a spitting gesture at Verwoerd’s picture.⁵⁰⁷² As recently as a year ago, Father Probst and Nick Vergos reported Tsafendas as a dangerous Communist.⁵⁰⁷³

All of this evidence was in the hands of the police, but none of it was used to challenge Smorenberg. If the Attorney General had challenged Smorenberg’s “impressions” that Tsafendas supported Dr. Verwoerd and his government, the Attorney-General could have presented him as an unreliable witness since his testimony was plainly incompatible with evidence gathered by the police. However, it was perfectly compatible with the defence’s case, of which it was an important part.

SOME “ODD INCIDENTS”

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was there any other incident which stands out in your mind as being odd?

SMORENBERG: From what point of view?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Just odd incidents. Things that you thought were strange conduct

⁵⁰⁶⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁰⁶⁹ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁷⁰ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁷¹ Roelof Erasmus Swiegers statement to the police, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

⁵⁰⁷² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Nickolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁵⁰⁷³ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

on the part of Tsafendas?

SMORENBERG: Regarding his conduct?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Yes?

SMORENBERG: Yes, there were one or two strange things about him. On one particular occasion he was required to change a fairly large pipe. These pipes are held together by 8 bolts. Normally speaking these bolts rust up. There is a lot of seawater there. When a set of bolts comes out we quite often replace them with new ones. On this occasion he had come to me with the bolts in his hand, and they were fairly badly rusted, and he asked me what he should do with them, to which I replied "Make out an order and get a new set from the stores." He went away, made the order out, drew the bolts, and about half an hour later I went on the job to check and I found the old bolts lying, I should say the new bolts lying to one side and he has replaced the old bolts. Well, I thought it was a bit strange to ask for new bolts and then put the old ones back

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Time sheets - can you recall an incident in relation to time sheets which you considered to be strange?

SMORENBERG: Yes. Normally time sheets for the fitters in the section are made out on Monday morning, and that covers the work for the previous week. Any overtime that has been done is also entered on these time sheets. Except in the case where there is a public holiday which falls during the week, as was the case in October. The 10th of October was Kruger Day, which fell on a Sunday. Monday was automatically taken as a holiday, so therefore we were required to make these time sheets out earlier in the week. It was done on a Thursday.

It makes it a bit difficult, because you are then entering up time which they have not yet worked, such as the Thursday and Friday, I had made out the time sheets for the week and sent them on. On the Friday we had a fairly urgent job to do, and the fitters were required to work throughout their lunch hour, and they would therefore be paid overtime for this. I then went out and explained to them that the time sheets had already been sent in, and I could only enter the overtime up on the following week. Everybody seemed to be quite happy about it. There was a number of Coloureds on the job, as well as other fitters

When the next Thursday came and they went to get their pay he had come back and complained bitterly that he had been underpaid for half an hour.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why did you think it was strange?

SMORENBERG: Well, I then went ahead and explained to him again. I said "I told you last week that you would have to wait an extra week before you get this money." But he could not quite grasp it. Eventually I had to take out a piece of chalk and a wooden board and sort of draw a long line and divide it up into seven days and explain from one week to the next week. The Coloureds understood quite easily the first time, but he had great difficulty in understanding why he had to wait an extra week for his money.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When you say "The Coloureds" are they labourers?

SMORENBERG: They are the labourers, yes.

COMMENTS REGARDING THE "ODD INCIDENTS"

Advocate Cooper appears determined to portray Tsafendas as acting strangely with regard to two apparently workaday situations, although Smorenberg is slow to understand his prodding. When Cooper mentions "Odd," Smorenberg asks, "From what point of view?" and when Cooper says "Just odd incidents," Smorenberg asks, "Regarding his conduct?" The first example of "strange conduct" involved eight rusted pipe bolts. Tsafendas asked Smorenberg what he should do about them and was told to draw new ones. Later, Smorenberg noted that Tsafendas had put the rusted bolts back while the new bolts were lying to one side. The second incident concerned overtime payments. In a week when there was a public holiday, as happened in this case, with Kruger Day on October 10, some overtime payments were delayed by a week. Tsafendas apparently failed to understand this and complained that he had been underpaid by a half-hour. Smorenberg said, "He had great difficulty in understanding why he had to wait an extra week for his money."

Neither of these incidents suggests anything stranger than the sort of back-and-forth and misunderstandings that take place in every workplace during a busy day. That Tsafendas put back the old bolts instead of the new ones could easily be an act of absent-mindedness. If he was unfamiliar with the overtime payments system, it seems natural that he would be suspicious and need the details explained to him. Neither of these incidents was mentioned by Smorenberg in his statement to the police made twelve days earlier. What might seem genuinely odd is that although the defence team had met ahead of the trial and Smorenberg knew what he would be asked, he seemed at a loss to find something strange about

Tsafendas's conduct. Whatever difficulties Tsafendas may have had with the time sheets, Smorenberg later told the court that he found Tsafendas's intelligence to be "perhaps a little bit higher than normal," contradicting his own testimony a few minutes earlier which suggested that the accused was perhaps not very bright.

TSAFENDAS'S TRAVELS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he talk about various subjects?

SMORENBERG: Well, he quite often started to talk about his travels, but in a sense it was garbled. He would start off on something and then he would sort of go off at a tangent, and you could never get to the basic point that he was trying to get to. Invariably I used to just sort of lose patience and not even worry to listen.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you believe that he was shooting a line?

SMORENBERG: Yes, very much so.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You didn't believe his story?

SMORENBERG: Not particularly. One or two of them may have been true. He said he had been an engineer at sea, which could quite possibly have happened, but on the standard of his work, I doubt it very much.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How would you describe these stories that he told you?

SMORENBERG: Which stories? The travels?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Yes?

SMORENBERG: They seemed a bit farfetched. He mentioned that he had been in Canada, and that he had been to sea as an engineer. I can't remember them all. In fact, as I said earlier, I had given up hope afterwards of even bothering trying to remember.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was his favourite saying?

SMORENBERG: Well, he gave me the impression that he thought he had done very well for himself in the world. And on a number of occasions he said "I don't think I have done too badly for a poor Portuguese boy born in Lourenço Marques."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is he married?

SMORENBERG: He told me that he was not.

TSAFENDAS'S STANDARD OF WORK

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the standard of his work?

SMORENBERG: It was very poor.

JUDGE BEYERS: Was he a qualified fitter? Could you see when he was doing a job? Did he do a job like a fitter that requires knowledge and dexterity? When he was on the job, did he look like a fitter on the job, or what?

SMORENBERG: No, he looked more like a labourer, to be quite honest.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why did Tsafendas leave his employment at the Power Station?

SMORENBERG: Well, we had given him notice; we had asked him - at least we told him that he was no longer required, we were going to fire him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he react?

SMORENBERG: I wouldn't actually say violently, but tendencies towards that. He was very upset about it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did he say?

SMORENBERG: He said he had worked all over the world, and then, when he came to a stupid place like the Cape Town City Council, they thought he wasn't good enough.
(Laughter).

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you think they were justified in terminating his employment?

SMORENBERG: Definitely.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Could he hold the job down?

SMORENBERG: No, he could not.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was it a difficult job? The work that you gave him, was it really difficult?

SMORENBERG: No. Quite often, if we have a breakdown and we have to get it going again, due to the fact that you must keep a constant power supply, quite often these labourers

will go ahead and change a pipe for us. There may be a fitter around, but he will be on the second job. A labourer can manage quite easily.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And did the labourer in fact perform this type of work better than the accused did?

SMORENBERG: Yes, but that could possibly be because they had had more experience.

CROSS-EXAMINED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What was the salary of the accused?

SMORENBERG: Approximately £85 a month.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: £85 a month?

SMORENBERG: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't he always complain that he was not adequately compensated for his work?

SMORENBERG: Yes, quite often.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: So he didn't regard £85 a month as sufficient?

SMORENBERG: No.

COMMENTS ON SMORENBERG'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S WORK STANDARDS

Smorenberg's testimony here supports Dr. Cooper's view that Tsafendas was not a good worker and that he was not capable of holding down a job. Several employers, supervisors and co-workers gave statements to the police about Tsafendas's work standards. Redvers Wakfer, who also worked at the same company, also told the police that Tsafendas's work was not good, saying. "I never worked with him but received a report that he was not a good worker and I have instructions that he should be dismissed."⁵⁰⁷⁴

The reasons why Tsafendas was not a good worker will be examined shortly. However, more than fifty former colleagues of Tsafendas were questioned by the police and

⁵⁰⁷⁴ Redvers Quintin Wakfer statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub File: 1/5, Subject Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

no one complained about his work standards, including five of his colleagues at the Parliament. On the contrary, several testified that he was a good worker. For example:

- Johannes Aurets, Tsafendas's supervisor at the South African Railways, told the police Tsafendas "was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature. During the time he was employed under my supervision, i.e. for approximately three weeks, I did not see him being cross at any time. He was a good worker."⁵⁰⁷⁵
- Charles Woods, Tsafendas's supervisor at Fraser and Chalmers, characterised him as "a very good worker, far from being a crank, fairly intelligent, but a violent type."⁵⁰⁷⁶
- Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden was Senior security officer of the Colpontoon, diamond boat of Marine Diamond Corporation and worked with Tsafendas for around three months in 1966. He testified to the police that "we were transferred from the Marina with a small outboard boat to the Colpontoon. It was terrible rough seas, so much so that almost all of us old hands got seasick. It struck me that Tsafendas adapted well. He was one of the few who were not sick. With landing he filled the mess-basin on the lower deck with water and started shaving. His calm way struck me that he must know the sea. Tsafendas was employed as a pump- or engineer operator and did not work under my direct supervision. I introduced myself to him and talked to him. He was friendly, outgoing, and was not aloof. I noticed that his eating was messy. Otherwise he was completely normal."⁵⁰⁷⁷
- Garnet Muller, Tsafendas's supervisor at South African Railways for three weeks, testified that Tsafendas gave him to understand that he took the job on a temporary basis. He "observed Demitrio Tsafendas to possess intelligence above that of the average person who is likely to accept a position with the little responsibility which is attached to that of shed attendant."⁵⁰⁷⁸
- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban

⁵⁰⁷⁵ Johannes Jaonus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁷⁶ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, 'Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.'

⁵⁰⁷⁷ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁷⁸ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

was approached by Tsafendas offering his services as a Portuguese or Greek interpreter. Tsafendas “was in the habit of regularly reporting two or three times a week to ask whether there is any interpretation work.” Eventually, Rudolph used him “on several occasions” in a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He testified that “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁵⁰⁷⁹

- Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas’s boss at F. A. Poole in Pretoria, said that in the five months he worked with Tsafendas, he found him to be “not a very good worker, but will say that he was an intelligent worker.”⁵⁰⁸⁰ He also testified to the Commission of Enquiry that he considered Tsafendas to be “an intelligent man, just untidy and lazy in rounding off his work.” He said Tsafendas was a very friendly, social and talkative person but he was always looking to quarrel with the White workers. Mr. Vercueil would usually receive complaints from the other (White) foremen, but never from the black workers. He never got the impression that Mr. Tsafendas wasn’t right in his mind. F.A. Poole moved from their warehouse and Mr. Tsafendas was tasked with organizing the move and he handled it effortlessly.⁵⁰⁸¹
- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for 9-10 weeks at Marine Diamond Corporation testified to the police that he “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁵⁰⁸²
- Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas’s employer at the heavy engineering company, Fries and Son, in Frankfurt, Germany, described Tsafendas as “extremely nice and friendly ... I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man...he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on... we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.” Tsafendas “left on

⁵⁰⁷⁹ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁸⁰ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰⁸¹ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁸² Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

his own wish” although Hartmann “would have liked to keep him.”⁵⁰⁸³ Tsafendas received a reference from Fries and Son, which he used, with other recommendations, to get his job in the Parliament.

As to holding down a job, Tsafendas worked for five to six months as a teacher in Istanbul in 1961. He resigned of his own accord and received a warm reference from his employer, Mr. Limasollu Naci. Mrs. Advije Vedia Limasollu, Limasollu's widow said her husband would not have kept anyone at his college if they were no good.⁵⁰⁸⁴ He also worked for almost two years (May 1940-April 1942) as a welder with the British Mining Supply Company in Johannesburg,⁵⁰⁸⁵ for two years (1936-1939) at the Imperial Airways factory in Quilemane,⁵⁰⁸⁶ and six years (1933-1939) at the “Vulcan Iron Works,” General Engineers.⁵⁰⁸⁷

Tsafendas worked voluntarily as a teacher of English to children in both Istanbul and in Lourenço Marques and was hired several times in Durban for interpreting work. His record suggests that Tsafendas was keen to work and that when he enjoyed the job and found the environment congenial, he worked well; but his work was questionable when he was not happy with working conditions. Since, as Smorenberg testified, Tsafendas considered the wages at the power station to be insufficient, it is unsurprising that he was not enthusiastic about the job. For more about Tsafendas's work abilities see Dr. Cooper's testimony, “unable to function on a reasonable level-employment.”

All of this evidence, that he Tsafendas was a good worker when he liked the job and a poor one when he did not, was held by the police, but again it was not used to challenge Smorenberg's testimony.

⁵⁰⁸³ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin.’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

⁵⁰⁸⁴ Advije Vedia Limasollu in a personal interview, 8 January 2016.

⁵⁰⁸⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰⁸⁶ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demetrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁰⁸⁷ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

TSAFENDAS'S MENTAL STATE AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS COLLEAGUES

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you think of his mental state?

SMORENBERG: Well, I wouldn't say he is mad, but he seems a little bit barmy.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he fit in?

SMORENBERG: No. He was not the type to fit in with the boys. He always seemed to be excluded from everything. If you saw him, you would see him sitting by himself. Although he did on a number of occasions try to strike up conversation with people.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: But the other people didn't fancy him?

SMORENBERG: Didn't take to him, no.

COMMENTS ON SMORENBERG'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S MENTAL STATE AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS COLLEAGUES

Smorenberg here claims that Tsafendas seemed "a little bit barmy," although clearly not "mad." What is important about this comment is not Smorenberg's opinion, and it is only his opinion, but the fact that it was regarded by Judge Beyers as a convincing sign of Tsafendas's insanity. However, consider how Judge Beyers twisted Smorenberg's words in his verdict. He said: "One of the strongest pieces of evidence in this case is that of Mr. Smorenberg, a down-to-earth foreman. I shall not forget that when he was asked: 'What did you think of this man?' his answer was: 'I don't like to call any man mad, but he is definitely barmy.'" However, Smorenberg did not say that. What he said was, "Well, I wouldn't say he is mad, but he seems a little bit barmy."

As for Tsafendas not fitting in with the boys and his co-workers not fancying him, there could be many reasons for this. It did not happen at all his jobs and many former colleagues and superiors testified about him in favourable terms. These included, as mentioned above, Johannes Aurets, Cornelius Rudolph, Charles Woods and Horst Hartman. Aurets said Tsafendas was not only "well-mannered and well-spoken" but that "associated with those working with him... appeared to be of a good nature... During the time he was employed under my supervision i.e. for approximately 3 weeks, I did not see him being cross

at any time. He was a good worker.”⁵⁰⁸⁸ August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁵⁰⁸⁹

Three workers at Fries and Son in Frankfurt described Tsafendas as “a good comrade,” “a nice guy”, “extremely courteous, a very pleasant man.”⁵⁰⁹⁰ Carel van Heerden, who worked with Tsafendas at the Marine Diamond Corporation, indicated that far from being a loner, Tsafendas was “friendly, outgoing, and was not aloof.”⁵⁰⁹¹ Father Nikola Banovic told this the author that Tsafendas was very popular with both students and fellow teachers at the Limasollu Naci College in Istanbul.⁵⁰⁹²

With regard to Tsafendas's attitude to his workmates, it is important to recall the statement made to the police by Horst Albert Vercueil, the foreman at F. A. Poole in Pretoria who had Tsafendas under his supervision for five months. He testified that Tsafendas “bullied the other Portuguese workers. He had fights with several white workers,”⁵⁰⁹³ but he never argued with Coloureds.⁵⁰⁹⁴ Nikolaas Nel, who worked with Tsafendas for five months on the same job, said he “was certainly unpopular among white workers. Accused adapted more to the non-whites.”⁵⁰⁹⁵ Martinus van Wyk, also at that job, said “he was quiet by nature and did not easily talk to us employees. He often spoke to the Bantu people.”⁵⁰⁹⁶

Nick Papadakis, who worked for a month with Tsafendas at the Hume Pipe Company in 1964 in Gondola, told the author that Tsafendas “often argued with Portuguese and other Whites.” The reason, he said, was that Tsafendas was “accusing the White workers of mistreating the Black workers ... he always defended the non-White workers.” Papadakis said that Tsafendas believed the Whites were exploiting and taking advantages of the non-

⁵⁰⁸⁸ Johannes Jaconus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁸⁹ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰⁹⁰ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Assassination a one man's job – says Vorster.’

⁵⁰⁹¹ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁹² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁰⁹³ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁰⁹⁴ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁹⁵ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁰⁹⁶ Marthinus Petrus van Wyk statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Whites and he often argued with them about it, although he tried to avoid them as much as was possible. Papadakis said that Tsafendas had told him that he couldn't help but intervene if he saw an injustice or something wrong taking place.⁵⁰⁹⁷ A similar statement was made to the police by Jacobus Bornman, Tsafendas's flatmate for three months in Pretoria in 1965. He testified that Tsafendas "stood up a lot for the Coloureds."⁵⁰⁹⁸

The author cannot be certain why Tsafendas did not "fit in with the boys" at the power station. His work record shows that at some jobs he got along fine with his workmates. The most likely reason is that he considered these particular White workers to be racist and felt they were taking advantage of the Blacks and Coloureds, and therefore sought to avoid them, as he did at F.A. Poole Engineering and Hume Pipe Company. If this was a continuing issue, it would have happened at his other jobs too, which it did not.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What was the salary of the accused?

SMORENBERG: Approximately £85 a month.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: £85 a month?

SMORENBERG: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't he always complain that he was not adequately compensated for his work?

SMORENBERG: Yes, quite often.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: So he didn't regard £85 a month as sufficient?

SMORENBERG: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Don't you think that when the accused spoke about Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. Vorster he wanted to impress you?

SMORENBERG: It could well have been, but I think, under the circumstances, he was not in any fit condition to impress anybody. He was quite frightened down at the bottom. It is not

⁵⁰⁹⁷ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵⁰⁹⁸ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

too pleasant an experience down there. I think at the earliest moment he just wanted to get out. I doubt very much whether he was in the mood for impressing anybody.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You say the accused told you that he was married?

SMORENBERG: No, he said he was not married.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was his intelligence normal?

SMORENBERG: Yes, I would say he had normal intelligence. Perhaps a little bit higher than normal.

COMMENTS ON THE CROSS-EXAMINATION

The cross examination here offers a possible clue as to why Tsafendas did not work effectively at the power station – that he was dissatisfied with his wages, frequently the main reason for poor standards in any work situation. The rest of the cross-examination does not offer anything new. Evidence gathered by the police which contradicts Smorenberg's testimony and which could have been adduced to reveal him as an unreliable witness was not used. His most absurd comment, that Tsafendas supported Dr. Verwoerd and the government, thus remained unchallenged. As usual, we are not in position to know whether the Attorney-General was in possession of this evidence.

CONCLUSION

Smorenberg "got the impression" that Tsafendas was a supporter of Dr. Verwoerd and of apartheid and that he did not like Coloureds. Overwhelming and undisputed evidence proves that Smorenberg's "impression" was totally wrong, although the Attorney-General did not bother challenging it.

Smorenberg's testimony regarding Tsafendas was a travesty of the truth, but it was crucial, according to Judge Beyers in reaching his conclusion that Tsafendas was insane. However, the judge manipulated Smorenberg's words in his verdict, as he did with Patrick O'Ryan. In this case, he said, "One of the strongest pieces of evidence in this case is that of Mr. Smorenberg, a down-to-earth foreman. I shall not forget that when he was asked: 'What did you think of this man?' his answer was: 'I don't like to call any man mad, but he is

definitely barmy.”⁵⁰⁹⁹ As we have seen, Smorenberg did not say this at all. He said “Well, I wouldn't say he is mad, but he seems a little bit barmy.”

What was the real purpose of the defence in having a witness like Smorenberg? Clearly to prove that Tsafendas was pro-government and therefore the assassination was not politically motivated but the deed of an unstable man. Out of the about one-hundred and fifty witnesses who were questioned by the police, David Bloomberg managed to locate the only one who had said something which might be taken as suggesting Tsafendas was “pro-government.” Smorenberg was also able to support the defence's argument that Tsafendas was mad, even though he also stated that “I wouldn't say he is mad, but he seems a little bit barmy.” Smorenberg also supported Dr. Cooper's diagnosis that Tsafendas was unable to hold down a job.

Everything in Smorenberg's testimony could have been taken apart and rendered null and void by using the evidence gathered by the South African police, but this did not happen. The saddest thing is that Smorenberg presented Tsafendas as a man who did not like Coloured people and who supported Dr. Verwoerd and Vorster. With these claims remaining unchallenged, people were left with the impression that these were Tsafendas's beliefs. Instead of being shown to the public as someone who considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a dictator who did not represent all the South African people, a tyrant oppressor, the monster who created apartheid and “Hitler's best student,” Tsafendas is represented in exactly the opposite light. None of the statements made to the South African police by witnesses such as Bornman, Furness, Smith, Ross and many others, as well as information collected about Tsafendas's political activities and real ideology, became known during the summary trial.

⁵⁰⁹⁹ Judge Beyers' verdict on Tsafendas's summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 9: DR. ISAAC SAKINOFSKY

DR. SAKINOFSKY'S PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHY AS RELATED BY HIM TO THE COURT

Isaac Sakinofsky qualified as a doctor in 1955, completed his internship at Groote Schuur Hospital, Cape Town, and in 1957 joined the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry at the same hospital. His initial position was Registrar and later Senior Registrar. In June 1961, he earned his Doctorate in Medicine based on post-graduate research he had completed. At the beginning of 1962, he went to London to do post-graduate study and was appointed at the Maudsley Hospital, the teaching hospital of the Post-Graduate Institute of Psychiatry of the University of London. He served on the professional unit as a Registrar and later was promoted to Senior Registrar to a Professorial Unit. As a teaching hospital in psychiatry, the Maudsley is regarded as of ultimate rank.

In 1964, Dr. Sakinofsky took the Academic Post-graduate Diploma in Psychological Medicine of the University of London, and in July 1965 he returned to South Africa as the full-time Consultant Psychiatrist to Groote Schuur Hospital. He was also Senior Lecturer to the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Cape Town. In September 1966 he had been acting head for three months in Groote Schuur's Department of Psychiatry in the absence of his chief overseas. Dr. Sakinofsky authored two chapters on emergency psychiatry in a book titled *Emergencies*, published by Staples, London, in 1962.⁵¹⁰⁰

BACKGROUND ON DR. SAKINOFSKY'S FIRST EXAMINATION OF TSAFENDAS

Dr. Sakinofsky examined Tsafendas on the evening of the assassination. Later, he contacted all the hospitals Tsafendas had mentioned, looking for as much information as possible in the event he was called to testify at a trial, which indeed happened.⁵¹⁰¹ Dr. Sakinofsky stated in correspondence with the author: "In psychiatry, after one has interviewed a patient, it is best practice to seek collateral information from family, friends and medical records."⁵¹⁰² Mr.

⁵¹⁰⁰ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵¹⁰¹ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵¹⁰² Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky in correspondence with the author, 30 March 2016.

van Zyl and Professors Burke, Tuviah Zabow, Heilbrun and Resnick all agreed with the above.⁵¹⁰³ Dr. Sakinofsky secured one medical report from Tsafendas's medical record, but got nothing about the accused from his family or friends.

EXTRACTS FROM DR. SAKINOFSKY'S TESTIMONY⁵¹⁰⁴

DR. SAKINOFSKY'S FIRST EXAMINATION OF TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Having disposed of the preliminaries, what happened at 7 p.m. on the 6th September, 1966?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, at 7 p.m. on September, 6th, I was examining the accused, Demetrios Tsafendas.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: In the Casualty Department, Groote Schuur Hospital.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: At whose request?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I was called by the Casualty Officer and by members of the Security Police.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the nature of your examination?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Psychiatric.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How long did this examination last?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I estimate, without having timed it exactly, about an hour and a half.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And did you make certain findings?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, I did.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you reduce your findings to writing and set it out in a report?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Indeed, I did.

⁵¹⁰³ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016; Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁵¹⁰⁴ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Which is dated, do you know?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: September the 7th.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When did you draw up that report?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: The report was partly drawn up the same night and completed the next morning.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: To whom did you submit that report once you had drawn it up?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, I expected that the report would be submitted to the Security Police for the use of the State and the report lay with the Medical Superintendent for some time.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And was subsequently forwarded to the Attorney-General?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I just want to skip ahead; were you informed by the Attorney-General that you were not required to testify for the State, but were to be called by the Defence?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. I made contact with the Attorney-General some weeks afterwards because I wondered what was happening and was told that I had been allocated to the Defence - my evidence was being allocated to the Defence.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you your report dated the 7th September, 1966, before you?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I have.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Will you read it out to the Court?

(Copy handed to the bench).

DR. SAKINOFSKY: (Witness reads report). "On September 6th, 1966, at 7 p.m. I was called to Groote Schuur Hospital Casualty Department where I examined the mental state of a man who identified himself to me as Demetrios Tsafendas, and gave his age as 48 years. The patient's demeanour was moderately excited (but not elated or exalted); he was tense, breathing rapidly at times, and he seemed perplexed. On two occasions he burst into weeping for a few seconds, but was not otherwise manifestly depressed. His speech seemed unguarded; was under some pressure. He answered most questions readily. There was no formal syntactical schizophrenic thought.

(The Court intervenes) **JUDGE BEYERS:** Do you mind if I interrupt where I don't understand? "His speech was unguarded; was under some pressure." I am not sure I've got the purport of that.

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Pressure alludes to the piece of behaviour which we refer to as "excitement" and which I think has some difference from the lay use of the word "excitement", and one of the ways that one assesses....

(The Court intervenes) **JUDGE BEYERS:** "His speech was unguarded", what does that mean? He was not careful of what he was saying?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. One makes the assessment clinically of whether a patient is holding back, and my assessment was that he was not holding back at that time.

JUDGE BEYERS: He was speaking openly?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: He was speaking openly.

JUDGE BEYERS: Now "He was under some pressure."

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. This refers to the rate of speech. The rate of speech was rapid and profuse, and is a symptom of excitement. (Witness continues to read report). "

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Disorder but I formed the conclusion that his reason was impaired, in that there was a manifest....."

(The Court intervenes) **JUDGE BEYERS:** You are going too fast for me. "There was no formal syntactical schizophrenic thought disorder...."

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: What does that mean?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Syntactical refers to the grammar with which the patient speaks. The psychiatrist analyses the patient's utterance in terms of the form (the grammar that is) and the contents, what he says in his speech. And when one uses the term "syntactical schizophrenic thought disorder" this is a cardinal feature of schizophrenia. But its absence at a particular time does not necessarily mean that the patient is not schizophrenic.

JUDGE BEYERS: So from the point of view of syntax his expressions were in order?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, the grammar of it was fine.

JUDGE BEYERS: You mean the verb didn't go where the noun should be or....?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, there are certain aspects of syntax which a psychiatrist concentrates upon. One of these is the phenomenon of thought blocking, which is an unexpected gap in the train of the patient's speech. Another is referred to as asyndesis which is a disjunction of a phrase with another phrase - two phrases being connected which are not logical. Another is the interpenetration of thoughts and ideas into a train of thought. And there are others where we talk of derailment.

JUDGE BEYERS: In other words, syntactically speaking, your observation there was negative?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: It does not negative schizophrenia?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No.

JUDGE BEYERS: But it did not support it at that stage?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Quite.

(Witness continues reading report) "But I formed the conclusion that his reason was impaired in that there was a manifest defect of logical processes with repeated non sequiturs. He was frankly deluded in that he said that the Portuguese Government had kept him in a prison for 14 years (between 1949 and 1963) for being a conscientious objector and that they had tried to kill him for this by the application of alternating currents to his head. He gave as one of the reasons for his assassination of the Prime Minister that the latter was in league with the Portuguese Government. He voiced several other delusional ideas, viz., that the Prime Minister had been a foreigner (and he, Tsafendas, a South African)"

JUDGE BEYERS: Why do you call that delusional? That was true, wasn't it?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: In the first place Tsafendas himself, I believe, is not a South African, and in the second place, the Prime Minister certainly by adoption a South African.

(Witness continues reading report) "Been against the English way of life (with which he, Tsafendas, identified himself on account of 'having had an English mother'). He said that Dr. Verwoerd had been against the ideal of a 'Cape to Cairo' union, which he, the patient, identified with 'the Commonwealth.' He claimed that his mother, from whom he had been separated, was called Von Willem and that she was a member of an overseas Royal Family and I wondered at the time whether this had to do with the existence of Queen Wilhelmina

and an allusion to the Prime Minister's Dutch descent.

And this idea he apparently connected with his concern for the Commonwealth. He stated that he had brooded over the weekend about the meeting between the Prime Minister and Chief Leabua Jonathan, which meant to him a further blow to the "Commonwealth," and this had determined his actions subsequently. He appears to have misinterpreted this meeting as being related to the immorality legislation, in that he claims to have applied for a double identity card, so that he could try and find a wife among either the White or non-White groups: he stated that he had been rejected by women of both race groups and therefore was not able to get married. Tsafendas spoke also of attacks of surges of "anguish and pain" ... (I am quoting him) ... "anguish and pain" throughout his body and limbs associated with "pressure headaches" (and I noted from his hospital records that he had attended the out-patient clinic for headaches - not the psychiatric clinic - during June, 1966). He claimed also to see "hairy springs and coils" in front of his eyes which he attributed to blood pressure, but I did not think that this betokened hallucinosis. He denied passivity feelings at that time but said that his thoughts raced most of the time.

JUDGE BEYERS: Now you've got me again. What is that "passivity feelings"?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: A passivity feeling is another very important cardinal feature of schizophrenia whereby an influence on the patient is interpreted, by the patient, as being due to an external agency. For instance, if a patient believes that his body had been changed by hypnosis or by computers or something like that, or by an enemy, this would be passivity.

JUDGE BEYERS: Passivity, does that mean that he maintains that it is not his fault because his body has been taken over by some other agent or something....?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: At this time I did not question him.

JUDGE BEYERS: Yes, but is that what it means?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: That he is just the tool of some other outside force or influence?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: If he said he was the tool of an outside ...

JUDGE BEYERS: Is that what 'passivity feelings' mean?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, that one's will is taken over, one's thoughts are tampered with, one's body functions are interfered with by an external agency.

(Witness continues reading report.) "He was fully orientated for time and person. His concentration was moderately impaired; his general knowledge reasonable (considering that he claimed only to have passed Standard V), and he denied epileptic seizures. The patient claims to have had several "nervous breakdowns." He says that he was detained in a New York immigration transit centre in 1942 and given tablets. Subsequently he spent about 18 months in the Grafton State Hospital, New York, where he had electro-convulsive therapy and he was subsequently deported to Greece. He had a further period of hospitalisation for "nervous breakdown" in 1963 at, what he told me was, the Ochosen Kranken- house outside Hamburg." May I say that it subsequently appears that his dates had been confused.

(Witness continues reading report.) Comment: I formed the conclusion that the patient is not of sound mind, that his thought processes are grossly impaired and deluded, and that he is not therefore in a position to evaluate correctly the consequences of his deed. I consider that it is probable that his mental state is the result of damage caused by previous attacks of a mental disease called Schizophrenia. In my opinion, further important information on the state of his mind should be obtained by the following:

- He should be detained in a closed mental hospital ward for a period of observation. I would like myself to assess his mental state over a period of time and at successive interviews.
- He should have the following special investigations: An electro-encephalogram, a blood and cerebro-spinal fluid Wasserman reaction because occasionally an organic disease of the brain can mimic the clinical picture of schizophrenia, and he should have psychological tests.

JUDGE BEYERS: What is the Wasserman for? To see if it is syphilitic in origin?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. Cerebral syphilis.

JUDGE BEYERS: To see if it is G.B.I. really?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

(Witness continues reading report):

- Medical reports should be obtained via the Portuguese government; Grafton State Hospital, New York, and the Krankenhaus outside Hamburg and I said it was possible that the names of these places had been garbled by the patient.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And you hand in that report as EXHIBIT C.

JUDGE BEYERS: Just before Mr. Cooper asks you further - and thanks for helping me through this - how did it come about that he told you all this that is written down here, about Chief Jonathan, the Prime Minister, Von Willem, and all that? Did you put him on a couch and make him talk, or what happened?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: He was on a couch; I didn't put him on a couch; he'd been on a couch because he had had a wound stitched on his nose, so I left him on the couch and just chatted to him as a psychiatrist does; leading him along certain lines and trying to probe other channels.

JUDGE BEYERS: Were you two alone?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No, there was one other person present. He was my Junior Registrar.

JUDGE BEYERS: And you just got him to ramble on and talk to see what came out?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: If I may quote from some notes I made at the time. I said to him: "Is it true that you killed the Prime Minister?" That is how I started, and he nodded. He agreed that he did assassinate the Prime Minister but he said: "I don't remember what happened after that." I asked him whether he had taken the job as a messenger in order to assassinate the Prime Minister. He denied this. He denied that he sought the job as a messenger with the intention of killing the Prime Minister. He claimed that he had no idea that he would be allowed access to the Prime Minister at any time, and he was rather taken by surprise that he was. I said; "What made you do a thing like that?" He said: "I didn't agree with the policy. I am in favour of the Commonwealth. My mother is a relative to Royalty overseas" and he went on rambling in this way about his mother's name being Von Willem, that she died in 1927.

JUDGE BEYERS: That is how all this came out?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, in that sort of way.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You followed, therefore, a recognised procedure?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, this is, I think, quite recognised as a means of eliciting information.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And did you follow various lines of questioning?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. This is what is called an unstructured interview, in that one didn't have a sort of questionnaire and then address it to the patient. I let him ramble in order to

promote him talking about things that I might not ask him about. But in doing so I tried to cover what we regard as the mental state, in other words, his general appearance and behaviour, his thought processes, existence of misperceptions, misinterpretations, his cognitive functions, and so on.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: At that stage you had no information of his background, apart from what he told you?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Apart from what he told me and from what I heard over the radio, that he had assassinated the Prime Minister.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You did not know that three months previously Dr. Kossew had diagnosed him as a schizophrenic?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I had no idea.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You did not know that in America he had been diagnosed as a hebephrenic type schizophrenic?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No idea at all.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Nor did you know of the fact that he had been to the Isle of Wight?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No, he didn't tell me that.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Nor did you know that he had been to London Hospital?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No. He didn't tell him about the hospitals

DEFENCE COUNSEL: A mental hospital, and that he had there also been classified or diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I had no knowledge of that.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You obviously must have realised that this was a very important diagnosis that you had to make?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Indeed.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Were you cautious? Did you give it a great deal of thought? Were you cautious in your approach?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, indeed. I was very much aware of the importance of this case.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You appear by nature to be a cautious person, if I may say so?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: That is for others to judge.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you thereafter request to see the accused again?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I did.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You requested the defence, did you not?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I initially contacted the prosecutor and then the defence.

JUDGE BEYERS: I think you initially contacted me, didn't you?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, I did.

JUDGE BEYERS: And I referred you to the Attorney-General?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: This case is obviously a matter of importance?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. It is more than of importance to - I think there are several aspects of importance in this case. I think as a case in forensic psychiatry it is of the utmost importance, but I don't think that this could have concerned me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you in fact write overseas for a report to the German hospital?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I did. I wrote to all the hospitals that the patient had mentioned.

JUDGE BEYERS: Perhaps we had better get this on record, in case more might be read into that remark than is necessary. Doctor, when you contacted me you asked me - I am putting it; you can say whether it is right or not - whether it isn't possible that we could do what is done in America and that you be called by the judge rather than by one of the two parties?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: That is quite true, but I don't think that I emphasised that I personally alone. My feeling, if I may say so in this place, is that in a matter of criminal trial the forensic psychiatrists should be called by the court - forensic psychiatrist.

JUDGE BEYERS: That is what you said to me. All I want is that it is clear that we discussed no aspect of this, and I didn't know what this record was going to have?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No, not at all. In fact what this record was going to have you told me you didn't want to know

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I accept that without qualification.

JUDGE BEYERS: I told the witness that in this country judges don't call witnesses, unless

they have to at the end of a case.

DR. SAKINOFSKY: May I say that the existence of an assessor who is a psychiatrist helps about my objection to the structure of criminal trials.

COMMENTS ON DR. SAKINOFSKY'S TESTIMONY REGARDING HIS FIRST EXAMINATION OF TSAFENDAS

Dr. Sakinofsky stated that his first examination of Tsafendas lasted "without having timed it exactly, about an hour and a half." However, according to the newspaper reports of the time, this examination must have lasted for thirty to forty minutes maximum. According to Dr. Sakinofsky, he saw Tsafendas at Groote Schuur Hospital at 7 pm. Dr. Darby, who examined Tsafendas at the same hospital just before Dr. Sakinofsky, had examined him at 6.40 pm, which suggests that Dr. Darby had spent maximum twenty minutes with Tsafendas. According to the newspaper reports of the time,⁵¹⁰⁵ if they are accurate, Tsafendas's visit to the hospital had lasted one hour, which leaves forty minutes maximum for Dr. Sakinofsky and not an hour and a half.

PRIOR TO DR. SAKINOFSKY'S EXAMINATION

First, we must examine the condition of Tsafendas at the time he was seen by Dr. Sakinofsky. Immediately after the assassination, Tsafendas was taken to the police station in Caledon Square. He claims he was beaten by policemen all the way there. At 2.50 pm, soon after his arrival, Tsafendas was examined, because of his injuries and bleeding, by Dr. Kossew, who found that he had a gaping wound of one and a half inches from his forehead to the bridge of his nose, which was swollen, and a half-inch cut on the lower lip. Tsafendas answered questions guardedly but did not appear confused and Dr. Kossew did not find anything wrong with his mental state.⁵¹⁰⁶

⁵¹⁰⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 'Tsafendas in hospital', 7 September 1966: 1; *Natal Mercury*, 'Assassin rushed to hospital.' 7 September 1966: 1.

⁵¹⁰⁶ Dr. Kossew's report on examination in case of alleged assault or other crime, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File 3. NASA.

Tsafendas remained at the police station for the next three hours, during which time, he claimed,⁵¹⁰⁷ and this was supported by a policeman who was present,⁵¹⁰⁸ he was tortured and beaten.⁵¹⁰⁹ Because of his injuries and severe bleeding from the beating, the officer in charge asked Brigadier Aucamp⁵¹¹⁰ to take Tsafendas to a hospital.⁵¹¹¹ Brigadier Aucamp and his detail must have arrived with Tsafendas at the casualty department of Groote Schuur hospital around 6.30 p.m.,⁵¹¹² according to newspaper reports of the time. During a heavily-guarded, one-hour visit,⁵¹¹³ the police imposed a total security blackout on the hospital and nobody was allowed to see Tsafendas. The newspaper reports of the time claimed that plain-clothed policemen stood by Tsafendas's side constantly during the hospital visit, including when he stripped to be examined and even inside the X-Ray room.⁵¹¹⁴

At 6.40 p.m., Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Darby, who found him to be "co-operative" and "composed." According to Dr. Darby's report, Tsafendas had a broken nose with blood obstructing the airways, a ragged laceration from the right eyebrow to the nose and a laceration of the lower lip. The cuts were stitched, the nose put in a splint and Tsafendas was given an anti-tetanus injection.⁵¹¹⁵ Dr. Darby's report did not contain anything about Tsafendas's state of mind. Dr. Darby's examination would have lasted at most twenty minutes as Tsafendas was then seen by Dr. Sakinofsky at 7 p.m.

In contradiction of newspaper reports that policemen were constantly with Tsafendas during the visit to the hospital, even in the X-ray room, Dr. Sakinofsky stated in correspondence with the author that he had examined Tsafendas without the presence of any policemen: "We found Mr. Tsafendas in a room that was milling about with uniformed and plain-clothed security men of all ranks. It would have been impossible to establish any kind of rapport with him under these conditions, so there proceeded a stand-off where we refused to examine him until the room was cleared of the security personnel, which we were

⁵¹⁰⁷ Dimitris Tsafendas in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. The part is available in the rushes; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

⁵¹⁰⁸ Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 12 December 2015.

⁵¹⁰⁹ For more about what happened to Tsafendas immediately after the assassination see Chapter Four.

⁵¹¹⁰ Not sure if this is the correct spelling, but it sounds something like this.

⁵¹¹¹ Dimitris Tsafendas in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. The clip is available in the rushes.

⁵¹¹² Dimitris Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Darby at 6.40, therefore he must have arrived at the hospital shortly before that.

⁵¹¹³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas in hospital'; *Natal Mercury*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin rushed to hospital.'

⁵¹¹⁴ *Natal Mercury*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin rushed to hospital.'

⁵¹¹⁵ Dr. Darby's statement regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, G.S.H. No: 65/14-081, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

eventually able to effect only after we contacted the superintendent of the hospital and got his support. After we had interviewed Mr. Tsafendas at length and after calming his agitation at the time and gaining rapport, we did complete our examination. We deliberately refused to make any public announcements until the following day. We would have liked to have detained him in the hospital for further study and treatment but the security authorities overrode our wishes and took him away.”⁵¹¹⁶ Dr. Sakinofsky is mistaken about making a public announcement the following day, as no such announcement took place.

THE EXAMINATION AND TSAFENDAS'S DELUSIONAL IDEAS

According to Dr. Sakinofsky, Tsafendas burst into tears twice, “his speech seemed unguarded, was under some pressure.” Dr. Sakinofsky goes on to describe in detail Tsafendas's mental condition at the time without reference to his physical condition. Of course, his task was to examine Tsafendas's mental and not his physical state, but this was a case of huge national importance when it might be assumed that all aspects of the accused assassin's condition would be of significance. Tsafendas was taken to hospital in the first place because of his physical injuries, which in themselves might have affected his mental state at the time. It is tempting to believe that the injuries would seem natural to Dr. Sakinofsky in a man who just four and a half hours earlier had killed the Prime Minister and then spent three hours in police custody. Dr. Sakinofsky stated that “there was no formal syntactical schizophrenic thought,” but Tsafendas's reason was impaired and he was also deluded. Let us examine now how “deluded” Tsafendas was.

TSAFENDAS BEING IMPRISONED FOR FOURTEEN YEARS BY THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT

Dr. Sakinofsky stated that Tsafendas told him that the Portuguese Government had kept him in prison for fourteen years, between 1949 and 1963, for “being a conscientious objector and that they had tried to kill him for this by the application of alternating currents to his head.” None of the about two hundred or so witnesses who were interviewed by the police, the Commission of Enquiry and by the author testified that Tsafendas ever told them anything like this. None of the psychiatrists and psychologists who examined Tsafendas before and after the assassination heard such a story from Tsafendas and he never repeated this claim

⁵¹¹⁶ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky in correspondence with the author, 30 March 2016.

subsequently to anyone, not even to Dr. Sakinofsky when he examined him for a second and a third time. If Tsafendas really believed this happened, surely he would have told someone else too. Tsafendas never told a single person about it, as far as the author can establish.

The fact is Tsafendas was imprisoned and tortured in Portugal and he told a number of people about it, but in a way that differed from the story Dr. Sakinofsky recounted. Patrick O’Ryan⁵¹¹⁷ and Gladstone Dunn⁵¹¹⁸ testified to the police about Tsafendas’s account, and several witnesses interviewed by the author said they were told the same story, such as Cleanthes Alachiotis, Elias Constantaras, Katerina Pnema, Fotini Gavasiadis, Nikolas Kambouris, Grigoris Pouftis, George Kantas, Mary Eendracht, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis, Father Nikola Banovic, Andreas Babiolakis, Father Minas Constandinou, Nikolaos Billis, Michalis Vasilakis, Ira Kyriakakis, Helen Grispos and Nick Papadakis. Tsafendas told these witnesses that he was imprisoned in Portugal because of his Communist and anti-colonialist activities, which was a fact according to the PIDE reports. He also told them that he was given electric shock treatment, which very probably happened. None of the witnesses remembers how long Tsafendas told them he was imprisoned, but they are all certain that it was not fourteen years.⁵¹¹⁹ According to the PIDE reports, Tsafendas was imprisoned by the Portuguese for about three years altogether. Tsafendas spoke at length to these relatives and friends, but he never told them what he told Dr. Sakinofsky.

Tsafendas also told Major Rossouw during his interrogation in Caledon Square police station that while in Portugal he was imprisoned “for over a year at the Port of Casias.” However, he made no mention of the things he told Dr. Sakinofsky.⁵¹²⁰ What he told Major Rossouw was what he told all the other witnesses.

⁵¹¹⁷ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵¹¹⁸ Gladstone Dunn statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹¹⁹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁵¹²⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Furthermore, in July 1966, in an interview with the *Cape Argus*, where Tsafendas had described himself as an “anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship.” He told the journalist that he was imprisoned without trial for three years in Portugal and “brainwashed,” a procedure from which he said he had never fully recovered. He also spoke about his imprisonment in Lisbon, in Barca d ‘Alva, in Aljuba and at the Machinegun Regiment, when he refused to serve in the Portuguese Army. He said that he was not allowed to return to Mozambique until 1963.⁵¹²¹ The newspaper did not explain that by brainwashing, Tsafendas meant the Portuguese’s attempts to change his Communist ideology and anti-Portuguese stance. That Tsafendas was telling the truth about all these matters is confirmed by PIDE’s “Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas, no: 2707/64/SR, of November 15, 1964.”⁵¹²²

Thus, why did Tsafendas tell Dr. Sakinofsky a different story to the one he told everyone else? The likeliest explanation is that he lied to Dr. Sakinofsky as he lied to the other psychiatrists who examined him after the assassination for his own ends, though it is worth pointing out some things in Tsafendas’s statement to Dr. Sakinofsky were true. Tsafendas was a conscientious objector and was imprisoned for a few days by the Portuguese because of his refusal to serve in the Portuguese Army.⁵¹²³ In addition, Tsafendas told Alachiotis, Babiolakis, Billis, Kyriakakis, Constantaras, Eendracht, Patrick O’Ryan, Pouftis, Vasilakis, Kantas, Kambouris, Fathers Nikola Banovic and Minas Constandinou that he had pretended to be mad to avoid service in the Portuguese Army, which was also a fact.⁵¹²⁴ Interestingly, the dates which Dr. Sakinofsky said Tsafendas gave him for his imprisonment, 1949-1963, are the years he was not allowed to return to Mozambique and forced to live in exile in Europe.

⁵¹²¹ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.’

⁵¹²² PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT

⁵¹²³ Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 November 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵¹²⁴ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

DR. VERWOERD BEING IN LEAGUE WITH THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you agree that millions of people think that Dr. Verwoerd and the Portuguese Government were in league together?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I think millions of people know that there is a friendly relationship between our two countries, but I would not say that they were in league in the sense that Mr. Tsafendas saw them to be in league. In other words, that the Portuguese Government was influencing the internal affairs of South Africa, the Immorality Act, etc.

Dr. Sakinofsky uses the words “Portuguese Government,” perhaps simply in imitation of the Attorney-General, who used the same words. However, Tsafendas had some “trademark” phrases, like Dr. Verwoerd being “Hitler’s best student,” and according to several witnesses, he invariably referred to “the Portuguese dictatorship,” as he did in his *Cape Argus*, interview,⁵¹²⁵ and not to “the Portuguese Government.”

Tsafendas told several witnesses that he considered Portugal’s Antonio Salazar to be a dictator and he actually was. He also believed and said often, that Dr. Verwoerd was also a dictator. He never spoke to any of these witnesses about Dr. Verwoerd being in league with Salazar, although he often denounced both men and almost certainly he believed, and rightly, that they were indeed in league, just not in the way he told Dr. Sakinofsky.

Dr. Sakinofsky does not explain in detail how he came to the conclusion that Tsafendas thought the Portuguese Government was influencing the internal affairs of South Africa. If Tsafendas told him this, Tsafendas was lying, as again he told this to no-one, although he spoke to many witnesses about his political ideas. None of the approximate two hundred witnesses who were interviewed by the police, the Commission of Enquiry and the author said that Tsafendas ever told them anything of this nature.

These are the testimonies of people who testified to the police about Tsafendas’s political ideas and other evidence collected by the South African police regarding his political activities and ideology. They are compatible with each other but incompatible with Dr. Sakinofsky’s version of what Tsafendas told him:

- Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas wanted to “create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South

⁵¹²⁵ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.’

African regime out of power.”⁵¹²⁶

- Tsafendas himself had testified to the police that he was a member of the South African Communist Party from 1937 to 1942, that he was against apartheid and colonialism, that he had joined the British anti-apartheid movement and that he took part in anti-apartheid demonstrations in London.⁵¹²⁷
- PIDE held a 130-page file on Tsafendas, the *Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*.⁵¹²⁸ It opened in 1938, when he was just twenty-years old, when he was “suspected of distributing communist propaganda”⁵¹²⁹ and went up to his release from PIDE custody on January 26, 1965 after spending three months in a cell in Beira accused of pretending to be a Christian missionary while in reality preaching “under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”⁵¹³⁰
- PIDE had withheld from the South African police the fact that they had such a file, along with other information “indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique,”⁵¹³¹ thus hiding the extent of Tsafendas’s political activities. However, the South African embassy in Lisbon was aware of all this and on September 7, the day after the assassination, informed the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Cape Town that Tsafendas “has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances, including shouting pro-Communist anti-Portuguese slogans.” The communication said he had “never been convicted as courts have found him to be of unsound mind” and added, “if information correct, we suspect Portuguese may play down assassin’s previous political activities and we would suggest full details in this connection be sought.”⁵¹³²
- The South African police had FOUR files on Tsafendas because of his Communist beliefs

⁵¹²⁶ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹²⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵¹²⁸ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵¹²⁹ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵¹³⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵¹³¹ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵¹³² Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

and political activities.⁵¹³³

- Tsafendas was on the Stop List of the Department of Immigration because of his Communist beliefs and activities.⁵¹³⁴ This list was also in the possession of the Security Police.⁵¹³⁵
- The Department of Immigration had two files on Tsafendas:
 - a. “On file B.7771 there were, *inter alia*, references to Demitrios Tsafendakis’s alleged communist activities, as well as references to his unsuccessful applications for permanent residence. It is also evident from the file that he had been placed on the stop list.⁵¹³⁶
 - b. “On file G.8226 there were references to his alleged communist activities, and detailed references to his unsuccessful applications of 1936, 1938, 1941, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1950 and 1959 to enter the Union of South Africa.”⁵¹³⁷
- It was known to the South African police that Tsafendas was deported and exiled from Mozambique due to his Communist and anti-colonialist beliefs and activities.⁵¹³⁸
- It was known that Tsafendas was arrested in Mozambique by the Portuguese Public Security Police on November 16, 1964 and subsequently handed to PIDE accused of “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.” It was also known that he had spent three months in custody being interrogated because of the accusations.⁵¹³⁹
- It was known to the South African police that while he was in South Africa from 1939 to

⁵¹³³ Report of the COE. Chapter XI, Paragraphs 4 and 5. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵¹³⁴ Report of the COE. Chapter IV, Paragraph 19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵¹³⁵ General H. J. Den Bergh memorandum to the COE, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File VDSO 17-64, NASA.

⁵¹³⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter IV, Paragraph 19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵¹³⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter IV, Paragraph 20. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵¹³⁸ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Tsafendas: Mystery man of parliament’; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 8 September 1966: 1, ‘The killer: Five passports and a record of subversion’; *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dimitrio a Red, they alleged’; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Assassin said to have been deported from P.E.A. for Communist connections.’

⁵¹³⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafendakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafendakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

1942 Tsafendas was “engaged actively in Communistic propaganda.”⁵¹⁴⁰

- It was known that in 1938 in Mozambique he was dismissed from a job “owing to his Communist leanings” and that he was suspected of being “engaged in disseminating Communistic propaganda.”⁵¹⁴¹
- It was known that Tsafendas supported Mozambique’s independence from Portugal and wanted to see “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother-nation.”⁵¹⁴²
- It was known to the police that Tsafendas, while in London, had associated with prominent anti-apartheid activists David Gardener, Solly Sachs and Rev. Canon Collins.⁵¹⁴³
- Although PIDE had concealed important information about Tsafendas’s political activities, it confided in a report which it gave to the South African police that Tsafendas had admitted after being arrested on one occasion that he was “a partisan of the independence of this province.” The same report also stated that “although, as above mentioned, TSAFENDAS is mentally deficient, the truth is you find in him an obvious spirit of rebellion against the Portuguese Administration, and a clear adhesion to the independence of Mozambique.”⁵¹⁴⁴
- Kenneth Ross was Tsafendas’s landlord in Durban for two months in 1965. He told the police that Tsafendas “was very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in politics. Tsafendas objected to the Communists being banished to Robin Island because of their political opinions and actions. In general, Tsafendas opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the

⁵¹⁴⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter I A, Paragraph 23. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵¹⁴¹ Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 16. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵¹⁴² PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵¹⁴³ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹⁴⁴ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

present Government, and was definitely pre-Russian.”⁵¹⁴⁵

- Patrick O’Ryan told the police that Tsafendas “was against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal” and that he “labelled the apartheid policies as unfair.”⁵¹⁴⁶ Later O’Ryan described Tsafendas as getting “excited” when he talked about politics and saying that Dr. Verwoerd was a tyrant who was oppressing his people, that he was ‘Hitler’s best student’ and if he (Tsafendas) ever get hold of him “he would bash his skull.” He did not tell the police about Dr. Verwoerd being a tyrant as he believed it would be bad for Tsafendas.⁵¹⁴⁷
- Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren, a security officer at the Mandini Paper Factory in Zululand, told the police that Nick Vergos said Tsafendas “was not Greek, but a kaffir and a Communist.”⁵¹⁴⁸
- Robert Smith was a night clerk at the Durban Men’s Home where Tsafendas stayed for two months in 1965. He testified that Tsafendas was a Communist, “a fanatic on politics and seldom spoke of anything else” and had described “United Party and National Party officials and members as capitalistic roughs.” Tsafendas had told him that the “South African Government’s policy was “rotten” and often compared conditions in South Africa with those of Russia, stating, “Look at all the poor people in South Africa... such conditions don’t exist in Russia because Russia is a Communistic state.”⁵¹⁴⁹
- Albert Vercueil said Tsafendas told him, “You are like your bloody government, but I will get you, and I will get your Prime Minister too.”⁵¹⁵⁰
- Johannes Botha, a security officer, told the police that Nick Vergos characterised Tsafendas in a remark to him as the “biggest Communist in the Republic of South

⁵¹⁴⁵ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹⁴⁶ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵¹⁴⁷ Patrick O’Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes. Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵¹⁴⁸ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹⁴⁹ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹⁵⁰ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Africa.”⁵¹⁵¹

- Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie, a sergeant of the South African police, testified that Nick Vergos reported Tsafendas to him as “Communist bastard.”⁵¹⁵²
- Father Hanno Probst reported Tsafendas to a security officer as a “communist and a dangerous person.”⁵¹⁵³ He also testified that Tsafendas “started swearing at the Mozambique government, saying it did nothing for the black people.”⁵¹⁵⁴
- Roelof Swiegers testified that Tsafendas “leaned towards the communist side.”⁵¹⁵⁵
- Jacobus Bormman testified that Tsafendas “stood up a lot for the Coloureds” and “often criticised the South African government and seemed to have a grudge against Dr. Verwoerd.”⁵¹⁵⁶
- According to Inspector Horacio Ferreira, of the Portuguese Security Police in Mozambique, Tsafendas was “intense anti-White” and told him that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-Whites.”⁵¹⁵⁷
- Keith Martincich testified that Tsafendas “on quite a few occasions he had discussed politics with me. He said he did not like the Government and that he was given a hard time in South Africa. He said the Government won’t reign very long.”⁵¹⁵⁸
- Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas’s landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, “I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was

⁵¹⁵¹ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹⁵² Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹⁵³ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹⁵⁴ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵¹⁵⁵ Roelof Erasmus Swiegers statement to the police, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

⁵¹⁵⁶ Jacobus Johannes Bormman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵¹⁵⁷ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵¹⁵⁸ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners.”⁵¹⁵⁹

- Antony Maw testified that the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique did not allow Tsafendas to enter the country on grounds of suspected Communist tendencies.⁵¹⁶⁰
- A report by of Col. van Wyk of the South African police characterised Tsafendas as being “intensely anti-white.”⁵¹⁶¹
- A 1941 report from the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs said that Tsafendas was “dismissed from employment at a kiosk in Portuguese South Africa (Mozambique) on account of his Communist leanings.”⁵¹⁶²
- Peter Pappas, whose café in Durban Tsafendas often visited, said Tsafendas “spoke angrily about the Salazar regime in Portugal and about the Mozambique police.”⁵¹⁶³
- In July 1966, just two months before the assassination, Tsafendas gave a seventy-five-minute interview to a reporter named N.D. Hartford of the *Cape Argus*. They had already met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to the newspaper and enquired whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as an “anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship.”⁵¹⁶⁴ Hartford’s impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. According to Hartford, Tsafendas spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation.⁵¹⁶⁵
- Reports from Mozambique which emerged after the assassination said that Tsafendas was “violently anti-Portuguese.”⁵¹⁶⁶
- Jorge Perestrelo, who met Tsafendas in Lisbon, told *Diario Popular* that “one could see how anxious he was to oppose the authorities.”⁵¹⁶⁷

⁵¹⁵⁹ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵¹⁶⁰ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

⁵¹⁶¹ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵¹⁶² Report of the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, 14 October 1941. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

⁵¹⁶³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁵¹⁶⁴ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.’

⁵¹⁶⁵ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵¹⁶⁶ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘180-day prison for Tsafendas?’

⁵¹⁶⁷ Cuttings from the *Diario Popular* of 9.9.66. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Eight more witnesses, Cleanthes Alachiotis, Elias Constantaras, Nikolaos Billis, George Kantas, Nickolas Kambouris, Vasilis Perselis, Grigoris Pouftis and Michalis Vasilakis, seven of them from the *Eleni* tanker, whose statements were not found at the National Archives, maintained that they were interviewed by the South African police and testified that Tsafendas was a Communist and against apartheid and considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator and “Hitler’s best student.” More importantly, they also testified that Tsafendas had joined the military wing of the Greek Communist Party during the Greek Civil War.⁵¹⁶⁸

Several other witnesses who knew Tsafendas very well like Ira Kyriakakis, Father Nikolas Banovic, Katerina Pnema, Helen Grispos, Fotini Gavasiadis, Nick Papadakis, Mary Eendracht, John and Antony Michaletos, Nick Augustides and Andreas Babiolakis stated to the author that Tsafendas was a passionate Communist who considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator, and “Hitler’s best student.”⁵¹⁶⁹ Tsafendas kept characterising Dr. Verwoerd with those words as long as thirty years after the assassination.⁵¹⁷⁰ Andreas Babiolakis told the author that Tsafendas made no attempt to hide his detestation for colonialism and apartheid. Tsafendas told Babiolakis one day that “Verwoerd and [Portuguese Prime Minister] Salazar are fascist dictators and should be executed like Mussolini.”⁵¹⁷¹

In addition, at least six crewmen from the *Eleni*, Cleanthes Alachiotis, Nikolaos Billis, George Kantas, Nickolas Kambouris, Grigoris Pouftis and Michalis Vasilakis, testified to the police that Tsafendas described a possible assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as morally justifiable, because he was a tyrant and a dictator who was oppressing his people. The fact that Tsafendas had said this just three days before the assassination gives extra value to the information. These six witnesses also told the police, as Elias Constantaras had done, that Tsafendas called Dr. Verwoerd Hitler’s best student and that he spat at his picture in a

⁵¹⁶⁸ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Nickolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁵¹⁶⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵¹⁷⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵¹⁷¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

newspaper.⁵¹⁷²

Tsafendas never told anyone that the Portuguese Government was influencing the internal affairs of South Africa, not even the police when he was arrested. He neither made such claim to the Portuguese police when he was interrogated by them. It is very possible that he believed that the two Prime Minister were in league with each other, which was accurate, but he could not possibly have believed that the Portuguese were influencing the internal affairs of South Africa.

Finally, why would Tsafendas tell everyone with whom discussed politics the same things about his ideology, but say something completely different to Dr. Sakinofsky? Tsafendas never repeated this comment to anyone, not even to the psychiatrists or the psychologists who examined him; Dr. Sakinofsky is the only person who ever said Tsafendas spoke of such things.

DR. VERWOERD BEING A "FOREIGNER"

Tsafendas never told anyone who testified to the police, to the Commission of Enquiry, but also to the author, that he considered himself to be a South African. He always described himself as African and Mozambican with a Greek and Shangaan background. He did not believe in nationalities, nations and borders, anyway; he felt people should be allowed to travel and live wherever they wished. What he said, time and again, was that he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a dictator, a tyrant, an oppressor of his own people and "Hitler's best student."

The fact that Tsafendas called Dr. Verwoerd a foreigner must be examined in the context of Dr. Sakinofsky's statement. As we saw in Tsafendas's police statement of September 19, he referred to Dr. Verwoerd as a "foreigner" and a "Hollander." He had said then, "I always had a grudge against the South African Government on account of its racial policies and I hated Dr. Verwoerd because he was a foreigner - a Hollander."⁵¹⁷³

⁵¹⁷² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁵¹⁷³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

It is true that Dr. Verwoerd was born in Amsterdam, Holland, but Tsafendas was clearly using the word in his own wider sense. He was not speaking in terms of citizenship, rather from his personal ideology in which “foreigners” were colonialists, such as the ruling Whites in South Africa and the Portuguese in Mozambique. His belief was that pre-independent African countries were “occupied lands,” settled by a ruling minority of foreigners, whereas they should be governed on a democratic basis by the people who were born in those countries, be they White or non-White. In Mozambique in 1964, Tsafendas was accused of “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”⁵¹⁷⁴

When interrogated by the PIDE, Tsafendas said he wanted to see “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they White or Black, and therefore separated from the mother nation.”⁵¹⁷⁵ This was a firmly held belief which he mentioned to numerous people, including Helen Grispos, Ira Kyriakakis, Katerina Pnema, Andreas Babiolakis, Mary Eendracht, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis and Father Minas Constandinou. They all said that Tsafendas considered the Portuguese rulers of Mozambique to be “foreigners” and “conquerors” and that he used those words to describe them. He believed the Portuguese had commandeered the land from its rightful owners.⁵¹⁷⁶

In the case of South Africa, Mozambique and Rhodesia, he considered these to be “occupied lands” under the oppressive minority rule of incomers such as Dr. Verwoerd, Ian Smith and the Portuguese colonialists. He exempted Whites who backed majority rule but considered as classic occupiers those settler Whites who had made large fortunes from vast tracts of land effectively stolen from the indigenous non-Whites. In effect, what Tsafendas meant by “foreigner” or “conqueror” was “colonialist.” His position was that Mozambique was a province, i.e. a colony, of Portugal, and the Portuguese who ruled it were therefore colonialists, foreigners, incomers from Europe. He also believed that South Africa and Rhodesia should be governed by the majority and not by a handful of Whites. For Tsafendas,

⁵¹⁷⁴ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵¹⁷⁵ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵¹⁷⁶ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

the word “foreigner” meant “colonialist.” With the witnesses mentioned above, he used the Greek word for foreigner, which can carry a darker shade of meaning than in English.⁵¹⁷⁷

Tsafendas believed that all those who supported the Portuguese and the white Rhodesian and South African Governments were foreigners who had stolen the land from the native Mozambicans and Rhodesians and set themselves up as unilateral rulers. Equally, he believed that apartheid-supporting Whites in South Africa were also foreigners and occupiers who had seized and settled native land forcibly removing the non-Whites.⁵¹⁷⁸ Tsafendas also considered apartheid to be a form of colonialism, not very different from the out-and-out colonialism of Mozambique and Rhodesia. We should note here that in 1963, the policy of apartheid had been declared by the South African Communist Party to be “colonialism of a special type.”⁵¹⁷⁹ It is possible that this pronouncement confirmed Tsafendas’s own convictions on the subject.

Father Minas told the author about Tsafendas’s political ideas:

“Dimitris used to say that apartheid was like colonialism, because a few Europeans were ruling a land which belonged to Blacks because their ancestors had invaded and conquered it. I remember he used to call the Portuguese in Mozambique and I think the whites in South Africa too, ‘conquerors’ and ‘occupiers;’ he considered Mozambique and South Africa to be ‘occupied lands,’ conquered by foreigners. He used to say that Verwoerd was Hitler’s best student, because he had learned from him some of his methods and laws and he was applying then to the Blacks.”⁵¹⁸⁰

As for Tsafendas seeing Dr. Verwoerd and the Whites in South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique as “foreigners,” he was certainly not the only one who thought that way. Even Dr. Verwoerd himself acknowledged this idea in a speech on February 8, 1961: “There are people who are far away and do not understand us. They see this southern point of Africa

⁵¹⁷⁷ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵¹⁷⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵¹⁷⁹ Visser, 1997: 79; Volpe, 1988: 28-35.

⁵¹⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

only as a White-dominated country in a large continent with over 200 million people who are black. And then they say we do not fit here, we are foreign to the body of Africa.”⁵¹⁸¹

DR. VERWOERD BEING AGAINST THE ENGLISH WAY OF LIFE

This is again something Tsafendas never mentioned to the two hundred-plus witnesses interviewed by the police, the Commission and the author. Dr. Sakinofsky in his testimony quoted Tsafendas as stating that Dr. Verwoerd was against the “English way of life,” which Tsafendas favoured. This excerpt was read by the author to fifty-eight people who knew Tsafendas, including nine who knew him very well: his half-sister Katerina Pnema, three friends who grew up with him, Ira Kyriakakis, Mary Eendracht and Andreas Babioulakis, and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis, Nick Papadakis, Father Nikola Banovic, Father Minas Constandinou, Father Michalis Visvinis and Fotini Gavasiadis. Not one of them believes he could have made such a comment and to have really meant it.⁵¹⁸² Tsafendas never repeated the “way of life” comment to anyone else, including medical experts who examined him later.

Tsafendas was also anti-British because of British assistance to the royalists during the Greek Civil War and also because of that country’s former colonial policies,⁵¹⁸³ therefore it seems unlikely that Tsafendas was concerned about the British Commonwealth or the “English way of life.” However, Tsafendas supported the British Labour Party because of its stance against apartheid and often attended party meetings in London.⁵¹⁸⁴ He considered London to be his favourite city and an ideal place to live, if it was not for the weather and his failure to get a work permit. He was impressed that many different people lived side by side

⁵¹⁸¹ Pelzer, 1966: 494.

⁵¹⁸² Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁵¹⁸³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵¹⁸⁴ Edward Furness statement to the police 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

in London and there was no evident racism.⁵¹⁸⁵

More importantly, Tsafendas despised royalty and titles. When the British king and queen visited South Africa in 1947, Eleni Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas's half-sister, who was still at school at the time, wrote or recited a poem or just participated in a ceremony in their honour. She was given a mug bearing a picture of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, which she treasured and which is now in the possession of her son. When Tsafendas found out about it, he protested jokingly in a letter to his father for allowing her to participate in the celebrations, since Michalis, too, was anti-royalist.⁵¹⁸⁶

After the Second World War, Tsafendas's father had become anti-British, too, because of that country's support for the royalists in the Greek Civil War.⁵¹⁸⁷ When Tsafendas returned to South Africa and spent nine months in Pretoria in 1964, he often ate or visited his half-sister's house. The mug was on display in her house and he told his sister that if he saw it he would "throw it out of the window." Of course, it was a joke and he never did.⁵¹⁸⁸

Further, it is clear Tsafendas was lying when he told Dr. Sakinofsky his mother was English. Dr. Sakinofsky had no way of knowing the truth, which was that Tsafendas's mother was born in Mozambique to a Mozambican mother and a German father. He never told anyone apart from Dr. Sakinofsky, that his mother was "a member of an overseas Royal Family." All of Tsafendas's relatives and two of the priests smiled at this comment.⁵¹⁸⁹

⁵¹⁸⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵¹⁸⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵¹⁸⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵¹⁸⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵¹⁸⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 22 April 2016; Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

DR. VERWOERD BEING AGAINST A "CAPE TO CAIRO" UNION

The Cape to Cairo reference is one of the strongest indications that Tsafendas was lying to Dr. Sakinofsky. Once again, none of the two hundred witnesses ever heard Tsafendas say Dr. Verwoerd opposed the idea of a Cape to Cairo union. They never even heard him mentioning the Cape to Cairo union. Tsafendas himself never mentioned it to the police when he was questioned; there is no reference to it in any of the reports by the South African police or PIDE, and it appears that Dr. Sakinofsky is the only person ever to hear him saying it. Furthermore, a Cape to Cairo union was one of Cecil Rhodes'⁵¹⁹⁰ dreams for Africa.⁵¹⁹¹ As a fanatical anti-colonialist, Tsafendas had no sympathy for the ideals of an arch imperialist such as Cecil Rhodes.

All the witnesses who knew Tsafendas and who were interviewed by the author were asked whether Tsafendas ever commented about Rhodes and whether he would have supported such an idea. Some respondents were not able to give a definite answer, but the majority discounted such a possibility outright. Let's examine the evidence:

- Tsafendas himself told the police on September 11, "I was anti-colonial, against slavery and in favour of all colonies which were controlled by Belgium, France and Portugal to be afforded self-government."⁵¹⁹² His ideas as expressed in this statement were confirmed to the author by several witnesses.
- He attended anti-colonialist meetings and demonstrations in London.⁵¹⁹³
- He considered it a disgrace that Zimbabwe had been named Rhodesia in honour of Rhodes.⁵¹⁹⁴

⁵¹⁹⁰ (1853-1902) Rhodes was part of the imperial machine, a politician and a businessman with an interest in mining. He funded the South African territory of "Rhodesia" which was named after him. He served as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony in South Africa from 1890 to 1896 (*The Times*, 27 March 1902: 7, 'Death of Mr. Rhodes'). A highly polarising figure, a statue of him was removed from Cape Town University in 2015 amid emotional scenes as reported by the BBC (9 April 2015).

⁵¹⁹¹ One of Rhodes' dreams for a united Africa was the construction of a railway running from the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt, a great "red line" on the map of the continent. On world maps of that era, British dominions were always denoted in red. Rhodes had secured much of southern and central Africa for the British Empire. He felt that the best way to "unify the possessions, facilitate governance, enable the military to move quickly to hot spots or conduct war, help settlement, and foster trade" would be to build a "Cape to Cairo Railway" (Freeman, 1915: 327-355).

⁵¹⁹² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵¹⁹³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵¹⁹⁴ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

- He told Katerina Pnema and her husband Gerry that one day Rhodes's statues in Africa would be brought down by the people.⁵¹⁹⁵ The monument to Cecil Rhodes at Cape Town University was brought down in April 2015.⁵¹⁹⁶
- He believed the Whites in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe had commandeered the land from its rightful owners. Thus these territories were "occupied lands" ruled by "occupiers." However, he recognised the right of Whites who accepted majority rule and opposed colonial government to live there.⁵¹⁹⁷
- Tsafendas admitted to the Commission of Enquiry that he endeavoured to recruit people for an uprising against the colonialist Portuguese in Mozambique.⁵¹⁹⁸
- A PIDE report stated that Tsafendas was a partisan for the independence of Mozambique.⁵¹⁹⁹
- Another PIDE report stated that Tsafendas wanted to see a "Mozambique governed by natives whether white or black, but separate from the mother-country (Portugal)" and that "he is all for the Independence of this Province."⁵²⁰⁰
- Yet another PIDE report stated that "you find in him an obvious spirit of rebellion against the Portuguese Administration, and a clear adhesion to the independence of Mozambique."⁵²⁰¹
- Tsafendas was arrested five times by the Portuguese Police in Mozambique because of his Communist and anti-colonial activities, while he was also banned from entering the country from 1951 to 1963 due to these activities.⁵²⁰²

⁵¹⁹⁵ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵¹⁹⁶ BBC, 9 April 2015, 'Rhodes statue removed in Cape Town as crowd celebrates.' Retrieved from:

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-32236922>

⁵¹⁹⁷ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵¹⁹⁸ Report of the COE, Chapter II B, Paragraph 32. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵¹⁹⁹ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵²⁰⁰ PIDE report regarding Demitrio Tsafendas or Dimitrios Tsafendakis, 19 January 1965. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas

⁵²⁰¹ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵²⁰² Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

- He was arrested in Mozambique accused of pretending to be a religious missionary while in reality, preaching “in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”⁵²⁰³
- Father Hanno Probst reported Tsafendas to a security officer as a “communist and a dangerous person.”⁵²⁰⁴ “He started swearing at the Mozambique government, saying it did nothing for the black people.”⁵²⁰⁵
- According to Inspector Horacio Ferreira, of the Portuguese Security Police in Mozambique, Tsafendas was “intense anti-White” and told him that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-Whites.”⁵²⁰⁶
- One day after the assassination, a secret telegram from the South African embassy in Lisbon informed the South African police that Tsafendas “has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances, including shouting pro-Communist and anti-Portuguese slogans.”⁵²⁰⁷
- A report by of Col. van Wyk of the South African police characterised Tsafendas as being “intensely anti-white.”⁵²⁰⁸
- Peter Pappas stated that Tsafendas spoke angrily about the Salazar regime in Portugal and about the Mozambique police.⁵²⁰⁹
- Also, in July 1966, just two months before the assassination, Tsafendas gave an interview to a reporter named N.D. Hartford of the *Cape Argus*. They had already met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to the newspaper and enquired whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as an “anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship.”⁵²¹⁰

⁵²⁰³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵²⁰⁴ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁰⁵ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁰⁶ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁰⁷ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵²⁰⁸ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁰⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁵²¹⁰ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

- Tsafendas admired Patrice Lumumba, Ahmed Ben Bella and Fidel Castro and put up their posters in his quarters.⁵²¹¹

All the above evidence is mutually compatible, compatible with what Tsafendas told the police and with what several witnesses told the author. However, they are incompatible with what he told Dr. Sakinofsky, which was something that he was the only one to ever have the “privilege” of hearing.

None of the sixty-nine witnesses who were interviewed by the author was ever told by Tsafendas about the “Cape to Cairo” idea. According to twenty-six witnesses, Cleanthes Alachiotis, Father Nikola Banovic, Father Ioannis Tsafaridis, Father Michalis Visvinis, Father Minas Constandinou, Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis, Alexandra Vaporidou, Katerina Pnema, Mike Vlachopoulos, Eleni Vlachopoulos, Ira Kyriakakis, Helen Grispos, Elias Constantaras, Nikolaos Billis, Nick Papadakis, George Kantas, Paul Babiolakis, Nickolas Kambouris, Mary Eendracht, Vasilis Perselis, Manuel Mastromanolis, Costas Poriadis, Vasilis Perselis, Grigoris Pouftis and Michalis Vasilakis, Tsafendas’s anti-colonialism would never have permitted him to support such an ideal. In fact, Tsafendas declared that Rhodes’ statue and the statues of all other colonialists would one day be removed from everywhere in Africa. These witnesses’ statements about Tsafendas’s political ideas have been included in this chapter already, so they will not be included here again.

Finally, Tsafendas spoke extensively about politics and his life while he was in prison and later in the hospital, but only to people he trusted. He never told anyone any of the things he told Dr. Sakinofsky but repeated what he told all these witnesses prior to the assassination - for example, that he was anti-colonialist and wanted all countries in South Africa to gain their independence.⁵²¹² All the foregoing evidence as to Tsafendas’s political convictions concerning colonialism and Cecil Rhodes make it evident that Tsafendas never supported such an idea and that he was simply lying to Dr. Sakinofsky.

⁵²¹¹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵²¹² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

DR. VERWOERD'S MEETING WITH CHIEF LEABUA JONATHAN

According to Dr. Sakinofsky, this meeting was for Tsafendas “a further blow to the Commonwealth.” He believed Tsafendas “misinterpreted this meeting as being related to the immorality legislation.” It is highly unlikely that Tsafendas, because of his ideology, would have been concerned about the Commonwealth, something he had never mentioned to anyone before. He talked politics constantly, especially with people he knew well, freely expressing his political ideas.⁵²¹³ If he had any interest in the Commonwealth, he would have told some of the about two hundred people who were interviewed by the South African police, the Commission and the author.

Furthermore, Tsafendas mentioned the Dr. Verwoerd-Jonathan meeting in his statement to the police on September 11 made no reference to the Commonwealth or the immorality legislation. What he said then was: “The meeting between Dr. Verwoerd and Chief Leabua Jonathan was a contributory fact in my decision to murder Dr. Verwoerd. I say this because I thought the Prime Minister was dealing with the wrong person. Both Dr. Verwoerd and Jonathan were, to my mind, not the real representatives of their countries. I wanted the Paramount Chief of Basutoland to represent the Basuto nation. I wanted to see a government representing all the South African people. I do not think the Nationalist Government is representative of the people and I wanted to see a different government.”⁵²¹⁴

Far from referencing the Immorality Act or the Commonwealth, Tsafendas characterised Dr. Verwoerd as a dictator in his usual terms, stating that the prime minister did not represent all South Africans and he (Tsafendas) wanted to see a government that would represent all of the South African people. Tsafendas characterised Dr. Verwoerd as a dictator to more than thirty witnesses. He never commented on Chief Jonathan to any of the witnesses interviewed by the police, the Commission or by the author. As for the Immorality Act, it is true that Tsafendas strongly opposed and openly criticised it, but he did the same with several other apartheid laws, comparing them to the Nuremberg Laws of Nazi Germany.

⁵²¹³ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²¹⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

TSAFENDAS'S APPLICATION FOR A DOUBLE IDENTITY CARD

According to Dr. Sakinofsky, Tsafendas told him that he applied for such a card in order to “try and find a wife among either the White or non-White group: he stated that he had been rejected by women of both race groups and therefore was not able to get married.” Tsafendas is lying again, since several witnesses and he himself stated that he had only applied for reclassification as Coloured.⁵²¹⁵

What is more, there is no evidence that Tsafendas was rejected by women of both groups. He had a Black girlfriend, Stella, in Mozambique in the late 1930s, a White Jewish girl around 1940 in South Africa,⁵²¹⁶ a Portuguese girlfriend, probably White, in Portugal in the 1950s,⁵²¹⁷ a White Communist German woman in Germany also in the 1950s⁵²¹⁸ and a Turkish Muslim woman in Istanbul in 1961. The Turkish woman wanted to marry him, but neither was willing to convert to each other's religion and anyway, Tsafendas wanted to go back to Africa.⁵²¹⁹ These were at least some of Tsafendas's serious relationships as far as the author was able to establish, but it is very possible that there were others.

Tsafendas never said much about his relationships with women to the priests who visited him in prison or the hospital or to other friends and acquaintances. Asked about girlfriends and how far he had gone with them, Tsafendas would say, “A gentleman never discusses such matters.”⁵²²⁰ The author learned about the above relationships from people who were close to Tsafendas at the time and not because he talked about them.

TSAFENDAS NOT HAVING ANY “PASSIVITY FEELINGS”

Dr. Sakinofsky stated that Tsafendas did not have any “passivity feelings” and as we see, Tsafendas did not even mention the tapeworm during this examination. Dr. Sakinofsky was the third doctor to examine Tsafendas on the day of the assassination and he mentioned it to none of them. Dr. Sakinofsky clearly stated that Tsafendas did not have any “passivity feelings” which means to the psychiatrists that, at least at the time, he did not believe he had a

⁵²¹⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵²¹⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵²¹⁷ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁵²¹⁸ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

⁵²¹⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 4 November 2015.

⁵²²⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

tapeworm. Tsafendas was not embarrassed to talk about having a tapeworm to everybody he met twenty days after the assassination and, as we have seen, he told doctors in hospitals where he sought admission that he had a "fixation with a tapeworm."

Thus, if Tsafendas believed he had a tapeworm, as he told these doctors, why did he not use it with Dr. Sakinofsky? The fact that Tsafendas did not have any passivity feelings proves that he did not believe he had a tapeworm, at least at that time. This was a very important issue and contradicted the defence's line, but it was not picked up by the Attorney-General or the Judge; Dr. Sakinofsky was allowed to continue without being asked to clarify the issue and, as we will see, was not challenged about it in the cross-examination.

Tsafendas spoke freely about the tapeworm to all those who examined him twenty days after the assassination. However, on the day of the assassination, he did not mention it to anyone, not even to a psychiatrist. The idea that Tsafendas hid it for some reason could not possibly be valid, for why would he hide it from Dr. Sakinofsky that day but use it a month later? Even if we assume that Tsafendas was delusional about the things he told Dr. Sakinofsky that day, still he named reasons for killing Dr. Verwoerd which were different from those he would use later with Dr. Cooper and even with Dr. Sakinofsky himself. Again, this suggests that at that time Tsafendas had not decided to use the tapeworm story, having had three opportunities to do so, especially with Dr. Sakinofsky who was a psychiatrist, none of which he used. This again, suggests that Tsafendas was play-acting according to the situation, as he did with the Portuguese and his Saint Peter act when he was accused of campaigning for the independence of Mozambique.

DR. KOSSEW'S DIAGNOSIS

The Defence Counsel refers to Dr. Kossew's diagnosis of Tsafendas without mentioning that he was diagnosed as such based on yet another delusional idea he appeared to have at the time, this time of a persecutory nature. He had claimed to Dr. Kossew that more than twenty people had died from food poisoning in the house where he was staying⁵²²¹ and did not mention the tapeworm at all. The incident has been discussed extensively in Dr. Kossew's testimony.

⁵²²¹ Dr. Ralph Kossew testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

However, the important issue here is that Tsafendas appeared to have had another delusional idea, apart from the tapeworm, just two months before the assassination and this was an idea that he never repeated to anyone else. All the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas claimed that he had the tapeworm since the mid-1930s, therefore he must still believe he had it when he was examined by Dr. Kossew, even if he did not mention it. The strange thing is not that he did not mention it, but that he appeared to hold two delusional ideas simultaneously - the tapeworm and the poison murders. This again, suggests that Tsafendas was play-acting according to the situation, as he did with the Portuguese and his Saint Peter act when he was accused of campaigning for the independence of Mozambique. The issue of having two delusional ideas simultaneously has been discussed in Dr. Cooper's testimony.

CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST EXAMINATION

Everything that Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky during their first meeting was a lie or he was extremely confused, which is not unlikely taking under consideration his situation. The fact that he never mentioned any of the things he told Dr. Sakinofsky to anyone else, not even to him again, suggests fabrication. If Tsafendas really meant the things he said, he would surely have told at least one other person, not to mention the doctors who began examining him three weeks later. What he said was completely contradictory to his beliefs as well as to all the evidence gathered by the South African police and later from forty-four interviews and 12,000 documents from archival sources which the author collected. More importantly, the evidence of the police is compatible with the evidence gathered by the author, and incompatible with what Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky.

One important issue concerning this first meeting was not adequately examined and was left unchallenged by the Judge and the Attorney-General. This was that Tsafendas did not tell Dr. Sakinofsky anything about the tapeworm and he did not have any passivity feelings at the time. Twenty days later, Tsafendas would speak freely about the tapeworm to anyone, including Dr. Sakinofsky. He had no problem talking to doctors about it, as he had done happily in the past and would do again in the future.

The doctors at the summary trial would claim that Tsafendas had had a tapeworm since the mid-1930s, that it was controlling his life and was responsible for killing Dr. Verwoerd. If he really believed that, why did he not tell Dr. Sakinofsky so shortly after the

assassination? Why did he give Dr. Sakinofsky different motives to those he would give later to the doctors? And of course different to the ones he gave to the police? The big difference though between the reasons he gave to the police and the reasons he gave to the doctors is that the evidence collected at the time by the police and the evidence later collected by the author are entirely compatible with what Tsafendas told the police but incompatible with what he told Dr. Sakinofsky. This alone suggests that Tsafendas did not at the time intend to use the tapeworm act and only decided to use it later when he could no longer endure the torture.

If you should ask any of those who know the author of this study, they will say that he does not like the heat and prefers cold weather. If ever that author should murder someone and then tell a psychiatrist or his lawyer, "I don't like the cold weather, I like the heat," what would all those who knew him for so many years say? This is exactly how the people who knew Tsafendas well felt when they heard about the tapeworm, that he was insane and about all the things he told Dr. Sakinofsky that first day.

Dr. Sakinofsky also very correctly suggested that a forensic psychiatrist should be called by the court for such a case, but his suggestion never materialised. As a matter of fact none of the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas was a forensic psychiatrist. According to Professor Tuviah Zabow, if Tsafendas was a schizophrenic when he was examined by Dr. Sakinofsky and the other psychiatrists, he must still have been one while he was in prison and then in the hospital. His health must also have been deteriorating, given that fact that he did not receive any medical treatment and he was in solitary confinement for twenty-three hours per day for at least twenty-two years. While he was deprived of any contact with his fellow prisoners, he was also brutally assaulted and kept in a room next to the death chamber where executions took place regularly.⁵²²² However, Tsafendas remained ever faithful to the ideas he had from his youth and never told anyone the sort of things he told Dr. Sakinofsky.

⁵²²² Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016.

DR. SAKINOFSKY'S SECOND EXAMINATION OF TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you see the accused subsequent to the 6th September, 1966?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I saw him exactly a month after the first time, on the 6th October.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: In the E.E.G. department at Groote Schuur Hospital.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the E.E.G. department?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It is the electroencephalography laboratory.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was an E.E.G. taken in this case?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: An E.E.G. had just been taken.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you know the result of that E.E.G.?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the result?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It was normal.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What does that indicate in itself?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It indicates in itself, as far as the diagnosis of schizophrenia is concerned, nothing.

JUDGE BEYERS: It would have been different if you were dealing with an epileptic?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, indeed.

JUDGE BEYERS: Then you would have found a dysrhythmia or something, which might have been indicative?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Quite so.

JUDGE BEYERS: But on schizophrenia you don't expect to find any dysrhythmia or any other thing wrong with the encephalograph?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No.

JUDGE BEYERS: Is that right?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Quite right.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: On the 6th October, then, did you have an interview with the

accused?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I did.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Of what duration?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: About an hour and a half to two hours, I should estimate.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you tell the Court the findings that you made at this interview?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. My findings confirmed my initial impression. The content of the interview was somewhat different, in that he then for the first time spoke to me about this tapeworm that I have heard discussed in this Court, which I regard as a hypochondriacal delusion, a delusion referring to bodily functions. He spoke more about the episode in Portugal when he claimed to have been ill-treated in a paranoid way, and the content of what he had to say was that the Portuguese doctors and nurses, the nuns in the hospital that he was in in Lisbon, were trying to ruin him by giving him shocks on the head. I asked him what the reason was for this. He said he didn't know the reason, but they had asked him if he was a Roman Catholic and he said he wasn't, and the hospital was run by nuns, so he assumed it was because he was a Protestant that they were trying to ruin him. He then went on to reveal to me ideas of passivity, by saying - I said: "Are you going so far as to say that they tried to ruin you because you weren't a Roman Catholic?" He said: "Maybe they were trying to change me." I said: "Change you? How could they change you?" He said "Do something to my brain." I don't want to go into too much detail, but the mechanism which they were using he said was a transformed radio, and then he revealed what I regard as another symptom of schizophrenia, delusional perception, which means that an innocent visual image, something which one may see, like this microphone, takes on a sinister meaning to a patient. He said he had passed an old radio on one of the tables and immediately he knew that this was the instrument that was being used to act on his brain. He called it a "graphanola." I said: "What is a graphanola? Is that a word?" He said: "It is a radio." I said: "Is it a Portuguese word?" He said: "Portuguese, yes." I have looked up this word in seven Portuguese-English dictionaries, and it doesn't exist. I can only conclude that this is what we in psychiatry call a neologism.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is a neologism?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It is a word which is manufactured by a patient with one of the major mental disorders, chiefly schizophrenia.

JUDGE BEYERS: Is it one of the symptoms of schizophrenic people that they manufacture words?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: Is that what you are telling us?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Some schizophrenics manufacture words. This was the only neologism I elicited.

JUDGE BEYERS: The graphanola?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Graphanola.

JUDGE BEYERS: Did you look up a Greek dictionary?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No, I didn't.

JUDGE BEYERS: It starts with a Greek word?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It may exist in Greek.

JUDGE BEYERS: And he also speaks Greek, I believe?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, he speaks a number of languages. I didn't look up the Arabic one either.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he claim that this word was a Greek word?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No, he claimed it was a Portuguese word.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What else did you find?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: He said that this graphanola had been used in previous murders which had been hushed up in Lisbon. One of them was the case of a son of a banker. I couldn't really follow him in his reasoning. He didn't seem to have much to go on to establish this, and I took this as part of his delusional system.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What else did you find?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Ideas of reference, which I can quote. This is a symptom of schizophrenia, too. He said that once when he was sitting in a cafe where Coloured people used to gather, from the colonies, "they mentioned at one of the tables I was sitting at what was taking place", namely, that he was having shock treatment and that his brain was being washed. This is an idea of reference. He also showed the symptom of depersonalisation,

which means a feeling of change in the body, which is so bizarre that it is regarded as psychotic. I asked him:

“Do you feel any strange sensation in your body, apart from this tapeworm?” and he said, “No. I don’t feel myself at all sometimes. I don’t feel my body. I don’t feel myself.” I said: “Tell me about that. That is important.” He said: “I don’t feel myself. I am walking, I just don’t feel myself. There are times when I more or less feel my body, but there are periods when I don’t feel myself. I feel I am walking lightly. I feel as if I am floating in thin air.” I think these were the chief features of that particular interview. He said that he had been turned into a hermaphrodite, which I think is significant - just paging through this.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: After the second interview, what was your opinion? To what extent were you now going to review your earlier opinion?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: At that point I felt I could confirm the diagnosis, broadly speaking, of schizophrenia, but I thought one could go further and try and reconcile some of the diagnostic difficulties, by using a particular sub-category of schizophrenia, which is called paraphrenia and which accounts for the relative preservation of this man’s personality. The fact that he was able to amble around the world for 30-odd years without spending more than short periods, that he appears to have spent in mental hospitals. It also accounts for the preservation of his emotions. He was not quite as flat and cold as I expected him to be. And the diagnosis of paraphrenia, hypochondriacal paraphrenia, seemed to me to fit this. There is a textbook - may I refer to it at this stage - called *Schizophrenia*, by Professor Fish from Liverpool, wherein he quotes the paraphrenias as classified by Professor Leonhard of Frankfurt, and he says: “Hypochondriacal Paraphrenia: The bodily hallucinations are usually referred to internal organs and are usually described so grotesquely that it is impossible for a normal person to empathise with the patient.” Further on, he says “Affectivity (that is, emotion) is fairly well preserved. These patients have thought-disorder which Leonhard calls ‘unconcentrated thinking.’ They tend to wander from the point, talk about subjects loosely related to the task in hand, and are inclined to “verbal derailments.” And I thought that, while there may still be diagnostic difficulties about the exact sub-class, he fitted into the broad category of paraphrenia very nicely.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Are there any further comments that you have to make on your second interview, otherwise I think we can now go to your third interview?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No. I did consider, by the way, in both the first and second interviews,

whether he was simulating mental illness, and my conclusion was that he wasn't, because there were obvious schizophrenic symptoms which he did not have when I led him up to them, and he seemed to be at pains to tell me exactly how he was feeling, rather than to fit in with the pattern that I wanted to fit him into.

COMMENTS ON DR. SAKINOFSKY'S SECOND EXAMINATION OF TSAFENDAS

Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky that he was a Protestant, whereas he was Greek Orthodox. He would never have said that unless he was lying for a reason or for fun. He had always asserted his membership of the Greek Orthodox Church and he knew Christianity too well to mix up Greek Orthodox and Protestant.

Tsafendas also told Dr. Sakinofsky that the Portuguese had tried to "change him." Tsafendas spoke to several witnesses about this, but not in the way he did with the doctor. He told these witnesses, including the *Cape Argus*, Patrick O'Ryan, Andreas Babiolakis, Father Nikola Banovic, Father Minas Constandinou, Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis, Michalis Vasilakis, Nikolas Kambouris, Mary Eendracht and Ira Kyriakakis that the Portuguese had attempted to "brainwash him," using the same verb every time. He did mean that they tried to "change him," but he explained explicitly that they wanted to change his political ideas, using brainwashing and torture. Tsafendas spoke a lot about this, explaining that when they were not torturing him, his captors were pressing on him the advantages that the Mozambicans enjoyed because of the Portuguese, like hospitals, churches and a modern infrastructure.⁵²²³

THE GRAPHANOLA

Tsafendas also spoke to Dr. Sakinofsky about a "graphanola" and explained that it was a "radio" that was used to torture him. Dr. Sakinofsky, unaware of the word, concluded that it did not exist and that Tsafendas made it up and this was also a sign of schizophrenia since "some schizophrenics manufacture words." However, if "graphanola" did not exist, "graphonola" certainly did, not only in Portuguese, but also in English, in which it is spelled

⁵²²³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

“grafonola.” The graphonola was a 1907 improved version of the Columbia company’s graphophone, which itself was a development of the original phonograph, recognisable by its horn. The original acoustic version of the graphonola was later adapted for electricity.

Prior to the assassination, Tsafendas told Father Nikola Banovic, Andreas Babiolakis, Nick Papadakis and Mary Eendracht that his torturers in Portugal had given him electric shocks using a wooden box that looked like the graphophone his father had in Lourenço Marques.⁵²²⁴ After the assassination Tsafendas told Father Minas Constandinou that when he was given electric shocks by the South African police, they also used a small wooden box with wires of different colours, though this time he did not mention the word “graphophone.” He just said it was much smaller than the device used by the Portuguese,⁵²²⁵ which he had previously said was “like a graphophone.”

The attached photographs below show an electric shock equipment and a graphophone from the 1950s and they look very much alike. Tsafendas’s description was quite accurate. Dr. Sakinofsky and the Court, probably unaware of the equipment used by the Portuguese and the South African police to administer electric shocks, could hardly envisage that the wooden box used for such a procedure looked “like a graphophone.” They were obviously unaware that the “graphonola/grafonola” and the “graphophone” were effectively the same device. Tsafendas did not make up the word and described clearly the equipment used by the Portuguese to torture him.

About twenty years after the assassination, while discussing his summary trial with Father Minas, Tsafendas said that he had often tried hard to not laugh at the things they were said about him in the court; this must have been one of those occasions.⁵²²⁶

⁵²²⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵²²⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵²²⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

Graphophone



Electric Shock Box



CONCLUSION REGARDING DR. SAKINOFSKY'S SECOND EXAMINATION

Tsafendas found inspiration for his exchanges with Dr. Sakinofsky from past experiences such as the torture, then changing them a little to make himself sound schizophrenic.

Tsafendas spoke to several people about some of the things he told Dr. Sakinofsky, such as the torture in Portugal, but he never mentioned the absurd things he had volunteered. Why did he tell the absurdities to Dr. Sakinofsky and not to the people he knew? Clearly to present himself to the medical expert as schizophrenic, something he did not need to do with other people in his life.

Tsafendas said later that most of the things that were heard during his summary trial were lies and sometimes he wanted to laugh.⁵²²⁷ The incident where the word graphonola was not recognised by anyone in the court and was misunderstood by Dr. Sakinofsky must have been one of them. Finally, Dr. Sakinofsky stated that Tsafendas spoke to him for the first time about the tapeworm during this meeting, but he did not elaborate further.

⁵²²⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

DR. SAKINOFSKY'S THIRD EXAMINATION OF TSAFENDAS

THE TAPEWORM AND THE KILLING OF DR. VERWOERD

DEFENCE COUNSEL: He is very preoccupied with his health, is he? He is very preoccupied with his state of health?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: In the third interview he talked about this tapeworm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Now we come to the third interview, again at your request - is that correct?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You saw the accused where?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I saw him at Caledon Square on the 14th of October.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: For how long did you see him?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: For about an hour.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you give the Court your findings and your comments?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. My findings were - I wanted to lead him on to the tapeworm at the beginning, because I wanted to find out more about what this meant to him, and we started talking about the tapeworm, and then he spontaneously said to me: "It may even be a serpent", and went on to describe in a delusional way how this tapeworm was a viper, a demon, a dragon, I thought in a way which wasn't at all solicited. He indicated exactly what this meant to him when he said as follows: "There is a lot in the scriptures about tapeworms. I got to the point in my church not to take bread and wine, when everybody else in the morning used to take it, the communion — you know what you call it, communion?" I said: "Yes." He said: "I said to myself, well, if I have a devil how can I be a partaker? So I left off when I came to my senses. This hasn't been long, this has been a year or two that I have stopped taking wine and bread. I thought, well, if I am taking it, I am trying to make a demon within me holy, or something." To me this was a grotesque description which fitted in with this being a delusion, not simply an idea.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is its significance?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: The significance of delusion?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Yes?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, I think the significance of this means that this man has schizophrenia, and if it can be shown that he has had this delusion over 20, 30 years, then I would say he has chronic delusional insanity — that kind of schizophrenia. I also found identification with the tapeworm. He alludes very much to the scriptures in this interview. He quoted a passage. I asked him if he was possessed by the tapeworm. He said: “Yes, I am possessed by a tapeworm put there by African enemies, African witchcraft.” I said: “Is it as if you were a kind of robot that they can send round the world to do what they want to, because you have got a tapeworm inside you that makes you do things?”, and he gave me an answer which I think as again showing that he wasn’t simulating. He said: “I don’t know what the effects are of that thing, but it seems to have ended up as if this had been the effect.” He quoted a passage from the Bible - I can’t lay my hands right on it - about “Lord, I am a worm, I am a worm”, that somebody says somewhere in the Bible. He drew an analogy between the Old Testament story of Moses and the serpent swallowing other serpents, but when I said did he see Dr. Verwoerd as a kind of Pharaoh and himself as a kind of Moses, he denied that. This was the content of that interview, more or less confirming the findings of the first two interviews.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he say whether this tapeworm sleeps, what its habits were?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. We went into some detail. He said that when he fed this tapeworm, it was like a boa constrictor which coiled itself round his gut, and when he fed it then the boa constrictor left him and left his emotions free. He said that it purred like a cat. In other words, he gave this concept life in a bizarre, grotesque, schizophrenic way. He gave it an animistic life, like someone possessed.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was there any other finding that you made?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, he had more ideas of reference.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is an idea of reference?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Idea of reference is usually found - it is found more often in schizophrenia than it is in another major mental disorder, an affective psychosis, a depressive psychosis, and it concerns the belief that other people, who may not know you from a bar of soap, are talking about you. Like when he said that in the cafe the coloured people were talking about the fact that he had got shock treatment. In this case he spoke about the Bible as having some personal reference to him. He said: “These passages have personally a deep meaning. A lot of these phrases have a meaning for me. They mean something which doesn’t

mean probably anything, which other people just call a lot of rubbish. They can't see it, they can't realise it." I said: "And it has meaning for you but not for other people?", and he said: "Yes, it has meaning for me but not for other people. Something that other people wouldn't understand." I asked him what kind of meaning did it have for him, "Does it mean that you have to do certain things as a result of it?" He said: "It means that it enlightens me. It puts me in the same situation." And then he er-ed. I said: "At the time that you killed Dr. Verwoerd, had you been guided by the Bible?", and he denied this, but he said it was as if he had been hypnotised by the tapeworm, because he couldn't remember what had happened. And he went on to say in a way which aroused considerable emotion: "I fell on him, people tell me, and it is probably true, but I don't remember a thing about stabbing him. I could have stabbed him a thousand times without knowing it." I said: "How? Because you were under hypnotism?" "I don't know what it was. You are a doctor, I am asking you. I was stabbing him, and I have never stabbed people before. I never handled a knife before. I was not myself. I was just stabbing him, and if the people hadn't lifted me off I would have been stabbing a corpse."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you put the question to him: did the tapeworm have anything to do with the act of killing Dr. Verwoerd?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, I did, several times. He never said to me that the tapeworm, as one perhaps might have expected, that the tapeworm had told him to kill Dr. Verwoerd, but he said that the tapeworm, being a demon inside him, had taken him over, and he remembered another case, when he had blurted out in Lisbon that he was a Protestant, he felt here again the tapeworm was responsible. But the main way in which he attempted to explain how the tapeworm had caused him to assassinate the late Prime Minister was that the tapeworm created a state of mind in him, when he was not himself. It had influenced his life so that he had become interested in a queer sect, wandered about trying to find a means of coping with this tapeworm, and had he not had the tapeworm he would not have been in this particular state of mind, of weakness.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he say that the tapeworm had corrupted him?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: He did say that, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he say that it had influenced him?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, in the way I have described.

JUDGE BEYERS: I don't want to interrupt, but don't you think the doctor's views are quite clear enough by now? I am not stopping you; please go on. It is very clear to me what this doctor's opinion is.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I formed the impression that he - for instance, in this passage, if I may quote: I asked him if the tapeworm was the most important influence in his life. He said: "It has caused me to see how other people live. If I didn't have a tapeworm I'd probably be living only for myself. I would not know what the rest of the world was like, what other people thought, their difficulties. I would have taken life, I would have taken life ah..... I would have only seen things ah... well, I would have taken life for granted. I would have just gone through life enjoying myself, taking life" And then he went on to explain how he struggled against this tapeworm within him, it had turned him into a kind of twisted saint. That is how he saw himself.

ASSESSOR: Was all this taken down on tape?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: This interview and the second interview were on a tape recorder.

ASSESSOR: What you are reading out to us now is actually what he said in his own words?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, when I quote, this is verbatim.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he speak with the same flow and fluency that you speak? How was the flow?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No, in the second and third interviews the initial pressure and excitement which had been present in the first interview were absent. Here there were lots of gaps in his train of thoughts and one might have formed a conclusion that this was thought blocking. This was an impedance of his thinking due to this disease process.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You say thought blocking. Is there a difference between thought blocking and thought disorder?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Thought blocking is a variety of thought disorder.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you find any other varieties of thought disorder?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, as I explained just now, there are several. The chief criteria I personally applied are: thought blocking, the interpenetration of thoughts which are not connected with the material that the patient is talking about; and asyndesis, which is a disjunction of utterances which have no meaning with each other, no consecutive meaning.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Your Lordship has suggested that it is pretty clear what this witness is saying

JUDGE BEYERS: It is pretty clear to me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The issue of course is whether that view is acceptable to the Court. If that view is accepted by the court, then I have no further questions.

JUDGE BEYERS: The point is whether asking further questions is going to make it more acceptable to the Court than it is now. But I am certainly not telling you that it is accepted by the court.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I think I will proceed to put further questions.

(Cont.): I will put certain general questions to you. Is it legitimate, say for instance when you view your first report, to take single sentences out and say, well, they appear in order, they make sense in themselves, or must you read the whole of what he says and then draw the inference?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I would certainly say the latter, as a psychiatrist. This is absolute sine qua non. One cannot make a diagnosis on an isolated piece of behaviour. One has to take all behaviour and, in fact, backwards in time, into account. I can quote my old teacher, Prof. Sir Aubrey Lewis on this in Price's Textbook of Medicine, 9th Edition, page 1664. He says: "More important than any Burgle feature is the impression of the case as a whole (talking about schizophrenia). The development away from normal interest and response to the real world and the establishment instead of autistic self-satisfaction, so that the patient's personality is twisted awry as it were, and withdrawn from easy contact."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What does autistic self-satisfaction mean?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Autistic means something which nobody can share with a patient. This is part of his inner life.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is that important in a schizophrenic?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. For instance, I would say that his delusion about this tape-worm is autistic. I cannot share it with him. While I am talking about the first report, what is talked about and the way he talked about the "Cape to Cairo" and the "Commonwealth", was this intelligible to you at the time?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It was not intelligible to me. I could not see any connection between

these slogans, almost. It seemed to me that what he was doing is that he was taking the news of the day and because of his diseased mental processes he was just throwing them out in a disconnected way. That is how it seemed to me. I couldn't understand it.

COMMENTS ON DR. SAKINOFSKY'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE TAPEWORM AND THE KILLING OF DR. VERWOERD

Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky that it was the tapeworm which made him travel to several countries. Apart from the fact that as we have seen the true story behind the tapeworm, Tsafendas never mentioned the tapeworm as a reason for his travels, which he called "forced globetrotting."⁵²²⁸ Naturally, he said nothing about it to the police either when he spoke to them about his travels.

More importantly, Tsafendas spoke to several witnesses, like Helen Daniels, Patrick O'Ryan about his travels and never mentioned to them that it was because of a tapeworm. We will not examine again what Tsafendas said about the tapeworm since it is pretty much the same as he told Dr. Cooper and all others who examined him while he was in custody in Caledon Square police station. The author read everything that Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky to forty-four people who knew Tsafendas, including nine who knew him very well and for many years. Their reaction was exactly the same as with the things he told Dr. Cooper. The author would not list their comments here, as they have already been listed in Dr. Cooper's testimony.

However, Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky something that he did not tell Dr. Cooper and it is further proof that he lied to him. According to Dr. Sakinofsky, Tsafendas told him that he "couldn't remember what had happened at the time of the killing," that "I fell on him, people tell me, and it is probably true, but I don't remember a thing about stabbing him. I could have stabbed him a thousand times without knowing it" and that it was as if he "had been hypnotised." This interview took place on October 14. Twice, just a month earlier, on September 11 and September 19, Tsafendas remembered perfectly well how it had happened

⁵²²⁸ Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

and described in detail how he killed Dr. Verwoerd and even explained how he had planned it. He did not claim that he was hypnotised or any of the other things he told Dr. Sakinofsky.

On September 11, Tsafendas said:

“Some days after I started working in the House of Assembly, all kinds of thoughts came to my mind about murdering the Prime Minister. I saw an opportunity of shooting the Prime Minister from the lobby. I thought of obtaining a firearm. I knew that I had to obtain a licence for a firearm. Obtaining a licence would take too long. This I found out at one of the shops where I enquired about purchasing a firearm in Durban. I thought of going to a ship, the *Eleni*, which I knew was in Cape Town for repairs. I was acquainted with the crew members of the *Eleni* ...I had an idea that I might be able to buy a firearm on the ship because some sailors carry firearms.

I went to this ship about three to four weeks before the assassination of the Prime Minister. I saw the man in the engine room (the donkey man), who told me that the bosun, foreman of the crew, may know where I could obtain a firearm. He said he could get me a “Beretta” revolver and a knife. I also enquired from him about a spring type knife, which he said he could get for me. He said he wanted 80 dollars for the two items. I told him I wanted the revolver and the knife for self-defence, he said he wanted the money in American dollars. He did not show me a revolver or a knife. I said I would return in a couple of days with the money. I waited until the end of August when I got my pay. It was, I think, R95.00. I went to Barclays Bank, Adderley Street, Cape Town and enquired to buy 80 American dollars. I was told that it would cost R56. The lady teller wanted my passport.

The next day I brought my passport and she gave me the 80 dollars. I took a taxi and went to the ship. There I saw the bosun and told him that I have brought the money for the gun and the knife as arranged. He said he did not have the gun, but the galley boy had a small gun which he would try and get for me. The bosun went to the galley boy and brought a small gun which he said I could have for 30 dollars.

I thought it was a small calibre pistol and I decided to buy it. I took it without examining it. They had no bullets. I thought I could buy bullets from local stores. I took the pistol home where I examined it and discovered that it was a gas revolver. On Saturday the 3rd of September, I took the gas pistol back to the ship. I found the bosun with the intention to return the firearm to him. Both the bosun and the galley boy told me that they had spent the money. I wanted another firearm or the return of my money but ended up getting nothing. I

went to the captain to protest, but as I saw I could get nothing and did not want to cause a scandal, I gave up and left. I returned to my room in Rondebosch.

The next thing is that I decided to use a knife to stab the Prime Minister in the House of Assembly. I never discussed my plans with anybody. The shops were closed over the weekend and the following Monday was a public holiday. At about 9 a.m. on Tuesday, 6/9/66, I went to town to buy the knives. I bought one knife from the first shop which was open. This shop is known as City Guns. Then I went to another shop further down the road and bought another knife. Both shops were closed when I arrived. I walked up and down the pavement waiting for the shops to open. I enquired at a certain shop as to when the sports shop would open. I cannot remember whether I spoke to a man or a woman.

I started work at 7.49 a.m. on 6/9/66. I arrived at the House of Assembly at 6.45 a.m. on 6/9/66. I went to work early in order to do my work and then to go out to buy the knives. I did not ask for permission to go to the town to buy the knives. I entered City Guns first and purchased a dagger. I paid R.3.30 for this dagger. I then went to the other shop where I bought another dagger - the one with the aluminium handle. It was more like a stiletto. I bought two weapons in order to make certain of the job which I had in mind, I thought something might go wrong and that one weapon might be taken away from me. Both weapons were wrapped up in brown paper.

After I bought the weapons I returned to the House of Assembly where I removed the paper wrappings from the weapons and left the paper wrappings in my locker. I also left the two daggers in my locker. I started working that morning wearing a khaki overall. When I went to the shops to buy the weapons I changed into a grey suit. When I came back I changed into my navy blue messenger's uniform, then I changed into my uniform. I had a waist-belt underneath my uniform pants, to which two sheaths were attached. I left the two knives in the locker. I then went to the first floor to serve coffee and tea. I waited for the lights to go on indicating which offices were calling for tea and coffee. I was there until about 2 p.m. that afternoon.

A few minutes before the Assembly bells began to ring for the starting of the session, I went to my locker to fetch the knives. I put them into the sheaths inside my pants and went into the Assembly lobby to wait for the Prime Minister's arrival. I had previously planned to stab the Prime Minister in the Assembly hall whilst walking to his bench. I watched him walk past and followed him into the Assembly hail. I tried to pull the dagger from the sheath but

had difficulty in pulling it out. Eventually I managed to pull it out, but by that time the Prime Minister had already sat down in his bench. I was very nervous and confused that I cannot remember where I stabbed him the first blow, but I aimed at his chest. I remember stabbing him twice and then the people caught hold of me. They beat me up, kicked me and dragged me into lobby. I was disarmed and arrested.”⁵²²⁹

On September 19, Tsafendas told the police:

“The idea of destroying Dr. Verwoerd entered my mind a few days after I started work as a messenger in the House of Assembly. I saw an opportunity to do so in the House of Assembly because I was inside the house. I first thought of buying a gun with which I could shoot him and then run away. I did in fact buy a gun from the crew of the *Eleni* hut I found that the gun was useless. I bought the gun at the end of the month when I got my pay. I went there before to try and get the gun but I had no money. I then waited until I got my pay. I was going to buy a Beretta but the man didn't keep his word and gave me the other pistol. He made all kinds of excuses. It was only after I found that the gun was useless that I decided on using a knife...

I was going to find refuge on the tanker, the *Eleni*, which I knew was sailing to South America. My planes were, however, upset when I could not get the right pistol. The boat sailed on the Saturday before the Tuesday on which I stabbed the Prime Minister... I never thought about hiding if I had to do the job with a knife. I didn't have much of a chance of getting away when using a knife. I didn't care much and didn't give it a second thought that I would be caught. I just happened to do it that way. I always had a grudge against the South African Government on account of its racial policies and I hated Dr. Verwoerd because he was a foreigner - a Hollander.”⁵²³⁰

On both occasions, Tsafendas remembers very clearly how he killed Dr. Verwoerd and what preceded it. He does not mention anywhere that he was confused or say anything to suggest that he is a schizophrenic. Tsafendas's story about the purchase of the gun from the crew and later of the two knives was confirmed by the police from their own investigation and from the interviews they conducted with those involved, as we saw in Chapter Four.

⁵²²⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵²³⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

About thirty years later, Tsafendas told the same story he told the police to David Beresford, Liza Key and Fathers Ioannis, Spiros and Minas. He not only described to all these people in perfect detail how he made and executed his plan, as he did with the police, but he gave additional details, such as the fact that he had poured anti-rust solution onto the blades, hoping it would poison Dr. Verwoerd's blood should he survive the stabbing. Tsafendas could even remember some of the contents of the anti-rust solution; for example the hydrochloric acid and the phosphoric acid.⁵²³¹ This proves that Tsafendas remembered what had happened: not only shortly after the assassination but as long as thirty years afterwards. The fact that he was not able to "remember" this incident when interviewed by Dr. Sakinofsky suggests that he either suffered from a temporary amnesia, for that day and for this incident only, or he lied to him.

Both of Tsafendas's statements were in the possession of the police and if they were also in the possession of the Attorney-General, as they should have been, it would have been very easy to prove that Tsafendas was lying to Dr. Sakinofsky about not remembering the assassination. However, once again, the statements were not used to challenge a witness' testimony.

Importantly, Dr. Sakinofsky clarifies that although he asked Tsafendas several times whether the tapeworm had asked him to kill Dr. Verwoerd, he denied it, as he did with Dr. Cooper. However, it became widely accepted that Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd because a tapeworm told him to. Tsafendas himself told several witnesses that both the police and some psychiatrists had tried to make him say it was the tapeworm that ordered him to do it. Tsafendas insisted to these witnesses that he never said such a thing,⁵²³² and according to Dr. Cooper, Dr. Sakinofsky and as we will soon see the other psychiatrists too, he was telling the truth.

⁵²³¹ Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Beresford (*The Guardian*), 6 November 1997: 6-7, "Inside Story: The madness that destroyed apartheid"; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Liza Key in a personal interview, 6 April 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵²³² Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Beresford (*The Guardian*), 6 November 1997: 6-7, "Inside Story: The madness that destroyed apartheid"; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Spiros Randos in a personal interview, 5 January 2004; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

COMMENTS ON DR. SAKINOFSKY'S DIAGNOSIS OF "THOUGHT-BLOCKING"

None of the two-hundred witnesses who were interviewed by the police and the Commission of Enquiry at the time and the other forty-four who were interviewed later by the author offered anything to suggest that Tsafendas was suffering from thought-blocking. This is clearly something that it is more evident to a psychiatrist, but certainly people can tell whether a man is talking coherently, if there are gaps in his speech and whether he can answer questions and follow a conversation.

These are the statements of people who were questioned by the police and commented on his mental state:

- Gillian Claire Lieberman was a personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation who was often visited by Tsafendas in her office. She "found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation."⁵²³³
- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he "never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers."⁵²³⁴
- Helen Grispos knew Tsafendas from birth and grew up with him, while her husband was Tsafendas's best childhood friend. She told the police that Tsafendas was "well-mannered and intelligent."⁵²³⁵ She also told the author that she never thought Tsafendas was insane. "He never did or said anything to make me or George (her husband) think that he was insane."⁵²³⁶
- Hendrik van Loggenberg knew Tsafendas and his family well in Pretoria. He told the police that Tsafendas "definitely came across as normal ... he also seemed healthy ..."⁵²³⁷
- Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira "was often in the company of the subject and others had several conversations with him." He considered Tsafendas to be "a normal and very intelligent person."⁵²³⁸

⁵²³³ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²³⁴ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²³⁵ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²³⁶ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁵²³⁷ Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²³⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

- Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas's boss at F. A. Poole in Pretoria, said that in the five months he worked with Tsafendas, he found him to be "not a very good worker, but will say that he was an intelligent worker."⁵²³⁹ He also testified to the Commission of Enquiry that he considered Tsafendas to be "an intelligent man" and never got the impression that he "wasn't right in his mind."⁵²⁴⁰
- James Summers, owner of the "Barlings Tea Lounge," which Tsafendas frequented from July 1966 until the assassination, testified that Tsafendas "was no nuisance, and appeared to be a quite normal, innocent type. I never had reason to even suspect that he could be mentally unbalanced. He acted quite normal."⁵²⁴¹
- John Gianouris, the Greek Vice Consul at Lourenço Marques, described Tsafendas as "a normal and intelligent person."⁵²⁴²
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be "very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease."⁵²⁴³
- Kyriakos Skordis who Tsafendas used to visit at his coffee shop in Durban for several months in 1965, testified that he "appeared to be quite normal and was apparently in a poor financial position."⁵²⁴⁴
- Inspector Horacio Ferreira of the Portuguese Security Police was in charge of the cells where Tsafendas was held in custody in Beira in 1964. His statement to the police said he considered Tsafendas to be "normal and regarded him as a very intelligent person."⁵²⁴⁵

⁵²³⁹ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵²⁴⁰ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁴¹ Herbert James Summers statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁴² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁴³ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵²⁴⁴ Kyriakos Skordis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁴⁵ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

- Costas Michaeletos,⁵²⁴⁶ who knew Tsafendas from birth, stated, “Ever since I knew Dimetrios Tsafantakis, I never, any time observed that he showed any deviations. He also never was an aggressive type person.”⁵²⁴⁷
- Richard Poggenpoel lived with him for two weeks in his house and kept on associating up to his arrest, “there was no mention or impression that he was mentally abnormal. He lived a completely normal life.”⁵²⁴⁸
- John Galanakis, who met Tsafendas in Umtali in 1964, told police that he found Tsafendas to be “an intelligent person.”⁵²⁴⁹
- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He testified to the police that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed” and he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”⁵²⁵⁰
- Gideon Cloete, an employee in the Department of Labour, met Tsafendas twice and said he “seemed eager to get employment, was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance.” Cloete said he saw no signs of abnormality, that “he seemed perfectly normal.”⁵²⁵¹
- George Liberopoulos met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and described him to the police as a “normal person with a very high intelligence.”⁵²⁵² Liberopoulos also stated to the author that he “never believed that Tsafendas was insane. He was perfectly normal; very clever man.”⁵²⁵³
- Harry Hall, a member of the Christian Church, knew Tsafendas from March 1966 until his arrest. He testified to the police that he regarded Tsafendas “as a sub-standard intellect, but otherwise found him to be reasonably normal.”⁵²⁵⁴

⁵²⁴⁶ The correct spelling is Michaeletos, not Michaeletos. Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁴⁷ Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁴⁸ Richard Poggenpoel statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁴⁹ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁵⁰ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁵²⁵¹ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁵²⁵² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁵³ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

⁵²⁵⁴ Harry Hall statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

- Reginald Robert Maile was the guard on the *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town from July 26, 1966 to September 3, 1966. He saw Tsafendas every day and told the police that he “never got the impression that he could be mentally defective. He was sober, polite and perfectly normal.”⁵²⁵⁵
- George Ananiades met Tsafendas in 1963 and described him to the police as a “normal person with a very high-intelligence.”⁵²⁵⁶ He later told the author that Tsafendas “is impossible to have been insane. He was a very intelligent and educated man.”⁵²⁵⁷
- Ian Boswell, administrative assistant at the Department of Labour in Cape Town. He interviewed Tsafendas three times in 1966 and testified that “he was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being over-talkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality, during his interviews with me.”⁵²⁵⁸
- John Verghis, owner of a coffee shop in Beira which Tsafendas visited often for several months, said he considered him to be a “normal person.”⁵²⁵⁹
- Lt. Col. P.J.B. van Wyk of the South African police interviewed several people in Rhodesia and in Mozambique, including in Beira and Lourenço Marques, who knew Tsafendas. He stated in his report that Tsafendas, “for all purposes, can be seen as a normal, intelligent person.”⁵²⁶⁰
- None of Tsafendas's five colleagues at the Parliament mentioned anything being wrong with him.⁵²⁶¹
- Petrus Schuin, the head messenger, was one of the three messengers who interviewed and appointed him. He told the Commission of Enquiry that “there was nothing out of the

⁵²⁵⁵ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁵²⁵⁶ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁵⁷ George Ananiades in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

⁵²⁵⁸ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁵²⁵⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁶⁰ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁶¹ Piet Bester Burger testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA; Fred Feinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Feliz George Miles statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 2, File: 1. NASA; Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA; Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

ordinary about him. Tsafendas was the same as any other person that had worked there.”⁵²⁶²

- Sydney Wiehand, a messenger who was also on the interview panel in the House of Assembly, said Tsafendas “was a quiet man. He wasn’t the rough type or anything like that. He was quiet, quietly spoken, well-mannered.”⁵²⁶³

Several people lived under the same roof or in close proximity to Tsafendas for substantial periods. None of them noticed anything wrong with him:

- Tsafendas lived in Fotini Gavasiadis’s house for a few weeks, then for the next eight months in an apartment next to hers. Throughout this period in Pretoria in 1963-1964, they were very close; she saw and talked to him every day and they worked together in her brother’s café. Gavasiadis never noticed anything wrong with Tsafendas and has no doubt that he was perfectly able to function, not just at a “reasonable level” but beyond that, since he was extremely intelligent and lucid. She told the author:

“Dimitris could buy you and sell you any time he wanted and as many times as he wanted to. He was so clever. He was very convincing and persuasive - he could turn black into white. If you disagreed with something with him, he would find a way to convince you that he is right and that you are wrong - even if you *know* that you are right and that he is wrong! If he made a mistake about something, he would turn things upside-down and at the end, he would even make you apologise to him.”

Gavasiadis laughed at the suggestion that Tsafendas was dysfunctional. She told the author:

“In those nine months, I saw him and spoke to him every day and not even once did he appear to have an issue with his speech or his thoughts. He was always the same. We spent hours and hours talking and his speech was never incoherent, disjointed, blocked or whatever else, it was always perfect. He never gave me even the slightest indication that he might be having the issues you mentioned. It must have been the doctor who said it, who was himself not able to function on a reasonable level if this was his diagnosis about Dimitri. Dimitri was not just able, but much more than able to function on a reasonable level. It’s absolutely ludicrous for someone to say this about Dimitri and it shows how

⁵²⁶² Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵²⁶³ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

little he knew him.”⁵²⁶⁴ According to Professor Burke, “if you lived with somebody for nine months, you would know if this person was strange.”⁵²⁶⁵

- Father Nikola Banovic lived in the same house as Tsafendas for four-five months in 1961, and then for another two-three months, he lived in a house next door. In all this time, he saw him every day. He declares that Tsafendas “was perfectly sane” and he does “not have the slightest doubt about it. It is impossible; Dimitri was not schizophrenic. With God as my witness, he was not crazy. He was more than capable of functioning on a reasonable level; he was a very intelligent and capable man. His brain was a level above most of ours.”⁵²⁶⁶
- Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas’s first cousin, knew him since he was five years old and grew up alongside him in Mozambique and in Egypt. In Pretoria in 1964, she spent a lot of time with him, including two or three weeks when they lived in the same house. She told the author: “Dimitris unable to function on a reasonable level? Are you sure a doctor said that? I don’t know what kind of doctor he was, but he either examined a different person or he had completely lost the plot with Dimitris. Dimitris was one of the most capable and intelligent persons I ever met. Nobody who knew him is going to agree with what this doctor said.”⁵²⁶⁷
- Patrick O’Ryan hosted Tsafendas in his home for five months in 1965-1966 and was close to him up to his arrest. Tsafendas was described to him by a preacher of the Christian Church as a “highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages.”⁵²⁶⁸ He formed a “deep liking”⁵²⁶⁹ for Tsafendas and considered him to be an “enlightened person.”⁵²⁷⁰ He also testified that “I had confidence in him and used to like him. He was a very kindly man. In my experience of him he had a good heart... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind,” or that he “was mentally

⁵²⁶⁴ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵²⁶⁵ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁵²⁶⁶ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵²⁶⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵²⁶⁸ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁵²⁶⁹ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵²⁷⁰ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

disturbed.”⁵²⁷¹ He also found Tsafendas to be “well-spoken and had good vocabulary.”⁵²⁷²

- John Bornman lived with Tsafendas for six-seven weeks in April and May of 1966. He found Tsafendas to be “normal, intelligent and friendly. He was neat in his person, but his eating habits were messy.”⁵²⁷³
- Reuben O’Ryan lived in the same house as Tsafendas for five months. He considered him “perfectly normal,” saying, “no-one in my family ever thought that he was mad. He couldn’t have been insane.”⁵²⁷⁴
- Stanley O’Ryan also lived in the same house as Tsafendas for five months and described him as a “very down to earth man, a very quiet man and very friendly. I never suspected, even in the slightest, that he might be unstable. No, never, nothing at all. Perfectly normal.”⁵²⁷⁵
- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas’s landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry: “it was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means.”⁵²⁷⁶
- Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas’s landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, “I was a nurse and worked in lunatic institutions. He was a normal person to the best of my knowledge.”⁵²⁷⁷
- Alice Mary Theyser was Tsafendas’s landlady from July 1, 1966 to August 30, 1966, just six days before the assassination. She testified to the police that she “never got the impression in any way that he might be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared a quite

⁵²⁷¹ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵²⁷² Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵²⁷³ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵²⁷⁴ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁵²⁷⁵ Stanley O’Ryan in a personal intervbw, 9 April 2015.

⁵²⁷⁶ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁵²⁷⁷ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

normal person.”⁵²⁷⁸

- Helen Daniels lived with Tsafendas in her parents' house for six weeks in 1965 and “did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal.”⁵²⁷⁹
- Kenneth Ross was Tsafendas's landlord in Durban for two months in 1965. He did not mention anything to suggest that Tsafendas was unable to function on a reasonable level and even stated that he “was very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well-versed in politics.”⁵²⁸⁰
- For two months in 1966 Tsafendas had his meals in Mary Scott's boarding house. She told police that she “never got the impression that he could be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared perfectly normal.”⁵²⁸¹
- J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”⁵²⁸²
- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott's boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest. He, too, disagrees with Dr. Cooper's diagnosis. “Dimitri was not mad, not even a little. He was an exceptional man, very clever too.”⁵²⁸³
- Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos was Tsafendas's landlady for three weeks in 1966. She testified to the police that she “considered him to be a completely normal person.”⁵²⁸⁴
- Andreas Babiolakis lived with Tsafendas in the same house in Beira for two or three months and knew him since they were children. As for Tsafendas being mad, he said:

“If he was mad, then the whole world must be mad. He was not even the slightest disturbed. Every single Greek in Mozambique discussed Dimitri after we heard about the

⁵²⁷⁸ Alice Mary Theyser statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁷⁹ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁵²⁸⁰ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁸¹ Mary Kathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵²⁸² *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

⁵²⁸³ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁵²⁸⁴ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

tapeworm; not even one from those who had met him believed that he was mad. He was not; we all said the same thing. He made it up, as he did with the Saint Peter act. If someone believes that he was mad, he did not meet him Dimitri, but someone else.”⁵²⁸⁵

- Nick Papadakis also lived with Tsafendas for two months in Beira and Gondola in 1964. He told the author: “I never believed, not even after I read what happened in the trial, that he was insane. He played the fool and they believed him. It’s impossible that he was insane, he was absolutely fine and very clever.”⁵²⁸⁶
- Irene Michaletos and her mother associated with Tsafendas for several months between 1964 and 1965. He even stayed several times at their house. She never noticed anything wrong with him and was sure that he was perfectly sane.⁵²⁸⁷
- In 1951 and between 1963 and 1965, Tsafendas slept for several nights in the house of his aunt Artemis Michaletos in Lourenço Marques. Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas’s cousins and Artemis’s sons, who lived in the same house, spent several hours chatting with Tsafendas. Both were adamant in conversation with the author that Tsafendas did not suffer from thought blockage and that he had no problems in following a conversation.⁵²⁸⁸

John Michaletos told the author:

“We all [his family] had many long conversations with him. I really mean hours and hours, in a row, the same day. He was from the kind of people who have something to tell you, that you could sit and listen to them for hours. And I did that, I very much enjoyed talking and listening to him. He was not boring, he could talk to you about religion, politics and history, his travels and adventures around the world. But he did not show off when talking; he was a humble man, he never tried to show off, like that he had travelled in so many countries or that he was very knowledgeable. He was very modest and very down to earth, a serious man.”⁵²⁸⁹

⁵²⁸⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁵²⁸⁶ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵²⁸⁷ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵²⁸⁸ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵²⁸⁹ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

In addition, Artemis Michaletos, who had brought Tsafendas up in Egypt and lived in Lourenço Marques while he was growing up there, always maintained that he was perfectly sane and very intelligent.⁵²⁹⁰

- Stelios Marangos was Tsafendas's landlord in Beira for six weeks. He did not mention anything to the police about Tsafendas being "unstable" or strange.⁵²⁹¹

Furthermore, in July 1966, just a few weeks after Dr. Kossew diagnosed him as schizophrenic and just two months before the assassination, Tsafendas gave a seventy-five-minute interview to a reporter named N.D. Hartford on the *Cape Argus*. They had met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to enquire whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as an "anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship."⁵²⁹² Hartford's impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. According to Hartford, Tsafendas spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation.⁵²⁹³

More importantly, Tsafendas was questioned twice by Major Rossouw while he was in custody. When Major Rossouw appeared in front of the Commission of Enquiry, the following dialogue ensued between him and Judge van Wyk:

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you get the impression that what he said was the truth or did you think that sometimes he was sly?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: I thought that he told the truth – I never got the impression that he tried to evade any question. He answered all the questions spontaneously.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Was he totally prepared to answer everything?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes.⁵²⁹⁴

By also looking at both of Tsafendas statements, we see that he did not have the issue Dr. Sakinofsky noted and all of Tsafendas's answers and narration are perfectly clear without

⁵²⁹⁰ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵²⁹¹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵²⁹² *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, 'Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.'

⁵²⁹³ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵²⁹⁴ Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

any sign of “thought blocking.” If such an issue was noted by Major Rossouw or General van den Berg, presumably they would have been able to notice it.

In addition, Tsafendas attended several interviews in his working life and appeared to be perfectly able to answer, or he would not have got the jobs. More importantly, he was examined and interviewed twice by two state doctors for a permanent residency permit for South Africa and neither of them noticed any “thought-blocking,” though they were not psychiatrists. However, one would expect anyone, particularly a doctor, to spot whether a patient is able to answer a simple question or if he presents the symptoms mentioned by Dr. Sakinofsky:

- On November 11, 1963, Tsafendas was medically examined by Dr. C. Been for his permanent residence application and was found “not to be mentally or physically defective in any way,” and “generally in a good state of health.”⁵²⁹⁵ Dr. Been would later examine Tsafendas again “for burns on his body whilst employed at Pooles.” Again nothing about his mental state would be noted.⁵²⁹⁶
- On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined again for the same reason by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who also wrote “a favourable report,” and subsequently a certificate for permanent residence was issued for him.⁵²⁹⁷

In addition to the above two doctors, Tsafendas was seen by a further ten doctors, none of them psychiatrists, over the previous three years and none noted any “thought-blocking”:

- On March 15, 1965, Tsafendas was examined by a South African Railways’ medical officer whose name is indecipherable in his report. He was found to be perfectly healthy, without any issues and therefore capable of working at the company.⁵²⁹⁸

⁵²⁹⁵ Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁵²⁹⁶ Dr. Been statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵²⁹⁷ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁵²⁹⁸ South African Railways Confidential Medical Examination Certificate of Demitrio Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 7, File: S 83708, Tsafendas: D. NASA.

- On September 25, 1965, he was examined by Dr. G.C. Baker, a casualty officer, and nothing was reported about his mental state.⁵²⁹⁹
- On November 19, 1965, Tsafendas was medically examined to insure that he was able to work for City Tramways in Cape Town. He was found fit to work and duly hired.⁵³⁰⁰
- On January 13, 1966, Tsafendas applied for work at the Marine Diamond Corporation and underwent a medical check-up that same day. The doctor who examined him⁵³⁰¹ found Tsafendas to be perfectly healthy and capable of working for the company.⁵³⁰²
- On April 18, 19 and May 3, 1966 Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Goldman, a consultant ear, nose and throat surgeon. He reported nothing about his mental condition.⁵³⁰³
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work.⁵³⁰⁴
- Dr. Ralph Kossew examined Tsafendas only half an hour after the assassination. His testimony is highly important due to its timing. Dr. Kossew found Tsafendas “not confused ... he answers questions guardedly but does not appear to be confused ... he didn't appear anxious ... He may have been a little bit nervous but not in any marked degree... He was calm...”⁵³⁰⁵
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not

⁵²⁹⁹ Dr. G.C. Baker Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. No date. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4, NASA.

⁵³⁰⁰ Donal Neville Mackay statement to the COE, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵³⁰¹ The doctor's name in the medical report is indecipherable.

⁵³⁰² Demitrio Tsafendas's Marine Diamond Corporation Application for Employment, 13 January 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

⁵³⁰³ I. Eisenberg Statement. RE: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. N.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³⁰⁴ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

⁵³⁰⁵ Dr. Ralph Kossew's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work at Marine Diamond Corporation.⁵³⁰⁶

- Dr. S. Michelson, a specialist physician, examined Tsafendas in the Neurology Department of Groote Schuur Hospital on 3rd June, 1966 and nothing was reported to be wrong with his mental state.⁵³⁰⁷
- Finally, Dr. Darby, a casualty officer, examined Tsafendas on the evening of the assassination but did not report anything to be wrong about his mental state.⁵³⁰⁸

Furthermore, Tsafendas worked and was interviewed on several occasions for jobs or in response to various other applications he had made, and again no one noticed anything. For example:

- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban, accepted Tsafendas as a Portuguese and Greek interpreter. Rudolph used him “on several occasions” over six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He said, “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁵³⁰⁹
- Petrus Schuin, the head messenger at the Parliament, was also one of the three men who had interviewed him and appointed him. He told the Commission of Enquiry that “there was nothing out of the ordinary about him. Tsafendas was the same as any other person that had worked there.”⁵³¹⁰
- Sydney Wiehand, who was also one of the three messengers who had interviewed him at the Parliament, said about Tsafendas, “he was a quiet man. He wasn’t the rough type, or anything like that. He was quiet - quietly spoken, well-mannered.”⁵³¹¹
- Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas’s employer in Frankfurt, Germany, at the heavy engineering

⁵³⁰⁶ Dr. Leon Solomon’s medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

⁵³⁰⁷ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 64. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵³⁰⁸ Dr. T.A. Darby. Statement re: Dimitrio Tsafendas. G.S.H. NO. 65/014-181, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³⁰⁹ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³¹⁰ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵³¹¹ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

company Fries and Son, characterised Tsafendas “as extremely nice and friendly ... I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man... He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman ... he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on... we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.”

Tsafendas “left on his own wish” although Hartmann “would have liked to keep him.”⁵³¹² Tsafendas was given a reference by Hartmann, so his work there must have been satisfactory.

- Gillian Claire Lieberman, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation, whose office Tsafendas often visited, “I had various discussions with him. I got quite interested in him as an individual. ... I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation.”⁵³¹³
- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁵³¹⁴
- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike’s Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966, frequently driving him to the tanker *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town. Of Tsafendas, he told the police that he “never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers.”⁵³¹⁵
- Michaelis Augustides, Tsafendas’s employer for two months, found him to be “competent at his job” and never got the impression that he might be insane.⁵³¹⁶
- Ian Boswell, administrative assistant at the Department of Labour, Cape Town. He interviewed Tsafendas three times in 1966 and testified to the police that “he was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being

⁵³¹² *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin.’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

⁵³¹³ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³¹⁴ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³¹⁵ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁵³¹⁶ Lambley, 1980: 241.

over-talkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality during his interviews with me.”⁵³¹⁷

- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour, Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He told the police that he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”⁵³¹⁸
- Gideon Cloete, also at the Department of Labour, interviewed Tsafendas twice. According to Cloete, Tsafendas “had a neat appearance and made a good impression.” He did not notice any “signs of abnormality” and “appeared totally normal” to him.⁵³¹⁹
- Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen, was Tsafendas’s tram instructor in December 1965 and January 1966. He testified that “I did not at all get the impression that mentally anything was wrong with him. He is mentally normal.”⁵³²⁰

Tsafendas was also interviewed by Mr Limasollu Naci, owner of a private language college bearing his name in Istanbul, given a week’s trial, and then hired full-time. He worked there for five to six months, teaching English. Mr. Limasollu died before the author’s inquiries began, but his wife, who also worked at the college, believes that it would have been impossible for her husband to hire a man who talked in the manner described by the psychiatrists or suffered from thought blocking. Tsafendas left the college of his own accord and was given an excellent reference, which he used to secure employment in Parliament.

Furthermore, none of the forty-four witnesses interviewed by the author and knew Tsafendas ever got the impression that his speech was disjointed or that he suffered from thought blocking. For example, Fotini Gavasiadis, who was very close to him and practically lived with him for nine months in 1963-4, told the author:

“[Tsafendas] could buy and sell you and he could do that at any time during a conversation, in the first ten minutes, then again after thirty minutes or an hour and then again after two hours. He wouldn’t let you get up from the chair until he had made you agree with what he was saying, especially when talking politics ... He was very convincing and

⁵³¹⁷ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁵³¹⁸ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁵³¹⁹ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas’s summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁵³²⁰ Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

persuasive - he could turn black into white! If you disagreed with something with him, he would find a way to convince you that he is right and that you are wrong - even if you *know* that you are right and that he is wrong! If he made a mistake about something, he would turn things upside-down and at the end, he would even make you apologise to him ...

In the nine months I knew him, I saw him and spoke to him every day. Not even once did he appear to have an issue with his speech or his thoughts. He was always the same. We spent hours and hours talking and his speech was never incoherent, disjointed, blocked or whatever else, it was always perfect. He never gave me even the slightest indication that he might have the issues you mentioned.”⁵³²¹

The priests who met him in prison and in the hospital in the 1980s and the 1990s and spent hundreds of hours with him are positive that Tsafendas did not suffer from thought blocking, that he was able to participate perfectly in a conversation and that he did not talk in a disjointed manner. Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis told the author:

“[Tsafendas] could speak for hours, telling you things about his life, his thoughts and his ideology, but he could also participate in a dialogue. We spoke for hours about politics, religion and history and he was one of the most knowledgeable people I ever met in all these subjects. He was very argumentative and insistent, especially about politics. He never got lost in the conversation and he would never drop a subject until I had agreed with him. He would never give up a conversation if you disagreed. He was very argumentative and insistent, especially about politics. He never, not even once, seemed to have difficulty expressing himself or talked incoherently. Every single time, everything he said made sense and was perfectly stated. I don't believe for a moment that he could have talked in the way described by the psychiatrists unless he did it deliberately. He spoke and argued even better than most people. His speech and thought were perfectly fine.”⁵³²²

Father Michalis Visvinis told the author:

“He [Tsafendas] was always very alert. I was actually surprised that his mind was so alert after so many years in prison. Most of our conversations lasted about an hour and a half and he never lost track, nor did I feel that he was struggling to cope with our discussion...I felt that he [Tsafendas] needed to speak, so several times I would just let him speak. He

⁵³²¹ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵³²² Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

enjoyed speaking and he could speak for hours. I also often asked him questions about his life, and his answers were always logical and what one would expect. He never evaded any question and I never had to repeat myself to him for a second time, nor was his answer ever off the subject. He always spoke absolutely fine, like a normal man. [His speech] was perfectly articulate and logical, always very coherent. He never said anything to suggest he had a mental problem or that he had any difficulty speaking or thinking and expressing himself properly. This comment is also entirely false.”⁵³²³

Mary Eendracht, his first cousin, who grew up with him in Egypt and Mozambique and was constantly with him for nine months in 1963-1964, “Dimitri always spoke very well. He sounded like a very educated man. There was nothing wrong with speech or his thoughts; they were both excellent. He could argue with you for hours and hours for politics. He was very good with words and his brain was bigger than most people’s.”⁵³²⁴

Irene Michaletos knew Tsafendas for more than a year in 1964 and 1965 and he often visited and stayed at her house in Beira. They had several long conversations and she never experienced any problems conversing with him; on the contrary, she found Tsafendas to be an excellent and interesting conversationalist. She told the author:

“It is certainly false that he was unable to follow a conversation or that anyone had any difficulty talking to him. As a matter of fact, it was the exact opposite. I found the conversations with him very easy and interesting, too. He was a great storyteller. I had many long conversations with him. He was from the kind of people who have something to tell you, that you could sit and listen to them for hours. And I did that, I very much enjoyed talking and listening to him. He was not boring, he could talk to you about religion, politics and history, his travels and adventures around the world. But he did not show off when talking; he was a humble man, he never tried to show off, like that he had travelled in so many countries or that he was very knowledgeable. He was very modest and very down to earth, a serious man.”⁵³²⁵

Alexander Moumbaris, who spoke to Tsafendas for at least one hour every day for about three months in 1972 in Pretoria Prison, flatly denied that Tsafendas suffered from thought blockage and that he had problems in following a conversation. He told the author:

⁵³²³ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁵³²⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵³²⁵ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

“He never had any difficulty expressing himself or participating in a conversation. Most times he led the conversations. There were never gaps or pauses in his speech, or anything that would make me think that he was struggling to speak or participate in our conversations.”⁵³²⁶

The *Eleni* men were so impressed by Tsafendas's knowledge and way of speech that they began calling him “Professor.”⁵³²⁷ “We were all wondering how come he knew all these things. How could he be talking like this? He was talking like a university professor”, said Nikolaos Billis, one of the crew.⁵³²⁸ Another, Michalis Vasilakis, said, “I can't explain it, but I remember he had a very specific way of talking, using not very common, but absolutely correct, words. He knew how to speak and how to choose his words. He talked like a professor – that is what we used to say between us and what we called him ... He was a very knowledgeable man. No, his speech was definitely not disjointed, it was excellent.”⁵³²⁹

For reasons of space, the study will list only a few of the witnesses who were interviewed by the author, those who knew him best and longest. None of the above witnesses ever got the impression that Tsafendas's speech was disjointed or that he was unable to answer a question properly or blocked in the way Dr. Sakinofsky described.

- His half-sister Katerina Pnefma;⁵³³⁰
- Father Nikola Banovic who lived with him at the same house for four months in 1961 and then lived right next to his house for another three;⁵³³¹
- His first cousin Mary Eendracht, who grew up with him and was constantly with him for nine months in 1964;⁵³³²
- Ira Kyriakakis, who also grew up with him and spent a lot of time together in 1964 and 1965;⁵³³³
- Andreas Babiolakis, who knew him since they were children, who lived him for two

⁵³²⁶ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

⁵³²⁷ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015.

⁵³²⁸ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

⁵³²⁹ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁵³³⁰ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵³³¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵³³² Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵³³³ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

months in 1964 and associated with him for about a year then,⁵³³⁴

- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott's boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest;⁵³³⁵
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins, first met him in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique.⁵³³⁶
- Costas Poriassis who met him in 1965 in Beira;⁵³³⁷
- Alexandra Vaporidis who knew him for about six months in Istanbul in 1961;⁵³³⁸
- Nick Papadakis, who knew Tsafendas for two-three months and lived with him for two months in Mozambique in 1964,⁵³³⁹
- Panagiotis Peroglou and Costas Chagios who were Tsafendas's friends in Cape Town for more than a year.⁵³⁴⁰

TSAFENDAS'S MEDICAL RECORDS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is the past medical history of this man relevant to you, important to you?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, it is, because one of the criteria for making a diagnosis of schizophrenia is prognosis. In other words, the state of the patient - mental state - in the course of time. And in fact, if one had an almost continuous history of 30 years of this kind of delusional insanity, then I would think that is absolutely pathognomonic of schizophrenia. No other condition that I know of can last-

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And what would his prognosis be?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Hopeless for recovery.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: So if evidence is obtained that he was diagnosed at St. Pancras

⁵³³⁴ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁵³³⁵ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁵³³⁶ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵³³⁷ Costas Poriassis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁵³³⁸ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁵³³⁹ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵³⁴⁰ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015; Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

Hospital on the 26th May, 1959 as being a paranoid schizophrenic?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I had not seen that report but if this were so, I would see this as being consistent with the diagnosis I have made.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And if the authorities there, the doctors who interviewed him, say that he there too talked about the tapeworm, which he called a 'dragon'?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, this would again be absolutely consistent with the diagnosis. I would think that this would mean that he could never have dreamt this up on the spur of the moment as a defence. We had the evidence this morning of a lady called Mrs. O'Ryan, who says that the accused talked to her, some months before the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, about this tapeworm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you comment on that evidence which is now before the Court?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, the only comment I would make is that this makes it all the more likely that there was this delusion, was held continuously in time. It was not something which left him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If evidence were led, and the Court were to accept the opinion of a person called Dr. Brown, Medical Superintendent of the Hospital on the Isle of Wight - the White Cross Hospital, "that although his conduct in hospital was quiet and amenable, I did note on my report to the authorities that he was suffering from a delusional psychosis which could affect his conduct very considerably," what would the importance of that be?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, again I haven't seen this report. If this is so, then I have no doubt that this is consistent with the diagnosis of chronic schizophrenia - a variety of chronic schizophrenia.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would it be consistent with a diseased, insane man who assassinated the Prime Minister?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. Yes, because every psychiatrist knows that chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid kind into which this man fits, while apparently amenable and moving about society, could be subject to sudden eruption.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And in that state of eruption would he act in this way, kill somebody?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Under the influence of his diseased brain, he could, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If you had evidence - that goes back a little further - that is, evidence from the German hospital near Hamburg to whom you wrote, and you have seen that report....?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Ochsenzoll?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Again if that evidence is placed before the Court - and let us assume for a moment it is before the Court- what would it establish in your opinion?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It establishes that at the time he was in the Ochsenzoll he was suffering from a major mental disorder, due to this tape-worm, his belief about the tapeworm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is mention also made in that report of his preoccupation with this tapeworm?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. He had just been investigated in the Tropical Hospital in Hamburg for a tapeworm and the doctors there had told him he had no tapeworm. He refused to believe this, became wretched and took an overdose of sleeping pills - he took 20 sleeping pills in an attempt at suicide. He was admitted to the Ochsenzoll Hospital. They found the presence of hypochondriacal delusion and they gave him a variety of treatments, insulin, opium therapy and finally electric-convulsive therapy - shock treatment.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If you are told that prior to 1955, and in America (the year 1946, round there) he was certified insane and suffering from hebephrenic schizophrenia, what is your comment about that? The relevance and importance of that evidence?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, my first comment would be that I would not be at all surprised about it being schizophrenia. I would be a little surprised at the diagnosis of hebephrenia, because this betokens a much worse prognosis as far as deterioration, and the man we have in the dock here shows. The patients are characteristically reduced to silly, gibbering idiots.

JUDGE BEYERS: Like a child or something? The word, doesn't it mean 'behaving like a child'?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, Like a child or like a woman. I am not quite sure.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Doctor, sitting as an assessor in this case, would you consider it important to have all this medical history of the past placed before you?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, if I were in that position I certainly would think it was relevant.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Let us come now to your final assessment of this man before the Court. Your opinion is that he is suffering from...?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I regard him as suffering from schizophrenia, the particular sub-category in my opinion being paraphrenia.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is schizophrenia, this mental disease that he has, a psychosis?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It is a major psychosis.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is he mentally disordered in terms of the Act?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you certify him?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Should he go to an asylum?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: He should, at the State President's pleasure, if I may say so.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you any reservations.....?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I have no reservations at all.

COMMENTS ON DR. SAKINOFSKY'S TESTIMONY REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S MEDICAL RECORDS

The Defence Counsel refers again, as he did with Dr. Cooper, to some of Tsafendas's medical records from overseas hospitals. In this particular case, advocate Cooper reads from the report from the hospital in the Isle of Wight. First, Dr. Sakinofsky states that he has not seen this report, as Dr. Cooper also did. The question is, since both psychiatrists were part of the defence team, why were they not given these reports, especially since their diagnoses were compatible? Dr. Sakinofsky had said in correspondence with the author, but also stated to the Court, that a patient's medical records are very important. Dr. Sakinofsky himself had written to some of the hospitals where Tsafendas was treated to get his records. The defence team had some of these records in its possession, but did not give them to him.

Reyner van Zyl, the clinical psychologist who examined Tsafendas for the defence stated to the author that he was verbally told that Tsafendas was diagnosed as schizophrenic by many overseas hospitals, but he did not see any of the actual reports, and this was the case with at least some, if not all, of those who examined Tsafendas.⁵³⁴¹ However, Dr. Sakinofsky was in possession of the medical report from Hamburg as he had personally requested it from this hospital. He had received them sometime after the 4th of October and while he had already examined Tsafendas at least once and maybe even twice.⁵³⁴²

The Defence Counsel then refers again, as he did with Dr. Cooper, to the medical report from "America." As he did with Dr. Cooper, he reads only the diagnosis and does not say anything about the tapeworm or anything else that it is in the report. Then, something unbelievable happens when he asks Dr. Sakinofsky: "Doctor, sitting as an assessor in this case, would you consider it important to have all this medical history of the past placed before you?" The first major question is why all of Tsafendas's medical history was not placed before Dr. Sakinofsky in the first place; before the summary trial where he would have had the time to evaluate it properly? Since the diagnosis was similar to Dr. Sakinofsky's, it would have strengthened his own diagnosis about Tsafendas. However, the report from America, more specifically from Grafton State Hospital, contained two very important phrases that would certainly have been picked up by Dr. Sakinofsky, and the Defence Counsel must have known they could have been damaging for the defence's line.

The report says about Tsafendas that "he faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings (sinkings) of ships."⁵³⁴³ It also says that Tsafendas "is in the habit of smearing the walls in his room with faeces and is hallucinated and suspicious. He hears voices coming though the radiators."⁵³⁴⁴ Both of the above statements are very important information for a psychiatrist and their significance has been discussed in Dr. Cooper's testimony.

We should remember here that the US Immigration authorities had a file on Tsafendas containing "full particulars" of his time in the United States, including the Grafton State

⁵³⁴¹ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁵³⁴² Letter of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, to Dr. Sakinofsky, 4 October 1966. K150. Vol. 7, No: 09/4, Subject: Suspect Persons: Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵³⁴³ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁵³⁴⁴ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

Hospital report. The South African embassy in Washington had informed the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs that according to US Immigration officials, Tsafendas was “understood to have shown under psychiatric treatment that he was unstable though not (not)⁵³⁴⁵ insane, but type of man who would easily be used as instrument of Communist or hostile organizations. Impression of U.S. Immigration people at the time was that he had been manipulated and was under influence of someone or some organization. He was subsequently deported to Europe.”⁵³⁴⁶

As to the alleged suicide attempt, Tsafendas must certainly have lied when he said in Hamburg that he had taken twenty sleeping pills. He never spoke about this specific incident, but later stated that he never contemplated suicide while he was in custody, despite the severe torture, because he knew he was not brave enough to do it. Contrary to the general belief, Tsafendas held the view that suicide was not an act of cowardice but one of bravery. He believed that only a brave person would have the courage to take his own life and that people who killed themselves were mistaken in thinking they were weak when they were actually strong.⁵³⁴⁷ In addition, the Grafton State Hospital report stated that Tsafendas threatened the US Immigration authorities with suicide if they deported him. He was later deported, but did not proceed with his threat.⁵³⁴⁸

The Defence Counsel also referred to the reports from the English hospitals, as he did with Dr. Cooper and Dr. Muller. None of them was submitted as evidence and we do not know the detailed contents, apart from the diagnosis. The picture that emerged from Tsafendas's time in London, according to the evidence collected by the South African police but also by the author, is that he does not appear to act as a “paranoid schizophrenic” as the diagnosis suggests. Tsafendas arrived in England on May 16, 1959.⁵³⁴⁹ He asked the authorities if he could take a language test and work as a hotel porter, but this was refused, as was his application to remain in the country as a student. He was ordered to leave the United Kingdom by September 2, 1959.⁵³⁵⁰ However, he ignored the order and remained in the UK

⁵³⁴⁵ This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second ‘not’ within brackets.

⁵³⁴⁶ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁵³⁴⁷ Father Minas Constantinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵³⁴⁸ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁵³⁴⁹ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁵³⁵⁰ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

“working clandestinely because legally he was not authorised.”⁵³⁵¹ On August 4, 1959, Tsafendas applied for permission to enter South Africa, sending a letter and an application form to the Union’s immigration attaché in London.⁵³⁵²

According to the report of the Commission of Enquiry, while in London, Tsafendas “was noticed in the company of leftists,” confirming Tsafendas’s own statement to the police.⁵³⁵³ Tsafendas told the police he had attended political meetings organised by the Committee of African Organisations in Hyde Park, plus Labour Party meetings in London’s Caxton Hall as well as demonstrations held by anti-apartheid and anti-fascist groups.⁵³⁵⁴ According to the report of the Commission of Enquiry, evidence was submitted to the Commission that while in London Tsafendas tried to “recruit people to take part in an uprising in South Africa.” Tsafendas admitted to the Commission “that he did in fact try to recruit people for an uprising,” but said “that his aim was confined to the Territory of Mozambique.”⁵³⁵⁵ It appears unlikely that a paranoid schizophrenic will be involved in such activities and would associate with all these people and that his condition would go unnoticed.

Tsafendas told Fathers Minas, Ioannis and Spiros many years later that whenever he was penniless and homeless, he always found shelter at a hospital. As he said, hospitals where like hotels with free food and free accommodation.⁵³⁵⁶ As we have seen, according to Gordon Winter, Tsafendas had said exactly the same thing to General van den Bergh when he was interrogated by him.⁵³⁵⁷

This seems to be the case in the UK. Tsafendas was not allowed to work so when he ran out of money, he admitted himself to the hospital in St. Pancras. A report from the South African Embassy in London also stated that Tsafendas admitted himself to the hospital, claiming he had a fixation with a tapeworm.⁵³⁵⁸ He also talked his way into a hospital on the

⁵³⁵¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵³⁵² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraphs 28-30. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵³⁵³ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 31. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵³⁵⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵³⁵⁵ Report of the COE, Chapter II B, Paragraph 32. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵³⁵⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵³⁵⁷ Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

⁵³⁵⁸ Secret Telegram from the South African Embassy in London to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

Isle of Wight. It is the only one of which he spoke extensively to others. He said that while he was in the St. Pancras hospital, he learned about the Isle of Wight, a “beautiful small island” off the south coast of England, with an “impressive psychiatric hospital which was like an ancient castle.” He had never heard of this island and decided to visit it. Tsafendas accordingly cut short his stay at St. Pancras, having “recovered” from his “illness,”⁵³⁵⁹ after a few days and on October 4, made his way to the Isle of Wight. After a look around the island, he had himself admitted to the Whitecroft Mental Hospital, near Newport, claiming mental problems.⁵³⁶⁰

According to Tsafendas, the hospital staff were initially suspicious, considering it strange that a foreigner should just turn up at the psychiatric hospital of this small island. Most patients had been transferred there upon a doctor’s recommendation and nobody had ever turned up on the doorstep. Tsafendas said this was his trickiest problem. He could not claim that he was just passing and suddenly fell ill. Instead, he said he had lost his way trying to get to France and gradually he managed to convince the doctors that his case was genuine.⁵³⁶¹

Tsafendas stayed at the hospital until December 3, 1959, when he was discovered by the British immigration authorities and deported to Germany.⁵³⁶² Again, there is also no mention of the 1964/1965 report from the hospital in Beira where Tsafendas was hospitalised believing he was Saint Peter. For a more detailed analysis of the issue of Tsafendas’s medical records see the relevant section in Dr. Cooper’s testimony.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you consider your finding on the 6th September, 1966, at 7 p.m. as conclusive?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Did I consider it conclusive?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes?

⁵³⁵⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵³⁶⁰ Secret Telegram from the South African Embassy in London to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁵³⁶¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵³⁶² Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, London to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Report of the COE, Chapter II B, Paragraph 33. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Up to that point it was conclusive. I was able to make a diagnosis.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And did you think that further tests and observations were necessary?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. Sometimes one is misled by the clinical picture and it is only reasonable to do certain tests to find out whether other conditions are not mimicking this picture.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Is it true that when you examined the accused on the 6th September, 1966, he answered all questions readily?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes he answered them unguardedly.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And you did not find any blocking?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Any blocking? No, not at that time.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He was not vague?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, he was vague, certainly, because I could not follow the processes of his reasoning. When he talked about his royal kinship with somebody called Von Willem and he talked about his quasi political ideas, I could not follow him there at all. When he talked about the meeting between Chief Jonathan and Dr. Verwoerd, it having something to do with the Immorality Act, I couldn't follow him there.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You found no syntactical schizophrenia?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I found no syntactical formal schizophrenic thought disorder at that time, which meant that his grammar was reasonable, taking into account the fact that he was in an excited state.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you agree that you also found the accused to be fully orientated as to time and person?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, I did.

JUDGE BEYERS: All that you are putting to him now he has already said. It is on record. It is from his report.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How did you come to the conclusion at 7 p.m. that the accused was not in a position to evaluate correctly the consequences of the crime?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I did not come to that conclusion at 7 p.m. I came to that conclusion

when I weighed up all that evidence the next morning, when I had thought about it and slept on it, and put it all together. I came to that conclusion, in fact, at the end of that interview when I came out and I said to a member of the Security Police - the Major who was there - I said that this chap ought to go into Valkenburg for observation, and he said - well, that is not relevant. Or if you like, he said: "I feel sorry for the poor bugger."

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But did you know, when you examined the accused at 7 p.m. on the 6th September, that he had been concussed in Parliament?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, I could see that he had been restrained, yes. Concussed, well, I could not see

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I must object. There is no evidence that the man was concussed in Parliament.

JUDGE BEYERS: It might still come.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Very well, but then put it but

JUDGE BEYERS: Why?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Dr. Kossew was the one who examined him and he did not find him to be concussed.

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Concussion to me ...

JUDGE BEYERS: What is wrong with putting the question? The State hasn't led evidence yet?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Does the State now contend that he was concussed in Parliament and will lead evidence to substantiate that?

JUDGE BEYERS: From that question and the way it is put, I would normally deduce that the advocate putting it has got evidence that he was concussed.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: From a medical man?

JUDGE BEYERS: I don't care from whom he's got it. He might have it from Tsafendas. He is entitled at this stage to cross-examine on that basis. The question is perfectly in order.

DR. SAKINOFSKY: If I may answer that question then from the Attorney-General. I did not conclude it on medical grounds because the man was not confused; he was not disorientated in time and place. Had he been concussed, had he been a man who was

unconscious for a time, I would have expected this. And if I found that he was disorientated in time and place then I would have thought that there was concussion present which was influencing my clinical picture at the time.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you know that the accused's nose had been broken?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, I saw stitches. I didn't go into exactly what anatomical feature had been broken,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you know whether the accused had had any injections before you saw him?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I assumed that he would have had an anti-tetanus injection and possibly an antibiotic, but he had not had a sedative and he did not in any way have his consciousness clouded or impaired by concussion when I saw him, and the way I establish this is by orientation in time and place,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Could an injection for pain have impaired his reasoning?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No, I don't think so. Not without sedating him to the point where he was drowsy. He was anything but drowsy.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Couldn't the accused have been suffering from delayed shock?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: When you examined him?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I don't think that he was suffering from delayed shock in any way that would impair the mental state that I found at that time.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you consider it at the time?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. He was not pale. His pulse was good; I felt it several times actually.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you agree that millions of people think that Dr. Verwoerd and the Portuguese Government were in league together?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I think millions of people know that there is a friendly relationship between our two countries, but I would not say that they were in league in the sense that Mr. Tsafendas saw them to be in league. In other words, that the Portuguese Government was influencing the internal affairs of South Africa, the Immorality Act, etc.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How can you say that this is a delusion?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: How can I say that that is a delusion?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Because taking the whole of his quasi political ideas, in their context, I would think that these are false beliefs which cannot be held by a majority of our society, by anybody other than someone who is mentally deranged. Taking into account the context, not taking things out of context.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Is it true that the subject of the meeting between Dr. Verwoerd and Chief Jonathan was a matter of general political speculation?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, I think that is certainly so.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he know what they were meeting about?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Did who know? Did I know?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: No, the accused?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I don't think he did. Not from what he told me. He told me they were meeting to consider the Immorality Act.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you regard the accused's explanation of the cause of his headaches as ridiculous?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: His explanation that they were due to pressure?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes. Did you regard it as ridiculous?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No, I didn't regard that in itself as being particularly ridiculous. Lots of lay people talk about their headaches being due to pressure.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: The accused never mentioned to you that it was a tapeworm that was responsible for his illness, did he?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: When? At the first interview?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: On the first occasion?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: On the first interview we didn't get round to the tapeworm, no.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Would you have expected him to have mentioned it on this first occasion?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I don't think so, because there were so many recent events. After all, he had just assassinated the Prime Minister, and one was talking about that and what led him to do that, and his mind, I think, was filled with the quasi-political delusions which he held at that time, in this state of excitement- excitement in the pathological sense.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If the tapeworm was the reason why he assassinated the Prime Minister, wouldn't you have expected him to have mentioned it on this very first occasion?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I think in retrospect, had I specifically asked him, he would have gone into great detail about the tapeworm, but I didn't ask him.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Would you have expected him to have mentioned it himself?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: No.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why not?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Because a lot depended on how the conversation was led, and I was interested in the political side, to find out whether he had a political motive, whether this man was a criminal or an insane person.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you ask him why he assassinated the Prime Minister?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, I did.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And what did he say?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: He said because the Prime Minister was against (witness refers to his notes) the Commonwealth, against the English way of life, because he was a foreigner, because he was in league with the Portuguese Government, because he was against the ideal of a Cape-to- Cairo union, and, somehow, also because he had a mother who was of the royal family, of royal birth. Somehow this was also intruded as a reason for his killing the Prime Minister, and I couldn't see the relevance of that.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: So do you agree that the accused only gave political reasons for killing the Prime Minister?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: He gave political reasons at that time. And also, I don't know whether you would include this being a member of an overseas royal family as being a reason - if that is political, then he included that also. And also if you include the delusion of his being subjected to torture, mental torture, in a Lisbon hospital for 14 years, if that is regarded as political, then he gave that as a reason too.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you agree that schizophrenia of hebephrenic type is one of the diseases which leads to rapid disintegration? Which is that - hebephrenia? Yes?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, it is said to lead to rapid deterioration of personality, and, if you recall, just now I said how surprised I was that they had made that diagnosis. But not all that surprised, because we know that originally these categories which Kraepelin and others put forward for schizophrenia merge with one another in the course of a man's life. A man can start off as a paranoid schizophrenia and end up as a hebephrenic schizophrenia - that kind of thing. Or he may schizophrenia start off as a catatonic and end up as a hebephrenic schizophrenia.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If the accused had been suffering from schizophrenia for 20 years, wouldn't you have expected him to have been permanently detained in a mental hospital by now?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Well, that was one of the reasons why I make the diagnosis of paraphrenia, in fact, and I would not necessarily have expected him to have been detained in a mental hospital. There are plenty of authorities I can't lay my finger on now which point out that a man can amble around the world for 20 or 30 years and spend a short space of time, every couple of years, in a mental hospital, and yet have this chronic incapacitating mental disease, schizophrenia, and yet be liable to erupt, as this man unexpectedly did.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He could be a periodic type, not so?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: This is one kind of schizophrenia which many people don't believe in.

JUDGE BEYERS: What is that?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I think the Attorney-General is suggesting a variety of schizophrenia which with lucida intervalla and then a bit of schizophrenia and then a lucidum intervallum again?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: You say not many people believe in that?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I think many people would prefer to call those a variety of atypic or affective psychosis, but for someone, as one understands this man, to have been for 30 years possessed with this idea that he has got a giant tapeworm inside him, chronic delusional insanity, I would have thought this was entirely out of keeping with that kind of diagnosis.

JUDGE BEYERS: With this sort of come-and-go business?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. With relatively completely lucid intervals in between. I would think that in between, if one probes, one would find disease,

ASSESSOR: Do you base that only on the tapeworm delusion?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, I regard that as a very important delusion, hypochondriacal delusion, particularly if it is established that it has been in existence throughout this man's mental hospital life.

ASSESSOR: Assuming that it has, that alone, you feel, would destroy the idea that it was a periodic form?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. Because I would have thought that somebody who has an episodic illness would bring out fresh delusions, not the same continuous delusion.

JUDGE BEYERS: Even at times when he is in the valleys, when it is not active, the sick, delusional material is still lying at the bottom of the valley, because when he gets up to the rise in the graph again the same thing comes out again - that is what you are trying to say?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: If it was periodic, it would be a tapeworm now, and in a few months' time it would be a lion?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes, quite.

JUDGE BEYERS: And then again?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: A tiger.

JUDGE BEYERS: Or a tiger. That is what you are trying to say?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Yes. With complete normality in between.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If there is evidence that the accused was diagnosed as a schizophrenic years ago, and there is evidence that over the last few years he has travelled widely and that he could take care of himself, isn't that strongly suggestive of recovery?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Of recovery?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Not in itself, no.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why not?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: It is the level of life at which this man maintains himself that would have to be taken into account. If he was living as a bum, moving around the world as a locksmith here, as a woodcutter in Sweden and Canada, as a stevedore in another country - a man of his intelligence - I would have thought this is consistent with many schizophrenics that one comes across, and who spend a great deal of their time in mental hospitals too.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Would you have expected the accused to have mentioned to you on the 6th September that he killed the Prime Minister because of this tapeworm?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Not necessarily. He might not have thought I would believe it at that stage.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Dr. Kossew found that the accused was not confused at 2.50 p.m. What would you say about that?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Not confused?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Not confused at 2.50 p.m. on 6th September?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: Sorry - what relation has this to the assassination? When was the assassination supposed to have been done?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: The 6th of September?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: At what time?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Between 2.14 and 2.15?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: So just after the assassination he wasn't confused?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes. Twenty-five minutes after the assassination Dr. Kossew found that he was not confused. I would infer from that that he could not be suffering from concussion at that time. But how do you relate it to your finding that his reasoning was not impaired?

DR. SAKINOFSKY: I think here we are in semantic jungles. The term "confused" to the lay person means somebody who is muddled. But to a doctor it means someone whose consciousness is clouded, who is disorientated in time and place or person and whose attention wanders due to a clouding of consciousness of organic kind. I assume that Dr. Kossew used the medical usage of the word confused.

COMMENTS ON THE CROSS-EXAMINATION

The Attorney-General and the Court made a good attempt to challenge Dr. Sakinofsky's testimony with obvious questions such as why Tsafendas did not mention the tapeworm in their first meeting. Although Dr. Sakinofsky's response seems adequate, it does not explain why Tsafendas mentioned all these other things like the Cape to Cairo union, the Commonwealth etc. as reasons for killing Dr. Verwoerd, but never repeated these reasons to anyone else, not the police nor the medics nor lawyers who examined him. With Dr. Cooper, Tsafendas gave "frustration" as his motive, without mentioning the reasons he gave to Dr. Sakinofsky. However, he gave the police clear and straightforward reasons. What he told them is compatible with the evidence gathered by the police and the author; what he told Dr. Sakinofsky is incompatible with both.

Again, the South African police were in possession of several documents, including statements by people which contradicted Dr. Sakinofsky's diagnosis. The report from Grafton State Hospital was also in the possession of the police and could have also been used to challenge Dr. Sakinofsky's diagnosis. It is highly likely that the police were also in possession of the report from the hospital in Beira where Tsafendas was diagnosed as a schizophrenic who believed he was Saint Peter. None of all this evidence was used to challenge given testimony, thus the author is not in a position to know if the evidence was given to the Attorney-General.

What is striking is the effort made by the Attorney-General to challenge Dr. Sakinofsky's diagnosis, when his own two State-appointed experts, Professor of Psychiatry van Wyk and clinical psychologist Erasmus had come to the same conclusion as Dr. Sakinofsky. To challenge Dr. Sakinofsky was tantamount to challenging his own two experts. If the Attorney-General had doubts or lacked confidence in his two experts or if he believed that Tsafendas may not have been schizophrenic, why did he not appoint more psychiatrists and psychologists to examine him?

CONCLUSION

Dr. Sakinofsky's diagnosis of Tsafendas as schizophrenic was inevitable based on the evidence available to him. Although he admitted in correspondence with the author that "in psychiatry, after one has interviewed a patient, it is best practice to seek collateral information from family, friends, and medical records," he was not in possession of any information concerning Tsafendas from any of his friends or family. Rightly and professionally, he had contacted some of the hospitals where Tsafendas was admitted in order to seek additional information about him.

Although the defence was in possession of additional medical records for Tsafendas, these were not given to the doctor, probably because they contained information incompatible with that available to the doctor. Withheld or unavailable evidence included the fact that Tsafendas had another delusion in the 1940s, hearing voices from the radiators, while there is also no mention about Tsafendas's delusional idea two months before the assassination that people were murdered in his house. Very importantly, the fact that he had faked mental illness while in an American hospital and had been caught at it is also not mentioned.

The Attorney-General should have been in possession of documentation, from witnesses' statements to medical reports and statements from various organizations around the world to effectively challenge this testimony, but as with other testimonies, this did not happen, although the Attorney-General and the Court tried harder than before to launch a challenge.

The ever-present tapeworm makes its appearance here too and again Tsafendas repeats what he told Dr. Cooper. Everything that Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky was a lie, most of them inspired by real events that had taken place in his life, like the wooden box similar to a grafonola which the Portuguese used to deliver electric shocks while he was imprisoned in Portugal. Dr. Sakinofsky was not in position to know that these were lies, but the State should have been. The police and the Commission had collected at least two hundred statements from people who knew Tsafendas.

Several extracts from Dr. Sakinofsky's testimony were read word by word, individually, to about sixty people who knew Tsafendas, including nine who knew him very well. None of them believes that Tsafendas meant what he said. Nor did he mention to them any of the topics he gave to Dr. Sakinofsky. Their position is supported by about two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission at the time and none of

them mentioned anything like this. Nine of those witnesses who were interviewed by the author were extremely close to Tsafendas and although he confided to them about many things, he never once mentioned the Cape to Cairo union or expressed an interest in the Commonwealth or mentioned any of the things he told Dr. Sakinofsky.

In addition, Tsafendas told several people before the assassination and police and others after the assassination, that he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant and a dictator, but he never said this to Dr. Sakinofsky. At the same time, he never mentioned to other people what he said to Dr. Sakinofsky. If Tsafendas really believed what he told Dr. Sakinofsky, especially his political ideas, he would surely have mentioned them to someone else. Why would Tsafendas talk about the same political ideas to more than a hundred people, to the South African police and to the Portuguese police, but say something completely different to Dr. Sakinofsky? Obviously, because he was lying to him in an attempt to present himself as “deluded” and mad.

According to Professor Tuviah Zabow, “if Tsafendas was really schizophrenic, his condition should have deteriorated after what he went through in prison, especially without receiving medical treatment.”⁵³⁶³ However, to the end Tsafendas maintained to everyone he met that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was a tyrant and a dictator who was oppressing his people and he hoped that his death would bring a change a policy or would be a stepping stone towards the fall of apartheid. He also maintained until his death the political ideas he held before the assassination and had expressed to tens of people, namely being a Communist, anti-fascist, anti-colonialist and supporter of the independence of Mozambique. Tsafendas never changed his political ideas. He never told anyone what he told Dr. Sakinofsky.

A lot of Tsafendas's claims could very easily been proven to be lies by looking at the evidence gathered by the police. The most obvious example is that Tsafendas told Dr. Sakinofsky he did not remember anything about Dr. Verwoerd's killing and felt that he was hypnotised although he had described it in perfect detail twice to the police while he was in custody. Even thirty years later, Tsafendas was able to describe the assassination in detail.

Dr. Sakinofsky's diagnosis is entirely wrong, but this is hardly his fault. Like Dr. Cooper and the other psychiatrists he was required to evaluate Tsafendas's condition based

⁵³⁶³ Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016.

on what Tsafendas said and on some of his medical records which told half the truth. Dr. Sakinofsky was the only one of those who examined Tsafendas who tried to get additional information about him. Advocate Cooper did an exceptionally good job for his side, as he had done with Dr. Cooper, by handling the Grafton State Hospital report in a carefully selective way. Tsafendas remembered very fondly Dr. Sakinofsky until he died, always speaking highly of him and described him as a “very kind, good and intelligent boy.”⁵³⁶⁴

⁵³⁶⁴ Tsafendas in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 10: GILLIAN CLAIRE LIEBERMAN

INTRODUCTION

Gillian Lieberman was also questioned by the police on October 6.⁵³⁶⁵ She was the last witness to testify this day as the court then adjourned until the next day.

GILLIAN LIEBERMAN'S TESTIMONY⁵³⁶⁶

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Miss Lieberman, what is your occupation?

LIEBERMAN: I am Personnel Secretary.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Which Company?

LIEBERMAN: The Marine Diamond Corporation.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you seen the accused before?

LIEBERMAN: Yes, I have.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where did you see him?

LIEBERMAN: I saw him approximately the first time in February, 1966 employed as...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And was he employment then?

LIEBERMAN: He was a pump operator on a diamond barge.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Owned by your Company?

LIEBERMAN: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: During which period was he employed as a pump operator?

LIEBERMAN: From the 3rd of February, 1966, and he resigned of his own accord on the 7th of April, 1966.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did he earn per month during this period?

⁵³⁶⁵ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³⁶⁶ Gillian Claire Liebermann's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

LIEBERMAN: He earned R180 nett.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: During the period of employment with The Marine Diamond Corporation, did you talk to him at any stage?

LIEBERMAN: Yes, I did.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the nature of your conversation?

LIEBERMAN: I spoke to him on a number of occasions. The first time he came to me, he came to my office, he had a query, and he wished to go and see a doctor.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: For what reason?

LIEBERMAN: He complained that he had something wrong with his ears and nose, with his head, and I referred him to our Company doctor.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he on the occasions that you spoke to him, did he have any grievance, any complaints?

LIEBERMAN: Yes, he did have a number of complaints.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Will you tell us some of them?

LIEBERMAN: He complained about the conditions of employment on our diamond barges. He complained about the type of person we employed on our diamond barge.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was his complaint about then?

LIEBERMAN: Well, I am not quite sure. He complained about the type of person. I never quite understood what he referred to when he meant "type of person", he did not have a tolerance towards the type of superintendent we employed, his superiors, he did not seem to like our superiors.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And as regard white people what was his attitude?

LIEBERMAN: He was rather intolerant towards them. When I refer to white people, the type of white people we employed, that was his intolerance, not to white people as a whole.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How was he dressed?

LIEBERMAN: Rather sloppily dressed.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was the impression you formed of him, overall?

LIEBERMAN: My overall impression was that he was rather untidy, sloppy. He seemed

rather odd to me.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Wasn't he a very dissatisfied person?

LIEBERMAN: Yes, he seemed rather a dissatisfied person.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you tell him that you could not arrange separate facilities for them?

LIEBERMAN: Yes, I did.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And what was his reaction to that?

LIEBERMAN: He accepted that.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why did he resign? Who advised him to resign? Did you advise him?

LIEBERMAN: I did advise him, he had a number of complaints and his general dissatisfaction of the Company. I suggested that the best thing would be for him to resign and he agreed with me.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused speak to you about the political situation in South Africa?

LIEBERMAN: He wished to know my political affiliation and I told him that in my position as personnel secretary I was not in a position to discuss them.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you find the accused to be intelligent?

LIEBERMAN: Well, I did not find him over-intelligent or under-intelligent. He was of normal intelligence to me. I mean I did not see him that long to be able to assess his intelligence as such.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How long were you associated with him?

LIEBERMAN: He was employed with us, as I said, for roughly two months, and I met him on a number of occasions, probably this interview I had with him lasted from anything from ten minutes to half- an-hour.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Didn't you say this to the Police: "I found him intelligent,

someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange type of person, a unique character?

LIEBERMAN: Yes, I did.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And is that still your opinion?

LIEBERMAN: Yes, that is my opinion.

COMMENTS ON LIEBERMAN'S TESTIMONY AND TO HER CROSS-EXAMINATION

Lieberman does not tell us much about Tsafendas apart from the fact that he was not happy with working conditions, that he was "rather untidy, sloppy" and he seemed "odd" to her. She had only spoken to him on "a number of occasions" and was not in contact with him every day like the company's field workers. Lieberman had earlier testified to the police about Tsafendas's dirty clothes. However, since his was a labouring job, dirty clothes would seem normal. He could hardly have work a business suit for work. All those who knew Tsafendas socially, as we have seen earlier, testified that he was always dressed and that wore dirty clothes only at work. For more about the way Tsafendas was dressed look earlier at Merle Daniels's testimony.

Lieberman also testified that Tsafendas seemed "odd" to her, but did not elaborate further and neither the Attorney-General nor the Court asked what she meant by that. Leaving the word hanging could give the impression that Tsafendas was a mentally peculiar. However, what Lieberman said in her statement to the police was: "I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange type of person, a unique character. Apart from him being well-travelled etc., I got the impression that he was physically different in dress and appearance. He was a big man, with a particularly striking big hat, stainless steel teeth, sloppy dirty clothing."⁵³⁶⁷

According to her statement to the police, Lieberman had found Tsafendas strange because of how he dressed and his physical appearance, not for what he did or said. On the contrary, she had stated, and this was heard in the court only because of the cross-examination, that she had found Tsafendas to be "intelligent" and "able to reason in conversation." Lieberman was not the first one to comment on Tsafendas "reasoning power."

⁵³⁶⁷ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine or ten weeks at Marine Diamond Corporation, the same company as Lieberman, testified to the police that he “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁵³⁶⁸

Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike’s Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966 and told the police that he “never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers.”⁵³⁶⁹

Lieberman had also told the police that she got the impression that Tsafendas did “not agree with authority (Governmental or other)” but she did not repeat this statement in court and the Attorney-General did not mention it.

Lieberman was obviously chosen to testify that Tsafendas was an “odd” and “dissatisfied” person who often complained. The defence seemed to turn a blind eye to the fact that she had testified to the police about Tsafendas’s intelligence and reasoning powers, probably because it was proving difficult to find suitable witnesses to support the defence line. If the defence wanted to bring forward witnesses who worked with Tsafendas and knew him reasonably well and were ready to talk about him, they would have called field workers and not an office worker who had limited contact with him. Tsafendas had worked in Marine Diamond Corporation for three months and had co-workers who saw him every day. Three of these workers had already testified to the police.

One of them was Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden, senior security officer of the company’s Colpontoon diamond boat. He testified to the police that:

“We were transferred from the Marina with a small outboard boat to the Colpontoon. It was terrible rough seas, so much so that almost all of us old hands got seasick. It struck me that Tsafendas adapted well. He was one of the few who were not sick. With landing, he filled the mess-basin on the lower deck with water and started shaving. His calm way struck me that he must know the sea. Tsafendas was employed as a pump, or engineer, operator and did not work under my direct supervision. I introduced myself to him and talked to him. He was friendly, outgoing, and was not aloof. I noticed that his eating was messy. Otherwise he was completely normal.”⁵³⁷⁰

⁵³⁶⁸ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³⁶⁹ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

⁵³⁷⁰ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Another one was Ralph Lighton who had testified on September 17 that having worked with Tsafendas for nine-ten weeks, he understood that he was “lazy and inefficient,” “used to mix with the Coloureds rather than with the Europeans,” “said that the climbing of the ladders were too much for him. I never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers, but despite his former career in the Merchant Marine, was unsuitable for our work.”⁵³⁷¹ Hulse, who also worked for the company at this time, testified to the police on September 28 that Tsafendas “informed him that he left Marine Diamond as the work was too hard for an old man like him.” He also said that Tsafendas “did not appear to be disturbed at any stage.”⁵³⁷²

These three witnesses knew Tsafendas better than Lieberman and would have been able to testify to his work skills and ethics. Naturally the defence did not choose them since what they had told the police did not suit the defence line. Instead, Lieberman was brought forward (despite her remark that Tsafendas was able to reason in a conversation and was intelligent), simply because she also testified that he wore dirty clothes, was dissatisfied and a “strange person.” This demonstrates the desperation of the defence to find suitable witnesses to support their line. On the other hand, these three statements could have been useful to the State to challenge the defence, but none of them was used.

⁵³⁷¹ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³⁷² Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

DAY 3: 19 OCTOBER 1966

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 11: REYNER JOHANNES VAN ZYL

REYNER VAN ZYL'S PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHY AS RELATED BY HIM TO THE COURT

Reyner Johannes van Zyl, a clinical psychologist practising at Grand Parade Centre, Castle Street, Cape Town, is registered with the South African Medical and Dental Council as a psychologist. He holds a B.A. degree and a Master's in Psychology. He secured the Master's Degree at the University of Pretoria in 1959 and then worked at the Tara Neuro-psychiatric Hospital in Johannesburg as an intern in clinical psychology for eighteen months. For approximately nine months he worked at the Constantia Reformatory as a psychologist and then was employed at Groote Schuur Hospital in the same capacity. He worked at Groote Schuur full-time for two years and for the last three years part-time. At the request of defence counsel David Bloomberg, he examined Tsafendas.

REYNER VAN ZYL'S TESTIMONY⁵³⁷³

VAN ZYL'S EXAMINATION, HIS TESTS AND TSAFENDAS'S IQ

DEFENCE COUNSEL: On what day did you examine the accused?

VAN ZYL: I examined the accused on the 13th October, 1966.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: For how many hours?

VAN ZYL: For three and a half hours.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was it one stretch or did you have a break?

VAN ZYL: There was a break in between.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: So the first session of the interview lasted how long?

VAN ZYL: For two hours.

⁵³⁷³ Reyner van Zyl's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And the second for one and a half hours?

VAN ZYL: That is correct.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you drawn up a report?

VAN ZYL: I have done so.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Of your tests and your findings and the conclusion you have come to?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you that report before you?

VAN ZYL: I have.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And there are photostatic copies available which you can hand in to the Court for the Court's convenience. This document which you will read out, adhere to and hand in will be R.S.C.D. would you start at the first paragraph?

VAN ZYL: I interviewed and tested Mr. Demitrio Tsafendas on the 13th October, 1966, for two hours in the morning and 1 1/2 hours in the afternoon.

(Witness reads R.S.C.D). The following psychological tests were used:

- The new South African standardization of the Wechsler Bellevue Adult Intelligence Test.
- The Thematic Apperception Personality Test.
- The Rorschach Personality Test.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Before we go any further, would you explain to his Lordship and the gentlemen assessors with him what is the new South African standardization of the Wechsler Bellevue Adult Intelligence Test?

VAN ZYL: It is an intelligence test consisting of ten sub-tests, and testing different aspects of intelligence. It is generally used for White South Africans and can test in the range from an I.Q. of 20 - which would be an idiot - to an I.Q. of plus-minus 190 - which is out and out a genius.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You say the average White adult?

VAN ZYL: That is correct,

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would the standard test by this test be higher than for, say, an average Coloured adult?

VAN ZYL: If you are going to test a Coloured adult on this test, it is very likely that he will score lower than a White man.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why?

VAN ZYL: Because it is standardized for White people and there are separate tests for Coloureds.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you deal with the sub-test - the sub-sections of the test. There were ten in number?

VAN ZYL: That is correct.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Just give us the ten?

VAN ZYL: The sub-tests were: Information; Comprehension; Arithmetic; Digit Span; Similarities; Picture Completion; Object Assembly; Block design; Digit symbol substitution; and Picture arrangement.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: May I just pause for a moment. How did the accused react to these tests?

VAN ZYL: He was very co-operative and calm and at ease in the testing situation.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was he interested in what you were asking him, or did he appear to be interested in what you were asking him?

VAN ZYL: He did not particularly appear to be interested but he responded quite well.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: First of all, as to the Information sub-section, what was his score?

VAN ZYL: 11.5.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the significance of that?

VAN ZYL: The average score is 10, and he scored 11.5.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was it a wide range of information that you tested him on?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Comprehension, what was his score?

VAN ZYL: 14.5.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the significance of that?

VAN ZYL: Again the average is 10, which means that it is a very high score.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Arithmetic, what was the result of that?

VAN ZYL: Nine.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is your comment there?

VAN ZYL: That it is somewhat below average

MR. BAKER: Is the average ten throughout?

VAN ZYL: Throughout.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Digit Span?

VAN ZYL: 12.5.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you explain to the Court what is meant by Digit Span?

VAN ZYL: You give the subject some digits to repeat. The easier ones he would have to repeat two or three digits immediately after you had said it, and then more difficult, it goes up to nine digits.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: So again, what is your comment on the figure 12.5?

VAN ZYL: It is again better than average and good.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Similarities, the result was?

VAN ZYL: 8.5.

JUDGE BEYERS: Mr. Cooper, I again don't wish to cut you short, but there does not appear to be any attack upon the fact that this man is of high intelligence. So couldn't we go through this, perhaps, a little less in detail?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Certainly, M'Lord.

JUDGE BEYERS: I did not understand there to be any question of his having more than an adequate I.Q.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: There is just one aspect, that this test also ties up with his present mental

JUDGE BEYERS: I don't want to put you off.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: That is why I think it is necessary to have a scatter of it. The important feature is schizophrenia; and to have a scatter of it.

(Cont.): Just go on now. What did you find in Similarities?

VAN ZYL: 8.5.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Picture Completion?

VAN ZYL: 13.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Object Assembly?

VAN ZYL: 10.5.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Block design?

VAN ZYL: 10.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Digit Symbol substitution?

VAN ZYL: 8.5.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Picture arrangement?

VAN ZYL: 15.5.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you then go on from that point to read your report further?

VAN ZYL: (Witness continues reading R.S.C.D). "His full I.Q. tests at 113.5. His verbal I.Q. tests at 125.00."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you test him for his standard of English?

VAN ZYL: As part of the verbal I.Q. test?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Yes?

VAN ZYL: I did.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was your finding?

VAN ZYL: That it was very good.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Compared to, say, Matric, or Standard VIII or university; could you give is some idea?

VAN ZYL: I'd say Matric level.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you proceed then with your report?

VAN ZYL: (Witness continues reading R.S.C.D). “The latter is a separate test of the Weschsler Bellevue Test and is commonly used to give a rough indication of the individual’s intelligence. The discrepancy between the full-scale I.Q. and the verbal I.Q. is therefore not important. As can be noted from the above sub-sections, there is a marked scatter in scores which can not only be contributed to higher aptitude on these sub-sections.

As a matter of fact, his verbal I.Q. as compared to his nonverbal I.Q. is 111 against 114, which is not a significant difference. These are the only two broad categories of aptitudes in this test. The scatter is therefore of great significance. This very wide scatter is indicative of gross personality disturbance and some kind of interference of the smooth functioning of the intellect of the individual. His particular pattern of scatter is not 100 per cent typical of any particular type of psychological illness. It is known that an atypical pattern does not necessarily exclude any diagnosis.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In administering the test, what did you find, what impression did you form?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D). “I very strongly got the impression that this man has great difficulty in abstract thinking and in expressing himself. The latter I did not think was due to language difficulty because of his high verbal intelligence. My impression was that his original I.Q. was + 125 but that this had deteriorated because of some interfering illness. I gathered from Mr. Tsafendas that this test was also done by the Clinical Psychologist representing the State but I do not think that the learning which took place by repeating the test can invalidate or change the basic pattern significantly.”

DR. PETER LAMBLEY REGARDING VAN ZYL'S IQ TESTS

Dr. Peter Lambley, a British psychologist and author of the acclaimed *The Psychology of Apartheid*, had worked in the 1970s in South Africa and for some time was colleague of both Dr. Cooper and Mr. van Zyl. The following is an extract from his book about van Zyl’s test:

“The evidence from the IQ testing indicated a temporal impairment - shown by only two low scores out of ten (of $z=85$) - rather than a major impairment of functioning. Truly hebephrenic schizophrenics show the reverse: impairment on all but one or two tests. Tsafendas’s scores showed him to be withdrawn and cut off - interpreted in court as schizophrenia - but not demented in anything like the degree claimed. Anyone, in fact any

normal-neurotic person in the same frightful and shocking situation, would show the same kind of fall-off in performance. If you took Tsafendas's IQ test results (ten sub-tests) and asked a clinician to evaluate them blind - that is, without knowing who he was - they would say, and I quote: 'Highly intelligent, creative adult male with some personality problems.' I did, in fact, take Tsafendas's results and gave them to other clinicians to rate blind. No one said he was schizophrenic or even severely disturbed. They noted that in some instances, his sub-test results showed an extremely high level of intellectual functioning."⁵³⁷⁴

**TSAFENDAS, A "WITHDRAWN AND ISOLATED INDIVIDUAL" WITH
"LACK OF HUMAN REACTION"**

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Now you came to the Thematic Apperception Test?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you shortly explain to the Court what the Thematic Apperception Test is, or as you call it, the T.A.T.?

VAN ZYL: It is a test consisting of a series of 20 pictures in which you ask the patient to tell you a story about each one. It represents everyday life, human situations. You ask him what is happening in the test, how he feels, what thoughts are concerned and the possible outcome of the story. And then you analyse that according to a specific training or pattern.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: From this test, what became clear?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D) "From this test it is clear to me that the usual type of psychodynamic pattern which is present in neurotic individuals is absent in Mr. Tsafendas's record. According to the test, it is evident that there is virtually nothing in the way of meaningful interpersonal contact."

JUDGE BEYERS: "Meaningful interpersonal contact." Could you tell me what that is?

VAN ZYL: The ability to relate warmly with feeling towards a fellow human being.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Give us an example?

VAN ZYL: For example, let's assume you tell somebody that your mother has just died, and he says to you: "So, she has just died" - there is no warmth in the reply.

⁵³⁷⁴ Lambley, 1980: 272-273.

JUDGE BEYERS: A lack of human reaction?

VAN ZYL: Lack.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What else did he show?

VAN ZYL: (Witness continues reading from R.S.C.D). "Also he shows a marked flatness and absence of feeling except for a strong statement about depression which could not be followed through at the emotional level. He also found it very difficult to project himself and identify with the test stimuli which is indicative of his being a withdrawn and isolated individual. All his test responses were dull and without drive to complete or follow them through. This is indicative of a lack of volition and an element of depression. His whole approach to the test was vague and unsure and he found it very difficult to think constructively and in accordance with his measured I.Q. about the test stimuli. It was quite an effort for me to get him to complete his responses according to my instructions. Without fail, I had to ask him about emotions concerned. On this inquiry, he never gave me a satisfactory answer."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In view of his difficulty to make reasonable and meaningful contact, what diagnosis did you make?

VAN ZYL: That I would say is a schizophrenic symptom, but of course, the diagnosis does not rest only on this one symptom.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you give us your conclusion then at the top of page 4?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.'D'). "In view of this individual's difficulty to make reasonable and meaningful contact with the outside world and his disorder of intelligence, emotions and volition, I am making the diagnosis of schizophrenia on this test."

COMMENTS ON VAN ZYL'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

TSAFENDAS'S "LACK OF HUMAN REACTION"

According to van Zyl, Tsafendas showed a "lack of human reaction" to the tests he carried on him and there was "no warmth" in his reply. Examples of compassionate actions in Tsafendas's past would give the mistake to this diagnosis. Tsafendas cried like a baby in front of his relatives upon reading in a letter that Elena, Father Nikola Banovic's twelve-year old daughter, had drowned in Turkey. He lost his appetite and ate almost nothing for several

days.⁵³⁷⁵ While he was in custody for the assassination, he begged the police to let him keep her photograph, but the police took it and he never saw it again. Even thirty years later, Tsafendas would weep when talking about the drowned girl.⁵³⁷⁶

As to an absence of feeling, Tsafendas is on record as deeply mourning his father and birth mother, constantly writing to family and friends, lending money and giving handouts to poor people. He was devastated when he learned that his step-mother was not his real mother and that his real mother had died.⁵³⁷⁷ Upon returning to Mozambique after twelve years in exile, Tsafendas desperately sought for information about his mother and for the location of her grave.⁵³⁷⁸ Later, when he was back in Pretoria, the first thing he did was to visit his father's grave. For nine months until he left, he would visit it at least once a week, tidying it, leaving flowers and lighting a candle. He often complained to his step-mother that she was not looking after the grave site properly.⁵³⁷⁹

Furthermore, Tsafendas always carried photographs of his family in his wallet and he sent them letters with pictures and postcards from wherever he travelled.⁵³⁸⁰ He also sent postcards to his close friends and thank you cards to those who had helped him, like Aris Tsafantakis' parents in Crete⁵³⁸¹ and Father Nikola Banovic in Istanbul.⁵³⁸² He lent money to his flatmate John Bornman and refused to take the repayment,⁵³⁸³ he gave money to poor Whites in Durban,⁵³⁸⁴ he defended two Black South African workers who were cheated by his colleague Nick Vergos⁵³⁸⁵ and he helped a poor Indian man to build a room in his house.⁵³⁸⁶

The fact that Tsafendas did not show much interest in van Zyl's tests had nothing to

⁵³⁷⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵³⁷⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵³⁷⁷ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁵³⁷⁸ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁵³⁷⁹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

⁵³⁸⁰ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵³⁸¹ Aris Tsafantakis in a personal interview, 13 April 2016.

⁵³⁸² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵³⁸³ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵³⁸⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.'

⁵³⁸⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 5 August 2011; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁵³⁸⁶ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal intergiew with the author, 30 January 2015.

do with his intellect or emotions. Tsafendas twice clearly told the police that he did not care about what would happen to him and he expected to be executed. Therefore, why would he care about IQ or Digital Symbol Substitution tests? What is more, Tsafendas had already done exactly the same tests when he was examined by Erasmus two weeks previously, which could have been another reason for him to not have bothered going through exactly the same things again.

Finally, by the time Tsafendas took these tests, he must have known that he was going to be found insane, since he had already been examined by five psychiatrists. Being experienced with psychiatrists and aware that the authorities wanted him declared insane, why would he bother with yet more tests, which, some thirty years later, he characterised as “childish stuff”?⁵³⁸⁷

TSAFENDAS BEING A “WITHDRAWN AND ISOLATED INDIVIDUAL”

Van Zyl also characterised Tsafendas as a “withdrawn and isolated individual,” which he described as a symptom of schizophrenia. Many witnesses testified to the contrary, Tsafendas was sociable, friendly and open, since he was a child. The most telling evidence that Tsafendas was neither withdrawn nor isolated comes from the following two incidents:

Guenther Haafe, doorman at the Frankfurt factory where Tsafendas worked for six weeks in 1958. Eight years later, after the assassination, he still remembered the jovial greeting which Tsafendas gave him every morning and said about him: “He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come into my locker (room) to say Hi. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met and trust me, in my twelve years as a doorman I have seen thousands and thousands of faces coming in and out; this man was courteous, they do not make them like that anymore.” Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas’s boss at that job, said Tsafendas was “well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous ... a very pleasant man. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman ... we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.”⁵³⁸⁸

⁵³⁸⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵³⁸⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man.’

While in Beira in 1964, Tsafendas attended the wedding of Vittorio, an Italian friend and fellow Communist, probably from Naples, who was working with him at the time. As the celebrations proceeded, Tsafendas rose from his chair and raised his glass. Everyone thought he was about to deliver a speech. He did indeed deliver a very short speech wishing the newly-weds well, but then, in a ringing baritone, he launched passionately into an Italian Communist song. Most of the Greeks among the guests were speechless, but Vittorio and his Italian friends joined in eagerly, clapping and rhythmically pounding the table with their fists or spoons. When he finished he received huge applause and Vittorio and some of his friends called for another song. Tsafendas obliged with a second Italian Communist anthem and again many guests joined him.⁵³⁸⁹

Furthermore:

- William Mare Volbrecht, Tsafendas's school mate at the English Medium Primary School in Middleburg, testified to the police that he was "never a loner and freely mingled with us."⁵³⁹⁰ His half-sister, Katerina Pnema,⁵³⁹¹ Mary Eendracht his first cousin who grew up with him in Egypt and Lourenço Marques,⁵³⁹² and Ira Kyriakakis, Helen Grispos and Andreas Babiolakis, who also grew up with him, confirmed Volbrecht's statement and said Tsafendas was also very talkative since he was a child.⁵³⁹³
- Johannes Aurets, Tsafendas's supervisor at the South African Railways, told the police Tsafendas "was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature."⁵³⁹⁴
- An unnamed "respected member of the Press gallery" in the House of Assembly "who knew Tsafendas well" spoke to Rene MacColl, of the *Daily Express*, about Tsafendas. He said that "far from being a withdrawn sort of man, he seemed to be intent on impressing his personality on one. There was always the big smile, the ready chat and an almost obsessive intention to make you remember him. There couldn't have been a less grey or

⁵³⁸⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵³⁹⁰ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Verklaring deur Majdor Venter. NASA.

⁵³⁹¹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵³⁹² Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵³⁹³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵³⁹⁴ Johannes Jaonus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

faceless figure.”⁵³⁹⁵

- J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”⁵³⁹⁶
- Keith Martincich who worked with him at the Marine Diamond Corporation testified that Tsafendas “spoke to me every day and I got the impression that he was sociable type.”⁵³⁹⁷
- Hulse, who worked with him at the Marine Diamond Corporation for nine or ten weeks said “Tsafendas was very talkative.”⁵³⁹⁸
- Colleagues at Durban Magistrate's Court described him as the “chatty Greek.”⁵³⁹⁹
- Ian Boswell, a clerk at the Department of Labour, testified that Tsafendas was “over-talkative.”⁵⁴⁰⁰
- Pieter Geldenhuys, also of the Department of Labour, testified that “he was very talkative.”⁵⁴⁰¹
- Owen Smorenberg, who worked with him for five-six weeks, testified that “Tsafendas was very talkative and gave the impression that he was very friendly. He wanted to talk to everybody and it became known to me that he was able to speak different languages.”⁵⁴⁰²
- Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas's boss at F.A. Poole Engineering for five months found him to be a “very friendly, social and talkative person.”⁵⁴⁰³
- Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden, who worked alongside Tsafendas for about three months at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified that “he was friendly, outgoing, and was not

⁵³⁹⁵ *Daily Express*, 9 September 1966: 2, ‘Was it murder incorporated?’

⁵³⁹⁶ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

⁵³⁹⁷ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵³⁹⁸ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; The edge of the document was not copied, so the word is missing.

⁵³⁹⁹ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Algumas versoes sobre a vida de Tsafendas.’

⁵⁴⁰⁰ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁵⁴⁰¹ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁵⁴⁰² Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

⁵⁴⁰³ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

aloof.”⁵⁴⁰⁴

- Jacobus Bornman, Tsafendas's flatmate for two months, characterise him as “a friendly and plausible person.”⁵⁴⁰⁵
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁵⁴⁰⁶
- Reginald Maile, guard on the *Eleni*, testified that Tsafendas was “on very friendly relations with the crew.”⁵⁴⁰⁷
- Neville Judson, who worked with him for two months, testified to the police that Tsafendas had “a very friendly way of talking.”⁵⁴⁰⁸ He later said that Tsafendas was “overly talkative and sociable.”⁵⁴⁰⁹
- Michaelis Augustides, Tsafendas's employer for two months, also found him to be “overly talkative and sociable.”⁵⁴¹⁰
- Jose Lopez Baltazar, a fireman in Beira, testified that “when Tsafendas was in the presence of whites, he said little or nothing, but was friendly and talkative with the Bantu.”⁵⁴¹¹
- Panagiotis Peroglou and his wife Pamela Abrahams, who knew him for about a year, testified to the police but their statements have gone missing. In a personal interview, however, they characterised him as being “very talkative and friendly.”⁵⁴¹²
- Peter Pappas, whose café in Durban Tsafendas often visited, characterised him as

⁵⁴⁰⁴ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁴⁰⁵ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁴⁰⁶ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁴⁰⁷ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

⁵⁴⁰⁸ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

⁵⁴⁰⁹ Lambley, 1980: 241.

⁵⁴¹⁰ Lambley, 1980: 241.

⁵⁴¹¹ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵⁴¹² Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

“pleasant.” He also stated that Tsafendas “was friendly with white down-and-outs and when he had some money he would give them a few cents.”⁵⁴¹³

In addition to the witnesses named above, van Zyl’s diagnosis of Tsafendas as withdrawn and isolated is rebutted by the forty-four witnesses interviewed by the author, who saw him as friendly, sociable and talkative. Their individual testimonies will not be listed for reasons of space, but the author will note two of them as representative of the general opinion. Father Nikola Banovic described Tsafendas as “one of the most sociable persons I ever met. He would always go and introduce himself to people he did not know in the church. He was not shy at all to speak to someone.”⁵⁴¹⁴ Katerina Pnema also disagreed with van Zyl’s comment, repeating to the author that her half-brother “could not keep his mouth shut for anything.”⁵⁴¹⁵

Fotini Gavasiadis told the author:

“Dimitris a withdrawn and isolated individual? You are making me laugh! He was the most outspoken and sociable person I ever met. He will speak to everyone, he was not shy at all. Some people when they see someone in the street they know and they can’t be bothered talking to him, they will pretend they have not seen him. Dimitris was the opposite; even if he saw someone who was far, he will shout to him to stop and talk to him.”⁵⁴¹⁶

THE RORSCHACH PERSONALITY TEST

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Then you did the Rorschach Personality Test?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The Court knows, but I think for the record would you just shortly explain to the Court what the Rorschach Personality Test is?

JUDGE BEYERS: This part of the Court does not know.

VAN ZYL: It is a series of ten standardized ink blots which is shown the patient.

JUDGE BEYERS: Modern paintings?

⁵⁴¹³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁵⁴¹⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁴¹⁵ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁴¹⁶ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

VAN ZYL: Almost, which you show the patient and then he responds to it. You know, when you ask him what it looks like or what it reminds him of, or what it could possibly represent.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: On the Rorschach Test, Tsafendas showed?

VAN ZYL: On the Rorschach Test Mr. Tsafendas showed some typical signs of schizophrenia. They were the following: Arbitrary variation in form accuracy with decrease in F +.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is F + ?

VAN ZYL: It is an inability to see something in the ink blot which could be equated reasonably accurately with something commonly known to all of us.

JUDGE BEYERS: You mean if most of us sitting here saw that ink blot we'd see some resemblance to some ordinary object which we know, and he failed to do so?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Proceed further?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D), W responses of poor quality.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What are W responses?

VAN ZYL: That is, if the patient only uses the whole of the ink blot and not part of the ink blot, but the response that he gives is of poor quality again in resembling something reasonably well-known.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the next observation?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D). Bizarre and unusual detail.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What do you mean by "Bizarre and unusual detail"?

VAN ZYL: May I give you an example?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Certainly, give the Court an example?

VAN ZYL: One of the ink blots that I showed him, he said: "I see a leg, but there has been a considerable amount of atrophy. It may be a rat's leg or a rabbit's leg, but I am not quite sure what species it belongs to, but there has been a considerable amount of atrophy," so really, a jumbled lot of nonsense.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The next observation?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D). F C virtually absent. Which means that he cannot give form to colour, and in psychodynamic terms it means he is not able to control his feelings adequately.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: As regards Colour naming?

VAN ZYL: Colour naming is of the same order as F C. It is related to that. For instance, you show him a red ink blot, and then he'd say this is just red. Whereas usually a person says: "It is a red butterfly or a red dragon" or whatever the case may be.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Blocking?

VAN ZYL: Blocking is the inability

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you find?

VAN ZYL: That he did not answer to one of the cards. He could find nothing in it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: So that is described as "blocking"?

VAN ZYL: That is blocking, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What else did you find?

VAN ZYL: Original responses of poor form level. For example, he said that he saw the face of a man in a position that I have never come across before on the ink blot. It was part of the small detail of the blot and he showed me eyes where I couldn't possibly see eyes, and a nose and a mouth which were just not there.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Now we come to Undifferentiated shading.

VAN ZYL: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You found that?

VAN ZYL: Yes, I found that.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What do you mean by Undifferentiated shading?

VAN ZYL: That is if the patient sees shading in a very vague and non-specific way.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you find further?

VAN ZYL: Queer specifications (which is considered to be extremely important in the diagnosis of schizophrenia).

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What do you mean by Queer specifications?

VAN ZYL: For example, the patients would say that: “I see a peculiar shape which may be a bat, which may be a bird, but of course I cannot say which species of bird or which species of bat.” And then deriding his own responses as he goes along, saying that it is a very poor performance.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You say he derides his own response?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What else did you find?

VAN ZYL: Then Description, which is when the patient describes the ink blot in terms of its outline only, not saying that it is an island, or something like that, but “Here the line goes up, and there it goes down, and it goes in a circle”, so describing the outline of the ink blot without giving its real meaning,

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What else did you find?

VAN ZYL: The Perseveration, which is that he carried on in his mind with the same thought or the same response all the time on one ink blot, and he also carries it over to the second one, perhaps.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You have given us these various findings. Would you continue with your report now?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D) “This in itself is probably meaningless to even a psychiatrist, but the interpretation of all this means very poor human contact, lack of self-control, emotional flatness, disturbance of intellect, and a general disintegration of the ego. From this I feel that the diagnosis of schizophrenia can safely be made.”

COMMENTS ON VAN ZYL'S RORSCHACH PERSONALITY TEST ON TSAFENDAS

According to van Zyl's interpretation of the tests, Tsafendas had “very poor human contact,” a diagnosis which, as we have already seen, was diametrically opposed to the opinions of people who knew him. That Tsafendas derided his own efforts suggests he was simply not interested, but van Zyl concludes that a diagnosis of schizophrenia can safely be made.

However, van Zyl later admitted in a personal interview with the author that all the statements given to the police by people who knew Tsafendas, along with Tsafendas's own two statements found in the archives, portrayed a completely different man from the one he

examined.

Furthermore, Dr. Peter Lambley, who had worked with van Zyl stated that he was inexperienced and not formally trained in the Rorschach test procedure. He wrote that:

“[Van Zyl] could not formally score an ink blot protocol, his grasp of psychotic signs was superficial, and he was unfamiliar with the research literature pertaining to Rorschach scores and schizophrenia, then, as now, still in its infancy. Examination of Tsafendas's responses and the interpretations given in court clearly showed that the testers were inexperienced. One clear example: Tsafendas saw a leg on one of the ink blot cards but was not sure if it was a rat's leg or a rabbit's. This very example was used in court to substantiate his schizophrenic diagnosis: ... such jumbled and nonsensical reactions are typical of schizophrenia which typically includes bizarre or unusual detail . . .

This statement comes out of a text book and the statement is true, but the example is not. It is not unusual to get this kind of response in intelligent adults; what the examiner was confusing in this instance was the confabulatory response category into which he thought Tsafendas's 'Leg' response fell, which it did not. This kind of loose and often inaccurate reflection marked the psychological analysis presented in court.”⁵⁴¹⁷

Van Zyl himself admitted to the author that he was inexperienced and not fully acquainted with the Rorschach literature, but he was better with the Thematic Apperception Test:

“I don't think, then and now in particular... I'm no great Rorschach expert, where the guys do a Ph.D. in Rorschach, and that's the only thing they pursue all throughout their careers. I'm nowhere in that league. But certainly the symptoms were there. I'm kind of averagely capable as far as the Rorschach is concerned. I'm more capable in other things.”

As For the Rorschach literature, van Zyl said:

“Well, you know, I'm fairly familiar. I've read books about it, and research articles and so on and I have a fair knowledge. But to say that I am totally familiar or unfamiliar, or that I was ever asked in court about research and records, it simply didn't happen.”⁵⁴¹⁸

Nevertheless, although van Zyl was inexperienced and not an expert on the Rorschach

⁵⁴¹⁷ Lambley, 1980: 239.

⁵⁴¹⁸ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

test, he was never challenged and his findings were simply accepted.

Finally, according to Professor Burke:

“Whether the interpretation was right or wrong, the Rorschach ink blot test was never a scientific tool, it was mainly a projective test, and, as in psychology, there are many approaches to things. So by saying it was incorrect, you could also say, ‘it was not the way I would have done it,’ so whether it was correct or incorrect doesn’t really matter. The fact is that those tests and the interpretation of those tests, were always open to interpretation. You could have done it, come to me with the results, and I would have looked at the same results and I would have come up with a different conclusion, so whether it was done correctly or incorrectly, is neither here nor there. The test could, at most, say that there is a possibility of schizophrenia, at the very most, but you could never make an accurate diagnosis. There are people who would argue that you could, but you could never make an accurate diagnosis of schizophrenia based on that test, or on any test for that matter...

I still think that your best instrument for making a diagnosis like this is what the people around you say, and your assessment of the functioning of the person; that gives you the best idea. The psychological tests would confirm what you have picked up, so what you would always have with any kind of diagnostic assessment is, you would have your observations of the patient, the information you get from the people around, and your psychological tests, and then you pick up themes. If you pick up the same themes in those three areas, then you say, ‘this is the diagnosis.’ If it’s only in one of those areas, you can’t confirm the diagnosis until you’ve got some kind of confirmation from other areas, as well, so it’s a weak way of making a diagnosis.”⁵⁴¹⁹

VAN ZYL’S GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What were your observations?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D). “In talking to Mr. Tsafendas, I got the impression that he was vague in thinking and difficult to communicate with at a personal level. I felt that he was in a world of his own. In his talk, he was circumstantial and often went off the point. His thoughts were constantly blocking and he was very poor in abstract thinking such as when

⁵⁴¹⁹ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

asking him to explain the meaning of the idiom – ‘A stitch in time saves nine.’ He said, by the way, that it is a labour-saving device. His emotions were flat and sometimes incongruous. He also grimaced and made rocking (stereotyped) movements with his head and had great difficulty in expressing himself. On both occasions when I visited him, he was lying on his bed presumably asleep or just doing nothing and was slow in his movements.

JUDGE BEYERS: Explain to me the use of the word “stereotyped” there, with the rocking movements. What does it mean? Was it a movement like any other movement or was it stereotyped to a certain condition? It can mean two things there. Do you mean every movement was like every other one?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

DC (Cont.): Now, your comment on the interview?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D). “My function and my reason for seeing Mr. Tsafendas was mainly to test him and not so much to interview him. I did, however, ask him about the tapeworm which he had told Dr. Cooper about. I communicated with Dr. Cooper very briefly with the consent of Mr. D. Bloomberg. Mr. Tsafendas jumped at the opportunity to tell me about this and came back to this topic every now and then throughout both interviews. He told me that he began suffering from this during 1936 and since then his whole existence had centred round the tapeworm. He has constantly got to eat to keep the tapeworm happy, otherwise it pricks him on certain nerve centres in his stomach or makes a noise which he can feel inside himself. The result of all this is that he had become withdrawn and lived only to eat and to sleep.

Apparently he had X-rays taken and consulted many people about his tapeworm. He had taken an interest in this to the extent that he knows about a machine which the Japanese invented to show up foreign bodies in the abdomen, stating that there is such a machine at the Queen Mother Maternity Hospital in Glasgow. According to him, the Americans have a similar invention. He also stated that the doctors only sent him to psychiatrists about this and that they had then given him shock treatment and not investigated his tapeworm condition any further. It appears as if this has been a long-standing delusion. He told me that he thought the tapeworm had a lot to do with his alleged attack on the late Dr. Verwoerd. This apparently has brought him into conflict with other people before. He was, however, very vague about it and could not explain the direct relationship in any other way than saying that it makes him impulsive. He also appeared to have no strong feelings about being in gaol or

about his alleged attack on the late Dr. Verwoerd.”

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Now the discussion?

VAN ZYL: (Witness reads R.S.C.D). “From the above tests, observations and interview, it is quite clear to me that this man is suffering from schizophrenia. His schizophrenia to me is not as absolutely florid as one sometimes sees it in Mental Hospitals, but taken into account his high intelligence, this is not very surprising because often a schizophrenic can contain his illness to a certain extent by virtue of his intelligence, and they achieve much less than can be expected of them by virtue of their intellect. This, I think, is the case with Mr. Tsafendas.

COMMENTS ON VAN ZYL'S GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON TSAFENDAS

According to van Zyl, Tsafendas “has constantly got to eat to keep the tapeworm happy.” It is true that he ate a lot, but he never attributed it to the tapeworm. In addition, van Zyl claimed that Tsafendas “had become withdrawn and lived only to eat and to sleep.” This is perhaps the least accurate statement in van Zyl's diagnosis. Tsafendas:

- was twice suspected of distributing Communist propaganda while in Mozambique;
- had voluntarily joined the military wing of the Greek Communist Party during the Greek Civil War;
- had voluntarily taught English to Greek and Turkish children in Istanbul and in Mozambique;
- had joined the British anti-apartheid movement and took part in several anti-apartheid and anti-fascist demonstrations in London;
- was arrested and imprisoned twice in Mozambique because he was “advertising in favour of Mozambique's independence”;
- was arrested and imprisoned twice in Portugal due to his political ideas and activities in Mozambique;
- was willing to do “anything that would get the South African regime out of power”;
- was exiled for twelve years from Mozambique due to his political ideas and activities;
- took visitors in South Africa to a township in Cape Town to show them the hardships of apartheid and convince them to not spend any money in the country because, he said, they would be contributing to apartheid's economy;
- was saving money to go and live in Cuba, which he had named as his preferred

destination because of the political situation there.

A person involved in such activities as these is not someone who “just eats and sleeps.”

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S ASSISTANT

BRUNETTE: I would like to just clarify a few points on your findings.

VAN ZYL: Yes.

BRUNETTE: With regard to the Wechsler Bellevue Test, I note that the highest score that you noted was the one for “Picture Arrangement.”

VAN ZYL: Yes.

BRUNETTE: That is a test into his social insight, is that so?

VAN ZYL: I feel it can be viewed as that. I have not come across it in the literature, that it is definitely termed to be social insight, certainly not in the new standardization of the Wechsler Bellevue Test.

BRUNETTE: Isn't that score of 15.5 for “Picture Arrangement” inconsistent with a person who has been a schizophrenic for about 20 years, or a long period?

VAN ZYL: No.

BRUNETTE: Why do you say so?

VAN ZYL: It is not only social insight that counts. It is also intelligence that counts, and I do not think that that particular sub-section of the test really tests social insight.

BRUNETTE: But is it consistent or inconsistent with schizophrenia of long-standing?

VAN ZYL: I'd say that it is somewhat inconsistent.

BRUNETTE: To what extent do you say it is inconsistent?

VAN ZYL: That it is surprising to find this.

JUDGE BEYERS: Does it mean that by this time you would have expected that activity to deteriorate further than it has?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: Is that the correct way of putting it?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

BRUNETTE: Does that also fit in with your finding that he was not a florid schizophrenic?

VAN ZYL: May I explain what I mean by the word florid?

BRUNETTE: Yes?

VAN ZYL: The type of schizophrenic that you find in the mental hospital, listening to voices and seeing things and being completely withdrawn and isolated and completely incapable of caring for himself, even to a small extent.

BRUNETTE: He was not that type?

VAN ZYL: No.

BRUNETTE: He was a type that was capable of looking after himself to a certain extent?

VAN ZYL: To a certain extent, yes. That is correct.

BRUNETTE: I see also that his arithmetic score was not very high. Would you say he was capable of looking after his money and running a banking account?

VAN ZYL: Yes, I would say so.

BRUNETTE: On the Rorschach Test, you said that you found blocking of his thought processes in that he did not react to one card.

VAN ZYL: That is correct.

BRUNETTE: Why do you say that that was blocking?

VAN ZYL: This is commonly accepted in the literature on the Rorschach technique that this is blocking.

BRUNETTE: Could it also be caused by anxiety?

VAN ZYL: It could be but I didn't think Mr. Tsafendas was anxious at all.

BRUNETTE: You said that a repetition of these tests would not make any difference, but surely, by repeating them he must learn to perform and to react to the test?

VAN ZYL: I didn't say on the Wechsler Bellevue that it made no difference. I said that it would make no difference to the particular pattern, and if he had learned to perform he would only have done better on the tests instead of giving an even poorer performance.

BRUNETTE: Did you make any allowance for the fact that he may have learned some of

these tests before?

VAN ZYL: No, I did not.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY THE ASSISTANT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

JUDGE BEYERS: I assume you know something about the contents of the 1916 Act on Mental Disabilities?

VAN ZYL: Unfortunately, not very much. I shall explain my situation: As a clinical psychologist one is not legally permitted to certify a patient.

JUDGE BEYERS: I understand. I now need to ask for your confirmation that schizophrenia is definitely a mental disability in terms of the law?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: Should you now interview this man as you had previously done – and I expect a responsible answer – would you have certified him if it were part of your duties? Does he need to be certified according to the Act?

VAN ZYL: If I had just performed the tests on him and had known nothing about his previous impulsive acts and so on, then I should not have certified him. He seems to be such a harmless person.

JUDGE BEYERS: If you had only the clinical tests?

VAN ZYL: Yes, then I would not have done so.

JUDGE BEYERS: At this moment, if I had to transfer my responsibility to you, would you certify him?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: What has happened since your tests that you are now satisfied to certify him?

VAN ZYL: I have heard of the history of his impulsive actions and behaviour.

JUDGE BEYERS: Can you state that your tests, taken against the background and history about which you have learned, that you would consider certifying such a person?

VAN ZYL: Yes, definitely.

JUDGE BEYERS: Does the history to which you refer include the murder of the Prime

Minister?

VAN ZYL: No.

JUDGE BEYERS: Would his background without that knowledge, in your opinion, lead you to certify him?

VAN ZYL: Yes.

COMMENTS ON THE CROSS-EXAMINATION

Van Zyl stated that he would not have certified Tsafendas based on the tests if he was not aware of his previous “impulsive actions and behaviour.” However, in a personal interview with the author, van Zyl stated that he would not have certified him if he had seen the statements made by the people who were questioned by the police. He also admitted to the author that if he had seen these statements before he examined Tsafendas, his final diagnosis would have been different, “Yes. Look, obviously that is important information, and information that influences one’s findings in the end. There is no doubt about it.”⁵⁴²⁰

Furthermore, van Zyl stated in the cross-examination that he “heard of the history of his impulsive actions and behaviour,” but this behaviour was not evident during his examination where Tsafendas seemed like “such a harmless person.” van Zyl told the author that he was told about Tsafendas’s “impulsive” behaviour by David Bloomberg and the other psychiatrists, mainly by Dr. Cooper who was a good friend. However, none of the psychiatrists had witnessed any impulsive behaviour and some of them were probably also told verbally about Tsafendas’s impulsive behaviour by his defence team and the police.

Van Zyl also admitted to the author that he was given Tsafendas’s medical record in an oral summary and never actually saw any of such reports. He said:

“We were told, or I was told – the group of guys that examined him – that he had been in various mental hospitals all over the world... Yes. Well, you know, we were given this information – that he was a disturbed, schizophrenic man. And that was the background that we had available, and nothing else. The third part [the medical reports] was given to us almost in summary. He has been to this hospital, that hospital, that hospital... I think three or

⁵⁴²⁰ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

four were mentioned – various hospitals overseas.”⁵⁴²¹

Again, statements gathered by the South African police from people who knew Tsafendas and could challenge and contradict van Zyl's diagnosis were not used. The only brief challenge came when van Zyl was forced to admit that Tsafendas 15.5 score for “Picture Arrangement” is somewhat inconsistent with a person who has been a schizophrenic for about twenty years or a long period.

CONCLUSION

Van Zyl concluded at the time that his tests definitely showed that Tsafendas was “suffering from schizophrenia,” adding that he was very intelligent, above average, as several witnesses told the police and the author. Van Zyl conceded in a personal interview with the author that he reached this decision based mostly on what was told to him about Tsafendas's past, without looking at any of his medical reports or talking to people who knew Tsafendas. He also admitted that he was inexperienced with some of the tests he conducted, though no one questioned this at the time.

Van Zyl agreed that witnesses' statements about Tsafendas and Tsafendas's own two statements to the police showed a completely different man from the one he and the other psychiatrists examined. He accepted that Tsafendas, in these statements, appeared not to be suffering from schizophrenia and felt that all this evidence should have been given to him and others who examined him to evaluate him properly.

Van Zyl told the author that he “firmly believed he [Tsafendas] was schizophrenic.” He admitted though that if he had seen the evidence gathered by the author before he examined him, his final diagnosis would have been different, “Yes. Look, obviously that is important information, and information that influences one's findings in the end. There is no doubt about it.” However, he still believes Tsafendas must had some “fairly gross personal instability” because of the way he killed Dr. Verwoerd in an amateurish way without an escape plan. He said: “With this new information, I'm beginning to think that he was a guy with, at least, fairly gross personal instability. And I wouldn't have been surprised that, within that context, he would develop schizophrenic symptomatology, as a consequence of

⁵⁴²¹ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

this. But what I didn't know about was his political involvement, as reported."⁵⁴²²

Van Zyl believes that a schizophrenic could be politically involved and could kill someone for political reasons: "Oh, he can kill him for political reasons, but to do something that is so outrageous, and so amateurishly planned, with a knife, in the middle of Parliament is ridiculous. A real assassin doesn't work like that." Van Zyl considers that a man of Tsafendas's intelligence "should have planned better." He admits though that a man with deep political convictions like Tsafendas is capable of committing such an "amateurish" act without this meaning that he was a schizophrenic.⁵⁴²³

Professor Alban Burke stated about van Zyl's psychological tests:

"The fact is that those tests and the interpretation of those tests, were always open to interpretation. You could have done it, come to me with the results, and I would have looked at the same results and I would have come up with a different conclusion, so whether it was done correctly or incorrectly, is neither here nor there. The test could, at most, say that there is a possibility of schizophrenia, at the very most, but you could never make an accurate diagnosis. There are people who would argue that you could, but you could never make an accurate diagnosis of schizophrenia based on that test, or on any test for that matter... back in those days, the psychological tests were very unsophisticated, so you could have had results, and it could have been argued one of two ways, to say it proves or disproves. It was never an exact science."⁵⁴²⁴

⁵⁴²² Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁵⁴²³ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁵⁴²⁴ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 12: JAMES JOHNSTON**INTRODUCTION**

Before we examine Johnston's testimony, it should be stated that he had testified to the police on October 6 that "I do not know Tsafendas very well and the longest discussion I had with him was for about 10 minutes at each occasion."⁵⁴²⁵ These occasions were just two, so a man who had spoken to Tsafendas for twenty minutes in his life was asked to testify in the court about him, while Tsafendas's family and people who knew him for years or months or lived under the same roof or were neighbours were ignored. This demonstrates how stretched the defence was for witnesses to support their line. Johnston was presumably chosen because he told the police Tsafendas seemed to be "slightly unbalanced," although he did not say anything else to support the defence argument.

Johnston, Martincich and Barbeau were the three of more than two hundred witnesses questioned by the police and the Commission who commented negatively on Tsafendas's mental state. Barbeau testified that after talking to him a few times, she got the impression he "was not all there" and Martincich thought after knowing Tsafendas for two-three weeks that there "was something mentally wrong with him" because Tsafendas sometimes mumbled to himself. Johnston testified that as a result of his two ten-minute meetings, he concluded that Tsafendas was "slightly unbalanced and that he seemed to have a mysterious background but otherwise he appeared to be all-right."⁵⁴²⁶

Both Johnston and Barbeau were members of the Christian Church. Merle Daniels, also a member of the church, had admitted the previous day under cross-examination at the summary trial she "would like to protect the name of the Christian Church." Many of the Church's law-abiding members were interviewed by the police⁵⁴²⁷ and felt deeply embarrassed to be so questioned, as well as endure the publicity shone on the Church by Tsafendas's criminal act. They felt it cast the whole of their church in a bad light and like the Greek Community in South Africa, tried to distance themselves and the Church from

⁵⁴²⁵ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁴²⁶ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁴²⁷ *The Observer*, 18 September 1966: 2, 'Police question S. African sect.>'; *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 18: 5, 'Tsafendas's brothers are quizzed.'

Tsafendas.⁵⁴²⁸ As with the majority of the Greek community, some from the Christian Church tried to portray Tsafendas as not one of them and perhaps a mad man, in order to protect their reputation. It must be more than a coincidence that the only two witnesses who testified negatively to the police about Tsafendas's mental state were members of the Christian Church.

Tsafendas often clashed with leaders and members of the Christian Church because they advocated "the Biblical idea of subservience to a Government," including to the governing National Party and its policy of apartheid.⁵⁴²⁹ None of the members of the Christian Church revealed this to the police, apart from Patrick O'Ryan.⁵⁴³⁰

JAMES JOHNSTON'S TESTIMONY⁵⁴³¹

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is your occupation?

JOHNSTON: I am a minister of the Christian Church and have been in this ministry for almost 39 years. The first time I met Mr. Tsafendas was shortly after his arrival here at the Cape.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: When was that?

JOHNSTON: It was in September, I would think.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Of which year?

JOHNSTON: Of last year. (Witness says he is a little hard of hearing.)

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did you come to meet Mr. Tsafendas?

JOHNSTON: I went along to see him at his home, where he was staying at Mr. Daniels's place.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why were you called to see him?

JOHNSTON: I went to see him because I heard that he had been staying there and that he

⁵⁴²⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁴²⁹ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013; Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁴³⁰ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁴³¹ James Johnston's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

was a Greek or a Portuguese, and I went to see him chiefly in connection with his racial status.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why did you go to see him in connection with his racial status?

JOHNSTON: I wanted to find out whether he was a white man or a Coloured man.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You were interested because he was a member of your persuasion?

JOHNSTON: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you discuss this racial position with him? Did you discuss his racial status with him?

JOHNSTON: I did, yes. I asked him whether he was a European or whether he was a Coloured man. The reason why I asked him that was because I was concerned about him being a foreigner, and if he was a Coloured man it was quite right for him to stay in a Coloured home as well as going to services in a Coloured home. But if he was a European or a white man, I would ask him to go along to services that were held in a white home.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you tell him that it was contrary to law for a Coloured man to mix in white circles, and conversely for a white man to mix in Coloured circles?

JOHNSTON: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: That was your view?

JOHNSTON: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did he react when you had this little conversation with him?

JOHNSTON: I must say that I found him rather strange or odd. He told me that he would like to classify himself as a Coloured man, but he gave no reason for it. And then he began to talk about his travels. He began to talk about his travels and the countries that he visited. And that just gave me the impression of being a strange man.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he continue to attend meetings held by Coloured members of your persuasion, or did he attend meetings of the white members of your persuasion?

JOHNSTON: Excuse me, I couldn't just catch that.

JUDGE BEYERS: Did he continue with the white people or did he continue with the Coloured people?

JOHNSTON: He continued with the Coloured people until I had further discussions with

him in February of this year. Then he came along to see me at the place where I was staying, at Mr. Slater's home in Plumstead. Then he told me that he had obtained employment at the Marine Diamond Corporation. And then the discussion came up again about whether he is a white man or a Coloured man, and he produced a small bit of typewritten paper with his name and number and a "W", which showed me that he was a white man. I then asked him if he would go along to services that were held in a white home, and he said he would.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And he did?

JOHNSTON: He did, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What kind of impression did Tsafendas make upon you?

JOHNSTON: Well, the discussions that I had with him was chiefly from a business point of view, because he wanted to find out different things. But the impression that I got of him was that he was an odd man, a strange man, because any discussion that we entered into he could never follow it fully.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did you think about his mental state?

JOHNSTON: His mental state - he didn't give me the impression that he was - he was a bit strange, and I would say just a little mentally unbalanced.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you remember that during the time that you knew him he received treatment for his nose?

JOHNSTON: He told me that after he had left the Marine Diamond Corporation. He came to see me on another occasion, and he told me that he was then receiving treatment for his nose and that he was staying at a convalescent home, either in Mowbray or Observatory. And then he told me that he'd be staying there for some time. I asked him whether he was going to stay there. He said he was going to make his home there, and that struck me as being odd or strange, and I didn't pursue that any further.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You have told us that he told you he was working for Marine Diamonds?

JOHNSTON: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Before he left for South West Africa, did he speak to you about it, did he ask you for names of persons?

JOHNSTON: He did. He told me that he was working for some weeks at a stretch and then

he was off at weeks at a stretch also, and in the weeks that he was off he would like to visit our friends in South West Africa. But, while I had the addresses of them, I was not too keen to give it to him at all.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Why didn't you want to give him the names?

JOHNSTON: I didn't want to give him the names because he was a strange man and he was making himself more of a nuisance among the friends that he was with down here.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was he a violent man, to your knowledge?

JOHNSTON: I never saw him violent in any way.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How would you describe him?

JOHNSTON: He was always mild when he spoke to me, and whenever I advised him in any matter he took it very meekly.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You made a statement to the police, not so?

JOHNSTON: I did, yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you say this to the police: "The Sunday night before the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd I saw Tsafendas at a service in Mr. Hall's home in Pinelands, but he did not discuss anything or take part in the service that night. He appeared to be perfectly normal."?

JOHNSTON: That is correct.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You said that?

JOHNSTON: That is correct.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Then you added to this: "I must say I did not speak to him apart from saying good-night. "Did you say this: "I did think Tsafendas to be slightly unbalanced and that he seemed to have a mysterious background, but otherwise he appeared to be all right."?

JOHNSTON: I did say that, yes.

COMMENTS ON JOHNSTON'S TESTIMONY

Johnston stated that he got the impression that Tsafendas was a strange, odd man after hearing about his travels and the countries he visited, but did not state what was strange about it. He also does not explain what was strange about Tsafendas telling him that he was going to live in Mowbray or Observatory. Surprisingly, the Attorney-General did not find it necessary to ask. More than two hundred witnesses who testified to the police, to the Commission and to the author stated that Tsafendas often spoke about his travels; none of them found this strange.

When asked about Tsafendas's mental state, Johnston testified that he got the impression that he was an "odd man, a strange man because any discussion that we entered into he could never follow it fully ..." Johnston had not mentioned in his statement to the police anything about Tsafendas's perceived inability fully to follow a discussion. Obviously two ten-minute conversations were sufficient to give Johnston such an impression. The issue of Tsafendas's alleged inability to follow a conversation has been examined in detail in the relevant section of Dr. Cooper's testimony, so it would not be discussed again here.

The Attorney-General referred Johnston in cross-examination to his statement to the police that Tsafendas seemed to be "perfectly normal" on the evening before the assassination. Then he asked him again about his comment that "I did think Tsafendas to be slightly unbalanced and that he seemed to have a mysterious background, but otherwise he appeared to be all right." However, he did not pursue this line of questioning and did not ask Johnston to explain his statement to the police. Nor did he ask him to explain what was so strange and odd about Tsafendas's stories about his travels. There seems little supporting evidence, therefore, that Tsafendas was "slightly unbalanced."

Johnston testified to the police in the same statement that he had only seen Tsafendas "periodically and had no discussions with him ... I do not know Tsafendas very well and the longest discussion I had with him was for about 10 minutes at each occasion." The third and last time they had spoken, all they said each other was "good night." Astonishingly, the Attorney-General, with the statement in front of him, did not ask the obvious question: How reliable could an opinion be about another person when it was formed from two ten-minute meetings with the person concerned?

CONCLUSION

This must be one of the weakest testimonies ever made to a court, clear proof of David Bloomberg's uphill struggle to find suitable witnesses to support the defence's line. A man who spoke to the accused for twenty minutes was asked for his assessment of the accused's character while people who knew him intimately, including his family, were ignored because their evidence would not support the defence line. However, the Attorney-General ignored the question of a twenty-minute character assessment and the creditability of the witness.

Johnston testified that he found Tsafendas to be odd and strange because of his stories about his travels and because he couldn't fully follow a discussion, although he did not specify what was so odd and strange about either. None of the two hundred witnesses questioned by the police, the Commission of Enquiry and the author detected this supposed oddness in Tsafendas, indeed most of them were impressed by Tsafendas's description of his travels. As to his inability to follow a conversation, this was a something only Johnston ever perceived. Notably, when he was first questioned, Johnston mentioned neither of these two character traits of Tsafendas to the police.

Despite the evident frailty of Johnston's testimony, Judge Beyers, though presumably unaware of the twenty-minute acquaintance of Tsafendas with the witness, said in his verdict: "Daniels said that this man is mad. It was obvious to O'Ryan and his wife. It was obvious to Mr. Johnston that this was a queer, strange man."⁵⁴³²

⁵⁴³² Judge Beyers' verdict on Tsafendas's summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 13: GIDEON JACOBUS CLOETE

GIDEON CLOETE'S TESTIMONY⁵⁴³³

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where do you work?

CLOETE: I am a clerk in the Department of Labour in the general enquiries office.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where?

CLOETE: In the Department of Labour.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In Cape Town or Pretoria or where?

CLOETE: Cape Town.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How long have you worked there?

CLOETE: Since 3 September 1957.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the exact nature of your work?

CLOETE: The general enquiry work in the office.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Does it concern people who come to make enquiries?

CLOETE: Yes, people who come to make enquiries concerning labour.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And also people who are looking for work?

CLOETE: Yes, people looking for work and any information which they want, which they need, those are the people who come to make enquiries with me.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The man who is in the Court today, Demitrio Tsafendas, have you ever seen him before?

CLOETE: Yes

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where?

CLOETE: The first time that I encountered him and met him was on 26 April of this year.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where was this?

⁵⁴³³ Gideon Jacobus Cloete's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

CLOETE: In my office in the Department of Labour in Cape Town.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did he want?

CLOETE: On that occasion he was off work on sick leave and he came about sick leave pay.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you grant him sick leave pay on that occasion?

CLOETE: Yes. I personally completed the application form for him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And did he receive the sick leave pay?

CLOETE: Yes, he did receive it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How much did he receive?

CLOETE: I am unable to tell you how much it was.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: But approximately how much?

CLOETE: I definitely cannot tell you how much it was.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Apart from this occasion, did you see him on any other occasion?

CLOETE: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: Would that be a Government grant?

CLOETE: Yes. He had undergone an operation on his nose, according to the medical certificate which had been completed by the Medical Doctor.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Apart from the occasion when he applied for a grant, did you see him again?

CLOETE: I saw him again during July of this year, also in the office.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What was he looking for at your office?

CLOETE: He came to me with three cuttings from an English newspaper which had been placed by employers in connection with positions which were vacant. And the reason why he came to me, was that he wanted my help, and wanted to use my telephone. I then explained to him that I could not allow him to actually use the telephone personally, but that I would help him by telephoning the firms myself to find out whether the positions were still vacant.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you do that?

CLOETE: Yes, I did as he wanted, he handed me the advertisements and I telephoned the firms. The first two of the advertisements did not supply the names of the firms in the newspaper, only the telephone numbers were given. I then called the firms and the receptionists who answered the telephone told me that the situations had already been filled. I then called the third telephone number and was put through to the works foreman, as it was an engineering firm in Maitland. The job which was vacant there was in connection with welding work. I spoke to the foreman personally.

JUDGE BEYERS: Mr. Cooper, is all this necessary?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: No, your Honour ... Did he then go to the employer for an interview?

CLOETE: I just want to complete my testimony.

JUDGE BEYERS: I know you want to finish, but I have a great deal still to deal with and I have no interest with what you are presently busy completing. Will you please deal with the only relevant information and complete the rest at your office.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he go to the place?

CLOETE: I told him that the foreman had told me to tell him that he must

JUDGE BEYERS: Did he go to the place?

CLOETE: I do not know that.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he come back again?

CLOETE: He did not come back to me again. I have never seen him again after that.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was your impression that he was serious? That he was anxious to find work?

CLOETE: It did seem to me that was a person who really want to work. It was for that reason that he had come to me for help.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was the accused well-dressed and did he have a neat appearance?

CLOETE: Yes, he had a neat appearance and made a good impression.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Were any signs of abnormality about him which you observed?

CLOETE: Absolutely nothing. He appeared totally normal to me.

COMMENTS ON CLOETE'S TESTIMONY

Cloete's testimony is a further indication of the defence's problems in finding suitable witnesses to support its line. Cloete was obviously chosen to support Dr. Cooper's claim that Tsafendas was actively seeking work but was unable to hold down a job. The witness's testimony is very short and the only thing it really offers is validation of Dr. Cooper's claim and diagnosis. However, in cross examination, Cloete also says something that contradicts what has been stated in the summary trial and agrees with the vast majority of witnesses, that Tsafendas was well-dressed and showed no signs of "abnormality."

CONCLUSION

Although Cloete agrees with Dr. Cooper that Tsafendas was actively seeking work, he disagrees with other defence claims, describing Tsafendas as a "totally normal" man, "well-dressed" and of "neat appearance."

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 14: GERALD EDWARD SHAW

GERALD SHAW'S TESTIMONY⁵⁴³⁴

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is your profession?

SHAW: I am a journalist.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And during the present Parliamentary session where were you engaged?

SHAW: In the Press Gallery.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The Press Gallery of...?

SHAW: Of the House of Assembly.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you spend a great deal of time there during the present session?

SHAW: Yes, I did.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Shortly, what is your function in being there?

SHAW: I am a political correspondent of the *Cape Times*.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: During this session did you come to know the accused?

SHAW: Yes, I did. That is so.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did you come to know him?

SHAW: He was employed as a messenger; he was serving tea and coffee and things like that in the Press Gallery.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How efficient did you find him?

SHAW: He was not an efficient messenger.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did you regard him?

SHAW: Well, he mixed things up. He mixed orders up, and I thought he must be a bit mentally retarded.

⁵⁴³⁴ Gerald Shaw's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Can you give us an example?

SHAW: Yes. On one occasion, the morning of the assassination of the Prime Minister, he brought me some tea when I ordered it and I paid him, and he re-appeared about 10 minutes later with a whole handful of notes, change. But I had already been given change by him when he brought the tea. So I drew this fact to his attention and he left. He seemed somewhat confused.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Any other experiences before the day?

SHAW: Well, yes. On that same occasion I reminded him that he hadn't collected money from me for a hamburger and coffee I'd ordered on the previous Friday. On that Friday I ordered this hamburger and coffee and it did not come. And I went back and listened to a debate and when I came back, it still wasn't there. I happened to glance into the office of a colleague next-door to my office, and I saw standing on the table a hamburger and coffee, which was cold. So I assumed he had delivered it to the wrong office.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he know whose office he had to deliver it to?

SHAW: Yes the order was placed in my office. We press a bell and the chap comes to the office and you place the order.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How were his manners? How did he behave?

SHAW: I found him off-hand. He didn't have the usual demeanour of a messenger, he didn't seem to be terribly obliging. He used to walk into the office without knocking and things like that.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was he capable of holding down this job of a messenger, in your opinion?

SHAW: Well, I wouldn't have employed him as a messenger; certainly not.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If he had been employed by a commercial concern, would he have lasted?

SHAW: I think if they had been very tolerant employers he might have.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you lodge any complaints against the accused?

SHAW: About his efficiency as a messenger?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes?

SHAW: I did not.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Why not?

SHAW: Well, I suppose I am fairly tolerant about this sort of thing.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How many reporters were there?

SHAW: In the Press Gallery? Off-hand I suppose there must be about twenty.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And the accused was the only messenger there?

SHAW: No, he was not. There were other messengers.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: How many were there?

SHAW: Three in all.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was the accused very busy?

SHAW: I suppose fairly busy, yes

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I suppose fairly busy?

SHAW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Wasn't he fairly busy?

SHAW: Well, in the Press Gallery I would be rather more preoccupied with my own job, I suppose. But he was fairly busy.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He was very busy?

SHAW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was he friendly?

SHAW: I did not find him friendly.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did you ever see where the accused stood when the bells rang?

SHAW: Once I noticed him standing at the door of the Press Gallery upstairs. At the time the

bell was ringing.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Is it a fact that from there he could have seen where the late Prime Minister sat?

SHAW: Yes, I think he probably could.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Was he supposed to have been there?

SHAW: Well, I don't know really.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I suppose I had better ask that question of some other witness. The psychologist says that the accused can work with money and that he can also run a banking account. How do you explain the episode that you told the Court about?

SHAW: I don't think I could explain it. He wasn't efficient in working with money in his dealings with me,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Isn't it perhaps because the accused was very anxious on that occasion?

SHAW: Yes, that may be so. It depends. There were other occasions.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What time was this?

SHAW: This particular incident with the change?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes?

SHAW: It could have been between 10 and 11 a.m.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: What change did you have to get?

SHAW: I can't be completely sure about this.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes, I appreciate that.

COMMENTS ON SHAW'S TESTIMONY

Let us examine the two incidents described by Shaw: how Tsafendas gave him the wrong change and how he delivered a hamburger to the wrong room. The first reaction is that these errors were the sort of mistakes that anyone could make, wrong change, wrong recipient. They do not signal schizophrenia or serious incompetence. More importantly, we have to examine when the incidents took place. The wrong change was given to Shaw only a few

hours before the assassination. Tsafendas had already bought the knives by then and was waiting for the right moment to strike, as he explained in his statement in the police. With something like that on his mind, it is hardly surprising that he mixed up the reporter's change.

The hamburger incident took place on Friday, September 2, 1966. This was the day Tsafendas was scheduled to work as a waiter at a function organized by Parliamentary correspondents, which Dr. Verwoerd was expected to attend.⁵⁴³⁵ Tsafendas had planned to shoot Dr. Verwoerd, flee to the *Eleni* and hide until departure the next day.⁵⁴³⁶ Although this plan was eventually aborted, Tsafendas's mind that morning at Parliament would certainly have been focussed on his preparations for the killing, which could certainly excuse his absent-mindedness.

Tsafendas had spoken to the police about both of his plans and therefore the Attorney-General should have been aware that the incidents described took place on days when Tsafendas was planning the assassination attempt and was presumably seriously distracted from his normal duties. If the Attorney-General was not aware of Tsafendas's initial plan of September 2 because he was not given his statements, he certainly knew that the incident with the correspondent's money occurred on the very day of the assassination. Surprisingly, he failed to make the connection. It must be more than coincidence that both incidents took place on the days when Tsafendas was planning to assassinate Dr. Verwoerd and nothing untoward about him was noted on other days. If Tsafendas was customarily inefficient this would have been remarked upon, and Shaw did not mention any incident concerning Tsafendas on any other day. In addition, none of Tsafendas's five co-messenger who were interviewed by the police and the Commission of Enquiry had anything negative to say about Tsafendas's work and the Chief Messenger stated clearly that there were no complaints against him.

Shaw wrote later that he had only a "brief acquaintanceship"⁵⁴³⁷ with Tsafendas, another pointer to the desperation of the defence team to find suitable witnesses for its case. Had it wanted reliable and sincere opinions about Tsafendas's capabilities, there were several witnesses who had worked with him for several months. These included for example Albert

⁵⁴³⁵ Fred Peinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁴³⁶ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁴³⁷ Shaw, 2007: 64.

Vercueil, who worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole engineering, and Ralph Lighton, Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden and Hulse, his co-workers for three months at Marine Diamond Corporation. Obviously, these witnesses could not support the defence's line and therefore were not called, while Shaw, and Smorenberg, were.

It is surprising that none of Tsafendas's colleagues at the Parliament was asked to testify in the summary trial, especially as the Attorney-General could have used them to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony. Even more surprising is what the Attorney-General did on the first day of the summary trial when he suggested there was evidence that Tsafendas was an efficient messenger, essentially contradicting Dr. Cooper's diagnosis that since Tsafendas was a schizophrenic, he was not able to perform his duties efficiently. This is the dialogue that took place:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: If I put it to you that he performed his work in the House of Assembly normally and efficiently, would you agree with that?

SHAW: I would like to know details of that. I would say that a highly intelligent man performing as a messenger in court may well be able to perform fairly reasonably, but I would suspect in this man that he didn't in fact perform all that reasonably. I would be surprised, in fact, that he performed altogether satisfactorily.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But he was a messenger in the Press Gallery, and if he didn't perform his duties efficiently wouldn't he have been dismissed?

SHAW: I understand that he was only there for a short time.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He was there from the 1st August to the 6th September?

SHAW: Yes. I must draw a conclusion from this that he wasn't completely and obviously hopeless and inefficient in his duties.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: But if there is evidence that he performed his duties normally and efficiently, you won't deny that?

SHAW: If the evidence is such, I must accept it.⁵⁴³⁸

Van den Berg suggested that Tsafendas's work in the House of Assembly was efficient and normal. He seemed to know that for a fact, but he did not adduce any evidence

⁵⁴³⁸ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

to support his claim or challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony and left the issue there. It seems odd that evidence appeared to exist which would challenge Dr. Cooper's diagnosis but it remained unheard, leaving Shaw's statements on record in apparent validation of Dr. Cooper's opinion.

The police and the Commission of Enquiry interviewed five Parliamentary messengers who had worked with Tsafendas. They were Piet Burger,⁵⁴³⁹ the Chief Messenger and Sydney Wiehand⁵⁴⁴⁰ and Petrus Schuin,⁵⁴⁴¹ both senior messengers, all three of whom had interviewed and appointed Tsafendas. Another two messengers, Fred Feinauer⁵⁴⁴² and Felix Miles,⁵⁴⁴³ also testified to the police. None of these five messengers stated that Tsafendas was inefficient or that they saw anything wrong with him. On the contrary, Schuin described Tsafendas as an ordinary man and "same as any other person that had worked there."⁵⁴⁴⁴

It is curious that none of Tsafendas's Parliamentary colleagues testified at the summary trial while five of them did so to the police and the Commission of Enquiry. Equally strange is that the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas did not seek any information about him from the messengers who worked with him daily for five weeks up to the assassination.

According to Sydney Wiehand, for someone to be appointed "he must be of sober habits, he must be always neat, and then also we ask him if he's got any sickness, or anything like that, then he must tell us. If so, then he must get a report from the doctor that he is fit for duty."⁵⁴⁴⁵ Petrus Schuin also described Tsafendas as an ordinary man and "same as any other person that had worked there."⁵⁴⁴⁶ Wiehand testified that he never received any complaints from anyone about Tsafendas's work. However, he was told by another messenger, Mr.

⁵⁴³⁹ Piet Bester Burger testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵⁴⁴⁰ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵⁴⁴¹ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵⁴⁴² Fred Feinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁴⁴³ Feliz George Miles statement to the police, 7 October 1966. K150, Vol. 2, File: 1. NASA.

⁵⁴⁴⁴ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵⁴⁴⁵ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵⁴⁴⁶ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

Pienaar, that Tsafendas was eating a lot, then sitting and sleeping. However, Wiehand did not receive this as a complaint and testified that most messengers, including himself, ate and slept until they were required to work again. Pienaar's comment had more to do with his surprise about how much Tsafendas was eating because he thought he was overeating.⁵⁴⁴⁷ These statements were in the possession of the police and the Commission and should have been known to the Attorney-General.

In addition, an unnamed "respected member of the Press gallery" in the House of Assembly "who knew Tsafendas well," talked to Rene MacColl, a leading *Daily Express* correspondent, about Tsafendas. He said that "far from being a withdrawn sort of man, he seemed to be intent on impressing his personality on one. There was always the big smile, the ready chat and an almost obsessive intention to make you remember him. There couldn't have been a less grey or faceless figure."⁵⁴⁴⁸

Forty-one years later, Shaw wrote about Tsafendas, "In my brief acquaintanceship with him in the Press Gallery I had never found Tsafendas to show signs of insanity ... I told the judge of the incident with the hamburger, the change and the pot of tea, and of my belief that Tsafendas was rather slow mentally."⁵⁴⁴⁹ Shaw's belief notwithstanding, several witnesses testified to the police, and the psychiatrists and the psychologists agreed, Tsafendas was not slow mentally, indeed that he was more intelligent than the average person. What is likely is that the incidents mentioned were the result of his anxiety on days when he planned to kill the prime minister. Alternatively, Tsafendas's attitude on those days may have been one of laziness or indifference since the only reason he was working in Parliament anyway was to find the opportunity of killing Dr. Verwoerd.

CONCLUSION

How reliable was Gerald Shaw as a witnesses and to what extent was he qualified to testify, since he had only a "brief acquaintanceship" with Tsafendas? It mattered very little to the defence, as long as his evidence supported its argument and it did that perfectly. Shaw turned out to be an excellent witness for the defence. His testimony validated Dr. Cooper's diagnosis

⁵⁴⁴⁷ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵⁴⁴⁸ *Daily Express*, 9 September 1966: 2, 'Was it murder incorporated?'

⁵⁴⁴⁹ Shaw, 2007: 64.

and appeared to stop in its tracks the Attorney-General's argument that Tsafendas was efficient, since he failed to bring any of that evidence forward.

What makes it stranger is the van den Berg must have had the evidence in his possession since at least five messengers had testified to the police and none of them reported that Tsafendas was inefficient. By not using any of the messengers' evidence, the Attorney-General handed an easy victory to Dr. Cooper and to the defence team. In doing so, the portrayal of Tsafendas as a man who could not even perform the lowly job of messenger prevailed. Finally, Shaw himself stated clearly that, although a defence witness, he "never found Tsafendas to show signs of insanity."⁵⁴⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁵⁰ Shaw, 2007: 64.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 15: FELIX BERNHEIM

FELIX BERNHEIM'S TESTIMONY⁵⁴⁵¹

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You are a handwriting expert, are you?

BERNHEIM: Yes, I am.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you been shown a sample of the accused's handwriting?

BERNHEIM: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And have you been shown this document (R.S.C.E)?

BERNHEIM: Yes, I have seen the document.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In whose handwriting is it?

BERNHEIM: The handwriting of the accused.

JUDGE BEYERS: What document is that, Mr. Cooper?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: A letter which the accused wrote.....

JUDGE BEYERS: I haven't seen it yet.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Your lordship will see it now. It is a letter written by the accused to the Prime Minister of England in 1959.

JUDGE BEYERS: The only purpose of this witness is to identify the handwriting?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Yes. I therefore don't think it is necessary to read through it.

COMMENTS ON BERNHEIM'S TESTIMONY

Bernheim refers to a letter which Tsafendas is said to have written to the British Prime Minister in 1959, Harold Macmillan. Bernheim identified Tsafendas's handwriting as that of the person who wrote the letter in question, which is signed "Staa-Sin-Hah." As we will see from Dr. Zabow's examination which follows, the letter was submitted in evidence to the court as Exhibit E. However, nothing has been recorded in the trial's records about what

⁵⁴⁵¹ Felix Bernheim's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

followed the submission and the letter was not found in the National Archives.

According to Press reports at the time, the letter was handed to Judge Beyers. He glanced at it and said, "I cannot make head nor tail of it. Which of course is the purpose of giving it to me."⁵⁴⁵² The letter was apparently written from St. Pancras hospital in London and was found in Tsafendas's medical file. It was headed: "St. Pancras Hospital, c/o North Wing, London. NW1." It was undated but refers to a letter written from 10 Downing Street on September 14, 1959, on behalf of the British Prime Minister, acknowledging receipt of a previous letter.

The letter began:

"Dear Sir, with reference to your letter dated September 14, 1959. Which I am enclosing as I have written on the back of it, just to make sure... Well, I have just had a second nervous breakdown because the situation is so serious. You can have us all killed if you don't do the following."

The letter then mentions a statue brought to London during Queen Victoria's reign which he described as a "hieroglyphs," adding if it is the original one, then "it is sacrilege."

It goes on:

"Dave this is getting too hot to handle, and in order to appease them before we all get fried, I suggest brother that you make a concession and give it back to them. I could arrange for the correct type of representations in the negotiations ... I don't think Labour can make Britain more prosperous. Don't let them convince you now you have the cards in your hand. And Mexican Litvinoff could act as mediator... Do not send anything back unless you consult me, as to the method and how it will have to be effected, including transportation etc. I have no more to write at present and am yours sincerely."

On the last page there are Greek characters and then the sentence: "Please don't ask me why fish and chips is cheaper at the restaurant or vice versa?" The last sentence is: "This was a lucid 60 seconds and five more or more."⁵⁴⁵³

Tsafendas never spoke to any of the witnesses the author interviewed about writing such a letter, but this does not mean that he did not write it. The author read its contents to forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas. None of them believed that Tsafendas

⁵⁴⁵² *The Cape Argus*, 19 October 1966: 1-2, 'He wrote to the British Premier...'

⁵⁴⁵³ *The Cape Argus*, 19 October 1966: 1-2, 'He wrote to the British Premier...'

wrote the letter or, if he did, that he meant it seriously. They included people who knew him extremely well, such as Father Minas Constandinou, Father Nikola Banovic, Father Michalis Visvinis, Katerina Pnema, Mary Eendracht, Andreas Babioulakis, Costas Chagios, Irene, Antony and John Michaletos, Michalis Vasilakis, Nikolas Kambouris, Reuben O’Ryan, Elias Constantaras, Manolis Mastromanolis, Ira Kyriakakis, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis, Costas Poriadis, Fotini Gavasiadis and Alexandra Vaporidis.

Between leaving Istanbul in December 1961 and being arrested in September 1966, Tsafendas wrote regularly to Father Nikola Banovic. Father Nikola stated that “all his letters were very normal; they were nothing like this ... he never wrote anything strange. These are like the letters of someone else. It couldn’t have been Dimitri’s unless he had gone mad by then which I very much doubt, as in seven months he never said or did anything to suggest that he was mad.”⁵⁴⁵⁴

Tsafendas also corresponded regularly, from 1942 until 1963 and then again from 1964 until his arrest, with his family, his first cousin, Mary Eendracht, and his good friend, Ira Kyriakakis. Often, the letters to his family included a post-card and sometimes a small souvenir, or even, though rarely, a picture of Tsafendas himself from wherever he was at the time. According to Mary Eendracht, Ira Kyriakakis and his half-sister Katerina Pnema, all of Tsafendas’s letters were perfectly normal and nothing like the gibberish letter to the prime minister. His friends and relatives are adamant that Tsafendas could not have written what appeared in the London letter; or if he did, that he couldn’t have meant it – he must have done it to gain something.⁵⁴⁵⁵

Katerina Pnema remembers that Tsafendas sent at least two letters to his father from London. One was in 1962, shortly after his father had died, which Tsafendas had not heard about. His step-mother then wrote to tell him of his father’s demise. Pnema is not certain when the other letter was sent to his father but it had to be before his death in 1962. Since the only other time Tsafendas was in London was 1959, that would most likely be when the letter was sent. Pnema remembers the letter clearly because Tsafendas included a small painting of the Tower of London, which is still in the possession of her family. She does not remember

⁵⁴⁵⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁴⁵⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

what he had written in any of these letters, but she is certain that there was nothing unusual or anything to suggest that her half-brother had a mental problem. "All his letters were the same as usual," she said.⁵⁴⁵⁶ Eendracht and Kyriakakis are not sure whether they received any letters from Tsafendas from London, but they both got letters from many different countries and none of them contained anything abnormal. They cannot believe that Tsafendas wrote the letter in question but say that if he did, he must have had a reason.⁵⁴⁵⁷

A strong indication that Tsafendas wrote the letter in question to support his act is evident from the following where one could clearly see his thinking and his manoeuvres. Tsafendas confided the truth about the tapeworm to Father Minas Constandinou and explained about the trial and his abuse in custody. However, he asked him to tell the prison staff that he talked about the tapeworm all the time and that he was "very mad," so they would "leave him alone."⁵⁴⁵⁸ Tsafendas also asked Rika Nikolatos and Father Minas to bring a double portion of food and to lie to the guards that he had asked for two portions because he wanted to feed the worm too.⁵⁴⁵⁹

In addition, while Tsafendas was in prison in the 1960s and 1970s, he wrote several letters to the prison authorities, all of which contained references to the tapeworm and bore some vague similarities to the London letter. Tsafendas signed most of these letters as Mimikos Demitrios Tsafantakis von Willem de Kanhume.⁵⁴⁶⁰ Mimikos is the same as Dimitris, which is how he was known as a child, before the family name Tsafantakis. The rest is presumably his maternal grandfather's surname.

Later, during the 1980s, when Father Minas visited Tsafendas in Pretoria Central Prison he always asked him if he wanted anything and he always got the same reply, "No." One day, however, Tsafendas asked if the priest would write letters to some of his friends to see if they were all right. He said he preferred not to write himself because they might feel uncomfortable to get a letter from prison and he did not want the police to note his association with them. The letters were to go to Father Nikola Banovic in Istanbul, Manuel in Lourenço Marques, John Michaletos in Athens and Patrick O'Ryan in Cape Town. Tsafendas gave the priest their addresses and apologised for being unable to pay the postage. Father

⁵⁴⁵⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁴⁵⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵⁴⁵⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁴⁵⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁴⁶⁰ Tsafendas's Correctional Service File in NASA.

Minas wrote to the four men, who replied eagerly that they would like to correspond with Tsafendas direct. However, Tsafendas declined. He gave no reason to Father Minas, simply saying that “it would be better if you write them and post them.”⁵⁴⁶¹

Sometime in 1994, but after the elections of April 27 that year, when Tsafendas was in the Pretoria Prison hospital, Father Minas visited him again. Tsafendas asked if he would post some letters he wished to write and mentioned that he would use the hospital address for correspondence if they wanted to write back. Surprised, the priest asked why he was now ready to write the letters himself. Tsafendas explained that in the 1980s any letters he wrote would have been read by prison censors. Since the authorities regarded him as a lunatic who believed he harboured a tapeworm, they would expect the letters to contain evidence of his insanity, including perhaps references to the worm. Tsafendas said that if he had written letters of that nature to his friends, they might conclude he really had gone mad.⁵⁴⁶²

Subsequently, Tsafendas started writing normal letters again, signing them with his name and not mentioning the tapeworm or anything else that would suggest he was insane. These letters were perfectly logical and similar to those he wrote before he was imprisoned, without, of course, any mention of the tapeworm or any other absurd claim. Father Nikola Banovic received a few letters from Tsafendas in the 1990s and they were exactly like the ones he would write to him in the 1960s.⁵⁴⁶³ Father Minas Constandinou, Mary Eendracht, Helen Grispos, and Ira Kyriakakis also received letters from Tsafendas in the 1990s and they were also perfectly normal, just as before.⁵⁴⁶⁴

Furthermore, when in jail, Tsafendas talked perfectly normal to fellow prisoners and to people who visited him, including Professor Renfrew Christie, James Mange, Alexander and Marie-Jose Moumbaris, Father Spiros Randos, Father Minas Constandinou, Father Ioannis Tsaftaridis, Father Michalis Visvinis and Dimitris Skoularikis.⁵⁴⁶⁵

The fact that Tsafendas wrote bizarre letters to the prison authorities, many times

⁵⁴⁶¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁴⁶² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁴⁶³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁴⁶⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵⁴⁶⁵ Professor Renfrew Christie in a personal interview, 12 April 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexander and Marie-Jose Moumbaris in a personal interview, 7 March 2010; Dimitris Skoularikis in a personal interview, 26 April 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

referring to the tapeworm and sometimes offering a softer line on Dr. Verwoerd, while in private conversations he talked in sober political terms, denouncing Dr. Verwoerd as a tyrant and a dictator, suggests that his letters to the prison officials were to convince them he was still mad and so the guards should “leave him alone,” as he told the priests. If Tsafendas believed the content of his letters, he would have said the same to those who talked to him. The fact that what he told these witnesses was the same as he told tens of witnesses before the assassination proves these were his true ideas and not anything he said in his letters.

Significantly, when apartheid collapsed and he was transferred from prison to a hospital, he wrote freely to his friends, never mentioning anything he had written to the prison authorities. All this suggests that the letters Tsafendas wrote while in prison, knowing very well that they were going to be read by the prison authorities were deliberate attempts to convince them that he was still insane. Naturally, he had to keep his guard up. He had already been tortured though officially considered to be insane, and he would have been well aware of the prospect of renewed torture should the authorities discover that he was sane and expressing anti-Verwoerd sentiments to his friends.

As for the London letter in question, for Tsafendas to spend time writing such a missive seemed an incongruous use of his energies and hardly reflective of his mental state at a time when he was deeply involved in politics, in the British anti-apartheid movement and other anti-fascist organizations, participating in many anti-apartheid, anti-fascist and anti-colonialist demonstrations. According to the report of the Commission of Enquiry, Tsafendas, while in London, “was noticed in the company of leftists,”⁵⁴⁶⁶ he attended political meetings in Hyde Park, Labour Party meetings at London’s Caxton Hall and many others organised by the Committee of African Organisations as well as anti-apartheid and anti-fascist demonstrations.⁵⁴⁶⁷ According to the Commission’s report, Tsafendas tried to “recruit people to take part in an uprising in South Africa.” Tsafendas admitted to the Commission that he tried to recruit people for an uprising, but his aim was “confined to the Territory of Mozambique.”⁵⁴⁶⁸ These activities are hardly the things a schizophrenic man would get up to in his spare time.

The reasons why Tsafendas was hospitalised in this hospital have been extensively

⁵⁴⁶⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 31. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁴⁶⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁴⁶⁸ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 32. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

discussed in Dr. Cooper's testimony. The question is: Why would Tsafendas write an incomprehensible letter to the British Prime Minister in 1959 from a hospital in north London? He later wrote letters to the authorities seeking to convince them he was insane. It seems that this was done with the same intention; to strengthen his claim to mental instability with the doctors. That the letter was never posted but ended up in the doctors' hands was very convenient for Tsafendas. It meant that it was read by the doctors. If he seriously wanted to post the letter, he could have done so, as he did with his first letter to the PM. That it ended up with his own doctors instead strongly suggests he wrote it to support his claim to be insane. The fact that the Prime Minister's acknowledgement of his first letter was addressed to Tsafendas by name indicates that he used his proper name in the first letter. It is also highly unlikely that the Prime Minister's office would have replied to the first letter if it was of the same type as the one in question.

Furthermore, Tsafendas, while at this hospital, was looking for work and often wrote off for jobs. It seems highly likely that to write such letters, which would certainly end up in the hospital's possession, was the perfect camouflage. Seeing Tsafendas writing so many letters could have made the doctors curious about their contents. A schizophrenic man sitting in hospital writing out job applications was not a regular sight. However, this is a hypothesis on the author's part, as we do not know exactly what did happen at that time. It must be said that Tsafendas's behaviour and attitude in similar situations in the future makes this scenario a very possible one.

It is also worth mentioning here that the defence could simply have asked Tsafendas if this letter was his and since it was found in his medical file, according to the defence, it would have been accepted by the court without the need of a handwriting expert. Since Tsafendas had not contested the fact that he had written the letter, what was the point of having someone examine it? The defence could have just submitted it as evidence. A graphologist is used only in cases when something written is contested. Since Tsafendas did not contest that he had written the letter, what was the point of appointing someone to examine his letter? This suggests that Bernheim was simply used as a "show witness" for the defence, purely with the aim of creating an impression.

Another issue that should be raised about this letter is whether Bernheim's opinion was wrong. Although there is no evidence to suggest this, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Like certain members of the judiciary and doctors in South Africa who "conspired with the

security police to keep torture and murder under wraps,”⁵⁴⁶⁹ there is little doubt that some handwriting experts did the same. An infamous case was to occur ten years later involving a student activist and a suicide note. Mapetla Mohapi, aged twenty-five, a former official of the South African Students' Organisation and of the Black People's Convention, was arrested on July 15, 1976 near East London. Twenty-one days later, the police announced that Mohapi had committed suicide in his cell, leaving a note in his handwriting. K. Landman, a South African handwriting expert, said he had no doubt that Mohapi's suicide note was in the same handwriting as another document written by Mohapi. However, two world renowned graphologists disagreed and declared the note a forgery.⁵⁴⁷⁰ By big coincidence, Wilfrid Cooper, Tsafendas's advocate, was also the advocate for Mohapi.⁵⁴⁷¹

It is worth mentioning here that on September 9, 1966, the *Daily Dispatch* carried a reproduction of Tsafendas's signature and an analysis by Dr R.M. Schweitzer of East London, who it described as a graphologist of thirty years' standing. Dr. Schweitzer managed to portray Tsafendas quite accurately based on his handwriting, indeed more accurately than any psychiatrist would do at his summary trial. He suggested the writer “experienced difficulty in accepting discipline, had unsteady working habits, showed evidence of vindictiveness, but was idealistic, a person of great enthusiasm and a quick thinker.” By studying loops, whirls and letter shapes, Schweitzer concluded that the signatory was “intelligent” and “capable of learning and thinking logically and can at times co-operate,” but he also nurtured emotional inhibitions and needed more sympathy in his emotional life. By underlining his signature three times, the writer signalled that he could be extremely vain.⁵⁴⁷²

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the letter in question makes no sense. However, none of the people who corresponded with Tsafendas over the years ever received anything in the same vein from him. The fact that Tsafendas wrote letters to the prison authorities in a similar confused style aimed at confirming his insanity to them suggests that he did the same while at the St. Pancras hospital. When Tsafendas was in prison, he never mentioned to his fellow inmates or to the priests who visited him any of the things he wrote about in his letters. He later asked

⁵⁴⁶⁹ Quoted in Bizos, 1998: vii.

⁵⁴⁷⁰ Motala, 1987: 34-35.

⁵⁴⁷¹ For more about the case see: Motala, S. (1987) *Behind Closed Doors*

⁵⁴⁷² *Daily Dispatch*, 9 September 1966: 1, ‘The hand the killer wrote.’

two priest visitors to assure the prison warders that he was mad and talked about the tapeworm all the time, so that they would leave him alone. In addition, when Tsafendas was in London, he wrote perfectly sensible letters to his family, while the evidence of his many political activities further suggests that he was perfectly fine while he was there.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 16: ABRAHAM AUBREY ZABOW

DR. ZABOW'S PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHY AS RELATED BY HIM TO THE COURT

Dr. Zabow, a psychiatrist practising at the time at the Medical Centre, Cape Town, having qualified as a doctor in December, 1949 with M.B. and Ch.B. from the University of Cape Town. After completing his internship year, he practised as a general practitioner for eleven years. Because of his interest in psychiatry since his student days, he took a full-time post at Valkenberg Mental Hospital as a clinical assistant for a year, from 1962 to 1963, and then a further year as a registrar in the Department of Psychiatry at Groote Schuur Hospital. During this time, he took certain examinations: the Diploma in Psychological Medicine at the University of Cape Town, and the Fellowship of the Faculty of Psychiatrists of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of South Africa, and eventually registered as a specialist psychiatrist.

For administrative reasons, Dr. Zabow joined the staff of Groote Schuur Hospital as a consultant in June, 1964, but did not register with the Medical Council until November or December of that year. Then, in January, 1965, he started in private practice and remained a part-time consultant in psychiatry at Groote Schuur Hospital; he also took on the post of part-time consultant in psychiatry to the Somerset Hospital. Dr Zabow declared that he had seen, certified and treated schizophrenics in the course of his practice and felt competent to express his opinion in the Court.⁵⁴⁷³

DR. ZABOW'S TESTIMONY⁵⁴⁷⁴

DR. ZABOW'S FIRST EXAMINATION ON TSAFENDAS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You have interviewed the accused at the request of Mr. David Bloomberg, the attorney for the defence?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, I was asked by Mr. David Bloomberg to see the accused, and I saw him

⁵⁴⁷³ Dr. Abraham Aubrey Zabow's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁴⁷⁴ Dr. Abraham Aubrey Zabow's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

on three separate occasions. The first time was on 30th September, when I saw him on my own, except that Mr. Bloomberg was there. There were no other psychiatrists present.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you do that deliberately?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. I wanted to be able to see this man on my own and form an independent clinical opinion of him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: After you had had that interview did you, again independently of other medical witnesses, communicate your opinion to the defence?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. I formed an opinion at the first interview and communicated that verbally to Mr. Bloomberg at the time, and then in writing as well, and I have had no reason to change my opinion since then.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The subsequent interviews were on which days?

DR. ZABOW: They were on the 4th October and the 11th October, and at these interviews Drs. MacGregor and Cooper were also present.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How long did the first interview last?

DR. ZABOW: Each of the interviews lasted approximately an hour and a half, I didn't time them exactly. All in all I was with the accused for at least four and a half hours.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: At this stage, on the basis of these interviews alone, what opinion did you form?

DR. ZABOW: On the basis of these interviews alone, I formed the opinion that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia. At my first interview I was satisfied that he was psychotic and schizophrenic, but I was not yet able to be sure into which category of schizophrenia he fell. Subsequent interviews have enabled me to form the opinion that although he is not a textbook case of any particular variety, he falls mainly into the category of a paranoid schizophrenic.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Your first interview with the accused, how did it go? Will you tell us, so that the Court can for itself see how a psychiatrist sets about his job of determining the mental state of the patient?

DR. ZABOW: May I stress to the Court, with respect, that in interviewing a patient for psychiatric examination one tries to be as systematic and review certain systems in the same way as a physician undertakes a medical and physical examination. One does not just look at

the man, listen to him talk, and then form a sort of general opinion. In the same way as a physician would look at the general condition of the patient and then examine his various systems - the respiratory system, the cardio-vascular system, and so on - the psychiatrist tries to examine the various systems which make up the behavioural pattern and the overall mental picture of the person whom he is seeing. So that the first impression, naturally, is the first sight of the patient.

JUDGE BEYERS: You mean he has got a sort of set procedure like Dr. Muller has when he looks me over?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, that is what I mean.

JUDGE BEYERS: How is my pulse, and does my liver hurt?

DR. ZABOW: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: And you do the same thing with the mind?

DR. ZABOW: That is right.

JUDGE BEYERS: Then I know what you are talking about.

DR. ZABOW: My first impression was of a man who - remember that I knew that he had been alleged to have assassinated the Prime Minister, and I was expecting certain things, and what I was struck by was the incongruity of my first meeting with him. Mr. Bloomberg introduced us to each other. He was not very tidy, he hadn't shaved - one could say that this was because of the circumstances that he was in. But then I asked him: "How are you?" I can look up my exact words, but I asked him "How are you?", and I have in the course of my experience seen other people who had been held for murder, and conducted psychiatric examinations on them, and this was quite an unexpected reply. I said: "Tell me, how are you feeling?" He said: "I always feel tired and exhausted. I just feel as usual, tired and exhausted, and my appetite is always good and my bowel movement is regular." Now he had been introduced to me as a psychiatrist, and one would have expected him to take the issue, well, this is the man who is supposed to be coming to help him, and yet this was the pattern of incongruity, and many times in that interview and subsequent interviews there was equal incongruity.

COMMENTS ON DR. ZABOW'S FIRST EXAMINATION ON TSAFENDAS

Dr. A. Zabow acknowledges that Tsafendas was untidy and unshaven because of the circumstances. What he did not know was that Tsafendas was being tortured regularly and left in dirty, wet clothes for days. Tsafendas said that he was allowed to have a shower and change clothes only when he was visited by his lawyers or the psychiatrists.⁵⁴⁷⁵ Obviously Dr. A. Zabow was not in position to know that.

Dr. A. Zabow stated that he interviewed Tsafendas three times, with each session lasting about an hour and a half, making it “at least four and a half hours.” The most important thing that Dr. A. Zabow said was that he diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic “on the basis of these interviews alone,” that is, without any additional information about him. Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky, Reyner van Zyl and Professors Tuviah Zabow, cousin of Dr. Aubrey Zabow, Alban Burke, Kirk Heilbrun, Robert L. Sadoff, and Phillip Resnick highlighted to the author the importance of collecting as much information as possible about the patient by talking to people who knew him, such as his family and friends, and by consulting his medical and criminal record.⁵⁴⁷⁶

However, that was not the case here. Dr. A. Zabow relied only on what he heard from Tsafendas and what Tsafendas told him was entirely different to what he told some two hundred relatives, friends and acquaintances who were interviewed by the police, by the Commission and by the author. Dr. A. Zabow found incongruity in Tsafendas, but none of the aforementioned witnesses noticed incongruity. Indeed, the witnesses who were interviewed by the author denied any incongruity in Tsafendas's everyday life.

TSAFENDAS'S “THOUGHT DISORDER”

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What were your major findings? We have had Dr. Cooper give evidence at great length, and we have had lots of other evidence given here. What were your major findings?

DR. ZABOW: My major findings were that this man suffered from a clearly recognised and

⁵⁴⁷⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁴⁷⁶ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016; Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Robert L. Sadoff in a personal interview with the author, 12 August 2015; Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky in correspondence with the author, 30 March 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

recognisable mental illness known as schizophrenia. Now in schizophrenia there are certain clearly defined disorders of mentation, of thought processes, of emotional life, of contact with reality and of perception, which one can look for in the course of one's systematic examination, and I found many of them there, and particularly I found many important ones, so important that certain authors, particularly Kurt Schneider, would say that even the presence of one of them is sufficient, in the absence of organic disease of the brain, to diagnose schizophrenia.

For instance, I found thought disorder. This thought disorder consisted of an inability to pursue the point of a question and answer sequence. Several times, in the course of my first interview and in the course of other interviews as well, he could not - he appeared not to be able to deal with - what was being asked, and we arrived, not merely at the point in a roundabout way - some people are circumstantial - but in his case we just never got there at all. Sometimes he went off at a complete tangent; sometimes he just petered out; and on one occasion I remember specifically asking him "Now what did I ask you?", and he looked a bit dazed, perplexed, and was not really able to say. If the Court wishes it, I could quote this passage. It runs into about three or four pages of typed foolscap, and I think it took a good few minutes for the accused to ramble through it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Well, unless the Court wants the exact passage, give the Court the substance of the passage?

DR. ZABOW: This was in the course of our third interview. Drs. MacGregor, Cooper and myself were present, and Drs. Cooper and MacGregor had been asking the accused questions, and then I went on and asked him, "You don't know what this is about? The sequence of events is, of course, that you planned to assassinate Dr. Verwoerd and that you did murder him. What we are trying to understand is just how that came about."

JUDGE BEYERS: That is what you said?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, that is what I said to him. He said to me: "Yes. I er.... (I am going to try and put in the pauses, my Lord, with the hesitations, because I feel this is important to understand how he spoke to us).

ASSESSOR: Is this a transcript of a recording?

DR. ZABOW: This is a transcript of a recording. I also have my own written verbatim notes which are fairly substantially the same, but my handwriting in taking it down was not so

good: "Yes. I don't know how that came about exactly, but I can tell you how I got quite a few people have asked me questions of how I got to Cape Town and I gave them er... quite a few versions of how I got to Cape Town but er. My mind.... my memory went bad a bit as to how I came to Cape Town and one of the influencing factors was.... that made me come to Cape Town as I was working there as a casual interpreter, was the fact that I received a letter through someone in my Church, through a person in my Church, through one of the people, a pastor in my church, and this pastor was in Cape Town. He is known as Willy Clarke. And I received the letter while I was in Cape Town or he received it, I mean, through somebody. It was not posted to him. It was brought to him by someone personally from Cape Town.

It was brought. It had no stamp on it. It was I think that I can remember. It was brought and handed to him and he called me over to his house and I went to get the letter. And the letter had been opened. It had been tampered with. And he gave me the letter. Oh, there's a mistake here.

Excuse me, I'm sorry. The pastor's name was Willy Clarke. He did not call me to his house to give me the letter. I had never been to his house and I went one day to visit him and when I got there he gave me this letter. He said he had received it from somebody that came from Cape Town. The envelope was opened and (long pause) I took the letter and we spoke for a few minutes and then I left. Later on, as I was going down the road, I passed through the race course" (this was in Durban, my Lord) "and there must have been the ... what you call it? The July handicap. I had never been to horse racing in all my life because we don't go to racing but I ... as I was passing by ... I like animals ... so I stopped and I went to look at the horses running round the course and they were getting near the bend"

JUDGE BEYERS: I wish that was all I did. (Laughter.)

DR. ZABOW: "And two jockeys I remember fell off and when I saw that accident."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Just repeat that to his Lordship.

DR. ZABOW: He may not have been able to hear it.

JUDGE BEYERS: Two jockeys fell off? "Two jockeys I remember fell off."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What year was that?

DR. ZABOW: It must have been 1965, I presume. "I saw that accident and the animals went right round the racecourse and I had a look at them - so it must have been the July Must have been in the month of July that I received the letter. I then ... I left and I went home and I

must have read the letter later on. Must have read the letter later on. The letter stated, this girl stated, her name was Helen Daniels, that she had heard about me when she was on holiday in Brakpan in the Home. There were some Christians living in the Transvaal on the Rand," My Lord, it goes on. If I could just point out ...

JUDGE BEYERS: Does he ever get back to what you asked?

DR. ZABOW: No, In fact, this goes on now to something about an identity card, then working for Marine Diamond, and then I said to him ...

JUDGE BEYERS: Before you interfere again, before you interpose a question again, does he ever get back to it?

DR. ZABOW: No, never at all.

JUDGE BEYERS: Does he ever get back to killing the Prime Minister and why?

DR. ZABOW: No, not at all.

JUDGE BEYERS: He has now rambled through the Durban July and I don't know what all, but does he ever get back to the Prime Minister?

DR. ZABOW: I will just make quite sure. I will read the last few words: "They did not care very much about papers out on the barges isolated." (This was because he had no identity- card. You will remember, he had given that in and had a receipt instead.) "They took on anybody, outlaws, criminals, they a receipt like that I was considered before this happened I was considered (pause) something like that. So they did not mind. They did not mind (pause) accepting me out there and they accepted me. They..." - and then I interrupted him. I said: "May I ask you something else, Mr. Tsafendas. What were you trying to tell me now?" Then he said "Er" and there was a long, long pause. And then he said "Concerning what?" Then I asked him, "You know, we asked you about the Prime Minister." He said: "I was trying to tell you how I got to Cape Town. What made me ... er ... what was the influencing factor that made me come to Cape Town. Then after that I lost ... after I got here ... after what happened after I got here about getting married ... I had lost the intention that made me come to Cape Town," (Because originally he was trying to say he had come to Cape Town to meet this Helen Daniels.) "I kept on wandering around. You know, I got this job" - and once again we still cannot get back to the point. If I could put this into technical terms, this is a variety of schizophrenic thought disorder in which the patient is unable to follow the main trend of thought, and various side issues obtrude themselves on to his thinking, and he is not able

logically to discriminate between the primary object of his discourse and the secondary intruding factors. I could go on to the other aspects now.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Just a little comment. The fact that he tells you about the pastor as Willy Clarke, and then he comes back and he has forgotten about it again and he talks about Willy Clarke, what is that indicative of?

DR. ZABOW: I am not altogether sure of the point.

JUDGE BEYERS: It is indicative of thought disorder?

DR. ZABOW: Of thought disorder, yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: Which is the first symptom you look for?

DR. ZABOW: Yes.

COMMENTS ON DR. ZABOW'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

DR. ZABOW'S DIAGNOSIS OF "THOUGHT DISORDER"

Dr. Zabow stated that he diagnosed "thought disorder" and that Tsafendas was unable to deal with what he was asked and properly answer a question. This is something that Dr. Cooper also diagnosed, but it is something that none of the about two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police, by the Commission of Enquiry and by the author ever noticed in Tsafendas. More importantly, Tsafendas was questioned twice by Major Rossouw while he was in custody. When Major Rossouw appeared in front of the Commission of Enquiry, the following dialogue followed between him and Judge van Wyk:

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you get the impression that what he said was the truth or did you think that sometimes he was sly?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: I thought that he told the truth. I never got the impression that he tried to evade any question. He answered all the questions spontaneously.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Was he totally prepared to answer everything?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes

By also looking at Tsafendas's two statements to the police, we see that he did not have the problem Dr. Zabow noted and all of his answers and his narration are perfectly clear

without any sign of “thought disorder.” If such a problem was noted by Major Rossouw or General van den Berg, presumably they would have raised it.

In addition, Tsafendas attended many interviews in his working life and appeared perfectly capable of answering questions or he would not have got the jobs. More importantly, he was examined and interviewed twice by two state doctors for his South African permanent residency permit and neither of them noticed any “thought-disorder,” though they were not psychiatrists:

- On November 11, 1963, Tsafendas was medically examined by Dr. C. Been for his permanent residence application and was found “not to be mentally or physically defective in any way,” and “generally in a good state of health.”⁵⁴⁷⁷ Dr. Been would later examine Tsafendas again “for burns on his body whilst employed at Pooles.” Again nothing about his mental state would be noted.⁵⁴⁷⁸
- On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined again for the permit by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who also wrote “a favourable report” and subsequently a certificate for permanent residence was issued for him.⁵⁴⁷⁹

In addition to these two doctors, Tsafendas was examined by another ten physicians, none of them psychiatrists, over the course of three years, and no one noticed any signs of thought disorder or an inability of answering questions:

- On March 15, 1965, Tsafendas was examined by a South African Railways’ medical officer whose name is indecipherable in his report. He was found to be perfectly healthy, without any issues and therefore capable of working at the company.⁵⁴⁸⁰
- On September 25, 1965, he was examined by Dr. G.C. Baker, a casualty officer, and nothing was reported about his mental state.⁵⁴⁸¹

⁵⁴⁷⁷ Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁵⁴⁷⁸ Dr. Been statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁴⁷⁹ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demitrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁵⁴⁸⁰ South African Railways Confidential Medical Examination Certificate of Demitrio Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 7, File: S 83708, Tsafendas: D. NASA.

⁵⁴⁸¹ Dr. G.C. Baker Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. No date. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4, NASA.

- On November 19, 1965, Tsafendas was medically examined to insure that he was able to work for City Tramways in Cape Town. He was found fit to work and duly hired.⁵⁴⁸²
- On January 13, 1966, Tsafendas applied for work at the Marine Diamond Corporation and underwent a medical check-up that same day. The doctor who examined him⁵⁴⁸³ found Tsafendas to be perfectly healthy and capable of working for the company.⁵⁴⁸⁴
- On April 18, 19 and May 3, 1966 Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Goldman, a consultant ear, nose and throat surgeon. He reported nothing about his mental condition.⁵⁴⁸⁵
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work.⁵⁴⁸⁶
- Dr. Ralph Kossew examined Tsafendas only half an hour after the assassination. His testimony is highly important due to its timing. Dr. Kossew found Tsafendas “not confused ... he answers questions guardedly but does not appear to be confused ... he didn't appear anxious ... He may have been a little bit nervous but not in any marked degree... He was calm...”⁵⁴⁸⁷
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work at Marine Diamond Corporation.⁵⁴⁸⁸

⁵⁴⁸² Donal Neville Mackay statement to the COE, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁴⁸³ The doctor's name in the medical report is indecipherable.

⁵⁴⁸⁴ Demitrio Tsafendas's Marine Diamond Corporation Application for Employment, 13 January 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

⁵⁴⁸⁵ I. Eisenberg Statement. RE: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. N.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁴⁸⁶ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

⁵⁴⁸⁷ Dr. Ralph Kossew's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁴⁸⁸ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

- Dr. S. Michelson, a specialist physician, examined Tsafendas in the Neurology Department of Groote Schuur Hospital on 3rd June, 1966 and nothing was reported to be wrong with his mental state.⁵⁴⁸⁹
- Finally, Dr. Darby, a casualty officer, examined Tsafendas on the evening of the assassination but did not report anything to be wrong about his mental state.⁵⁴⁹⁰

Like a normal worker, Tsafendas was interviewed for jobs and other applications and again no one noticed anything amiss, for example:

- Petrus Schuin, the head messenger at the Parliament, was also one of the three men who interviewed and appointed Tsafendas. He told the Commission of Enquiry that “there was nothing out of the ordinary about him. Tsafendas was the same as any other person that had worked there.”⁵⁴⁹¹
- Sydney Wiehand, who was also one of the three messengers who had interviewed him at the Parliament, said about Tsafendas, “he was a quiet man. He wasn’t the rough type, or anything like that. He was quiet - quietly spoken, well-mannered.”⁵⁴⁹²
- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban appointed Tsafendas as a Portuguese and Greek interpreter. Rudolph used him “on several occasions” in a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He testified that “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁵⁴⁹³
- Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas’s employer in Frankfurt, Germany, at the heavy engineering company Fries and Son, characterised Tsafendas “as extremely nice and friendly ... He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man...he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on... we liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.” Tsafendas “left on

⁵⁴⁸⁹ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 64. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁴⁹⁰ Dr. T.A. Darby. Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. G.S.H. NO. 65/014-181, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁴⁹¹ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵⁴⁹² Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁵⁴⁹³ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

his own wish” although Hartmann “would have liked to keep him.”⁵⁴⁹⁴ Tsafendas was given a reference by Hartmann, so his work there must have been satisfactory.

- Tsafendas got a reference from this job, so his work there must have been quite satisfactory.
- Ian Boswell, administrative assistant at the Department of Labour in Cape Town. He interviewed Tsafendas three times in 1966 and testified to the police that “he was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being over-talkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality, during his interviews with me.”⁵⁴⁹⁵
- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He testified to the police that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed” and he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”⁵⁴⁹⁶
- Gideon Cloete, also employed at the Department of Labour, interviewed Tsafendas twice. According to Cloete, Tsafendas “had a neat appearance and made a good impression.” He did not notice any “signs of abnormality” and “appeared totally normal” to him.⁵⁴⁹⁷
- Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen was Tsafendas’s tram instructor in December 1965 and January 1966. He testified to the police that “I did not at all get the impression that mentally anything was wrong with him. He is mentally normal.”⁵⁴⁹⁸
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the

⁵⁴⁹⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin.’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

⁵⁴⁹⁵ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁵⁴⁹⁶ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁵⁴⁹⁷ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas’s summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁵⁴⁹⁸ Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁵⁴⁹⁹

Tsafendas was also interviewed, and hired after a week's trial, by Limasollu Naci, the owner of the private language college that bore his name in Istanbul. He worked there for five-six months. Newly interviewed, Mrs. Adviy Vedia Limasollu, Mr. Limasollu's widow, who also worked at the college at the time, believes that it would have been impossible for her late husband to hire a man who talked in the way described by Dr. Zabow; equally impossible that no-one should notice for six months.⁵⁵⁰⁰ Tsafendas left the college of his own will and got a very good reference, which he used to get the job in the House of Assembly in Cape Town.

Furthermore, just a few weeks after Dr. Kossew diagnosed him as schizophrenic and just two months before the assassination, in July 1966, Tsafendas gave a seventy-five-minute interview to a journalist named N.D. Hartford of the *Cape Argus*. They had met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to enquire whether there was any news of the freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as an “anti-Portuguese rebel and an antagonist of the Portuguese dictatorship.”⁵⁵⁰¹ Hartford's impression was that Tsafendas was normal. He had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. According to Hartford, Tsafendas spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in his conversation.⁵⁵⁰²

None of the two hundred or so witnesses who were questioned by the police and by the Commission mentioned anything about Tsafendas's way of speech. They all said he spoke perfectly well, like a normal person. Indeed, several were impressed by him:

- Gillian Claire Lieberman, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation, whose office Tsafendas often visited, “I had various discussions with him. I got quite interested in him as an individual. ... I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation.”⁵⁵⁰³
- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he “never got the slightest impression that he was

⁵⁴⁹⁹ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁵⁰⁰ Adviy Vedia Limasollu in a personal interview, 8 January 2016.

⁵⁵⁰¹ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, 'Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.'

⁵⁵⁰² Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁵⁰³ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁵⁵⁰⁴

- Patrick O’Ryan said “he was well-spoken and had good vocabulary.”⁵⁵⁰⁵
- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban appointed Tsafendas as a Portuguese and Greek interpreter. Rudolph used him “on several occasions” in a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He testified that “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁵⁵⁰⁶
- J. Willemse was Tsafendas’s landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”⁵⁵⁰⁷
- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike’s Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966, frequently driving him to the tanker *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town. Of Tsafendas. He told the police that he “never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers.”⁵⁵⁰⁸ He later said that Tsafendas was “overly talkative.”⁵⁵⁰⁹
- Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas’s landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry that Tsafendas “was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman.”⁵⁵¹⁰
- Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira “was often in the company of the subject and others had several conversations with him.” He considered Tsafendas to be “a normal and very intelligent person.”⁵⁵¹¹
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and

⁵⁵⁰⁴ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁵⁰⁵ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁵⁰⁶ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁵⁰⁷ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. ‘Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.’

⁵⁵⁰⁸ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁵⁵⁰⁹ Lambley, 1980: 241.

⁵⁵¹⁰ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁵⁵¹¹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁵⁵¹²

Furthermore, none of the forty-four witnesses the author interviewed noticed any signs of thought disorder or of an inability of answering questions and no-one ever got the impression that Tsafendas suffered from thought disorder. Every friend or acquaintance contacted was surprised that anyone could believe Tsafendas was unable to answer a question properly and spoke as Dr. Zabow described. Fotini Gavasiadis and Mary Eendracht used the same word, “ridiculous.”⁵⁵¹³ Of course this was not Dr Zabow’s fault, as he simply repeated what Tsafendas had told him.

Mary Eendracht, his first cousin, who grew up with him in Egypt and Mozambique and was constantly with him for nine months in 1963-1964, “Dimitri always spoke very well. He sounded like a very educated man. There was nothing wrong with speech or his thoughts; they were both excellent. He could argue with you for hours and hours for politics. He was very good with words and his brain was bigger than most people’s.”⁵⁵¹⁴

Fotini Gavasiadis, who was very closed to him and practically lived with him for nine months in 1963-4. She told the author:

“[Tsafendas] could buy and sell you and he could do that at any time during a conversation, in the first ten minutes, then again after thirty minutes or an hour and then again after two hours. He wouldn’t let you get up from the chair until he had made you agree with what he was saying, especially when talking politics ... He was very convincing and persuasive - he could turn black into white! If you disagreed with something with him, he would find a way to convince you that he is right and that you are wrong - even if you *know* that you are right and that he is wrong! If he made a mistake about something, he would turn things upside-down and at the end, he would even make you apologise to him ...

In those nine months, I saw him and spoke to him every day and not even once did he appear to have an issue with his speech or his thoughts. He was always the same. We spent hours and hours talking and his speech was never incoherent, disjointed, blocked or whatever

⁵⁵¹² August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁵¹³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵⁵¹⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

else, it was always perfect. He never gave me even the slightest indication that he might be having the issues you mentioned.”⁵⁵¹⁵

Fathers Ioannis, Michalis and Minas who met him in prison and in the hospital in the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s and spent hundreds of hours with him are positive that Tsafendas did not suffer from thought disorder, that he was able to participate perfectly in a conversation and that he never talked in a disjointed manner.⁵⁵¹⁶ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis said:

“[Tsafendas] could speak for hours, telling you things about his life, his thoughts and his ideology, but he could also participate in a dialogue. We spoke for hours about politics, religion and history and he was one of the most knowledgeable people I ever met in all these subjects. He was very argumentative and insistent, especially about politics. He never got lost in the conversation and he would never drop a subject until I had agreed with him. He would never give up a conversation if you disagreed. He never, not even once, seemed to have difficulty expressing himself or talked incoherently. Every single time, everything he said made sense and was perfectly stated. I don't believe for a moment that he could have talked in the way described by the psychiatrists unless he did it deliberately. He spoke and argued even better than most people. His speech and thought were perfectly fine.”⁵⁵¹⁷

Father Michalis Visvinis told the author regarding Dr. Zabow's comment,

“No, no, this is not true; he did not talk like this [with gaps in his speech]. He never spoke like this with me, his speech was always absolutely fine. I felt that he [Tsafendas] needed to speak, so several times I would just let him speak. He enjoyed speaking and he could speak for hours. I also often asked him questions about his life, and his answers were always logical and what one would expect. He never evaded any question and I never had to repeat myself to him for a second time, nor was his answer ever off the subject. He always spoke absolutely fine, like a normal man. [His speech] was perfectly articulate and logical, always very coherent. He never said anything to suggest he had a mental problem or that he had any difficulty speaking or thinking and expressing himself properly. This comment is also entirely false.”⁵⁵¹⁸

⁵⁵¹⁵ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵⁵¹⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁵⁵¹⁷ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁵¹⁸ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

For reasons of space, the study will list only a few of the witnesses who were interviewed by the author, those who knew him best and longest. They all insist that Tsafendas never appeared to be suffering from thought disorder in front of them:

- Alexander Moumbaris;⁵⁵¹⁹
- Katerina Pnema, Tsafendas's half-sister;⁵⁵²⁰
- Father Nikola Banovic who lived with him at the same house for four months in 1961 and then lived right next to his house for another three;⁵⁵²¹
- His first cousin Mary Eendracht, who grew up with him and was constantly with him for nine months in 1964;⁵⁵²²
- Ira Kyriakakis, who also grew up with him and spent a lot of time together in 1964 and 1965;⁵⁵²³
- Andreas Babiolakis, who knew him since they were children, who lived with him for two months in 1964 and associated with him for about a year then;⁵⁵²⁴
- Thirteen crewmen from the *Eleni* who saw him every day for forty-two days;⁵⁵²⁵
- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott's boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest;⁵⁵²⁶
- Irene Michaletos, who knew him for more than a year (1964-1965) and whose house he often visited;⁵⁵²⁷
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins and sons of Artemis Michaletos, Tsafendas's aunt and his father's sister who brought him up in Egypt. They first met

⁵⁵¹⁹ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

⁵⁵²⁰ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁵²¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁵²² Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵⁵²³ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵⁵²⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁵⁵²⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 19 January 2016; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁵⁵²⁶ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁵⁵²⁷ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

Tsafendas in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique.⁵⁵²⁸

- Costas Poriassis who met him in 1965 in Beira;⁵⁵²⁹
- Alexandra Vaporidis, who knew him for about six months in Istanbul in 1961,⁵⁵³⁰
- Nick Papadakis, who knew Tsafendas for two-three months and lived with him for two months in Mozambique in 1964,⁵⁵³¹
- Panagiotis Peroglou and Costas Chagios who were Tsafendas's friends in Cape Town for more than a year.⁵⁵³²

As for the story Tsafendas told Dr. Zabow about the horses, the author interviewed all the witnesses who knew Tsafendas at the time, but no one remembers him ever mentioning such a story, though it could not be ruled out. The author read the above story and how Tsafendas spoke to several of the witnesses who knew Tsafendas for a very long time and spent a lot of time with him, and not one of them recognises Tsafendas talking this way. People like Father Minas Constandinou, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis, Katerina Pnema, Andreas Babiolakis, Mary Eendracht, Father Nikola Banovic, Nikolas Kambouris, Michalis Vasilakis, Manuel Mastromanolis, Elias Constantaras, Costas Chagios, Ira Kyriakakis, Irene Michaletos, John Michaletos, Antony Michaletos, Nick Papadakis, Father Michalis Visvinis and Alexandra Vaporidis were all adamant that Tsafendas could never have talked like that unless he did it deliberately.⁵⁵³³

⁵⁵²⁸ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵⁵²⁹ Costas Poriassis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁵⁵³⁰ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁵⁵³¹ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵⁵³² Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015; Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁵⁵³³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

COMMENTS CONCERNING HOW TSAFENDAS GOT TO CAPE TOWN

Tsafendas himself stated clearly to the police when he was interrogated how he came to Cape Town from Durban and said nothing like the things he told Dr. Zabow:

“... While I was still living at the Durban Men's Home I was trying to obtain a lift to Cape Town. I managed to get a lift with a director of a cardboard factory in Cape Town in a Ford Sedan car. I got a lift with this man as far as Port Elizabeth. From Port Elizabeth I bought a train ticket Cape Town. I arrived in Cape Town during September or October, 1965. When I arrived in Cape Town I went to stay at 1 San Sauci Street, Belville with the family of a girl who was staying there and who had written to me previously to say that she wanted to marry me. Her name was Helen Daniels, a Coloured woman. She belonged to the same church as me, i.e. 'The Christian Church.' I did not, want to get married. This was her idea. I stayed there for almost two months while I was searching for a job. I found work at the Table Bay Power Station. When I found work, I paid the Daniels family for my board and lodging.”⁵⁵³⁴

Almost thirty years later, Tsafendas would repeat to Father Minas Constandinou the exactly same reasons and how he got to Cape Town from Durban, without mentioning any of the things he told Dr. Zabow.⁵⁵³⁵

THE TAPEWORM

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Would you proceed?

DR. ZABOW: The other symptoms which I looked for were evidence of delusional thinking, and associated with this evidence of feelings of passivity or feelings of influence from an agency. Here is a play on words, because in Schneider's writing he talks about influence from an external agency, and one could argue that the tapeworm is internal, but I think we could agree that in fact it is an external agent which has an animus of its own.

JUDGE BEYERS: It is obviously external to the motivation of the man himself?

DR. ZABOW: Yes.

⁵⁵³⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁵³⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

JUDGE BEYERS: Other than the man himself would be external means?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. Other than the man himself. So that here is another primary symptom of schizophrenia, one which Schneider would say, in the absence, once again, of organic brain disease, would make the condition of schizophrenia the diagnosis. It is not a question now of deciding what other conditions could do this. Once one has excluded organic brain disease - and he has had an E.E.G., he has had a Wasserman done and he has had a full neurological examination by a physician - then we are left with schizophrenia. I don't want to labour the point, because you have heard this so often, but I just want to stress that these were the things that I looked for and found. So that I now had thought-disorder, delusions, feelings of influence. One of the other important features of schizophrenia, although not diagnostic, is the presence of hallucinations in a setting of clear consciousness. There are many conditions in which there are hallucinations when the patient's level of consciousness is lowered, but once again there are very few conditions, in the absence of organic brain disease, in which there can be hallucinations, other than schizophrenia, in a setting of clear consciousness. The typical hallucination which one would expect a schizophrenic to complain of is an auditory one, and at no time has the accused complained to me of that. But there are other hallucinations, and in his case there has been the disordered perception of some activity going on inside him. To me he has described it as a feeling, at various times, of pain or discomfort, or, in more clear terms, as the tapeworm unwinding when it smells food and then coming up to smell the food, and then after it has fed the tapeworm settles down again. The tapeworm rests, and then Tsafendas may rest as well.

Now, it is not very important whether one were to call this a visceral hallucination or a tactile hallucination, or even, for that matter, an illusion. In other words, there may be some - now and then everybody has experienced the sensation of peristalsis, of a wind travelling in the abdomen, or a hunger-pain, or something, but these are normal physiological sensations, and when a man describes it in the terms in which Tsafendas has described it, then it becomes either a hallucination, or perhaps one could call it an illusion, but I would prefer perhaps even to call it a delusional percept: he is perceiving something in terms of his delusional system.

The other, I think, important aspect of his disorder which I found was his autism, that is his lack of contact with reality. The accused basically, although he does understand words when one speaks to him and, as has been shown repeatedly in this Court, he is an intelligent person, his grasp of reality is such that he is not basically in the same world as we are. His world is a

world dominated by an agency which at times causes him discomfort, at times causes him to behave in embarrassing ways, and he has described to me how at times the tapeworm has caused him to utter embarrassing statements. It is a world in which his sensitivity and perception of other people is altered. He has described to me how he is more sensitive to the feelings of other people and understands how they feel. When he says that, he says it in a - not in the sense that one may talk of empathy, but rather that he has an altered perception. But more prominent that this was the fact that when at one stage we tried — or rather, I asked him in one interview - I can't remember exactly how it led up to it, but I can give you the - it was towards the end of our last interview with him. It seemed that he wasn't altogether really with us as to why we were there. Now we were three psychiatrists. He had already seen each one of us individually, and then he had seen myself and my two colleagues on two previous occasions together. Then he was seeing us again for the third time together, and from the way he spoke it seemed that he wasn't altogether aware of why we were there or what was going on. And if I, with your permission, my Lord, could tell you what this sequence was (witness refers to page 11 of the transcript of the recording he made): I asked him: "You said a while ago, I gathered, that you appreciate the fact that we are assisting you. In what way do you feel that we are assisting you?"

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is that the question you put to him?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. "Well, I gathered the fact that you were, I mean, giving me this attention, I mean, that's what I meant, concerning this matter." "Which matter?" "I beg your pardon?" "Which matter in particular?" "Well, er ... concerning this matter about the tapeworm about ... and all this ... er. "We have had a few talks with you together, what do you feel has been the object of our talks? What do you feel we are trying to do?" "I ... er ... I don't know what exactly. But I feel I feel the pain and I want to convince you people to get me the tapeworm out. That's what worried me. Even if it meant a surgical operation or something in the bowels. I'd be willing to undergo a surgical operation and the bowels to be opened in two or three places ... large and small intestines ... but these can be sewed up again and that would prove whether I ... that will be definite proof that I had a tapeworm, furthermore (pause) trying to find something to see what is there because the X-ray department are obsolete as far as tapeworms and other things are concerned", and then he went on to describe this machine which I think is similar to what Dr. van Zyl described in his evidence this morning.

Then I asked him: "What is Mr. Bloomberg's function in this whole situation?" (He was with us at the time.) "I don't know what ... er ... whether Mr. Bloomberg is an assistant attorney but ... er and he has (pause, and then he started to laugh) I am very indebted to him for what he has been trying to do for me I don't exactly know what ... er ... I want to thank him for especially getting those ... er ... documents from overseas and other things." And then he was asked - I say "he was asked", because I am not sure if it was I or one of my colleagues who asked him: "Where do we fit in with Mr, Bloomberg?" "Er" "Or do we fit in with him at all?" "Well, I think Mr. Bloomberg has been nominated by the ... by the Court... and so has Mr. Cooper and another man, Mr. Burger. But I ..." "But where do we come in?"(that is, us doctors) "Well, I think you are private physicians. I don't think you are Government physicians. I think you are private physicians." "For what reason do you think we are here?" "Well, I ... er ... to assist me I think." "In what way?" "Well, to find out what has been the cause of what ... how this matter took place or something, I really don't know ... I ... I really don't know why you people ... I know you are investigating ... er ... I don't know whether it's just research work or whether it's just ... er ... I ... that I can't say ... I ... (then a very long pause)" "What sort of doctors do you think we are? You said physicians, what sort of a doctor?" "I know you are a psychiatrist" - he addressed that specifically to me - "I know you are a psychiatrist. And ... er ... I think Dr. MacGregor is ... I think you said you were a medical practitioner and er ... Dr. Cooper, I thought you were a lawyer. I ... well I just thought so because of your questions ..." "Why should you feel that Dr. Cooper is a lawyer asking these questions?" I said: "Yes, but we all, you included, address him as 'Doctor'." Then there was a very long pause: "Well, I call lawyers also doctors. I also call lawyers of advocates lawyers." "Isn't one of your lawyer's names actually Cooper?" I asked him. "Well, er ... yes."

Then I said: "Is he Mr. Cooper of Advocate Cooper?" "No, he is Advocate Cooper. He's er ...he was er ... something to do with." Then I put in "Dr. Cooper?", and then there was a long pause. And then he was asked: "What I am trying to find out is, is there anything because they have the same name that made you feel that Dr. Cooper is a lawyer." This was not merely punning, my Lord; this is a recognised variety of schizophrenic thought-disorder as well - I will come back to the autism, but may I just add this - in that schizophrenics often relate similarities to the predicate of a sentence instead of to the subject. For instance, they may say that a table and a dog are the same because they both have legs. Their logical classification breaks down, and they do not think logically, as ordinary people do. I am not

labouring the point, because this only happened once in all the times that I saw him, but it may have been significant here, because both the advocate and one of the psychiatrist's names were Cooper, that he seemed to be confused as to the function of the psychiatrist, Dr. Cooper. To come back to the autism which this had to do with: Here is a man who is on trial for murder, a man who has been seen by his defence attorneys, his advocates, by several doctors. We all asked him how he came to murder the late Prime Minister, what he felt about it. We have all taken pains to, I think, exclude malingering or simulation. And yet, after three joint interviews and several individual interviews, we arrive at the fact that we are interested doctors who are interested in helping him about his tapeworm and are listening to him talk about his tapeworm. He didn't seem able to connect our presence there with our functions at all.

JUDGE BEYERS: You say you have dealt with other people under similar circumstances, people referred to you, who are up for trial for murder?

DR. ZABOW: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: Do you feel that even the intellectually much more ordinary man we usually get on murder would by that time have known exactly what you were there for?

DR. ZABOW: In my experience, which includes both at Valkenberg and in private practice, I have at no time, in any racial group, or even having to use an interpreter, had any difficulty in directly engaging the accused in discussion about the crime, the circumstances of the crime, and I have never found any one of these people to be unaware of what my function was. In fact, if anything at all, they were only too pleased that I was there and could try and put something across to them.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was Tsafendas grateful? Did he express his gratitude for the attention that you and the other two doctors had given him?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. This was another aspect of it. He expressed his gratitude to the three of us for taking so much notice of his tapeworm, because, as has been said in Court before, no-one really paid attention to him. He complained about it, he was sent off to psychiatrists, they gave him shock treatment. No-one had ever patiently sat and listened to his tale of woe about the tapeworm, which, I must add, I haven't burdened you with the details of everything he said about it, but he gave me chapter and verse about visiting the chemist in Lourenço Marques anything on a pail of water. It was all there, as it has come up repeatedly.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What did he call it, the tapeworm?

DR. ZABOW: At various times he called it - in my presence, apart from what has been said in other people's presence - a tapeworm, a demon and a devil. In fact, I asked him whether by demon he actually meant anything supernatural, and he explained to me that what he meant was that as in the Middle Ages, when someone was possessed by something which influenced his life, so he felt himself to be possessed by this demon.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you consider whether this was merely hypochondriacal, this talk about the demon and about the tapeworm?

DR. ZABOW: I considered it, but not for very long, because it was so patently not a neurotic hypochondriasis. It was a delusion of much greater proportion. It was part of a psychotic illness, and it just did not have the characteristics of what we normally understand by hypochondriasis.

COMMENTS ON DR. ZABOW'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE TAPEWORM

The issue of the tapeworm has been examined in Dr. Cooper's and Patrick O'Ryan's testimonies, so it will not be examined again here. However, we will examine Tsafendas's statement to Dr. Zabow that the tapeworm often made him "behave in embarrassing ways."

The author read those parts of the above testimony where Dr. Zabow recited Tsafendas's words to him to twenty people who knew Tsafendas very well and to another ten who were with him for forty-two consecutive days up to three days before the assassination. Most of them laughed in derision and all said they could not believe that Tsafendas had spoken that way. They said they were sure that Tsafendas talked in such a fashion deliberately in hopes of being found insane. Every one said he never spoke like that and would never have done so in normal circumstances. The question of Tsafendas's talking in such a way has been discussed earlier and witnesses' detailed comments have been included in Chapter Four as well as earlier in this Chapter, in Dr. Cooper's testimony. Therefore, the author will list here only the names of those who were read these extracts and made the comments set out above:

- Katerina Pnema, his half-sister.⁵⁵³⁶

⁵⁵³⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

- Father Minas Constandinou who knew him since 1963 and visited him in Pretoria Central Prison and later in the prison's hospital and in Sterkfontein Hospital.⁵⁵³⁷
- Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis who visited him in Pretoria Prison hospital and in Sterkfontein Hospital.⁵⁵³⁸
- Father Michalis Visvinis who visited him very regularly for five years (1989-1994) in Pretoria Central Prison and in Zonderwater prison.⁵⁵³⁹
- Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas's first cousin, knew him since he was five years old and grew up with him in Mozambique. She spent a lot of time with him in Pretoria in 1964, when they occupied the same house for two or three months.⁵⁵⁴⁰
- Father Nikola Banovic, in 1961, lived in the same house as Tsafendas for four months and in a house next door for another two or three months.⁵⁵⁴¹
- Fotini Gavasiadis who spent every day for nine months with him.⁵⁵⁴²
- Ira Kyriakakis, who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and remained a lifelong friend.⁵⁵⁴³
- Reuben O'Ryan lived with Tsafendas in the same house for five months and kept in touch with him for another year.⁵⁵⁴⁴
- Costas Poriassis who met him in 1965 in Beira.⁵⁵⁴⁵
- Antony Michaletos
- Irene Michaletos was very close to Tsafendas between 1964 and 1965.⁵⁵⁴⁶
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins and sons of Artemis Michaletos, Tsafendas's aunt and his father's sister who brought him up in Egypt. They first met Tsafendas in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in

⁵⁵³⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁵³⁸ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁵⁵³⁹ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁵⁵⁴⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵⁵⁴¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁵⁴² Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵⁵⁴³ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵⁵⁴⁴ Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁵⁵⁴⁵ Costas Poriassis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁵⁵⁴⁶ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

Mozambique.⁵⁵⁴⁷

- Alexander Moumbaris who spent three months in a cell next to Tsafendas's in Pretoria Prison. They spoke every day for an hour when they exercised together in the prison yard.⁵⁵⁴⁸
- Andreas Babiolakis knew Tsafendas since they were children and had lived in the same house as him in Beira for about two-three months.⁵⁵⁴⁹
- Nick Papadakis, who knew Tsafendas for two-three months and lived with him for two months in Mozambique in 1964,⁵⁵⁵⁰
- Costas Chagios, a Cape Town café owner, who knew Tsafendas for about two years.⁵⁵⁵¹
- Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for about six-seven months in Istanbul in 1961.⁵⁵⁵²
- Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town when they both had their meals at Mary Scott's boarding house and saw him daily until his arrest.⁵⁵⁵³
- Helen Grispos was another who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques, and her mother was the best friend of Tsafendas's step-mother.⁵⁵⁵⁴
- Ten of the sailors of the *Eleni* saw Tsafendas every day for forty-two days and up to three days before the assassination.⁵⁵⁵⁵

Dr. Zabow stated that Tsafendas appeared unable to understand why all the psychiatrists were there and that he thought that they were just trying to help him with the tapeworm. How did he come to this conclusion? Because Tsafendas told him so and Dr. Zabow, just like the other psychiatrists, took it at face value. However, Tsafendas was

⁵⁵⁴⁷ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵⁵⁴⁸ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

⁵⁵⁴⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁵⁵⁵⁰ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵⁵⁵¹ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015.

⁵⁵⁵² Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁵⁵⁵³ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁵⁵⁵⁴ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁵⁵⁵⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 19 January 2016; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

perfectly able to understand what was happening when he was questioned by the police, where twice he stated clearly why and how he killed Dr. Verwoerd. He was also perfectly able to understand and described what happened even thirty years later. Then suddenly, he is lost and unable to understand what is happening. It is obvious that Tsafendas is lying to Dr. Zabow.

Tsafendas told the police that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was “disgusted with his racial policies,” because he was not the real representative of ALL the South African people and because he hoped that a change of policy would take place after his death. He said exactly the same things to at least five witnesses after the assassination (Fathers Ioannis, Minas, Spiros, Alexander Moumbaris, Liza Key), while he was in the prison and later in the hospital.⁵⁵⁵⁶ The only people that Tsafendas spoke to in an insane way about the assassination were the psychiatrists, his lawyers and the prison authorities.

If Tsafendas was insane at the time of the assassination and when he was examined by the psychiatrists, his situation should have deteriorated while he was in prison. He was denied medication and for at least thirteen years was brutally and systematically tortured. However, in prison and later in the hospital, Tsafendas did not speak the way he did to Dr. Zabow and the other psychiatrists to those he knew and trusted. On the contrary, he gave these people, the same reasons he gave to the police about the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd and even went further, discussing details which he had not revealed to the police. According to Professor of Forensic Psychiatry Tuviah Zabow, if Tsafendas was really a schizophrenic, it would not have been possible for him to recover without receiving medical treatment, especially because of torture and harsh treatment he revived in prison.⁵⁵⁵⁷

None of the about two-hundred witnesses who were interviewed by the police and the Commission and a further forty-four who were interviewed by the author said that Tsafendas behaved in “embarrassing ways.” They stated that he was perfectly fine and behaved normally. We will not list all the witnesses who testified to that, plus the cases of Barbeau, Martincich and Johnston, as they have been covered in detail in Dr. Cooper’s testimony. Many that the author spoke to had spent a lot of time with Tsafendas and knew him since he was a child, such as his half-sister Katerina Pnema, his cousin Mary Eendracht, Andreas

⁵⁵⁵⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Liza Key in a personal interview, 6 April 2015; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁵⁵⁵⁷ Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016.

Babiolakis, Ira Kyriakakis and Helen Grispos. All grew up with Tsafendas and none remembers Tsafendas doing anything embarrassing or abnormal. They insist that he always behaved like a normal man.⁵⁵⁵⁸

His half-sister Pnema, considered some of his behaviour to be an embarrassment, but this was not necessarily how it would be perceived by people who were perhaps less conventional or conservative. For example, her half-brother tried to organize a strike by workers at the dock where he was employed. What was embarrassing was that Katerina and her husband had asked the owner to give Tsafendas a job there. She considered embarrassing the fact that when he was refused entry to Lourenço Marques, Tsafendas pretended to be suffering from appendicitis, was taken ashore to a hospital and then fled. She was embarrassed that Tsafendas denounced as fascists some guests at her sister's wedding in 1941 although they were indeed Nazi supporters. That Tsafendas often argued loudly about politics and was a self-proclaimed Communist and radical who opposed apartheid and the Portuguese colonialists was embarrassing for her. As were his frequent denunciations of Greeks and whites who supported apartheid, and whites in Rhodesia and the Portuguese in Mozambique he called "foreigners who had stolen the land." Those were the embarrassing incidents that Pnema could recall. "Apart from this, his behaviour was perfectly normal," she said. "He was a normal and intelligent man. You could tell he was intelligent after a five-minute conversation with him. He was the cleverest of us all. He got the brain from my dad."⁵⁵⁵⁹

People like Fotini Gavasiadis, Father Nikola Banovic, Alexandra Vaporidis, Andreas Babiolakis, Nick Papadakis, Costas Chagios, Reuben O'Ryan, Joyce Dick, Stanley O'Ryan, Pamela Abrahams, Elias Constantaras, Irene, Costas and Antony Michaletos, and Panagiotis Peroglou, all of whom knew Tsafendas for more than a year, do not recall any embarrassing behaviour by Tsafendas; on the contrary, all say his behaviour was always perfectly normal. The other witnesses interviewed by the author, although they did not spend as much time with Tsafendas, also cannot recall any embarrassing incident caused by him and they all maintained that Tsafendas was well-behaved and never did anything in the slightest embarrassing.

Finally, Dr. Zabow testified that at one point, while Tsafendas was talking about

⁵⁵⁵⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁵⁵⁹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

David Bloomberg's role, Tsafendas started laughing. Tsafendas later said that he often wanted to laugh, over what he heard about himself in court and over the things he told the doctors.⁵⁵⁶⁰ He said he had to try very hard to be calm while he was talking "like this," i.e. insanely, and not to laugh. Presumably on this occasion, he failed to control his amusement.

COMMENTS CONCERNING THE WAY TSAFENDAS SPOKE TO DR. ZABOW

The author read the transcript of Tsafendas's interview by Dr. Zabow, as read in the court, to forty-four people who knew Tsafendas. None of them recognised Tsafendas as talking in such a fashion; they said if he did, or pretended to do so, then he did it for a purpose. All declared that Tsafendas talked perfectly clearly and everything he said always made sense. The comments of the witnesses this time were less detailed since they had already listened to what Tsafendas told Dr. Cooper and Dr. Sakinofsky. Therefore, to avoid repetition, the author will only state the names of thirteen witnesses who knew Tsafendas extremely well. All strongly denied that Tsafendas could have said all this. They were: Fotini Gavasiadis, Katerina Pnema, Mary Eendracht, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis, Costas Chagios, Andreas Babiolakis, Alexandra Vaporidis, Father Michalis Visvinis, Antony, Irene and John Michaletos, Nick Papadakis, Reuben O'Ryan and Elias Constantaras.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TAPEWORM DELUSION

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the significance of a delusion?

DR. ZABOW: The significance of a delusion is that it is a symptom. It is not an illness in itself. It is a symptom of a disordered state of mind, a breakdown in functionings of the mind, which in all of us correlates our input of information, our memory, our processes of logical thinking; co-ordinate this with our emotional life,. When a man has a delusion of this nature, when he experiences feelings of passivity to do with this delusion, one cannot say that he is functioning in the ordinary way. He is not able to use logical thought processes, because his whole associational processes in his mind have broken down. I think this is particularly important, that the delusion is a symptom of mental illness. It is not in itself a disease. It is a symptom of a severe mental illness. If I may draw once again a physical analogy, it may help.

⁵⁵⁶⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

One can be breathless for a number of reasons. One can be breathless because of unaccustomed exertion, or one can be breathless because of severe heart disease. Breathlessness in itself is a symptom. The severe heart disease is a serious condition. A delusion of this variety - chronic, over 20 years - sorry: the delusion itself I know of for not 20 years. I am sorry. Mental disorder for 20 years. I think the delusion was first mentioned out 1959, that I can remember for the moment, but that is already six years. Feeling of passivity. These are more than just isolated things. This is a general mental disease, in which all the functions of the mind become affected, so that one cannot expect a man with this sort of illness to exercise judgment, to be able to weigh up issues, to attach the correct amount of importance to particular things which are happening to him and around him.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: If the evidence is that he had this delusion in 1955, then it is a long-standing delusion?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. It is a long-standing delusion. It is in many ways just more evidence of what I have just said.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In relation to the charge against the accused, what role did this delusion play?

DR. ZABOW: From my interviews I tried to ascertain just how the delusion fitted in to the murder. It was extremely difficult to get a clear-cut account, in the sense that I don't think that there is a clear-cut account; I don't think that this man is able for himself to know what precisely happened. One went so far as to say: "Look, did the tapeworm tell you to commit the crime?" He says no. And he says that if he was not infested with a tapeworm he would not have committed the crime. Then, in another sequence, he talked about the tapeworm being right in the middle of it.

JUDGE BEYERS: That is a phrase Dr. Cooper used, I remember?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, this was at a joint interview. "Right in the middle of it." So that rather than say that the delusion caused the crime, the way that I understand schizophrenia I would say that the delusion is part of the mental illness. The crime is a result, in my opinion, of the mental illness. Rather than to say that the delusion caused the crime.

JUDGE BEYERS: I follow. You could get delusions which are far more closely associated with murder than this delusion?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, in the classical paranoid ...

JUDGE BEYERS: It could be linked to the object that you are killing?

DR. ZABOW: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: You didn't get this sort of direct, that the late Prime Minister and this animal or creature he describes were at one stage delusionally the same?

DR. ZABOW: No. In fact, we actually put it the other way and asked him if he felt that the late Prime Minister was responsible for his infestation,

JUDGE BEYERS: But you could get a delusion which is strong enough to that a man is killing another human being and thinks it is a dog?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. Even there, there is usually other evidence of mental disorder, but certainly the paranoid delusion may appear to be more directly related to the crime than in this instance.

JUDGE BEYERS: I follow you entirely.

COMMENTS ON THE TAPEWORM'S SIGNIFICANCE ACCORDING TO DR. ZABOW

According to Dr. Zabow, Tsafendas was unable to exercise judgment and assess what was happening to him and around him. However, Tsafendas's life proves the exact opposite:

- Tsafendas seemed to be perfectly aware in 1947/1948 of the creation of Israel and donated money and even sold his clothes to a fundraiser to support the event.⁵⁵⁶¹
- In Istanbul during the second half of 1961, he volunteered to teach English to poor Greek and Turkish children. At the same time, he managed to get a full-time job as a teacher of English at the best private language college in Istanbul. He stayed for nearly six months before resigning to move on.⁵⁵⁶²
- Tsafendas was penniless when he arrived in Istanbul in June 1961. He went to a hospital and donated his blood to earn some money in order to survive.⁵⁵⁶³

⁵⁵⁶¹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 April 2015.

⁵⁵⁶² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA;

⁵⁵⁶³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

- In 1964 in Mozambique, he became aware of that a colleague was in difficulty and worked voluntarily with him to build an extra room on his house so the man's daughter could get married.⁵⁵⁶⁴
- In the 1930s and in 1964, also in Mozambique, Tsafendas taught English and History to poor children believing that education was the most important tool in someone's life.⁵⁵⁶⁵
- In 1964 in Durban, he was very well aware of the difficulties faced by some poor White people and frequently gave them money.⁵⁵⁶⁶
- In 1965, for the five months he lived with Patrick O'Ryan, he frequently bought food for everyone, knowing the family was poor. When O'Ryan complained that this embarrassed him because he was the head of the house, Tsafendas told the children that it was their father who was buying the food.⁵⁵⁶⁷
- He also seemed to be perfectly aware of what he needed to say when applying for employment or for the permanent residency permit where he simply lied about his past, saying he had never been hospitalised, arrested or imprisoned. In November 1963, he managed to hide his past from three officials of the Ministry of the Interior who interviewed him for his permanent residency application.⁵⁵⁶⁸
- Tsafendas seemed to be perfectly aware of the politics in Mozambique and the situation with the Portuguese. From Britain he smuggled anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid books in order to conduct propaganda for the independence of Mozambique. Although he was arrested twice accused of conducting subversive propaganda, he avoided a lengthy prison term by putting on one of his mad acts, in this case pretending to be Saint Peter. Before that, he had the courage to tell his Portuguese interrogators that he wanted to see "a Mozambique governed by the natives of that

⁵⁵⁶⁴ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵⁵⁶⁵ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 April 2015; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁵⁶⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.'

⁵⁵⁶⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁵⁵⁶⁸ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie.NASA.

Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the mother nation.”⁵⁵⁶⁹

- Tsafendas also appeared perfectly aware of the situation in South Africa and the importance of Dr. Verwoerd, whom he believed was the “brains behind apartheid,” which is why he decided to kill him, believing that “a change of policy would take place” or at least it would be a stepping stone towards the fall of apartheid.⁵⁵⁷⁰

The author could include other incidents that disprove Dr. Zabow's testimony, but they are clearly set out in Tsafendas's biography. Finally, Tsafendas again denied that the tapeworm told him to kill Dr. Verwoerd, although he says that the tapeworm was in the middle of it. This matter has been examined in detail in Dr. Cooper's testimony. However, we will state again that what Tsafendas told the police concerning his motive and his beliefs about Dr. Verwoerd are entirely compatible with what he told several witnesses before and after the assassination. On the other hand, what he told Dr. Zabow is the opposite of what he told the witnesses and compatible only with what he told his psychiatrists and lawyers.

TSAFENDAS: “NOT WRONG FOR ME TO KILL DR. VERWOERD”

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Does he feel that it would have been wrong for anybody else, for instance, to have killed the Prime Minister, or would it have been right for somebody else to have killed the Prime Minister?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. In my first interview, bearing in mind the purpose of the interview, I asked him questions which might apply to McNachten rules, and I asked him whether he knew that killing another person was wrong, and he qualified it and said yes, in peace time it is wrong. Then I said “it wasn't it wrong of you to kill the late Prime Minister?”, and then he said: “No, for me it wasn't wrong. For anyone else it would have been wrong. For me it wasn't wrong.” I must put this in its context. This was all part of the conversation, trying to sort out whether there was a political motive, whether this man was able to form - whether he was in fact psychotic - and it was in the process of asking him these questions. This transcript came out very badly, and I am going to refer to my own written notes.

JUDGE BEYERS: You are looking for something to show why it would have been wrong

⁵⁵⁶⁹ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁵⁷⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

for somebody else to do it but not him?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. I just want to put that in the actual context. (Witness looks at his notes.)

DEFENCE COUNSEL: We might come back to it at a later stage.

JUDGE BEYERS: It is rather an important one, Mr. Cooper. You don't remember his answers?

DR. ZABOW: I am just trying to put it in the context. As I said, he said "For me it wasn't wrong", but I just want to put it into the context. It was the natural outcome of all these things put together", his tapeworm, his mental illnesses in the hospital where one of the nurses had told him that he had schizophrenia. We had been talking about his previous psychiatric history. "It was the natural outcome of all these things put together. This was not something that was done in a day. It took many years for all the build-up to get to the stage where I got to murder Dr. Verwoerd. It was not wrong in my eyes, what I was doing. When I did it I wasn't one of the public. I was my individual self." And then he went still, paused, and then I asked him: "Now, do you know that you can hang for murdering someone?", and he said: "I can't pronounce myself on how I feel" - but, my Lord, not as clearly as I have said it to you. This was a series of "ers" and disjointed thoughts, but one had the feeling all the time that he could not give - and repeatedly one tried at subsequent interviews and during that interview to get him to give a clear account of what happened, why it happened and how it happened, and t no time could he follow this logical pattern. It always tied up with not being well, being physically ill, mentally ill, the influence of the tapeworm, always tired, not being able to work, and so on. This was the context of the interview.

COMMENTS CONCERNING TSAFENDAS'S CLAIM THAT IT WAS NOT WRONG FOR HIM TO KILL DR. VERWOERD

With regard to the assassination, Tsafendas was unable to give Dr. Zabow a clear account of what happened, why it happened or how it happened. However, he gave a perfectly clear account of his motivation and how he planned and killed Dr. Verwoerd in both of his statements to the police. In nether statement did he say anything that bore the slightest resemblance to what he told Dr. Zabow. In addition, what Tsafendas told the police is exactly

what he told several witnesses after the assassination.⁵⁵⁷¹ Nothing that he told Dr. Zabow bore even the slightest similarity to what he told the police or the other witnesses later.

As we have seen, Tsafendas also gave the police and later witnesses clear political reasons for killing Dr. Verwoerd. He even characterised Dr. Verwoerd's possible assassination as justifiable even before it happened, on the basis that it was morally acceptable to slay a tyrant and a dictator, an action that is known as "tyrannicide." He repeated the same argument to several witnesses after the assassination. The issue of Tsafendas's motive and how he killed Dr. Verwoerd have been extensively discussed with the testimonies of Dr. Cooper and Dr. Sakinofsky. The fact that Tsafendas gave a completely different account of the assassination is not questioned in court by the Attorney-General.

DISCUSSING TSAFENDAS'S MEDICAL HISTORY WITH HIM

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Are there any other factors which you feel - before we come to our assessment - are important and which weighed with you - that is, just from your interviews with the accused?

DR. ZABOW: From my interviews?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: From the interviews, yes.

DR. ZABOW: I think I have covered behaviour, thought disorder, delusions, feelings of passivity, autism. His own account of his life and his own account of his psychiatric and medical history obviously helped me to come to an assessment. Here was a man who told me how he had been in various hospitals in various parts of the world. He described having had shock treatment. He described having escaped from, I think, at least one hospital. He described having been told at one stage that he had schizophrenia. And, once again to draw an analogy between physical and psychiatric medicine, one is most concerned with the history of the patient and his illness in order to assess the degree of illness and the prognosis of the illness.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: One factor which you can help the Court on is the accused's emotional level?

⁵⁵⁷¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

DR. ZABOW: The accused's emotional level I found to be rather blunt at most points. He displayed very little - in fact, I must say to me he displayed no anxiety when I spoke to him. He did not seem overly concerned with his predicament, but only with himself and his difficult sensations and his discomfort, but not with his situation.

JUDGE BEYERS: Mr. Cooper, I have had quite a lot of this now, and I will take some more if you wish to feed it to me. I am interested in the work that has been done, but don't you think that you are overburdening the Court with details?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: My Lord, my difficulty is

JUDGE BEYERS: I know your difficulty, and you must appreciate mine and I cannot at this stage tell you that you are doing so. I just want you to consider whether you aren't perhaps giving us a bit of indigestion.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: My difficulty is that it has not been put crisply to any of my experts what the State says.

JUDGE BEYERS: I agree with you. I have been looking for that myself. I agree with you. It hasn't been put.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Therefore I can't take anything for granted.

JUDGE BEYERS: No, of course not. I can't tell you to take anything for granted, but I want you to be intelligent too.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: They say a nod is as good as a wink.

JUDGE BEYERS: I want a conclusion to this, and I think the details we have had quite long.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: May I just put the position? I will try to curtail my examination now, but naturally, should something arise in the State's.

JUDGE BEYERS: If you ask me to call Dr. Zabow back, I undertake to say "Yes." Just shortly, did you find thought blocking?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, there were times when I found thought blocking, when he would, in fact, be talking about one thing, there would be a pause and he could not continue talking about it at all. I actually asked him at the first interview whether he had any of the other disturbances of thought in the past. I asked him had he ever felt himself flooded with thoughts, or his thoughts suddenly cutting out, and he told me that at times this had happened. Once again, an

important aspect of schizophrenic thought disorder.

COMMENTS ON DR. ZABOW DISCUSSING TSAFENDAS'S MEDICAL HISTORY WITH HIM

Dr. Zabow states here that he came to the conclusion that Tsafendas was schizophrenic also by taking into account Tsafendas's medical history as it was described to him by the accused himself; he accepted without question an alleged schizophrenic's own account of his medical history. It seems though that Tsafendas told Dr. Zabow only parts of his medical history, omitting his hospitalization in Beira, where he was also diagnosed as schizophrenic after he claimed to be Saint Peter, and that he was caught out faking mental illness in the USA.

The author is not in position to know for certain if Tsafendas mentioned these incidents, but given that Dr. Zabow did not refer to it, we could assume that Tsafendas omitted them. Why would Tsafendas do that? Presumably because as an experienced "schizophrenic," he was aware that it would raise suspicion if it was found out that just about two years before the assassination, Tsafendas also believed himself to be Saint Peter. Presumably, Tsafendas also failed to mention that he was medically examined at least ten times the past two and half years and none of the doctors who checked him spotted any of the alleged symptoms as described in the court.

It is surprising that Dr. Zabow took for granted Tsafendas's own account of his medical history and did not seek to double-check it. Professor Kirk Heilbrun disagrees with the method used by Dr. Zabow to diagnose Tsafendas and the fact that he relied on what his patient told him. He told the author that if he was in his position he "would have sought information from the second and third domains [collateral interviews with people who knew Tsafendas and his medical and criminal record] rather than additional information from the first domain." He added he did not believe it possible to make an accurate diagnosis about a patient, especially in a forensic case, after observing him for only three one-and-a-half-hour sessions.⁵⁵⁷²

Dr. Zabow mentions again that Tsafendas suffered from thought disorder and had admitted to him that this was something that had happened in the past, too. However, none of the forty-four witnesses who were interviewed by the author and who knew Tsafendas noticed anything like that about him and that it never happened while they were present.

⁵⁵⁷² Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017.

Since we have discussed the issue before, for more about it see Dr. Cooper's and Dr. Sakinofsky's testimonies. Tsafendas himself never mentioned anything resembling thought disorder to people who knew him nor to any of the nine doctors who examined him while he was in South Africa for jobs or permanent residency applications. As for the issue of Tsafendas not being concerned about his fate, this is something that we have discussed extensively in the testimonies of Dr. Cooper and Mr. van Zyl.

DR. ZABOW'S CONCLUSIONS REGARDING TSAFENDAS

JUDGE BEYERS: As a result of these investigations you carried out, are you quite satisfied that the accused is a schizophrenic?

DR. ZABOW: I am absolutely satisfied that the accused is a schizophrenic.

JUDGE BEYERS: The degree? Would you say he was a certifiable schizophrenic?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, I would. Would you like me to say why?

JUDGE BEYERS: Yes, I would?

DR. ZABOW: First of all, I diagnosed.....

JUDGE BEYERS: I will put my question differently. Are you satisfied, as a result of your investigations, that he is mentally disordered for the purposes of Section 2 of the Mental Disorders Act?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. I am satisfied that he suffers from a mental disorder, that he is unable to care for himself, that he needs control and treatment. That he is a danger to himself, I am not sure of, but to others. But I would put him mentally disordered in terms of the Act, that he falls into the first sub-group of mental disorder.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: And where should he be kept?

DR. ZABOW: He should be kept in a suitable institution where he could be adequately controlled and even at this late stage of his illness I feel that he should get treatment for whatever worth that may be.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the prognosis?

DR. ZABOW: Unfortunately, for recovery, the prognosis is poor. For a reasonable degree of control under supervision, there may be, but for recovery after a 20-year history of

schizophrenia, I would be most surprised - having taken into account his mental state as I have seen it and having heard facts presented in this Court - to hear that he would ever recover completely. I would always regard him as being a chronic psychotic, a chronic schizophrenic.

JUDGE BEYERS: You use the word 'chronic' - it has been used several times. What exactly does chronic mean in that context?

DR. ZABOW: In that context I only mean a schizophrenic who has had the illness for a long time and that the illness has been present during the time that he has had it. There has been no total remission.

JUDGE BEYERS: There must be many people walking around who have in some degree certain elements of schizophrenic conditions - I am not sure we haven't all got bits and pieces of it - but there must be lots of people that have them?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, not all schizophrenics are in mental hospitals, if that is what you mean.

JUDGE BEYERS: Yes. Would you suggest that all schizophrenics should be in mental hospitals?

DR. ZABOW: No, I would not suggest that all schizophrenics should be in mental hospitals.

JUDGE BEYERS: This becomes a matter of degree?

DR. ZABOW: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: In this man's case is the degree such that you think he should be?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, I think - and I would like to stress this - that presuming he presented at an out-patients' or clinic which I were doing, and he had not been accused of murder (because I don't want the Court to feel that I am basing this on the murder) I would take the history with the mental examination - I don't say that I would straightaway certify him and put him into a mental hospital, but I would certainly institute treatment. I would want to know his social background, I would want to know whether he is able to live adequately on his own, earn a living and hold down a job adequately; in other words, whether he can look after himself, or not. I might, if I felt it indicated, ask a social worker or the Community Nurse to call at the places where he lived and find out what sort of person he is, how he relates to the people around him. This is where I would, if possible - and I don't guarantee that I would be right - try and assess whether he is, in fact, a danger to himself or to the community. Then,

eventually, I would have to come to a decision after a period of investigation and possibly out-patient treatment, as to whether to hospitalize him, or not. So that it would be an overall investigation. On the evidence presented to this Court - and I sat in the Court since the proceedings started - I think that I have found out very much what the social worker and the Community Nurse would have found out, and that was that he can't hold down a job, that he is a drifter and that he certainly needs, at least, treatment and possibly control.

ASSESSOR: The evidence led from Mr. Daniels and his wife and the witnesses that followed, the people with whom he lived, rather confirms your diagnosis?

DR. ZABOW: Yes. I was particularly struck by the description of this man; the way he walked in with this parcel of meat, with the blood dripping down him, and was only pre-occupied in feeding the worm. Everything else went by the board. Now, one may say that a navy-type, a labourer, an uncouth person might behave in such a way. But then we must take the overall picture into account; remember, this is a man of intelligence; this is not an unintelligent, feeble-minded person; so that it would add weight to the fact that he is not able to live, what we would call I suppose, a normal sort of life.

JUDGE BEYERS: I think we are approaching this wrongly. In answering the question whether you would certify him, I was concerned with this man's mental condition today. I am not concerned with his mental condition at the time when he committed the murder. I am concerned with his mental condition today. So in telling me whether today this man is a person who falls within the definition of the Mental Disorders Act, you must not disregard the murder, you must take it into account. The murder is probably one of the most important factors that you should take into account in expressing an opinion?

DR. ZABOW: With respect, I misunderstood the emphasis of your question. Certainly, up till the last time that I interviewed the accused - that was on the 14th of the month - I felt him at that time to be mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act, and certifiable. I am sorry, I used the word 'murder.' It is the killing. To be precise, on the 11th October, when I last examined this man psychiatrically I regarded him as being mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act, and I would have no hesitation in signing a Mental S.2 to support that opinion.

JUDGE BEYERS: You'd sign it today?

DR. ZABOW: Up to yesterday. In terms of the Act I must have examined him within seven days.

JUDGE BEYERS: If I asked you yesterday or the day before?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, I would

JUDGE BEYERS: You would have no hesitation?

DR. ZABOW: In completing a Mental S.2 as a specialist psychiatrist.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You have seen this letter, Exhibit E?

DR. ZABOW: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: I don't want to deal with it at all but what is your comment on that letter?

DR. ZABOW: My comment on this letter is that it shows schizophrenic thought disorder and is the sort of letter which could well be used in a text book of psychiatry to illustrate schizophrenic thinking.

COMMENTS ON DR. ZABOW'S CONCLUSIONS REGARDING TSAFENDAS

Dr. Zabow's conclusions about Tsafendas show more clearly than anywhere else how wrong he was in his diagnosis of Tsafendas.

TSAFENDAS BEING UNABLE TO CARE FOR HIMSELF AND NEEDING CONTROL AND TREATMENT

Several of the diagnoses of Tsafendas have been off the mark in this summary trial, such as Dr. Cooper's that Tsafendas is unable to function on a reasonable level, and this is equal to it. If Tsafendas was unable to care for himself, how did he manage to survive the forty-eight previous years of his life? A man who, although penniless most of the time, managed to travel to sixteen countries where he knew no-one yet never spent an evening without a bed. A stranger in all these countries, he always managed to find a job and sometimes he even thrived, as he did in Istanbul, where he worked for almost half a year at the Limasollu Naci College.

Tsafendas always seemed to find a way of achieving his goals. During the Greek Civil War, he managed to join the Democratic Army of Greece, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party, and he survived. Arrested five times by the Portuguese police because of his political ideas and political activities, he managed to secure his release each time. Banned from entering Mozambique due to his anti-colonialist beliefs and activities, he convinced the

Portuguese that he was harmlessly mad so they allowed him to return. Tsafendas attended several job interviews and no one noticed anything wrong with him, and that included three officials at the Ministry of the Interior who interviewed him three times over his application for permanent residency in South Africa. PIDE would not have held a detailed 130-pages file on Tsafendas and withheld from South Africa information on his political activities if he was a man who was not able to look after himself.

The author asked forty-four relatives, friends and acquaintances if they ever got the impression Tsafendas was not able to care for himself. Not a single one agreed. Again, we list opinions by those who knew him well:

- Fotini Gavasiadis, who was with Tsafendas every day for nine months in 1963-1964, was shocked and asked, “Are you serious? Are you sure the doctor said this about Dimitri? He must have examined a different man.”⁵⁵⁷³
- Mary Eendracht, his cousin who grew up with him in Egypt and Mozambique, characterised the comment as “ludicrous” and “for laughs.”⁵⁵⁷⁴

The following are some incidents and statements which are indicative of Tsafendas's character and ability to care for himself:

- Reuben O’Ryan, Patrick’s son: “We all loved him ... he was an adorable man ... he was the answer to our prayers. We were poor and he brought food to our house.”⁵⁵⁷⁵
- Peter Pappas, owner of a Greek café in Durban, said when Tsafendas had some money he would give “a few cents to the white down-and-outs of the city.” Pappas said, “When his luck was out, I sometimes gave him a free meal, but when he started work he paid me.”⁵⁵⁷⁶ These are hardly the things that someone who is unable to look after himself would do.
- Jacobus Bornman was Tsafendas’s flatmate. When he was broke, Tsafendas lent him five cents and when Bornman tried to return the money, Tsafendas refused to take it back.⁵⁵⁷⁷
- On January 25, 1965, Tsafendas was released after three months’ imprisonment in Beira

⁵⁵⁷³ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 18 March 2016.

⁵⁵⁷⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 18 March 2016.

⁵⁵⁷⁵ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁵⁵⁷⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁵⁵⁷⁷ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

for subversive propaganda. Penniless as without a roof over his head, Tsafendas asked if he could sleep at the Beira fire department premises and the fire-fighters agreed. He slept there for ten nights, making sure that “he arrived at mealtimes, when he was invited to share in the food.”⁵⁵⁷⁸

- Tsafendas was penniless when he arrived in Istanbul in June 1961. He went to a hospital and donated his blood to earn money for food and bed.⁵⁵⁷⁹
- When he was arrested in Beira by the Portuguese police with a suitcase full of anti-fascist and anti-colonialist books, but also some Bibles, he was accused of pretending to be a missionary spreading the word about religion, while in reality preaching “under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”⁵⁵⁸⁰ Questioned in custody, Tsafendas came up with the idea of pretending to be Saint Peter, which fitted perfectly with his story of Christian missionary preaching. The Portuguese thought he was mad and released him.⁵⁵⁸¹
- When he was ordered to fulfil his duty of compulsory military service in the Portuguese army, he pretended to be mad and got away with it.⁵⁵⁸²
- In 1964 in Beira, John Emmanuel Marvis lent him twenty escudos, which Tsafendas paid back a few days later.⁵⁵⁸³
- In 1963, he managed to convince the Portuguese that he was a “reformed man,” no longer a Communist or a supporter of the independence of Mozambique, but just a little bit mad and harmless, so they granted him amnesty and allowed him to return to Mozambique

⁵⁵⁷⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁵⁵⁷⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁵⁸⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁵⁸¹ Alberto Henriques de Matos Rodrigues conclusion to the Subdirector, 23 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Conclusion, signed by António Fernandes Vaz, 22 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁵⁸² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁵⁵⁸³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

after twelve years of exile.⁵⁵⁸⁴

I could go on listing evidence to prove how wrong Dr. Zabow's testimony was, but I feel that this particular statement is best disproven by reading Tsafendas's biography in Chapter Two, everything else that has been discussed in this chapter and more importantly all the statements of the people who knew Tsafendas. For more about Tsafendas's ability to care for himself see his biography (Chapter Two).

TSAFENDAS BEING UNABLE TO LIVE ADEQUATELY ON HIS OWN

Interestingly, Dr. Zabow stated that he would like to have known Tsafendas's social background, whether he was able to live adequately on his own and how he related to the people around him. This could easily have been discovered if Dr. Zabow had spoken to people who knew Tsafendas, or easier, if he had read any of the one hundred and fifty statements that the police took from people who knew him. He would have seen that Tsafendas was more than able to live on his own, as he did for two years in Mozambique (1937-1939), two years in Greece (1947-1949), three years in Portugal (1955-1958), nine months in Pretoria in 1963-1964, three-four months in Beira in 1964, three-four months in Istanbul in 1961.

According to Mary Eendracht and Fotini Gavasiadis, Tsafendas was perfectly fine living on his own in Pretoria in 1963-1964 for eight months. Both were surprised by Dr. Zabow's comments and believed they were completely off the mark.⁵⁵⁸⁵ According to Alexandra Vaporidis and Father Nikola Banovic, who met him in Istanbul, Tsafendas managed perfectly well living for three-four months on his own.⁵⁵⁸⁶ Andreas Babiolakis, Costas Poriadis, Nick Papadakis, Antony, Irene and John Michaletos, Marina Tsihlakis and Ira Kyriakakis, who knew Tsafendas while he lived on his own in Mozambique, both in Lourenço Marques and in Beira, stated to the author that he was perfectly competent to live

⁵⁵⁸⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁵⁸⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵⁵⁸⁶ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

alone and nobody ever thought otherwise.⁵⁵⁸⁷

Ira Kyriakakis and Andreas Babiolakis also remembered Tsafendas living in his father's house in Lourenço Marques from 1937 to 1939 on his own. They both remember him being excited at having the whole house to himself, although he often told them that he missed his family. Both said Tsafendas managed perfectly well, living his own at age nineteen. Babiolakis said Tsafendas was happy to be on his own because he was able to bring his girlfriend Stella to the house any time he wanted to. He even allowed some of his friends to take their girls to his house because they were still living with their parents.⁵⁵⁸⁸ Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, stated to the author that "if he was not capable of living on his own, my dad would have never left him on his own. Its absolute nonsense the doctor's comment."⁵⁵⁸⁹

Further proof of Tsafendas's ability to live adequately on his own comes by reading his biography. He travelled all around the world on his own, he visited countries where he was a complete stranger and still managed not only to survive, but on many occasions to live the "normal life" the doctors claimed he did not have - in Hamburg, for example, where he lived for a couple of years with his German girlfriend. Presumably Tsafendas lived on his own for two years in Greece (1947-1949) and Portugal (1951-1953, 1960-1963).

TSAFENDAS BEING A "DRIFTER"

Calling Tsafendas a "drifter" is like calling Odysseus a drifter. Tsafendas never travelled aimlessly or just for the sake of it. Wherever he went was for a purpose. Remember he was banned from South Africa and Mozambique and was prosecuted in Portugal. As result of this, he travelled either to find employment (Sweden, Germany, England), or because these countries were on the way to his destination (Syria, Lebanon, France, Spain, Denmark, Italy), or simply for a holiday (Bulgaria, Rhodesia, Greece again).

Dr. Zabow seems to be unaware that Tsafendas was forced to spend the years from

⁵⁵⁸⁷ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Marina Tsihlakis in a personal interview, 03 April 2015.

⁵⁵⁸⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁵⁵⁸⁹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

1951 to 1963 in exile, having been banned from Mozambique, the country of his birth, because of his pro-Communist and anti-colonialist activities. At the same time, he was barred from South Africa because he was a Communist “half-caste” who was suspected of being engaged in Communist propaganda when he lived in Mozambique. In the years up to 1963, Tsafendas made nine applications for permanent residence in South Africa and all were rejected; he made at least six to be allowed to return to Mozambique, all of which were turned down.

Mozambique was then a Province of Portugal and Tsafendas was officially a Portuguese citizen. However, not only was Tsafendas banned from Mozambique, he was prosecuted and imprisoned in Portugal. The authorities objected to his past political activism in Mozambique and the fact that he was a Communist who opposed the dictatorship of Premier Antonio Salazar. As for drifting around the world, Mozambique and South Africa were the only countries Tsafendas lived in prior to being banned from them, although as a child, he had also lived for a year in Egypt. While serving the Allied cause as a merchant seaman in World War Two, he was stationed in Canada and in the United States. In 1947, he was deported from America to Greece and it was then that his odyssey began. With Mozambique, Portugal and South Africa inaccessible, he tried to find a place to live.⁵⁵⁹⁰

The fact is Tsafendas was travelling because he was not allowed to live where he wished to live, in Mozambique and South Africa. “Forced globe-trotting,” he called it.⁵⁵⁹¹ If one of his visa applications had been successful, he would have gone there immediately. It is true that Tsafendas travelled much more widely than most people, but an analysis of his journeys and intentions comprehensively disproves Dr. Zabow’s characterization of Tsafendas as a “drifter.” He spent the first twenty-three years of his life in Mozambique, Egypt and South Africa. He lived in those countries because that was where his family was. From 1941 to 1947, he lived in the United States or, during the Second World War, at sea serving in American Liberty Ships. In 1947, and against his will, he was deported to Greece because of his Greek origins, although he wanted to return to Mozambique.

While in Greece, he joined the Democratic Army, the military wing of the Greek

⁵⁵⁹⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁵⁹¹ Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

Communist Party, and fought with them in the civil war. When it was obvious that the Communists had lost and the war was coming to an end, Tsafendas applied for a visa to return to South Africa. In his application he wrote, "I am here a man without a country, living in strange lands with people who have different ways of living, customs and languages."⁵⁵⁹² The application was turned down. He decided to try Mozambique, via Portugal. He managed to do this by taking ship from Greece to France, then travelling on foot to Portugal through Spain.⁵⁵⁹³

In Portugal, in November 1949, Tsafendas was arrested because the authorities had questions about his identity. It was discovered that he was indeed a Portuguese citizen, but had not served his compulsory term in the military and that he had been dismissed twice from jobs in Mozambique for Communist activities.⁵⁵⁹⁴ Tsafendas spent the next year in prison but was then released and boarded a ship to Mozambique. He arrived there in October 1951 but was refused entry because he was listed in official files as a Communist and suspected of involvement in subversive activities.⁵⁵⁹⁵ This refusal led to his next twelve years being spent in exile. In January 1952, he was back in Portugal and was arrested in Lisbon. The police discovered that he was a Communist and an avowed anti-colonialist who was under suspicion of "unclear activities" during his time in Mozambique and put him in jail again.⁵⁵⁹⁶

Upon his eventual release a few months later, with his chosen destinations South Africa and Mozambique unattainable, he decided to go to Sweden, where he had heard he could get a job as a welder. He travelled there through Denmark, and eventually got a job as a carpenter.⁵⁵⁹⁷ He did not stay in Sweden long as the weather was too cold and the money too little, so he moved to Hamburg, Germany. Tsafendas remained in Germany from early 1954 to June 1955. During his time there, he sent off applications to be allowed to return to Mozambique and to South Africa. All were rejected and in mid-1955 he returned once more

⁵⁵⁹² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 17. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁵⁹³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁵⁹⁴ PIDE Confidential Report about Demetrio Tsafendas, 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁵⁹⁵ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁵⁵⁹⁶ *Diario Popular*, 9 September 1966, 'E conhesido em Lisboa o assassino do Dr. Verwoerd.'

⁵⁵⁹⁷ Ochsensall Hospital report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub-file: 1/8. NASA.

to Portugal and spent the next three years working as a hawker in Lisbon.⁵⁵⁹⁸

Weary of constant PIDE supervision and police harassment, Tsafendas decided in 1958 to leave Portugal, and he travelled to Brussels to sell embroidery at the international exhibition, Expo 58. From there, he went back to Germany and spent the next year and a half in Frankfurt, working for one and half months at Fries and Son, six months for Anglo-American Fashions and Designers, and then another six months at a US Army printing works.⁵⁵⁹⁹ During his time in Germany, he lived on his own but had a relationship with a German girl who was a Communist.⁵⁶⁰⁰

In May 1959, Tsafendas travelled to Britain, hoping to find a job. He was refused a work permit and took “clandestine” jobs to survive.⁵⁶⁰¹ While in London, once again, he applied for permission to enter South Africa, sending a letter and an application form dated August 4, 1959 to the Union’s immigration attaché in London. A note attached to his file at the embassy stated that Tsafendas had sought permanent residence status in South Africa several times without success, that in 1941 he entered illegally and was fined; it said he had Communist leanings and had threatened to enter without permission if he was denied again. The diplomat dealing with the application wrote, “Refusal is suggested!” On September 11, 1959, “Demetrio Tsafandakis, alias Demetrio Tsafendas,” was blacklisted by the South African Department of the Interior, meaning that he could receive no passport or admission facilities without the consent of the Department’s head office.⁵⁶⁰²

In London, Tsafendas also became politically active with anti-apartheid and anti-fascist organisations. He was discovered to be in the country illegally and in December 1959, the British sent him back to Germany, where he spent the next six months working in a tractor factory in Munich.⁵⁶⁰³ In March 1960, he read about the Sharpeville massacre and decided to return to South Africa and “do something” against Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid.⁵⁶⁰⁴

⁵⁵⁹⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁵⁹⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁰⁰ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

⁵⁶⁰¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁶⁰² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraphs 28-30. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁶⁰³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁰⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

Convinced by now that he would not be allowed to enter the country legitimately, he decided on an illegal route, “through the African states south to South Africa.” The first stage took him through the Balkan States to Piraeus, Greece, then he took a ferry to Alexandria, Egypt. There his passport expired and he was unable to renew it or replace it, but with the help of the Red Cross, he managed to get to Beirut and Jerusalem.⁵⁶⁰⁵

With his Africa North-to-South plan blocked, Tsafendas decided to return to Portugal. Travelling through Lebanon and Syria by bus, he crossed the Taurus mountain range and reached Ankara, Turkey in May 1961. A month later, he arrived in Istanbul, where he worked as a teacher of English at the best private language college in Turkey at the time, the Limasollu Naci College.⁵⁶⁰⁶ In December 1961, he left to visit a former comrade from the Greek Civil War who lived in Sofia, Bulgaria. His visit lasted two weeks and then he went to Greece to spend Christmas with his good friend John Michaletos and his family.⁵⁶⁰⁷ In January 1962, he travelled to the island of Crete to meet his relatives and see where his beloved father and his hero great-grandfather were born. From Greece, he travelled to Italy, then took the train to Lisbon, where he arrived in February 1962.⁵⁶⁰⁸

Tsafendas worked as a welder in Lisbon until July 1962, when he went back to England and again participated in anti-apartheid and anti-fascist demonstrations. In late 1962, he learned that his father had died and he determined to visit his grave in South Africa. After several more unsuccessful applications for a visa for Mozambique and South Africa, in August or September of 1963, after twelve years of exile, the Portuguese government relented. Convinced by an “act” he put that he was mad but harmless, and “reformed” in terms of his political ideology, the authorities gave him amnesty and permission to return to Mozambique.⁵⁶⁰⁹

In October 1963, Tsafendas arrived in Mozambique and a month later, with the help of his family, he was back in South Africa in Pretoria. He remained in Pretoria until July 1964, working for five months for F.A. Poole Engineering and the rest of the time at his half-

⁵⁶⁰⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁰⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁰⁷ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁶⁰⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁰⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

sister's café. He crossed into Rhodesia to visit another half-sister he had not seen since 1941, and from there went again to Mozambique. He remained in Beira from October 1964 until November 1964, working for the Hume Pipe Company,⁵⁶¹⁰ before being arrested by the Portuguese police for “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”⁵⁶¹¹ After three months in jail in Beira, he left Mozambique for Durban in March 1965. He remained there until October 1965, working off and on as an interpreter at the Durban Court, as a welder at Fraser and Chalmers for two months and for a month for South African Railways. After receiving a letter from Helen Daniels who said she wanted to meet and marry him, he travelled from Durban to Cape Town, where he met her. He remained in Cape Town from October 1965 until September 1966.

None of the above travels can be described as aimless. Tsafendas himself, as already mentioned, characterised them in his affidavit as “forced globetrotting”⁵⁶¹² and he was right. Several countries happened to be on the way to his destination, like France, Italy, Spain, Syria, Lebanon, Denmark and Turkey. Naturally, he spent little time there because he was just passing through. This does not apply to Turkey, where he got a teaching job and stayed for seven months. He visited Greece for the second time, Rhodesia and Bulgaria for holidays. For business and work, he travelled England, Belgium and Sweden, while one of the Liberty ships during the Second World War also took him to Canada. Apart from places where he stayed only weeks or a few months, this is his life story:

- Six years in Egypt, all in Alexandria (1919-1925)
- Seventeen years in Mozambique: 16 years in Lourenço Marques and one in Beira (1918-1919, 1925-1939, 1963-1964)
- Five years in South Africa: approximately two years in Pretoria, one in Johannesburg, one in Cape Town and a eight months in Durban (1939-1941, 1963-1966, plus school in Middleburg)

⁵⁶¹⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 12 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵⁶¹¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁶¹² Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA.

- Six years in the USA in Boston and New York, a lot of this time at sea (1941-1947)
- Two years in Greece, all in Athens (1947-1949)
- Six years in Portugal, all in Lisbon (1951-1953, 1955-1958, 1962-1963)
- Three years in Germany, all in three cities, Munich, Frankfurt and Hamburg (1953-1955, 1958-1959)
- Seven months in Turkey in Istanbul (1961)⁵⁶¹³

This is not drifting, it is the odyssey of a man who was forced to live in exile from the country where he was born (Mozambique) for twelve years, who for sixteen years was not allowed to enter the country where his family lived (South Africa) and who was prosecuted and imprisoned because of his political beliefs in the country of his official nationality and where, after Mozambique, he spent most of his time (Portugal). Wherever he was, he always applied for permission to return to Mozambique and South Africa. Had he been allowed to return to either country or left in peace in Portugal, this vast Baedeker of travel would never have been opened.

Tsafendas travelled through so many countries mainly for two reasons:

- In search of a better place to stay and work
- He needed to cross through many countries to reach his destination.

Tsafendas's desperate efforts to return to Mozambique or South Africa and find a place to live and work without being followed by the police do not constitute "drifting." His peregrinations recall those of Odysseus, who travelled for ten years through many different places to reach his destination.

Finally, it might also be noted that a person who travels from place to place, finds work where he stops and then moves on, is not necessarily a schizophrenic. On the contrary, several highly successful people, especially exponents of the arts, have lived such a life. During his thirties, the renowned and influential French poet, Arthur Rimbaud travelled the world, moving from country to country and sustaining himself with jobs along the way. He did so because he wanted to explore lands and cultures outside of his French experience. History has not labelled Rimbaud as a schizophrenic or an aimless drifter. Unlike Rimbaud,

⁵⁶¹³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

however, Tsafendas did not keep moving for pleasure, but usually because he was barred or deported from a country and was forced to travel elsewhere. He made the most of his enforced sojourns, learning new languages and investigating cultures, but his life's aim was always to settle down, at first in Mozambique and later South Africa.

TSAFENDAS'S INABILITY TO HOLD DOWN A JOB AND HOW HE RELATED TO PEOPLE AROUND HIM

Tsafendas's ability to find and hold down a job has been discussed extensively in Dr. Cooper's testimony. As to how Tsafendas related to people around him, this could be seen by the people's own statements that have been used in this study. Furthermore, it could also be seen in Dr. Cooper's testimony.

DR. ZABOW'S PROGNOSIS REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S CHANCE OF RECOVERING

As for Tsafendas ever being able to recover from his schizophrenia, all those who knew him while he was in prison and in the hospital strongly believe that he was not schizophrenic and that he was perfectly all right when he was talking to them. None of these witnesses ever thought that Tsafendas might be a schizophrenic and he never told them any of the things he told his defence team and those who examined him during the summary trial. These witnesses include Alexander and Marie-Jose Moumbaris, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis, Father Spiros Randos, Liza Key, Father Minas Constandinou, Father Michalis Visvinis, Rika Nikolatos and Dimitris Skoularikis.⁵⁶¹⁴

⁵⁶¹⁴ Professor Renfrew Christie in a personal interview, 12 April 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Alexander and Marie-Jose Moumbaris in a personal interview, 7 March 2010; Dimitris Skoularikis in a personal interview, 26 April 2015; Father Spiros Randos in a personal interview, 5 January 2004; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you agree that the finer feelings in regard to family and friends are the first to be affected in a schizophrenic?

DR. ZABOW: I would agree that they may be one of the earlier signs, but if you are asking me to say that it is a sine qua non then I can't say that.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Doesn't such a person lose sympathy and regard for their people?

DR. ZABOW: It depends on the phase and the activity of his illness, it depends what sort of contact you are referring to. I am not altogether sure that I understand. If you could explain to me, with respect, what particular relationship you wish me to deal with.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He enquired about his friends while he was in gaol. Has that got any significance?

DR. ZABOW: Well, we have heard in Court from people who knew him that he had friendships with them: the Daniels' the O'Ryans. The Daniels' commented - I think it was the Daniels or the O'Ryans - one of the families commented on his fondness of the children. I have taken that into account in coming to my formulation.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you think that there is emotional blunting?

DR. ZABOW: I have observed some emotional blunting, but I would like to stress that emotional blunting is not the symptom of schizophrenia, it is rather a disorder of emotion which may at times be blunted, at times incongruous, and at times there may be rages or depression, very often in keeping with the inner phantasy life, the autistic life of the patient, and not necessarily with outer reality.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: In what sub-class of schizophrenia do you put the accused?

DR. ZABOW: In this morning's evidence I mentioned I felt he fell most closely into the paranoid group, but that he was not a typical paranoid schizophrenic.

JUDGE BEYERS: The sub-classes are very fluid, aren't they?

DR. ZABOW: That is the point I wish to make.

JUDGE BEYERS: They are not species of the same genus. They are emanations and they intertwine and they show signs of one and signs of another. Isn't that so?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, that is so.

JUDGE BEYERS: That is how I understand the subject. I don't know much about it.

DR. ZABOW: That is correct. One doesn't always get a textbook picture of a particular typo.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you agree that one gets periodic schizophrenics?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, there is a condition described more correctly than periodic schizophrenia, as periodic catatonia, which is a specific variety of schizophrenia described by a Scandinavian psychiatrist Jessing, which he has attempted to relate to the activity of the thyroid gland. It is not the sort of illness that this man presents with, which has to do with catatonic disorder, which is more particularly a motor manifestation of schizophrenia, either acute excitement or catatonic stupor. I would not class the accused in that group at all and I may add that, although Jessing has described this group and it is mentioned in most text books it is not necessarily accepted by all authorities.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Do you get remissions in regard to this condition?

DR. ZABOW: Which condition? Remission in regard to which condition?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: In regard to the condition you have just described?

DR. ZABOW: Periodic catatonia?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Yes?

DR. ZABOW: I believe that the text books describe remissions. I have not personally seen this.

JUDGE BEYERS: What on earth is remission? Is that a time when you do not show the thing?

DR. ZABOW: Well, that would be either a time - it depends there on the definition of the remission. It may either mean, in some people's view, that the disease was no longer present, or perhaps in other people's view, that the disease is no longer manifested,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: To what extent do you think the accused could plan, if there is a serious thought disorder?

DR. ZABOW: Once again I must stress and think of the intelligence itself of the patient, I must stress that although he has once been diagnosed as hebephrenia, we must now accept that it was not a pure hebephrenia anyway, and that there is a certain amount of ego function

intact. It is not uncommon for paranoid schizophrenics to be able to plan very ably, but in keeping with their autistic view of the world. Let us say, as they see the world they plan, and the plan itself may be a reasonably complex one, although I am not sure that buying two knives in the morning and stabbing someone the same day is necessarily a complex plan. One could even credit a paranoid with planning something more complex. So that I don't see any contradiction between what has been described to the Court in this man's actions and his mental condition.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused give you a detailed account of how he planned to kill the deceased?

DR. ZABOW: I attempted to get an account from him on several occasions. At times he described to me, as has been described to the Court, how he stabbed the, and how, had he not been held back, he would have continued to stab the deceased. At other times he got so far off the point, as I outlined in my this morning's evidence, that it was impossible to get a coherent account of what had led up to the killing.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused tell you that he first decided to kill the Prime Minister early in August, 1966?

DR. ZABOW: I hesitate. I am not sure that he told me directly, or if I heard it in evidence in Court, but I am aware of it. He did tell me about a gas pistol. I think this was the occasion when he had considered it.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Before we get to that, did he tell you that he originally planned to shoot the deceased?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, that is why I say the 2.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And did he say that he arranged to buy a Beretta pistol from a seaman on the tanker *'Eleni'*?

DR. ZABOW: Once again I must say I am not sure if the accused told me this, or if I heard it in the Court here.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he tell you that he waited for his salary at the end of August, 1966, before buying the pistol?

DR. ZABOW: He didn't tell me that, no

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: And did he also tell you that he intended escaping on the ship

'Eleni' after shooting the deceased?

DR. ZABOW: When I questioned the accused about escape it was mainly in relation to the escape at the time of the alleged offence, and at that time it seemed to me that I could not - in fact, not seem to me, it was so - that I could not get a clear answer from him. He said that he was not aware of the situation and had not a plan to escape. At a subsequent interview I tried to ascertain whether there was any question of him trying to make a sacrifice of himself, and once again there was no logical answer; it got tied up with the tape worm and his whole mental condition.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he tell you how he came into possession of this gas pistol?

DR. ZABOW: I say once again I do not recall asking him specifically. My emphasis, in interviewing him, was on assessing the mental state, the motivation and rather the circumstances of the actual event than the plan which came to no good. I didn't enquire into all that detail.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he say that he changed his plans after he had purchased the pistol which was not suited to his purpose?

DR. ZABOW: The same answer applies. I don't know that I can say.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused tell you that he decided to kill the Prime Minister by stabbing him?

DR. ZABOW: Well, I am not sure that he used the words 'by stabbing him' but he certainly did tell it to me because he told me about buying the knives, so that I was aware of it.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused also tell you that on the morning of the 6th September, 1966, he changed his uniform in Parliament and put on a suit to go down town?

DR. ZABOW: Yes.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he say that he left Parliament and went to buy two daggers at different shops round about 9.00 a.m.?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, I have an idea that I may even have the name of the one shop in my notes. It was a gun shop, or something, I think he said. But in any case, I was aware of that too.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did he tell you that he stabbed the Prime Minister in a minute or two when his body-guard was going around to the public gallery?

DR. ZABOW: No, he did not tell me that. As he described that to me, he told me that he was in a sort of a, almost dazed condition; that he came to when he found the people were restraining him, and he said to me that had they not restrained him he would have continued stabbing the deceased repeatedly. At that time he also (for the record) displayed a certain amount of incongruity in telling me this, when he couldn't understand why he was restrained so violently, nor could he understand the reaction of the people around him, and the injuries that he received. He didn't seem to be able to appreciate, you know, he would be restrained.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Did the accused tell you that he hid the daggers in his locker?

JUDGE BEYERS: What is the relevance of all this? The only relevance I can see: Is it possible for a person suffering from schizophrenia to plan, and to plan quite elaborately, to do something?

DR. ZABOW: The answer to that question is 'Yes.' It is possible. All this goes to show that he planned it,

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You say that he could plan, he could plan carefully, even if he was in that condition?

DR. ZABOW: Yes, he could plan. I have said that I feel he could even have planned more complexly than has been described to us, and I would still say that this is in keeping with his schizophrenic illness.

JUDGE BEYERS: Of course, assuming he is a chronic schizophrenic, then his planning would also be related to the unreal and shadow world in which he lives, rather than to the world of reality? I am putting a plain question, I am not being clever.

DR. ZABOW: No, I think one must divide it into the mechanics of the planning and the motivation of the planning. The mechanics obviously - the fact that a knife will kill a human being - he has accepted that part of the real world. But the overall motivation, the whole situation in his mind which led to this plan and to the carrying out of this act, was planned in terms of his autistic life, rather than in terms of reality of the world in which he lives.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Does the accused give a good account of his actions?

DR. ZABOW: If counsel would tell me what he means by a 'good account'?

JUDGE BEYERS: The witness has told us at length about the garbled, nonsensical, stupid, disjointed account which the accused did give him when he asked him the question. He has

read out at length the account he gave him when he asked him: "Did you kill the Prime Minister, and why?" He read pages of the account.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Would you have expected that the accused could have performed his job in Parliament efficiently?

DR. ZABOW: That would depend on the nature of the work the accused was expected to perform.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: He was a messenger?

DR. ZABOW: A messenger could have unskilled or skilled duties. It would still depend on the nature of the actual work, not- the designation of the post.

COMMENTS ON THE CROSS-EXAMINATION

Dr. Zabow, just like Dr. Cooper, was unable to get a coherent account from Tsafendas about his killing of Dr. Verwoerd. However, as we have seen in Dr. Sakinofsky's testimony, Tsafendas was well able to give a perfect and detailed account of what led up to the killing and the killing itself twice to the police, but also thirty years later to several witnesses.

Dr. Zabow also stated that Tsafendas told him that he "was not aware of the situation and had not a plan to escape." He said, "At a subsequent interview I tried to ascertain whether there was any question of him trying to make a sacrifice of himself, and once again there was no logical answer; it got tied up with the tapeworm and his whole mental condition." However, Tsafendas gave a perfectly clear and logical answer to the police regarding his escape and about 'sacrificing' himself. More importantly, he discussed the subject in detail thirty years later with three different witnesses on different occasions. Both the issue of escape and "sacrifice" have been discussed in detail in Dr. Cooper's testimony.

Van den Berg's incompetent and irrelevant questions continued with Dr. Zabow. He first asked him whether Tsafendas gave "a good account of his actions." Judge Beyers had to intervene again to remind him that "the witness has told us at length about the garbled, nonsensical, stupid, disjointed account which the accused did give him when he asked him the question. He has read out at length the account he gave him when he asked him: "Did you kill the Prime Minister, and why?" He read pages of the account." Naturally van den Berg then dropped the subject.

What was extraordinary about the Attorney-General's handling of the issue was not so much his incompetent and irrelevant questioning as the fact that once again he did not use the plethora of evidence he had in his possession, including the report of Professor van Wyk, his own expert-witness, which flatly contradicted Dr. Zabow's assessment. Prof. van Wyk said that after he had examined Tsafendas three times, he had found that "he is orientated. He gives a good account of himself. His comprehension is good and his answers are relevant. His emotional responses are adequate and apt. His discourse is coherent. At times he is discursive, but not vague and he never strays from the main point of conversation."⁵⁶¹⁵ Though van den Berg had this critical report in his possession, he chose not to use it but to waste time with footling questions.

Van den Berg's next question was whether he expected Tsafendas to work in the Parliament efficiently. Again, this is a completely incompetent question, though it would have been relevant before Gerald Shaw's testimony. Shaw had testified to the court just a few hours before that he found Tsafendas's work in Parliament to be inefficient, so what is the purpose of asking his opinion about it? Van den Berg's question would have been perfectly relevant and competent if he had followed up the issue and brought evidence to support his initial argument that Tsafendas's work was efficient. Since he did not do that, what was the purpose of the question? No matter what Dr. Zabow's answer was, it would have made no difference. This question offered nothing at all to the State's case, while it strengthened further the defence's.

The Attorney General's cross-examination of Dr. Zabow was arguably the weakest in the entire summary trial. It was pointless, aiming nowhere and going nowhere, adding nothing of substance to the State's case and posing no challenge to the witness, despite the volumes of evidence the South African police had in its possession.

⁵⁶¹⁵ Bloomberg, 2007: 81.

CONCLUSION

Dr. Zabow diagnosis is almost identical to those of Dr. Sakinofsky and Dr. Cooper. Naturally, therefore, it contains the same mistakes. You don't have to be a psychiatrist to see that Dr. Zabow's diagnosis is miles from the real Tsafendas, the Tsafendas described to the police and to the author by two hundred witnesses. Tsafendas is presented by Dr. Zabow, after four hours and a half of examination, as a man who was not able to look after himself and live adequately on his own, although at the time he was forty-eight years old and had travelled to sixteen countries, most of the time with very little money, countries where he knew no one, but still managed to work and survive. He is also called a "drifter," which is like calling Odysseus a drifter because of his travels. Tsafendas's odyssey is misunderstood and characterised as drifting by Dr. Zabow, who is clearly not aware of the circumstances of his travels

Dr. Zabow admitted that he based his diagnosis entirely on what he heard from Tsafendas, without receiving any other information from friends, family or even his medical records. The fact remains that Dr. Zabow's diagnosis on Tsafendas is very wide off the mark, as two hundred witnesses can verify. Tsafendas remembered Dr. Zabow until he died. Dr. Zabow and Dr. Sakinofsky were names Tsafendas remembered in later life, always with fondness.

DEFENCE WITNESS No. 17: DR. JAMES WILLIAM MACGREGOR

DR. MACGREGOR'S PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHY AS RELATED BY HIM TO THE COURT

A specialist psychiatrist and neurologist since 1937 practising in Cape Town. Qualified in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1937 and worked in a general hospital, then in a mental hospital. Took his Diploma of Psychological Medicine in London in 1938, then went to Oxford. In 1939, Dr. MacGregor joined the British army and in 1940 was appointed an acting specialist psychiatrist and neurologist. Two years later, he was made a full psychiatrist and neurologist and worked in a head injury unit throughout the war. In 1945, he was made consultant neurologist and psychiatrist to the South East of England for the Army. In 1947, he took membership of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh and in 1949, membership of the Royal College of Physicians of London. He came to South African in 1949 and since then had been a specialist neurologist and psychiatrist on the register of the South African Medical Association, working at the Groote Schuur Hospital and in private practice. For the last three years, head of the Neurology Department at Groote Schuur Hospital and a lecturer at the University of Cape Town in neurology. In the course of his professional life, saw many schizophrenics.⁵⁶¹⁶

EXTRACTS FROM DR. MACGREGOR'S TESTIMONY⁵⁶¹⁷

EXAMINING TSAFENDAS AND TAKING "SHORTCUTS"

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You were asked by Mr. Bloomberg, attorney for the defence in this case, to examine the accused who is now before Court?

DR. MACGREGOR: I was.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: With a view to determining his mental state?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes.

⁵⁶¹⁶ Dr. James William MacGregor's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁶¹⁷ Dr. James William MacGregor's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Shortly, how many examinations did you make?

DR. MACGREGOR: I had three examinations. On the 29th of September this year, and on the 4th and 11th of October of this year. All in Caledon Square. Each one lasting approximately an hour and a half or so.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Your first interview was conducted in the presence of Mr. Bloomberg?

DR. MACGREGOR: It was.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: There were no other medical practitioners present?

DR. MACGREGOR: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: It was your purpose to establish independently of the opinions of other medical practitioners what you felt the accused's mental condition was?

DR. MACGREGOR: It was.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Correct?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Were you, on the basis of that interview alone, able to form a firm opinion as to the accused's mental state - present mental state?

DR. MACGREGOR: I was. I formed a firm opinion, and I put it in writing, and I gave it to Mr. David Bloomberg, saying that I considered this man was suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type, and that he was probably certifiable. I was not absolutely certain of this, and I wanted to have other interviews in order to be quite certain about that.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Tell the Court, shortly, and just give the salient features of your first interview?

DR. MACGREGOR: I thought I had to - time was a little bit precious; I had to take shortcuts. I accepted what was given to me about this man's life history, various dates and to which countries he had been. I told him that I was a psychiatrist and I wished to see what his mental state was. I then divided my psychiatric interview up in the usual way. I asked him questions about his childhood; asked him questions about his adult life, his interests, his views on life, his aims, his religion, his political views, and then, finally, coming down to the murder, the motives for the murder and his feelings about the murder.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Approaching the matter and analysing the position – you have analysed it. Will you deal with those heads? First of all his thinking or disturbance of thinking?

DR. MACGREGOR: He showed considerable disturbance of thinking. His thinking was woolly and disjointed. He gave birth to delusions concerning a tapeworm. I can go into more detail about this, but the Court has had a great deal about this, but I await your instructions, my lord, as to whether I should enlarge on this. But it was very much the same matter about the tapeworm which he has told other psychiatrists, and which has been related here.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you have to prompt him on it?

DR. MACGREGOR: No, I knew nothing about this tapeworm before I saw him. And within, I should think three minutes of asking him about his childhood, this story of the tapeworm started to come out.

JUDGE BEYERS: Was this a new one to you? Have you ever heard this one before?

DR. MACGREGOR: I have never heard this one before.

JUDGE BEYERS: A man being almost under the machinations and control of a tapeworm?

DR. MACGREGOR: No. At first I didn't even know whether it was relevant.

JUDGE BEYERS: Have you ever seen it anywhere?

DR. MACGREGOR: I have known schizophrenics who believed that they had spirits and demons within them, yes, but not a tapeworm.

JUDGE BEYERS: That is a completely new one?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In your initial interview did you try and lead him away from the tapeworm? Did you get him to talk about something else?

DR. MACGREGOR: Well, at first I tried to lead him away from it, but then I wasn't aware that it was of much importance. But it didn't take very long to realise that this was the central theme of his thought. Very early on he told me that this tapeworm had changed his whole life. Again at first I approached it as a purely medical matter, and asked him what tests had been done, what sort of tapeworm it was, and how he thought it was there, and we got the same kind of replies that had been given to other people, that this was a special tapeworm. He

called it in that particular interview a demon, a snake and a devil. He described it in grossly exaggerated terms as a very large tapeworm, probably 20 or 30 feet long, probably related to an East African species. Such was the command of his language that he used the term "serrated," "with serrated edges."

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where did he feel that he could obtain treatment for this bizarre tapeworm?

DR. MACGREGOR: He told me at that interview that he thought the only place where he could be treated satisfactorily was in South America.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Has he since expressed any other opinion as to how he could be treated for the tapeworm?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes. He thought that he might go to Glasgow and be treated with this machine which was described earlier on this morning. But he still thinks perhaps in South America he would get the best treatment.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did he also consider whether he may not go to a surgeon to have it cut out?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes. He has told me that it is incurable, except by surgery, and that this machine that he mentioned was probably only a diagnostic method of discovering the whereabouts of this worm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Again, this is repetition, but it is important; this is a serious enquiry, it is a serious charge. What is the importance of this delusion, if I may call it that?

DR. MACGREGOR: It seems to me that it has disorganised his whole personality, his whole relationship with the real world.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What has it done to his personality?

DR. MACGREGOR: I don't know what the delusion has done to it, because this is, I think part of a schizophrenic process. But it has altered his actions in certain ways in that he is forever thinking of food for this tapeworm, and forever being careful, he told me this, not to pass too close to shops with delicacies in the windows in case the tapeworm smelt this and would crawl up underneath his chest and start causing him pain. He further me that the pains caused by this tapeworm are so terrible that, if it had not been for his religion, he would be dead.

COMMENTS ON DR. MACGREGOR'S ABOVE TESTIMONY**ON TAKING "SHORTCUTS" DUE TO THE LACK OF TIME**

Like Dr. Zabow, Dr. MacGregor also spent a total of four and a half hours with Tsafendas. Dr. MacGregor admitted something that went unmentioned by the other psychiatrists although it affected them too, and appeared quite understandable in the circumstances. This was that under pressure of time, he was forced "to take shortcuts" in his examination and accept what was given to him by Tsafendas about Tsafendas's own life history without the opportunity to check it further. This admission by Dr. MacGregor says a great deal, not only about his diagnosis and how he came to it and how reliable it could be, but also about the way things were done by all those involved with Tsafendas's defence due to the pressure of time.

THE TAPEWORM

The issue of the tapeworm, as Dr. MacGregor observed, was extensively discussed earlier in this chapter and in this report, so it is not going to be discussed here again. However, we should mention that Tsafendas spoke about the tapeworm in relation to his childhood and only three minutes after Dr. MacGregor had brought up his childhood. As we have seen before, Tsafendas never mentioned the tapeworm to anyone when he was a child, not even to his family.⁵⁶¹⁸

Dr. MacGregor conceded he had never heard of anyone hallucinating about a tapeworm and that it was something "completely new" to him. This is exactly what Tsafendas said about why he used the tapeworm ploy - because it was unique and everyone took an interest in it and believed him. He later said, "Everyone hears voices or pretends to be Napoleon, but who would ever suspect anyone who believes he has a tapeworm?" Tsafendas had been impressed by the way the psychiatrists treated Tom Tuff, who supposedly had a tapeworm, and the amount of attention he was receiving from them. This was the reason Tsafendas adopted the tapeworm idea – its uniqueness.⁵⁶¹⁹ The author is not in position to know whether Tom Tuff really believed he had a tapeworm or not, but it was he who inspired Tsafendas to use it.

⁵⁶¹⁸ For more about the issue look at Dr. Cooper's testimony.

⁵⁶¹⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

TSAFENDAS'S "ONLY WISH"

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Have you put to him what he would like, what one wish he had in life?

DR. MACGREGOR: At the end of that first interview I put it to him that if he were to be granted one single wish in life what would it be, and I expected him to say that he would like to be out of the Police cells, a free man, but to my surprise he said he wanted to get rid of the tapeworm. I then thought I would give him an alternative, and I said slowly and carefully to him that if he had an alternative between two wishes, either to get rid of the tapeworm or to avoid this terrible tragedy, to avoid all the fuss and horribleness of being a prisoner awaiting trial, with his life in danger, and avoid the murder, avoid all the consequences of the murder, if he had a choice between that and getting rid of the tapeworm, which would he choose, and, without any hesitation, he said there would be no point in being free unless he got rid of the tapeworm.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: How did you find his emotional balance?

DR. MACGREGOR: I thought his emotional balance was extremely poor. He showed great ferocity of emotion. I put to him that he was accused of murdering a man - not only that he was a politician, but that he was a man who was a father and a husband - and what did he think of this, and he said yes he had thought about it. And this was the one time when he used a word which he mispronounced he said it has caused me "misery", and I believe he meant "misery." And I said "Tell me further, what do you think about this? - What do you think about the Prime Minister's wife?" And he said "Yes, I thought about her." Then there was a long pause. I asked him again what has he thought about her, and he said "I would not like to meet her face to face." I said "Have you thought anything else about her?" and he said "Yes, I wouldn't like to live in Cape Town." I said why would he not like to live in Cape Town, "I am asking you what have you thought about the consequences of this murder?", and he said yes, he would not like to live in Cape Town because he didn't think he could face up to people, and he would prefer to go to South America and to start cultivating the ground there, he would like to be in the jungle. And then there was a whole ramble about having a pool, he would like there to be fish in the pool, and he could work there, and work hard.

COMMENTS REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S "ONLY WISH"

When Dr. MacGregor asked Tsafendas about a wish, he replied that his only wish was to "get rid of the tapeworm." We won't discuss the tapeworm again, but just to show how this answer was a "performance" for the psychiatrists, we list the following incidents. In 1996, Tsafendas was visited in prison by Alexander and Marie-Jose Moumbaris. When they asked him if there was anything he wanted, he replied, "my freedom."⁵⁶²⁰

When Tsafendas was frequently asked by Father Minas Constandinou, Rika Nikolatos, Father Spiros Randos and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis who visited him in prison and later in hospital if there was anything he wanted, he always gave the same answer, "my freedom." He never asked them for help to "get rid of the tapeworm."⁵⁶²¹ In 1993, Tsafendas wrote a letter to his good friend John Michaletos "kindly requesting" him to endeavour to have him released from prison.⁵⁶²²

TSAFENDAS'S RACIAL PREFERENCES AND DR. VERWOERD BEING "THE RIGHT MAN"

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In this context, you remember that a Mr. Smorenberg said that Tsafendas worked under him at the power station. You heard Mr. Smorenberg say that?

DR. MACGREGOR: I did.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Mr. Smorenberg said they were one day below the surface, 40 feet down I think, or something like that, in an eerie chamber which he likened unto a dungeon, and then this little conversation took place. Tsafendas suggested there that it would be a good thing if all the Coloured people were brought into the chamber, the chamber closed, and a door opened and the seawater then drown then. That remark. On the other hand we have it that Tsafendas was very fond of the O'Ryans and the Daniels, and that from time to time he thought about becoming a member of the Coloured community. What is your comment on this?

DR. MACGREGOR: I think this shows an ambivalence, a variation, a plus and minus sign

⁵⁶²⁰ Alexander and Marie-Jose Moumbaris in a personal interview, 27 June 2014.

⁵⁶²¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁶²² Letter of Dimitri Tsafendas to John Michaletos, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

so to speak about his attitude towards the Coloured. And this kind of ambivalence is very typical of the attitudes of schizophrenics. They are inconsistent in their attitudes and outlooks.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You have it there that on that occasion he thought Dr. Verwoerd was a good man - I think he put it that he was the right man?

DR. MACGREGOR: I heard the witness say that, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Now you have it subsequently that he goes and stabs Dr. Verwoerd, the person whom he two months previously called the right man. What is your comment on that?

DR. MACGREGOR: I think that probably is an example of this very kind of ambivalence again, when schizophrenic swings from one extreme to the other.

COMMENTS ON DR. MACGREGOR'S TESTIMONY ON TSAFENDAS'S RACIAL PREFERENCES AND DR. VERWOERD BEING "THE RIGHT MAN"

Dr. MacGregor attributed Tsafendas's dislike of Coloureds, according to an incident reported by Owen Smorenberg, to schizophrenia. He said: "I think this shows an ambivalence, a variation, a plus and minus sign so to speak, about his attitude towards the Coloured. And this kind of ambivalence is very typical of the attitudes of schizophrenics. They are inconsistent in their attitudes and outlooks." However, as we have seen, it was not Tsafendas who was inconsistent in his views, but Smorenberg's statement. Smorenberg's statement has been analysed and dismissed by the author as inaccurate for various reasons, which were obviously unknown to Dr. MacGregor.

The issue of whether Tsafendas liked or disliked Coloureds has also been examined at length in the testimonies of Dr. Cooper and Smorenberg himself, so these issues will not be discussed again here. However, the surprising thing here is that Smorenberg's contradictory statement is taken as "ambivalent" behaviour by Tsafendas by Dr. MacGregor, who is obviously unaware of Tsafendas's political ideas and character. The fact that the statement is contradictory is attributed to schizophrenia and not that Smorenberg might have misunderstood.

Advocate Cooper then carefully and intelligently manipulates Tsafendas's alleged words and from Dr. Verwoerd being the "right man," he becomes a "good man." Thus,

Advocate Cooper asks how Tsafendas could have killed someone he thought he was a “good man.” The issue of the “right man” has also been extensively discussed in Smorenberg’s testimony. Dr. MacGregor, obviously unaware of Tsafendas’s beliefs about Dr. Verwoerd, attributes it to “ambivalence” again, “when a schizophrenic swings from one extreme to the other.” However, as we have seen repeatedly, Tsafendas did not swing from one extreme to the other. More than a hundred witnesses testified to this study, to the police and to the Commission that Tsafendas opposed apartheid, while more than twenty testified that he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator, Hitler’s best student, not the real representative of all South African people etc. Not a single one of the three hundred witnesses who were questioned by the author and by the police at the time said anything about Tsafendas considering Dr. Verwoerd to be the “right man.” Of course, Dr. MacGregor was not in position to know that and could only comment on what was given to him, as he himself admitted.

The fact that Smorenberg’s statement is a contradiction to Tsafendas’s actions and to what was testified by the O’Ryans and the Daniels about him, is taken as “ambivalent” behaviour by Tsafendas without anyone considering the possibility that Smorenberg’s statement was inaccurate. Dr. Macgregor was not aware of the inaccuracy of Smorenberg’s statement, but the Attorney-General must have known since he would have been in possession of the one hundred and fifty statements the police gathered from people who knew Tsafendas, the two statements that Tsafendas gave to the police and several other evidence gathered by the South African police that could have easily broken down Smorenberg’s testimony. The fact that van den Berg failed to use them when Smorenberg testified gave the defence the opportunity to use this false testimony to further support their line. The Attorney-General remained in his seat, offering no challenge.

TSAFENDAS HAVING “NO AIM IN LIFE,” “ACHIEVED NOTHING WORTHWILE IN HIS LIFE” AND “NO FRIENDSHIPS OF LASTING DEPTH”

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Similarly, you have here the incident when at seven o’clock in the morning, at the Daniels’s, he knocks them up, he has a bag of meat which could feed about two people, tomatoes and eggs etc., and he wants a pan and he wants a little stove to make a meal, but he eats this meal in a gargantuan way, if I can say it.

JUDGE BEYERS: Don’t look like that about a rare done T-bone steak, Mr. Cooper. You are

pulling a face about something which I wouldn't mind having tonight.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: He eats it with the blood, and then he says he is feeding the worm. What is your comment on that?

DR. MACGREGOR: Well, I think this illustrates how this delusion about the worm disorganised his life and his realistic approach to life.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you find any disturbance of volition?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes. I think this great stubborn persistence after years of investigations in the belief that he still had the tapeworm - no one could shake him about this - this is a very good example of this stubbornness, the negativistic attitude of the schizophrenic. His whole drifting life in which, as far as I can make out, he never achieved anything worthwhile, any concrete act, concrete position that is worthwhile - he never seemed to achieve any friendship of lasting depth, and he had no particular desires to achieve anything. He had no aim in life except to get rid of this tapeworm. This too is typical of the lack of volition, the lack of pattern, the lack of drive of the schizophrenic.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is this "borne out" by the history that we have of him in Cape Town between the 28th of August and the time of his arrest? Going from one job to another, being unemployed and visiting hospitals?

DR. MACGREGOR: That is consistent with his state, but I would not have diagnosed schizophrenia just on that alone. It is perfectly consistent with a schizophrenic state.

COMMENTS ON TSAFENDAS HAVING "NO AIM IN LIFE," "ACHIEVED NOTHING WORTHWILE IN HIS LIFE" AND "NO FRIENDSHIPS OF LASTING DEPTH"

The above is an identical diagnosis to that of Dr. Cooper and as we have seen in his testimony, is entirely inaccurate. Tsafendas's friendships and relationships with people have been covered at length in comments on Dr. Cooper's testimony, as have the other two claims, but due to their importance and in order to show how wrong Dr. MacGregor was, they will be discussed here again, although not in such detail. The issue of the steak at Daniels's house and the "feeding the worms" comment have been discussed extensively in Peter Daniels's testimony.

According to Dr. MacGregor, Tsafendas had achieved nothing and had no aims in his life. The fact that PIDE had a 130-page file on him since he was twenty and that he was forced into exile from Mozambique and prosecuted in Portugal for his Communist and anti-colonialist beliefs and activities give the lie to Dr. MacGregor's assessment of a life lacking in aims and achievements. As for doing something "worthwhile," Tsafendas taught English without charge for six or seven months to Greek and Turkish children in Istanbul, and also on two occasions to poor children in Mozambique. This was because he believed education was "worthwhile." That he was an active member of the British anti-apartheid and anti-fascist movements, participating in demonstrations and that he smuggled anti-apartheid literature into South Africa would certainly be considered "worthwhile" by many, though undoubtedly not by everyone, especially in South Africa in 1966.

This supposedly aimless man toured villages in Beira, seeking to raise awareness of the independence cause and for this suffered imprisonment and torture.⁵⁶²³ Working for Mozambican independence at the cost of arrest, imprisonment and torture by the Portuguese Police is an achievement rooted in conviction. The fact that the Director-General of PIDE in Portugal instructed the Sub-Director of PIDE in Mozambique that "information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of your country should not be transmitted to the South African authorities,"⁵⁶²⁴ can also be seen as an achievement for Tsafendas. That he joined the Greek Communist Party and its military wing, the DSE, during the Greek Civil War and fought for a cause was the achievement of an aim.

Finally, he taught at Turkey's best private language college for about half a year. That was an achievement not everyone could have managed. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Tsafendas's political ideas, it cannot be denied that the activities listed above are many more than most ordinary people achieve. Yet that does not make these people non-achievers or schizophrenics.

Tsafendas did enough during his lifetime to render significant service to society, the question of Dr. Verwoerd's assassination being debatable. Far from having no aim in life, he had well-defined goals. He wanted "to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa" and

⁵⁶²³ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁶²⁴ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

was willing to “anything that would get the South African regime out of power.”⁵⁶²⁵ He fearlessly told the PIDE agents who were questioning him that he wanted to see “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the mother nation,” and that he was strongly in favour of the independence of Mozambique.⁵⁶²⁶ Furthermore, Tsafendas did not simply cherish these as hopes for Mozambique’s future, but worked actively to secure them by campaigning for independence and by “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”⁵⁶²⁷ For his political beliefs and his efforts to raise awareness of the independence issue, he was five times arrested, imprisoned and tortured and forced to live on exile for twelve years.

However, the most glaringly obvious aim of Tsafendas’s life was right there in front of Dr. MacGregor and he failed to see it. Tsafendas wanted apartheid to end, he wanted to see a government in South Africa that would represent all the South African people and he wanted Dr. Verwoerd removed so that national policy would change, as he told the police in his statement⁵⁶²⁸ and later repeated several times.⁵⁶²⁹ However, Dr. MacGregor was not in possession of Tsafendas’s statement, or the statements given to the police by people who knew him or of any other information to apprise him of who Tsafendas really was. Thus, as he openly admitted, he simply took what was given to him at face value.

THE IMPORTANCE OF VAN ZYL’S TESTS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: We also had the evidence of the psychologist, Mr. van Zyl, this morning. What is the significance of his findings and his observations?

DR. MACGREGOR: I believe this finding of scatter, as it is called, is very significant and indicates strongly, tends to indicate a schizophreniform process. And furthermore his inability to deal adequately with abstract situations. He finds it easier to deal with concrete

⁵⁶²⁵ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁶²⁶ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁶²⁷ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁶²⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶²⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

situations. It is quite typical of a schizophrenic.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: So you find that important evidence?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes, I do. Confirmatory but not diagnostic.

JUDGE BEYERS: More or less a cross check?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes. I don't think anyone would diagnose schizophrenia on that alone.

COMMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VAN ZYL'S TESTS

Dr. MacGregor found van Zyl's tests as "confirmatory, but not diagnostic." However, as this study has already shown, van Zyl's tests were inaccurate and his conclusions wrong. Since this issue has been discussed extensively in van Zyl's testimony, it would not be discussed here again.

TSAFENDAS SIMULATING

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Isn't the work of the clinical psychologist helpful in trying to remove the possibility of all this being simulated?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes, I think so. Very much so. And, taking that point, all of us of course wondered whether this man might be simulating, and I went there prepared to deal with a man that might be simulating, because I knew very little about him, except what I had read in the papers. But you know, when one put things to him which, if he was simulating, he could have clutched at, he didn't take them. When one asked whether he heard voices, which is a common thing, for mad people to hear, he denied this. But I am not sure whether he doesn't actually hear some kind of voice. But we know schizophrenic people often deny that they have hallucinations. When I asked him whether he had any sense of unreality, no.

COMMENTS REGARDING TSAFENDAS SIMULATING

The issue of simulation has been discussed in detail in Dr. Cooper's testimony. However let us briefly examine what was said here. Dr. MacGregor stated that he considered whether or not Tsafendas was simulating. He tried the same "trick" that Dr. Cooper tried. He asked him if he heard "any voices, which is a common thing, for mad people to hear." As with Dr.

Cooper, Tsafendas did not fall into the trap, denying any such thing. Why did Tsafendas react in this way? Because twenty years earlier, he had pretended to hear voices and he was then discovered to be simulating. The Grafton State Hospital report also stated that in 1946 Tsafendas heard voices from the radiators.⁵⁶³⁰

The Commission of Enquiry, which had no psychiatrist, noted that Tsafendas is “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders—he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him... and (the Commission) therefore adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”⁵⁶³¹ Of course the Commission of Enquiry was in possession of most of the documents gathered by the police, plus others. Dr. MacGregor was unaware of anything about Tsafendas except what he heard from him.

Given that Tsafendas was experienced with psychiatrists, it was to be expected that he did not take Dr. MacGregor's bait. It is also evident that Dr. MacGregor was not aware of the contents of the Grafton State Hospital report, where it said that Tsafendas had “faked mental illness” and had claimed to hear voices from the radiators.⁵⁶³² Naturally, Tsafendas's experience with psychiatrists had increased since 1946 and he did not make the same mistake of claiming to hear voices. Dr. MacGregor was not aware of this, unlike the Commission of Enquiry, the South African police and presumably the State.

TSAFENDAS'S HOSPITALIZATIONS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Was he influenced by people? Did he feel himself under pressures from outside agencies of any kind?

DR. MACGREGOR: No. All these questions were not put at once. One had to slip them in unobtrusively. When I asked whether he thought he was mentally unbalanced, he denied this firmly - not in any way. If one said to him “Why have you been in so many mental hospitals?” then we got all kinds of reasons, including the reason that at least on one occasion

⁵⁶³⁰ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁵⁶³¹ Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁶³² Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

he was put into a mental hospital in Lisbon because the doctors were so poorly paid that the only way they could supplement their earnings was to take patients from the tropical hospital, where he was being investigated for a tapeworm, keep their clothes and belongings, and put them in a mental hospital. This he told me was well known, and it was told to him by the cook, nurses and by many people outside. When I said this was a ridiculous statement because, if it was true, it would become public, he said no, the corruption was so great that no one could ever make this public.

COMMENTS ON TSAFENDAS'S HOSPITALIZATIONS

The issue has been examined extensively in Dr. Cooper's testimony and therefore it would not be discussed here again.

TSAFENDAS'S MANNERISMS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: His face - what were his facial mannerisms?

DR. MACGREGOR: Most of the time throughout these interviews he looked in a bland, rather disinterested, way. From time to time he would make a grimace, which I think Dr. Cooper referred to, which is half a smile, half a snarl. He pulled down the corners of his mouth and showed his teeth. This seemed to be irrelevant to the subject that was under discussion at the time. From time to time he rocked backwards and forwards, and, particularly at the last interview, he seemed to scratch himself continuously. When I asked whether there was any reason for this, he paid no attention and just went on scratching.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the significance of this?

DR. MACGREGOR: I think these are mannerisms such as are common in schizophrenic patients. I saw no other reason. Stereotyped repetition of these movements, which were not very noticeable, particularly the rocking wasn't particularly noticeable, but, particularly at the last interview, it went on the whole time.

COMMENTS ON TSAFENDAS'S MANNERISMS

The report from Grafton State hospital also stated that Tsafendas demonstrated peculiar mannerisms.⁵⁶³³ However, none of about two hundred people who were interviewed by the author, by the Commission or by the police at the time mentioned anything about peculiar mannerisms. The author specifically asked forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas well about this, and no one ever saw him do anything like Dr. MacGregor described. It would be unnecessary and not practical to name every person who was asked about this, particularly since names are given in the introduction of the study. Here is a short selection from the many knew Tsafendas very well and spent a lot of time with him and denied ever noticing grimaces or rocking or scratching or suchlike by Tsafendas:

- Katerina Pnema, his half-sister.⁵⁶³⁴
- Father Nikola Banovic, in 1961, lived in the same house as Tsafendas for four months and in a house next door for another two or three months.⁵⁶³⁵
- Father Michalis Visvinis who very regularly visited him for five years in prison (1989-1994).⁵⁶³⁶
- Fotini Gavasiadis spent every day for nine months with him.⁵⁶³⁷
- Reuben O'Ryan lived with Tsafendas in the same house for five months and kept in touch with him for another year.⁵⁶³⁸
- Stanley O'Ryan lived with Tsafendas for five months at the same house and kept in touch for another year.⁵⁶³⁹
- Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas's first cousin.⁵⁶⁴⁰
- Ira Kyriakakis who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and remained a lifelong friend.⁵⁶⁴¹

⁵⁶³³Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁵⁶³⁴ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁶³⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁶³⁶ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁵⁶³⁷ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵⁶³⁸ Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁵⁶³⁹ Stanley O' Ryan in a personal interview, 9 April 2015.

⁵⁶⁴⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁵⁶⁴¹ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

- Irene Michaletos was very close to Tsafendas between 1964 and 1965.⁵⁶⁴²
- John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousin, met him in Lourenço Marques in 1951, and saw a lot of him in Mozambique between 1963 and 1965.⁵⁶⁴³
- Antony Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousin, met him in Lourenço Marques in 1951 and saw a lot of him in Mozambique between 1963 and 1965.⁵⁶⁴⁴
- Andreas Babiolakis knew Tsafendas since they were children.⁵⁶⁴⁵
- Costas Chagios knew Tsafendas from 1965 until his arrest.⁵⁶⁴⁶
- Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for about six-seven months in Istanbul in 1961.⁵⁶⁴⁷
- Joyce Dick, one of Helen Daniels's best friends and member of the Christian Church.⁵⁶⁴⁸
- Peter Protoulis was a supplier of foodstuffs to the tanker *Eleni*. He met Tsafendas on board.⁵⁶⁴⁹
- Miltiades Kaldis knew Tsafendas for about a year, having met him in 1965 in Cape Town.⁵⁶⁵⁰
- Elias Constantaras met him in 1965 in Cape Town and saw him almost daily until his arrest.⁵⁶⁵¹
- Helen Grispos, another who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques.⁵⁶⁵²
- Peter Peroglou ate at the same place as Tsafendas for several months in 1966.⁵⁶⁵³
- Pamela Abrahams knew Tsafendas for several months in 1966.⁵⁶⁵⁴
- Nick Augustides, the son of the owner of Mike's Outfitters in Cape Town for whom Tsafendas worked on commission for about two months in 1966.⁵⁶⁵⁵

⁵⁶⁴² Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵⁶⁴³ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵⁶⁴⁴ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016.

⁵⁶⁴⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁵⁶⁴⁶ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015.

⁵⁶⁴⁷ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁵⁶⁴⁸ Joyce Dick in a personal interview, 6 August 2016.

⁵⁶⁴⁹ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 3 August 2016.

⁵⁶⁵⁰ Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016.

⁵⁶⁵¹ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁵⁶⁵² Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁵⁶⁵³ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁵⁶⁵⁴ Pamela Abrahams in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁵⁶⁵⁵ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

- Ten of the sailors of the *Eleni* saw Tsafendas every day for forty-two days and up to three days before the assassination.⁵⁶⁵⁶

TSAFENDAS'S E.E.G.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: An E.E.G. was taken?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes. That was perfectly normal. That was done in my department at Groote Schuur.

JUDGE BEYERS: What is that?

DR. MACGREGOR: An electro encephalogram. That was perfectly normal.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is that finding inconsistent with your diagnosis of the accused's condition?

DR. MACGREGOR: It is perfectly consistent with schizophrenic process. It is not likely to be - one is not likely to have a normal E.E.G. In fact I think it is practically impossible to have a normal E.E.G. in a mental picture due to some years of organic process in the brain. In other words if this picture was due to brain damage back in 1959 we would have an abnormal E.E.G.

JUDGE BEYERS: Or if it was due to epilepsy?

DR. MACGREGOR: Or if it was due to epilepsy.

JUDGE BEYERS: You would see it there?

DR. MACGREGOR: We would almost certainly see it. I specifically got the technician to get him to overbreathe, flash lights at him which are ways of simulating the abnormal waves, and bringing them out if epilepsy is present.

JUDGE BEYERS: If I understand anything of what I have heard, and understand anything about the subject of schizophrenia, you would find nothing?

DR. MACGREGOR: That is the usual finding, yes, in my experience. There are other

⁵⁶⁵⁶ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 19 January 2016; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

people who say that they are rather abnormal waves, but this depends on the degree of dementia. If the schizophrenic patient is very demented, then you may get abnormal, rather irregular waves - not epileptiform waves. But when the personality, when the intellect is not too far deteriorated, the picture is nearly always a normal one, unless there is some other factor present, isn't the dysrhythmia of the waves caused "by the electric impulse passing through the tissues? Mustn't you by that time have a physiological change taking place?

DR. MACGREGOR: There must be a physiological change, yes. And this is one of the arguments which many psychiatrists put forward to the fact that they believe that schizophrenia is primarily

JUDGE BEYERS: It may have an organic background?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes.

TSAFENDAS'S THOUGHT-BLOCKING, PAST MEDICAL RECORDS AND DR. MACGREGOR'S PROGNOSIS

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Did you find thought blocking?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes. In my first interview, not very much thought blocking. He paused. I was not very happy about putting this down as thought blocking. But in the second, and particularly in the third interview, he showed very marked thought blocking. On one occasion there was absolute silence for a timed period of just on two minutes. There were very many occasions when he stopped speaking for ten seconds, and would then go off at a complete tangent.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In short then, what is the accused's present mental state?

DR. MACGREGOR: I believe that he is suffering from schizophrenia. I would put I think it into the paranoid type. Dr. Sakinofsky put it in the paraphrenic type. I would not quarrel with this. A paraphrenic type is a subdivision of the paranoid type. I don't think one needs to be too exact as to which category one puts it in. That he is suffering from schizophrenia I have absolutely no doubt at all. That he is certifiable within the meaning of the Act I have also no doubt at all.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Is it a long standing disease?

DR. MACGREGOR: I believe in his case it has gone on from at least 1946 or 1947, yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is the prognosis?

DR. MACGREGOR: I agree with the others in thinking the prognosis is hopeless. But it would be worthwhile giving him treatment, but I would not give it with any sanguinity.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Where should this Court, in your opinion, send the accused?

DR. MACGREGOR: My opinion isn't worth very much, but, if I were asked, I would say he must be sent somewhere where he can be very closely watched and guarded, because he told us that on at least two occasions he has escaped from mental hospitals, once in Germany and once in Lisbon.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Should he be sent to an asylum?

DR. MACGREGOR: I don't think any ordinary asylum would hold this man for any length of time.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Finally, do you see any purpose whatsoever in having any further medical examination of this man?

DR. MACGREGOR: Not unless the Court were to ask me - I myself would not see any further purpose at all.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Just finally, you have seen the information from overseas concerning this man's past medical history and mental history?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: What is your comment on that? How important is that information?

DR. MACGREGOR: If that information is correct, I think it is absolutely consistent and confirmatory of the fact that this man has had chronic paranoid schizophrenia for many years.

COMMENTS ON DR. MACGREGOR'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

TSAFENDAS'S MEDICAL RECORDS

Dr. MacGregor states here that he has seen some "information from overseas" concerning Tsafendas's "past medical history and mental history." He then, surprisingly maybe, states that "if this information is correct ..." which suggests that he is unsure whether or not the information is correct. The author is not in a position to elaborate further on the subject as it does not know which information Dr. MacGregor is talking about. However, the likelihood

must be that the information regarding Tsafendas's medical history was given to him verbally by the police and the defence, as in the case of van Zyl.

It seems unlikely that if he had seen a medical report from a British or an American hospital with his own eyes he would have asked if this information was correct. What seems likelier is that he was merely told of some of the contents. That he learned about Tsafendas's past history from Tsafendas himself can be adduced from his statement that Tsafendas "told us that on at least two occasions he has escaped from mental hospitals, once in Germany and once in Lisbon." This argues strongly that his source was Tsafendas, not any medical report. Most likely, as with van Zyl, he was given the summary of a medical report stating just that Tsafendas was diagnosed in such and such hospital as being a schizophrenic.

Furthermore, Dr. MacGregor was not aware of very important information regarding Tsafendas's medical history, such as the fact that he had faked mental illness before, that he claimed to hear voices in the early 1940s and that on at least four occasions he had shown signs of mental illness while being interrogated in detention. This again suggests that he had not seen the report with his own eyes and was probably told about the diagnosis only. Furthermore, the fact that he did not personally see any medical reports is also suggested by his statement at the beginning of his testimony that "time was precious" and he had "to take shortcuts. I accepted what was given to me about this man's life history, various dates and to which countries he had been." Dr. MacGregor also stated that he made his diagnosis on the basis of his interviews with Tsafendas alone without mentioning consulting any medical reports.

We should also mention here again that at least the report from the Grafton State Hospital did not become available to the defence before, at best, the 5th of October, when Dr. MacGregor and all the defence's expert witnesses, apart from Dr. Sakinofsky and van Zyl, had already examined Tsafendas twice and concluded that he was a schizophrenic.

DR. MACGREGOR'S PROGNOSIS

Dr. MacGregor's prognosis was that Tsafendas's condition was "hopeless," with doubts that treatment could help him. However, thirty-three years later witnesses declared that Tsafendas was perfectly fine. In all that time, he had received no treatment (at least not for the first twenty-eight years); for at least twenty-three years he was kept in solitary confinement for

twenty-three hours per day, in a cell right next to the death chamber, often forced to watch the executions; he was frequently and severely beaten, deprived of books and newspapers and even contact with his fellow prisoners.

That Tsafendas was perfectly normal after that was testified by Alexander and Marie-Jose Moumbaris, Dimitris Skoularikis, Liza Key, Rika Nikolatos and Fathers Minas Constandinou, Spiros Randos, Ioannis Tsafaridis and Michalis Visvinis. All these people visited or saw Tsafendas in prison or in the mental hospital to which he was eventually moved, and spent considerable time with him. None ever got the impression that Tsafendas was insane or "hopeless" in the way described by Dr. MacGregor and by the other psychiatrists at this summary trial. More importantly, after his long incarceration, Tsafendas explained in detail everything regarding Dr. Verwoerd's assassination and his life. What he told these witnesses is entirely compatible with what two hundred people told the police and the author and completely incompatible with Dr. MacGregor's and the other psychiatrists' testimonies.

COMMENTS ON TSAFENDAS'S THOUGHT-BLOCKING

The issue has been discussed extensively in the testimonies of Dr. Sakinofsky and Dr. Zabow.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE ASSISTANT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

BRUNETTE: Can you perhaps remember when it was that you saw the accused for the first time?

DR. MACGREGOR: Yes, on the 29th September. At about 6.30.

BRUNETTE: You say he was not certifiable on that day?

DR. MACGREGOR: I say I wasn't very happy about considering him certifiable.

JUDGE BEYERS: The doctor never said anything of the kind. He said on the strength of the first interview he had with him he would have been doubtful whether he would at that stage certify him, which is quite different from your telling him that he says that at that stage he was not certifiable.

BRUNETTE: You would not have been prepared to certify him on that day?

DR. MACGREGOR: If I had been pressed to certify him on that day I would have asked for a longer interview. But I had about an hour and a half with him, and I knew there was no need to certify him on that day, and I knew I was going to have further opportunity of seeing him, so I thought to myself that I would just bide my time, but I did say in my report that I thought that he was probably certifiable.

BRUNETTE: You also mentioned that schizophrenics do move from one extreme to the other. So do you concede that you get remissionary periods?

DR. MACGREGOR: No, that is not what I meant, moving from one extreme - one extreme of emotional attitude - one extreme of an attitude towards a person, a negative attitude, perhaps disliking them, distrusting them, to a more positive attitude of liking them and trusting them. This has nothing to do with remissions. It is all part of the schizophrenic process.

BRUNETTE: Do you concede that there are periodic types?

DR. MACGREGOR: I concede that there are periodic types, but I would also agree with the last witness that - in my opinion these are virtually always the catatonic type. And I don't believe this patient is a catatonic type of schizophrenic. He had no evidence of catatonia when we saw him.

BRUNETTE: Did you get any information in probing the history of the accused that he had simulated suicide before?

DR. MACGREGOR: No, I knew nothing about any simulation of suicide.

JUDGE BEYERS: Simulated suicide - what on earth does that mean? He pretended to commit suicide?

BRUNETTE: He pretended. Feigned suicide.

JUDGE BEYERS: What does that mean, that he committed suicide but was not successful?

BRUNETTE: Unsuccessful, yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: Simulated suicide would mean that he pretended to commit suicide but didn't try it.

BRUNETTE: Perhaps I can put it in a better way: any of simulated abnormality?

DR. MACGREGOR: I know nothing in the reports that say that he simulated abnormality.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The only matter that remains at present is the subject that I raised at the commencement when I outlined my case, if I might call it that, and that is the taking of evidence on commission, I have prepared an application which I now want to formally place before your Lordship.

JUDGE BEYERS: This is not the stage to do it, nor will I deprive you of the right to do it. Should it, after evidence is led by the State, be necessary, I will allow you to make the application, and I will consider it on its merits. But obviously in granting or not granting leave to take evidence overseas, the first consideration is whether the evidence can assist the Court, if it is not necessary it obviously cannot assist the Court, I think you should wait, but I will allow you to make the application again, if necessary.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Subject to that, I have no further evidence to lead.

COMMENTS ON THE CROSS-EXAMINATION

The most astonishing part of Brunette's cross-examination is his reference to Tsafendas having simulated abnormality before. Even more extraordinary, although it is not spelled out, is that Brunette suggests that such information is in Tsafendas's medical records. It is unclear what Tsafendas is supposed to have done on this occasion and where this information came from, but the important thing here is that the State had in its possession such vital information and it had not been used, especially with the defence's psychiatrists. It seems that the State did not consider it important enough or for some reason deliberately did not bring this issue up when challenging the defence psychiatrists who had examined Tsafendas, even when the issue of simulation came up. As for Brunette's cross-examination, neither he nor the Attorney-General nor the judge saw fit to pursue the simulation angle and the matter was allowed to drop.

The Attorney-General's assistant refers initially to Tsafendas having simulated suicide. Although the author cannot be certain to which incident Brunette refers, this is probably in Hamburg when Tsafendas turned up at the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital claiming falsely that he had attempted suicide by taking twenty sleeping pills. The fact that Tsafendas was lying does not appear anywhere in the reports from this hospital, so if this was the incident Brunette is referring to, how did he know about it? Tsafendas never discussed

this particular incident with anyone who was interviewed by the author. However, he discussed the issue of suicide in philosophical and religious terms several times with the priests who visited him.

Tsafendas firmly believed that only a very brave man could commit suicide and considered himself not brave enough to do so. That was why, he said, he never contemplated suicide, not even when he was tortured in custody or in prison. Also, he considered suicide to be seriously sinful and since he was very religious, this was another reason why he never contemplated such an act.⁵⁶⁵⁷ If he did not contemplate suicide at some of the worst times of his life, why would he do so in Hamburg? It is not impossible but very unlikely that the suicide attempt mentioned in Dr. Bieser's report was genuine. The more likely scenario, which would fit with Tsafendas's life style and ideas, is that being penniless and homeless in Hamburg, he admitted himself to the Tropen Krankenhaus Hospital claiming he had a tapeworm; when he was discharged, since no tapeworm was found, he was still penniless and homeless and so admitted himself to another hospital, lying that he had taken the twenty sleeping pills. It is possible that Brunette was referring to this incident, although the author did not find any evidence to support or contradict the possibility. It is merely the author's opinion based on Tsafendas's beliefs and modus operandi with the hospitals. If Brunette was referring to this incident, he got the information from a source that was not found in the archives or anywhere else by the author.

The only other reference to suicide in Tsafendas's medical records is from the United States in 1943, when he told the US Immigration he would commit suicide if he was deported. However, that was just a threat and obviously never carried it out. As for "simulating abnormality," the South African police were very well aware that Tsafendas had done such thing at least twice. The first was the report from the Grafton State Hospital which said that in 1943 Tsafendas had faked mental illness to avoid being shipped out; the second was when Tsafendas pretended to be mad so as to avoid compulsory service in the Portuguese Army in 1952, which was known to the police from witnesses' statements.

⁵⁶⁵⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

CONCLUSION

Dr. MacGregor's testimony and diagnosis are very similar to those of the three other psychiatrists. He comes to the same conclusions and therefore the same misdiagnosis. There is a major difference to the other psychiatrists' testimonies, however, and this is that Dr. MacGregor admits freely that he was pressed for time and took "shortcuts" in order to complete his diagnosis, which was based exclusively on four and a half hours he spent with Tsafendas, without consulting any additional information.

The most important thing we learn from Dr. MacGregor's testimony is that the State was aware that Tsafendas had "simulated abnormality" before, but had not found it important enough to bring up with all the other defence witnesses. Another important element in his testimony is that he refers to "information from overseas," as if this information is inevitably correct. He is unlikely to be referring to actual medical reports, as he would have known they would be right. More likely, he is referring to information about Tsafendas's medical history that was given to him verbally, as was the case with van Zyl and very probably with the other psychiatrists, too. Dr. MacGregor's diagnosis and conclusions are entirely wrong, but he is hardly to blame since he made them only by talking to Tsafendas and without any supplementary information. Once again, the Attorney-General did nothing to challenge testimony despite the plethora of evidence which the South African police had in its possession.

Tsafendas remembered Dr. MacGregor warmly in later years, referring to him as "the Scottish psychiatrist." Father Minas does not remember exactly what Tsafendas said, except that he referred to him in positive terms, as he did with Dr. Zabow and Dr. Sakinofsky.⁵⁶⁵⁸

⁵⁶⁵⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

DAY 4: 20 OCTOBER 1966

**PROSECUTION WITNESS No. 1: JACOBUS ANDREAS JOHANNES
ERASMUS**

INTRODUCTION

Jacobus Erasmus, a clinical psychologist with an M.A. in Psychology, was working at the time at Weskoppies Hospital in Pretoria; he was the State's first expert witness.⁵⁶⁵⁹

EXTRACTS FROM JACOBUS ERASMUS'S TESTIMONY⁵⁶⁶⁰

BRUNETTE: On the 28th and 29th of September 1966 did you interview the defendant?

ERASMUS: Yes.

BRUNETTE: Did you perform certain tests?

ERASMUS: Yes.

BRUNETTE: Explain to the Court what these tests were - The Wechsler-Bellevue IQ Test; the Wechsler Memory Scales; the MMPI; the T.A.T. and the Rorschach Tests. Are these tests the same as those described to the Court by Dr. van Zyl?

ERASMUS: Yes, except that I did two additional tests.

BRUNETTE: What were your findings from the tests?

ERASMUS: I first did the Wechsler- Bellevue test. My findings were that his intellectual capacity was classified within the upper limits of the average. His IQ was 109. Whereas he has a higher potential intellectual capacity, this is diminished by restricting factors revealed by the patterns of the sub-tests of the Wechsler-Bellevue tests and the large difference between the verbal IQ of 117 and the practical IQ of 100.

⁵⁶⁵⁹ Jacobus Andreas Johannes Erasmus' testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁶⁶⁰ Jacobus Andreas Johannes Erasmus' testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

In order to determine these factors it is necessary to analyse the different sub-tests. Here there is a lowering of both the concentration capacity and the visual-motor coordination. This diminished concentration and attention capacity are attributable to the fact that the subject has difficulty in keeping his thoughts to one subject, his anxiety state, general anxiety and debilitation and depression. This would explain why the subject, Tsafendas, frequently repeats the questions put to him and is inclined to be long-winded. He would therefore find difficulty to direct his thoughts to one subject only because of these other possible problems. This could also derive from the acutely psychotic patient's being unable to concentrate. A prior psychotic episode could also lead to diminished capacity and poor concentration. Although this cannot be eliminated in this instance, it is unlikely given the good achievements in some of the other sub-tests and the absence of spread within the sub-tests.

The poor visual-motor coordination is due to the generalised apathy, slowness of the patient in performing motor tasks. He was unable to consistently perform the practical tasks in the given time. This phenomenon frequently occurs with patients who are in a debilitating state of anxiety and psychological disintegration. There is a formulary for psychological disintegration which is used in this test and it is 21%. At the patient's age, the expected level is 11%, which should then be corrected and then the rate of disintegration level of 10% for intellectual capacity, which places him on the borderline- which raises the doubt of whether he has disintegrated or not.

If it was higher than 10% one could have confirmed this. Although possible indications of disintegration were found, this was uncertain, and could have been explained with reference to his age or the presence of psychic tension.

Then I also used the Wechsler Memory Test in which he achieved an IQ of 106, which places him above the average of 100. The Wechsler Memory Test purpose is to test the memory and is equivalent to the IQ test, but has a memory quotient. Here Tsafendas had a good result, he had no defect in his memory.

Then I also performed the Rorschach Test where the results did not reveal any bizarre response distortions or perseveration or any other tendencies to disintegration. The responses were reasonably appropriate for the stimuli, but only minimal responses were given, which indicates a blockage or inability to react freely. The responses were also stereotypical. This test shows a weak ego development and an insufficient control of the tendency to act impulsively.

The subject therefore cannot strive towards adult objectives and often resorts to fantasy. He shows a strong tendency towards withdrawal from his surroundings. As a result of this, his evaluation of his surroundings is primarily subjective and he is incapable of objectivity. This is connected to and combined with his unfulfilled need for acceptance.

According to the Rorschach Test, the subject's personality development is on an infantile level, with a tendency to withdrawal; a stereotypical tendency towards a general withdrawal from reality. As a result of the small amount of responses given in this test because of the existing blockages in the subject, it is difficult to do an accurate analysis of this test.

There were 10 cards and he only responded to 7 or 8.

The above conclusions about the Rorschach Test were confirmed by the T.A.T. Test in which he gave logical responses showing a good insight into the motivations of the figures. He displayed a good grasp of the connection between self and the outside world and no distortions were found. Although the subject, (D.S.) connected well with the outside world, he was always reworking reality in terms of his own dream and fantasy world, without being involved in a realistic way.

Tsafendas sets extremely high ideals for himself, but is unable to take positive steps to achieve them, and rather believes in his own fantasy world and that his ideals would be achieved through supernatural and magical means.

JUDGE BEYERS: Is this not a textbook definition of a schizophrenic?

ERASMUS: Yes, it does fit in with that definition. Interpersonal interactions in the T.A.T. Test were acknowledged while these took place. However, because of the undertone of depression, these interactions were not experienced as satisfactory by D.S.

The M.M.P.I. Test is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Test which is a personality questionnaire containing many different items, including hypochondria, psychopathy, paranoia, schizophrenia. The subject is questioned and graded on each of the above scales. This test also has an invalid scale. When the subject does not answer the questions consistently, the test is invalidated and the result cannot be used. This is the case here with Tsafendas, who was careless and inconsistent in his answers and the result was thus invalid.

The high levels in the various scales were those of schizophrenia, depression, hypochondria and psychopathy. He achieved low scales for paranoia and manic tendencies. But I reiterate that the test results can be accepted because he was inconsistent in his answers.

JUDGE BEYERS: What is your conclusion after all your tests?

ERASMUS: What these tests especially show is that there are clear signs of schizophrenia from the signs of the blockages encountered, the poor capacity for concentration is often found, and the strong fantasy world. There are also aspects of the sub-tests which do not entirely fit in with the Wechsler-Bellevue Tests, particularly the various sub-tests with picture arrangement, where he did well and where his insights were also good. On the other hand, it is to be expected that the schizophrenic's intellectual capacity would not be affected and that the intelligence would remain on which level. Also, the history of the accused should also be considered, in which case it will be accepted that schizophrenia is present.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE DEFENCE COUNSEL

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you not contest the opinions of Drs. Zabow, Cooper and Sakinofsky that the accused before the Court is schizophrenic?

ERASMUS: No, I do not contest this.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: That he is untreatable?

ERASMUS: No.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: That he should be sent to an institution?

ERASMUS: In the light of the history...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: In the light of the evidence which has been presented to the Court?

ERASMUS: Correct, I do not contest it.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: The Court can only come to one conclusion, do you agree?

ERASMUS: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: That he is mentally disturbed? Correct?

ERASMUS: Yes.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: That he ought to be certified? Correct?

ERASMUS: No answer...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: You just said so - yes - correct?

ERASMUS: Is it necessary that I give an opinion? ...

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Yes, it is very necessary. I want an unanimous conclusion.

ERASMUS: Yes.

COMMENTS ON ERASMUS'S TESTIMONY

TSAFENDAS BEING "UNABLE TO DIRECT HIS THOUGHTS TO ONE SUBJECT ONLY"

According to Erasmus, Tsafendas "frequently repeats the questions put to him and is inclined to be long-winded. He would therefore find difficulty to direct his thoughts to one subject only. This is very similar to Dr. Cooper's diagnosis which said that Tsafendas was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes.

Major Rossouw, head of the Security Police in Cape Town and a highly experienced interrogator, was the officer in charge of Tsafendas's interrogation. Rossouw questioned Tsafendas on several occasions over at least twenty days and the transcripts of two of these interrogations were found in the NASA and have been examined here. The first of these sessions lasted two days and the second seems to have taken a few hours. The second transcript contains Rossouw's questions and Tsafendas's answers. Rossouw told the Commission of Enquiry that Tsafendas "told the truth – I never got the impression that he tried to evade any question. He answered all the questions spontaneously" and he was "totally prepared to answer everything."⁵⁶⁶¹

Rossouw made no mention to Erasmus's comment that Tsafendas "frequently repeats the questions put to him ..." Indeed, reading both of the transcripts makes clear that there was no repetition. If something of the sort was observed by Rossouw, an experienced interrogator, he would have almost certainly mentioned it to the Commission and most probably called in a psychiatrist to examine Tsafendas. However, none of that happened.

Major Rossouw was not the only one who failed to observe the symptom mentioned by Erasmus. None of the two hundred or so witnesses questioned by the police and the

⁵⁶⁶¹ Major Rossouw testimony to the Commission of Enquiry, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

Commission of Enquiry observed it either. Some expressed exactly contrary views. For example:

- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine-ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁵⁶⁶²
- Gillian Claire Lieberman, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation, whose office Tsafendas often visited, “I had various discussions with him. I got quite interested in him as an individual. ... I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation.”⁵⁶⁶³
- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike’s Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966, frequently driving him to the tanker *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town. Of Tsafendas, he told the police that he “never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers.”⁵⁶⁶⁴
- Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban appointed Tsafendas as a Portuguese and Greek interpreter. Rudolph used him “on several occasions” in a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He testified that “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁵⁶⁶⁵

The author asked forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas if they thought that Erasmus’s diagnosis was correct and whether they had noticed anything of the sort with him. They all strongly disputed Erasmus’s conclusions. For example, Father Michalis Visvinis who visited Tsafendas for five years in prison (1989-1994) and got to know him very well, told the author:

“He [Tsafendas] was always very alert. I was actually surprised that his mind was so alert after so many years in prison. Most of our conversations lasted about an hour and a half

⁵⁶⁶² Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁶⁶³ Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁶⁶⁴ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁵⁶⁶⁵ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

and he never lost track, nor did I feel that he was struggling to cope with our discussion... I felt that he [Tsafendas] needed to speak, so several times I would just let him speak. He enjoyed speaking and he could speak for hours. I also often asked him questions about his life, and his answers were always logical and what one would expect. He never evaded any question and I never had to repeat myself to him for a second time, nor was his answer ever off the subject. I never noticed that, it never happened [Tsafendas being “unable to direct his thoughts to one subject only”]. I don’t think that this is true. His speech was always absolutely fine. He always spoke like a normal man. [His speech] was not disjointed or anything else. It was perfectly articulate and logical, always very coherent. He never said anything to suggest he had a mental problem or that he had any difficulty speaking or thinking and expressing himself properly.”⁵⁶⁶⁶

Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis told the author:

“[Tsafendas] could speak for hours, telling you things about his life, his thoughts and his ideology, but he could also participate in a dialogue. We spoke for hours about politics, religion and history and he was one of the most knowledgeable people I ever met in all these subjects. He was very argumentative and insistent, especially about politics. He never got lost in the conversation and he would never drop a subject until I had agreed with him. He would never give up a conversation if you disagreed. He never, not even once, seemed to have difficulty expressing himself or talked incoherently. Every single time, everything he said made sense and was perfectly stated. I don’t believe for a moment that he could have talked in the way described by the psychiatrists unless he did it deliberately. He spoke and argued even better than most people. His speech and thought were perfectly fine.”⁵⁶⁶⁷

For reasons of space, the study will list only a few of the other witnesses who were interviewed by the author, those who knew him best or longest:

- His half-sister Katerina Pnefma;⁵⁶⁶⁸
- Ira Kyriakakis who grew up with him and spent a lot of time together in 1964 and 1965;⁵⁶⁶⁹
- Andreas Babiolakis who knew him since they were children, lived with him for two

⁵⁶⁶⁶ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁵⁶⁶⁷ Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁶⁶⁸ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁶⁶⁹ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

months in 1964 and associated with him for about a year then;⁵⁶⁷⁰

- Alexander Moumbaris who spent three months in a cell next to Tsafendas's in Pretoria Prison in 1972. They spoke every day for an hour when they exercised together in the prison yard. They met again in March 1996 at Sterkfontein Hospital;⁵⁶⁷¹
- Thirteen crewmen from the *Eleni* who saw him every day for forty-two days in 1966;⁵⁶⁷²
- Elias Constantaras who lived under the same roof for two months in Cape Town in 1966 and knew him for more than a year;⁵⁶⁷³
- Irene Michaletos who was very close to him for more than a year (1964-1965), when he often visited her house in Beira;⁵⁶⁷⁴
- John Michaletos, Irene's husband, Tsafendas's cousin and the son of Artemis's (Tsafendas's aunt who brought him up in Egypt), met Tsafendas in 1951 and associated with him in 1963-1965, getting to know him very well.⁵⁶⁷⁵
- Antony Michaletos, John's brother, met Tsafendas in 1951 and associated with him in 1963-1965, getting to know him very well.⁵⁶⁷⁶
- Alexandra Vaporidis who knew him for about six months in Istanbul in 1961;⁵⁶⁷⁷
- Nick Papadakis, who knew Tsafendas for two-three months and lived with him for two months in Mozambique in 1964;⁵⁶⁷⁸
- Panagiotis Peroglou, Stratis Vamvarapis, Antonis Nichas and Costas Chagios, who were Tsafendas's friends in Cape Town for more than a year.⁵⁶⁷⁹

⁵⁶⁷⁰ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁵⁶⁷¹ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

⁵⁶⁷² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 19 January 2016; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁵⁶⁷³ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁵⁶⁷⁴ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵⁶⁷⁵ John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁵⁶⁷⁶ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016.

⁵⁶⁷⁷ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁵⁶⁷⁸ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵⁶⁷⁹ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015; Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016; Antonis Nichas in a personal interview, 31 March 2016; Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016; Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

TSAFENDAS "CANNOT STRIVE TOWARDS ADULT OBJECTIVES AND OFTEN RESORTS TO FANTASY," SHOWS A "STEREOTYPICAL TENDENCY TOWARDS A GENERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM REALITY," AND HE "SETS EXTREMELY HIGH IDEALS FOR HIMSELF, BUT IS UNABLE TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO ACHIEVE THEM, AND RATHER BELIEVES IN HIS OWN FANTASY WORLD AND THAT HIS IDEALS WOULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH SUPERNATURAL OR MAGICAL MEANS"

Erasmus's above testimony is completely inaccurate. Tsafendas cherished many adult objectives which were more serious and highly principled than most peoples. For example, he was strongly in favour of the independence of Mozambique and wanted to see "a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the mother nation."⁵⁶⁸⁰

Tsafendas campaigned constantly for independence, distributed books and leaflets and tried to raise awareness of this goal, while in 1938 he had attempted to raise awareness against Portugal's forced cotton policy. For these very public efforts and other political activities in Mozambique, he was arrested five times and imprisoned three times by the Portuguese. More importantly, PIDE considered him to be a "partisan for the independence of Mozambique."⁵⁶⁸¹

Another major objective was an end to apartheid; Tsafendas wanted to see "a government that would represent all South Africans,"⁵⁶⁸² he wanted to bring about "a change of policy" in South Africa,⁵⁶⁸³ to "create a resistance to the regime of South Africa" and was even willing to do "anything that would get the South African regime out of power."⁵⁶⁸⁴ He strove to achieve this goal by smuggling anti-apartheid literature into the country, asking foreign visitors not to spend any money so as not to contribute to the apartheid economy.

Finally, he took the most drastic of measures to achieve his objective (or "fantasy" according to Dr. Erasmus) by killing the man he believed had created and was "the brains

⁵⁶⁸⁰ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁶⁸¹ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁶⁸² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁸³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁸⁴ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

behind apartheid,”⁵⁶⁸⁵ in the hope that “a change of policy would take place.”⁵⁶⁸⁶ Certainly, independence for Mozambique and an end to apartheid in South Africa were “adult themes” as Tsafendas strove tirelessly to achieve both goals. Of course, Erasmus was unaware of all this and diagnosed him according to what he was told by Tsafendas himself and the results of the tests he gave him.

None of the two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry at the time reported anything with the slightest resemblance to what Erasmus said. Furthermore, none of forty-four witnesses interviewed by the author agreed with Erasmus’s diagnosis. People who knew Tsafendas well said that far from being withdrawn from reality, he was a firmly grounded yet highly principled idealist. We feel it is not necessary to include all the statements as we have seen the comments in previous testimonies. Was Tsafendas a dreamer living in a fantasy world because he wanted to see an independent Mozambique and to bring an end to apartheid? To paraphrase John Lennon, “you may say he was a dreamer, but he was not the only one...”

TSAFFENDAS “SHOWS A STRONG TENDENCY TOWARDS WITHDRAWAL FROM HIS SURROUNDINGS”

According to Erasmus, Tsafendas showed “a strong tendency towards withdrawal from his surroundings. As a result of this, his evaluation of his surroundings is primarily subjective and he is incapable of objectivity.” Again, this is completely inaccurate. Two witnesses out of around two hundred who testified to the police said Tsafendas “did not mix freely and kept to himself most of the time,”⁵⁶⁸⁷ and that he was “not very talkative.”⁵⁶⁸⁸ The vast majority declared the opposite:

- William Mare Volbrecht, a friend and schoolmate at the English Medium Primary School in Middleburg, testified to the police that Tsafendas was “never a loner and freely mingled with us.”⁵⁶⁸⁹ Tsafendas’s half-sister, Katerina Pnema, his first cousin who grew

⁵⁶⁸⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁵⁶⁸⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁸⁷ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁶⁸⁸ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁶⁸⁹ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Verklaring deur Majdor Venter. NASA.

up with him in Egypt and Lourenço Marques, Mary Eendracht, and Ira Kyriakakis, Helen Grispos and Andreas Babiolakis, who also grew up with him, agreed with Volbrecht's comment and said that from childhood Tsafendas was sociable, friendly and very talkative.⁵⁶⁹⁰

- An unnamed "respected member of the Press gallery" in the House of Assembly "who knew Tsafendas well" spoke to Rene MacColl, of the *Daily Express*, about Tsafendas. He said that "far from being a withdrawn sort of man, he seemed to be intent on impressing his personality on one. There was always the big smile, the ready chat and an almost obsessive intention to make you remember him. There couldn't have been a less grey or faceless figure."⁵⁶⁹¹
- Keith Martincich who worked with him at the Marine Diamond Corporation testified that Tsafendas "spoke to me every day and I got the impression that he was sociable type."⁵⁶⁹²
- J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a "sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man."⁵⁶⁹³
- Hulse who worked with him at the Marine Diamond Corporation for nine or ten weeks said "Tsafendas was very talkative and always expressed his..."⁵⁶⁹⁴
- Ian Boswell of the Department of Labour, in his description of Tsafendas, included the phrase, "aside from being over talkative ..."⁵⁶⁹⁵
- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour, testified that "he was very talkative."⁵⁶⁹⁶
- Owen Smorenberg who worked with him for five-six weeks, testified that "Tsafendas was very talkative and gave the impression that he was very friendly. He wanted to talk to

⁵⁶⁹⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁶⁹¹ *Daily Express*, 9 September 1966: 2, 'Was it murder incorporated?'

⁵⁶⁹² Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁶⁹³ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. 'Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.'

⁵⁶⁹⁴ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; The edge of the document was not copied, so the word is missing.

⁵⁶⁹⁵ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁵⁶⁹⁶ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

everybody and it became known to me that he was able to speak different languages.”⁵⁶⁹⁷

- Albert Vercueil, his boss at F.A. Poole Engineering for five months found him to be a “very friendly, social and talkative person.”⁵⁶⁹⁸
- August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet.”⁵⁶⁹⁹
- Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden worked with Tsafendas for some three months at the Marine Diamond Corporation and testified that “he was friendly, outgoing, and was not aloof.”⁵⁷⁰⁰
- Jacobus Bornman, his flatmate for two months, summed Tsafendas up as “a friendly and plausible person.”⁵⁷⁰¹
- Jose Lopez Baltazar a fireman in Beira, testified that “when Tsafendas was in the presence of Whites he said little or nothing, but was friendly and talkative with the Bantu.”⁵⁷⁰²
- Reginald Maile, shipguard on the *Eleni*, testified that Tsafendas was “on very friendly relations with the crew.”⁵⁷⁰³
- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for two months and testified to the police that he had “a very friendly way of talking.”⁵⁷⁰⁴ He later said that Tsafendas was “overly talkative and sociable.”⁵⁷⁰⁵
- Michaelis Augustides, Tsafendas’s employer for two months, also found him to be

⁵⁶⁹⁷ Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

⁵⁶⁹⁸ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁶⁹⁹ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁷⁰⁰ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁷⁰¹ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁷⁰² Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁵⁷⁰³ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁵⁷⁰⁴ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘*Eleni*.’ NASA.

⁵⁷⁰⁵ Lambley, 1980: 241.

“overly talkative and sociable.”⁵⁷⁰⁶

- Panagiotis Peroglou who knew Tsafendas for about a year, testified to the police but his statements have gone missing, However, in a personal interview, he and his wife Pamela Abrahams, who had also met Tsafendas, characterised him as “very talkative, courteous and friendly.”⁵⁷⁰⁷

Fotini Gavasiadis also said that while Tsafendas worked at her brother’s café, he “was always with a smile in his mouth, chatting and joking with the customers... he was very popular, especially with the older customers. Some of them were coming to the café just to talk to him. They were quite old and had no else to talk to. Dimitris patiently listened to their stories or whatever they had to say. He always had a comforting word for them and for those who needed it.”⁵⁷⁰⁸

Perhaps the most convincing proof that Tsafendas did not tend to “withdraw from his surroundings” as Erasmus suggested, comes from the following two incidents:

Guenter Haafe was the doorman at the Frankfurt factory where Tsafendas worked for six weeks in 1958. Haafe was interviewed eight years later, shortly after the assassination, and vividly remembered the jovial greeting Tsafendas gave him every morning. “He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come into my locker (room) to say Hi. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met and trust me, in my twelve years as a doorman I have seen thousands and thousands of faces coming in and out. This man was courteous, they do not make them like that anymore.” Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas’s chief on the Frankfurt job, said Tsafendas was “well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous ... a very pleasant man. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman.”⁵⁷⁰⁹ “We liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.”⁵⁷¹⁰

While in Beira in 1964, Tsafendas attended the wedding of Vittorio, an Italian friend and fellow Communist, probably from Naples, who was working with him at the time. As the celebrations proceeded, Tsafendas rose from his chair and raised his glass. Everyone thought he was about to deliver a speech. He did indeed deliver a very short speech wishing the

⁵⁷⁰⁶ Lambley, 1980: 241.

⁵⁷⁰⁷ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁵⁷⁰⁸ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁵⁷⁰⁹ *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

⁵⁷¹⁰ *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin.’

newly-weds well, but then, in a ringing baritone, he launched passionately into an Italian Communist song. Most of the Greeks among the guests were speechless, but Vittorio and his Italian friends joined in eagerly, clapping and rhythmically pounding the table with their fists or spoons. When he finished he received huge applause and Vittorio and some of his friends called for another song. Tsafendas obliged with a second Italian Communist anthem and again many guests joined him.⁵⁷¹¹

As well as the witnesses questioned by the police, the forty-four interviewed by the author characterised Tsafendas as very friendly, very sociable and very talkative. None agreed with Erasmus's diagnosis. Their testimonies cannot be listed here for reasons of space, but the words of those reproduced above clearly prove Erasmus was wrong.

CONCLUSION

Erasmus's diagnosis is mostly based on the tests he conducted on Tsafendas. These showed Tsafendas as a completely different person to the one described by two hundred and fifty people to the police, to the Commission and to the author. Again, Erasmus did not have any other information about Tsafendas apart from what he heard from him. Some thirty years later, Tsafendas characterised the psychological tests he took while he was in custody as "childish stuff."⁵⁷¹²

Asked by the author to comment on the psychological tests, Professor Burke said:

"Back in those days, the psychological tests were very unsophisticated, so you could have had results, and it could have been argued one of two ways to say it proves or disproves. It was never an exact science. Whether the interpretation was right or wrong, the Rorschach ink blot test was never a scientific tool, it was mainly a projective test, and, as in psychology, there are many approaches to things. So by saying it was incorrect, you could also say, 'It was not the way I would have done it,' so whether it was correct or incorrect doesn't really matter.

The fact is that those tests and the interpretation of those tests, were always open to interpretation. You could have done it, come to me with the results, and I would have looked

⁵⁷¹¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵⁷¹² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

at the same results and I would have come up with a different conclusion, so whether it was done correctly or incorrectly, is neither here nor there. The test could, at most, say that there is a possibility of schizophrenia, at the very most, but you could never make an accurate diagnosis. There are people who would argue that you could, but you could never make an accurate diagnosis of schizophrenia based on that test, or on any test for that matter.

I still think that your best instrument for making a diagnosis like this is what the people around you say, and your assessment of the functioning of the person; that gives you the best idea. The psychological tests would confirm what you have picked up, so what you would always have with any kind of diagnostic assessment is, you would have your observations of the patient, the information you get from the people around, and your psychological tests, and then you pick up themes. If you pick up the same themes in those three areas, then you say, 'This is the diagnosis.' If it's only in one of those areas, you can't confirm the diagnosis until you've got some kind of confirmation from other areas, as well, so it's a weak way of making a diagnosis."⁵⁷¹³

However, the most important thing here is not Erasmus's testimony as it was given to the court, but the fact that he had diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic from the 29th of September. This is highly significant because it means that since he was one of the State's two expert witnesses, he must have been given his diagnosis to the Attorney-General, the man who appointed him in the first place, before he testified in the court. What makes this even more important is the fact that the State's other expert witness, Adolph van Wyk, a Professor of Psychiatry, had also found Tsafendas to be a schizophrenic. Therefore despite the fact that both of the State's experts found Tsafendas to be insane, thus agreeing with the defence, the Attorney-General appeared to be "sceptical" about the defence's witnesses, questioning them extensively, when his own experts had already come to the exactly same conclusion. The issue will be discussed in detail in Professor van Wyk's testimony which follows.

⁵⁷¹³ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

**PROSECUTION WITNESS No. 2: PROFESSOR ADOLF JOHANNES
VAN WYK**

**PROFESSOR VAN WYK'S PROFESSIONAL BIOGRAPHY AS RELATED BY HIM
TO THE COURT**

Adolf Johannes van Wyk qualified as a physician in 1938, with the degrees M.B., Ch.B., and worked in general practice until 1949. He then began specialising in psychiatry, gained the DPM diploma and was placed on the register as a specialist-psychiatrist. From that time, he worked solely in the field of mental disorders and psychiatry. Professor van Wyk was appointed consulting psychiatrist in the prisons, carried out many observations for the State and testified often in court. His prison work included occasionally interviewing prisoners who had been sentenced to death on behalf of the State President. His appointments included Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pretoria, head of the Department of Psychiatry, Senior Psychiatrist of the General Hospital, and also Adjunct Commissioner of Mental Health of the Republic of South Africa.⁵⁷¹⁴ Professor van Wyk, as State's expert witness, had also examined John Harris.⁵⁷¹⁵

PROFESSOR VAN WYK'S TESTIMONY⁵⁷¹⁶

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Have you observed the accused?

PROF. VAN WYK: Yes, I saw the accused on five occasions: on 23 September, on 24 September, on 4 October, on 13 October and on 14 October.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: You were in the Court all the time that the psychiatrists for the defence testified, is that so?

PROF. VAN WYK: Yes, I was present the whole time and I also possess certain reports of his illnesses overseas, which I also studied. The last one which I received from the Ochenzoll Hospital in Hamburg is also in my possession.

⁵⁷¹⁴ Professor Adolf Johannes van Wyk's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁷¹⁵ Cooper, 2016: 107.

⁵⁷¹⁶ Professor Adolf Johannes van Wyk's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I would like you to give your conclusions to the Judge and his learned assessors.

PROF. VAN WYK: If one undertakes to observe and study a particular case, particularly if it is current, the first thing to consider is simulation. It is something which one should definitely distinguish, and then, even if one finds a psychological problem, in the second instance one must determine – even if there is a psychological problem, that does not imply irresponsibility – is the accused so affected by the mental state that he is not responsible for his deed?

And these were the two things which were uppermost in my mind the whole time that I had the accused under observation. During the first two observations, on the 23rd and the 24th, I was a little uncertain, because the man was very evasive, and one could not really place him, to determine to what extent there was simulation, and I felt at that time that I definitely would not certify him with the information and with the interviews which I had had with him until then. I wanted to know more about his background; I wanted to know more about the motivation for the act, would he be able to give this? Although he was evasive in that respect, it could also be a schizophrenic symptom. They often say “I don’t know. It may be.” That is a disturbance in thought processes. Because they cannot adequately express their thoughts, they answer in a seemingly evasive way. To what extent had he tried to evade giving the real reason? And I wanted to know more about the background.

On the 4th of October I found a symptom in the accused which definitely appeared spontaneously and which made me definitely decide that he was schizophrenic and that it was a disturbance of the self, of a passivity phenomenon, in the sense that the person blames influences outside himself for his thoughts, emotions and actions.

JUDGE BEYERS: Does one call this, the impassiveness, passive/passivity phenomenon?

PROF. VAN WYK: Passivity phenomenon?

JUDGE BEYERS: Yes, or a disturbance of the self? He regards himself as a sort of instrument?

PROF. VAN WYK: Yes, as a robot operated by someone else. I can give a good example. I dealt with a non-white young woman who kicked over fire buckets and had fights and then said that it was not she, but her late brother who had done it. In other words, she was totally passive and was taken over by an outside influence. Something happened which persuaded

me that it was not simulation. This came out after Mr. Bloomberg was present at the interview and I asked him about the tapeworm – and I definitely put leading questions to him and he had the chance, should he have wanted to simulate, that he could have done so. Then I asked him: can you tell me why you travelled around so much in the world? He pondered this for a while and then he said to me: “You know, doctor, in the beginning I thought I did it myself. It was voluntary, it was by myself, but you know now I realise that it was the tapeworm that made me travel over the whole world.” Then I followed this up in the afternoon, without Mr. Bloomberg – it was perhaps unauthorised, but I felt concerned. So that afternoon I again interviewed him from 3 to 4 and then I focussed more on this and gave him more chance to talk and that afternoon he said to me,: “Doctor, sometimes I say things (this came out spontaneously) sometimes I say things to people and they get annoyed with me and actually it is not I who says these things, but the tapeworm which forces me to say those things.”

That is definitely a cardinal symptom of schizophrenia. But until that time I had not realised the extent of the schizophrenic condition and to what extent and whether it rendered him certifiable. And whether the tapeworm was just a secondary delusional- imaginary interpretation of the passivity phenomenon.

It happens that a person can display the passivity phenomenon, and then he begins to explain the passivity phenomenon by saying that he has been hypnotised, or another influence is at work on him. Is it in the passivity that the tape worm manifests? Or is it just a delusional- imaginary interpretation of a passivity phenomenon?

But after later on, after one had heard the person's history here in the Court, I had to come to the conclusion that it – the tapeworm - is actually a primary delusional imaginary thing, and that it was not just an imaginary interpretation of his passivity manifestations.

JUDGE BEYERS: I think I follow you.

PROF. VAN WYK: And with taking this into consideration, the mental disturbance which in the beginning was vague, later with more interviews – and we all know that thought disturbances in schizophrenia are often difficult to find. When one has an interview with a patient on his own you may not find any thought disturbance. When he is on his own and is at ease and feeling good, he does not have to show you a thought disturbance. But if you encounter him where he has to talk in front of an audience or in a situation where there is a certain amount of emotion, the thought disturbance phenomenon is displayed. Often it

manifests typically and very nicely. And with the first interviews he only displayed roundabout statements and long-windedness and evasiveness and I was not sure what this was all about – was it just a thought disturbance or was it just evasiveness?

But during my interviews with him on the 13th and 14th – and I should have wanted to see him again on the 15th, but it was not possible for me, the defence needed to see him and I was unable to do so – it became clear to me that there was definitely a measure of thought disturbance present with him. And with all the information available to me, beside the fact of the murder, as consulting psychiatrist, if I had encountered this person with all the information now available, I would have had to certify him. There was no question but that it fell within the ambit of the Mental Health Act of 1916.

JUDGE BEYERS: You say that other than the murder, but the murder itself meets one of the requirements, namely that he is a danger to others?

PROF. VAN WYK: Yes.

JUDGE BEYERS: So, at the moment, if today this problem was put forward to you and this man was sent to you today and you were asked: “Must he be certified, yes or no?” - would you have any doubt today?

PROF. VAN WYK: No, there will be no doubt at all. He can commit a crime but it does not have to be as a result of his mental illness, and I felt – after all that one has heard – that, he said to me for example “There was a pressure building up” and I had the feeling that it was because of the tapeworm, and he said: “ It had to break out some time”, and then he became a little evasive about this situation, and it kept on building up, this mental illness of his, and he said to me that he never knew that it would manifest in such a manner, and to a certain extent he blamed the doctors. At one stage he said to me that he had consulted the doctors and that they never put him in a hospital or put him into an institution. He said that if they had done so, this would never have happened.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY THE DEFENCE COUNSEL

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Do you agree, on the fourth day of this enquiry, with the opinion that Dr. Cooper so stoutly defended on the first day of this enquiry?

PROF. VAN WYK: That the man is certifiable under the Mental Disease Act?

DEFENCE COUNSEL: Yes, that he suffers from schizophrenia?

PROF. VAN WYK: Yes, but it is not a conclusion which I have only reached today. I came to that conclusion before.

DEFENCE COUNSEL: So you also agree with Dr Zabow, Dr MacGregor, and Dr Sakinofsky?

JUDGE BEYERS: But this witness has already said what you want. Can you possibly get more? It says much for you that you took a time in coming to your conclusion. One does not make up one's mind hastily about these things. It is a responsible task and it redounds to your honour that you did not come to a hasty conclusion but that you took your time and gradually reached your conclusion. I appreciate it.

COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR VAN WYK'S DIAGNOSIS

Before we examine this development, we should examine Professor van Wyk's testimony. Professor van Wyk stated that he wanted to know more about Tsafendas's background and "motivation for the act." However, instead of seeking additional information from Tsafendas's friends and family, as Dr. Sakinofsky and Professors Tuviah Zabow, Burke, Heilbrun and Resnick all recommended, Professor van Wyk attempted to get the information from Tsafendas himself, just like Dr. Cooper, Dr. Aubrey Zabow and Dr. MacGregor. He, too, accepted what he was told without question. He could very easily have found what he was looking for in the two statements Tsafendas gave to the police. He could also have got much information from the about two hundred statements the police and the Commission of Enquiry took from people who knew him.

Professor van Wyk also states that he was in possession of "certain reports" from overseas hospitals and that the last one he received was from Ochenzoll Hospital in Hamburg. There is no mention of the Grafton State Hospital report, which was certainly in the possession of the South African police since September 16,⁵⁷¹⁷ or of the report by the Government Hospital in Beira. The author is not in position to know whether these reports were in Professor van Wyk's possession. If they were, as they should have been, he never

⁵⁷¹⁷ Letter of the USA Embassy in Cape Town to the South African Security Branch, 3 October 1966. Correctional Service. Subject: Demitrio Tsafendas. File: 80/0043 A123 Vol. 1. NASA.

referred to Tsafendas faking mental illness while in the USA and that he believed he was Saint Peter just two years ago in Mozambique.

In his diagnosis, Professor van Wyk stated that he gave Tsafendas the opportunity to simulate by offering him leading questions which Tsafendas did not fall for. Professor van Wyk seems unaware or ignored the fact that Tsafendas had been caught pretending to be mad and that he was experienced with psychiatrists. The Commission of Enquiry, which had no psychiatrist, noted that Tsafendas is “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders—he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him... and (the Commission) therefore adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”⁵⁷¹⁸ Although this was evident to the Commission, it was not evident to Professor van Wyk, who was a psychiatrist and accepted everything Tsafendas said.

We will not examine the tapeworm again, but we should look at two of the things Tsafendas told Professor van Wyk about it: “Sometimes I say things to people and they get annoyed with me and actually it is not I who says these things, but the tapeworm which forces me to say those things” and “You know, doctor, in the beginning I thought I did it myself. It was voluntary, it was by myself, but you know now I realise that it was the tapeworm that made me travel over the whole world.”

Firstly, Tsafendas repeatedly called his travels “forced globetrotting.” He used this description with several people and even on his affidavit. He said he had to live “like a gypsy” because he was exiled from Mozambique, barred from South Africa and continually persecuted in Portugal. He never mentioned the tapeworm as a reason for his travels to anyone, not even to the police. Both of the alleged tapeworm statements were read by the author to forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas very well. Not even could accept that Tsafendas believed what he was saying. Since the issue with the alleged statements has also been discussed before, I would not again list the people’s reaction to them.

Professor van Wyk also said in his testimony: “when one has an interview with a patient on his own you may not find any thought disturbance. When he is on his own and is at ease and feeling good, he does not have to show you a thought disturbance. But if you

⁵⁷¹⁸ Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

encounter him where he has to talk in front of an audience or in a situation where there is a certain amount of emotion, the thought disturbance phenomenon is displayed.” This is an inaccurate diagnosis. Again, all of the forty-four witnesses who were asked about the above statement strongly deny that this was the case with Tsafendas. Since it would be impractical to include everyone’s statement, the study will present only the following five examples contradicting Professor van Wyk’s diagnosis.

From the mid-1930s to 1939 and then again in 1964 Tsafendas voluntarily taught English and History to Greek and Mozambican children in Mozambique.⁵⁷¹⁹ Ira Kyriakakis one of his students, strongly dismisses Professor van Wyk’s diagnosis. Kyriakakis said, “Dimitris really loved teaching. You could tell. He was a natural talent. Of course he did not have any issue talking in front of us. How would he have taught if he had a problem?”⁵⁷²⁰

In 1961, Tsafendas worked for about six months as a teacher at the best private language college in Turkey. Naturally, he had to talk in front of an audience five days per week and clearly this was no problem since the owner of the college, Mr. Limasollu Naci, tried to keep him on his staff and when he left gave him a positive reference. Furthermore, for six or seven months also in 1961, Tsafendas taught English to Greek and Turkish children in Istanbul. Father Nikola Banovic and Alexandra Vaporidis were often present at the lessons, which were held in a room near the Greek Orthodox church of Panagia in the city’s Pera Taxi district.

Asked about Professor van Wyk’s diagnosis, Father Nikola said:

“No, we never understood anything like this. (Tsafendas) loved teaching and he was clearly enjoying it. He was really good, really, really good. He was funny and witty and at the end of each lesson, he would tell the students a story about his travels. All the students waited for that. I was not present at the classes he had at Mr. Limasollu’s college, but I was told by Mr. Limasollu that he was exactly the same with the students there. They all adored him. He made a very positive contribution to the Greek community here and after he left, we all missed him, especially the children... For many years, they asked, ‘When is Mr Dimitris

⁵⁷¹⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 April 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁵⁷²⁰ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

coming back?' He never showed any thought disturbance while he was teaching or any time he was with us. He was always perfectly fine."⁵⁷²¹

Alexandra Vaporidis also lived in Istanbul at the time. She did not know Tsafendas well, but her husband, Father Agathagos Vaporidis, was very close to him. Tsafendas had dinner once in her house and she often spoke to him at church and was present at some of his classes. "I saw him teaching many times although we only spoke briefly each time at the end of the lesson. I never noticed anything to be wrong with him while he was teaching or any other time. He seemed to enjoy teaching and the children enjoyed it too. They were all very sad when he left."⁵⁷²²

Andreas Babiolakis and Nick Papadakis went often with Tsafendas at the Scala Café in 1964 in Beira, where many Greeks gathered. Both strongly deny that Tsafendas had any kind of thought problems and insist that he enjoyed talking in front of an audience about politics. Both remember an incident in Gondola when Tsafendas attended the wedding of Vittorio, an Italian friend and fellow Communist, who was working with him at the time. As the celebrations proceeded, Tsafendas rose from his chair and raised his glass. He delivered a very short speech wishing the newly-weds well and then in a ringing baritone, launched passionately into an Italian Communist song. Most of the Greeks were speechless, but Vittorio and his Italian friends joined in eagerly, clapping and pounding the table. When he finished, Tsafendas received huge applause and Vittorio called on him to sing another one. Tsafendas duly sang another Italian Communist anthem and again many guests joined him.⁵⁷²³

Fotini Gavasiadis also strongly denies that Tsafendas had any such issue. She said that when Tsafendas worked at her brother's coffee shop for nearly nine months, "he talked constantly with the customers. A lot of them, especially very old men, would come to the shop just for him, to talk about history, religion and his travels. He avoided talking to them about politics because he believed they were all or most of them supporters of apartheid. No, he had no problems talking in front of an audience. He was perfectly fine, as he was at all other times."⁵⁷²⁴

⁵⁷²¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁷²² Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 10 October 2015.

⁵⁷²³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁵⁷²⁴ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 11 June 2016.

Professor van Wyk also stated that Tsafendas's "thought disturbance" becomes evident with "a certain amount of emotion." However, while Tsafendas was in custody in Caledon Square, which certainly could be classified as a time of high emotion, he displayed no signs of disturbance, certainly not in his two statements. Speech and thought processes are entirely logical. It had been the same in November 1964 when Tsafendas was interrogated by PIDE agents in Mozambique accused of conducting propaganda for the independence of Mozambique. He was questioned by PIDE's Sub-Inspector, Joaquim Piçara Sabino, Brigade Chief Augusto de Sousa Maia, and agent Virgílio Francisco.⁵⁷²⁵ He told them clearly and logically that he wanted to see "a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the mother nation."⁵⁷²⁶ Inspector Horacio Ferreira, who was in charge of the police cells where Tsafendas was kept characterised him as being "intense anti-white" and convinced that "the Portuguese Government has never done anything for its non-whites." He added that Tsafendas was "normal" and he regarded him "as a very intelligent person."⁵⁷²⁷

PROFESSOR VAN WYK'S DIAGNOSIS AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Professor van Wyk was the last witness to testify in the summary trial, bringing it to an "abrupt end," as David Bloomberg and Wilfrid Cooper rightly said.⁵⁷²⁸ It was abrupt, because no one expected the State's main witness to give such evidence. The defence team was under the impression that Professor van Wyk had diagnosed Tsafendas as being able to follow the trial proceedings and would not mention anything about schizophrenia.

Professor van Wyk's report, written before October 6, probably on October 4, although the exact date is not known to the author, had said:

"He is orientated. He gives a good account of himself. His comprehension is good and his answers are relevant. His emotional responses are adequate and apt. His discourse is coherent. At times he is discursive, but not vague and he never strays from the main point of conversation. The tests indicate that his intellectual abilities are above average. He maintains that he is infested with a tapeworm, and that this influences his life. He denies that he suffers

⁵⁷²⁵ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁷²⁶ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁷²⁷ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, File 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁵⁷²⁸ Bloomberg, 2007: 98.

from hallucinations. I have found no indications that he is incapable of following the court proceedings or that he is unable to exercise his rights and privileges and instruct his legal advisers and assist them in the conduct of his defence.”⁵⁷²⁹

This report was given to the defence team on October 6. By that time Professor van Wyk had seen Tsafendas three times (September 23, 24 and October 4). The other State witness, Erasmus, the psychologist, had testified just a few minutes before Professor van Wyk that he had examined Tsafendas on September 28 and 29 and his tests had revealed “clear signs of schizophrenia.” However, Professor van Wyk’s report says nothing about signs of schizophrenia and states the tests showed that Tsafendas was “very intelligent.”

The question is: why did Professor van Wyk not include in his initial report that the other State witness had found signs of schizophrenia? He must have discussed the case with him as they were both State’s expert witnesses and the psychologist’s job was to perform the tests and support the psychiatrist’s diagnosis. It seems highly unlikely that van Wyk was unaware of Erasmus’s tests, as he specifically refers to tests that showed Tsafendas’s intelligence. These were the tests carried out by Erasmus, as he testified a few minutes earlier. There are seem to be five possibilities:

- The tests were differently interpreted at the time and Erasmus did not find “clear signs of schizophrenia” then; that would explain why this is not in Professor van Wyk’s report. Perhaps Erasmus later changed his mind regarding the interpretation of the tests, maybe also influenced by Professor van Wyk’s diagnosis, and discovered the “clear signs of schizophrenia.” That would explain what he told the court and why such information was absent from Professor van Wyk’s report. It would also agree with Professor Burke’s statement that the “those tests and the interpretation of those tests, were always open to interpretation.”⁵⁷³⁰
- Erasmus told Professor van Wyk that the tests showed that Tsafendas as very intelligent but forgot to mention that there were also “clear signs of schizophrenia.”
- Erasmus told Professor van Wyk that there were “clear signs of schizophrenia” in the tests and the Professor forgot to include it in his report.
- Professor van Wyk did not consider the tests as accurate and dismissed them, accepting

⁵⁷²⁹ Bloomberg, 2007: 81.

⁵⁷³⁰ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

only results of the intelligence tests.

- For some reason Professor van Wyk deliberately omitted it from his report.

The author cannot think of any other reason why Prof. van Wyk's initial report did not contain the findings of Erasmus' tests as they were presented in the court and it does not mention anything about Tsafendas's alleged schizophrenia. Very importantly he found Tsafendas to be "orientated," giving "a good account of himself. His comprehension is good and his answers are relevant. His emotional responses are adequate and apt. His discourse is coherent. At times he is discursive, but not vague and he never strays from the main point of conversation." The above diagnosis completely contradicts the diagnosis of Dr. Cooper, Dr. Sakinofsky and Dr. Zabow.

However, Professor van Wyk also stated that he later, on October 4, he changed his mind and diagnosed Tsafendas as a schizophrenic. This was confirmed when he examined Tsafendas twice more on October 13 and 14, four and three days before the beginning of the trial. Since both of the State's witnesses had diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic, therefore agreeing with the defence's line and experts, which was known at the time to the State, the question is: Why did the Attorney-General appear so sceptical of the defence's witnesses? The State was aware of the defence's line since the 6th of October, so if van den Berg disagreed or doubted the diagnosis of his two expert witnesses, which was identical with the defence's line, and really believed that Tsafendas was fit to stand trial, he could have very easily appointed additional psychiatrists and psychologists to examine him. However, he did not do such thing and the reason must have been because he must have accepted his witnesses' opinion.

Both David Bloomberg and Wilfrid Cooper were surprised by this as they believed that since the State's experts had already agreed with the defence's experts, there was no need for this line of questioning. Bloomberg said about the incident: "One presumed that the Attorney-General knew what evidence his psychologist and psychiatrist would be giving. If that was the case, why did he challenge, in cross-examination, the evidence of the defence witnesses, when he knew that his own witnesses agreed with them, and allow Dr Harold Cooper, in particular, to be tested so vigorously and sceptically by the judge?"⁵⁷³¹ Gavin Cooper, son of Wilfrid Cooper, also wrote about his father's surprise: "... they were left

⁵⁷³¹ Bloomberg, 2007: 98.

puzzled as to why, if the State had known what their experts were going to say when they took the stand, the Attorney-General had cross-examined Dr. Cooper so aggressively on the first day of the inquiry to try to prove that Tsafendas was able to stand trial. Was the State as surprised as the defence with the testimony of their key witnesses?"⁵⁷³²

The question here is whether there was any possibility that the State did not know what evidence its two main witnesses were going to give? If the State was aware, which is almost certain, why did the Attorney-General behave as he did during the summary trial? If the State did not know, then it would explain such behaviour, but is it really possible that the State's two main and only expert witnesses had not informed the Attorney-General about the evidence they were going to give? That is impossible, according to Advocate George Bizos and Professor John Dugard.⁵⁷³³ Then, we are back to the previous question; why all this then? The issue will be discussed further along with the role of the Attorney-General.

After Professor van Wyk's testimony, to general surprise, the Attorney-General announced that he had no further questions and that the case for the prosecution was concluded.

FOR THE STATE

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: A request was made on behalf of the defence that the Court in terms of Article 28 (2) of Act 38 of 1916 that the accused is mentally ill and that in addition the Court must insist that he, depending on the availability of the State President, be placed in an institution. The Court has heard the evidence about this, and the Court noted the overwhelming nature of the expert witnesses. Even the witnesses for the State recommended without any doubt that the mental state of the accused was such that he falls within the ambit of Article 28 of the Act. It is necessary for the Court, in the light of all this evidence, that they give the required order and judgement if it agrees that the evidence justifies it.

But I wish to make a submission: Should the Court make such a judgement in terms of Article 28 (2), then I ask that you rule that the accused should not be kept in an institution, but that he should be kept in a prison.

⁵⁷³² Cooper, 2016: 123.

⁵⁷³³ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 5 April 2016; Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

JUDGE BEYERS: You don't have to address this to me. Apparently it should be a prison. I think that as I have noticed that in the Pratt case, prison is indicated. Should I rule that he should be detained at Caledon Square until the State President has made his ruling, or what do you want?

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: I do not think it is necessary.

JUDGE BEYERS: The Afrikaans text is still in the Netherlands (Dutch) language and I find the English is easier: "A gaol or institution." I am not now sure whether it is necessary for the Court to determine the first "gaol." Afterwards, obviously, it will be the State President who is to rule on what is to happen with the man and where he will go.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: Under Article 30 the Minister has certain powers.

JUDGE BEYERS: I think it will be sufficient if I say "a gaol."

ATTORNEY-GENERAL: That is my submission.⁵⁷³⁴

THE SEQUEL

Judge Beyers then adjourned the hearing until 10.45 a.m., pending a decision on whether he would give judgment then or announce it later. David Bloomberg and Wilfrid Cooper, were shocked by what both described as the "abrupt end" to proceedings. Following what they were told by the Attorney-General on October 6 where he had also handed them Professor van Wyk's medical report on Tsafendas, where it stated that he had "found no indications that he is incapable of following the court proceedings or that he is unable to exercise his rights and privileges and instruct his legal advisers and assist them in the conduct of his defence," and given the line of questioning by the Attorney-General during the inquiry, they expected the State would continue seeking to prove that Tsafendas was fit to stand trial.⁵⁷³⁵

⁵⁷³⁴ Professor Adolf Johannes van Wyk's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁷³⁵ Bloomberg, 2007: 81-82; Cooper, 2016: 123.

THE VERDICT**THE STATE VERSUS DEMITRIO TSAFENDAS⁵⁷³⁶**

Judge Beyers: The Court is clear in its mind as to what its order should be in this case, and under the circumstance I can see no justification for prolonging the proceedings. If I had taken time to consider this judgment it would probably have gained something in elegance of language, but in substance the case is clear, and I think it is incumbent upon me to give judgment now, which I propose doing.

The case before the Court is one in which a man called Demitrio Tsafendas is charged with the crime of murder. He stands arraigned before this Court upon an indictment which charges that upon the 6th September, 1966, and at Cape Town, in the district of The Cape, he did wrongfully, unlawfully and maliciously kill and murder Dr. The Honourable Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa.

This Court is no less conscious of the momentous background to this case than is anyone less in this country. Once, however, a case is brought in a court of law these considerations of the immensity of the crime and the effects it has upon the people of this country really disappear. Once, as I have said, a case of this nature comes into a court of law, the law takes command, and considerations other than legal ones are not and should not be allowed to come into the picture at all. The elements of the crime of murder and the legal processes employed in trying such a crime remain the same and in no wise differ whether the victim of the alleged crime is the Prime Minister of the country or the lowest of the low. Murder is murder, and its elements remain unchanged. To allow anything else to cloud this approach would be to supplant law and order by anarchy and chaos. It would mean that one dethrones responsibility and replaces it with primitive emotion. That I do not understand to be my function and that is something to which, happily, I do not believe that this country would wish me to lend myself.

Because of the deep issues underlying this case, which, as I have already said, are for the purposes of the law really irrelevant but which obviously obtrude themselves and cannot be ignored, I in approaching this case thought fit to appoint senior counsel, with junior counsel to assist him, with attorneys to assist him, to represent the accused. This is a

⁵⁷³⁶ Judge Beyers' verdict on Tsafendas's summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

civilized, and, if I may proudly say, a highly civilized country, and when a man is charged on a capital charge this country sees to it that, at the expense of the State, he is represented.

Having regard to the emotional stresses that underlay this particular case, I thought fit to see that in this case he be represented as well as I was able to provide for. My first duty, I think, is to express to senior and junior counsel and their attorneys the deep appreciation of this Court for the work they have done. To them it has meant - and I think it should be understood — that without any meaningful remuneration they took upon themselves the unenviable and unpopular task of defending this man. Not for a moment did they demur to make the sacrifice of time, and the considerable financial sacrifice that goes with it. I think I need say no more than that by their conduct they have graced the profession to which they belong and that they have acted in accordance with the highest traditions of the legal profession of this country.

I - and again because of the nature of this case - introduced what is probably, as far as I know, an innovation in this country, in that I appointed as one of my assessors, to assist me as psychiatrist. I do not know if that has been done before. It was certainly of great assistance to the Court, and I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Henning and my gratitude to my other assessor, Mr. Baker.

I can now go on with the case.

Before the Court is an enquiry. It is a different kind of procedure from the ordinary. It is a procedure in which, as I see it, there is neither plaintiff nor defendant, there is neither prosecutor nor defending counsel. It is an enquiry which if necessary has to be conducted mero motu by the Court itself. It is an enquiry which rests upon the simple civilized human principle that a court of law does not try a madman. That is the simple proposition which underlies the enquiry upon which I am presently embarked. I shall refer in a moment to the 1916 Act, the Mental Disorders Act. But, of course, the enquiry upon which I am embarked, does not flow from the Mental Disorders Act. The principle is centuries old, that madmen are not tried, and the enquiry at the moment is: is the man before me a man who can be tried by a court of law? Irrespective entirely of what his mental condition was, what animus he was capable of at the time when he committed the crime. One can have cases in which a person could be wholly sane and commits a crime, but after the commission of the crime - let me assume for a moment that after the commission of a crime a man has a serious motor accident, and if, because of that motor accident, he sustains brain damage which means that his mind becomes disordered, then that man cannot be tried in a court of law, whether he was

completely sane at the time he committed the crime or was not sane at the time he committed the crime. As I understand the law, the crime with which this man is charged is also entirely irrelevant. The enquiry, while definitely it would have been loaded less with emotional stresses, would have been exactly the same if it was a person tried for any other crime, if it was a person tried for theft, or for a parking offence. It is a preliminary enquiry which precedes all further proceedings in a court of law, and that is: is the person before the court a man sane enough to be tried by a court of law? That is how I understand it. And that is why I have said that at the moment there is before me no prosecutor and no defending counsel, but merely persons who are trying to help the Court to arrive at a conclusion on this enquiry.

The enquiry has been codified for this country. As I have stated, it is ancient law, but it has been codified in Section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act of 1916 I referred to that section, but I will refer only to the portiere of that section which are relevant to the present enquiry. The relevant portions of this section read as follows: "If, on the arraignment of any person charged with a criminal offence, it appears to the judge presiding at the trial that such person is mentally disordered, the question of such a person's mental condition shall be enquired into by such Court."

Then sub-section 2 proceeds: "If such Court finds, after hearing evidence, which shall include medical evidence, that such person is mentally disordered, the presiding judge shall record that finding and issue an order committing such person to a gaol pending the signification of the Governor-General's decision." (This has subsequently been amended to read: "the decision of the State-President.")

It will be seen from the wording of this section that the Court has no discretion in these matters, that it is to embark upon this enquiry, and that it is forced to come to a conclusion. I also am of the opinion that in law this enquiry rests upon no onus on either side, because the section goes on to say that if the Court is in any doubt - it does not say that the doubt will be to the benefit of the accused or it will be against the accused - the Court must resolve those doubts by committing the person to a proper institution for proper investigation, and when that is over the Court has just got to answer the question one way or another.

In this case I don't believe any good purpose will be served by the further remittal to an institution of any kind, and the Court is by law, of which it is but a servant, conjoined to give a finding.

The enquiry presently before this Court is exactly the same as the enquiry which came

before the Court in the Transvaal, presided over by my very distinguished learned brother Rumpff J.P., as he then was, in the case of *Rex vs. Pratt* (1960(4) S.A.L.R., 743). There the exact same enquiry had to be conducted upon a man who had shot this same victim - fortunately for us, fortunately for this country, unsuccessfully, and we had the benefit of the leadership of the late Prime Minister for what might prove to be vital years thereafter. In this case - I am referring to the bottom of page 746 - the learned Judge says: "It is clear that whatever anomalies may flow from the law as it stands the legislature has decided that epilepsy in certain circumstances is a disease of the mind and that if an epileptic is a danger to himself or others or is incapable of managing himself or his affairs, he should not be tried. He must be regarded as mentally disordered or defective in terms of the Act. It is not for me to disagree with the legislature. That being the case, it is necessary to consider whether on the evidence the accused is an epileptic and a danger to himself or others."

His Lordship then, having considered all the evidence, comes to the conclusion that the accused in that case, Pratt, was an epileptic, and he gave the order which Section 28 conjoins. I am embarking upon exactly the same enquiry, with this exception only: that the man presently before me, presently arraigned before me, is said to be a schizophrenic and not an epileptic. That is the only difference.

It is not disputed by anyone that schizophrenia is a mental disorder, that it is a mental disorder such as envisaged in the Mental Disorders Act, and that, if of a sufficient degree to make the person suffering from that disorder a danger to himself or to others, or to make it impossible for him to properly look after himself or his affairs, then he is a mentally disordered person in terms of the Act.

As I have stressed, the enquiry is not into what was Tsafendas mental state on the 6th September, 1966, but what it is today. Today we know that he is certainly a danger to other people, and probably also to himself. The only enquiry before the Court therefore is – and it is the only enquiry that is left - is the Court satisfied that he is a schizophrenic.

In the course of this case reference was made to this man's prior history. Really the events therein referred to are not evidence in this Court. Application was made by Mr. Cooper for evidence to be taken overseas so that these matters covered in his history could in fact and indeed become evidence in a court of law, and had the evidence not been as clear as it is I would have had to deal with that application.

I want to make very brief reference to that history. Everybody seems to have accepted

it, and although I think the truth of every statement need not be in it, I think one cannot approach this case without realising that this man has a long history of mental disorder. I merely touch on one or two of the experiences which are recorded here.

It is now 1966. As early as 1935 there is on record that this man was already preoccupied with this extraordinary, bizarre tapeworm delusion of his. That is thirty years ago. He has been in mental hospitals. I find here, glancing through it, that in 1943 he was detained in the Psychopathic Hospital of Boston. He was then transferred to the Metropolitan State Hospital. In 1944 I find him in the United States General Army Hospital in England. Again in 1944 I find he is diagnosed as suffering from psychosis and he is detained in the Roper Hospital. There is then a special board of enquiry instituted in the Roper Hospital, and as a result of that enquiry this man is declared, in 1944, as insane. In the same year he tries to get back into the United States and he is detained in the medical hospital - the other side of it. In 1946 he is detained in the Boston Psychopathic. That year again he is certified insane in the Grafton State Hospital in the United States. In that same year, in 1946, after a United States Department of Justice hearing at North Grafton State Hospital, the man before me is diagnosed as a schizophrenic, hebephrenic type, with deterioration and prognosis poor. He eventually, in 1949, gets to Portugal. There he is detained in a state hospital. He is given shock treatment. He then gets to Germany in 1954, and there he is detained in the Ochsenzoll Hospital and is again given shock treatment. He gets back to London and there he is at St. Pancras Hospital, London, definitely once more, in 1959, diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic. He is then detained in the Whitecroft Hospital in the Isle of Wight with a diagnosis of delusional psychosis. That is the history of this individual before he comes here.

In 1963, to our extreme misfortune, this man returns to South Africa. He is in and out of jobs, leading an unsatisfactory life. I will only refer to one other very important matter: in June, 1966, he comes before the District Surgeon of Cape Town, Dr. Kossew, applying for a disability pension. District surgeons are busy people, as was stated in evidence. They are not psychiatric experts, and have never pretended to be, and I don't suppose that district surgeons are chosen for the ease with which they give away State pensions. Although the District Surgeon saw this man only for a short time, only as one of many that passed through his hands, it is to his great credit that in the short time he had at his disposal he could see through this man and diagnosed him as schizophrenic. Perhaps I should also mention, briefly, that the ordinary people, the ordinary everyday people with whom he came into contact did not take long before they could see that this man was mentally affected. One of the strongest pieces of

evidence in this case is that of Mr. Smorenberg, a down-to-earth foreman. I shall not forget that when he was asked: 'What did you think of this man?' his answer was: 'I don't like to call any man mad, but he is definitely barmy.' It was obvious to Daniels and his wife. Daniels said that this man is mad. It was obvious to O'Ryan and his wife. It was obvious to Mr. Johnston that this was a queer, strange man.

Of course thoughts must arise, have arisen and must continue to arise, as how it could have been possible that a man like this, a man with this history, a man so obviously deranged, could find his way into an assembly where the leaders of our people are busy in Parliament. Those are questions that do not concern this Court. We have no concern with it, but it is almost unavoidable that the question arises in one's mind.

I have had before me a number of eminent psychiatrists. May I be allowed, in parenthesis, to say that I have been informed that each of the medical men in this case has given his services, to assist this Court, free, they have given their time free, and I can only say that it once again shows that this country, and its people, is something of which one can be proud. I am grateful to you gentlemen, I am grateful for the sacrifice. I am not surprised: I expected no less. The Court thanks you.

Now before me came a whole host, if I may call it that, of psychiatrists. The first one was Dr. Cooper. A court of law does not lightly sit back and allow a man who has committed a grievous crime to get away on a plea or an enquiry of this nature. Dr. Cooper led the van, and at that stage it was obvious that this Court was prepared to resist, as far as it could, that this man was not responsible for his actions, and, if Dr. Cooper got it, that is what the first tank over must expect. It became clear, however, as psychiatrist followed psychiatrist, that there can be no doubt whatever in this case that the man before me is a schizophrenic; that he is a lunatic - in more direct terms - or, as Roman Law would have had it, that I had before me a furiosus. A furiosus is something which I cannot try. I can as little try a man who has not got at least the makings of a rational mind as I could try a dog or an inert implement. A man who is mentally disordered can perform no legal act. He couldn't possibly plead. Pleading in a Court of law is an act in law which has results. The acts of a mentally disordered person have no consequences in law.

I have before me, on the evidence, clearly a man with a diseased mind, a mind subject to delusion, a mind which is so trammelled, if not guided, by irrational forces, that obviously I cannot even begin to find whether he is guilty or not guilty of a crime at law. The process

cannot even start, you cannot get to the provisions of the Criminal Law. You cannot get to Section 164, or any other provision of the Criminal Law until you have decided that the man presently before you has a sufficiently rational mind that he is capable of being tried. So that I don't believe it is necessary for me to go into any other of the provisions of the Criminal Law. I am satisfied, and indeed, I could not other than be satisfied, on the pre-history of this man, on the evidence of the psychiatrists, one after the other (I don't think that any purpose will be served in mentioning them by name) who have agreed that here we have, not a criminal, but a sick person; mentally sick, mentally disturbed, mentally irresponsible.

In this enquiry on which I was embarked it was the duty of the State, no less than of the Defence, to assist the Court, and I am grateful also for the evidence of Mr. Erasmus and the evidence of Professor van Wyk. They have made my task an easy one because, appearing at the behest of the State, they have also said that the man before me is certifiable and that he should be sent to an institution. So that really, I have no option in the matter. There is really nothing for me more left to decide, and I and my two learned assessors find ourselves in the position where we cannot otherwise than, in terms of Section 28 (to which I have already made reference) say that the person presently before us is found by us to be mentally disordered.

That is really the end of it all, but I think it would not be amiss if I said a few words more about this whole matter, and for reasons of my own I choose to say them in Afrikaans. The application that was submitted to me has now been resolved and the order of the court should be made accordingly.

The case of the State versus Demitri Tsafendas, for the time being at any rate – and in all probability for all times – has come to an end. As I've said previously, as far as this court is concerned, this is a murder case and nothing more. We deal with murder cases on a daily basis and it is, with regard to the legal aspects of this case, just another murder case. And because it is a murder case and a case in a Supreme Court, this Court would not fulfil its duty, and would not be worthy of the trust put in it, if it would act differently from the provisions in the law that this Court, like any other citizen of this country are obliged to obey.

In fact, if this Court were to act differently than in accordance with the strict provisions of the judicial process it would, in my opinion, not be worthy of the name of Supreme Court. If it, in contradiction to the admonishments and the provisions of the law, sentence a person to death who was on trial, then this court would be guilty of the crime of

murder. This is what this Court would do if it deviates from the law and sentence someone to death.

We and our forefathers in this country are orderly and law-abiding citizens. We are an orderly people. I understand fully that people in this country have deep feelings regarding this case. I fully understand when people say: "Why? Can it be true that an insignificant human being could have done what he did?" I know that the first reaction of every community throughout the centuries have always been a sense of revenge and retribution. I share that feeling with the rest of the country.

It is recognized, and it's an opinion that I strongly share, that one element of a judgement in a criminal case is to give organized expression to the sense of retribution and revenge by the community and I know that if the Law does not do it, the community tends to eventually do it themselves. I am fully aware that when people trust that retribution will take place in an organized way, you won't get violence and it's one of the reasons why we, in this country of ours, never experienced "lynch law."

I am fully aware of all the undercurrents but one should also consider understanding these matters to a greater extent. By paying with his life, that person can do nothing for us. Even if he is executed or not, it would make no difference to our loss. But what would have had a huge impact was if he, through his actions, was able to get a Supreme Court to disregard the law of this country, then he would indeed have caused a greater harm to our survival as a nation than he has already succeeded in so far. Then he would, by sacrificing his useless life, shake the foundations of our nation's institutions, and then we would give an importance to this creature that he does not deserve. He would, if we had tolerated such a thing, caused us much more harm than what he has already succeeded in doing. In fact, people come and people go, but if this people, this nation, loose its trust in the judicial institutions and in its judicial bench then you would indeed have a humiliation and a shame that is irreparable and would rest like a blot on this country.

One of the assessors made the observation that a leader of the people such as the deceased listed in this indictment, if he understood the situation, without a doubt would not have wanted it otherwise. Of that I have absolutely no doubt. We must continue in the deep realization that, by granting this man a defence, that by providing him with the best legal and medical assistance, through the instruction I'm obliged to make, the honour and glory and the good name of our country, to act correctly remains unblemished and stay the foundation on

which we build an orderly community, unshaken and unharmed.

I am also of the opinion after considering the matter – although I can understand that it may immediately generate a certain degree of dissatisfaction and shock in certain people – I'm certain that after due consideration by all right-minded people in the country they will realize that the matter could not be dealt with differently, that it is not humane, that it is not Christian, to condemn the mentally ill; that the man who sits there is a sick person, deeply sick in spirit; that when the law says he is not responsible for his actions, then it's not only legally true but also humanly true. You cannot continue to have feelings of revenge in respect of a sick person and on the basis of the evidence presented to this court, the only conclusion that I can come to is that the accused is deeply and immensely disturbed, and is deeply and extremely ill, and that his actions does not arise from a rational state of mind, which is the first requirement before anyone can be punished, or is guilty of any crime. It is therefore my duty to recommend that the person, Dimitri Tsafendas, be taken from here to a prison and that he is detained there, pending the determination of the State President of this country.

COMMENTS ON JUDGE BEYERS' VERDICT

When Judge Beyers appointed Wilfrid Cooper as Tsafendas's advocate, he warned him that his client would "swing" unless he was found to be insane.⁵⁷³⁷ Tsafendas was duly found insane and escaped the gallows. It is necessary to stress, however, that Judge Beyers based his verdict on the evidence presented to him and was almost certainly unaware of evidence gathered by the South African police.

At the same time, it is important to mention that in David Pratt's case, Judge Frans Rumpff, who presided, heard the case for the defence, including testimonies by the psychiatrists, then sent the accused for fourteen days of psychiatric evaluation at the Weskoppies hospital for mentally disturbed persons.⁵⁷³⁸ There, Pratt was observed daily during this period by Dr. Lamont, who was in charge of evaluating Pratt's mental state.⁵⁷³⁹ Judge Beyers did not find it necessary to send Tsafendas for similar observation, even though Dr. Cooper and Prof. van Wyk spent only about six hours each with him while each of the

⁵⁷³⁷ Wilfrid Cooper in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997

⁵⁷³⁸ Maisels, 1998: 105.

⁵⁷³⁹ Prof. Lamont's psychiatric report on David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, 'Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered.'

other psychiatrists spent about four and a half hours. Nor did Judge Beyers appear concerned about the environment in which the examination took place. Pratt was observed in the clinical surroundings of a hospital, while Tsafendas was seen in custody in the Caledon Square police station. Professor Tuviah Zabow considers that this is an important issue and that Tsafendas should have been taken to a hospital for observation and proper examination.⁵⁷⁴⁰

Another important difference was that Dr. Lamont interviewed six people who knew Pratt well, including relatives, friends and one of his employees.⁵⁷⁴¹ None of those who examined Tsafendas spoke to a single person who knew him. Judge Beyers nevertheless accepted their diagnoses, clearly believing that no further examinations were necessary. He also praised Dr. Kossew, who, although not a psychiatrist, had diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic after an examination that lasted “a little bit longer” than ten minutes. His conclusion apparently was that the evidence to hand was sufficient to make a judgment on Tsafendas.

Let us examine his verdict.

SOUTH AFRICA, “A HIGHLY CIVILIZED” COUNTRY

Judge Beyers characterised South Africa as a “highly civilized country.” While acknowledging that such a characterisation is entirely subjective, the author considers it to be a most debatable, if not wholly inaccurate, description of South Africa in 1966. Apartheid was in full force, 79% of the country’s citizens were governed by the 21%, deprived of basic rights and subjected to inferior education system, designed by Hendrik Verwoerd himself, to ensure that non-whites “knew their place” in a racist society and would never dare to dream of a better life, as the architect of apartheid himself had infamously declared:

“The Bantu must be guided to serve his community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his community, however, all doors are open. For that reason, it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its main aim absorption in the European community, where he cannot be absorbed. Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from

⁵⁷⁴⁰ Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 2 September 2016.

⁵⁷⁴¹ Prof. Lamont’s report about David Pratt: Accused reaction to information gleaned from documents, friends, relatives and employees in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, ‘Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered.’

his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze.”⁵⁷⁴²

This was a country where 79% of the population had no land rights, were forced to live in designated areas and were forbidden to enter “whites only” territory; a country where the White people, 21% of the population, owned 87% of the land, forcing the 79% who were not White onto the remaining 13%; a country which was effectively a police state, where the law allowed police to hold a person in custody for 180 days without access to a lawyer, where political opponents of the government were impassioned, exiled, tortured, persecuted and banned. Professor John Dugard has expressed “outrage and shame” about the South African legal system during apartheid,⁵⁷⁴³ characterising it as “abnormal.” He wrote:

“A legal system that excludes 70% of its population from the franchise, that excludes 70% of its population from owning land in 87% of the country, that arbitrarily deprives 8 million people of their nationality, that has forcibly relocated many millions of people on account of their race, that formally executes some 160 persons per year, that authorizes repression in the name of national security and that permits international aggression, [is] . . . a grossly abnormal one.”⁵⁷⁴⁴

Furthermore, a society that allowed the flogging of humans as a form of punishment could hardly be described as “civilized.” In 1965, just a year before Judge Beyers’s verdict, reliable figures showed that 64,905 strokes were inflicted on 15,756 persons.⁵⁷⁴⁵ In an era when more and more nations were turning away from capital punishment, 194 men were hanged in South Africa between 1963 and 1965, representing 47% of all the world’s executions. South Africa was the world’s “busiest hangman,” said Albie Sachs, anti-apartheid activist and former judge at the Constitutional Court of South Africa.⁵⁷⁴⁶ These and other anti-democratic aspects of South African society at the time are widely known. If such a society was Judge Beyers’ idea of a civilized country, it tells us a lot about his definition of civilization and arguably what kind of a person he was himself.

Judge Beyers’ next sentence appeared intended to demonstrate the civilized nature of South African society: “(If) a man is charged on a capital charge, this country sees to it that,

⁵⁷⁴² Bunting, 1986: 260; Dubow, 2014: 55-6; O’Meara, 1996: 73; Lipton, 1985: 24; Schadeberg, 1990: 81.

⁵⁷⁴³ Klug, 2000: 660.

⁵⁷⁴⁴ Klug, 2000: 659-660.

⁵⁷⁴⁵ Sachs, 1970, 3-5.

⁵⁷⁴⁶ Sachs, 1970, 1-3.

at the expense of the State, he is represented.” This is true in that Tsafendas was indeed represented at the expense of the State. However, he had asked to be represented by Advocate George Bizos, well-known at the time for his involvement in two major political trials, the Rivonia and the Bram Fischer proceedings. He was also the son of Tsafendas's good friend, Antonis Bizos. Instead, the State appointed lawyers of its own choice in David Bloomberg, Wilfrid Cooper and Willie Burger. A truly civilized country would have complied with the accused's request and given him the lawyer of his choice. It is very possible though that Judge Beyers was not aware of Tsafendas's request for Bizos when he named these three lawyers. It cannot go unmentioned though that David Bloomberg was the son of Abe Bloomberg, who was a good friend of Judge Beyers⁵⁷⁴⁷ and who had publicly praised and defended Dr. Verwoerd's policies just a year earlier.⁵⁷⁴⁸

The “civilized” nature of South African society might be questioned in view of the treatment Tsafendas received after his summary trial. Officially recognised by the state as a schizophrenic in need of medical treatment, Tsafendas was entitled to accommodation in a psychiatric hospital and to treatment, as the law required, for those who are mentally ill. Instead, he was kept for twenty-three years in a cell on Death Row in a maximum security prison and he never received any medical treatment for his stated problem.

THE TAPEWORM

Judge Beyers goes on to state that Tsafendas had the tapeworm since 1935. However, he was simply repeating what he heard about the tapeworm during the summary trial and was not in position to know anything beyond that. It was indeed claimed that Tsafendas had the tapeworm since 1935, when according to Louisa O’Ryan, his step mother removed and destroyed six feet of the creature which Tsafendas had excreted. However, Tsafendas's step-mother denied to the Commission of Enquiry that such an incident ever took place and stated that she never heard her stepson say anything about a tapeworm. Tsafendas's whole family denied to the Commission that Tsafendas ever mentioned a tapeworm and maintained that he was “definitely not insane.”⁵⁷⁴⁹

⁵⁷⁴⁷ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁵⁷⁴⁸ *The New York Times*, 23 May 1965: xi, ‘David Bloomberg: Yes to South Africa.’

⁵⁷⁴⁹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

However, Judge Beyers was not aware of this. He was also unaware that not one of the approximately two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission ever said they heard Tsafendas talking about a tapeworm and that included people who knew him in 1935 and after. Furthermore, Judge Beyers did not know that Tsafendas had told Patrick O’Ryan that he had made up the tapeworm story, nor that Wilfrid Cooper had asked O’Ryan and his wife Louisa to “talk up” the tapeworm and exaggerate some stories about Tsafendas in order to save his life.⁵⁷⁵⁰

THE HOSPITALS

Judge Beyers then mentions the hospitals where Tsafendas was treated. He sets out all of his hospitalizations in the United States but does not mention the reasons for them, probably because he is unaware of them. As we have seen, Tsafendas, while in the USA, was hospitalized for two reasons: he was taken there by authorities while he was in custody or he admitted himself when he had no money and nowhere to stay. No reference is made to the fact that Tsafendas was hospitalised after showing signs of mental illness while in custody, something that would happen again and again. For example in 1943, he was arrested on charges of contravening US immigration laws.⁵⁷⁵¹ While in detention, he “showed symptoms of mental disorder” and was admitted to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, Massachusetts, from where he was transferred on April 23, 1943 to the Metropolitan State Hospital.”⁵⁷⁵² While there he was found to be faking mental illness,⁵⁷⁵³ something Judge Beyers was unaware of since it was not mentioned during the summary trial.

Of equal importance is that Beyers was ignorant of the opinion of the US Immigration Department about Tsafendas. The US Immigration authorities had dealt with him for five years and had his medical history and recorded that Tsafendas “is understood to have shown

⁵⁷⁵⁰ Patrick and Louisa O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁵⁷⁵¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw, 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 2. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁷⁵² *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA; Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁵⁷⁵³ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

under psychiatric treatment that he was unstable though not (not)⁵⁷⁵⁴ insane, but type of man who would easily be used as instrument of Communist or hostile organizations.”⁵⁷⁵⁵

The Judge then refers to Tsafendas's hospitalization in Portugal in 1949 and the fact that he was given shock treatment. What he does not mention, because he is unaware of it, is that Tsafendas was hospitalized after he showed signs of mental illness while in police detention,⁵⁷⁵⁶ and that on another occasion he was hospitalized after pretending to be mad so as not to serve in the Portuguese Army.⁵⁷⁵⁷ Finally, he refers to the hospitals in England and Germany, unaware that Tsafendas admitted himself to these hospitals.

DR. KOSSEW

Judge Beyers says that “district surgeons are busy people, as was stated in evidence. They are not psychiatric experts, and have never pretended to be, and I don't suppose that district surgeons are chosen for the ease with which they give away State pensions. Although the District Surgeon saw this man only for a short time, only as one of many that passed through his hands, it is to his great credit that in the short time he had at his disposal he could see through this man and diagnosed him as schizophrenic.” The Judge here praises Dr. Kossew, who diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic, although he was not a psychiatrist, examined him only for “a little bit longer” than ten minutes and stated that his aim was to determine Tsafendas's “physical condition” and not his mental state.

However, as we have seen, Dr. Kossew's testimony was extremely weak and was left unchallenged by the Attorney-General when it could so easily have been broken down. Judge Beyers is unaware of the fact that Tsafendas was examined ten times by nine different doctors, none of them a psychiatrist, over the last three years, none of whom noticed anything wrong with him or perceived any of the symptoms mentioned in court. On all of these occasions, Tsafendas wanted to be found sane and healthy and this is how he was found; with Dr. Kossew he wanted to be found insane in order to qualify for the disability grant he had

⁵⁷⁵⁴ This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second ‘not’ within brackets.

⁵⁷⁵⁵ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁵⁷⁵⁶ PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 5 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁵⁷⁵⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

applied for, and that is how he was found. Judge Beyers was not aware of any of this because the Attorney-General had failed to present any such evidence and Dr. Kossew's testimony, instead of being now exposed as weak, unreliable and false, was accepted and praised by the Judge.

"EVERYDAY PEOPLE" AND TSAFENDAS

Judge Beyers made the most inaccurate of his statements when he said that "ordinary everyday people with whom he came into contact did not take long before they could see that this man was mentally affected." Again, he is unaware that of the about two hundred people questioned by the police and the Commission only three commented negatively on Tsafendas's mental state: Caroline Barbeau who got the impression that Tsafendas "was not all there,"⁵⁷⁵⁸ Keith Martincich who thought that there "was something mentally wrong with him" because Tsafendas sometimes mumbled to himself,⁵⁷⁵⁹ and James Johnston, who also testified in the summary trial, who considered Tsafendas to be "slightly mentally unbalanced."⁵⁷⁶⁰

We have examined these statements and the reasons for their opinions so it will not be discussed here again. The rest of the witnesses had stated clearly that Tsafendas appeared perfectly sane and they never noticed anything wrong with him including the symptoms mentioned in court. Once again, the Judge was not aware of these two hundred statements the police and the Commission had taken and took under consideration only what it was presented to him.

OWEN SMORENBERG

Judge Beyers was noted in the legal community for having a photographic memory and not keeping notes during trial proceedings. However, in at least one case, he mis-remembered the evidence given at the summary trial. He characterised Smorenberg as a down-to-earth foreman and said, "I shall not forget that when he was asked: 'What did you think of this

⁵⁷⁵⁸ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁷⁵⁹ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁷⁶⁰ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

man?' his answer was: 'I don't like to call any man mad, but he is definitely barmy.' However, Smorenberg did not say that. What he said was, "Well, I wouldn't say he is mad, but he seems a little bit barmy."⁵⁷⁶¹

The Judge also characterised Smorenberg's testimony as "the strongest piece of evidence." As we have seen, Smorenberg's testimony was well off the mark; none of the aforementioned two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission had said anything that bore the slightest resemblance to Smorenberg's testimony, while the vast majority of them contradicted his claims. The Attorney-General could easily have broken down Smorenberg's testimony using the evidence gathered by the police, but he did not do so, leaving Judge Beyers to take the remarks seriously.

THE O'RYANS, JOHNSTON AND THE DANIELS

Judge Beyers' mistaken recollection of Smorenberg's words was not his only inaccuracy. He also said that "it was obvious to Daniels and his wife. Daniels said that this man is mad. It was obvious to O'Ryan and his wife. It was obvious to Mr. Johnston that this was a queer, strange man." In fact, while Patrick O'Ryan might have testified to the lunacy of the tapeworm, he did not state that Tsafendas was mentally affected. On the contrary, he said, "I never actually doubted his mental state, since to me he had a mind that the majority of people have."⁵⁷⁶² The court also heard O'Ryan's statement to the police where he said that Tsafendas "was not spiritually or mentally disturbed ... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind."⁵⁷⁶³ This the Judge seems to have overlooked.

Judge Beyers said it was obvious to Johnston that Tsafendas appeared to be a strange man. The Judge is unaware that Johnston had spoken to Tsafendas for only twenty minutes in his life and that he also said, "I did think Tsafendas to be slightly unbalanced and that he seemed to have a mysterious background, but otherwise he appeared to be all right."⁵⁷⁶⁴

⁵⁷⁶¹ Owen Smorenberg's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁷⁶² Patrick O'Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁷⁶³ Patrick O'Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁷⁶⁴ James Johnston's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

Peter Daniels did indeed characterise Tsafendas as “mad,” but this was due to things Tsafendas did which he perceived as mad. However, as we have seen, none of the things mentioned by Daniels and his wife would be considered the actions of a mad man by most people. After all, it was Peter Daniels who thought that Tsafendas was “mentally deranged” because he “tried to cool the fowls down” with a hosepipe. Judge Beyers himself retorted that this was the right thing to do in hot weather and Tsafendas’s act was certainly not that of someone who was mentally deranged.

Although all the other incidents described by the Daniels couple were of a similar type, the Judge nevertheless took their testimony seriously. This was mostly down to the Attorney-General’s failure successfully to challenge their testimonies and expose the lies, although substantial police evidence was available. Mr. and Mrs. Daniels portrayed Tsafendas as a tramp for whom they felt sorry and who foisted himself upon them, while hiding the fact that Helen Daniels asked to meet him so he could marry her, even claiming that it was Tsafendas who had taken the initiative with regard to Helen.

THE VERDICT

Judge Beyers’ conclusion that Tsafendas was unfit to stand trial and mentally disordered as defined in the Mental Disorders Act was based strictly on the evidence presented before him. However, to commit him to a prison, pending the decision of the State President, instead of to a psychiatric hospital where he was entitled to receive treatment as a certifiable schizophrenic, was a direct contradiction of his claim that South Africa was a “highly civilized county.” David Pratt, in a similar situation was detained in a hospital.

Dr. Sakinofsky had suggested Tsafendas be detained in an asylum,⁵⁷⁶⁵ but Judge Beyers did not refer to this statement in his verdict. It is possible the Judge was influenced by Dr. MacGregor’s comment, “I don’t think any ordinary asylum would hold this man for any length of time,”⁵⁷⁶⁶ although that remark itself does not bear scrutiny. Certainly, Tsafendas had left or “escaped” from a psychiatric hospital, but then he was a patient not a prisoner who had murdered someone. The apartheid authorities certainly had the means to keep Tsafendas

⁵⁷⁶⁵ Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁵⁷⁶⁶ Dr. James William MacGregor’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

locked in a psychiatric hospital. The Fort, at Bloemfontein, was a maximum security mental institution, and if it was thought special facilities were needed for an especially dangerous man, these could easily have been created in a secure hospital environment.

Furthermore, although not related to the verdict but relevant to the “highly civilized country” comment, it is worth noting that although he was declared to be a schizophrenic, Tsafendas received no treatment whatsoever while he was in prison, at least for the first twenty-plus years. Hardly the behaviour of a highly civilized country.

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT OF 1944

When the summary trial ended, Tsafendas's defence team spelled out to him the 1944 Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Act, which ruled that since mental illnesses might prove temporary, the charge in cases such as his could never be abandoned or withdrawn. This meant that Tsafendas could be tried again if his mental state was deemed restored.⁵⁷⁶⁷ Tsafendas got the point; he had to remain insane at least for as long as apartheid existed.⁵⁷⁶⁸

⁵⁷⁶⁷ *Daily Dispatch*, 27 September 1960: 1, ‘No trial for David Pratt’; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 1, ‘Pratt will not stand trial: mentally disordered’; *The New York Times*, 27 September 1960, ‘Assailant of Dr. Verwoerd found mentally unfit’; *The Star*, 1 October 1960: 1, ‘Pratt is unfit to plead.’

⁵⁷⁶⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafataridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN THE SUMMARY TRIAL

Officially, the Attorney-General believed that Tsafendas was not a schizophrenic and thus was fit to stand trial, and proving that contention appeared to be his main objective during the summary trial. It was also what he told David Bloomberg and Wilfrid Cooper on October 6, when Tsafendas was remanded for the trial proceedings. To support his stance he gave the defence team Professor van Wyk's medical report on Tsafendas which made no mention of schizophrenia and contended that Tsafendas was fit to be tried. However, the Attorney-General's conduct during the summary trial was puzzling, especially the fact that both of his own expert witnesses testified that in examinations conducted before October 6 they found Tsafendas to be schizophrenic and unfit to stand trial.

Professor van Wyk, the State's principal expert witness who was appointed by the Attorney-General himself, said that initially, after two examinations, he believed Tsafendas was fit to stand trial. However, after examining him again on October 4, he changed his mind and concluded he was schizophrenic. He confirmed this opinion during his next two examinations on October 13 and 14. In the meantime, Mr. Erasmus, a clinical psychologist, the other State witness appointed by the Attorney-General, had diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic from September 29, according to his testimony to the court.

Therefore, the diagnoses of both of the States' witnesses agreed with the defence's line. In that case, the question is why the Attorney-General appeared to question the defence's medical witnesses so strongly while trying to prove Tsafendas was fit to stand trial. As David Bloomberg and Wilfrid Cooper rightly wondered, why did he allow Judge Beyers to question all their witnesses, especially Dr. Cooper, so vigorously?

Let us first examine the diagnoses of the State's two expert witnesses and their relations with the Attorney-General. The first question is whether van den Berg was aware of their diagnoses. According to Advocate George Bizos and Professor John Dugard it is impossible to believe that his witnesses did not inform him of their findings. Thus the Attorney-General had two options:

- a. He did not agree with their diagnoses.
- b. He agreed with their diagnoses.

Let's examine both scenarios:

A. HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THEIR DIAGNOSES

If the Attorney-General did not agree with his expert witnesses' diagnoses that would explain his what appeared to be hostile questioning and the fact that he remained mute while Judge Beyers adopted a similar approach. However, it does not explain why he did not produce evidence to support his assertion that Tsafendas was fit to stand trial, as well as his line of questioning at times.

First and perhaps mostly importantly, if the Attorney-General had doubts about his two experts or lacked confidence in them, he could have appointed more psychiatrists and psychologists to examine Tsafendas. Arguments as to limited time are not valid. Erasmus carried out his tests on September 28 and 29, thus the Attorney-General had three weeks to appoint another expert to examine Tsafendas. Professor van Wyk initially diagnosed Tsafendas as fit to stand trial, but on October 4 formed the opinion he was schizophrenic, giving the Attorney-General two weeks to appoint a second psychiatrist.

Furthermore, the Attorney-General could easily have found medical and non-medical witnesses to support his case. About one hundred and fifty people were questioned by the police and not a single one of them backed the defence's line. On the contrary, several could have challenged the defence, having described Tsafendas variously as a dangerous Communist, an opponent of apartheid and colonialism, and someone who considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant and a dictator. Witnesses had also testified that Tsafendas characterised a possible assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as "justifiable." None of those who made these statements was called, although this might simply have been because the police did not make these testimonies available to van den Berg. Another possibility is that he was given witness statements which included nothing of importance. However, the Attorney-General must have known that the police would have questioned Tsafendas. Did he not ask to see these statements? Did he not think of asking what Tsafendas told the police during the forty-days he was in their custody? He could not have believed the accused man did not talk to the police at all during this period.

The Attorney-General seems to have knowledge of Tsafendas's movements prior to the assassination and of its planning. Such information could have come only from Tsafendas himself. Since Tsafendas had told the police about his movements and his planning in both of his statements, the fact that the Attorney-General was aware of these matters suggests that he was given Tsafendas's statements. However, if this was the case, he did not use the more

important information in the statements which concern Tsafendas's motives. Tsafendas had given clear and logical reasons for killing Dr. Verwoerd: that he was "disgusted with his policies," considered Dr. Verwoerd not to be the real representative of ALL South African people and he hoped that by killing him a "change of policy would take place."⁵⁷⁶⁹ It cannot also be excluded that the Attorney-General was not in possession of the full statements given by Tsafendas, but had been given only chosen extracts.

The Attorney-General appeared to try his best to prove that Tsafendas was politically motivated but he did not use any of the statements Tsafendas gave to the police, nor any of the evidence the police gathered regarding his political activities especially those which led to his arrests by the Portuguese, nor did he use any of the many statements by people who characterised Tsafendas as a Communist and anti-apartheid. Instead, he used the report by Dr. Sakinofsky which referred to "delusional" ideas, such as the Cape-Cairo Union, and pronounced Tsafendas to be a schizophrenic. The use of Dr. Sakinofsky's report was an extremely clumsy way of trying to prove that Tsafendas's motive was political. The report referred to "confused and delusional" ideas held by Tsafendas and, more importantly, diagnosed Tsafendas as a schizophrenic. Who would ever try to prove a man is sane by using a report which argues that he is a schizophrenic? This was like trying to put out a fire with gasoline.

The Grafton State Hospital report, which was in the possession of the police since September 16,⁵⁷⁷⁰ stated that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in the 1940s.⁵⁷⁷¹ And six witnesses testified to the police on October 12 that Tsafendas had pretended to be mad to avoid service in the Portuguese Army.⁵⁷⁷² The author is not in position to know whether the Attorney-General was in possession of this evidence, but certainly it was not used to advance his case. The Attorney-General was also aware that Tsafendas had "simulated abnormality" before but did not think of raising the issue with any of those who examined Tsafendas. It was only brought up by the Attorney-General's assistant with Dr. MacGregor, the last of the

⁵⁷⁶⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁷⁷⁰ Letter of the USA Embassy in Cape Town to the South African Security Branch, 3 October 1966. Correctional Service. Subject: Demitrio Tsafendas. File: 80/0043 A123 Vol. 1. NASA.

⁵⁷⁷¹ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁵⁷⁷² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

defence witnesses, and even then, it was quickly brushed away.

Even if the Attorney-General was not given all the evidence by the police, he must have considered Tsafendas's colleagues at Parliament as witnesses who could testify to his work and his mental state up to the assassination. This would have supported the assertion he made to Dr. Cooper and Dr. MacGregor that Tsafendas's work was satisfactory. However, he produced no evidence to support his claim and was left looking embarrassed when the defence appeared to prove that Tsafendas's work was not satisfactory. Not even at that point did he produce anything to support his argument, leaving the defence's witness unchallenged.

If the Attorney-General did not agree with his expert witnesses' diagnoses, that would explain his line of questioning, but it does not explain his failure to produce any substantial evidence to support his opinion and it also does not explain why he did not appoint additional psychiatrists to examine Tsafendas. It would also not explain his bizarre attempt to use Dr. Sakinofsky's report to prove that Tsafendas was politically motivated. The fact is the Attorney-General did not use any evidence to support the argument that Tsafendas was fit to stand trial, so why did he even attempt to prove such a thing, especially since his two own experts appeared to agree with the defence that the accused is schizophrenic and unfit to stand trial? He couldn't really have expected a successful challenge to the defence without any evidence.

B. HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THEIR DIAGNOSES

This would mean that he accepted Tsafendas was a schizophrenic and unfit to stand trial, which would certainly explain his failure to produce any evidence to challenge the defence. However, it does not explain his line of questioning and his apparent attempt to prove that Tsafendas was not a schizophrenic and that this was a political act. Furthermore, if he had accepted his witnesses' diagnosis, he should have prevented Judge Beyers from being so aggressive towards the defence witnesses, as David Bloomberg and Wilfrid Cooper correctly pointed out. Despite the fact that the State and the defence were in agreement, the Attorney-General allowed the trial to be turned into a showcase.

C. OTHER SCENARIOS

The question is: which of the above options was correct? Did the State accept the diagnoses of its own witnesses or did it not? Either way, there are questions left unanswered. However, there are three other scenarios involving the Attorney-General that would explain everything, including his attitude and actions during this inquiry:

- **The Attorney-General is incompetent.** He fails to evaluate correctly the importance of the evidence gathered by the police. His questioning is irrelevant, pointless or self-defeating. He fails to call evidence to support his case and challenge the defence. Incompetence would explain his behaviour during the summary trial. That, however, would probably make him the most incompetent Attorney-General ever.
- **The Attorney-General is not aware of the evidence gathered by the police.** The police gave him selective evidence and therefore he did not have the right information to challenge the defence. This option, along with the incompetence theory, would explain his line of questioning and the lack of evidence to challenge the defence and support his claim that Tsafendas was fit to stand trial.
- The Attorney-General appears to challenge the defence's line, seeking to prove that Tsafendas is fit to stand trial and that the assassination was a political act, but he is actually just pretending. That would explain everything that happened during the summary trial; it would explain his line of questioning, his failure to produce any evidence to challenge the defence and why he appeared to be questioning the defence witnesses while the State's two expert witnesses had already agreed with the defence.

OTHER ISSUES WITH THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S CONDUCT

Let us examine some aspects of the Attorney-General's strange behaviour:

TSAFENDAS'S MOTIVE

This is the area which most clearly suggests that the Attorney-General is merely pretending to challenge the defence case or possibly that he has not been given all the evidence. He heard each of the defence's psychiatrists state that Tsafendas was not politically motivated and that

he killed Dr. Verwoerd out of “frustration” and because of the tapeworm. However, Tsafendas had not said anything like that in his statements to the police; instead, he gave clear and logical political reasons for his act. These motives were never mentioned during the summary trial and certainly, for whatever reason, they were not used to challenge the defence. It is true that the Attorney-General had knowledge of things that were in Tsafendas's statements to the police, but this does not prove that he had access to the whole statements. People who knew Tsafendas for lengthy or for shorter periods told the police that they heard him say he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant and a dictator, that he was a communist and anti-apartheid. None of their statements was led in evidence by the Attorney-General.

What points to scenario C as the likeliest reason for the Attorney-General's apparently bizarre conduct is his attempt to challenge Dr. Cooper's claim that the killing was not politically motivated by using Dr. Sakinofsky's report. Even if van den Berg was not in possession of Tsafendas's statements or any other evidence where his political ideology was mentioned, he could never have expected to challenge Dr. Cooper's testimony with a medical report whose diagnosis was schizophrenia. Furthermore, Tsafendas's alleged ideas set out in this report were plainly idiotic, and the Attorney-General could not have expected anyone to take them serious as political motives. Still, not one of the 150 people who were questioned by the police at the time said anything about Tsafendas that bore the slightest resemblance to the things mentioned in this report, and this should have been known the Attorney-General. He should have known that Tsafendas was a Communist and an opponent of apartheid, as several witnesses had testified. He was also well aware that Tsafendas was a former member of the SACP.

Even if the Attorney-General believed that these outlandish ideas at Dr. Sakinofsky's report constituted Tsafendas's motivation, did he actually consider them to be the beliefs of a sane man? Dr. Sakinofsky had diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic precisely because of these ideas. The Attorney-General may not have been given all the statements taken from people who knew Tsafendas, but he must have seen that not one witness mentioned such ideas. Fortunately for the Attorney-General, he was stopped by Judge Beyers before he continued further with Dr. Sakinofsky's report, and the damage he was doing to his own case was limited. However, just the next day Dr. Sakinofsky spoke at length about Tsafendas's alleged motive as given to him by Tsafendas himself, and presented them, clearly and convincingly, as “deluded” and “confused.”

The Attorney-General might have the excuse that he was not in possession of Tsafendas's statements to the police or any other evidence he could use to challenge the question of motive. However, as leading counsel for the State, he had no excuse for attempting to challenge Dr. Cooper with Dr. Sakinofsky's report. This was a move which, if not stopped by Judge Beyers, would have reinforced from the very first day of the summary trial the idea that Tsafendas was a schizophrenic without any political motive, thus supporting the defence and ruining the State's own case.

TSAFENDAS'S ABILITY TO WORK

The Attorney-General sought to challenge Dr. Cooper's opinion that Tsafendas could not hold down a job or work efficiently by stating that there was evidence that Tsafendas's work at Parliament was satisfactory. However, he not only failed to produce evidence to support his claim, he did open the issue of Tsafendas's efficiency at Parliament for discussion. The next day, defence witness Gerald Shaw, a Parliamentary correspondent, testified that Tsafendas's work was unsatisfactory, confirming Dr. Cooper's testimony and damaging the Attorney-General's claim. The Attorney-General did nothing to challenge Shaw and again produced no evidence to support his initial claim. Then, just a few hours after Shaw's testimony, he again raised the issue of Tsafendas's working ability when he cross-examined Dr. Zabow and once again, he failed to produce any supportive evidence.

By returning time after time to the question of Tsafendas's work, the Attorney-General managed to reinforce the defence's line that the accused was incapable of handling even menial jobs. What is extraordinary is that abundant evidence existed that would not just challenge such a claim, but would destroy it completely. Two simple examples: in 1961, Tsafendas worked for six months as a teacher of English at the best private language college in Istanbul. Even if the Attorney-General was not in possession of Tsafendas's statement about his time teaching in Istanbul or the fact that he used a reference from the college to get his job at Parliament, the South African media had reported this.⁵⁷⁷³

If the Attorney-General had moved to discover these facts, he could have posed a virtually unanswerable question to Dr. Cooper: "How is it that the man you say cannot hold down a simple job, actually worked for six months as an English teacher at a prestigious

⁵⁷⁷³ *The Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas taught Turks English'; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas taught English in Turkey.'

private college?" However, even if the Attorney-General was unaware of the teaching job, he certainly knew that Tsafendas had worked for six years at the Vulcan Iron Works and for two years at the Imperial Airways factory in Quilemane. More importantly, he was in possession of testimonies from the Vulcan Iron Works that Tsafendas had "performed his duties in a satisfactory manner." Van den Berg made no mention of such important evidence, although he had included this information in his memorandum about Tsafendas on October 3.⁵⁷⁷⁴

Finally, no apparent effort was made by the Attorney-General to contact Tsafendas's colleagues in the House of Assembly as to his working abilities. Five of them had already testified to the police and to the Commission of Enquiry and none of them had said anything negative about Tsafendas, his work or his mental state, on the contrary he was characterised as a normal man who did his work just like any other messenger.

STATEMENTS OF DEFENCE WITNESSES WERE LEFT UNCHALLENGED WERE THEY COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN BROKEN DOWN

As we have seen, there was a plethora of evidence gathered by the police which could have been used to challenge statements by defence witnesses. These included absurd claims that Tsafendas was unsympathetic towards Coloureds, that he was a supporter of Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid, that he was unable to function on a reasonable level, that he forced his way into the Daniels's house and several others. Not one of these claims was challenged and though it is certainly possible that the police withheld evidence that would have been useful to the Attorney-General, they could not know before the trial what evidence a witness would give and therefore could not have removed statements that could have been used in the trial. They could have withheld evidence about Tsafendas's political activities and ideology, but not other statements that did not contain references to his political ideas.

A clear example of the above is the one concerning the marriage issue between Helen Daniels and Tsafendas. Tsafendas and Helen Daniels both testified that she had proposed to him that they should meet and get married.⁵⁷⁷⁵ Caroline Barbeau testified that Tsafendas

⁵⁷⁷⁴ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

⁵⁷⁷⁵ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File VDSO 17/64, NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

wanted to be reclassified in order to marry Helen Daniels.⁵⁷⁷⁶ However, this was not mentioned during Peter Daniels's testimony. In that, he claimed that they allowed Tsafendas to stay in their home simply because he was a member of their Church and that Tsafendas appeared like someone who practically forced himself onto the family.

Tsafendas is portrayed in a negative way by both Peter and Merle Daniels and the Attorney-General does not ask them about Helen's marriage proposal to Tsafendas. Helen Daniels had testified that Tsafendas was recommended to her by fellow members of their sect. Helen was a highly respected preacher and naturally the other members of the sect would not have recommended Tsafendas if he was the type of person described by the Daniels. Helen Daniels herself, who knew Tsafendas better than her brother and sister-in-law, as she had lived under the same roof with him, had testified to the police that Tsafendas was not insane. Neither this nor anything else from her statement was used during the cross-examination when it could have shattered the Daniels's weak testimony.

Several witnesses testified that Tsafendas preferred Coloured people to Whites. For example, his flatmate Jacobus Bornman testified that Tsafendas "stood up a lot for the Coloureds" and Inspector Horacio Ferreira, of the Portuguese Security Police in Mozambique, testified that Tsafendas was "intensely anti-White."⁵⁷⁷⁷ However, Smorenberg's opinion and claim was left unchallenged and was attributed to Tsafendas's ambivalence. These and other claims could easily have been challenged but no move was made to examine them.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S LINE OF QUESTIONING

Apart from his cross-examinations of Dr. Cooper, Patrick O'Ryan and Dr. Sakinofsky, the Attorney-General did little to challenge defence witnesses and often when he did, his questions were pointless and seemed to go nowhere. Often they were just repeats of statements by the witnesses, as in "Did you say it was the 26th" or they were irrelevant or pointless, adding nothing to the State's aim. For instance, when the Attorney-General cross-examined Dr. Zabow, he asked if Tsafendas had given "a good account of himself." This was

⁵⁷⁷⁶ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁷⁷⁷ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

after Dr. Zabow had spoken at length about that very subject and had even read lengthy extracts from Tsafendas's statement to him to demonstrate that Tsafendas was not able to give a good account for himself. Judge Beyers had to intervene again, saying: "the witness has told us at length about the garbled, nonsensical, stupid, disjointed account which the accused did give him when he asked him the question. He has read out at length the account he gave him when he asked him: 'did you kill the Prime Minister, and why?' he read pages of the account."⁵⁷⁷⁸ Only then did van den Berg drop the question.

On occasions, his questioning was more harmful than beneficial to the State. One example was using Dr. Sakinofsky's medical report on Tsafendas to challenge Dr. Cooper. Another was the question of Tsafendas's efficiency as a Parliamentary messenger. A third was asking Patrick O'Ryan, a witness who had spoken positively about the accused, if he felt that Tsafendas was sponging on him. That was the sort of question that should have been asked by the defence counsel, not by the State which is supposedly challenging the emerging picture of Tsafendas as a hopeless case.

What is more, the Attorney General did nothing to challenge Peter Daniels's important testimony which sought to portray Tsafendas as someone who virtually forced his way into the Daniels's home and was chasing Peter Daniels's sister. Although both claims were untrue and could have been easily challenged by Helen Daniels's testimony to the police, this did not happen. Instead, the Attorney-General asked about statements Peter Daniels had already made, a point which the Court highlighted, or asked him irrelevant or unimportant questions such as how many suitcases Tsafendas had, whether he used his welding kit and if he received and wrote letters. Daniels twice said that Tsafendas arrived on August 28, 1965, but the Attorney-General still asked if it was July 10. Helen Daniels had testified to the police that Tsafendas arrived on August 28, 1965. Van den Berg did not suggest that August 28 might have been the wrong date, so why press it?

Finally, although at times the Attorney-General's cross-examination appeared to be fierce and insistent, as with Dr. Cooper and Dr. Sakinofsky, and to some extent, Patrick O'Ryan, in reality it failed to challenge any of the testimonies. It did not come close to exposing or destroying the evidence offered. What is surprising is that there was a massive amount of evidence gathered by the South African police that could have been used to

⁵⁷⁷⁸ Dr. Abraham Aubrey Zabow's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

challenge every single testimony, but this simply did not happen. Once again, however, this could be because the State was not in possession of all the evidence.

THE VERGOS ISSUE

On October 12, the story of the day in South Africa was that Nikolas Vergos, the man who had fought with Tsafendas at Mandini and was a sought-after witness, was finally located. “KEY WITNESS FOUND” announced the front page of the *Daily Dispatch*,⁵⁷⁷⁹ while *The Cape Times* bannered “IMPORTANT WITNESS TRACED.”⁵⁷⁸⁰ Justice J.T. van Wyk, chairman of the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd’s death, had appealed to the media earlier for help in locating Vergos, who was thought to have “vital information” regarding Tsafendas. Six hours later, Vergos walked into the office of the *Rand Daily Mail* in Johannesburg and was later questioned by the police and the Commission.⁵⁷⁸¹

Vergos, although characterised as a “key” and “important” witness who had “vital information” about Tsafendas, was not asked to testify at the summary trial. He gave a statement to the police and testified before the Commission, but he was not asked by either the defence or the State to appear at the summary trial. Why was such an important witness not required to appear?

Let us examine Vergos and his relationship with Tsafendas for a possible explanation. They both worked at Frasers and Chalmers in Mandini. There was an argument after Vergos refused to pay two African workers he had employed illegally. Tsafendas defended them and asked him to pay them and a fight began.⁵⁷⁸² Vergos then asked his superiors to fire Tsafendas because he was “a kaffir and a Communist.”⁵⁷⁸³ He even described him as “the biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa”⁵⁷⁸⁴ and a “Communist bastard.”⁵⁷⁸⁵ All these statements were in the possession of the South African police.

⁵⁷⁷⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Key witness found’,

⁵⁷⁸⁰ *The Cape Times*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Important witness traced.’

⁵⁷⁸¹ *The Cape Times*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Important witness traced.’

⁵⁷⁸² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁵⁷⁸³ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁷⁸⁴ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁷⁸⁵ Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Clearly, Vergos would not have been a suitable witness for the defence, who were trying to portray Tsafendas as a man without any political ideas and who was even “unsympathetic towards the Coloureds,” but he would have been the perfect witness for the State if it really wanted to challenge the defence line. Vergos twice described him to his boss and to a security officer as a Communist and had even fought with him after Tsafendas defended the two Black South Africans. However, as we have already noted, the word “Communist” was never heard at the summary trial.

THE STATE-WITNESSES

As we know, the Attorney-General before the trial refused permission to the defence to speak to people on the State's witness list. The defence lawyers appealed to Judge Beyers who gave them permission to do so.⁵⁷⁸⁶ Why did he do that, especially when he did not call even one of them to support his stated belief that Tsafendas was capable of standing trial? There were more than a hundred witnesses able to challenge the defence's line and its witnesses and support the Attorney-General's alleged claim, but not one was called.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S LIE

Let us now examine an incident that tells us much about the Attorney-General's integrity and reliability, but also about his role in the case. As already stated, the word “Communist” was never heard during the summary trial, although the police had a plethora of evidence that Tsafendas was a devoted and passionate Communist, had been a dues-paying member of the South African Communist Party at a time when it was legal, had fought with the Communists during the Greek Civil War and was suspected of distributing Communist propaganda while in Mozambique. What makes the actions of the Attorney-General in the summary trial strange and suspicious is the following incident.

On October 30, ten days after the end of the summary trial, *The Post* revealed on its front page that Tsafendas used to be a member of the South African Communist Party. A *Post* journalist had interviewed the Attorney-General and asked him if he was aware that Tsafendas was a former member of the South African Communist Party. At this point in time, it had not become known to the Press or to anyone else that Tsafendas was a former member

⁵⁷⁸⁶ Cooper, 2016: 106-7.

of the Communist Party. Van den Berg's bare-faced reply to the journalist was: "This is news to me – I certainly had no knowledge of it until this very moment when you brought it to my notice."⁵⁷⁸⁷

It was an outright lie. On 3rd October, two weeks before the start of the summary trial and twenty-seven days before this interview, the Attorney-General had written a detailed memorandum regarding Tsafendas. In paragraph 3 of the memorandum he wrote: "In a statement to the South African Police on 19 September 1966, Demitrio Tsafendas admitted that he had joined the Communist Party shortly before World War II. He also attended their meetings and paid the fees but denied the he had any further association with the Communists after he left South Africa in 1942."⁵⁷⁸⁸

Thus, even if the Attorney-General was not in possession of any other evidence gathered by the police as to Tsafendas's Communist beliefs or activities, he was certainly aware that he was a former member of the South African Communist Party; after all, that was why he included the information in his memorandum. However, then, when questioned by *The Post* journalist, he pretended that it was the first time he heard about it. Why would he lie? We cannot know for certain, but the likeliest explanation seems to be that if he had admitted knowledge of Tsafendas's membership, then the question everyone would have asked was, "How come this was not brought up in the summary trial?" Tsafendas was portrayed as man with very little interest in politics and confused political ideas. The next question then would have been, "was other important information suppressed?" No matter what the Attorney-General's reasons were, the fact is that he lied. This raises large questions about his integrity and creates further suspicion about his role during the proceedings.

It should be mentioned here that during apartheid it was not unusual for the State to lie or to fabricate evidence. By coincidence, while Tsafendas's summary trial was taking place, another major trial was also taking place in Johannesburg, the Theron Trial. Johannes Andrias Theron, a head warder at the Cinderella Prison, Boksburg, was accused of twelve charges under the Commissioner of Oaths Act and the prisons Act-including two of publishing information about prisons in a newspaper and two of inciting people to do so.⁵⁷⁸⁹ Theron had revealed to newspapers some of the atrocities and brutal torture that was used in

⁵⁷⁸⁷ *The Post*, 30 October 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas: I was a communist.'

⁵⁷⁸⁸ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

⁵⁷⁸⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 October 1966, 'Amazing liar says Utar.'

his prison against prisoners in order to extract information; one of them being the use of electric shocks.⁵⁷⁹⁰ The prosecutor of the case was the infamous Percy Yutar, who was characterised by Israel Maisels as “*plus royaliste que le roi* – more royalist than the king,” because of his blind support for apartheid.⁵⁷⁹¹ Yutar was also at the time Deputy Attorney-General of the Transvaal. According to Benjamin Pogrund, the *Rand Daily Mail* journalist who covered the trial, Yutar’s “unscrupulous alliance” with the police turned “day into night,”⁵⁷⁹² so the defence team, which included Arthur Chaskalson and Joan Coaker, described the State case as being “riddled with perjury from top to bottom.”⁵⁷⁹³

CONCLUSION ABOUT THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S ROLE

All of the above issues make the position of the Attorney-General look awkward, to say the least, especially because the police had in their possession ample evidence to break down the defence’s line which was not used during the proceedings. However, his illogical behaviour can be explained perfectly if we accept that he was only pretending to challenge the defence, or that he was incompetent or that he was not in possession of all the evidence. It would explain:

- a. Why he appeared to question some witnesses rigorously, while his two own experts had come to the same conclusion as the defence.
- b. Why he used only certain extracts from Tsafendas’s statements to the police, ignoring the most important ones, especially about motive.
- c. Why he attempted to challenge Dr. Cooper by using Dr. Sakinofsky’s report, thus raising yet more “delusional and confused” ideas of Tsafendas.
- d. Why he attempted to challenge Dr. Cooper by claiming that Tsafendas’s work at the Parliament was efficient. He did not produce any evidence and the next day a defence witnesses easily rebuffed his claim, stating the exact opposite. Nevertheless, he attempted to challenge Dr. Zabow by making the same claim.

⁵⁷⁹⁰ Pogrund, 2000: 168.

⁵⁷⁹¹ Maisels, 1997: 319.

⁵⁷⁹² Pogrund, 2000: 173-4.

⁵⁷⁹³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 October 1966: 4-5, ‘Perjury in State case alleged’; For more details about the case see Pogrund, B. (2000) *War on Words: Memoirs of a South African Journalist*.

- e. The fact that none of the evidence gathered by the police which could have challenged the defence was used.
- f. The Attorney-General's pointless, repetitive and irrelevant questioning of some of the witnesses. On occasions, not only did it offer nothing to the State's cause, it seriously harmed it, as with Dr. Sakinofsky's report, the claim about Tsafendas's work inefficiency and the "sponging" comment with O'Ryan. Add to these, asking Dr. Zabow if Tsafendas was able to give a good account of himself and the exchanges with Peter and Merle Daniels.

Of course, these scenarios are only suppositions, and a combination of incompetence and lack of evidence could also explain everything. That, however, would make van den Berg just about the most incompetent lawyer ever to hold down the post of Attorney-General. Professor John Dugard believes that the police may have withheld the evidence from the Attorney-General, but that it is also possible that van den Berg was pretending to challenge the defence. He notes that during apartheid the "prosecutors were never independent." He is "quite sure" that van den Berg knew what he had to do in this case and it is possible that he "could have suppressed" the evidence.⁵⁷⁹⁴

Advocate George Bizos also believes that both scenarios are feasible and stated that during apartheid, in "serious political cases", often the "public prosecutor was the last wheel of the car (A Greek expression meaning the person of least importance)."⁵⁷⁹⁵ Denis Goldberg also believes that both scenarios are very possible. He has no doubt that the Attorney General could very well have withheld the evidence and lied to the court. He mentioned as an example Percy Yutar, the public prosecutor in the Rivonia Trial: "He would actually make false statements; the prosecutor would make false statements deliberately."⁵⁷⁹⁶ No matter what the reasons were, or the political climate at the time, the fact is that the police had abundant evidence to break down the defence case and none of it was used by the Attorney-General.

⁵⁷⁹⁴ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁵⁷⁹⁵ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 6 April 2016.

⁵⁷⁹⁶ Denis Goldberg in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

AFTER THE TRIAL

Tsafendas's trial did not dispense with all the concerns relating to Dr. Verwoerd's assassination. Minister of Justice Mr. P.C. Pelser said that the Government accepted the trial findings and urged the public to do likewise,⁵⁷⁹⁷ while he also announced that a Commission of Enquiry would be appointed to "thoroughly investigate the effectiveness of the existing legal rules applicable to cases of this type."⁵⁷⁹⁸

On November 6, Judge van Wyk, who was still at work as the sole member of the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd's death, called for the establishment of registers listing people with dangerous mental disorders, as well as those known to be drug addicts or alcoholics. Van Wyk urged that a record be maintained of people who had been treated at mental hospitals and were potentially harmful. Their details should be contained in a confidential central register to which the Security Police would have access. A second register would be of "known alcoholics or people suffering from drug addiction or similar mental disorders." Van Wyk said such people could be banned from driving "and this could have an effect in cutting the rate of road accidents." The psychiatric profession was shocked by these proposals.⁵⁷⁹⁹

An insight into the Government's true beliefs concerning the assassination and Tsafendas emerged a few months after the trial, when Dr. J. D. Vorster, brother Prime Minister Vorster, spoke to an anti-Communist symposium in the United States sponsored by the Church League of America. Vorster said, "Your President Kennedy and our Dr. Verwoerd were both killed by Communists."⁵⁸⁰⁰ The *Sunday Times* front-paged Vorster's statement with the headline "Premier's brother drops a bombshell."⁵⁸⁰¹ There was no mention of schizophrenia or of the hopeless, wandering, and friendless man without political interests who so dominated the trial. Vorster was clearly aware of Tsafendas's Communist beliefs, and probably his activities, too, no doubt courtesy of his brother or his brother's close friend, General van den Bergh.

As for Tsafendas: shortly after the trial, he was taken to Robben Island. He was the only prisoner ever held there to be classified as "White." He remained there for four months

⁵⁷⁹⁷ *Pretoria News*, 20 October 1966, 'Pelser asks public to accept verdict.'

⁵⁷⁹⁸ *The Cape Times*, 21 October 1966: 1, 'Mad killer can still stand trial if cured.'

⁵⁷⁹⁹ *Sunday Times*, 6 November 1966: 17, 'Judge says: Register dangerous mental cases.'

⁵⁸⁰⁰ Bunting, 1986: 76; *Sunday Times*, 'Premier's brother drops a bombshell.'

⁵⁸⁰¹ *Sunday Times*, 'Premier's brother drops a bombshell.'

before being moved to Pretoria Central Maximum Security Prison in February 1967.⁵⁸⁰²

There, warders had built a “cell” in the Death Row section especially for him. Bernard Mitchel, a former inmate told the British *Guardian* in 1968:

“They built a special cell – a flat they called it – for him in the death block in Pretoria Central Prison ... they put a screen around the landing in front of the cell and “exercised” Tsafendas there... a screw would stand in each corner and Tsafendas’s exercise would consist of dodging their truncheons as they threw him from one side to the other. We used to exercise in the yard below his cell and you could hear him screaming.”⁵⁸⁰³

Tsafendas’s file at the Prison Service, File: A5078, described him as “*A person of Colour, an extremely resourceful and cunning individual who is physically and mentally able to plan and execute escape.*”⁵⁸⁰⁴ These words hardly fit the Tsafendas described by the psychiatrists – someone unable to function on a reasonable level and unfit to stand trial. However, the description fits perfectly with the way Tsafendas was described by people who knew him well. Vorster’s remark and Tsafendas’s prison file suggest that the high authorities were well aware of the real Tsafendas as opposed to the caricature that was put on trial.

⁵⁸⁰² Tsafendas’s transfer order from Robben Island to Central Prison, Pretoria. 3 February 1967. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁵⁸⁰³ de St Jorre (*The Observer*), 1 December 1968: 7, ‘I was glad that cancer got me out of Vorster’s jail.’

⁵⁸⁰⁴ Marais, 1992: 208.

SUMMARY TRIAL CONCLUSION

The most striking thing about the summary trial was not the distorted way in which Tsafendas was portrayed, but the fact that the Attorney-General did so little to challenge the profile when he could have broken it down very easily by using evidence gathered by the South African police. The vision of Tsafendas presented to the court was a travesty of the truth: a schizophrenic, incapable of looking after himself, unable to function on a reasonable level, a loner, withdrawn and without political interests. Not mentioned were the facts that he was a committed Communist, a former dues-paying member of the South African Communist Party and a street-level activist, that he was exiled from Mozambique for twelve years due to his Communist and anti-colonialist activities, and that he boldly displayed an intense life-long interest in political ideology. Instead, he was shown as a deluded and confused outsider who killed Dr. Verwoerd because of a tapeworm that supposedly lived inside him. The court accepted the defence's insanity plea and found Tsafendas unfit to stand trial. On the surface, the defence case appeared strong, but it could have been exposed by dutiful examination of witnesses and their statements and by other evidence gathered by the police.

THE DEFENCE WITNESSES

Naturally, the defence chose witnesses to support its line. This must have been a difficult task since no one of the two hundred people who were questioned by the police and the Commission of Enquiry could convincingly fulfil such a role. The defence's desperation to offer suitable testimony was obvious with the selection of witnesses like Johnston, Lieberman, Shaw and Cloete, who had minimal contact with Tsafendas. Individuals who had a passing acquaintance with Tsafendas, such as Shaw, or who had spoken to him for just twenty minutes in an entire lifetime, like Johnston, were chosen in preference to family and friends. However, those witnesses who did take the stand were chosen because each one could support something from the defence's line or the psychiatrists' diagnoses, which they did very well.

The O'Ryans spoke about the tapeworm, Smorenberg about Tsafendas being unable to hold down a job and being unsympathetic towards Coloureds, Johnston said he found him to be a strange man, the Daniels spoke about his supposed oddities. These were weak testimonies, especially by those who scarcely knew him, but they were taken seriously and

went largely unchallenged by the Attorney-General despite a plethora of contrary evidence gathered by the police.

WITNESSES NOT USED

Apart from Patrick and Louisa O’Ryan, none of the defence witnesses knew Tsafendas well; clearly and correctly the defence wanted only witnesses who would support the insanity plea. While it is understandable that the defence did not call witnesses who knew Tsafendas well, it is surprising that the State did not produce even one witness to support its claim that Tsafendas was fit to stand trial. Especially since there were many who could have done so. Indeed, the police and the Commission of Enquiry had interviewed about two hundred people who would have been useful witnesses for the prosecution.

Tsafendas’s efficiency as a Parliamentary messenger was discussed extensively, but none of his work colleagues was asked to testify, although five of them had already spoken formally to the police and testified to the Commission of Enquiry. All would have been excellent witnesses for the State as they flatly contradicted the defence’s claim that Tsafendas’s work in the Parliament was not good enough.

Nikolas Vergos, who was much sought after by the Commission of Enquiry and the South African police and who was characterised by the South African media as a “key witness,”⁵⁸⁰⁵ did not testify. Again, although he would not have been useful for the defence, he would have been extremely helpful to the State because he could have challenged the defence claim that Tsafendas was unsympathetic towards Coloured people and was bereft of political thought.

The *Eleni* crew could not appear in court since they were outside the country, but their statements were taken by the South African police in Venice on the 12th of October and should have been very useful to the State. Some of the seamen told police that Tsafendas was a Communist who had fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War, and, more importantly, that he had characterised a possible assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as “justifiable” because he was a tyrant and a dictator. That Dr. Verwoerd’s death was being

⁵⁸⁰⁵ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd: Key witness found’; *The Cape Times*, 12 October 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Important witness traced.’

discussed on the *Eleni* three days before the assassination was a major issue for the Commission of Enquiry, but it was never mentioned during the summary trial.

However, the most important of the missing potential witnesses were Tsafendas's family. All of them had stated that he was "definitely not insane" and none was aware of the tapeworm.⁵⁸⁰⁶

THE TAPEWORM

The main focus of the summary trial was the tapeworm. The court was told two different stories about its origins though this was not picked up by anyone. According to Dr. Cooper, Dr. Muller and Mr. van Zyl, Tsafendas had it since 1935 or 1936, while according to Louisa O'Ryan it was since he was a little boy. Tsafendas was seventeen and eighteen years old in 1935 and in 1936, no "little boy."

Furthermore and more importantly, according to Louisa O'Ryan, Tsafendas's step-mother removed six feet of a tapeworm, which he had excreted as a boy, and destroyed it, and since then, Tsafendas believed the rest of the worm was living inside him. However, when examined by the Commission of Enquiry, the step-mother flatly denied that any such incident ever took place and insisted that she had never heard anything about a tapeworm. She further maintained that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane." The other members of Tsafendas's family also denied that he told them anything about a tapeworm and all declared that he was "definitely not insane." For the rest of their lives, Marika and the family insisted that Tsafendas invented the tapeworm story and that none of the things he claimed in relation to it ever happened. The police and the Commission questioned two hundred witnesses at the time, including people who knew Tsafendas very well, some since childhood. Not one of them mentioned anything about the tapeworm.

The O'Ryans did testify in court about the tapeworm, but they admitted later that this was at the suggestion of Wilfrid Cooper to prevent Tsafendas being sentenced to death. Patrick O'Ryan was one of the 150 witnesses questioned by the police before the summary trial and he did not mention a tapeworm then. He had also told the police that Tsafendas was perfectly sane.

⁵⁸⁰⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

All the psychiatrists who testified said Tsafendas told them that the tapeworm did not direct him to kill Dr. Verwoerd, although he told Dr. Cooper that the “tapeworm was right in the middle of it.” However, the psychiatrists concluded that since the tapeworm had virtually taken over Tsafendas’s life, it was responsible for the killing. Finally, very soon after the assassination, Tsafendas was examined by three doctors, one of them Dr. Kossew and another Dr. Sakinofsky, and both testified for the defence. Tsafendas did not mention the tapeworm to any of these three doctors.

THE PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE PSYCHOLOGISTS

Five psychiatrists and two psychologists examined Tsafendas on behalf of the defence and the State and found him to be schizophrenic. However, although this was a forensic case, none of the psychiatrists was a forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Sakinofsky even suggested during the proceedings that a forensic psychiatrist “should be called by the court,” but this did not happen. It is scarcely credible that in such an important criminal case, none of those who examined the accused was a forensic psychiatrist.

Furthermore, all the examinations of Tsafendas took place while he was in custody in Caledon Square police station. In David Pratt’s case, after the defence had led its evidence, including the medical evidence by the psychiatrists, the accused was sent to Weskoppies, an institution for mentally disturbed persons, for psychiatric evaluation for fourteen days.⁵⁸⁰⁷ Fourteen days of observation in a clinical institution for Pratt contrasted with four and a half hours which each of the psychiatrists spent with Tsafendas, in a police cell (except for Dr. Cooper and Prof. van Wyk, who spent around six hours with him). Apparently this was enough for Judge Beyers to decide it was not necessary to send Tsafendas for further evaluation at a mental hospital or being examined by a forensic psychiatrist too.

In addition, Prof. Lamont, apart from observing Pratt, interviewed five people who knew Pratt very well.⁵⁸⁰⁸ By contrast, none of the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas spoke to anybody who knew him. What Tsafendas told the psychiatrists was the antithesis of what two hundred people had told the police and the Commission about his character and his

⁵⁸⁰⁷ Maisels, 1998: 105; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, ‘Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered.’

⁵⁸⁰⁸ Prof. Lamont’s psychiatric report on David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, ‘Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered.’

political ideas, but the psychiatrists were not in position to know that. More importantly, what he told them flatly contradicted what he told the police when he was in custody, but these statements were not given to the psychiatrists and were never mentioned at the court. Several of the psychiatrists' claims were easy to challenge, but the Attorney-General failed to act.

It is also worth pointing out that after their initial inspection, for reasons unknown to the author, all the defence psychiatrists except Dr. Sakinofsky examined Tsafendas for a second time on October 4. Dr. Cooper, Dr. MacGregor and Dr. Zabow examined Tsafendas that day, each separately and for ninety minutes. In addition, Tsafendas was also examined that day by the State psychiatrist, Professor van Wyk. Thus, Tsafendas was seen in one day by four different psychiatrists on four different occasions, meaning that he spent six hours that day talking about the same things, and answering the same questions. It would seem more logical for each psychiatrist to have examined him on different days so they could observe his functioning at different times, but surprisingly this did not happen. The third and final examination by the defence psychiatrists took place on October 11; this time the psychiatrists were all together.

Were the psychiatrists to blame for misdiagnosing Tsafendas? Clearly not. Dr. MacGregor said he had to "accept what was given to him" and that he "had to take shortcuts" due to the limited time before the court sitting. It was the same for the other psychiatrists. They took for granted what Tsafendas told them and had no way of double-checking it. Some, like Dr. MacGregor, even accepted Tsafendas's medical history as it was told by the accused himself. The psychologist Reyner van Zyl told the author that he and very probably some of the psychiatrists were given Tsafendas's medical history verbally and saw none of his medical records.

The psychiatrists were not given the statements Tsafendas made to the police while in custody nor any statement taken from people who knew him. Dr. Cooper was discouraged from probing too deeply into Tsafendas's background and his activities prior to the assassination. He was told that this was the job of the police and was given the impression by the police and the defence that this was a straightforward case. Van Zyl was given the same impression. The fact that none of the experts who examined Tsafendas sought collateral information about him from family and friends seems to confirm this.

None of them was aware that Tsafendas had faked mental illness at least twice in the past and that he was experienced with regard to hospitals. None of them was given some of

the records of Tsafendas's hospitalizations, such as the report from the Government Hospital in Beira where he was admitted after claiming to be Saint Peter. Had they accessed this document, they would have seen behavioural inconsistencies that were not normal for a true schizophrenic. None of them read the Grafton State Hospital report which stated that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in 1943. Furthermore, this report also contained several behavioural inconsistencies in contrast to the symptoms noted during the doctor's observations of Tsafendas while in custody.

Tsafendas's mental state apart, none of those who examined Tsafendas seemed concerned with his physical condition at the time. He was in police custody for twenty days before he was examined by the defence and all the examinations took place inside the police station where he was in custody. Although David Bloomberg found him twice with bruises and Tsafendas himself later described in detail how he was tortured while in custody, none of those who examined him makes any mention of his physical state, which could have affected his state of mind. It seems highly unlikely that the psychiatrists did not wonder about how Tsafendas was treated while in custody. Given the reputation of the South African police for brutality, they could hardly have expected him to be handled with kid gloves. It is curious that the doctors met with Tsafendas on several occasions yet appeared to remain ignorant of his physical conditions. They may not have known about the torture, unlikely as that seems, but they must have been aware of the conditions of his cell by his lawyers who had seen it. Without a bed, he was forced to sleep on the concrete floor. Yet none of the doctors seemed curious about Tsafendas's physical state or that he was in custody for twenty days before anyone examined him.

Furthermore, Tsafendas's treatment differed markedly from that of David Pratt after his defence lawyers claimed he was unfit to stand trial. Pratt was given an extended period of observation and investigation at Weskoppies Mental Hospital. After two weeks, a report was prepared by the head physician and Pratt was returned to court. He was then found insane and not fit to stand trial and he was committed to Bloemfontein Mental Hospital.⁵⁸⁰⁹ Tsafendas, by contrast, was examined for periods of no more than four and half hours inside the police station where he had been detained since the assassination.

⁵⁸⁰⁹ Prof. Lamont's psychiatric report on David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Maisels, 1998: 102-107; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, 'Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered.'

Finally, Tsafendas had the impression that all the psychiatrists, especially those of the defence, were eager to find him to be schizophrenic. That is why he thought that it was very easy to convince them as they also did not push him as much as they probably could have. He thought that on some occasions, he could have been put in a difficult position because of clear inconsistencies in his stories, but the psychiatrists did not do that and just let it go.⁵⁸¹⁰ Naturally, it was also not that difficult to convince them as all the information they got about him was from himself, and they had no means of confirming it.

THE DIAGNOSES

The psychiatrists and the psychologists presented Tsafendas as a hopeless loner, unsociable and withdrawn, a man without any serious political consciousness. However, the vast majority of the witnesses had described Tsafendas to the police and to the media as exactly the opposite. For example, Tsafendas was characterised by the medical experts as a “withdrawn and isolated individual.” Compare this with the testimony of Guenter Haafe, a doorman at the Frankfurt factory where Tsafendas worked in 1958:

“He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come into my locker (room) to say Hi. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met, and trust me, in my twelve years as a doorman I have seen thousands and thousands of faces coming in and out. This man was courteous, they do not make them like that anymore.”⁵⁸¹¹

Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas's boss on the Frankfurt job, said Tsafendas was “well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous ... a very pleasant man. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman.”⁵⁸¹² All of the psychiatrists' statements could have been exposed as inaccurate by using testimonies such as those of Haafe and Hartmann, but this did not happen.

Those who examined Tsafendas claimed that he was unable to function on a reasonable level, unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, unable to give a coherent account of himself, talked in a disjointed manner and suffered from thought

⁵⁸¹⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁵⁸¹¹ *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

⁵⁸¹² *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte’; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’

blocking. However, none of the two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission or the forty-four who were interviewed by the author, ever noticed any of these symptoms. On the contrary they described him as an intelligent man, perfectly able to carry on a conversation and with excellent reasoning powers. Is it possible a man to have all these symptoms as set out in the court and no-one ever notice? According to Professors Alban Burke, Phillip Resnick, Robert L. Sadoff and Tuviah Zabow, it is extremely unlikely, and very close to impossible.⁵⁸¹³ Reyner van Zyl, who examined Tsafendas for the defence, told the author that it was “highly improbable,”⁵⁸¹⁴ while Professor Phillip Resnick found it “extremely unlikely.”⁵⁸¹⁵

Father Nikola Banovic told the author:

“Everything this doctor [Dr. Cooper] has been saying is inaccurate; it’s not true about Dimitri. He was nothing like this, it’s like he had either examined a different person or he was a bad doctor.”⁵⁸¹⁶

Fotini Gavasiadis told the author:

“Everything you have been telling me [as to what Dr. Cooper and the other doctors said] is gibberish. Everything that they were saying is gibberish. Everything. I don’t know how they came to these conclusions and how they managed to get away with it. It’s absolutely gibberish. Dimitris must have had a lot of fun sitting [in the court] and listening to all this gibberish about him. I can imagine him [in the court] laughing inside him ... I am sure he must have had enjoyed it ... especially since he succeeded in fooling them and getting away with it.”⁵⁸¹⁷

The psychiatrists based their diagnoses wholly on what Tsafendas told them without any third-party information, and apart from Dr. Sakinofsky, no-one attempted to get more information about him. Even Dr. Sakinofsky was able to get only very limited details about Tsafendas from some of his medical records and did not speak to anyone who had met him. All of the examinations took place in the police station at Caledon Square after Tsafendas had

⁵⁸¹³ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 17 December 2016; Professor Robert L. Sadoff in a personal interview with the author, 12 August 2015; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 10 October 2016.

⁵⁸¹⁴ Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 17 April 2016.

⁵⁸¹⁵ Professor Phillip Resnick in correspondence with the author, 7 May 2017.

⁵⁸¹⁶ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁵⁸¹⁷ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 22 April 2016.

been held there incommunicado for twenty days. This was not considered worthy of comment, perhaps understandable since South Africa at the time was a virtual police state.

Leading forensic psychiatrist Professor John Macdonald said that “simulation is more frequent when a suspect faces the death sentence.” Tsafendas’s “symptoms” were seen in several cases where the accused faked mental illness. Professor Macdonald mentions the case of an accused man who asked his friends to testify in court in order to save his life, saying that he “gave the impression of being unstable, irrational and unsettled, that he would always lose interest in things he was doing, that he would begin a conversation and suddenly stop in the middle of it and start roaming, that he would sit and stare into space for long periods of time and pay no attention to those about him.”⁵⁸¹⁸

What is surprising is that the police and even the Commission were aware that Tsafendas was well read about psychiatry and mental illnesses. The police had found two medical books in his possession, one about insanity and psychiatry, the other concerning intestinal disorders.⁵⁸¹⁹ The Commission of Enquiry noted that Tsafendas was “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders — he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him... and (the Commission) therefore adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”⁵⁸²⁰

In addition, the police found evidence that in at least two cases Tsafendas faked mental illness in order to from his predicaments. None of these facts was made available to those who examined Tsafendas, although they should have been. The doctors did not use any third-party information about Tsafendas in order to confirm or question what he was telling them, simply taking him at his word. As Tsafendas would later admit, he knew very well what to tell his examiners and how to behave with them.⁵⁸²¹

It is inconceivable that a court in any democratic society today would accept psychiatrists’ diagnoses of an accused in a criminal case based on only three interviews,

⁵⁸¹⁸ Macdonald, 1958: 61.

⁵⁸¹⁹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁵⁸²⁰ Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁸²¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

lasting a total of four and a half-hours, and lacking any third-party information. The medical experts concerned seem to have accepted what they were told, that it was a straightforward case and Tsafendas was a schizophrenic with a long mental history. More surprisingly, only two of those who examined Tsafendas had seen some of his medical records, while the others were told verbally of their content. Professor Alban Burke told the author that the diagnosis of schizophrenia “was based on very little evidence.”⁵⁸²²

Professor Kirk Heilbrun agreed in personal interview with the author that such diagnoses would not have been seen as credible in an American court. He said:

“It [Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis] would not be given much credibility in a U.S. court. Many of the points we have discussed [above] would be incorporated into cross-examination to challenge the credibility of the opinions based only on self-report.”⁵⁸²³

TSAEFNDAS’S MEDICAL HISTORY

Although Tsafendas’s medical history was fundamental to the defence case, references to his medical past were spotty and incomplete. A more careful examination would have shown that Tsafendas was not an authentic schizophrenic but a person who pretended to be one. In addition, a great many medical documents which could challenge or contradict the psychiatrists’ judgments were not used.

Importantly, at least some of those who examined Tsafendas were told verbally that he had a long medical history of schizophrenia, but they never saw any records. They accepted the verbal assurance as a fact, without seeing inconsistencies in these reports which signalled clearly that Tsafendas could not have been a schizophrenic. The fact that he had faked mental illness at least twice was known to the South African police, but it was not mentioned during the summary trial. The US State Department’s report which accompanied Tsafendas’s medical record from Grafton State Hospital stated clearly that the US Immigration authorities had found Tsafendas, after dealing with him for about five years, to be “unstable, but not insane.”⁵⁸²⁴ Again, this crucial statement was not referenced. Nor were the inconsistencies in his medical history, for example that he appeared not only to believe he

⁵⁸²² Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

⁵⁸²³ Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview with the author, 15 January 2017.

⁵⁸²⁴ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

had a tapeworm, but that he had other delusions, too: that he believed himself to be Saint Peter in 1964, that he could hear voices from the radiators, and that he believed people were being poisoned by food in the lodgings where he was staying, just two months before the assassination.

The fact that every time he was arrested he showed signs of mental illness, while otherwise he functioned perfectly well in life, was not picked up. Nor was the curious fact that the only times he entered hospital he had either been arrested or admitted himself. A fact that was overlooked by everyone is that none of the doctors who examined Tsafendas in previous years had found him to be as described by the doctors at the summary trial, and none of them had found him to be certifiable. If his condition had deteriorate since 1959 when he was last hospitalized about the tapeworm, someone must surely have noticed this, including the ten doctors who examined him between 1963 and 1966 or some of the two hundred or so witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission.

That he was examined ten times by nine doctors in South Africa over the last three years and found in every case to be mentally sane and physically healthy did not see the light of day at the summary trial. On the other hand, the diagnosis of schizophrenia by Dr. Kossew, a district surgeon who was not a psychiatrist was taken seriously. This despite the fact that the examination had taken only “a little bit longer” than ten minutes and focussed primarily on his physical condition. No-one pointed out that the reason Dr. Kossew examined Tsafendas was to adjudicate on Tsafendas's application for a disability grant, for which he needed to be found incapable of working.

Equally, no-one raised the issue the previous times when Tsafendas was examined by doctors and had to be found sane and healthy in order to get a permanent residency permit or a job he had applied for. It was evident that when Tsafendas needed to be found sane he was found sane and when he needed to be found insane, he was found as such. The medical records confirm Tsafendas's claim that he was capable of doing this, and that he was hospitalised only for two reasons – when he appeared to be mad (a pretence to get out of custody or to be free of torture) or because he had no money and/or place to stay.

It is also surprising that Tsafendas's medical records were not placed before the Court. Although Defence Counsel offered to submit them, Judge Beyers decided that was not necessary, and now these records cannot be found. It seems strange by any standards that medical records which played a crucial role in a case pivoting on the issue of insanity were

not submitted as evidence and the Court only heard extracts read from their contents. However, as we have seen, two of the records used by the defence team were manipulated by it to support the defence case. The other startling thing is that the State did not bother examining them.

OMISSIONS FROM THE SUMMARY TRIAL

In an effort to save his life, Tsafendas was presented as an anti-social person without friends or political convictions, a sponger and someone who was unable to function on a reasonable level. The defence did an excellent job in presenting its case with carefully selected witnesses, helped of course by what Tsafendas told the psychiatrists, as none of this would have been possible without his "participation."

However, there were several important facts about Tsafendas which were known to the South African police and would have been extremely useful for evidence but were not used. For example, that Tsafendas worked for some six months as a teacher of English at the most prestigious private language college in Istanbul, the Limasollu Naci. This fact was known to the police as Tsafendas had told them about it when he was interrogated, and the South African Press had also written of it. However, it was not mentioned during the inquiry and Tsafendas was presented as a man unable to do even the simplest of menial jobs.

TSAFENDAS'S MOTIVE

The greatest omission from the summary trial was Tsafendas's real motive for killing Dr. Verwoerd. Although the court heard much discussion of Tsafendas's possible motives for killing Dr. Verwoerd, what was never brought up was his avowal to the police that he murdered the Prime Minister because he was "disgusted with his racial policies," considered him a dictator and hoped "a change of policy would take place" by removing him. Several people said they heard Tsafendas characterise Dr. Verwoerd as "Hitler's best student," a tyrant and a dictator, but their statements were not produced. Tsafendas's declared willingness to do "anything that would get the South African regime out of power"⁵⁸²⁵ was also never mentioned.

⁵⁸²⁵ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Instead, Tsafendas appeared to have no idea why he killed Dr. Verwoerd and was unable to explain his reasons. What took centre stage was the tapeworm. Tsafendas insisted that the tapeworm did not ask him to kill Dr. Verwoerd and the psychiatrists admitted as much, but it was their conclusion that the tapeworm was ultimately responsible because it strongly influenced his life and thoughts. The Attorney-General could have overturned the psychiatrists' claims as to Tsafendas's motive simply by reading the statements he made to the police which were entirely compatible with what several witnesses had told the police and the Commission and quite incompatible with what was heard in the court. Needless to say, these statements were never heard. What the court did hear was a claim that Tsafendas actually liked Dr. Verwoerd.

TSAFENDAS'S POLITICAL IDEAS

The second greatest omission from the summary trial were Tsafendas's political beliefs and his past political activities. Although the evidence gathered by the police, including several witnesses who testified that he was well-versed in politics and was a political animal,⁵⁸²⁶ he was presented, astonishingly, as a man without any interest in politics. His political activities in England, Mozambique and South Africa are never mentioned and he is instead presented as a deluded simpleton who killed Dr. Verwoerd because of a tapeworm that lived inside him.

Several witnesses had told the police that Tsafendas was anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist and a Communist. Tsafendas himself had admitted this when he was interrogated. Two men, Vergos and Father Probst, had reported him to a security officer and to the South African police respectively, one year before the assassination, specifically as a dangerous Communist. It was also known to the police that he had become a member of the anti-apartheid movement in Britain and had been associated with the leading anti-apartheid activists David Gardener, Solly Sachs and the Rev. Canon John Collins. He participated in anti-apartheid and anti-fascist demonstrations and meetings in London and was willing to do "anything that would get the South African regime out of power." It was also known to the police that Tsafendas established a friendly relationship with Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt,

⁵⁸²⁶ For example Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

the secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society in London and one of the leading figures in the modern anti-slavery movement.

More importantly, it was known to them that he was a former member of the South African Communist Party and that he had fought with the Communists during the Greek Civil War. It was also known to the South African authorities that he was banned from Mozambique and lived in exile until 1963, when he received an amnesty from the Portuguese government. It was known that he was arrested at least twice in Mozambique, and was suspected another two times, for conducting Communist and anti-colonialist propaganda. None of this was mentioned.

THE KILLING

All the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas stated that he was unable to describe the killing and its planning. In fact, Tsafendas had described the planning and the act in detail to the police twice - on September 11 and then again on the 19th.⁵⁸²⁷ The Attorney-General failed to challenge this, although he must have had Tsafendas's statements. Even thirty years later, Tsafendas was able to give a good account of the planning and the killing.⁵⁸²⁸

GENERAL APPEARANCE OF TSAFENDAS

Tsafendas was presented as a drifter who lived an aimless life, taking advantage of people, dirty, rude at times, unable to look after himself, a low-life. Abundant evidence existed from statements by people who knew Tsafendas, which flatly contradicted this characterisation and could easily have been used to destroy the distortion. Unmentioned were Tsafendas's political activities, his stints as a volunteer teacher of children in Istanbul and

⁵⁸²⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁸²⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Mozambique,⁵⁸²⁹ the fact that he was extremely well read⁵⁸³⁰ and soft-spoken,⁵⁸³¹ that he stood up for the Coloureds,⁵⁸³² that, though himself poor, he gave money to down-and-outs,⁵⁸³³ that he had “excellent reasoning powers”⁵⁸³⁴ and that he was “able to reason in conversation.”⁵⁸³⁵

The Daniels's testimonies played an important role in the false portrayal of Tsafendas and though easy meat for the Attorney-General, he failed to engage with them. Both Daniels presented Tsafendas in a very negative way, perhaps on instructions from Wilfrid Cooper, as he had done with the O'Ryanes. Their evidence painted the picture of a sponger who practically forced his way into their home and batted off the family. They indicated that they allowed him to stay out of charity and because he belonged to the same Christian sect.

What they did not say was that Helen Daniels, Peter Daniels's sister, had written first to Tsafendas asking to meet him and even proposing that he should marry her. She sent him five letters plus a photograph of herself. Tsafendas, like most normal men, agreed to meet her, but reserved any decision about marriage until they met face to face. The two family members were asked to testify since Helen, who knew Tsafendas much better, had already told the police that Tsafendas was perfectly sane. Obviously this ruled her out as a witness for the defence, but she could have been a very useful witness for the prosecution as her statement to the police contradicted what her brother and her sister-in-law testified. Omitted was also the fact that Tsafendas was recommended to Helen as a prospective spouse by fellow members of the sect. This is important since Helen Daniels was a preacher and a highly respected sect member. Her fellow Christians would hardly have urged her to see a person such as the one described by her brother and her sister-in-law.

⁵⁸²⁹ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

⁵⁸³⁰ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁸³¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2014.

⁵⁸³² Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁵⁸³³ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.'

⁵⁸³⁴ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁵⁸³⁵ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

EVIDENCE NOT USED

The South African police collected a massive amount of information about Tsafendas from a wide variety of sources, including people who knew him and documented reports from all over the world. These latter included reports from the Portuguese security police which were incomplete because “any information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique” was omitted.⁵⁸³⁶ Nevertheless, the totality of evidence showed Tsafendas as a completely different person from the one portrayed in court by the psychiatrists, both in personality and in political ideas.

The police knew perfectly well that Tsafendas considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator, an evil man, the brains behind apartheid, and Hitler's best student; they knew that he hoped that by killing him a change of policy would take place and that he wanted to do anything to get the apartheid regime out of power; they knew that he was against slavery and colonialism, that he was a committed Communist, a former paid-up member of the South African Communist Party who had fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil war, and that he was imprisoned by the Portuguese because of his political activities.

Despite all these things being known to the South African police, they were not used to challenge the defence. Instead, the State remained mute, tolerating the picture put forward by the defence of a schizophrenic who believed he harboured a life-controlling tapeworm, who was unsympathetic towards the Coloureds, and who assassinated the prime minister because he was “frustrated” by his life.

As stated before, the author is not in a position to know whether the Attorney-General turned a blind eye to the evidence, whether he was never given it or whether he was simply incompetent. According to Professor John Dugard and Advocate George Bizos, both scenarios are very feasible. It is possible that van den Berg suppressed the evidence since prosecutors during apartheid were never independent. It is also possible, however, that van den Berg was not given the evidence by the police as it would not have been the first or last time that this happened during apartheid. The police always did whatever was necessary to

⁵⁸³⁶ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

protect apartheid's interests.⁵⁸³⁷ For example, Gordon Winter stated that General van den Bergh asked him to not reveal to the Commission of Enquiry that Tsafendas was a Communist and to downplay his political activities.⁵⁸³⁸ After the Sharpeville massacre, the police went to the hospitals and removed the bodies of victims to hide the fact that the police had used the banned dum-dum bullets. Then the police conveniently "lost" evidence about the use of dum-dums and "misplaced" evidence as to the ammunition rounds issued. All in all, an effective cover-up of the use of dum-dums.⁵⁸³⁹ Since the police were able to "misplace" evidence in 1960, they were surely capable of doing so again six years later.

Finally, the withholding and concealment by the authorities of evidence which contradicted apartheid's interests became legal three years after the assassination. Prime Minister John Vorster and General van den Bergh engineered legislation which allowed them legally to withhold and conceal any documents and evidence in the pursuit of apartheid's interests. In 1969, the General Law Amendment Bill (the so-called 'BOSS' law) was passed, whose notorious Clause 29 authorised the Prime Minister or his nominee (i.e. van den Bergh) to prohibit oral testimony or the production of any document before any court or statutory body should they believe the evidence or document would be "prejudicial to the interests of the state or public security." In reality, this permitted the police and the security forces to conceal or ensure the unavailability of any document or evidence which might jeopardise their cause and made it possible for them to continue use the courts for the punishment of offenders but to disregard the courts for all other purposes.⁵⁸⁴⁰ Tsafendas's case exemplified such a situation, when statements and documents contradicting the evidence presented in the court were concealed.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

The Attorney-General's attitude was somewhat bizarre and he damaged rather than helped his case with incompetent questioning. Examples of this were his attempt to use Dr. Sakinofsky's report to challenge Dr. Cooper that Tsafendas was politically motivated or his claim about the existence of evidence that showed that Tsafendas's work in the Parliament was satisfactory.

⁵⁸³⁷ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 6 April 2016; Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁵⁸³⁸ Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

⁵⁸³⁹ Frankel, 2001: 147-8; 154-6.

⁵⁸⁴⁰ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 11; Sachs, 1973: 256.

Every single testimony could have been challenged and broken down quite easily by the State, although the Attorney-General failed to do so possibly for the reasons we examined previously.

It is also surprising that he failed to produce any evidence to support his claim that Tsafendas was fit to stand trial. What makes it even more surprising is that the South African police had gathered enough evidence not only to seriously challenge the insanity plea but to break it down. The evidence regarding Tsafendas's political activities and beliefs was overwhelming, although none of it was used.

However, the most astonishing aspect of the Attorney-General's conduct of the case was that his two main witnesses had concluded two weeks before the summary trial started that Tsafendas was a schizophrenic and unfit to stand trial. In doing so, they agreed with the case for the defence. Despite his witnesses' conclusions, the Attorney-General gave the impression throughout the proceedings that he did not accept the defence's plea and that he was seeking to challenge it. Everyone, including the defence team, was stunned to hear the evidence given by the State's two expert witnesses. It was the Attorney-General who allowed what should have been a simple and straightforward case, since both sides were in agreement about the accused, to be turned into a show trial. Further evidence of the Attorney-General's duplicitous role in the proceedings came just ten days after the summary trial when he lied to *The Post* about his knowledge of Tsafendas once being a member of the South African Communist Party. He claimed that he had just found that out from the *Post* journalist when in fact he knew about it at least from the 3rd of October because he had mentioned in a memorandum about Tsafendas which he wrote that day.

THE DEFENCE TEAM

Judge Beyers rightly praised the lawyers who defended Tsafendas, as they had indeed "graced the profession." Their handling of the case was the opposite of the Attorney-General's. Evidence from psychiatrists and from people who had met Tsafendas, along with some medical records, made for a convincing case, even though things were not as they appeared to be. The picture could have been very different if the State had used the evidence gathered by the police to challenge Tsafendas's defence, but the fact is the State did not do so and the defence team deserved credit for the solid-looking case it presented. David

Bloomberg told the author that at the end of the trial Tsafendas was “very grateful for everything that was being done for him. He kept on thanking us.”⁵⁸⁴¹

David Bloomberg in particular devoted a huge amount of energy to the case, succeeding, in a very limited time period, in finding suitable witnesses and evidence to support the defence's insanity plea. A gargantuan effort involved an international search for information from hospitals, government institutions and individuals long before the era of computerised communications technology and the invention of aids such as the internet. Wilfrid Cooper, too, with his highly intelligent and competent questioning of the witnesses, presented the defence's line with confidence and conviction. Cooper chose his words carefully and intelligently when presenting the case, especially with regard to Tsafendas's medical records and the scientific witnesses. Bloomberg and Cooper, along with their colleague Willy Burger, put together what seemed to be an extremely strong and convincing line, which they presented to the court with professional aplomb and conviction.

TSAFENDAS

Tsafendas was not the first or last person to pretend to be mad in order to escape punishment. It happened down the centuries. In Homer's *Trojan War*, Ulysses feigned insanity in order to escape going to the war. In the Bible, there is a description in the First Book of Samuel of David's successful pretence of madness to avoid punishment by the King of Gath. In fiction, pretending to be crazy is a regular novelist's device. For example in *The Count of Monte Christo*, imprisoned Abbe Faria pretended to be mad so that his guards would not take him seriously while he worked on his escape. In 1960, in South Africa, after the Sharpeville massacre, witnesses were advised to “play the fool” to avoid police abuse.⁵⁸⁴²

There is little doubt that the defence would have failed to prove their case without Tsafendas's “cooperation.” Although Tsafendas had given the police a perfectly logical political explanation for the killing, he changed his tune entirely with his defence team. The fact that he was not allowed to see his defence lawyers until twenty days after the assassination should be taken under consideration. As should the fact that he had specifically

⁵⁸⁴¹ David Bloomberg in a personal interview, 6 April 2014.

⁵⁸⁴² Frankel, 2001: 194.

asked to be represented by Advocate George Bizos and his request was not accepted, although it is possible that it was never transmitted to the State by the police.

Why did Tsafendas talk to his defence team in exactly the opposite way he spoke to the police? What he told the police in his two statements was wholly compatible with the evidence gathered by the police and the Commission, including the two hundred statements taken from people who knew him, as well as statements made to the author by forty-four people. What he told his defence team was completely incompatible with the above evidence. Tsafendas changed his tune because he could no longer take the pain and feared that an “undignified death” was waiting for him in the police station where he was held. He was not afraid to die, he had told the police, but he was terrified of being hanged in his cell by a plastic wire around his neck, and appalled at the lack of dignity associated with such a death. The torture he had endured over three weeks, especially the electric shocks and the mock hangings, also convinced him to simulate madness as he had done with the Portuguese police. The possibility of spending the rest of his life in a hospital must have seemed infinitely preferable to being hanged in his cell.

THE JUDGE AND HIS VERDICT

Judge Beyers' comportment throughout the summary trial was perfectly in accordance with the circumstances. Naturally, he questioned all of the defence witnesses and tried to find out more about Tsafendas. His judgment, too, was based on the evidence presented before him and he probably had no way of knowing about the abundance of evidence collected by the police and the Commission which contradicted the defence's insanity plea. Although he seemed to manipulate, or not remember correctly, some of the evidence presented in court, as with the O'Ryans and Smorenberg, his verdict could not have been anything else based on the evidence before the court.

The judge's verdict was that Tsafendas was mentally disordered, as defined in the Mental Disorders Act, and therefore he should be detained in a prison pending a decision by the State President as to his future disposition. Sending him to a prison, instead of to a hospital, where officially he belonged since he had been diagnosed as mentally disordered, is not an act that would be expected of a “highly civilized” country, which was Judge Beyers' own description of South Africa. Even less “civilized” was the subsequent decision by the

State President that Tsafendas, officially a schizophrenic, should be detained without medical treatment on Death Row in a maximum security institution, Pretoria Central Prison.

REACTION OF THOSE WHO KNEW TSAFENDAS

Anyone who knew Tsafendas well was stunned to read in the newspapers that he was schizophrenic and believed he had a tapeworm since he was a child. Not even one of the forty-four people questioned by the author believed at the time, or now, that Tsafendas was schizophrenic and thought he had a tapeworm. All were convinced that he made the whole thing up so as not to be executed. The reaction of some of these people has been included earlier in this chapter.

END NOTE

The doctors described in the trial a Tsafendas that had not the slightest resemblance to the person that some two hundred and fifty witnesses described to the police, the Commission and the author. It seems extremely unlikely that none of the people who knew Tsafendas, some extremely well, ever noticed that he was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes or that he spoke in a disjointed manner. They must have been naive or very unobservant, unless the symptoms were simply not there; because Tsafendas made them up when talking to the doctors.

It is impossible to believe that a judge in a serious criminal case today would accept the diagnoses of five psychiatrists based wholly on what they were told by the person they were examining without any additional information to verify what they were told. However, that is what happened fifty years ago in apartheid South Africa. Was Tsafendas capable of convincing the psychiatrists that he was a schizophrenic? That he had done so in the past with the tapeworm story and the Saint Peter act suggests that he was. He also told three priests later that it was not difficult because both State and defence wanted to find him insane. He was pushing at an open door. Judge Jacques Theodore van Wyk of the Commission of Enquiry said in his final report that Tsafendas was “quite knowledgeable about mental disorders—he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him—and therefore (the Commission) adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied

upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”⁵⁸⁴³

Although Judge van Wyk was able to acknowledge this, no-one seemed to take it into consideration during the summary trial. Furthermore, the State must have been aware, as were the police and the Commission, that Tsafendas had faked mental illness before, but this, too, was never mentioned. Finally, Advocate George Bizos believes that with the evidence at their disposal, “the police and the authorities of the time could have very easily built up a case (against Tsafendas), but they withheld it in order to find him insane.”⁵⁸⁴⁴ He also found the evidence showing Tsafendas to be politically motivated and not insane to be “overwhelming and unquestionable.”⁵⁸⁴⁵

⁵⁸⁴³ Report of the COE, Chapter II D, Paragraph 18. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁵⁸⁴⁴ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 6 April 2016.

⁵⁸⁴⁵ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 3 September 2016.

CHAPTER SIX

THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH OF THE LATE DR. THE HONOURABLE HENDRIK FRENCH VERWOERD⁵⁸⁴⁶

INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the Commission of Enquiry which was appointed to investigate the circumstances of the death of Dr. Verwoerd and its “findings,” but more importantly with what it concealed. The Commission is examined here on the basis of the information it had at its disposal and not on further evidence collected by the author. Nevertheless, the Commission’s Report is materially very different from the evidence that was available to it and this is mostly due to the frequent omission of important information. Before we proceed further with this chapter, we should first examine the entity known as a Commission of Inquiry and its role during apartheid.

COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

A Commission of Inquiry (COI) can play an important role in determining who is accountable in a crisis, and in creating new policies to avoid a similar situation in the future. In theory, a COI can be a challenge to serving politicians. In practice, they appear to propose change, while really upholding the status quo. By exploring how and why COI are appointed, we can learn about where and how politics, accountability and policy learning collide. Multiple studies demonstrate that when governments decide to appoint a COI, they are motivated less by a genuine desire to make people accountable and learn from past mistakes, and more by the need to avert blame, give a good impression to the media, and bolster their popularity.⁵⁸⁴⁷

⁵⁸⁴⁶ Hereafter cited as Commission or COE or van Wyk Commission.

⁵⁸⁴⁷ Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010: 613.

WHAT IS A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY?

A COI can be defined as:

- An ad hoc institution put together for a specific task that ceases to exist when it has been carried out;
- Which is, at least officially, not part of the government or other executive body;
- Brought into existence by the government or a government minister;
- At their discretion;
- With the principal purpose of carrying out an investigation;
- Of events that have taken place in the past.⁵⁸⁴⁸

THE PURPOSE OF A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

A COI is assembled following a crisis to figure out what went wrong, who is responsible for decisions and actions taken, and how policy can be changed in response.⁵⁸⁴⁹ By definition, they explore the unusual – crises and events that do not usually occur and that cannot be managed via ordinary regulation and governance. In this way, institutions of sovereign power can “pose questions to themselves about the scope, limits and aims of governance.”⁵⁸⁵⁰

Commissions of Inquiry are portrayed as providing an “impartial assessment” and as independent of biased, partial governments.⁵⁸⁵¹ When they explore situations with the potential for civil or criminal liability, procedures need to resemble ordinary legal procedures to give the impression of fairness, and so that the public will ultimately accept its findings as legitimate. Inevitably, Commissions of Inquiry are political tools, used for political ends,⁵⁸⁵² as their determinations are relevant to governance and policy-making, and reduce public outrage and media interest by instigating a slow-moving process of the gradual emergence of data intended to avoid apportioning blame to the authorities,⁵⁸⁵³ that can delay meaningful change.⁵⁸⁵⁴

⁵⁸⁴⁸ Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010: 615.

⁵⁸⁴⁹ Inwood and Johns, 2014a: 3-7

⁵⁸⁵⁰ Sitze, 2013: 132-138.

⁵⁸⁵¹ Inwood and Johns, 2014a: 10-17.

⁵⁸⁵² Bishop, 2014: 19-23.

⁵⁸⁵³ Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010: 613-618.

⁵⁸⁵⁴ Inwood and Johns, 2014a: 17; Johns and Inwood, 2014: 46-48.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

A COI is composed of a Commissioner, its staff and its researchers. These bodies interact with the public and the media. In theory the Commissioner is impartial. Appointees are presented as non-partisan,⁵⁸⁵⁵ and are often charismatic, influential individuals who often lend their names to the COI.⁵⁸⁵⁶ Staff are sourced from elite groups in government, academia, and the private sector, unlikely to operate outside the existing order.⁵⁸⁵⁷

DISCOURSE OF COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY

Commissions of Inquiry have historically been used in a wide range of settings to nullify the rights of indigenous and ethnic minority peoples by giving the superficial impression of fairness and open-mindedness, and whitewashing often horrific state actions. Rather than challenging colonial structures, they tend to be governed by them. Thus, Commissions of Inquiry rarely pose any meaningful challenge to the status quo. While they often record large quantities of data regarding people who were mistreated or killed, they rarely lead to prosecutions. Thus, colonial governments were granted a mechanism whereby they could declare sorrow and regret for state actions, while doing nothing to prevent recurrence. Many Commissions of Inquiry were carried out in colonial settings, especially as independence movements got underway, including Trinidad, Ireland, Barbados, Rhodesia, Sierra Leone, and India. Invariably, they concluded that the government should tweak policies to avoid future “tragedies”, rather than identifying a problem with colonialism per se. They deferred the self-representation of “native” people with the idea that “native” peoples were simply unable to represent themselves at all.⁵⁸⁵⁸

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Commissions of Inquiry are rooted in pre-revolutionary England, when they emerged as a way in which rulers could figure out why their policies were not working as they wanted them to.⁵⁸⁵⁹ They have even been traced to 1085, and William I’s mandate to create the huge

⁵⁸⁵⁵ Inwood and Johns, 2014a: 10-11; Johns and Inwood, 2014: 35-36.

⁵⁸⁵⁶ Sitze, 2013: 138.

⁵⁸⁵⁷ Bishop, 2014: 22.

⁵⁸⁵⁸ Sitze, 2013: 148-150.

⁵⁸⁵⁹ Sitze, 2013: 11-12; Frankel, 2006: 141.

survey of England known as the Domesday Book.⁵⁸⁶⁰ By the early nineteenth century, Commissions of Inquiry were ways in which authorities could explore how they governed, why they governed as they did, what the outcomes were, and how to achieve a more favourable outcome,⁵⁸⁶¹ and had become one of the tools of Britain's colonial empire.⁵⁸⁶²

During the modern colonial period, colonised populations (as in the colonies of Britain, France, etc.) were considered essentially as resources or units of labour. Thus, when colonised peoples rebelled, their actions were not seen as a demand for autonomy, but as a hindrance to productivity.⁵⁸⁶³ This was typically the case even when Commissions of Inquiry genuinely attempted to understand natives' viewpoints.⁵⁸⁶⁴ The often brutal efforts of colonial administrations to suppress unrest were seen as necessary, if regrettable. "Experts" typically came from the same elite whose transgression (often heavy-handed governance or policing) was being investigated, while their work was presented as benefiting all of society.⁵⁸⁶⁵

Of course, Commissions of Inquiry have not been developed purely in the colonial context. Other examples include the Warren Commission following the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, the Widgery and Saville Inquiries into the Bloody Sunday massacre in Northern Ireland in 1972, the Scott Inquiry into British arms sales to Iraq, and the 9/11 COI following the terrorist attacks on New York in 2001.⁵⁸⁶⁶

COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY IN SOUTH AFRICA

From the colonial period, throughout the apartheid era, and into the democratic era, Commissions of Inquiry have played a role in South Africa in being "used to fight political battles between parties, hide government embarrassment, and take the pressure off beleaguered state institutions."⁵⁸⁶⁷ Commissions of Inquiry can be delayed by third parties, including those being investigated, who wish to delay conclusions and adverse findings. Frequently, the terms of reference can be framed so that the desired findings are essentially a foregone conclusion. The primary audience is the government, and how the government will

⁵⁸⁶⁰ Inwood and Johns, 2014a: 5.

⁵⁸⁶¹ McDowall Clokie and Robinson, 1969: 54-79.

⁵⁸⁶² Inwood and Johns, 2014a: 5-10.

⁵⁸⁶³ Badiou, 2012: 38-41.

⁵⁸⁶⁴ Kostal, 2005: 91.

⁵⁸⁶⁵ Sitze, 2013: 138; Stoler, 2009: 141.

⁵⁸⁶⁶ Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010: 613.

⁵⁸⁶⁷ Bishop, 2014: 2, 19.

react is always brought to bear on how a COI is carried out, and how extensive its findings will be.⁵⁸⁶⁸ The outcome is heavily influenced by who can take part. Participation often calls for legal representation, which is difficult for the average citizen to access. When participants cannot take part on an equal footing, it is likely that the COI will fail to uncover the truth, while also being anti-democratic, and consistently using language that posits atrocities as “tragedies.”

Throughout the apartheid era, South Africa engaged in COI, typically on the topic of race relations,⁵⁸⁶⁹ often with a focus on state violence. While Commissions of Inquiry took evidence from a wide range of witnesses, this was invariably viewed from the authorities’ perspective, as White “experts” spoke on behalf of the “natives.”⁵⁸⁷⁰ While they often investigated matters of huge importance to Blacks, their voices were often replaced by those of the “experts.” “Native” people were listened to only in the context of the desire to “restore law, coherence, and order to colonial rule,”⁵⁸⁷¹ never truly threatening the status quo.⁵⁸⁷²

The Sauer COI in 1949 recommended complete apartheid and the 1960 COI into the European Occupancy of the Rural Areas recommended that Blacks be placed in “native reserves,” leading to forced removals.⁵⁸⁷³ Commissions of Inquiry thus helped to determine how governments formed and enacted policies. Issues were typically represented as “problems” to be remedied with firm state action. Various laws were passed indemnifying the police and security forces from legal action. Thus, indemnity and Commissions of Inquiry need to be considered as two parts of the same whole. If it was found that the authorities, or bodies acting on their behalf, had erred, there were rarely any repercussions. Often, Commissions of Inquiry functioned to justify what was essentially martial law after the fact; many were exempted from prosecution for their involvement in atrocities such as the Sharpeville massacre,⁵⁸⁷⁴ and by 1960 South Africa’s Statute Book was filled with laws indemnifying a wide range of public officials from prosecution.⁵⁸⁷⁵

⁵⁸⁶⁸ Bishop, 2014: 21-22.

⁵⁸⁶⁹ Stoler, 2009: 142.

⁵⁸⁷⁰ Ashforth, 1990: 1-4.

⁵⁸⁷¹ Sitze, 2013: 142-143.

⁵⁸⁷² Johns and Inwood, 2014: 25; Inwood and Johns, 2014b: 285.

⁵⁸⁷³ Mamdani, 1996: 31-32, 48-49.

⁵⁸⁷⁴ Sitze, 2013: 25.

⁵⁸⁷⁵ Hahlo and Kahn, 1960: 147n61.

Commissions of Inquiry under apartheid quickly became closely associated with scandals arising from state violence, and efforts to restore the public's confidence,⁵⁸⁷⁶ which retained the constitutional right to appoint Commissions of Inquiry to look into the president as well as provincial premiers.⁵⁸⁷⁷ Often, atrocities were reconfigured, emerging as unpreventable "tragedies." For example, the government slaughter of the Bondelzwart people in 1921 was presented as a tragic, but inevitable, outcome of their "simplicity."⁵⁸⁷⁸ Furthermore, as we have already seen, the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Eastern Pondoland absolved the police of any blame for the killing of eleven unarmed protestors. Instead, its report accused the ANC of being the moral instigator of the massacre. The eleven dead, it said, "were the victims of the insidious propaganda of the African National Congress and associated organizations."⁵⁸⁷⁹

According to Adam Sitze, Associate Professor of Law at Amherst College, commissions under apartheid generally failed in their stated aim to open contentious events to scrutiny and public debate, serving rather to disguise or conceal state crime and its methods. They were an integral part of apartheid's repressive and propaganda machine and very often hid more than they revealed. A typical example, he wrote, was the Sharpeville inquiry which transformed itself from a fact-finding device into a "whitewashing machine."⁵⁸⁸⁰ He added:

"As would become painfully evident in apartheid South Africa, the more that Commissions of Inquiry would be created to investigate state massacres, the less they would produce public debate and discussion (...), and the more they would reduce public debate, by obfuscating or even concealing altogether the ways and means of state crime. Here [referring to the Sharpeville COI], the COI was not a fact-finding device; it was a 'white washing' machine."⁵⁸⁸¹

Professor John Dugard told the author about the Commissions of Inquiry during apartheid:

"One of the most disgraceful things about South Africa during this period was the way in which judicial commissions were manipulated, and also the way in which inquest

⁵⁸⁷⁶ Bishop, 2015: 7.

⁵⁸⁷⁷ Constitution s 127(2)(e).

⁵⁸⁷⁸ Sitze, 2013: 133.

⁵⁸⁷⁹ Badat, 2013: 117; Wylie, 2011: 197-201, 206.

⁵⁸⁸⁰ Sitze, 2013: 157, 311.

⁵⁸⁸¹ Sitze, 2013: 157.

inquiries were conducted and the magistrates just ignored the evidence. And it was quite clear that the Sharpeville Inquiry and the Langa Inquiry, that the... I can't remember who the Langa Inquiry judge was... but they were both conducted by judges who were political appointments. And they knew how to make a finding that would help the government. That was very clear.”⁵⁸⁸²

The COI into the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 speculated that the shootings might have contributed to a minimising the loss of life and whitewashed the role played in the massacre by the police and state,⁵⁸⁸³ determining that it was a “tragedy” to which both the victims and their killers had contributed.⁵⁸⁸⁴ The Sharpeville COI created a template for further Commissions of Inquiry. The 1976, so-called Cillie COI which investigated the Soweto uprising, was carried out primarily from the police’s perspective. According to Professor Sitze, it was a “sham and a charade,”⁵⁸⁸⁵ that failed to account for missing bodies and attempted to shift blame from the police to their victims and their parents.⁵⁸⁸⁶ According to Benjamin Pogrud, it was “... an effort to blame anyone except from the government.”⁵⁸⁸⁷ In 1986, following violence in Langa after a local funeral,⁵⁸⁸⁸ the investigating judge, Kannemayer, omitted evidence that he considered “background information,” but which included vital data about living conditions and police conduct in the townships in a clear attempt to whitewash the police.⁵⁸⁸⁹

Commissions of Inquiry did not disappear when apartheid ended. Although often the objects of controversy and conducted at great expense, they became a regular aspect of the political scene⁵⁸⁹⁰ (in 2014 no fewer than six were running at the same time⁵⁸⁹¹). Most notable was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in 1996 which investigated abuses carried out during apartheid by both the state and its opponents.⁵⁸⁹² The aim was to ensure

⁵⁸⁸² Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁵⁸⁸³ Lodge, 2011: 328.

⁵⁸⁸⁴ Bishop, 2014: 24-25.

⁵⁸⁸⁵ Sitze, 2013: 182.

⁵⁸⁸⁶ Pohlandt-McCormick, 2000: 30-34.

⁵⁸⁸⁷ Pogrud, 2000: 276.

⁵⁸⁸⁸ Forty-seven Blacks were shot dead by the police, of whom thirty-five had been shot from behind (Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999: 57).

⁵⁸⁸⁹ Haysom, 1986: 494.

⁵⁸⁹⁰ Bishop, 2014: 3. For more about the role of the Inquiries in the democratic South Africa see Michael Bishop (2014) *An Accidental Good: The Role of the Commissions of Inquiry in South African Democracy*.

⁵⁸⁹¹ Bishop, 2014: 1-3

⁵⁸⁹² Dugard, 1998b: 293; Dugard, 1997: 260.

that South Africa moved from a racist regime to democratic governance without recourse to revenge and violence.

EXAMPLES OF COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY DURING APARTHEID

To understand better how Commissions of Inquiry operated during apartheid, we will briefly examine some typical examples. All of them, especially the inquiry into the Sharpeville massacre, have parallels and similarities with the Dr. Verwoerd Commission of Enquiry in terms of police methods, attitude towards witnesses, evidence, findings and concealment of evidence and facts.

THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE OCCURRENCES AT SHARPEVILLE (AND OTHER PLACES) ON THE 21ST OF MARCH 1960

On 24 March, 1960, just three days after the Sharpeville Massacre,⁵⁸⁹³ Dr. Verwoerd moved quickly to announce that a one-man Commission of Inquiry would be appointed to investigate the incident.⁵⁸⁹⁴ The person chosen to investigate was Judge Wessels.⁵⁸⁹⁵ The then police Captain H.J. van den Bergh was appointed as Police Chief Investigator,⁵⁸⁹⁶ tasked with determining who fired the first shots and who shouted “shoot.”⁵⁸⁹⁷ In the aftermath of the shooting, van den Bergh was detailed to Baragwanath hospital. There he directed a team of Black and White policemen to drag from their beds patients who had been shot at Sharpeville, handcuff them and transport them to Boksburg Prison. There they were stripped naked, sprayed with water and ordered to dress again in their blood-stained clothes which they were ordered to wear unchanged for months. They were told it was punishment for their “agitation.”⁵⁸⁹⁸

There was a great need to convince the world that it was business as usual, and that South Africa was still a good place in which to invest. Of course, Dr. Verwoerd’s government would have to hope that external observers would not notice, or would not care about, the extent to which the government controlled the judicial system.⁵⁸⁹⁹ Dr. Verwoerd met with his Minister of Justice, then Frans C. Erasmus,⁵⁹⁰⁰ and other senior officials, in an emergency

⁵⁸⁹³ For more about the incident see Chapter One.

⁵⁸⁹⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 24 March 1960: 1, ‘Official Inquiry into the riots.’

⁵⁸⁹⁵ Reeves, 1960: 81.

⁵⁸⁹⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 July 1960, ‘Sharpeville Magistrate.’

⁵⁸⁹⁷ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 154; Roux, 1972: 408.

⁵⁸⁹⁸ Frankel, 2001: 194-195.

⁵⁸⁹⁹ Coniglio, 2012, 499-500.

⁵⁹⁰⁰ (1896 - 1967) Minister of Justice from 1959 to August 1961; he also served as Minister of Defence from 1948 to 1959 and as South Africa’s Ambassador to Italy after his term as Minister of Justice (Beyers et al, 1987: 246-248).

meeting to decide what to do in both the short- and the long-term. Within an hour it had been decided that a Commission of Inquiry would be held. It was clearly vital that the state be seen to be in full control of the situation and its aftermath – both in order to inhibit the wave of panic now sweeping the country and to head off any sympathy demonstrations and protests that could reasonably be expected in the wake of public reaction.⁵⁹⁰¹

The government had to tread carefully. If the Commission was chosen to produce a report that completely absolved the authorities, it would be an obvious whitewash and attract foreign criticism while reducing Dr. Verwoerd's government's credibility in the eyes of potential trading partners. On the other hand, if it led to a harsh criticism of the authorities, the government would look bad when Dr. Verwoerd was trying to present apartheid as a humane, fair and just way to administer a racially diverse nation.⁵⁹⁰²

Dr. Verwoerd and his government tried desperately, as usual, to turn black into white, and to convince the world that the apartheid policies did not cause the massacre. He maintained that the demonstration had nothing to do with opposition to apartheid but was the result of a Communist conspiracy. It was the Communists and not the police — and most certainly not the government — who bore responsibility for the deaths, he declared. He even claimed that the demonstrators had shot first, although no weapons were found among them.⁵⁹⁰³ The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eric Louw, known as “South Africa's Goebbels” because of his pro-Nazi propaganda and resemblance to the German Nazi,⁵⁹⁰⁴ claimed that “40,000” Africans had protested, and asserted that if the police had not shot they would have been murdered.⁵⁹⁰⁵ He was echoing remarks made by a sergeant involved in the massacre immediately afterwards: “We were only a handful against very many. If the men had reached us, I am sure they would have wiped us out.”⁵⁹⁰⁶

In London, the High Commissioner, van Rhyen, stated that a hostile crowd of about 20,000 had attacked the police with firearms, forcing the police to shoot them in self-defence.⁵⁹⁰⁷ At the United Nations, South Africa's delegate, B.G. Fourie, gave his government's official version of what happened, which blamed “Bantu extremists,” as

⁵⁹⁰¹ Frankel, 2001: 186-187

⁵⁹⁰² Martin, 2007: 13.

⁵⁹⁰³ Mandela, 2013: 281; Loveland, 1999: 383; *TIME*, 4 April 1960: 19, ‘South Africa: The Sharpeville massacre’; *The Illustrated London News*, 9 April 1960: 590, ‘South Africa: The issues appraised.’

⁵⁹⁰⁴ Pogrund, 1990: 157

⁵⁹⁰⁵ *The Cape Times*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘No more Sharpeville says Louw.’

⁵⁹⁰⁶ *The Cape Times*, 13 April 1960: n.p., ‘Sharpeville Sergeant on surging mob.’

⁵⁹⁰⁷ Reeves, 1960: 81.

follows: “A splinter organisation of extremists had started some time ago to organise a mass demonstration to protest against the carrying of reference books ... At Sharpeville some agitators immediately adopted a threatening attitude towards the police. Attempts were made to arrest some of the violators — but the crowd became more belligerent and the police were attacked with a variety of weapons: pangas, axes, iron bars, sticks, knives and firearms. Indeed shots were fired at the police before the police returned fire in order to defend their own lives and also to forestall what might have led to even greater and more tragic bloodshed... No government can allow hundreds of thousands of its citizens to be intimidated by extremists, as the Bantu in South Africa often are: to be threatened with the most dire consequences, if they proceed with their daily occupations and disobey the instructions of this militant group referred to.”⁵⁹⁰⁸ Thus, at this point, most of the outside world seemed to have accepted the official South African version of events as accurate.⁵⁹⁰⁹ Not everyone, though: the London *Times*, for example, called Dr. Verwoerd “a liar” and his policy “manifestly bankrupt.”⁵⁹¹⁰

The official version was also flatly contradicted by observers such as *Rand Daily Mail* reporter Benjamin Poggrund, who saw everything first hand,⁵⁹¹¹ and by Bishop Ambrose Reeves, whose detailed rebuttal resulted in his eventual deportation. A statement by Bishop Reeves said there was no evidence that shots were fired by the protestors, nor that they attempted to charge the police, nor that weapons had been left behind as they fled. The bishop said the police shot into the backs of the fleeing crowd long after there were any signs of impending violence. The action was “punitive” and the force used excessive, he said.⁵⁹¹² The bishop’s challenge to the official version of Sharpeville resulted in his being declared a threat to national security. Fearing that he would be arrested and “silenced,” he fled to the British Protectorate of Swaziland in South Africa,⁵⁹¹³ from where he sent sworn statements by eighteen Africans injured in Sharpeville to New York lawyer Allard Lowenstein. The statements affirmed that victims were shot in the back while running away from the police station. Their depositions were distributed to delegates at the United Nations.⁵⁹¹⁴

⁵⁹⁰⁸ *The Guardian*, 9 April 1960: 7, ‘Sharpeville- the official version: Mr. Fourie blames Bantu trouble-makers.’

⁵⁹⁰⁹ Poggrund, 2000: 10.

⁵⁹¹⁰ de Villiers, 1975: 67.

⁵⁹¹¹ Knight, 2000.

⁵⁹¹² *The Canberra Times*, 15 June 1960: 7, ‘Sharpeville shooting ‘punitive’, Bishop tells Inquiry.’

⁵⁹¹³ *The Canberra Times*, 6 April 1960: 1, ‘Bishop will speak elsewhere.’

⁵⁹¹⁴ *The Star*, 11 April 1960, Sharpeville Reports going to UNO; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Bishop sends documents on Sharpeville.’

After receiving government assurances as to his safety, Bishop Reeves returned to South Africa and submitted to the Wessels Commission a memorandum that was severely critical of the police actions at Sharpeville. Weeks later, he was picked up, bundled onto an airplane and deported to Britain.⁵⁹¹⁵ His expulsion was denounced by the British media as “a clumsy attempt to silence him.”⁵⁹¹⁶ The result, however, was a book, *Shooting at Sharpeville*, in which Bishop Reeves set out in detail the events of the massacre.⁵⁹¹⁷ In South Africa, his account was condemned as “conspicuously prejudiced,” “irrelevant” and full of “blatant lies and fabrications.”⁵⁹¹⁸ It was not until the Truth and Reconciliation Commission met three decades later that *Shooting at Sharpeville* received the recognition it deserved as an historic document detailing one of apartheid’s most vicious crimes.

Far from evincing discomfort over the massacre, the government promised similar armed responses in the future. On the day that the Sharpeville Inquiry began, Foreign Minister Eric Law stated: “If 20,000 Africans were again threatening 130 policemen, as at Sharpeville, the police in maintenance of law and order, and in their own defence would be obliged to fire. We are now alerted, and this sort of thing will not happen again. In Cato Manor this year, nine policemen were hacked to pieces by Africans. There was not much fuss in overseas newspapers about that. You can’t handle gangsters with kid gloves. If it is necessary to use strong arm methods to deal with gangsterism, we are not different from any Government in the world.”⁵⁹¹⁹

The Wessels Commission of Inquiry began on Monday, 11 April, twenty-one days after Sharpeville and two days after David Pratt’s assault on Dr. Verwoerd. In the courtroom at Vereeniging, there were more policemen and journalists than witnesses, and of the 20,000 Africans at Sharpeville when the police opened fire, only fifteen were willing to give evidence. Harold Hanson, the lawyer representing many of the victims, made a bold attempt to have the hearing postponed, citing restrictions on his actions under the then current state of emergency, the unavailability of some witnesses and the fear of others to testify to the truth. Hanson said, “I am not certain how far I will be able to go with what I consider the proper

⁵⁹¹⁵ *Daily Dispatch*, 14 September 1960: 1, ‘Reeves expulsion clearly illegal’; *Daily Representative*, 12 September 1960: 1, ‘Reeves deported in secrecy’; *TIME*, 26 September 1960, ‘South Africa: Off goes the bishopp’; *The Star*, 12 September 1960: 1, ‘Bishop Reeves deported in great secrecy.’

⁵⁹¹⁶ *The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 2, ‘Deportation a clumsy way to silence Reeves says British Press.’

⁵⁹¹⁷ Reeves, 1960.

⁵⁹¹⁸ Frankel, 2001: 192-193.

⁵⁹¹⁹ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘News girl seized.’

cross-examination of witnesses, having regard to the present state of emergency.”⁵⁹²⁰

Further, he said, some witnesses with material evidence were incommunicado, some of the injured were detained after being discharged from hospital and others were frightened to come forward. “And if they come forward, will they speak without fear or favour?” Hanson asked.⁵⁹²¹ Urging a postponement at least until the state of emergency had ended, Hanson also cited the absence of scores of his witnesses. He told the Commission, “You are without the evidence of 180 persons. The 180 are the wounded. They are in hospital, all accused or suspected in a case of public violence...”⁵⁹²²

What you have to bear in mind at this state, Mr. Commissioner, is whether you will have the evidence on both sides of the scale before you. The body of evidence might be given until the present conditions had subsided. The people who had been injured or bereaved should be able to give evidence freely and unafraid.”⁵⁹²³ Finally, Hanson said the evidence of some witnesses would be that the Sharpeville shooting was unprovoked, that the crowd was not hostile, and that if the shooting was necessary, the police acted beyond what was necessary. Such evidence, Hanson said, could well be regarded as inciting members of the public against the authorities.⁵⁹²⁴

Hanson’s application was opposed by Mr. P. S. Claassen, Q.C., Attorney-General of the Orange Free State, who argued that Hanson was imagining “possible difficulties” and suggested that witnesses could be protected by prohibiting publication of certain evidence or by holding some parts of the inquiry in camera. Claassen also told the Commission that he would call evidence that the police opened fire “after shots had been fired at them and they had been threatened.” It was in the public interest that the inquiry should proceed as a matter of urgency, he said.⁵⁹²⁵

⁵⁹²⁰ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘The missing witnesses’; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Sharpeville Inquiry: request for delay’; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 2, ‘Inquiry into Sharpeville disturbance’; *The Guardian*, 12 April 1960: 9, ‘Sharpeville Inquiry opens’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960, ‘Judge asked to postpone inquiry’; *The Star*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Official inquiry starts: Policemen describe Sharpeville events.’

⁵⁹²¹ *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 2, ‘Inquiry into Sharpeville disturbance’; *The Guardian*, 12 April 1960: 9, ‘Sharpeville Inquiry opens’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960, ‘Judge asked to postpone inquiry.’

⁵⁹²² *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘The missing witnesses’; *Daily Express*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Satisfactory’; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Sharpeville Inquiry: request for delay’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960, ‘Judge asked to postpone inquiry.’

⁵⁹²³ *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 2, ‘Inquiry into Sharpeville disturbance.’

⁵⁹²⁴ *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 2, ‘Inquiry into Sharpeville disturbance’; *The Guardian*, 12 April 1960: 9, ‘Sharpeville Inquiry opens’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960, ‘Judge asked to postpone inquiry.’

⁵⁹²⁵ *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 2, ‘Inquiry into Sharpeville disturbance’; *The Guardian*, 12 April 1960: 9, ‘Sharpeville Inquiry opens’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960, ‘Judge asked to postpone inquiry.’

Not unexpectedly, Judge Wessels refused Hanson's application and the inquiry went ahead without the evidence of Hanson's many missing witnesses.⁵⁹²⁶ The judge said he decided "after anxious thought" to let the inquiry proceed because he believed, as Claassen had also suggested, that this was in the best interests of the public. He said that because the Inquiry concerned events that led to the state of emergency, "the Commission's report may consequently have a direct bearing upon the circumstances in which the state of emergency was proclaimed." Regarding Hanson's witnesses, he said, "Every power at my disposal will be used to ensure that intended witnesses will be able to come forward freely." However, he added that he would not be "able to provide absolute security" for them. It was up to the witnesses whether they wanted to come forward, he said, acknowledging that it would take "people of some courage" to do so.⁵⁹²⁷ That the Commission chairman himself raised the point of the witnesses' safety and warned that he could not guarantee it, must surely have made many potential witnesses even more reluctant to come forward.

An early police witness, Sergeant J.L. Grobler, set out the evidence template which the police witnesses followed. Grobler, who was the officer in charge of Sharpeville police station, said, "Stones were being thrown by the crowd; there were about 15,000 natives, armed with kerries and irons, and 100 to 150 policemen. No tear-gas was used, the wind was in the wrong direction; there was nothing else they (the (police) could do but fire. We were a handful against so many. If the mob had reached us, I am certain they would have wiped us out."⁵⁹²⁸ The remaining police witnesses said much the same.

Despite the preponderance of evidence along these lines, the case put before the Commission did not support the government's version of events as described orally by the police and in van Rhyen's and Fourie's statements. The police had fired seven hundred rounds into the crowd, while showing no greater proof of weapons than a small assortment of sticks and umbrellas. Many official documents had been destroyed by the police after the massacre, and the official documents often did not identify the Black policemen who had been there properly, referring to them only by their first names. This "removal" of the Black policemen from the record gave the impression that there had been far fewer police than there actually were, suggesting that just 130 officers were surrounded by a vast mob. In fact, there were at

⁵⁹²⁶ *Pretoria News*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Sharpeville inquiry to go on'; *The Star*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Inquiry must proceed judge rules 'after anxious thought.'

⁵⁹²⁷ *The Star*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Inquiry must proceed judge rules 'after anxious thought.'

⁵⁹²⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 13 April 1960: 1, 'Nothing else to do but fire'; *The Star*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Official inquiry starts: Policemen describe Sharpeville events.'

least 160 White officers with firearms, and 130 Black officers with “knobkerries” (a sort of truncheon) and other weapons, and armoured vehicles and a large body of armed police in the general area.⁵⁹²⁹

Much of the evidence that came before the Commission was weak, and there were many gaps in the record. The Commission never fully investigated the shooting and tended to avoid exploring many of the “important technical and brutal aspects of the killings,” such as the type of ammunition used and how the Black policemen acted. The pressure on the investigators to produce a report within a short period was unhelpful in this regard.⁵⁹³⁰

Black protestors were very reluctant to testify. Some were still in police custody and feared police violence, and all were subject to intimidation. They were also under pressure from the PAC to follow its “party line” that the police had committed premeditated murder rather than slaughtering the protestors in a chaotic scene that owed much to poor leadership and heightened fears.⁵⁹³¹ Moreover, Judge Wessels tended to favour police testimony over that of victims or witnesses. He described a police officer, Captain Cawood, as making a “favourable impression” and possessing qualities including “reflection, initiative and humanity,”⁵⁹³² and took at face value Cawood’s testimony about having shot dead the African leader of a group of protestors who had been throwing stones at him and then “stormed” him.⁵⁹³³ At the same time, he was dismissive and suspicious of the African witnesses, such as Sidwell Kasa, asserting that the crowd had had “ample opportunity to disperse” before the police resorted to violence.⁵⁹³⁴

In general, Wessels had a poor view of the PAC. He quoted the chairman of the local branch as saying, “there is no freedom without bloodshed” and stated that while it did not appear that the PAC had had the explicit plan to engage in violence, they had at least been prepared for the possibility. In this way, he emphasised any association between the PAC and

⁵⁹²⁹ Frankel, 2001: 97-98.

⁵⁹³⁰ Frankel, 2001: 192.

⁵⁹³¹ Martin, 2007: 17.

⁵⁹³² Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 28.

⁵⁹³³ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 33.

⁵⁹³⁴ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 31. Kasa was later imprisoned for three years and subsequently banished (Lodge, 2001: 21-22).

violence. The report deals at length with violence and the intimidation supposedly used by the PAC in order to force people to participate in the demonstration, criticising the organization's supposed violence more than the police's actual violence.⁵⁹³⁵

A chaotic picture emerged, in which it was shown that not all the police had fired, and that those who had were mostly in subordinate positions. Police who fired claimed that they had heard shots from the crowd, that the crowd was "rushing the fence" that separated them from the police station, that they were throwing stones, and that a mob was rushing through the gate of the precinct. None of this was supported by Africans' evidence, or by photographic or forensic evidence,⁵⁹³⁶ although it is likely that many of the police sincerely believed that the crowd had been heavily armed.⁵⁹³⁷ The testimony of Africans and police was often contradictory; African witnesses described a festive scene greeting the arrival of the armoured Saracen vehicles, while police described a crowd that was "grim, savage and ruthless."⁵⁹³⁸

A White constable who lived in a nearby suburb said that if the officers had not acted "the Blacks would have killed us – and then gone on to slaughter our women and children."⁵⁹³⁹ It seems that not all the police questioned realised the gravity of the situation. Asked by the Commission if he had "learned any useful lessons," the officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel Pienaar, replied "well, we may get better equipment," and that "the Native mentality does not allow them to gather for a peaceful demonstration. For them, to gather means violence."⁵⁹⁴⁰

The Commission was told that 496 rounds were fired in total, and that an "inflammable" crowd had threatened to kill the policemen.⁵⁹⁴¹ Police authorities insisted that there was no evidence of the use of anything other than "normal" bullets. To conceal their use, the police had told the medical staff, who had seen the injuries, that it would not be in the national interest for them to make "exaggerated" disclosures.⁵⁹⁴² When the injured victims started to arrive at hospitals for treatment police officers were already in place to inspect

⁵⁹³⁵ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 20.

⁵⁹³⁶ Reeves, 1960: 81-88.

⁵⁹³⁷ Frankel, 2001: 99.

⁵⁹³⁸ Frankel, 2001: 90.

⁵⁹³⁹ Frankel, 2001: 122.

⁵⁹⁴⁰ Reeves, 1960: 93-95.

⁵⁹⁴¹ *The Cape Times*, 21 April 1960: 1, '476 Shots by policemen at Sharpeville.'

⁵⁹⁴² Frankel, 2001: 149.

those who were dead and remove bodies that had been very badly damaged by explosive ‘dum-dum’ bullets. An estimated twenty-four dead bodies were spirited away and buried in secret so that no post-mortems could be carried out on them. The Commission sided with the police, anyway, agreeing that no “dum-dums” were used and declaring that the dead were all killed by ordinary bullets.⁵⁹⁴³

As far as the Commission was concerned, the evidence that the crowd showed “no real hostility... could not be accepted.” This was despite testimony from Colonel Spengler that he did not think the crowd likely to attack the police station. Wessels maintained that though the crowd “could not be regarded as an armed one” the situation was indeed “inflammable” because of the “size and the mood of the gathering.” He said that the police’s shooting was at least partly prompted by the shots they heard from the crowd “and a sudden flooding of the Bantu” across the boundary of the station compound and that it might have prevented even greater bloodshed.⁵⁹⁴⁴

According to Bishop Reeves “much of the police evidence about the crowd can only be described as untruthful” and completely inconsistent with the press photographs. Moreover, the police’s evidence was completely contradicted:

- By the absence of defensive preparations by the police against the attack.
- By the fact that there was no attack on the police before the arrival of the Saracens.
- Because a considerable part of the crowd was only at the Police Station by reason of intimidation.
- By the experience of at least three White men who passed among or through the crowd at one o’clock or shortly after one o’clock, namely Berry – the *Drum* photographer, Hoek – the *Rand Daily Mail* photographer, and Labuschange, the superintendent of the Sharpeville Township.⁵⁹⁴⁵

Ultimately, the Commission’s 218-page Report failed to lay down a definitive judgment and simply related events as unfolded by “evidence” before it.⁵⁹⁴⁶ Judge Wessels “concluded” that he could not find anyone culpable nor whether or not the shooting was

⁵⁹⁴³ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal. 1960: pp. 128, par. 209.

⁵⁹⁴⁴ Lodge, 2011: 329.

⁵⁹⁴⁵ Reeves, 1960: 82-84.

⁵⁹⁴⁶ *Daily Dispatch*, 24 January 1961: 1, ‘No findings on Sharpeville.’

justified,⁵⁹⁴⁷ but merely presented the evidence that had been given to it.⁵⁹⁴⁸ It reported that although there had been no organised attempt to attack the police, the police had sincerely believed that their lives were in danger, and had shot in good faith:⁵⁹⁴⁹ “... the Commission, to its very end, avoided, circumvented, or lightly touched upon many of the important technical and brutal aspects of the killings – such as the type of ammunition used by the SAPS and the actions of the black police whom the SAP, in their official history of the events of the sixties, admit “occasionally acted without self-restraint and in an undisciplined manner.”⁵⁹⁵⁰

Wessels tended to agree with the police’s contention that they had been facing a hostile crowd, insisting that there was “no doubt” that the night before had featured “violence and threats of violence” from the PAC, aimed at the residents of Sharpeville. Most of the residents who provided evidence had been coached by the state’s lawyers, and stated that they had had no knowledge of the PAC’s involvement and had gone to the protest out of curiosity or because they had been intimidated. Wessels agreed that the shooting had been prompted at least partly by shots from the crowd and by a sudden charge of Black protestors towards them.⁵⁹⁵¹

Although Wessels included some very mild criticism of the police and how they were deployed by Lieutenant Corporal Pienaar, he agreed with their claim that they had no option but to respond with violence;⁵⁹⁵² he had no problem with the police characterisation of the protestors as a “frenzied mob.”⁵⁹⁵³ He included lengthy testimony from the police, but only perfunctory evidence from witnesses, many of whom were in police custody and had been coached under intimidation to provide monosyllabic answers to questions that bolstered the state’s position. Wessels repeated the dehumanising terms the police used to refer to the Black protestors, referring to them as a “throng,” and as “prancing about,” “massed together,” and “frenzied.”

The judge also overlooked and concealed clear lies. For example, the police had denied carrying skamboks (a type of whip) although the few photographs of the massacre, by

⁵⁹⁴⁷ Lodge, 2011: 328.

⁵⁹⁴⁸ *The Cape Argus*, 23 January 1961: 1, ‘Sharpeville: no findings on responsibility.’

⁵⁹⁴⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 January 1961: 1, ‘Sharpeville, Langa report findings.’

⁵⁹⁵⁰ Frankel, 2001: 192.

⁵⁹⁵¹ Lodge, 2001: 329.

⁵⁹⁵² Lodge, 2011: 328.

⁵⁹⁵³ Sitze, 2013:179-180.

Ian Berry,⁵⁹⁵⁴ the photographer for *Drum* magazine, clearly show that they were. Berry's photographs also showed that the higher estimates for the crowd, as favoured by the police, were unlikely to be accurate, but Wessels accepted these estimates despite the photographic evidence.⁵⁹⁵⁵ The police also denied that any shots had been made from their Saracen tanks. This position was taken to support the notion that the police had been unable to assess the real level of danger from a vantage point at ground level and had made the best possible decision in light of what they knew. This evidence was demonstrated as false by photographs that showed that the police had shot at the crowd from their armoured carriers.⁵⁹⁵⁶ The police claimed that they had helped wounded victims after the massacre. By this point, British cameramen were actually filming the events before them, and the footage shows that the police did essentially nothing to assist the wounded, while photographs show a police officer using a spade to shovel up brain tissue.⁵⁹⁵⁷

Professor Phillip Frankel describes the report that ensued from the Commission as being “so densely unintelligible, so ridden with double-talk, qualifications, and refutable logic as to defy both legal reasoning and ordinary comprehension,” and points out the vast amount of forensic evidence that was available to him during his archival research in 1999, but which was apparently “either unknown or unavailable to the Commission.”⁵⁹⁵⁸ Quite simply, the whole point of the Commission was to create the impression that the state was investigating the massacre, while actually whitewashing the record. The police operated within a system in which they “had” to be found in the right or to have acted only under severe provocation. The general state of fear among the wider white population meant that the police could “confidently walk into the white legal system virtually assured of little more than a sharp slap on the wrist,”⁵⁹⁵⁹ because there was no will in government or among most Whites to curtail their brutal activities.

The evidence included that more than 700 shots had been made into the crowd and that more than half of those shots were made by eleven policemen.⁵⁹⁶⁰ Although Judge

⁵⁹⁵⁴ (1934-) A British photojournalist and the only photographer to document the massacre at Sharpeville. According to Tom Lodge (2011: 229), his contribution was critical in amplifying Sharpeville's impact, as his pictures were crucial in turning opposition to apartheid into an international public cause.

⁵⁹⁵⁵ Lodge, 2011: 328-329.

⁵⁹⁵⁶ Frankel, 2001: 197.

⁵⁹⁵⁷ Lodge, 2011: 107.

⁵⁹⁵⁸ Lodge, 2011: 329.

⁵⁹⁵⁹ Frankel, 2001: 13-14.

⁵⁹⁶⁰ *The New York Times*, 24 January 1961: 6, 'Sharpeville findings inconclusive.'

Wessels found that the massacre was essentially an avoidable tragedy, the medical evidence showed that 70% of the sixty-nine killed and 186 injured were shot from the back, and just 15% (at most) of the injuries had been inflicted on the front, while only three policemen had been injured by stone-throwing, and that very slightly.⁵⁹⁶¹ If the crowd had been rushing towards the police, most injuries would have been to the front of victims' bodies. Even the Commission had to confirm that no more than 30% of the victims had been shot while facing towards the direction from which the bullets had been travelling.⁵⁹⁶²

Intimidation by the police was very effective in limiting testimony to the Wessels Commission. Black witnesses reported intimidating behaviour, having to share the “non-white” bathrooms with Black policemen who had been involved in the massacre, and being questioned very aggressively in Afrikaans, which many did not speak fluently. One witness, Petrus Mokoena, reported being advised by his friends to “play the fool” and give his evidence in a way that suggested that he was unintelligent. By playing into widespread assumptions about Blacks' inferior intelligence, it was easier for witnesses to survive the gruelling experience without police abuse.⁵⁹⁶³

This message was not lost on Black and Coloureds in South Africa, who knew that often the easiest way to escape a brutal punishment was to play into the prevailing prejudice of non-Whites as stupid. Years later, members of the police force who had been involved at the time recalled that they had not even had to use torture to make their point; all they had to do was circulate rumours among bereaved families and friends that anyone who testified was likely to be placed in custody as a “precautionary measure” and that anyone found to have “lied” to the inquiry would be locked up.⁵⁹⁶⁴

Likewise, cover-ups and intimidation reduced the Commission's access to information,⁵⁹⁶⁵ while the police felt completely free to lie, knowing they would never be punished. While practically every police witness stated that there had been no order to shoot, nobody admitted to being among the first, and while many of the victims near the fence had heard the order to shoot, all of the police insisted that they had heard no such thing.

⁵⁹⁶¹ Pogrand, 2000: 83.

⁵⁹⁶² Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 272.

⁵⁹⁶³ Franke, 2001: 194.

⁵⁹⁶⁴ Frankel, 2001: 194.

⁵⁹⁶⁵ Martin, 2007: 15.

Moreover, even though the victims' lawyers called on the testimony of many experts, the police had had ample opportunity to tamper with the evidence in the field immediately after the killings, allowing them "hegemony over what was concealed and what was discovered."⁵⁹⁶⁶

A Detective-Sergeant Fourie, whose job it was to collect forensic information, remembered years later that he had been told to leave the site by the security police and that it was much more important to find subversives and get them to confess than to focus on "scientific *krap*."⁵⁹⁶⁷ Captain Coetzee testified that he was sure that none of his men fired any shots. It was later proved that two constables under his command did shoot, but the Judge did not believe that Captain Coetzee "wilfully misled the Commission" and thought that he was simply unaware of this fact.⁵⁹⁶⁸

The Commission's Report, tabled in Parliament on January 23, 1961, came to no conclusions, declared no winners or losers, no guilty or innocent, no liars or witnesses to the truth, and certainly did not find the police responsible for what it termed the "tragedy" at Sharpeville. It simply related events as unfolded in evidence before the Commission, in line with Wessels' opinion that "it is not the duty of the Commission to report on the responsibility of people for their actions and omissions... the task of the Commission is simply to inform your Excellency of the incidents referred to in your terms of reference."⁵⁹⁶⁹ One who won praise from Judge Wessels for his hard work on the inquiry was the then Captain van den Bergh, the investigator who failed to discover who fired the first shots, who had shouted "shoot" and who covered up the illegal use of dum-dum bullets.⁵⁹⁷⁰

That the judge was not able to issue a report completely whitewashing the police can in large part be attributed to the swift response to the shooting by Bishop Ambrose Reeves who immediately afterwards arranged for lawyers to rush to the hospitals where the wounded

⁵⁹⁶⁶ Frankel, 2001: 197.

⁵⁹⁶⁷ Frankel, 2001: 197.

⁵⁹⁶⁸ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 169-170.

⁵⁹⁶⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 24 January 1961: 1, 'No findings on Sharpeville'; *The Cape Argus*, 23 January 1961: 1, 'Sharpeville: no findings on responsibility'; *The New York Times*, 24 January 1961: 6, 'Sharpeville inquiry inconclusive.'

⁵⁹⁷⁰ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 10, 154.

were being kept under guard and to take their statements.⁵⁹⁷¹ Wessels' report recapitulated the police evidence in detail. Black witnesses, whose testimony was relatively scarce, were referred to only occasionally and without detail. White evidence tended to corroborate the police, especially in the case of those who were in detention when they appeared before the Commission, often as witnesses coached and prepared by the police's lawyers.⁵⁹⁷²

Judge Wessels suggested that the long duration of the shooting had been the result of different officers beginning to shoot at different times.⁵⁹⁷³ The use of "dum-dum" bullets, which caused horrifying exit wounds, was not addressed and, as stated above, the Commission lacked the testimony of many Black witnesses, while police lied, hid and fabricated evidence.⁵⁹⁷⁴ Major van Zyl and Colonel Pienaar lied when they told the Commission that no dum-dums had been used, but their word was accepted.⁵⁹⁷⁵ In addition, the police had removed bodies with evidence of dum-dum attacks, had lifted dum-dums from the field, and had removed surviving dum-dum victims from hospitals.⁵⁹⁷⁶ Local tradition maintained (although it remains unproven) that many corpses displaying evidence of dum-dums were dumped in the local dam.⁵⁹⁷⁷ The police conveniently had "lost" evidence about use of dum-dums, "misplaced" evidence on the ammunition rounds issued, used and not used. No experts on dum-dums were called. All in all, cover-up of the use of dum-dums was quite effective.⁵⁹⁷⁸

Ultimately, the Commission's report served to bolster the idea that while the events at Sharpeville were tragic, they did not result from government policy but from an unfortunate lapse in discipline.⁵⁹⁷⁹ Wessels used the term "tragic occurrences," with the clear implication that nobody was really to blame; he even suggested that perhaps the police's actions had resulted in fewer deaths than might otherwise have been the case.⁵⁹⁸⁰ There was no recognition of the fact that the police were the product of a society steeped in racial injustice and hatred.⁵⁹⁸¹ The whitewash created by the Commission resulted in a concerted effort to

⁵⁹⁷¹ Pogrand, 1990: 136.

⁵⁹⁷² Lodge, 2011: 328.

⁵⁹⁷³ Frankel, 2001: 192.

⁵⁹⁷⁴ Martin, 2007: 13.

⁵⁹⁷⁵ *The Star*, 13 April 1960: 1, 'Sharpeville Inquiry: Get evidence of some detainees, says judge.'

⁵⁹⁷⁶ Frankel, 2001: 147-148; 154-156; Martin, 2007: 14.

⁵⁹⁷⁷ Frankel, 2001: 148.

⁵⁹⁷⁸ Frankel, 2001: 147-148; 154-156.

⁵⁹⁷⁹ Sitze, 2013: 180-181

⁵⁹⁸⁰ Sitze, 2013: 180.

⁵⁹⁸¹ Frankel, 2001: 169-172.

silence anyone trying to tell the truth. As for Judge Wessels, he was rewarded for his services to apartheid with promotion to the post of Judge President of Natal, although he was only sixth in terms of seniority and had joined the Natal bench just a year earlier.⁵⁹⁸²

How seriously can we take the findings of the Commission? According to Professor of Law Adam Sitze, “the Commission of Inquiry was not a fact-finding device; it was a “whitewashing” machine” that it had been set up to present the government in the kindest light possible while attempting to give the impression of even-handedness.”⁵⁹⁸³ The Commission remained vague on most points and reached a “balanced” conclusion that found fault both with individual policemen and with the protestors. Afterwards, in the Senate, GJ Suttor stated that the report left him “no better off than he was” and that “The judge does not say that the police were right or that the police were wrong. He does not say the natives asked for it or they did not ask for it.”⁵⁹⁸⁴

In general, the report had a “paralyzing” effect on readers and the Commission’s findings, characterised a “mixed blessing”,⁵⁹⁸⁵ and even contributed to a conspiracy theory that the PAC had actually *intended* to provoke the police to commit a massacre for propaganda purposes.⁵⁹⁸⁶ Sitze pointed out that the Wessels Commission was specifically designed to quell investor concern in apartheid police tactics.⁵⁹⁸⁷

The “balanced” findings of the Wessels Commission could not be considered a faithful or loyal account of the events of Sharpeville as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission proved. The Commission’s failure to properly address the massacre contributed to both the whitewashing of the appalling attitudes and lack of preparedness that led to it, while creating the narrative that the government had deliberately conspired to kill a large number of people so as to teach the Blacks a lesson.⁵⁹⁸⁸ It was broadly successful in terms of silencing discussion, and a more complete picture of events would emerge only a full generation later as part of the work that was carried out by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Until that time, the “official” version created by the Wessels Commission was generally accepted, at least by Whites.

⁵⁹⁸² *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 January 1961: 9, ‘Sharpeville judge is tipped for Natal post.’

⁵⁹⁸³ Sitze, 2013: 157.

⁵⁹⁸⁴ Republic of South Africa, Debates of the Senate, 15 June 1961 col. 5342.

⁵⁹⁸⁵ Sitze, 2013: 180.

⁵⁹⁸⁶ Frankel, 2001: 179.

⁵⁹⁸⁷ Sitze, 2013: 187.

⁵⁹⁸⁸ Frankel, 2001: 119.

In 1985, Henry R. Pike, in *History of Communism in South Africa*, described the massacre as the result of mass hysteria among the inhabitants of Sharpeville, the result of the efforts of “professional agitators” and the victims as armed with “sticks, clubs, bottles, knives, iron pipes, assegais, pangas, needle swords and other weapons.” A similar account was published in *The Police Station*, a memoir by JPJ Coetzer, a senior official in the Department of Justice.⁵⁹⁸⁹ Without the Wessels Commission, such appalling untruths would not have been allowed to hold such weight.

According to Professor Frankel:

“A pliant (or partially pliant) commission which confirmed the vicious intent of the Sharpeville mob and presented police responses as a natural, if over-reactive, case of self-defence could connect very positively with the prevailing persecution mentality among white South Africans in the aftermath of the massacre — including many who would not, other than in these exceptional circumstances, lend their support to the Nationalist government ... Ultimately, a sympathetic commission — indeed any commission— was essential to smoothing the panic and fears of a vast array of international interests with stakes in a post-Sharpeville South Africa... The bland outcome of the Commission of Inquiry contributed to the culture of impunity that gained strength, exemplified by the ongoing desecration of the cemetery in Sharpeville by white supremacists and their collaborators among the police.”⁵⁹⁹⁰

It now seems more than clear that the primary function of the Commission of Inquiry was to give the world the impression that justice was served in South Africa. For a whole generation many commentators discussed the horrifying events as if they were indeed the no-fault tragedy the Commission claimed. Sadly, this is par for the course for investigations carried out while a conflict is still ongoing. Globally, it is typical for such investigations to come up with findings that are partisan, at best, and often outright propaganda.⁵⁹⁹¹

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission held hearings in the area in 1996, beginning with a series of testimonies about the Sharpeville Massacre. This was when the full truth (or as full a truth as can be obtained so many years after the event) began to emerge.⁵⁹⁹² The evidence presented to the TRC clearly showed that the police had actually deliberately fired on an unarmed crowd after failing to give them adequate warning to leave, and that

⁵⁹⁸⁹ Lodge, 2011: 330.

⁵⁹⁹⁰ Frankel, 2001: 13, 152.

⁵⁹⁹¹ Campbell, 2012: 262.

⁵⁹⁹² Lodge, 2011: 338.

excessive force was used, resulting in the large number of deaths among protestors mostly unaligned with any political pressure group, but simply opposed to the pass laws.

The TRC also found that many of the wounded were subsequently treated like criminals, placed under police guard in hospital and “released” into prison where many were detained for a long time before appearing in court and having the charges withdrawn – facts that did not make it into the commission’s report. Ultimately:

“The commission finds the former state and the minister of police directly responsible for the commission of gross human rights violations in that excessive force was unnecessarily used to stop a gathering of unarmed people. Police failed to give an order to disperse and/or adequate time to disperse, relied on live ammunition rather than alternative methods of crowd dispersal and fired in a sustained manner into the back of the crowd, resulting in the death of sixty-nine people and the injury of more than 300.”⁵⁹⁹³

The findings of the TRC were utterly contradictory of the Wessels Commission, essentially overruling everything the earlier document had stated. Jeremy Pogrund, the *Rand Daily Mail* journalist who had seen the massacre at first hand, stated that while there were many accusations of police torture and brutality, they were invariably protected by the National Party from all charges. The Sharpeville Massacre was in a way the inevitable result of this degree of impunity, brutality having become standard practice.⁵⁹⁹⁴

The experience of the Commission of Inquiry after Sharpeville makes it abundantly clear that any results emanating from such state bodies were not to be taken seriously. Its work makes no sense until we examine it in the context of apartheid South Africa, and consider the many constraints it was under.⁵⁹⁹⁵ As in the case of the Commission that investigated the Broederbond, the Soweto uprising, the shootings at Langa (see below) and many other incidents, the real agenda was *never* to find out the truth, but to produce a series of outcomes showing the government in the best light possible while besmirching its detractors, and allowing its reign of terror to continue, while not dissuading actual or would-be investors in the South African economy. According to Benjamin Pogrund, the *Rand Daily Mail* journalist who witnessed the massacre, every time there were accusations of brutality and torture, the

⁵⁹⁹³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 537.

⁵⁹⁹⁴ Pogrund, 2000: 87.

⁵⁹⁹⁵ Frankel, 2001: 193.

Nationalists protected their police from all charges of wrongdoing, steadily, brutality came to be accepted as the standard *modus operandi*.⁵⁹⁹⁶

The Sharpeville experience is a prime example of how the various elements of the apartheid machine could come together and present a lie as truth and make people believe it. Government officials such as van Rhyen and Fourie, along with the police and the Commission, played significant roles in misrepresenting the horror of Sharpeville. The same three institutions performed precisely the same functions with Soweto in 1976 and the Langa shootings in 1984.

The Sharpeville Commission of Inquiry was not a fact-finding device but a “whitewashing” machine and it would have certainly been even more favourable towards the police if it was not for Bishop Reeves’s brave stance.⁵⁹⁹⁷ Some of the police methods used during the Sharpeville Inquiry, for example the misplacing and concealing of evidence, will also be used by the police in the van Wyk Commission. Judge van Wyk himself would also adopt a similar attitude with that of Judge Wessels with the witnesses, the evidence and his portrayal of events and Tsafendas’s character.

The findings of the two Commissions are identical in absolving the police of blame, misrepresenting the cases and the truth and producing results the government wanted, but they also shared another important common factor: H.J. van den Bergh. As a police captain in 1960, he was the Police Chief Investigator for the Sharpeville Commission, and in 1966, by then a General, he was in charge of the Tsafendas investigation which came before the van Wyk Commission. Finally, the Sharpeville Commission not only whitewashed the police, but created a template for further investigations. For instance, following the uprisings in Soweto in 1976, the so-called Cillié Commission was appointed to investigate the incidents, while the Kannemayer Commission took place following similar events in Langa in 1984.

⁵⁹⁹⁶ Poggrund, 2000: 87.

⁵⁹⁹⁷ Sitze, 2013: 157.

THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE RIOTS AT SOWETO AND ELSHEWHERE⁵⁹⁹⁸

The Soweto uprising was in reality a series of protests by students which began on the morning of 16 June 1976 but continued sporadically until early 1978, involving thousands of young people and resulting in hundreds of deaths. The spark was the imposition of Afrikaans, widely resented as the language of apartheid, to be the medium of instruction in schools, although it was known to few teachers and fewer students. On that mid-June morning, classes from numerous high schools in Soweto Township took to the streets, growing to an estimated 20,000 individuals. Police met them with fierce armed brutality, but the protests spread beyond Soweto to other townships and neighbourhoods, resulting in hundreds of school closures.⁵⁹⁹⁹

Throughout the many months of demonstrations, students chanted slogans against Vorster's government, two of which were dedicated to Tsafendas, already a prisoner for ten years. One chorus asked, *Where are you now that we need you, Dimitri Tsafendas?* It was an adaptation of the anti-Nixon chant during Watergate, *Where are you now that we need you, Harvey Oswald?*⁶⁰⁰⁰ The other slogan was *Tsafendas Inyanga Yezizwe* (Tsafendas healer of the nation).⁶⁰⁰¹

The heavy-handed police response led to ever larger and more violent riots and numerous student deaths. The initial government claim was that "only twenty-three students" were killed by police, but the true figure was between 600 and 700.⁶⁰⁰² John Kane-Berman, Chief Executive of South African Institute of Race Relations, arrived at a death toll of 661, based on figures compiled by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR). Twenty-three people were said to have died in Port Elizabeth, 153 in the Western Cape, and 442 in the Transvaal, of which Soweto accounted for between 350 and 400. There were also 43 other deaths due to unknown circumstances.⁶⁰⁰³ Eighty-nine of the dead in the West Rand

⁵⁹⁹⁸ For a very detailed account of the accuracy and charade of this Commission, see Pohlandt McCormick, H. (2000) *"I Saw a Nightmare...": Violence and the Construction of Memory*.

⁵⁹⁹⁹ Kane-Berman, 1978.

⁶⁰⁰⁰ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁶⁰⁰¹ Martin, 25 October 2013, retrieved from:

http://www.christianmartin.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93:request-to-declare-gravesites-of-hf-Dr.-Verwoerd-and-dimitri-tsafendas-as-historically-heritage-sites&catid=36:articles&Itemid=62;

Michalis Michelis in a personal interview, 12 December 2015; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

⁶⁰⁰² Brink et al, 2010: 9; Harrison, 1981: 143; Kane-Berman, 1978: 27-28; Pohlandt McCormick, 2000: 25-28.

⁶⁰⁰³ Kane-Berman, 1978.

Area were under twenty years old, twelve below age eleven.⁶⁰⁰⁴ Many of the victims were children and adolescents, while at least 1,000 were injured. Only a handful of victims were White.⁶⁰⁰⁵

Shooting and killing schoolchildren caused international outrage and the Vorster government scrambled to cover its tracks. First, it sought to disparage the victims, hiding their ages and identities, disposing of bodies, belittling their actions and claiming deaths were fewer than they were. Officials spread misinformation as to the intentions of the protestors and gagged witnesses and any voices raised in their support.⁶⁰⁰⁶

Second, Vorster did exactly what Dr. Verwoerd did after Sharpeville, he appointed an investigating commission. Justice Petrus Cillie⁶⁰⁰⁷ was named chairman of the *Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere from the 16th of June 1976 to the 28th of February 1977*. Leading evidence at the Inquiry to “investigate the incident,”⁶⁰⁰⁸ was Percy Yutar, supporter of apartheid and the government, and the prosecuting lawyer in the Rivonia Trial. This permitted the government to invent a version of the uprising which suited its purposes and have it published as an official Report. The way it dealt with allegations of police misconduct such as removing bodies, became the template for apartheid’s methods of rewriting the truth and thus the historical memory at Commissions of Inquiry.⁶⁰⁰⁹

The challenge facing the Cillie Commission was considerable: effectively it had to demonstrate that the authorities were justified in killing schoolchildren.⁶⁰¹⁰ Benjamin Pogrund attended all of the Commission’s hearings and openly criticised the Commission in the *Rand Daily Mail*: “while commissions can serve an invaluable purpose, there is need to guard against assassination of character and a great responsibility rests on those conducting the inquiry to protect uninvolved innocent people. This kind of erosion, we believe, has been manifesting itself this week in the Cillie Commission. A number of people have been named

⁶⁰⁰⁴ Pohlandt McCormick, 2000: 26.

⁶⁰⁰⁵ *TIME*, 28 June 1976: 12, ‘The Soweto uprising: A soul-cry of rage.’

⁶⁰⁰⁶ Pohlandt McCormick, 2000: 25-29.

⁶⁰⁰⁷ Justice Piet Cillie, a supporter of the apartheid government, was at the time Judge President of the Transvaal and had also served as Judge in the Prisons Trial. According to Lord Joel Joffe, Cillie “was elevated to the bench at a time when he had very limited legal experience, having by-passed the normal routine of long experience as an advocate and senior counsel” (Joffe, 2009: 142). Of course such a “by-passing” was standard practice under apartheid for loyal supporters of the regime.

⁶⁰⁰⁸ Pogrund, 2000: 276; *TIME*, 28 June 1976: 12, ‘The Soweto uprising: A soul-cry of rage.’

⁶⁰⁰⁹ Pohlandt McCormick, 2000: 29.

⁶⁰¹⁰ Pohlandt McCormick, 2000: 25-29.

by witnesses, sometimes in relation to specific events of last year, and at other times seemingly in a more passing way.

The witnesses concerned are current Terrorism Act detainees, freed only temporarily and in a formal sense from their incommunicado detention where they are wholly at the mercy of their captors. As their names are concealed by order of the commission, it is difficult to evaluate their testimony and anyone who considers himself injured certainly faces obstacles in seeking redress. The problem is aggravated because of the absence of normal court safeguards where evidence can be challenged by defence counsel. Thus the way could be opened to character assassination. That, of course, cannot be the commission's intention. But the situation must cause disquiet."⁶⁰¹¹ Pogrund later wrote that "at best, it was an inquiry into the obvious, and at worst an effort to find someone to blame – anyone except the government."⁶⁰¹²

Throughout the Soweto uprising and in the years after 1976, the government portrayed the students as a bunch of out-of-control extremists whose opposition to the Afrikaans language policy was short-sighted and irrational. This was the formula to which the Cillie Commission loyally adhered, reiterating the State's case that the police were blameless because it was the students who, for no good reason, attacked white people, government property and the forces of law and order.⁶⁰¹³

The Commission did acknowledge that the country's non-Whites may have had a reason for their anger. "Virtually all legislation regarding relations between races is separationist and seen by Blacks and Coloureds as unjust and discriminatory," the report said, adding that some blame attached to ordinary Whites as much as officials. "The manner in which so many whites treat blacks is of great importance," it said. "The objections do not end with the actions of officials or the police. Dissatisfaction is also caused by the action of ordinary citizens in everyday situations." The Commission emphasized the importance of communication between Blacks "and those whites concerned with the black wellbeing." The Commission listed the number of deaths as 575.⁶⁰¹⁴

However, insofar as events on the ground were concerned, the Commission generally followed the police's point of view, demonstrating an evident bias. Systematically, the

⁶⁰¹¹ Pogrund, 2000: 276-277.

⁶⁰¹² Pogrund, 2000: 276.

⁶⁰¹³ Nieftagodien, 2014: 20-21, 81.

⁶⁰¹⁴ *The New York Times*, 1 March 1980: 3, 'South African judge says racial justices caused Soweto riots.'

Commission misrepresented victims' ages, suppressed evidence, suggested that children had been engaged in violence that made it necessary to shoot them, and presented a false version of events. Stone-throwing children were represented as a serious threat to police officers' lives, making their deaths the result of a reasonable show of force in response. In fact, many had been shot in the back as they fled.⁶⁰¹⁵ Forensic evidence was twisted to present a distorted interpretation of how victims had been killed, suggesting that they had been bending over to pick up stones to throw when the evidence suggested that they were shot in the back.⁶⁰¹⁶

The Commission highlighted anything that might portray victims in a negative light (as the Sharpeville Commission did and as the van Wyk Commission would do extensively with Tsafendas). It stressed that some had been drinking (after doing blood alcohol tests on corpses), and claimed that traces of paint on bodies suggested that paint was used as an incendiary device. It manipulated evidence and intimidated witnesses, interrogated the parents of child victims, even obstructed some parents from locating their children's bodies. It strove to prove that the policemen's lives were endangered by the stones thrown by students and that it was only then that the police opened fire. This was a deliberate attempt to obscure the fact that the use of deadly force against students lacking deadly weapons was wholly inappropriate. Oral testimonies collected from many participants demonstrated how the police lied, but these were omitted by the Commission. These descriptions of the events of 16 June and publications based on them demonstrate vividly how the authorities subverted the truth and the Commission turned a blind eye to the fact.⁶⁰¹⁷

Ultimately, it was abundantly clear that the official explanation for the protests/riots, as "uncovered" by the Commission, was simply "an attempt by the apartheid state to exonerate itself of responsibility for its ill-conceived policies and the murderous intent of its security forces,"⁶⁰¹⁸ a "sham and a charade,"⁶⁰¹⁹ and "another inquiry into the obvious, and at worst an effort to blame anyone except from the government."⁶⁰²⁰ The official narrative may have been accepted by ardent apartheid supporters but few among the general public gave it any credence.⁶⁰²¹

⁶⁰¹⁵ Pohlandt McCormick, 2000: 29-34.

⁶⁰¹⁶ Pohlandt McCormick, 2000: 30.

⁶⁰¹⁷ Nieftagodien, 2014: 82.

⁶⁰¹⁸ Baines, 2007: 284.

⁶⁰¹⁹ Sitze, 2013: 182.

⁶⁰²⁰ Pogrand, 2000: 276.

⁶⁰²¹ Nieftagodien, 2014: 21.

One of the ironies of Soweto was the introduction of legislation to protect the police from any repercussions resulting from their actions in similar situations. In January 1977, Justice Minister James Krueger placed before Parliament an Indemnity Bill under which the State and its servants were indemnified against civil and criminal prosecutions of any kind for acts committed “in good faith with the intent of suppressing or terminating internal disorder.” Krueger told the Parliament, “Those who gave rise to the unrest, and had a part in it, and in the process were injured or suffered damages, cannot expect to load the police with defending unfounded claims.” The Bill became law in August 1977.⁶⁰²² Retrospectively, the violence in Soweto in 1976 was claimed as an important turning point in the anti-apartheid movement.⁶⁰²³

COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY ON THE LANGA SHOOTINGS⁶⁰²⁴

In 1984, violence broke out in impoverished black townships in the East Cape and Witwatersrand. It was met with strong police action, leading to a number of deaths, all of which occurred in the context of police harassment and assaults against both activists and ordinary black families. Considering funerals of victims to be important flashpoints for further violence, the government ordered that such proprieties should take place on workdays to minimise attendance.

When it became apparent that workers intended to leave work en masse to go to funerals, they were prohibited. When protestors in the township of Langa held a march in protest, they were confronted by the police, who opened fire. Twenty protestors were killed, and forty-three were injured. The Minister of Law and Order promptly claimed that the police had feared that their lives were in imminent danger. To international outrage, the government decided to appoint a Commission of Inquiry under Justice Kannemeyer.⁶⁰²⁵

As the Commission went to work, it quickly became apparent that the police were not prepared for crowd management and had been equipped only with weapons of lethal force. Survivors testified that they had been taunted by the police and that victims, including a

⁶⁰²² Amnesty International, 1978: 102.

⁶⁰²³ Pohlandt McCormick, 2000: 25-28.

⁶⁰²⁴ All the information regarding this Commission has been taken from Nicholas Haysom’s 1986 journal article *The Langa Shootings and the Kannemeyer Commission of Enquiry*. Haysom is at the time of writing the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and in the past has held high-level positions with both the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of South Africa in the post-apartheid period.

⁶⁰²⁵ Haysom, 1986: 494-501.

fifteen-year-old boy, had been shot without provocation. The Commission stated that “one can only conclude that this failure to equip the police patrols was the result of a policy deliberately adopted.” It went on to state that “at what level this decision was taken, and who was responsible cannot be determined from the evidence heard by the Commission.” What it did not do was seek to discover who took the fateful decision, although the Commission had the power necessary to call for such evidence.⁶⁰²⁶

Justice Kannemeyer announced that he would not hear “background evidence” about conditions in the black townships, even though it included allegations of rape and other violent behaviour on the part of the authorities, and how the police reacted to violence in the townships. This decision meant that crucial information about black living conditions was disregarded and the Commission relied solely on the police to provide evidence on this important aspect of the flare-up. Thus allegations about police misbehaviour went unheard and were omitted from the Report while the Commission listened to police witnesses describing incidents of violence and property damage in the Uitenhage area.⁶⁰²⁷

One of the more sensational aspects of the Langa shootings was the claim by eye-witnesses that the police had placed stones among the bodies of those who had fallen in the shooting. Justice Kannemeyer, apparently unable to believe that the police could fabricate evidence, accepted their denials on this point. He argued, without supporting evidence, that the locals would have picked up the stones when they were confronted.⁶⁰²⁸

Finally, the Report criticised the decision to ban funerals, but did not find anyone responsible for the massacre. In general, the Commission tended to accept police testimony, including their contention (unsupported by the evidence) that stones had been thrown at them, causing them to fear for their lives and even concluding that some of the evidence given by the police was so “bizarre” that it must be true, as nobody would have made it up.⁶⁰²⁹

Nicholas Haysom described Kannemeyer’s approach to evidence as *ad hoc* and in places “extremely unsatisfactory.” He argued that the Commissioner found against the police only when this could not be avoided and that when required to choose between two versions of an incident, “he seemed to lack the courage to find against the police.” He said

⁶⁰²⁶ Haysom, 1986: 500-503.

⁶⁰²⁷ Haysom, 1986: 494-497

⁶⁰²⁸ Haysom, 1986: 506.

⁶⁰²⁹ Haysom, 1986: 505.

Kannemeyer seemed subconsciously to bring his own perception to what happened and how the police and the township residents acted.⁶⁰³⁰

The Sharpeville, Langa and Soweto Commissions concealed more than they uncovered.⁶⁰³¹ They were aspects of a judicial system that was, “the world’s most elaborate legal structure for the repression of political resistance of all kinds.”⁶⁰³² None of these Commissions could disguise what happened in Langa in 1984, or retrospectively Sharpeville in 1960 or Soweto in 1976. What they did was provide a convenient forum in which events could be presented in a way that was convenient to the government. This was the case not only for the three Commissions mentioned above but for quite a few set up during the apartheid years. It could be argued that the state compounded the physical violence originally directed at the victims by distorting and hiding evidence and misrepresenting incidents before the Commissions in an attempt to clear the government and police of blame. As we will see, the treatment of evidence at the Tsafendas Commission was perhaps the worst of all.

THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE BROEDERBOND

In 1958, when Dr. Verwoerd became Prime Minister, the Broederbond acquired new, extensive powers as he granted it “co-responsibility with the party to prepare the electorate” for nationalist policies.⁶⁰³³ Dr. Verwoerd’s government sought candidates for top government posts and through the secretive organisation the men running the army, government departments and important state-owned bodies such as the railways, many were Broederbond appointees.⁶⁰³⁴

A. Hertzog and N. Diederichs became members of his cabinet and they were both former Broederbond colleagues who had served on the organisation’s Executive Council.⁶⁰³⁵ In 1959, Dr. Verwoerd appointed Piet Meyer,⁶⁰³⁶ a close friend, as chairman of the South

⁶⁰³⁰ Haysom, 1986: 503-509.

⁶⁰³¹ Sitze, 2013: 311.

⁶⁰³² Turk, 1982: 146.

⁶⁰³³ Asmal et al, 1996: 153-154.

⁶⁰³⁴ Morris, 2004: 160.

⁶⁰³⁵ *The New York Times*, 27 November 1964: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd gets wider support.’

⁶⁰³⁶ Aside from Betsie, his wife, Meyer was the only one allowed to visit Dr. Verwoerd in hospital in 1960 when he was recovering from Pratt’s assault (Serfontein, 1978: 87). Mayer had served as propaganda chief of the OB (Moodie, 1975: 230) and was an influential Nationalist Party member who would later become head of the Broederbond (Grundy, 1973: 4). He was the chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation until 1980 (Booth, 1998: 38). In 1934, while touring on Germany, he met several Nazi officials, gone skiing with Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s Chief of Staff (Furlong, 1991: 80) in order to see Hitler up close (Furlong, 2010: 70). A fanatical Nazi, he named his son Izan, Nazi spelled backward (Booth, 1998: 38; Frye, 1970: 100).

African Broadcasting Corporation.⁶⁰³⁷ Meyer was a fanatical Nazi and a member of the Broederbond and later became head of that organisation.⁶⁰³⁸ In 1964, the General Secretary of the Broederbond, Piet Koornhof, was also elected to government in a move that was seen as reflecting widespread acceptance of the Broederbond in government and of its hold over South African political life in general.⁶⁰³⁹

Before long, some members of parliament queried if the Broederbond was intimately involved in affairs of the state (no doubt knowing very well that this was the case) and Dr. Verwoerd was asked about his membership status. The United Party had identified the Broederbond as a potential weak point for the National Party and would not cease to demand an investigation in the hope that it would weaken them and strengthen the opposition.⁶⁰⁴⁰ At the same time, a growing number of churchmen were also expressing reservations of the Broederbond.⁶⁰⁴¹

Feeling under political pressure, and perhaps horrified by Beyers Naudé's "treachery" (Naudé was the son of Jozua François Naudé, one of the founders of the Broederbond and its first chairman),⁶⁰⁴² Dr. Verwoerd announced the appointment of a one-man Commission to inquire into the secret activities of the Broederbond, the Freemasons and the Sons of England. The inquiry, which was to be carried out by Justice D.H. Botha⁶⁰⁴³ of the Appellate Division, would be carried out secretly and would investigate if any of the above-named societies were guilty of:

Any form of subversion, treason or intrigue, directed at obtaining for itself domination of or unlawful influence over the people or the state, or any of its organs such as the central government, the provincial authorities or the administration of justice;

Anything which might weaken the determination and will of the people of South Africa in the fight for their survival;

The acquisition of funds from hostile sources, of the use of its own funds, for the financing of subversive action against the Authority of the State, or of any threats to the security, peace

⁶⁰³⁷ Booth, 1998: 38.

⁶⁰³⁸ Grundy, 1973: 4.

⁶⁰³⁹ *The New York Times*, 27 November 1964: 11, 'Dr. Verwoerd gets wider support.'

⁶⁰⁴⁰ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 321.

⁶⁰⁴¹ *The New York Times*, 30 April 1963: 10, 'Ministers oppose secret group.'

⁶⁰⁴² Harrison, 1981: 89; (Soggot (*The Guardian*), 8 September 2004, 'The Rev. Beyers Naudé').

⁶⁰⁴³ The judge was not member of any secret organization (Wilkins and Strydom, 1978: 326).

and order of the people; or for the overthrow of the government by impermissible and undemocratic methods;

Nepotism or interference in appointments and promotions in the public service, the Defence Force, the police in such a way that people were appointed or promoted for reason other than merit;

Attempts to subvert the relations between the English and Afrikaans-speaking people with the object of bringing about strife and national discord, and undermining national unity;

Improper or objectionable activities which harmed, prejudiced or undermined the rights, liberties or interests of persons or groups;

Subversion in any form of the morals, customs and way of life of the people of South Africa by circumventing or transgressing the country's laws, or by any other means;

Become a serious danger to the peace and order in the body politic by exerting influence in an impermissible manner in the economic and cultural spheres;

Attempts to dominate the Prime Minister, Ministers, Administrators or any other persons in authority in an effort to use him or them in service of an organization such a manner that, as far as the performance of his or their official duties was concerned, loyalty was in the first place shown to other organization and not to the state.⁶⁰⁴⁴

There were some objections from the opposition and from elements in the press about the fact that the Commission would carry out its work in secret. The *Rand Daily Mail* queried Dr. Verwoerd's assertion that no crime had been committed when one of the main points of the inquiry was to consider the use of funds obtained from "hostile sources" and "subversive activities."⁶⁰⁴⁵ On June 19, 1964, the well-known apartheid critic Stanley Uys pointed out in the *Sunday Times* that the Commission had been set up by Dr. Verwoerd to investigate the potential criminal acts of an organisation of which he himself was a member and that this was a very clear conflict of interest.⁶⁰⁴⁶

When the Inquiry was first mooted, Dr. Verwoerd had had to deal with complaints from the Broederbond, as there were many things they did not want brought to light. Prior to the Commission, Dr. Verwoerd had guaranteed to Broederbonder Meyer that the Commission

⁶⁰⁴⁴ Serfontein, 1978: 87; Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 321.

⁶⁰⁴⁵ Serfontein, 1978: 94.

⁶⁰⁴⁶ Serfontein, 1978: 95.

would not look into anything that might cause the organisation problems, after which Meyer reassured the Broederbond that they could trust Dr. Verwoerd.⁶⁰⁴⁷ They were indeed reassured. Dr. Verwoerd was greatly indebted to the Broederbond for the work that they had done towards passing the referendum that saw South Africa become a republic (discussed below) and he knew it.⁶⁰⁴⁸

The Broederbond reacted bullishly, stating that they welcomed the investigation and were prepared and delighted to give evidence. They stated their pleasure that two other organisations were also going to be investigated.⁶⁰⁴⁹ The Broederbond cooperated and made all its information completely available. Judge Botha was given full access to the organization's minutes, newsletters, study material, etc., where these were relevant, as well as its membership lists.⁶⁰⁵⁰

However, in a circular to its members, the Broederbond told them that the investigation resulted from an attempt by their enemies to take away the power of the Afrikaner people. Members were instructed that they should not reveal their names to the Commission without permission from their leaders, and that the leaders would do likewise. They were also told to have faith in Dr. Verwoerd, with the assertion that he would never do anything to damage the organisation; certainly a barely-encoded message that Dr. Verwoerd would ensure that nothing unflattering came to light. Dr. Verwoerd knew that the investigation had to go well, from the Broederbond's point of view. He owed them an enormous debt in the role that they had played in persuading their members to vote for a republic, and in securing him a successful political career.⁶⁰⁵¹

The Commissioner simply did not look at a great deal of the material that was relevant to the project, including speeches that stirred up sentiment against English-speaking South Africans, and it chose never to explore the comments made by Hertzog in 1935 that condemned the Broederbond's machinations and how it had infiltrated the education system; a significant blind spot. Unsurprisingly, on March 1965, the commission reported that the Broederbond and the other two organizations were innocent of any of the above

⁶⁰⁴⁷ Serfontein, 1978: 96-97.

⁶⁰⁴⁸ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 323.

⁶⁰⁴⁹ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 321-322.

⁶⁰⁵⁰ Pelzer, 1979: 87-88.

⁶⁰⁵¹ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 321-324.

accusations,⁶⁰⁵² despite the fact that the tentacles of the Broederbond stretched into every aspect of the state apparatus.⁶⁰⁵³

The fact that Dr. Verwoerd had elevated many Broederbonders to government positions was ignored. Judge Botha reported that he could reveal little of what he had learned because he had been given all the information in confidence and the public was supposed to simply accept this. Moreover, the investigation was carried out in secret (the first such case in the history of South Africa), and was allowed to present unsubstantiated findings. Moreover, Dr. Verwoerd had ensured that the remit of the investigation did not include a clause that had been mooted originally, to cover groups “which may interfere in politics secretly.” Had this inclusion been left in, it would have been very difficult for the investigation not to rule against the Broederbond.⁶⁰⁵⁴

The judge presented his conclusion that the Broederbond was certainly innocent of any of the “irregular” activities of which it had been accused. More than that, his conclusion even commented very positively on much of its work,⁶⁰⁵⁵ claiming among other things that “through its resistance to communism and other ideologies inimical to the nation, the Bond has already done much to steel the will of the people to fight for its survival with all the means at its disposal.”⁶⁰⁵⁶

Furthermore, paragraph 41 of his report states:

“I believe that it is unnecessary for the purposes of this report to outline here the achievements of the Bond, as it is clear from the documents submitted. The Bond itself does not boast in it. It is sufficient, I think, to state that the achievement of the Bond, in the relatively short span of its existence, is impressive, especially in certain areas, such as bringing together or uniting Afrikaners, the Afrikaans language, culture and traditions, the Afrikaners’ part in the national economy and the business world, and the promotion of good relations between whites and the non-white groups in South Africa. A well-founded dynamic organization like the Bond, who in its 14 study groups or task forces has the finest experts in various fields, in a favourable environment, could hardly have been expected otherwise.”⁶⁰⁵⁷

⁶⁰⁵² Ngcokavane, 1989: 122.

⁶⁰⁵³ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 331.

⁶⁰⁵⁴ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 331.

⁶⁰⁵⁵ Pelzer, 1979: 89.

⁶⁰⁵⁶ Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Secret Organization, 1965: p. 7.

⁶⁰⁵⁷ Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Secret Organisations, 1965: p. 5.

After the findings were presented, Judge Botha thanked JPJ Coetzer, who had led the evidence before the Commission, and CM Van Niekerk, the secretary of the Commission, for all the hard work they had done towards completing the inquiry. Some years later, the two men would go to serve as, respectively, Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice, and as members of the Broederbond.⁶⁰⁵⁸

The Commission had given Dr. Verwoerd the result he needed, because the bottom line was that it was there to serve the government, and not the people, even if that meant misrepresenting reality. Only three years later, in 1968, Piet Meyer, Chairman of the Broadcasting Corporation, personally appointed to this position by his close personal friend Hendrick Verwoerd, and vice chairman of the Broederbond's Executive Council, confirmed that the organisation had been intimately involved with the government under Dr. Verwoerd, stating: "... because of our active participation in the realization of our republican ideal, the Afrikaner Broederbond aligned itself closer in practice with the national organising of the political struggle ..."⁶⁰⁵⁹

The Commission, ignoring all the evidence (in particular the fact that Dr. Verwoerd had given government positions to many Broederbonders), provided the result the government wanted, and a template for future Commissions of Inquiry under the corrupt apartheid government.⁶⁰⁶⁰ In general, after the Commission of Inquiry, the Broederbond continued to grow and spread its influence, now secure in its knowledge that the National Party would never try to interfere. Why would it, when so many of its members were also Broederbonders? While the Broederbond's power to impact on decision-making at governmental level is well-known, its influence at grass-roots level, in communities, schools, agricultural bodies and local chapters of the National Party, was also considerable,⁶⁰⁶¹ and membership of the organisation grew enormously during Dr. Verwoerd's reigns as Minister for Native Affairs and Prime Minister.⁶⁰⁶²

⁶⁰⁵⁸ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 332.

⁶⁰⁵⁹ Serfontein, 1978: 87.

⁶⁰⁶⁰ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 324.

⁶⁰⁶¹ Serfontein, 1978: 188.

⁶⁰⁶² Pirie et al, 1980: 99.

After Dr. Verwoerd's death his successor, Balthazar Johannes Vorster,⁶⁰⁶³ would transform the organisation into a tool of the National Party.⁶⁰⁶⁴ Essentially, the Commission of Inquiry provided Dr. Verwoerd with an "invaluable smokescreen" behind which the government and the Broederbond could operate as before, immersed in "political intrigue and manipulation."⁶⁰⁶⁵

THE BOSS INQUIRY AND THE "INFORMATION SCANDAL"

In 1971, faced with pressure from the Press, the public and some eminent judges about the BOSS activities and extensive powers, Vorster appointed, as usual, a one-man Commission to inquire into all aspects of state security. The Commission was called *Commission of Inquiry into Matters relating to the Security of the State*, and the Judge who was appointed was Justice H. J. Potgieter.⁶⁰⁶⁶ Vorster said about it "I do this because it is of vital importance that the Republic should have the best machinery at its disposal to guarantee its security, and secondly to give all persons who have recently expressed misgivings or have launched attacks on BOSS and the legislation concerned the opportunity to lay their points of view and objections before the Commission."⁶⁰⁶⁷

The first part of the Commission's brief was belated and largely superfluous while the second was clearly a concession to the critics. In the event, the Potgieter Commission proved, like many such commissions, to have been merely a device for deflecting protest. Once it was appointed, the noisy objections tailed off, leaving General van den Bergh and BOSS free to carry on with their appointed tasks. In the end, the Potgieter Report found BOSS innocent of any illegalities and recommended that phone tapping and mail interception be authorised by legislation.⁶⁰⁶⁸ The *Rand Daily Mail* commented about the decision "It seems ironic that a Commission which was appointed to allay public anxieties that the powers of BOSS were too sweeping should in the end recommend that those powers be extended."⁶⁰⁶⁹

⁶⁰⁶³ (1915-1983) A lawyer and a pro-Nazi politician who was among the founders and generals of the Ossewabrandwag. For participation in the organisation, he was imprisoned for two years (1942-1944). He was a hardliner who supported apartheid with ruthlessness. In 1961 Dr. Verwoerd made him Minister of Justice. From 1966 he also filled the role of Minister of Police and Prisons. He became South Africa's Prime Minister after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination in 1966, remaining in the post until 1978. He served as President of South Africa from 1978 to 1979 (D'Oliveira, 1977). For more about Vorster: D'Oliveira, J. (1977) *Vorster – the Man*.

⁶⁰⁶⁴ Callinicos, 1995: 30.

⁶⁰⁶⁵ Wilkins and Strydom, 1979: 333.

⁶⁰⁶⁶ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 6, 12.

⁶⁰⁶⁷ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 12-13.

⁶⁰⁶⁸ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 13-20.

⁶⁰⁶⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 February 1972.

Despite the supine record of the Commissions examined above, not all such bodies and not all judges were servile supporters of apartheid, and one in particular, Judge Anton Mostert, risked his career in the cause of truth. In 1978, just seven years after the BOSS Inquiry whitewash, Judge Mostert, the sole member of a Commission of Inquiry into exchange control regulations, discovered evidence of widespread government corruption at the Ministry of Information. It became known as the “Information Scandal,”⁶⁰⁷⁰ or more commonly “Muldergate,” after Information Minister Cornelius Mulder. Sensationally, Prime Minister John Vorster and General van den Bergh were named as being involved. What was not known was that two years earlier, in 1976, Vorster and van den Bergh ordered the destruction of all “unnecessary documentation” that would have disclose their involvement.⁶⁰⁷¹

Then, in 1977, these two, with the co-operation of Mulder, pressured L.S. Reynders, who was investigating the Department of Information, to produce a document declaring them innocent of any involvement in unconstitutional or illegal activities. Investigator Reynders’ findings duly offered Vorster, van den Bergh and Mulder the whitewash they wanted.⁶⁰⁷² Despite the fact that the newly elected Prime Minister, P.W. Botha tried to stop him, Judge Mostert proceeded with his inquiries and discovered the evidence. He said, “I have endeavoured to discover what particular interest of the state is furthered by suppression, albeit temporary, rather than disclosure of the evidence. I have been able to find none.”⁶⁰⁷³

Judge Mostert then disclosed the evidence, despite intense government pressure, at a Press conference. He said that Mulder’s Information Ministry, seeking ways of influencing public opinion in favour of apartheid, collaborated closely and covertly throughout the 1970s with van den Bergh’s BOSS, presumably with Vorster’s knowledge and agreement.⁶⁰⁷⁴ For making his disclosures public, Judge Mostert was dismissed and his Commission of Inquiry was disbanded.⁶⁰⁷⁵

As a result of the scandal, the Erasmus Commission of Inquiry was appointed to investigate the irregularities in the Department of Information. In June 1979, the Erasmus Commission issued three reports which implicated Vorster and Mulder in misleading

⁶⁰⁷⁰ For more about the scandal see: Rees, M., Day, C. (1980) *Muldergate: The story of the info-scandal.*; Rickard, C. (2012) *Thank You, Judge Mostert!*

⁶⁰⁷¹ Sanders, 1999: 62.

⁶⁰⁷² Pollack, 1981: 31.

⁶⁰⁷³ Smith, 1979: 43.

⁶⁰⁷⁴ Burns, 1980: 3; Hachten and Giffard, 1984: 243-244.

⁶⁰⁷⁵ *The Globe and Mail*, 6 April 1979: 6. *Secret life of Pretoria.*

Parliament about secret funding of *The Citizen* newspaper. It laid responsibility for extensive financial irregularities on Mulder and van den Bergh.⁶⁰⁷⁶ When L.S. Reynders was questioned by the Erasmus Commission, he said he had produced his “whitewash” under fierce pressure from van den Bergh. He said he feared that if he had opposed him, the general would “pulverize” him because “few people in this land realise what power van den Bergh possesses.”⁶⁰⁷⁷ Subsequently, van den Bergh was forced to resign and retire.⁶⁰⁷⁸

CONCLUSION ABOUT THE ROLE OF COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY DURING APARTHEID

As we have seen, the aforementioned Commissions and many more during apartheid were mere whitewashing machines whereby the government and police could avoid responsibility for their illegal or extrajudicial actions and secure results which the State desired. They were part of a judicial system that has been described as “the world’s most elaborate legal structure for the repression of political resistance of all kinds.”⁶⁰⁷⁹ The Sharpeville, Soweto and Langa investigations in particular demonstrate how right Professor John Dugard was when he spoke of the way judicial commissions “were manipulated, and also the way in which inquest inquiries were conducted and the magistrates just ignored the evidence.”⁶⁰⁸⁰ This was how the apartheid machine worked, hiding the truth from the world and presenting an account of history which suited its self-image. In essence, these so-called investigations hid more than they exposed.⁶⁰⁸¹

History has now consigned the above Commissions, Erasmus apart, to the dustbin. It is notable, however, that the Verwoerd Enquiry has never been seriously examined or questioned. Given the apartheid regime’s dismal record for truth-telling, state institutions’ unflinching instinct for secrecy and knowledge of the tokenist inquiries of the past, one would expect a questioning and sceptical approach to the Verwoerd Enquiry. Crucially, is the Commission’s portrayal of Tsafendas a truthful one and how accurate is its account of events surrounding Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination? Strangely, scholars and writers who are

⁶⁰⁷⁶ Leonard, 1983: 163.

⁶⁰⁷⁷ Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Department of Information, 1978: chap. 11, par. 385.

⁶⁰⁷⁸ Sanders, 2006: 64, 77, 161.

⁶⁰⁷⁹ Turk, 1982: 146.

⁶⁰⁸⁰ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁶⁰⁸¹ Sitze, 2013: 311.

researching the relevant period and the assassination seem generally to accept the van Wyk Report without question.

However, as we will shortly see, the Dr. Verwoerd Commission was no more objective or honest than any of the inquiries mentioned above. Indeed, it is arguably worse than its predecessors in that it concealed important facts about Tsafendas so as to maintain the fiction that he was a mad outcast without any serious political interest who killed Dr. Verwoerd because of a tapeworm. It went further than this, doing everything possible to belittle him in the eyes of the public so that no-one could think that Tsafendas was capable of committing a political crime.

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO DR. VERWOERD'S DEATH

On September 14, 1966, eight days after the killing, South Africa's new Prime Minister, John Vorster, announced in Parliament that a judicial investigation, a one-man Commission of Enquiry, would be launched immediately "into all aspects of the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd." The process would be led by Justice Jacques Theodore van Wyk, South Africa's representative at the World Court in The Hague. Vorster urged anyone with information about the matter, however trivial, to come forward and lay it before the Commission.⁶⁰⁸²

Back in Parliament eight days later, Vorster officially proclaimed the formation of a *Commission of Enquiry into the Circumstances of the Death of the Late Dr. The Honourable Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd*.⁶⁰⁸³ He affirmed that Judge van Wyk, who was present in the Distinguished Visitor's Gallery for the occasion, would be the chairman and sole member of the Commission.⁶⁰⁸⁴ Since the Commission would be a judicial one, it would come under the authority of the Minister of Justice, Mr P.C. Pelser.⁶⁰⁸⁵

BACKGROUND ON JUDGE JACQUES THEODORE VAN WYK (1913-1975)

As we have seen, when the National Party came to power in 1948, a minority of judges were members of the Party. Most, however, were relatively independent, and many supported the old United Party. The new government decided to appoint judges who would support its goals, creating a legal system that was decidedly biased in favour of Afrikaners' interests and the apartheid state. One of them was Jacques Theodore van Wyk.⁶⁰⁸⁶

Jacques Theodore van Wyk, a native of Vanrhynsdorp, Western Cape, was an enthusiastic nationalist and supporter of apartheid.⁶⁰⁸⁷ As is evident from the following incident, he was also a racist. In the early 1950s there was just one Black member of the Cape Town Bar, a man called Ndhlovu. Because the Group Areas Act had just come into force, he was prohibited from taking chambers in Temple Chambers, as this was a building in a

⁶⁰⁸² *The Cape Argus*, 1 September 1966: 1, 'Judge will probe Dr. V's death'; *Daily Dispatch*, 15 September 1966: 1, 'Premier's killing full inquiry.' ???

⁶⁰⁸³ *Government Notice*, No. 1435, 23 September 1966.

⁶⁰⁸⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 September 1966, 'Killing inquiry to be secret.'

⁶⁰⁸⁵ *The Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 22 September 1966, 'Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry in camera.'

⁶⁰⁸⁶ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016; Sachs, 1973: 257.

⁶⁰⁸⁷ Francois Marais quoted in Geni.com. Retrieved from <https://www.geni.com/people/Jacques-Theodore-Van-Wyk/600000008317660124>

“white” area. On the occasions when Ndhlovu was present in the common room, van Wyk refused to enter it.⁶⁰⁸⁸

Professor John Dugard, who knew van Wyk well, had this to say about him:

“Van Wyk was a very austere, strict man. He took his professional duties very, very responsibly. So he would not speak to any of the advocates while we were in Calvinia, which is a small town. We were all staying in the same hotel. There was only one hotel. But all the top senior advocates from Cape Town then, you knew them all socially. But he said to me, ‘I do not want to be seen talking to any of these advocates because the local people will think that I am biased.’ So, for two weeks, van Wyk and I were virtually incommunicado. He didn’t speak to anyone else. He only spoke to me. We used to go for long walks in the country. So I know van Wyk very well. Professionally he was very austere, but politically van Wyk was very much a party person. He supported the National Party and was very much in favour of the government... he was, intellectually, one of the better judges. He and Beyers were intellectual giants, so to speak, amongst the National Party judges... they were certainly both political persons, and they owed their appointments to the government.”⁶⁰⁸⁹

Van Wyk represented the apartheid government in a number of high profile trials. In return for his service and loyalty, he was given a number of swift promotions. Aged just thirty-six, he was appointed KC in 1949, making him the youngest in South Africa to hold this position. He was promoted to Judge in October 1955.⁶⁰⁹⁰

One of van Wyk’s landmark achievements was representing the apartheid government in the *Harris* case in 1958⁶⁰⁹¹ concerning the removal of Coloured voters from the Electoral Roll.⁶⁰⁹² He was noted during proceedings to react viciously if any junior lawyers in the Cape Bar argued against the move. The voters’ attorney, Pilkington-Jordan, wrote to United Party leader J.G.N. Strauss that both Beyers and van Wyk had treated the court with “scant courtesy” and that they had been “thoroughly rude” to Graeme Duncan KC, the leader of the

⁶⁰⁸⁸ Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 8-9.

⁶⁰⁸⁹ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁶⁰⁹⁰ Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 73; Francois Marais quoted in Geni.com. Retrieved from <https://www.geni.com/people/Jacques-Theodore-Van-Wyk/600000008317660124>

⁶⁰⁹¹ The issue of legal favouritism became particularly pressing during the 1950s, when there was a dispute about the government’s disenfranchisement of Coloured voters. In fact, this policy could ultimately be enacted because the government had appointed favoured judges to an enlarged Appellate Division. Among the new, partisan appointees were Beyers and van Wyk (Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016).

⁶⁰⁹² Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016; Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 8-9.

legal team representing the voters. He said: “They really are monkeys in dinner jackets and the sartorial elegance of that garb does not in the least conceal the barbarian beneath ...”⁶⁰⁹³ Separately, van Wyk also served as an advisor to the Rhodesians in their talks between their Prime Minister Ian Smith and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.⁶⁰⁹⁴

Van Wyk was elevated to the Appellate Division in January 1962, and was rewarded for his services with a position in The Hague. There, between 1962 and 1966, he served as an *ad hoc* member of the International Court of Justice, hearing the *Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa* case when the former collectively claimed to have a mandate to control South West Africa.⁶⁰⁹⁵ His counterpart, representing both Ethiopia and Liberia, was Sir Louis Mbanefo, a Chief Justice from Nigeria.⁶⁰⁹⁶

South West Africa was a former German colony that had been captured by South Africa during the First World War, and administered by it following the war. After the Second World War, the area was supposed to come under the jurisdiction of the United Nations and to start the process of becoming independent. However, the then Prime Minister of South Africa, Jans Smuts, objected and stated the view that it should instead be absorbed into South Africa.⁶⁰⁹⁷ From 1949, Whites from South West Africa were represented in the South African parliament, and apartheid law was applied throughout the area. The case arose when the applicants to the court maintained that South Africa was engaging in discrimination, which ran counter to its obligation to “protect to the utmost” the well-being of the area’s residents, and also claimed that South Africa was legally bound by international law not to practice discrimination, which it claimed had been established as an international norm, citing the official, stated practice of the United Nations, among other international bodies.⁶⁰⁹⁸

Van Wyk roundly rejected the idea that any organ of the United Nations had the right to “bind a dissenting minority” to the decisions it took, and firmly stated that no body of the UN had any such competence, as well as his view that it should not pursue it in any application or interpretation of the relevant legal Article. Van Wyk stated, in a comment described a few years later as “depressing” and “disappointing” but “not unexpected” that: “Applicants’ contention involved the novel proposition that the organs of the United Nations

⁶⁰⁹³ Davis and le Roux, 2009: 25.

⁶⁰⁹⁴ Wood, 2012: 569-573.

⁶⁰⁹⁵ Wiechers, 1968: 408.

⁶⁰⁹⁶ International Court of Justice, 1962: 865.

⁶⁰⁹⁷ Higgins, 1970: 43.

⁶⁰⁹⁸ Higgins, 1970: 43-46.

possessed some sort of legislative competence whereby they could bind a dissenting minority. It is clear from the provisions of the Charter that no such competence exists ...⁶⁰⁹⁹ Essentially, his argument was that, for any UN ruling to be valid, every member would have to agree with it. Clearly, this view implied van Wyk's (and the South African government's) position that South Africa had the legal right to ignore any international ruling that it did not like about apartheid or any other internal matter. He stated that the applications to the court had not even tried to show any example of international practice that was consistent with the "alleged norm" and that they relied, instead, on statements rather than practice, and on criticism of South Africa.⁶¹⁰⁰

Judge van Wyk further argued that there was no proof that other states did not discriminate, that their official statements to the UN were not worth anything, and that in discriminating against its own citizens, South Africa was doing nothing wrong or indeed out of the ordinary. What is striking is that, while certainly he was correct in asserting that many other states practiced discrimination, South Africa was proud to do so, and had made said discrimination a matter of policy.⁶¹⁰¹

On July 16, 1966, the Court eventually ruled in South Africa's favour, dismissing the application of Ethiopia and Liberia on grounds that they had no specific legal right or interest in the performance of the Mandate for South West Africa. It was a triumph for van Wyk and apartheid, especially as Ethiopia and Liberia had attacked South Africa's apartheid policies in the hope that South Africa would be abandoned by the United Kingdom and the United States, and despite the fact that the United Nations did not endorse South Africa's racist policies, as the government had hoped.⁶¹⁰² Judge van Wyk's provocative manner of celebrating the Court's decision offended and angered many Africans. A number of African representatives at the United Nations decided they would celebrate Dr. Verwoerd's assassination in 1966, partly in response to the unseemly way in which van Wyk and the South African delegation had celebrated the rejection of Ethiopia's and Liberia's claim. Eventually, however, they decided against any kind of public demonstration.⁶¹⁰³

⁶⁰⁹⁹ Higgins, 1970: 43-46.

⁶¹⁰⁰ Higgins, 1970: 47.

⁶¹⁰¹ UN General Assembly, res n° 2154 (XXI), 17 November 1966. Available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/21/ares21.htm>

⁶¹⁰² Wiechers, 1968: 408-428.

⁶¹⁰³ *Le Courrier d'Afrique*, 9 September 1966: 2, 'A eleição do sucessor.'

The Tsafendas case was held in 1966, by which stage van Wyk had more than demonstrated his ability to support the National Party, and invariably come up with the judgement that it wanted. Beyers and van Wyk were appointed to oversee the case in a move that Professor Dugard interprets as the government taking care to ensure that the outcome would be in its favour: “I suspect that the government was very careful when it came to appointing judges to hear the Tsafendas case, and so that would explain why both Beyers and van Wyk were involved. They were certainly political persons and they owed their appointments to the government.”⁶¹⁰⁴

The Tsafendas case resolved to the government’s satisfaction, van Wyk continued to pass judgements that suited the State. For example, in 1970 he ordered a member of the opposition not to reveal the contents of a statement that had been banned from publication on the grounds that it contravened South Africa’s Official Secrets Act and could “prejudice State security.”⁶¹⁰⁵ Together with two other judges, in 1974 van Wyk also presided over a case taken against the prominent anti-apartheid writer André Brink, who had written a book that “offended” apartheid sensibilities. The court found the book, which was published in Afrikaans in 1973, objectionable on a number of grounds, with van Wyk stating that it was “undesirable” on “moral, political and religious” grounds. Brink’s book, *Kennis van die Aand*, which told the story of a Coloured actor who is in prison awaiting execution for the murder of his White lover, explicitly discussed sexual relations between people of diverse racial backgrounds in a contemporary (late 1960s/early 1970s) setting, was critical of the behaviour of South Africa’s security police, mentioned real-life incidents that had resulted from apartheid such as the Sharpeville Massacre, and described White South Africans as being cruel to Blacks.⁶¹⁰⁶

Van Wyk, who had stated in *Die Transvaler* that the book contravened South African law because it ridiculed the white section of the population,⁶¹⁰⁷ determined that the state had a clear interventionist role to play in keeping South African literature within the parameters that the racist state considered acceptable, arguing that the “likely readership” of the book was composed of people who were vulnerable to corruption by it.⁶¹⁰⁸ Whereas the other judges assessing the book were also in favour of banning it, van Wyk’s view that it should be

⁶¹⁰⁴ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁶¹⁰⁵ *South China Morning Post*, 25 February 1970: 20.

⁶¹⁰⁶ De Lange, 1997: 46.

⁶¹⁰⁷ De Lange, 1997: 48.

⁶¹⁰⁸ Allo, 2015: 289.

banned on all three of the criteria listed above was, in fact, a minority opinion. He stated that, although the book was fictional, it was written in such a realistic way that readers were likely to assume that it was based on fact.⁶¹⁰⁹ André Brink characterised van Wyk as an “arch-conservative, narrow-minded rightist with a number of axes to grind with liberals.”⁶¹¹⁰

In August 1973, van Wyk rose to the position of Judge President, replacing the newly retired Judge Beyers, and held this position until 11 November 1975. He died from cancer five days later.⁶¹¹¹ Of van Wyk, Dennis Davis, a High Court Judge in South Africa, and Michelle le Roux, an advocate of the High Court of South Africa, wrote: “Whereas Beyers was a man of pronounced personality and sometimes humanity, van Wyk possessed none of the latter. He did have a formidable intellect which was evenly matched by a parsimonious and mean-spirited view of the world, a true apartheid ideologue. Unlike Beyers he never showed an inch of compassion when confronted by the inhumane consequences of apartheid.”⁶¹¹²

THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMISSION

A *Government Notice* set out the Commission’s purpose in the following terms: “To enquire into and submit a report on all aspects relating to the death of the late Dr. the Honourable Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd which the said Commission deems to be in the public interest.”⁶¹¹³ Judge van Wyk stated that the Commission would investigate twenty-eight different aspects of the assassination, including:

- The history of Tsafendas.
- Tsafendas’s motives.
- Circumstances surrounding Tsafendas’s entry into South Africa.
- Tsafendas’s appointment as a messenger in the House of Assembly.
- Security arrangements in the Assembly.⁶¹¹⁴

⁶¹⁰⁹ De Lange, 1997: 48-9.

⁶¹¹⁰ Brink, 2009: 224.

⁶¹¹¹ Friedman and Gauntlett, 2013: 28, 77.

⁶¹¹² Davis and le Roux, 2009: 18.

⁶¹¹³ Report of the COE. Chapter I, Paragraph 2. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁶¹¹⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 October 1966, ‘Murder of Dr. V-probe widens.’

THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

The timeline of the various judicial proceedings following the assassination is as follows: September 26, 1966, the Commission begins preparatory work in Cape Town; October 17-20, 1966, Tsafendas's summary trial takes place at the Cape High Court; end November, 1966, the Commission concludes its work. Thus the Commission at times was interviewing witnesses who had already spoken to the police and in some cases had given evidence at the trial. In order to comply with its terms of reference, the Commission trawled far and wide for information about Demitrio Tsafendas.⁶¹¹⁵

A questionnaire was drawn up and given extensive publicity on Press and radio, and any individual with relevant information was requested to advise the authorities. Government departments, foreign embassies, banks and business houses were advised of the Enquiry's needs. As a result, the Commission received a large number of affidavits and numerous letters, as well as the statements made to the police by Tsafendas and by people who knew him, while all government departments declared their files open for inspection. One hundred and five persons, including Tsafendas, gave oral evidence before the Commission.⁶¹¹⁶

EVIDENCE GIVEN IN SECRET

On September 22, four days before the Commission began its work, Vorster announced that evidence would be presented behind closed doors because the case was too serious for all the evidence to be heard in public.⁶¹¹⁷ He declared that the integrity of Judge van Wyk was sufficient guarantee that the people of South Africa would hear the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.⁶¹¹⁸

On October 10, Judge van Wyk stated that it was his initiative that evidence be given in secret. Although he repeated Vorster's reasoning for the decision, he also offered a more credible sounding explanation. He said, "South Africa, more than other countries, has to see that nothing is done to prejudice the course of justice. It is not desirable that an inquiry of this kind should take place in public while criminal proceedings are pending. I did not think it is desirable to wait until after the completion of any criminal proceedings before starting this

⁶¹¹⁵ Report of the COE. Chapter I, Paragraph 4. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁶¹¹⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter I, Paragraph 4. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁶¹¹⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 September 1966, 'Killing inquiry to be secret.'

⁶¹¹⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 September 1966, 'Killing inquiry to be secret'; *The Canberra Times*, 23 September 1966: 5, 'South Africa: Assassination Inquiry.'

inquiry. A lot of evidence may be stale by then. As a great deal of the Enquiry relates to security matters, I do not think it would be wise for these matters to be heard in public.”⁶¹¹⁹

This meant that the public would not hear what people said about Tsafendas, which was most convenient for Vorster and van den Bergh since by this time, as we have seen earlier, the police had heard from witnesses and discovered from other evidence that Tsafendas:

- was a passionate and committed Communist,
- a former dues-paying member of the South African Communist Party,
- had fought with Communists in the Greek Civil War,
- was a strong supporter of the independence of Mozambique and was arrested several times for his anti-colonial actions in Mozambique,
- was anti-apartheid, had joined the British anti-apartheid movement and had participated in anti-apartheid demonstrations in London. While in London, he had met such leading anti-apartheid activists as the Rev. Canon John Collins and Solly Sachs.
- considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator and “Hitler’s best student.”
- was a political animal and “a fanatic on politics” who “seldom spoke of anything else”
- had described the “United Party and National Party officials and members as capitalistic roughs.”
- was reported more than a year before the assassination by two different men as a dangerous Communist,
- had been characterised by another party as the “biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa.”
- had engaged in distributing Communist propaganda both in South Africa and in Mozambique and was deported from Mozambique due to his Communist and anti-colonialist beliefs and activities.

More importantly, the key witness was Tsafendas himself, who would testify not once, but twice. Tsafendas had already told the police that he was anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist, anti-slavery and in sympathy with the people fighting racialism, that he was a

⁶¹¹⁹ *The Sunday Tribune*, 9 October 1966: 3, ‘Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Judge explains.’

former member of the South African Communist Party, that he considered Dr. Verwoerd not to be the real representative of all South Africans, that he wanted to see a government representing all the South African people, and most importantly that he was disgusted with Dr. Verwoerd's racial policies and had killed him in the hope that a change of policy would take place after his death. Tsafendas was not going to have the chance to say all these things at his summary trial, so clearly the state could not permit him to repeat them in front of the Press and public at the Enquiry, when he was supposedly mad and killed Dr. Verwoerd because of a tapeworm.

Vorster would have been aware of all this information about Tsafendas since his closest associate, General van den Bergh, was in charge of the investigation. Vorster had already made a blunder when he declared just two weeks earlier that the police had no file on Tsafendas. As it turned out and was confirmed by the Commission, the police had four files on Tsafendas, one with his name on the Government's Stop List. Both men would have been desperate to conceal two elements in particular from Tsafendas's statements: first, the embarrassing revelation that he penetrated the security system for which they were responsible, and secondly that he was a Communist and anti-apartheid who demonstrated the existence of a dangerous opposition to the apartheid system. It would be much better for them and for apartheid if the assassin was a deluded lunatic rather than a political activist, particularly a Communist.

In addition, since the police investigation was still ongoing, Vorster and van den Bergh were not to know what else might be discovered and they could not leave this to chance. Better to control the information, releasing only what was convenient for them. As it turned out, the blocking of information proved crucial for Vorster and van den Bergh since new revelations from Tsafendas added to the picture of an intelligent political activist. They will discover that while in London he had associated with David Gardener, leading anti-apartheid activist and member of the Labour Party and the ANC representative there, Tennyson Xola Makiwane.⁶¹²⁰

More importantly, that just three days before the killing, Tsafendas had discussed with friends a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as being morally justifiable because he was a tyrant and a dictator who oppressed his people. The ANC contact and the assassination

⁶¹²⁰ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

conversation were omitted from the Commission's Report and did not become known then or even later. Whatever evidence was given behind closed doors to the Commission was entirely beneficial to Vorster and van den Bergh.

THE PRESS

On September 24, 1966, Judge van Wyk ordered all of South Africa's newspapers to submit to the Commission all of their "files of reports published on the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, as well as the names of the writers and sources of information."⁶¹²¹ Newspapers duly obliged, sending to the Commission everything they had published about Tsafendas and the assassination, including the names of article writers and their sources. Several news articles, plus documents listing requested names, were found at the NASA.

That the Commission had knowledge of all that was carried by the written Press is very important because van Wyk's Report omitted several important and accurate news reports, most importantly statements by people who knew Tsafendas but also references to his political activities. This issue will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

THE REST OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK

The Commission sent questionnaires and letters to all government departments and parastatals, requesting details of any dealings they may have had with Tsafendas. Completed questionnaires and related documents started arriving at the Commission after September 27. On October 9, van Wyk said he was pleased with the responses.⁶¹²² The Commission received copies of evidence collected by the South African police, the PIDE and the British police, as well as witnesses' statements. It was given secret communications between South Africa's embassies and foreign governments, information from different government departments, reports by officials and embassies of foreign governments, and the documented judicial process, plus all records relating to Tsafendas's movements in foreign countries, including his various hospitalisations. Overall, the Commission conducted what was effectively a detailed forensic audit of the movements of files and folders between different

⁶¹²¹ *The Cape Times*, 24 September 1966: 1, 'Press ordered to disclose facts'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 September 1966, 'Questions on Dr. V's death.'

⁶¹²² *The Sunday Tribune*, 9 October 1966: 3, 'Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Judge explains.'

government departments and officials.

MISSING STATEMENTS

According to the Commission's Report, "One hundred and five persons, including Tsafendas himself, gave oral evidence before the Commission."⁶¹²³ However, only forty-one of these statements were found in the archives. According to the Commission's interview schedule and its Report, Tsafendas gave evidence twice, on October 25 and on November 11. Neither of these statements was found in the archives and nor were the Dictaphone recordings which were supposed to accompany them. The system was that the words on a Dictaphone recording would also be set down in written form. It was discovered that whenever a written statement was missing, the Dictaphone version was missing, too, thus setting aside that statements went missing through carelessness or mishandling.

Tsafendas's two statements to the Commission are not his only ones missing from the archives. As we saw in the Investigation chapter, his first statement to General van den Bergh is also missing. The content of the two statements to the Commission remains entirely unknown, although, as we will see, the Commission makes references to the way Tsafendas answered questions. However the references are extremely vague and no extracts are used.

The issue of missing evidence was also a factor in the police investigation, as we discussed earlier in chapter Four, and it is indisputable that several statements disappeared at some point from the archives, for example, Patrick O'Ryan's statement to the police. During his cross-examination at the summary trial, the Attorney-General read substantial parts of the statement he gave to the police on September 17.⁶¹²⁴

The interview schedule of the Commission was found at the archives. However, it is inaccurate as to the dates of when some of the interviews took place. For example, according to the schedule, Father Probst was down to give evidence on 19th October, but actually, according to the date on his statement, he testified on the 13th October. Gordon Winter was scheduled for 14th October, but according to the date on his statements, gave evidence on 6th and 12th October. In addition, some witnesses who were not listed in the schedule gave evidence to the Commission, such as N.D. Hartford of the *Cape Argus*. It is clear from the

⁶¹²³ Report of the COE. Chapter I, Paragraph 4. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁶¹²⁴ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

Commission's Report that Hartford gave evidence at some point after Tsafendas's summary trial, but his name was not on the schedule.⁶¹²⁵ His statement was also not found in the archives.

Another example is Mogamat Isaacs, who gave evidence to the Commission on 21st October⁶¹²⁶ but is not listed on the schedule. It is clear that the interview schedule cannot be considered as a reliable source for the dates when the interviews took place, nor as a record of unlisted witnesses who also gave evidence. The issue of the missing statements and other evidence will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

⁶¹²⁵ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁶¹²⁶ Mogamat Isaacs statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12. File: die Post aangeleentheid, NASA.

THE COMMISSION'S HEARINGS

INTRODUCTION

The Commission began hearings behind closed doors on 5th October, 1966 in the Thomas Boydell Building in Cape Town,⁶¹²⁷ with Judge van Wyk setting out a proposed schedule. He said, "We hope to hear all evidence, with the exception of evidence from witnesses who may be called to give evidence at the summary trial of Tsafendas, by the end of the month. After the trial has ended, the Commission may call witnesses who gave evidence at the trial."⁶¹²⁸ Eventually, at least one of these witnesses, Patrick O'Ryan, would give evidence to the Commission presumably after the end of the trial, as there is no date on his statement. We will start the examination of these testimonies with the most important of them, that of Tsafendas's family. The various members gave evidence on October 21, 1966, just one day after Judge Beyers had delivered his verdict at Tsafendas's summary trial. Most of the family were interviewed together. This is their testimony:

REPORT REGARDING VISIT TO FAMILY MEMBERS OF DEMITRIO TSAFENDAS, PRETORIA, 21 OCTOBER 1966⁶¹²⁹

Nicolas Vlachopoulos

This person is married to a half-sister of Tsafendas and is the owner of Proclamation Hill Café, 600 Church Street West, Pretoria. Mr Vlachopoulos says that he had seen Tsafendas about two years ago. Whilst in Pretoria Tsafendas worked at Poole's and City Engineering. He stayed in about 20 places. Tsafendas never made any friends. A Bible and two medical books – one about stomach ulcers – belonging to Tsafendas was in Vlachopoulos' possession and these he had handed over to Lt. Strumpher of the SA Police.

According to Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas had visited him at the Café. He was always bankrupt because he always used all his money to buy food. He habitually ate a huge amount of food but never mentioned a tape worm. They never actually conversed with each other and

⁶¹²⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 October 1966: 1, 'Assassination probe begins.'

⁶¹²⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 October 1966, 'Murder of Dr. V-probe widens.'

⁶¹²⁹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

they never discussed politics. Tsafendas often disappeared for two or three days and then returned to the café where he would sit and read a newspaper for an hour or two, after which he would disappear again. He always had a Bible in his pocket.

The wife of Vlachopoulos also saw Tsafendas for the first time in Pretoria. She had never seen him before. The members of the so-called "Christians" sometimes fetched Tsafendas to attend their services. He sometimes went to Johannesburg for two or three days to do so. Tsafendas never went to the cinema. He claimed that he was religious and that it was forbidden by his religion.

Victor Tsafandakis

This person worked as a draughtsman at Iscor Steel Works in Pretoria. He was Tsafendas's half-brother. According to him, Tsafendas had lived in Johannesburg about 23 years ago. During 1963 his half-brother encountered him in Lourenço Marques when he went there with a cousin to discuss affairs with the step-mother. Victor went there to fetch his mother and took Tsafendas back (to Pretoria) at the same time. Tsafendas worked in Pretoria for about six months and then disappeared again.

When he arrived in Pretoria he stayed with Victor for about two days, but he did not want him there any longer as he was a "disturbing personality." Tsafendas would rise at five in the morning and then move around. Tsafendas never complained about anything. However he seemed to have problems with his stomach and that must have been because he always ate too much. He never mentioned a tapeworm. Tsafendas always walked around with a Bible in his hand.

Victor Tsafandakis said that on occasion he said to Tsafendas that South Africa was a wonderful country. Tsafendas agreed and said it was progressive. As far as Victor could recall, Tsafendas never commented when Victor said that integration was not a good thing. He was vague and could easily be contentious. Victor could not recall that Tsafendas ever complained about the government. However, he did complain that he had to work for too little money. It was obvious that Tsafendas worshipped his father. He also said that even if he was handed R1.000, he would spend it all on food. According to Victor, Tsafendas was looking for too much but had too little to give. He described him as "shrewd" and "peculiar."

Marika Tsafandakis (stepmother)

Mrs. Tsafandakis (wife of Victor Tsafandakis)

Mrs. Vlachopoulos

Mrs. Nissiotis

Victor Tsafandakis

These five people were interviewed together.

Tsafendas's stepmother said that Tsafendas could not speak Portuguese when he arrived in Lourenço Marques from Egypt as a six-year-old, and could speak only Greek. He was sent to a Portuguese school once he had learned the language. She had no knowledge of an Anglican Mission School in Lourenço Marques.

Tsafendas was favoured over the other children and sent to Middelburg because Portuguese children could only receive a proper education either there or in Swaziland. After he returned from Middelburg, he was again sent to a Portuguese school. He started working in a restaurant in 1933 or thereabouts. She remembered that he attended boxing lessons at night. Between the ages of 15 to 17 he worked in Lourenço Marques. Thereafter he worked for a British aircraft company. His stepmother had heard from someone else that he had developed appendicitis and was hospitalised during that period. Mrs Tsafandakis later went to South Africa for her children's schooling. She had heard that Demitrio had worked at a café, but that he only worked intermittently and that he had been sent back to Lourenço Marques around 1937 or 1938 after the Police had been summoned as he had been accused of being a Communist.

Tsafendas returned to South Africa in 1939 at which time he worked for British Mining Supplies. From around 1940 until 1963 none of the family saw anything of him. Tsafendas only wrote to them when he needed money. In 1963 someone phoned Mrs Tsafandakis from Lourenço Marques to tell her that Demitrio had asked her to intervene in bringing him back to his family. She had felt it to be her duty to do so as his father had died. After his stepmother had fetched him he had stayed with his family for a while and then hired a room. He refused to commit himself to any work. The family were of the opinion that he had returned because he thought that his father may have left a legacy. He searched all the cupboards for anything that belonged to his father. He remained in Pretoria for about 6 months, after which the family lost all contact with him.

Tsafendas never talked to the family about his tapeworm. According to them, he was definitely not insane. He always had proper accommodation in Pretoria. According to his stepmother, Tsafendas only learned that he had coloured origins when he looked for work at the aircraft factory. He had grown up as one of her children. He was depressed after he had learned about this, but never said anything about it. The stepmother vehemently denied that she had arranged for him to be raped as he had claimed. Her brother had only arrived from Egypt in 1928. Mr Victor Tsafandakis thanked the Government and the police on behalf of his family for the way they had treated them.

COMMENTS ON VLACHOPOULOS'S TESTIMONY

According to Fotini Gavasiadis, Vlachopoulos's sister, who spent every day for nine months with him in Pretoria in 1963-1964, and to Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas's cousin who grew up with him in Egypt and Mozambique and was also in Pretoria in 1963-1964, Tsafendas always wanted to discuss politics, but the family were reluctant because they were afraid of the apartheid system. Tsafendas constantly criticised apartheid and everyone in the family kept telling him to "keep your mouth shut."⁶¹³⁰

Furthermore, according to both women, Vlachopoulos had a very good relationship with Tsafendas and was closer to him than any of his other in-laws. He went along with Marika and Victor to Lourenço Marques from Pretoria, keen to meet Tsafendas, of whom he had heard so much from his wife. He assumed he could not meet him in South Africa since he was a banned person. In Mozambique, it was Vlachopoulos who provided the money to bribe J.J. van den Berg, the responsible officer at the South African consulate, to ignore the fact that Tsafendas was on his government's Stop List. Upon their return to Pretoria, Vlachopoulos gave Tsafendas a rent-free apartment and offered him work in his café.⁶¹³¹

According to Gavasiadis and Eendracht, Vlachopoulos often discussed politics with Tsafendas, as he sympathized with his radical ideas, but he never discussed such things in public and he continually urged him to following the same course.⁶¹³² Gavasiadis was aware

⁶¹³⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁶¹³¹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁶¹³² Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

that her brother told the police that they never discussed politics. "He lied," she said and added:

"Everyone in the family did the same. They were all very afraid to admit that he was a Communist and against apartheid. Everyone knew Dimitri's political ideas ... after the assassination, Nick and the others in the family tried to distance themselves as much as possible from Dimitri. They just couldn't admit that Dimitri was a Communist and against apartheid. They all said we knew nothing about it. They were terrified, absolutely terrified. They did not know what would happen to them. My brother had helped him come to South Africa and was very close to him and he was more afraid than anyone. I have never seen him so scared in his life."⁶¹³³

Mary Eendracht's memory is also that Tsafendas's family was well aware of his political stance and that he often discussed it with them, especially Nick Vlachopoulos. She said:

"Everyone in the family said that they were not very close to him and knew nothing about his political ideas. They all said the same because they could not tell the police they knew he was a Communist and anti-apartheid and they had helped him to come to South Africa. Communists were persecuted at the time and they would have been in serious trouble if it had become known that they had helped someone they knew was a Communist to enter the country."⁶¹³⁴

Vlachopoulos stated that Tsafendas had "stayed in about 20 places" while in Pretoria. According to Tsafendas's half-sister Katerina Pnema, Gavasiadis and Eendracht this is entirely untrue.⁶¹³⁵ The rest of the family members would also testify to the Commission, as we will soon see, that Tsafendas "always had proper accommodation in Pretoria."⁶¹³⁶ Vlachopoulos was well aware of this as he was the one who had given Tsafendas a rent-free apartment. Vlachopoulos farther had previously given this apartment free to Antonis Bizos,

⁶¹³³ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁶¹³⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁶¹³⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹³⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

the father of Advocate George Bizos. Nick Vlachopoulos was a good friend of Antonis Bizos and Tsafendas was introduced to Antonis Bizos by him.⁶¹³⁷

According to Eendracht and Gavasiadis, Tsafendas did not just visit Vlachopoulos's café shop, but worked there voluntarily for almost nine months, another fact that Vlachopoulos hid from the police. Gavasiadis said "My brother was initially not very keen on having him there because he was told that he would start arguing with customers over politics, but he never argued with anyone as long as he was there." Tsafendas worked voluntarily at the café and he was so good at the job that Vlachopoulos offered him permanent employment with good wages, but Tsafendas refused because he felt obligated since he was given a rent-free apartment. He worked full-time at the café when he was unemployed, and part-time when he was at F.A. Poole Engineering.⁶¹³⁸

Gavasiadis said her brother's comment about Tsafendas not making friends was also a lie. She considered herself to have been a very good friend of Tsafendas and spent practically every day for nine months with him. They lived together for a few weeks and then they would often go to each other's apartments since they were in adjoining buildings, while they would often go out in the evenings. She believes that she was Tsafendas's best friend during the nine months he was in Pretoria. However he also had other friends to whom he introduced her. Gavasiadis also said her brother's claim that Tsafendas did not go to the cinema because it was forbidden by his religion was untrue. She could not understand why he said such a thing because he knew it was a lie. She said on the contrary, Tsafendas was a movie fan and went often to the cinema, with her and his half-sister Eleni, Vlachopoulos's wife.⁶¹³⁹

It is also a lie that his half-sister had seen him for the first time in Pretoria in 1963. Eleni Vlachopoulos was born in 1936 in Lourenço Marques at a time when Tsafendas lived with the family. Furthermore, she was six when Tsafendas left South Africa and from 1939 to 1941, he had also lived with the family in Johannesburg. Tsafendas adored Helen as a baby and when she was older they corresponded regularly. Tsafendas would often send her gifts from overseas along with his letters. Vlachopoulos either lied about seeing him for the first

⁶¹³⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁶¹³⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁶¹³⁹ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

time, or he meant the first time she was an adult.⁶¹⁴⁰ Finally, it was Nick Vlachopoulos who Tsafendas named as his next of kin when he took up residency in E.R. Carney, Clair Wood.⁶¹⁴¹

COMMENTS ON VICTOR TSAFANDAKIS'S STATEMENT

According to Katerina Pnema, Victor's sister, and Irene and John Michaletos, his cousins, Tsafendas and her brother were exact opposites. Tsafendas's father had talked to Demitrio about politics and history as he was growing up, but he did not do the same with Victor. Tsafendas's mother, Marika, seeing that Tsafendas was becoming rebellious, frequently urged her husband not to bring up Victor the same way. However, Victor and Tsafendas had a good relationship and they wrote regularly to each other when Tsafendas was away.⁶¹⁴²

Pnema said Victor had volunteered to drive his mother in Lourenço Marques to meet Tsafendas, but he strongly opposed bribing van den Berg and threatened to return to South Africa without them. He was the most fearful of all the family after the assassination because he had brought Tsafendas back to South Africa in his car and he feared the police would find out about the bribe. He had even considered leaving South Africa and had a packed suitcase at the ready in case he had to leave suddenly.⁶¹⁴³

Tsafendas stayed in Victor's house but he left after Victor discovered to his horror that Tsafendas had a large amount of anti-apartheid and Communist literature in his suitcase. According to Gavasiadis, Pnema and Eendracht, Tsafendas left after he was asked to throw them away. The atmosphere in the house was tense over the suitcase, but also because of the bribery and Tsafendas's political outspokenness. Victor's wife did not know about the bribe, but she was terrified on account of the literature and Tsafendas's political ideas.⁶¹⁴⁴

Pnema, Gavasiadis and Eendracht dispute the claim that Tsafendas told Victor South Africa was a "progressive country." They said Tsafendas held exactly the opposite point of

⁶¹⁴⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

⁶¹⁴¹ Casper Andries Willemsse statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶¹⁴² Irene and John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹⁴³ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹⁴⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

view and that Victor lied. Elizabeth Groves, Tsafendas's landlady in Cape Town in 1966, agreed with the three women. She said Tsafendas had characterised Afrikaners to her as a "backward nation."⁶¹⁴⁵ According to the three women, fear made Victor lie about the things which he claimed Tsafendas said. They said Victor was often present when Tsafendas spoke against apartheid and he always pleaded with him to "not talk like this."⁶¹⁴⁶ Eendracht also said that when Tsafendas talked about politics, Victor always asked him to lower his voice.⁶¹⁴⁷

COMMENTS ON THE FAMILY'S COMMON STATEMENT

The most significant part of the above statement is that the family, including Marika, knew nothing of any tapeworm. This is highly important, because during the summary trial, it was stated that Tsafendas had the tapeworm since he was a small boy and that Marika was involved in an incident with it: "... he told me that a while back, when he was a little boy, about six feet of it came down. The doctor gave him something and six feet of it came down. He was sitting on a bucket. And then he fainted on the bucket, and his mother removed it and she destroyed it, and since then nothing has ever come down."⁶¹⁴⁸

Until the day she died, Marika denied any knowledge of a tapeworm. She confided to close family members that she was certain Tsafendas made it up to escape the death penalty. This was actually what the whole family thought, and they knew Tsafendas very well.⁶¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, the family stated clearly that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane" and this is what they all still believe. All the members of the family who knew him well always maintained among themselves that Tsafendas was pretending to be mad so as to escape the death penalty. None of them ever believed that he really thought he had a tapeworm or that he was insane.⁶¹⁵⁰ Gavasiadis and Eendracht also confirmed that the family did not disclose their knowledge of Tsafendas's political ideas and tried to distance themselves from him out of

⁶¹⁴⁵ Elizabeth Magdalena Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶¹⁴⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹⁴⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁶¹⁴⁸ Louise O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶¹⁴⁹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹⁵⁰ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

fear. Equally important is that none mentioned knowing that Tsafendas was banned from South Africa.⁶¹⁵¹

According to Katerina Pnema, her mother deliberately did not tell the police about Tsafendas's Communist and anti-apartheid ideology or that he had been a member of the South African Communist Party. She told the author:

“We all said the same thing [that] he never discussed politics with us ... how could she and us have told them that he was a Communist? That he was anti-apartheid? That he was anti-colonialist? That he called Dr. Verwoerd ‘bastard,’ and ‘Hitler’s student’ and ‘dictator? That he had been getting us into trouble because of politics since he was child? They [the police] would have said ‘Why did you bring him here then [to South Africa]? Why didn’t you report him to the police?’ They might have even thought that we had the same ideas as him.

Remember, these were very difficult times for anyone who was even suspected of being a Communist and anti-apartheid. The Communist Party was illegal at the time in South Africa ... my mother had not only known that he was a political animal, but she had helped him to come to South Africa. Can you imagine what would have happened to her and to us if they knew that we knew that he was Communist and anti-apartheid and we helped him to come to South Africa? My poor mother was so terrified that they might find out they had bribed this guy in the embassy in Lourenço Marques and that they would all go to jail. None of us told the police that he [Tsafendas] was a Communist and anti-apartheid. How could we have said such things then? They might have deported us all or even worse ... who knows what they could have done to us if they had found out that we knew. Even so, it took another twelve years before our application to reside permanently in South Africa was accepted. We had to hire lawyers and appeal several times. We spent a fortune ...”⁶¹⁵²

Marika in her family statement confirms that Tsafendas was treated as an equal member of the family and was even favoured over the other children when he was sent to South Africa for schooling, which is entirely true. This contradicts the picture Dr. Cooper gave of Tsafendas in the summary trial, where he claimed that he did not have a “normal family background.”⁶¹⁵³ Several witnesses, including Tsafendas himself, confirm Marika's

⁶¹⁵¹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁶¹⁵² Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹⁵³ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

statement that Tsafendas was “brought up as one of her children.”⁶¹⁵⁴ The fact that she travelled to Lourenço Marques to meet him is alone sufficient to render the picture developed at the summary trial and would also be developed by the Commission as a travesty.

Marika states that Tsafendas learned about her not being his biological mother when he worked at the aircraft factory. This was in 1935, when Tsafendas was aged seventeen, not a child as implied at the summary trial. His reaction, one of depression then silence, would fit the reaction of an adult to such news. Marika’s account about how he found out is compatible with what Tsafendas told some witnesses.

Tsafendas claimed in one of his police statements that his step-mother asked her brother to rape him when he was nine.⁶¹⁵⁵ In 1946, in Grafton State Hospital in the United States, he spoke extensively about his sexual life and past sexual “traumas,” all of which he invented, but he did not mention the alleged rape.⁶¹⁵⁶ Tsafendas brought the rape story up with Dr. Cooper when he examined him for the defence at the summary trial. The author is not in position to know if such a rape occurred. What is almost impossible to believe is that his step-mother asked her brother to do such a thing and that Tsafendas really believed it happened. He spoke negatively about his relationship with his step-mother to various psychiatrists, but never to anyone else. On the contrary, he often described how loving she was and how she treated him as her own child.⁶¹⁵⁷ Tsafendas never spoke about the alleged childhood rape to anyone else but given the seriousness of such a claim and perhaps the embarrassment attaching to it, it was probably natural that he did not do so, always assuming it really happened.

Later in life, Tsafendas said two claims were necessary to make an “insane act” look real and convince someone you are mad:

- a. To have a family history of insanity and
- b. To have a childhood trauma.⁶¹⁵⁸

⁶¹⁵⁴ Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹⁵⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶¹⁵⁶ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁶¹⁵⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁶¹⁵⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

The above would explain why Tsafendas said negative things about his step-mother to the psychiatrists, but not to anyone else. It is very possible that Tsafendas made the rape claim to the police because he knew he might need to pretend madness to avoid torture or worse as a consequence of killing Dr. Verwoerd. If a mad act became necessary, having a childhood trauma in his past would add authenticity. The fact that he had talked about sexual traumas at the Grafton State Hospital back in 1946 would further strengthen his claim. However, the author has not been able to establish for a fact why Tsafendas made a claim of rape or whether such an incident ever occurred.

The family also testified that Tsafendas “only wrote to them when he needed money.” However, according to Katerina Pnema, this is not true. She told the author that as far as she could remember, Tsafendas never asked for any money. On the contrary, his father, who was concerned for Demetri’s welfare abroad, regularly asked in letters if he needed money or any other help. Pnema believes that the family made the money reference to highlight the fact that Tsafendas was overseas writing letters and thus did not have a close relationship with them. Pnema said Tsafendas regularly corresponded with her father and her sister Eleni and he often sent presents for everyone in the family, including his step-mother.⁶¹⁵⁹ Some of these gifts are still in the family’s possession. Mary Eendracht, also strongly denies that Tsafendas wrote to the family asking for money and confirms that he often sent presents along with his letters from overseas.⁶¹⁶⁰

According to the family, Tsafendas “refused to commit himself to any work.” This is entirely untrue. Tsafendas worked over the Christmas-New Year period, December 9, 1963 to February 3, 1964, for City Engineering and Carron Limited,⁶¹⁶¹ and from February 7, 1964, to July 10, 1964 for F.A. Poole Engineering.⁶¹⁶² In addition, throughout this period, in his spare time, he worked voluntarily at Nicolas Vlachopoulos’s café.⁶¹⁶³

On the question of Tsafendas’s return to South Africa, the opinion of some family members was that he had done so because he believed his father would have left him a legacy. They testified that he “searched all the cupboards for anything that belonged to his

⁶¹⁵⁹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹⁶⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁶¹⁶¹ Report by D.G. Gallard of City Engineering and Carron Limited regarding Demitrio Tsafendas to the Commission of Enquiry, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

⁶¹⁶² Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶¹⁶³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

father.” Marika Tsafantakis gave quite a different reason for her stepson’s repatriation when she was questioned by the police on September 7. She then said: “When he returned [to Mozambique] during 1963 he told me that he wanted to settle down and he wanted me to help him. I then caused him to come to South Africa and he subsequently got permanent residence in the Republic.”⁶¹⁶⁴ According to family members who were interviewed by the author, namely Katerina Pnefma (half-sister), Fotini Gavasiadis (sister-in-law), Mary Eendracht (first cousin) and John and Antony Michaletos (first cousins), what Marika told the police on September 7 was the truth, that Tsafendas returned because he wanted to settle down, not because he thought his father had left him a legacy. He knew his father was not a wealthy man and he could not have expected to receive anything substantial.⁶¹⁶⁵

Tsafendas did ask if his father had left him anything and did indeed search the cupboards for anything that belonged to his father. However, according to all these family members, he was not looking for money or valuables but for personal belongings of his father. He worshipped Michalis and wanted to keep items, such as hats and books that he had sent to him from Europe. Michalis Tsafantakis had an extensive collection of anarchist and revolutionary literature and Tsafendas wanted to take it, not for sale, but to ensure its safekeeping. He knew how much the books meant to his father and he was well aware of how they had been a constant source of friction with Marika, who did not share his political ideas. Marika had already destroyed most of Michalis’s literary hoard because she did not want her grandchildren to find it, but also because she saw no value in such books. Tsafendas searched diligently for any volumes she may have missed and kept safely whatever he found. Before he left South Africa for Rhodesia in 1964, he gave all the literature to Nick Vlachopoulos for safekeeping, telling him to “look after it like it is his own eyes.”⁶¹⁶⁶

⁶¹⁶⁴ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶¹⁶⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶¹⁶⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

SYDNEY WILLIAM WIEHAND⁶¹⁶⁷

INTRODUCTION

The following is significant testimony because Sydney Wiehand was one of the messengers who interviewed Tsafendas for employment at Parliament. He described in detail how Tsafendas was appointed. Questioned by Mr. Terblanche and Judge van Wyk, Wiehand stated that he was a senior, permanent messenger and had worked in Parliament for eight years. He said his work consisted of supervising, looking after stores and handling complaints. If he received a complaint, he would take it to his superior, the chief messenger, Mr Burger, who would act on it. Wiehand said he made the rounds of Parliament once a day to ensure that everything was in order.

SYDNEY WIEHAND'S TESTIMONY

Evidence adduced on 5.10.1966

TERBLANCHE: Now, when people are appointed as messengers, or temporary messengers, have you anything to do with it?

WIEHAND: Yes well, we are called in, Sir, the three of us, to see what takes place.

TERBLANCHE: Now, who are "we"?

WIEHAND: We are also given a chance to question these people...

TERBLANCHE: Who are the "three"? You said the "three"?

WIEHAND: The three is Mr, Burger, the Chief Messenger, and the - well, I shouldn't say the "second in charge" but the third in charge is Mr. Schuin, and then myself.

TERBLANCHE: Who?

WIEHAND: S-c-h-u-i-n. And then myself, Sir. That is, the Chief Messenger and his three assistants.

TERBLANCHE: Now, the Chief Messenger - you've now named two assistants?

WIEHAND: Yes, because the other one is not there. He's sick.

⁶¹⁶⁷ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

TERBLANCHE: I see, but usually the three of you?

WIEHAND: Usually it is the three of us, yes.

TERBLANCHE: But when this man Tsafendas was considered, and interviewed, it was only the three of you?

WIEHAND: That's right, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: The Chief Messenger, you yourself and Mr. Schuin.

WIEHAND: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: Why are you, the three assistants, called in by the Chief Messenger?

WIEHAND: That is, if anything happens. Who knows what happens to the Chief - if he's not there one day, that we can take his place. We know exactly what to do. The question is to ask.

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Wiehand, can you remember what questions were put to Tsafendas when he was interviewed?

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir.

VAN WYK: Yes?

WIEHAND: No. I — he must be of sober habits. He must be always neat, and then also we ask him if he's got any sickness, or anything like that, then he must tell us. If so, then he must get a report from the doctor that he is fit for duty. Then we tell him: "The normal hours of working is long, but the work is not hard."

TERBLANCHE: Anything else asked from him?

WIEHAND: Well, then we ask him.

JUDGE VAN WYK: No, but what happened in the case of Tsafendas?

WIEHAND: When he came for an interview, he wasn't taken on straight away.

TERBLANCHE: But were you present when he was interviewed?

WIEHAND: Yes, yes.

TERBLANCHE: Well, what did you ask him then?

WIEHAND: Well, I asked him also about the other places where he had worked -

TERBLANCHE: You asked him where he worked?

WIEHAND: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: And what did he tell you?

WIEHAND: He told me he worked in Durban at some firm there. He worked about eleven months there, or something to that effect.

TERBLANCHE: In Durban?

WIEHAND: In Durban somewhere.

TERBLANCHE: Yes, and what else?

WIEHAND: And he said it was because of a reduction of staff.

TERBLANCHE: Yes?

WIEHAND: Because - of course, then we asked him if he had an unemployment card - Identity Card.

TERBLANCHE: And did he have an unemployment card?

WIEHAND: He had an unemployment card. He had an Identification Certificate, which number -

TERBLANCHE: What is an Identification Certificate?

WIEHAND: Well, it is almost like these papers when you haven't got your Identification Card yet.

TERBLANCHE: I see.

WIEHAND: We took that and compared it with the number on the - his Identity Number on the unemployment card. It corresponded, and then also if he had any references to show to us.

TERBLANCHE: And did he have any references?

WIEHAND: He had some references. There was one —

TERBLANCHE: What were these references?

WIEHAND: They were from different firms -

TERBLANCHE: Pardon?

WIEHAND: From different firms. One or two of them. I just can't remember how many, Sir

-

TERBLANCHE: One or two?

WIEHAND: Yes, and then he had one - I think it was from a school — where he went to school, somewhere in Natal or the Transvaal. I can't remember, Sir. There's such a lot that I see.

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Wiehand, are there any notes kept of these interviews?

WIEHAND: Well, no Sir. The only thing on our records that we keep is a sheet that we make cut with his name, his Identification Number, the date he starts to work, the date he ends -

TERBLANCHE: Is this the type of sheet you are referring to? (Sheet of particulars shown to witness).

WIEHAND: That's right. This is one yes, Sir.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Just identify that?

WIEHAND: This is the one I made out.

TERBLANCHE: What is the annexure number?

WIEHAND: Beg your pardon?

TERBLANCHE: Annexure 'D', page 24, Exhibit 'I'? Yes?

WIEHAND: And then speaking to him, Sir, he said to me he speaks twelve languages, six fluently and six broken, but I never asked him what the languages were. I think if you look underneath, on that form, Sir, you'll see I've made a note there.

TERBLANCHE: Yes, there is a note. It didn't occur to you to ask him what languages he could speak?

WIEHAND: No, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: If he had told you he could speak Russian, would that have made you suspicious?

WIEHAND: Well, then I would have asked him, perhaps. I don't know. The man hadn't any - I mean, the appearance that he had wasn't anything like that. But just out of curiosity, I think, I asked him if he spoke languages, or whether he told me - I can't remember that.

TERBLANCHE: Wasn't it slightly strange for a man who could speak so many languages to - ?

WIEHAND: I did. I commented on it, Sir. I said to him: "It is rather strange that you come here to work as a messenger, whereas you can get a better position as a translator somewhere else? He said to me - then he had - he was a translator, or something, in a Durban Court, or something.

TERBLANCHE: Yes? An interpreter?

WIEHAND: An interpreter, yes.

TERBLANCHE: Yes?

WIEHAND: Then I said to him: "What is the good to come and work here? I mean, you can find a better position? He said, well, he can't find any work at the moment, and he must fill his stomach.

TERBLANCHE: Didn't it strike you as strange that a man of his age, and his ability, should be penniless?

WIEHAND: Well, Sir, the thing is - we get so many of them there, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: So many of what?

WIEHAND: These people. I mean, they've got good qualifications. Their ages count against them.

TERBLANCHE: What was that?

WIEHAND: Their ages count against them. I take it from myself, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Yes?

WIEHAND: When I left my employment, I had to find new employment. I knew I wouldn't be able to -

TERBLANCHE: What are your qualifications?

WIEHAND: My qualification was - I was in charge of a cabinet workshop.

TERBLANCHE: A what?

WIEHAND: A cabinet workshop.

TERBLANCHE: And what are your educational qualifications?

WIEHAND: Well, I went to six, Sir, and then I went to seven, and then I went away and I came back, and I went to the next one higher up, but I don't I ever stayed to pass that -

TERBLANCHE: Yes?

WIEHAND: Well, that was the end of my interview where he was concerned.

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Wiehand, you also had before you, at that time, or didn't you - Annexure "By page 22 of Exhibit "I" Unemployment Insurance?"

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Now, according to that - that is on page 22 - according to that he had been employed by the City of Cape Town, Electrical Department, from the 13th of September, 1965, to the 25th of October, 1965 - a little more than a month, and he'd been employed by "Marine Diamond Corporation" from the 3rd of February, '66, to the 30th of March, 1966. That's for about two months. Didn't that give you a feeling that this man was not, perhaps, a very good worker?

WIEHAND: Well, no Sir. I don't - no, Sir. Not that. We get quite a good few like that.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Who has been from one job to the other?

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir. And they turn out quite good.

TERBLANCHE: You realised that he was going from one job to another?

WIEHAND: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: Did you ask him in what capacity he was employed by these firms?

WIEHAND: No, Sir. The only one about which he actually told me, was the one where he was an interpreter.

TERBLANCHE: At Durban?

WIEHAND: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: And why did he say did he terminate his employment there?

WIEHAND: That I can't remember, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: And did anybody ask him anything about his employment in Cape Town?

WIEHAND: I'm not quite sure, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Did anybody ask him what his Nationality was?

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Who asked him?

WIEHAND: I also asked him that one, and so did my Chief, and my other colleague.

TERBLANCHE: You all three - ?

WIEHAND: Yea.

TERBLANCHE: Why did you all three ask him?

WIEHAND: Well, I mean – we're all there. I take it for granted we've all got the same idea.

TERBLANCHE: Yes, but did only one put the question?

WIEHAND: Well, one put the question, but I mean we would all like to put the same question. Everybody that was there, and he said he was a naturalised South African.

TERBLANCHE: And did he produce any proof that he was a naturalised South African?

WIEHAND: Well, we took it for granted that it was true, because of his identification.

TERBLANCHE: What was his identification?

WIEHAND: The slip that I've told you about, and when we took it and compared it with his unemployment card number.

TERBLANCHE: Didn't you know that foreigners also have identification cards?

WIEHAND: No, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Didn't you know that?

WIEHAND: No, Sir. Not the one that he showed me - the one that he said he was waiting for his card to come. He applied for one.

TERBLANCHE: Yes, but didn't you know that foreigners are also issued with identification cards - ?

WIEHAND: For coming into the country, Sir?

TERBLANCHE: No, no. And when they're here they get a "Persoonskaart" Didn't you know that?

WIEHAND: No, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Are you really qualified then to make these appointments, if you don't even know - ?

WIEHAND: Well, that is why we learn, Sir. We get trained for that.

TERBLANCHE: But how can you be trained, if you're not told that the fact that a person has an identification card is no proof that he is a South African?

WIEHAND: Well, Sir, in one instance we had one young fellow there. He was naturalised. He had his paper. I should say he had a form -

TERBLANCHE: Who was naturalised?

WIEHAND: Well, we had one young fellow there by the name of Barber, but he was a young boy.

TERBLANCHE: What is his name?

WIEHAND: Barber. I took it he should have had the same as that? (Just a minute, Sir. Just let me think). (Witness remains quiet for some seconds).

TERBLANCHE: Why are you taking such a long time? What are you trying to think about?

WIEHAND: No, Sir – the thing is this. He had some papers with him - quite a few. Now that I am thinking about Barber, I think he had a paper similar, to that –

TERBLANCHE: I'll show you another paper here, Mr. Wiehand. Annexure "A," page 21 of Exhibit "I"? Is that the paper you are referring to?

WIEHAND: I think it was something like this, Sir.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but you see, that is no proof that he is a South African. It merely proves that he's got an identification number.

WIEHAND: Yes well, I mean, the man was employed all over the show. I mean, in Cape Town also.

TERBLANCHE: So why couldn't he be a foreigner and employed in Cape Town?

WIEHAND: It could be, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Well, so you only had his word that he was a South African?

WIEHAND: He had the things that we asked for. We asked him if he was naturalised - whether he is a naturalised South African, so he said yes. And then we asked for the -

TERBLANCHE: Why did you ask him whether he was naturalised? Why couldn't he have been born in South Africa?

WIEHAND: No, Sir. According to him - he said he came from Lourenço Marques.

TERBLANCHE: He said he came from Lourenço Marques.

WIEHAND: Yes, so then I asked him. He said, no, he was born in Lourenço Marques, but he was brought up in the Transvaal.

TERBLANCHE: And you asked him whether he was naturalised and he said yes?

WIEHAND: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: And were any further enquiries made to find out whether he was actually naturalised?

WIEHAND: Not that I know of, Sir. It could be. Then it falls out of my hands -

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Wiehand, the making of appointments is really not your concern. You are only present at the interview, in order to learn?

WIEHAND: That is right, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Now, do you know that only South Africans - South African citizens - can be appointed as messengers, or temporary messengers? You know that?

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Now, Mr. Wiehand, after his appointment - or rather, did you afterwards discuss this man between the three of you?

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir. Not after his appointment! Before his appointment.

TERBLANCHE: I mean, after the interview?

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: After he had gone, you three discussed him at length. What was the nature of this discussion that took place between you?

WIEHAND: Sir, we had to take into consideration the way he spoke, his mannerisms, how he dressed, and we couldn't find anything wrong. I mean, according to what we need there, for doing the work, and so forth, and coming into contact with the Members.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Were you ever required to make any check as to whether there was any security risk attached to a particular individual?

WIEHAND: No, Sir. We never had it before.

TERBLANCHE: You were never asked to make sure whether this man was not a security risk?

WIEHAND: No.

TERBLANCHE: You were never asked?

WIEHAND: No.

TERBLANCHE: And that you never discussed?

WIEHAND: We never discussed that, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: As long as he could do the work that he was employed for, that was all that you were concerned with?

WIEHAND: That's right, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Afterwards, did you come into contact with him again, whilst he was working there?

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir when I go on the rounds, checking up each point, asking if there were any complaints, I used to come across him and I would ask him how was he doing, and he'd say, no, he was doing fine, and I asked him if he liked that type of work, and he said yes.

TERBLANCHE: And what impression did he make on you during all this time?

WIEHAND: Well, he was a quiet man. He wasn't the rough type, or anything like that. He was quiet - quietly spoken, well-mannered.

TERBLANCHE: Did he ever tell you anything about his previous history?

WIEHAND: No.

TERBLANCHE: Nothing?

WIEHAND: Nothing.

TERBLANCHE: He never told you about places he went to?

WIEHAND: No.

TERBLANCHE: Where he travelled - ?

WIEHAND: No, I never had the opportunity of speaking to him for so long.

TERBLANCHE: He never mentioned this during the interview -?

WIEHAND: Never. Nothing.

TERBLANCHE: So, that all you knew about him, really, was that he was born in Lourenço Marques?

WIEHAND: Yes, well that he told himself.

TERBLANCHE: That he grew up in the Transvaal, and you didn't know that he had ever left the country at all?

WIEHAND: No.

TERBLANCHE: As far as you were concerned, since he came to the Transvaal, when he was young, he had been in the Republic, ever since?

WIEHAND: Yes.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you not ask him whether he had any previous convictions?

WIEHAND: No.

TERBLANCHE: You didn't ask him what he'd done in all his life? You didn't ask him what he'd done before he was an interpreter, and that sort of thing?

WIEHAND: No, I didn't ask him that.

TERBLANCHE: Nobody else did, either?

WIEHAND: No, Sir. My Chief may have asked him, afterwards.

TERBLANCHE: Did you have a messenger called Carroll - Houses of Parliament, "Carroll"?

WIEHAND: No, Sir. Not as far as I can remember, Sir.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS

SYDNEY WILLIAM WIEHAND'S SECOND STATEMENT TO THE COMMISSION⁶¹⁶⁸

Evidence adduced on 13.10.1966

Sydney William Wiehand: (Duly Sworn, states): (recalled)⁶¹⁶⁹

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Wiehand, you have already given evidence in this?

WIEHAND: Yes, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: Now, it is being alleged here in evidence before the Commission, that a certain complaint was made to you in regard to the way in which Tsafendas did his work as temporary messenger. Is that correct?

WIEHAND: No complaint that I can remember, unless the complaint is that - shall I have to say it in Afrikaans?

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes well, do?

WIEHAND: The complaint - well, I didn't treat that as a complaint. I was told that: "the man stuffs himself with food." It was: "stuffs himself with food, sits and sleeps."

TERBLANCHE: That was Mr. Pienaar, I think?

WIEHAND: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: And he asked you to remove him?

WIEHAND: No, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: He didn't ask you to remove him?

WIEHAND: He didn't. My reply was to him when he said that to me, was: "do not worry, I shall make sure that he is on his feet."

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Wiehand, why didn't you consider that as a complaint?

WIEHAND: Well, I mean there is quite a few of them at lunchtime - they have something to eat and they sit and sleep, until they are ready.

⁶¹⁶⁸ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁶¹⁶⁹ This is Venter's second statement to the COE, the first being on October 5.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Where do they sit and sleep?

WIEHAND: Well, where they have there what's name - meal.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Aren't they on duty then?

WIEHAND: Well, they are actually on duty all the time. There's no off-duty there with us. They have their meals as they can, until such time as when the rush starts, and then they get busy.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And that's quite usual?

WIEHAND: That's quite usual. I myself, Sir, after I have something to eat, and it is not actually time for me to go upstairs, I shut my eyes there, Sir, because I've got to work every night.

TERBLANCHE: But then, what did you mean by saying that you'll see that "he's on his feet"?

WIEHAND: Well, see that he has work, by shifting him to a different position - in between the two positions - then he must work upstairs and he won't get time to sit down,

JUDGE VAN WYK: If he's doing something that is quite usual, and not objectionable, why do you then say you'll do something about it?

WIEHAND: Well, they didn't like it, perhaps, there Sir - or whatever it is. I don't know, but I said that he mustn't worry. I'll see that he gets on his feet, because maybe he is right in the public eye there, because they are right up there on the Gallery.

TERBLANCHE: Now, on the 6th of September, were you on duty in, or close, to the - ?

WIEHAND: The foyer?

TERBLANCHE: Yes?

WIEHAND: I was in the foyer, yes.

TERBLANCHE: You were in the foyer? And what were you doing in the foyer?

WIEHAND: My job is that I must guide the public, and also help the visitors.

TERBLANCHE: Help the visitors to do what?

WIEHAND: That they go in the right direction. That they do not follow their M.P.'s into the Chamber.

TERBLANCHE: So, you had to see that no unauthorised persons went into the Chamber?

WIEHAND: That's right, Sir,

TERBLANCHE: Where were you standing, Mr. Wiehand?

WIEHAND: I was standing at the one pillar near to the passage.

TERBLANCHE: And did you move from there to another?

WIEHAND: No, I stood there all the time. My back was towards the Chamber and my face was towards the big doors.

TERBLANCHE: Weren't you supposed to move up to the one side of the screen at a certain stage?

WIEHAND: I'll move when the bell stops ringing, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: When the bell stops ringing?

WIEHAND: Then before I move from there I'll ask for silence, and then I move to the walk in between the wall and the screen to stop any member from entering the Chamber while the Speaker's procession is coming along.

TERBLANCHE: But before you move there, do you watch the door to the Chamber to see that nobody - no unauthorised person enters?

WIEHAND: Well, now and again I look that way, Sir. If I see strange faces there, you always follow their movements.

TERBLANCHE: Now, I want to put this to you, Mr. Wiehand, if you had seen Tsafendas entering the Chamber at that stage, would you have done anything about it?

WIEHAND: No, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: I take it the reason being the same as the others have testified to, that any messenger can enter the Chamber at that time?

WIEHAND: That is right, Sir.

TERBLANCHE: And no check is kept on the messengers to see that they, are in fact, taking messages to members, etc.?

WIEHAND: No, Sir. Sometimes these messages are given at the last minute.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS-WITNESS EXCUSED

GORDON WINTER'S STATEMENT TO THE COMMISSION⁶¹⁷⁰

This is s statement by Gordon Winter, a reporter employed by POST newspapers in their offices at 14 Upper Darling Street, Cape Town.

I, Gordon Winter, swear on oath that the following statement by me is completely true:

Monday, September 26, 1966, I visited Mr. Omar Vallie, aged 65, at his cafe, "The Star Cafe" in Tennant Street, District Six, Cape Town. I asked Omar Vallie if he was the father of one Isak Vallie. Omar Vallie said he was the father of Isak. I asked Omar Vallie to direct me to Isak. Omar told me that Isak was working. I asked Omar to give a message to Isak. I asked Omar to tell Isak that I wished to speak to him. I gave Omar my telephone number at work (25601 Cape Town) and asked him to tell Isak to telephone me. Omar said he would do this.

Next day, on Tuesday, September 27, 1966, a man telephoned me. He said his name was Isak Vallie. I told him that I wished to interview him in connection with rumours which I had heard concerning Demetrio Tsafendas, the alleged assassin of Dr. Verwoerd. Isak told me that he would talk to me but not on the telephone. I asked Isak where he was speaking from. He said a shop in Upper Darling Street. I went to this shop and met Isak Vallie. I told him that I had heard a rumour that he had met a man named Tsafendas. I said I understood that Tsafendas had described himself as a Russian sailor (To Isak Vallie). Isak told me that this was true.

Isak then told me that Demitrio Tsafendas had entered his father's cafe in Tennant Street, at about 10:30 one morning about three or four weeks before the death of Dr. Verwoerd. Isak said he had been present when Tsafendas sat down in the cafe and was offered a cup of tea by his father (Mr. Omar Vallie.) Isak told me that Tsafendas had spoken of liking Indian food. Isak told me that Tsafendas had laboured this point and that he, Tsafendas had asked how the food was cooked. Isak told me that he was of the opinion, at the time, that Tsafendas was trying to "scrounge" free food.

⁶¹⁷⁰ Gordon Winter's statement to the COE, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12. File: die Post aangeleentheid, NASA.

Isak told me that Tsafendas had said he was off a Russian ship and that he was from Russia. Isak said Tsafendas had spoken of living in Woodstock. Isak said Tsafendas had spoken of looking for a job. Isak said he was behind the service hatch at one point when he saw Tsafendas talking to a man named "Berny." Isak said he had later heard Tsafendas tell "Berny" that he, Tsafendas, had had "dealings" with Russian fishing vessels off the coast of Walvis Bay. I asked Isak how this subject had been broached. Isak said, and I quote him, "He volunteered the information that he had had dealings with the Russian ships. He (Tsafendas) said he had changed clothes for food." (I took it that he meant Tsafendas changed clothes for food with the Russian fishermen.)

I then asked Isak to introduce me to his father, Omar Vallie. Isak walked with me from the shop in Upper Darling Street, and took me to his father's cafe in Tennant Street. There, I asked Omar Vallie if he had met Tsafendas. Omar Vallie said he had done so. Omar Vallie confirmed exactly what his son Isak had told me with one exception. Omar Vallie told me that he had not heard Tsafendas talk about having dealings with Russian fishermen in Walvis Bay. At this point, a man who I was later to learn was Isak's brother, Sulaiman Vallie, entered the cafe. He was introduced to me. He then joined the conversation.

I then told Omar Vallie and his two sons, Isak and Sulaiman, that I intended publishing their story in POST. They said they did not want the story in POST. I persuaded them to let me publish the story when I explained that the Prime Minister had suggested that any person having information, however trivial, about Tsafendas, should come forward. Isak told me, in front of his brother Sulaiman and his father, Omar Vallie, that the family had not reported the matter to the police. Isak said: "No, we were scared of getting involved because my brother and I have had problems with the Security Branch in the past and we were afraid we might be suspected of being mixed up with Tsafendas...."

Isak then told me that Sulaiman had just finished serving a 12-month jail sentence in connection with the possession of explosives. Isak said Sulaiman had been released from jail in early August. Isak also said he had been involved with the Security Branch some time ago in connection with the smuggling of letters from prisoners on Robben Island. Isak said he had been questioned by Security Branch men who had also visited the shop where he works. I remember that Isak said something about the shop address being used as a "cover" address.

I asked Omar Vallie and Isak Vallie how they knew for sure that the man who came into their cafe was, in fact, Demetrio Tsafendas. The two men told me that they had

recognised Tsafendas's photograph in the newspapers just after the murder of Dr. Verwoerd. They said they were quite positive about their identification of Tsafendas and that "Berny" had also identified Tsafendas. I asked if I could interview "Berny." Isak sent someone to look for "Berny" I gather, because shortly afterwards a little boy entered the cafe and spoke to Isak. Isak immediately told me that "Berny" was not at home. I dropped the idea of speaking to "Berny" because I was satisfied that Omar and Isak Vallie were telling me the truth. I could see no reason why they should be lying about meeting Tsafendas because they had already indicated that they did not want the matter publicised. I asked Mr. Omar Vallie to pose for a picture. He refused and I was unable to persuade him to pose. I asked Isak to pose and he refused. I finally persuaded him to pose and I took several pictures of him in the doorway of the cafe. In the background of my pictures the figure of his brother can be seen, (his face is clear and proves that he was present when I took the pictures.)

Isak does not know that his brother Sulaiman is also in the picture, I should imagine, so it would be interesting to see if he, Isak, admits that his brother Sulaiman was present when I took the photographs.) Omar Vallie was rather unhappy about me taking pictures but his son Isak talked him into letting me publish the pictures and my story. The old man (Omar) made it clear that he was worried in case the police were, "suspicious" about the family connection with Tsafendas. I pointed out that it was better for the family to admit knowing Tsafendas, rather than face the possibility, that Tsafendas might, conceivably, mention that he knew them (in court evidence). This point was made by me to influence the Vallie family into letting me publish their story. Isak grabbed at this and said to his father that it would "look bad" if Tsafendas stated in court that he knew the Vallie family. Omar Vallie agreed that if he was a policeman he would also be suspicious.

At about 3 p.m. Isak Vallie came into my office on the third floor of Qranje House, 14 Upper Darling Street. He asked me NOT to publish the article about his family having met Tsafendas... I immediately realised that the family were getting worried of possible repercussions. With this in mind I carefully read through my notes of my interview and asked Isak Vallie if they were correct. Isak confirmed that my notes were correct and he substantiated everything I had written. This is very important because two others were present in the office when I read my notes to Isak Vallie. The two men were; MR. MIKE NORTON, Cape Editor of POST and Mr. David ANDREWS, a freelance reporter, for POST.

I talked to Isak Vallie at length and persuaded him to let me publish the article. When he left the office I made a careful point of asking Mr. Norton and Mr. Andrews to remember that Isak had quite clearly confirmed my notes of my interview with him. I pointed out that Isak Vallie might possibly deny my article after it was published. (I have experienced this dozens of times in the last six years while I have worked in South Africa as a journalist.) Earlier in the day I had asked Isak to sign a statement permitting me to publish my article just in case he DID try to deny it.)

On my return to my office I asked Mr. Norton to witness this by placing his initial to it. He did so. It would be interesting to discover if Isak Vallie DENIES having signed this piece of paper. Next day, on Wednesday, September 28, Isak Vallie came into my office again. He again asked me not to print the article. Mr. Norton was present during this interview. I had already written my article and I allowed Isak Vallie to read it in the presence of Mr. Norton. After Isak Vallie had read the article I made a special note of asking him (Isak Vallie) if I had made any mistakes. He said my article was 100% correct and factual but he asked me to delete the mention I had made of his being questioned by the Security Branch in connection with the smuggling of letters from prisoners on Robben Island.

I asked Isak Vallie why he wished me to delete this part. He said he was worried about the Security Branch. I pointed out to him that the Security Branch ALREADY knew about this because he had been questioned by them— so why should he worry? The logic of this baffled Isak and he agreed, rather reluctantly, to let me leave this in. Isak asked me not to publish his picture. I also talked him out of continuing in this vein by stating that I would telephone Johannesburg to request that his picture be held out. (In all truth, I misled Isak and had no intention of telephoning Johannesburg to make this request.) Before Isak left my office I made quite certain that he again confirmed the accuracy of my article— in Mr. Norton's presence. Isak definitely agreed that my article was completely factual.

When Isak had gone I asked Mr. Norton to keep the matter fresh in his mind because I said I was convinced that Isak would deny my story later. Today, October 5, 1966, I was telephoned by Sergeant van Wyk of the Security Branch. He asked me to visit him in his office. I did so at 3 pm. Mr. van Wyk told me that he had taken an affidavit from Isak and also an affidavit from Omar. Mr. van Wyk asked me to give him my version. I gave Mr. van Wyk all the details and showed him the signed permission to publish by Isak Vallie. Mr. van Wyk was quite clearly doubtful about my side of the story. I asked him point-blank if he believed

me or if he believed the two Vallie men. Mr. van Wyk made no bones about it. He said he believed the two Vallie men. I asked him why. He replied "I have two affidavits." I then offered to make an affidavit. Mr. van Wyk said he was "not interested." I explained how I had talked to Isak Vallie, and gone through my interview again, in the presence of Mr. Norton—and that I would ask Mr. Norton to sign an affidavit supporting me. Mr. van Wyk said he was "not interested." Mr. van Wyk said he had "completed his investigations into the matter" and that he intended to hand the "file" over to Mr. Justice J.T. van Wyk, who is heading the COE into Dr. Verwoerd's death.

I pointed out to Mr. van Wyk that his "file" would be rather one-sided if he did not include my affidavit and the affidavits-of my witnesses. I also pointed out that I would like him (Mr. van Wyk) to take a statement from Sulaiman Vallie to see if it checked with what Isak Vallie and Omar Vallie had said. Mr. van Wyk replied: "That is a waste of time. Sulaiman would only tell the same story as his father and brother." I pointed out to Mr. van Wyk that I thought him clever enough to find out if Sulaiman's version was true or not. But Mr. van Wyk again repeated that he had closed his investigation and that he was "not interested" in seeing Sulaiman. I asked Mr. van Wyk to call in Sulaiman Vallie and let me question Sulaiman in his (Mr. van Wyk's) presence. Mr. van Wyk said he was not interested in doing this. I asked Mr. van Wyk if he would believe me if I made an affidavit. In the presence of a witness, Mr. van Wyk replied: "No." I then pointed out that Mr. van Wyk was clearly of the opinion that I would lie on oath and that this was defamatory of myself.

At this point the witness, I think he is also a Security Branch man, walked away. During my interview with Mr. van Wyk I told him that I had not written the Tsafendas article simply for sensationalism. I told Mr. van Wyk that I was of the opinion, after speaking to Isak and Omar Vallie, that I was entitled to think the matter of some importance — even if later it was to be ascertained that Tsafendas was merely lying to the two Vallie men. Mr. van Wyk made a great play on my use of my phrase "I was of the opinion" and he told me; "You are not entitled to write your opinion." I take strong exception to Mr. van Wyk's attitude in this whole matter and for this reason, I submit this sworn statement.

Signed ... Gordon Winter

Agreed to & witnessed ... (Indecipherable name)

Agreed to & witnessed... (Indecipherable name)

6/10/1966

The following is part of the second statement by Gordon Winter to the Commission. This is only the second page of the statement as its first page was not found at the archives.

GORDON WINTER'S SECOND STATEMENT TO THE COMMISSION⁶¹⁷¹

I asked Isak if he wished me to delete this part. He said he did because he was "worried" about the Security Branch. I pointed out to Isak that the Security Branch already knew because they had questioned him on the matter so why should I leave that out of the story? The logic of this appeared to bemuse Isak because he then reluctantly, allowed me to leave it in.

Isak asked me not to publish a photograph of him. I told him that it was rather late because my firm printed its Cape edition on Wednesday. But I told Isak that I would put a telephone call through to Johannesburg and ask them not to use the photograph. Isak appeared satisfied by this and after some discussion - during which I said he must not be afraid of the Security Branch (if he was tailing the truth) Isak agreed that the story be published. He left us with the impression he was not happy about the publication of the story however and that he had been "talked into it" by me.

Just before he left I again got him to confirm that my article, as read by him, was factual. In Mr. Norton's presence, Isak agreed that my story was completely correct. When Isak had left the office I asked Mr. Norton to keep the matter fresh in his mind because, I said, I was convinced Isak would deny my story when he read it in the newspaper. Norton asked me if I intended telephoning Johannesburg to ask them to take out the photograph of Isak. I told Mr. Norton that I was not going to make the request and that when I made this remark to Isak, I had had no intention of doing so.

I wrote my article in good faith, firmly believing that I was entitled to bring the matter into the open. It may be ascertained that Tsafendas, if he did make the statements as alleged by Omar and Isak Vallie (to me), was deliberately telling them lies. On the other hand he may

⁶¹⁷¹ Gordon Winter statement to the COE, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12. File: die Post aangeleentheid, NASA.

not have been. I was of the opinion, when I wrote my article, that this was a matter for the police to thrash out. I would like, at this stage, to make it quite clear that I realised the Security Branch would approach me- after the publication of my story. I pointed this out to Mr. Norton BEFORE the article was published. For this reason, I submit that it is clear that I could hardly have fabricated the statements which Omar and Isak Vallie have now repudiated.

Signed ... Gordon Winter

Agreed to as correct as far as I am concerned.... M. Norton.

Agreed-to as-correct as far as I am concerned ... (indecipherable name)

Cape Town. 12.10.66.

Sworn to before me at Cape Town this 12th day of October 1977.

D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505. Commissioner of Oaths.

PIET BESTER BURGER⁶¹⁷²

Questioned by: Mr. Terblanche

Date: 13/10/1966

Mr. Burger is the head messenger at the Assembly. He worked there for almost twenty-three years at the time of the case and accordingly, he interviewed Demitrios Tsafendas for a messenger position at the Assembly. Burger approved Tsafendas for the position and appointed him. There were two colleagues, Piet Schuin and Sydney Wiehand, who were present when Burger conducted the interview. These two colleagues were always

⁶¹⁷² Piet Bester Burger testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

present when conducting interviews for the reason being that if they notice something about the person being interviewed, they could bring it to Burger's attention.

The messengers have to not only deliver messages but they must also stand at the entrance of the National Assembly when the First Minister passes by. These messengers stand there to close the door when the Speaker and his procession enter the National Assembly. Burger and his colleagues, an assistant and two seniors, are responsible for stopping any unauthorized person from entering the boardroom where the Assembly is held. Once the Speaker and his procession have entered the boardroom, only certain messengers may be inside the boardroom.

However, before the Speaker and his procession have entered the boardroom, any messengers, even temporary messengers, were able to be inside the room. The press or the private secretary often used temporary messengers to quickly deliver a message inside the boardroom. It was assumed that the messengers always had a message to deliver if they were seen inside the boardroom before the meeting begin, but, as soon as the Speaker and his procession entered the room, Burger ensured that only the allowed messengers are present inside. Thus, concerning the messengers, there was no control over who entered and left the room before the Speaker and his procession.

Burger stood on the second step to look over the assembly and to see that no one enters the boardroom who was not allowed. Next to Burger stood a temporary messenger, whom Mr. Burger himself called from the reading room. This messenger stopped any members of the Assembly from leaving before the procession. There was a screen where Burger stood to meet the Speaker. Burger and Wiehand were both there on the 6th of September. Burger had not seen Tsafendas on that day.

Dr. Verwoerd was going to speak at the Assembly, so many members stood outside to finish their cigarettes because they knew they were going to be inside for a long time. The door to the room was still open even when the bells rang. The corridor to the room was closed when the Speaker left his office.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Nothing in the remaining testimony is relevant to Tsafendas or the assassination.

PETRUS ROBERT SAMUEL SCHUIN⁶¹⁷³

Questioned by: Mr. Terblanche

Date: 13/10/1966

Mr. Schuin was a head messenger at the parliament. He had been working there since September, 1953; a total of thirteen years. Schuin only reached standard 6 at school, after which he joined the parliament, working under Mr. Burger. On the 6th of September, Schuin was on duty and declared that by the time he entered the boardroom, Dr. Verwoerd was already seated.

He also declared that he saw Tsafendas as he was coming up to the table of the Assembly. Tsafendas was more or less at the head of the table of the Assembly by the time Schuin saw him. This occurrence, not being anything strange to Schuin, he noticed him and knew that it was his duty to be there if there would be any message to deliver and was expecting that Tsafendas would have a message for him (Schuin). The Parliament was not in sitting, nor has the Speaker and his procession arrived yet. Schuin was on the right-hand side of the speakers' chair and saw what happened.

Mr. Schuin noticed, during Tsafendas's interview, that there was nothing out of the ordinary about him. He noticed that Tsafendas was the same as any other person that had worked there.

CAPTAIN MARX⁶¹⁷⁴

Cape Town, 13 October 1966.

On 5.3.1964, Sergeant Warrant Officer Bezuidenhout and I received a letter from Mr. Howard of the Department of Home Affairs. This letter as I could remember, was directed to the Honourable Minister of Home Affairs and written by Tsafendas. It was about bribery in respect of the issuance of passports. The author acted as informer and had no self-complaint.

⁶¹⁷³ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁶¹⁷⁴ Captain Marx statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File VDSO 17-64, NASA.

The persons named in the letter were spoken to by Sergeant Warrant Officer Bezuidenhout, in the presence of the informer. They both denied that they had paid bribes to any person. A letter was written by me on 03/20/1964 to the secretary of Home Affairs, Pretoria, and read as follows:

Attached letter addressed to his honourable, the minister of Home Affairs, was handed to Captain Marx by Mr. J. Howard on 03/05/1964. The author was interviewed and an investigation was made, but no evidence could be obtained to connect any person with his allegations. The persons who are claimed by the writer of the letter, to have the bribes, were questioned in his presence but denied the allegations. No file was opened in this regard, as no specific complaint could be found. As far as can be remembered, the accusation was that the two people who were spoken to, paid bribes to officials at the Department of Home Affairs. This information is largely supplied from memory as little supporting documentary proof is available.

HANNO PROBST⁶¹⁷⁵

C/o Mangete Catholic Mission Station. Mangete Zululand

I am a European male born in Germany and am at present the Priest in charge of the Mangete Catholic Mission station in Zululand. Sometime during 1965, I cannot remember the exact date, but it must have been during June, I went to the town of Mandini to collect mail and do some purchases at the Mandini store. At the Mandini store, as I emerged I noticed a person, who appeared to me to be a coloured, sitting on a bench in front of the store. I noticed that this person's one arm was wrapped in bandage and as he looked rather lost, I approached him to find out whether I could be of any assistance. I immediately realised that this person was not a South African because of his dark complexion and general appearance. I even told him that he was not a South African but that he came from Mozambique. He appeared to be much surprised at this remark I passed and asked me how I knew he came from Mozambique. I told him that I had travelled a lot and knew, by his appearance that he

⁶¹⁷⁵ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

was actually a Mozambique citizen. This person thereupon informed me that he too, had done much travelling and that he could speak eight different languages.

I tried him out in different languages and found that he could speak Spanish, Czech, Italian, German, the Munich Dialect of German and English fluently. During our conversation he also mentioned to me that he had been to Germany and actually stated that he had visited Munich in Germany. Because very few people in South Africa can speak or understand the Munich Dialect of German I spoke to him in this dialect. I was surprised to hear that he could speak this dialect so well. I gained the impression that this person was very well trained in the different languages and I actually said to him that he must have had very good teacher in Moscow to be able to speak the different languages so well. To my surprise he admitted have been in Moscow.

During our conversation, this person asked me to what church I belonged apparently because he recognised me as a priest. I informed him that I was attached to the Roman Catholic Church. He then suddenly started to swear at the Roman Catholic Church and also at the Portuguese Government in Mozambique, stating that the Nuns in Mozambique Hospitals inject the natives to get rid of them and that the Portuguese Government approves of this. I became annoyed at his groundless accusation and told him that he was a communist and that he reacted like a Zimba of the Congo. I told him what the Catholic Church does for the natives and that it definitely not to get rid of them, but on the contrary to help them. I told him that we have a law against Communists in this country and that he would not get far in South Africa and that it would be better if he returned to Mozambique. I then left him. This person did not introduce himself to me and at that stage I did not know what his name was or where he was employed.

The following morning I again went to Mandini. As I had given the matter thought (I refer to my meeting with the European the previous day) I decided to bring the matter to the attention of the security officer at Mendini Paper Factory (SAPPI). I spoke to a Mr. van Vuuren at this Factory and told him what had transpired between me and the other person the previous day. I told Mr. van Vuuren that this man was a Communist and a dangerous person. I did not know who he was because he did not introduce himself to me but I gave Mr. van Vuuren a description of him. I cannot remember that I pointed him out to Mr. van Vuuren at his office. I can however, recollect that this person told me during our conversation that he worked for Roberts construction at Mendini.

After the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, I heard on the radio that the assassin was of Portuguese origin and that he could speak eight different languages. Mention was also made of the fact that he used to work at Mandeni. I immediately realised then that the person I had occasion to meet at the Mandini Store must be the assassin, I have seen this man only once, on this particular day at the Mandini store and never again. After the murder of Dr. Verwoerd I saw a photo of the alleged assassin in some newspapers and recognised the man of which the photo was published, as the same person I had spoken to at the Mandeni store. The name of this person was given in the newspapers as Demetrios Tsafendas.

On a certain day, subsequent to my meeting with Tsafendas at the Mandini Store, I spoke to Coloured male Gladstone Dunn who resides in the Mangete Reserve. I mentioned the incidence at the store to him and also gave him a description of Demetrios Tsafendas. He then informed me that the same man had on one occasion visited him and had stayed with him overnight. I have not seen Demtrios Tsafendas in the Mangete Reserve or at any other place, except Mandini on that one occasion. I however suspect that he must have had some influence on the inhabitants of the Mangete Reserve. I say this because, during the period Demetrios Tsafendas stayed at Mandini, the youngsters in the Mangete Reserve became unruly end aggressive. This, however, is only suspicion because since the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd everything became quiet again and the youngsters controllable. I have reported the incidence with Demetrios Tsafendas only to Mr. van Vuuren at the Mandini Paper Factory. I have not reported to the South African Police or to any individual Policeman. The first time I have mentioned the incidence to the South African Police was on 9.9.1965 when I was approached by D/Sergt. Els of the Security Police Empangeni to whom I have made a statement.

Mangete. 13.10.1966 at 11.30 am.

Statement taken by me ... (Indecipherable name) Captain

MAJOR DANIEL JACOBUS ROSSOUW⁶¹⁷⁶

Testimony taken 14.10. 1966

Daniel Jacobus Rossouw (Declared under Oath):

Questioned by Mr. Terblanche and Judge van Wyk

TERBLANCHE: Major Rossouw, are you the Chief of the Security Police in Cape Town?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes I am.

TERBLANCHE: Were you also here in the Cape from 1962?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No, I started here on the 26th of September 1963.

TERBLANCHE: What was your rank at that time?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Captain.

TERBLANCHE: Was a certain Captain Rossouw here before you?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes, a Captain Rossouw was here some years, but I cannot remember exactly which years they were.

TERBLANCHE: Who was that?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Brigadier – he is now Brigadier Rossouw.

TERBLANCHE: And you did not take over from him?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No.

JUDGE VAN WYK: What is your rank now?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Major

TERBLANCHE: Do you know someone by the name of Hendrik Mulder?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes

TERBLANCHE: He claims that he spoke to a Captain Rossouw last year.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes I do remember someone by that name calling me last year.

⁶¹⁷⁶ Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

TERBLANCHE: What did he say to you? Why did he call you?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: He called me on two occasions. The first time he wanted to report that he had overheard two Coloured people working in a factory in Paarden Island discussing how to kill the children of the Security Police and even how to kill the Police. On the second occasion he told me that his wife had run away and asked me to help him find her.

TERBLANCHE: Did you investigate the first report Major?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes, and it was found to be groundless.

TERBLANCHE: Did he call you on any other occasion?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No.

TERBLANCHE: Did he ever tell you that certain people had told him that the Prime Minister would be killed and that he had told you about this?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: I have no knowledge of this whatsoever

TERBLANCHE: He never said this to you?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No he never said that to me.

TERBLANCHE: Do you know someone called Nagel?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: At the moment he lives in Port Elizabeth – I do not know his rank - No I do not know this person.

TERBLANCHE: Did anyone call you after the death of the Prime Minister and tell you, “Major (or Captain) Mulder told you that this would happen” and that you replied that you do recall something like that?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No I deny this – I know nothing about this.

TERBLANCHE: I want to move on to something else now - in your investigation did you find certain evidence about certain parcels for Tsafendas at the Post Office?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes, this was brought to my attention during the investigation from the Woodstock Police that a Mrs “Taizer” had handed him a document. A member of the police brought this slip to my office at my request and I then sent a staff member to retrieve the parcel from the Post Office and found that it was not a parcel but a letter – a pamphlet containing Bible texts.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Where is the pamphlet now?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: I gave it to Tsafendas.

TERBLANCHE: Can you recall the origin of the letter?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes, it came from America.

TERBLANCHE: Can you remember who sent it?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No, but I wrote it down and it is in my office.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Was this handed over to a Code expert to determine whether it contained a code?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No I examined it myself and am confident that there was no code in at all Your Honour.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes but even though it was a printed document it could still have been in code?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: True, but I found several more of these texts addressed to him and am satisfied that none of them were in code – they were just Bible texts with the quotations from the verses of the Bible

JUDGE VAN WYK: You are aware that the Bible is often used for code purposes, the order of the texts and so on?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes I am perfectly aware of that, but in this case I am certain this is not the case. I deal with these matters frequently and am confident that in this case there were no codes in the pamphlets.

TERBLANCHE: Was the name of the sender perhaps Barandella?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No. The name Barandella is known to me and it is not Barandella. This was someone in America – I cannot recall it now

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes but there is also a Barandella in America

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No I am not aware of this.

JUDGE VAN WYK: There is a Barandella.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: The Barandella of whom I know is a young Coloured girl.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes she has an uncle in America

MAJ. ROSSOUW: I am not aware of that Your Honour. I will be able to find out the name for you.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes I should like to see those pamphlets which you found

MAJ. ROSSOUW: If Tsafendas still has them. I do not know whether he still has them because we gave them to him shortly after his arrest and I think he has nothing with him in the cell but I shall try to determine whether he still has them.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes it will be better that the Commission should see it.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Certainly I shall do my best to get hold of this but I really do not know that it will be available.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Are you the person who took a declaration from Tsafendas in the prison cell?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes I took a declaration from him.

TERBLANCHE: Did you question him later?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes I did and wrote the questions and the answers.

JUDGE VAN WYK: What language did you use with him?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: English.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And was it read out to him afterwards?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did he admit everything

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes and he was satisfied and signed it.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you get the impression that what he said was the truth or did you think that sometimes he was sly?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: I thought that he told the truth. I never got the impression that he tried to evade any question. He answered all the questions spontaneously.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Was he totally prepared to answer everything?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes

JUDGE VAN WYK: What was your impression – how does he feel about his deed? Does he regret it, or is he indifferent about it or did he not show any obvious emotion about it?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: I shall answer you to the best of my ability – when I originally questioned him I accused him of being a horrible murderer. To which he answered, “That is what you think, but the world thinks differently!” At a later stage I asked him whether he regretted his deed yet and he answered that he did feel remorse and that he was very sorry about what he had done.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Another thing is that there is a lot of evidence that on the Friday morning BEFORE the murder people had been running back and forth screaming to one another that Dr. Verwoerd had been murdered – are you aware of this?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes I am aware of that.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you come across anyone who had said that he had been told about the plan by Tsafendas?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No he denies this strenuously. I have asked him repeatedly whether he had told anyone of his plan to murder the Prime Minister and he had always specifically said that he had never told anyone about this.

JUDGE VAN WYK: All the statements thus far have concurred that he did not drink, but one person stated that sometimes he would drink a whole bottle after which he became very talkative. Are you aware of any of this?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: He always told me that he did not drink at all; although I have come across one or two who said that they had seen him drink beer.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Have the Security Police ever found old Communist member lists dating from the 1940's?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: No I am not aware that such lists have been found. I do know that with the Rivonia trial such lists were found but they were new lists, not the old ones.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Around 1953 when the anti-Communist Act was promulgated, and the Communist Party was banned and even before then, the police did have documents relating to it and I wonder if they still exist and whether it would be possible to find them.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes although I was obviously not attached to the Security Police when the Communist Party was banned, but we do possess old files which should indicate whether there are such name lists of members.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Tsafendas said that he was a member for ten years from 1936 and I should want to obtain those old files.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes I shall investigate whether I can find such old files. But we also compiled files on all the people who were brought to our attention and if any such files contained his name then we would have opened a file on him and we do not have such a file, not locally in the Cape.

JUDGE VAN WYK: No not just in Cape Town – he would not have been a member here – but the liquidator of the Communist Party would have such a complete list of all Communists.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes we do possess those lists and I shall investigate this and bring the information to you.

TERBLANCHE: Is Evidence “T” which is a photocopy, the first statement that you took from him?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: Is Evidence “U” the other further questioning that you conducted with him?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes.

Handed in as evidence.

TERBLANCHE: Major there is a memorandum here that you presented in which the name of the person who sent the registered letter to is “Vaughan A. Tomkins”?

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes that is the name.

TERBLANCHE: Of “38 Walnut Street, Arlington F.4, Massachusetts, U.S.A.?”

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Yes.

COMMENTS ON MAJOR ROSSOUW’S TESTIMONY

This is a very important testimony as Major Rossouw was the police officer who questioned Tsafendas while in custody. Major Rossouw was not a psychiatrist, but he was a senior police officer, with extensive experience of questioning prisoners, and thus a natural choice as Tsafendas’s lead interrogator. As such, he must certainly have been able to tell whether

Tsafendas could follow a conversation for more than fifteen minutes, whether he talked in a disjointed manner or suffered from thought-blocking. These were the characteristics imputed to Tsafendas in court, in effect that he was someone who could not answer questions or gave vague or irrelevant responses. However, Rossouw made no mention of any such issues in his testimony, saying instead that Tsafendas did not evade any questions and replied spontaneously to everything he was asked, while this was after he interrogated Tsafendas for many hours on several separate occasions.

More to the point, Rossouw got the impression that Tsafendas told the truth. It is important here to look at compatibility. What Tsafendas told Rossouw is compatible with what he told several witnesses before and after the assassination; it is also compatible with the evidence gathered by the police. However, it is not compatible with what was heard in the court about him or the way he was described by the Commission, particularly in regard to his motive for killing Dr. Verwoerd. However, as we will see, although the Commission was in possession of Tsafendas's statements to the police and the testimony of the officer who questioned Tsafendas and recorded those statements, its Report ignored what Tsafendas had to say about his motive. Instead the Commission turned to speculation, presenting a quite inaccurate and obscure picture of what it purported to believe was his motive.

A very important issue discussed by the Commission and Rossouw concerned the reported exchanges about Dr. Verwoerd's death at the *Eleni*. The Commission asked him,

“Another thing is that there is a lot of evidence that on the Friday morning BEFORE the murder, people had been running back and forth screaming to one another that Dr. Verwoerd had been murdered – are you aware of this?”

It is clear the Commission attached great importance to this incident. Rossouw replied that he knew of the incident but was unable to shed any light on it as Tsafendas denied that he had discussed his plans with anyone and he had no other information. The Major was telling the truth because most of those involved in the conversation were no longer in South Africa but had sailed on the *Eleni*. The South African police would subsequently question all the *Eleni* sailors and find out why and how this discussion had taken place that Friday morning. However, their evidence would be omitted from the Report and instead the Commission would speculate fruitlessly about what might have taken place when the sailors had told the police exactly what happened.

Another important aspect of Rossouw's testimony is that he makes no mention of the tapeworm. Indeed, nowhere in his testimony does he say anything to suggest that he thought Tsafendas to be insane, quite the opposite. As for the tapeworm, if Tsafendas believed he had a tapeworm and this had something to do with the assassination, would he not have told Rossouw, who questioned him so many times?

A final issue highlighted by Major Rossouw is that Tsafendas not only failed to show any remorse about the killing, but appeared to be happy and proud of it. When Rossouw accused him of being "a horrible murderer," Tsafendas replied, "That is what you think, but the world thinks differently." This remark clearly reflects Tsafendas's conviction that several people in South Africa and around the world would see his action as he saw it, namely as the justifiable killing of a tyrant.

OMARJEE VALLIE⁶¹⁷⁷

Indian male, owner of the Star Café in Cape Town.

About three to four weeks before Dr. Verwoerd was murdered, I was standing in my café when I noticed a white man standing outside in the street. He stood there for some time and I then called him inside. He entered the café and I offered him a cup of tea. While he was drinking the tea I asked him where he came from and he told me that he came here with a steamer. I asked him what kind of a steamer and he told me a Russian Steamer. I then asked him when and he told me a long time ago. He then told me he was staying in Woodstock and that he was looking for a job. Some customers then entered the shop and I attended them. The white man finished the tea and left the café without saying anything.

After the murder, I saw a photo in a newspaper and identified it as the photo of the man who was in my café. The name underneath the photo was given as Demetrio Tsafendas. My son, Isaac Vallie, was not in the café at the time but when I saw the photo in the paper I told him that I gave this man Tsafendas a cup of tea. About a week ago, a reporter of the "Post" called at the Café and my son Isaac then told him what happened. I was present when my son talked to the reporter. He never told the reporter that we overheard Tsafendas talking

⁶¹⁷⁷ Omarjee Vallie statement to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12. File: die Post aangeleentheid, NASA.

to another man, telling him that he had dealings with seamen from Russian fishing vessels. I never knew Tsafendas was working at S.W.A. or Walvis Bay. Tsafendas never talked to anybody while he was in the café. I only had the conversation with him because when I saw him outside, I thought he was a member of the C.I.D. looking for somebody. The reporter never asked me whether I made a report to the police and I never told him that I did not report it because the police will have suspicions about him meeting my family.

I never reported Mr Tsafendas's visit to my shop to the police because I did not think that his visit could help them in their investigations. To me it seems silly to use the words "Tsafendas posed as Russian sailor" because nothing of that sort was ever said by Tsafendas and it was also never mentioned during the conversation with the reporter. The fact that Tsafendas told me that he came to the Republic on a "Russian steamer" does not mean that he said he was a sailor on a Russian ship and the reporter was never given to understand that it was the case.

Statement taken by ... (Indecipherable name) D/Sgt.

ISAAC VALLIE⁶¹⁷⁸

I am an adult Indian man living at 1 Greatmore Street, Woodstock. I have just been shown the newspaper "POST" by the Police. The person Demitrio Tsafendas is totally unknown to me. I was not in my father's café on the day when, it is alleged, he came in to drink a cup of tea. I am indeed aware of the report which appears in the Post newspaper. About 14 days ago I did have a conversation with someone who works for Post and told him that my father told me that Tsafendas was in our café once. About a week ago Mr. Gordon Winter, a reporter at the Post came to see my father and I and I did talk to him then after he said that he wanted to write a story about Tsafendas. That was when I told him that my father says that a white man, whose photo he had seen in a newspaper was recognized by him as Tsafendas; this was about 3 weeks before the murder of the late Dr. Verwoerd. He was standing in front of our café and my father invited him inside and served him with tea. Upon my father's question about where he lived, he answer that he lived in Woodstock and that he had arrived

⁶¹⁷⁸ Isaac Vallie statement to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12. File: die Post aangeleentheid, NASA.

in the Republic of SA from a Russian ship. I did not Mr... (The second page of the statement is missing).

WILLEM NEL VISSER⁶¹⁷⁹

No.29097 Sergeant.

I am a sergeant in the South African Police stationed at Durban Central where I was in charge of the Immorality section.

On a date before the 11th of September I was spoken to by Mr. Brian Rudden who is connected to the Sunday Times as a reporter. Mr. Rudden wanted to know if I knew the alleged assassin - Mr. Tsafendas - of Mr. Dr. Verwoerd. I shared that I knew Tsafendas simply as an interpreter in the Regional Courts of Durban where he (Tsafendas) worked as interpreter in a fornication case I handled. Mr. Rudden wanted to know what Tsafendas's attitude towards the Immorality Law was and I notified him the following: "That Tsafendas have asked what people say when I arrest them under the Immorality Law and whether I catch a lot of these cases. That Tsafendas was interested no more and no less in such business than a normal member of the public is interested when they hear what kind of cases I deal with." Mr. Rudden also wanted to take a portrait of me to publish in the "Sunday Times" which I refused to allow, because of Captain du Toit, my commanding officer, had not given permission. The report of Mr. Rudden is mere sensationism and untrue.

Durban. 17/10/66. 1.35 p.m.

⁶¹⁷⁹ Willem Nel Visser statement to the COE, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

HELEN STRUTHERS⁶¹⁸⁰

White woman, aged 32 years, Greyville, Durban.

I am an adult White woman, resident and employed at the above address.

During late June or early July, 1965, on a Sunday evening, a White male who had the appearance of a Greek, paid a visit to me. He introduced himself to me as Demetrios. I accepted that he was Mr Demetrios.

I have seen a photograph of the assassin of the late Dr. Verwoerd and identified the photo as being the same person who paid the visit to me in 1965 and who will be referred to as Demetrios hereafter. Mr Demetrios said that he had come to thank me for having visited with him whilst he was in hospital. At that stage, his hand was bandaged. I pointed out to him that he was mistaken and that I had never visited him. Mr Demetrios said that he belonged to our faith, The Fellowship of Christ, and I accordingly invited him into my house. We did not discuss anything along political lines and Mr Demetrios did not make his political beliefs known to me. He asked if he could see me again, apparently to promote a personal relationship, but I rejected his request and I also rejected to correspond with him. After about an hour, Mr Demetrios left my house and that was the first and last time that I had ever seen or heard from him. Mr Demetrios did not relate his travels to me and there was very little else that we discussed.

Helen Struthers.

The above statement was taken by ... (Indecipherable name) ... 40205 D/Sgt.

Durban. 12.50 p.m. 19/10/66

⁶¹⁸⁰ Helen Struthers statement to the COE, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

DR. WILLEM LODEWICUS DANIEL MATTHYS VENTER⁶¹⁸¹

Adult White Male, N.G Minister, Parow.

On 06/09/66 at about 2:18 pm I was in the Assembly. The bells had already rung and we waited for the Speaker to enter. My position is near Dr. Verwoerd (deceased's) chair. While there were still members walking past, Mr. Jan Visse made the remark - "Look, that guy is not properly dressed yet." He referred to the messenger (D. Tsafendas), now the accused. I saw accused fiddling with his clothes near his pants, where you usually tie your suspenders. I saw him take something shiny from his pants and pointed Mr. Visses' attention to it. By then Dr. Verwoerd was already in the hall and had taken his seat.

Accused very quickly approached from the big door heading in the direction of Dr. Verwoerd. I was under the impression that he wanted to pass behind the Speaker's chair before the Speaker came. When the accused was right behind Dr. Verwoerd, he bent over and disappeared from my sight. Immediately after that, I observed an expression of shock and surprise on deceased's face. I saw the accused partially behind Dr. Verwoerd and noticed that his hand was moving up and down swiftly. I saw no knife until Dr. Verwoerd slightly fell forward and I then saw the accused with a knife in his hand, and he then again brought his hand down and stabbed Dr. Verwoerd in the neck.

Several other members and I jumped up. Chaos ruled. Some people grabbed the accused and someone shouted "Get the knife." Accused was thrown to the ground halfway across the bench and his hand with the knife was near me. I grabbed the hand and forced the fingers open to take the knife. His fingers were clenched around the knife. After the accused was overwhelmed, I put the knife on the table in front of the Speaker chair, where the police had taken it.

Cape Town. 19/10.1966

Statement taken by D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

⁶¹⁸¹ Dr. Willem Lodewicus Matthys Venter statement to the COE, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

MOGAMAT ISAACS⁶¹⁸²

Sirs, Mr. Gordon Winter, of our staff, has asked me to confirm that I gave him the tip-off about the Vallie family having met Demitrio Tsafendas and that they had stated Tsafendas had mentioned that he was a Russian. This is correct. I told Mr. Winter these facts on September 24, 1966. I told him that he should go to see Isak Vallie because there might be a story for him there. Mr. Winter asked me for more details. I told him that I had spoken to Isak Vallie and that Isak Vallie had told me that Demitrio Tsafendas had once visited his father's cafe, The Star Cafe, in Tennant Street, District Six, Cape Town. I told Mr. Winter that Isak claimed that Tsafendas had spoken of being from Russia and that he (Tsafendas) had also spoken of having had some dealings with Russian fishing vessels off Walvis Bay.

Mr. Winter asked me why I did not write the story. I told Mr. Winter that the Vallies did not want me to write the story. Mr. Winter then said Post would still want the story and that I should go and get it. I told him that I did not want to get involved with the Vallie family because I knew that they had good connections in the underworld. I also told Mr. Winter that the Vallie family were associated with Sherif Khan, the well-known Johannesburg underworld figure. I told Mr. Winter that there was a risk that I would be beaten up if I wrote a story which the Vallies did not want publishing.

Mr. Winter then said he would go and get the story from the Vallie family because he was not scared of being beaten up. I told Mr. Winter the address of the cafe (The Star Cafe in Tennant St.) and I drew a sketch for him so that he would find it easily. Since Mr. Winter's article appeared on our front page, on October 2, 1966, I have deliberately avoided the Vallie family just in case they may blame me for the fact that Mr. Winter wrote about them — apparently against their wishes.

I SWEAR THAT THIS IS THE TRUTH, THE WHOIE TRUTH, and NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH, SO HELP ME GOD.

Signed ... Mogamet Isaacs

Witnessed ... Gordon Tobin

⁶¹⁸² Mogamat Isaacs statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12. File: die Post aangeleentheid, NASA.

VIOLET IRENE MANNING⁶¹⁸³

E/F/A. Cape Town

I am a housewife residing at the above address. I let rooms at No. 7 Prince Street.

Approximately October-November 1965 I had rooms advertised at the latter place and Demetrio Tsafendas answered my advert and came to see me. He rented Room 3 next to the Ferreiras. It was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. I thought him to be a Greek. For a few weeks he attracted no unfavourable attention, until Mrs Ferreira came to me to complain that he was a nuisance. She said he was going into her kitchen to fetch water and that he was spilling water on the floor. I spoke to Tsafendas, but after some time, the Ferreiras complained again. When he was interviewed, he said that Mrs Ferreira was blackmailing him, I had given him instructions not to go into her kitchen, so I gave him notice to leave at the end of the month, which was two days later. He returned my keys at the end of the month and left.

During his stay, I regularly inspected his room. I also spoke to him. He told me he had just come from Mozambique and that he was looking for a café or catering business to buy. From his general appearance, he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means. During the days he went out, I thought to look for a business. He never spoke politics that I know of. In his room I saw two good suitcases, a box with pots and pans, a good briefcase etc. He received no visitors that I know of.

V.I. Manning. Cape Town. 21/10/66.

Statement taken by me. D.J.V. Troost. D/Sergt. 23505.

⁶¹⁸³ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL BROODRYK⁶¹⁸⁴

I'm a Captain in the South African Police stationed at The Grays, Johannesburg and attached to the security police.

On Friday, October 21, 1966 at about 11 am I was present when Brigadier Bester interviewed Rowley Israel Arenstein at office Nr. 505, The Grays, Johannesburg in connection with the assassination of the late Dr. Verwoerd. Arenstein denied knowing Tsafendas, that Tsafendas ever was a client of his or that he at any time granted him an interview. During the interview it was clear that he was completely honest with the police in connection with this matter. He also stated that his secretary, Mrs. Suddes would know if Tsafendas was at any time in his office. He sent a letter to Mrs. Suddes, directing her to give me all possible help, and handed the letter over to me.

Saturday afternoon, 22 October 1966, I interviewed Mrs. Suddes in Durban. I took an affidavit from her. It was clear to me that she was completely honest with me and gave all possible assistance. She told me that she did not share the political views of her employer, Mr. Arenstein, but was not willing to mention it in her statement as she was still in his employ. From past experience, I know that Mrs. Suddes is fully aware of all matters relating to this law firm. I showed her a file containing various newspaper photographs.

Johannesburg 24.10. 1966.

MAURICE KLEIN⁶¹⁸⁵

25 October 1966.

Mr. Maurice Klein, the owner of Wm. Rawbone en Kie, a local hardware store, claimed that Mr. Tsafendas was in his shop on September 6th 1966. Mr. Klein said that Mr. Tsafendas entered his shop and requested the price of a sheath knife which was in the showcase. Mr.

⁶¹⁸⁴ Johannes Christoffel Broodryk statement to the COE, 24 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶¹⁸⁵ Maurice Klein testimony to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

Klein told him it was R3.30 and Mr. Tsafendas bought the sheath knife. The blade of the knife was approximately 5½ inches long. Mr. Klein did not ask Mr. Tsafendas what his purpose was with the knife, even though he knew it was a dangerous weapon. Mr. Klein was not aware of Article 10 Act 54 of 1949, which entails that the owner of the shop has to enquire to the reason why a client wanted a knife. Mr. Klein stated that he has never seen Mr. Tsafendas before.

ALBERT VERCUAL⁶¹⁸⁶⁶¹⁸⁷

25 October 1966.

Mr. Vercual; a foreman at F.A. Poole, an engineering firm, personally knew Mr. Tsafendas. F.A. Poole was also the place where Mr. Tsafendas worked from 7th February 1964 until 10th July 1964 under Mr. Vercual's management. Mr. Vercual claimed that Mr. Tsafendas was an intelligent man, just untidy and lazy in rounding off his work. He also said that Mr. Tsafendas was a very friendly, social and talkative person, but he was always looking to quarrel with the white workers. Mr. Vercual would usually receive complaints from the other (white) foremen, but never from the black workers. Mr. Vercual would always reprimand Mr. Tsafendas, but Mr. Tsafendas would normally just not respond.

On one occasion Mr. Vercual had an argument with Demitrio about his poor workmanship and he (Demitrio) was very angry about it. Later Mr. Vercual got reports that Demitrio wanted to fight with the foremen. Mr. Vercual went to him and told him: "You are always causing trouble. I want you to leave." Demitrio walked off. And later returned to Mr. Vercual's office asking why he had to leave. Mr. Vercual again asked him to leave, this causing Mr. Tsafendas to turn around and grabbing the door handle – his knuckles turned white – and he said to Mr. Vercual: "You are like your bloody Government, but I will get you, and I will get your Prime Minister too!"

Mr. Vercual stated that he never got the impression that Mr. Tsafendas wasn't right in his mind. F.A. Poole moved from their warehouse and Mr. Tsafendas was tasked with

⁶¹⁸⁶ Albert Vercual statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶¹⁸⁷ His surname in his statement to the police is given as Vercoueil.

organizing the move and he handled it effortlessly. Mr. Tsafendas was busy sawing of the letters which made up the company's name and then dropping the letters to the ground, upon which Mr. Vercual saw this and told him not to drop the letters as they will be re-used. Mr. Vercual walked on and heard Mr. Tsafendas say: "The bloody foreman does not know what he is doing." Mr. Tsafendas never spoke of his worm. His threat against the First Minister was the only incident that Mr. Vercual knows about.

JOHANNA HENDRIEKA MULRENAN⁶¹⁸⁸

U/W/Vrou – Woman, Green Point.

I reside at the above address; I am a housewife and rent out 5 rooms in the house to men.

During September 1965 Tsafendas stayed with me for 1 or 2 weeks. The room was advertised. Although I accepted him as a boarder in one of the rooms, I soon observed that he was not neat in his room and told him to look for another place. He prepared food in my kitchen and was a big eater. He also never removed his big hat and wore a coat all the time. He worked at the power station during his stay with me. Apart from the fact that he was messy, he never drank and that sort of thing. He said was from overseas, was Portuguese and spoke many languages. I know nothing more of his movements or anything else about him.

J.H. Mulrenan. Cape Town. 26/10/1966.

N.D. HARTFORD⁶¹⁸⁹

In July, 1966, Tsafendas had a long interview with Mr. Hartford of the Cape Argus. They had already met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to enquire whether there was any news of the so-called freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as a rebel from Mozambique. Mr. Hartford thought that he might be able to provide material for a

⁶¹⁸⁸ Johanna Hendrieka Mulrenan statemet to the COE, 26 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁶¹⁸⁹ Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 75. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

magazine article and asked him to return later for an interview. This interview was postponed a few times until it took place sometime in July. It lasted about 75 minutes. Tsafendas recounted inter alia, how he had entered the Union illegally in 1936. He made no secret of his strong anti-Portuguese feelings, but did not utter a word against the South African Government. He complained, inter alia, that he still suffered from headaches as a result of the treatment he had been given by the Portuguese in Lisbon after the war. Mr. Hartford's impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. This witness had listened to the evidence in the Supreme Court on Tsafendas's condition after the death of Dr. Verwoerd and his impression was that his condition must have deteriorated since the interview for, when he interviewed Tsafendas, the latter spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation. He added, however, that after he had heard the evidence, it occurred to him that Tsafendas had in fact sometimes evaded his questions, but not to such an extent as to arouse his suspicions about his mental condition.⁶¹⁹⁰

CHRISTO VAN⁶¹⁹¹ MALEN⁶¹⁹²

I am an adult white man presently awaiting trial at the Dundee Prison. I make this statement willingly well-knowing that I do so under oath.

In 1964 I was a hard labour prisoner in Standerton Prison. During September of that year I escaped from that prison. I then went to Pretoria where I did odd jobs at private homes. I boarded with Mr Cilliers whose house was behind new flats called Lampfopolis Heights. Before that I boarded with Mr Pretorius in Pretoria West. I also did odd jobs at overseas ambassadorial houses situated against Meintjieskop in Pretoria, so I knew the area very well. I worked as a welder. I also knew the area around Libertas (PM's residence) and often spoke to police guards.

⁶¹⁹⁰ This testimony was not found in the archives, but according to the Commission's Report, the interview took place on November 11, 1966.

⁶¹⁹¹ It might be 'von' instead of 'van.' This is a handwritten statement and the name is not very clear.

⁶¹⁹² Christo van Malen's statement to the COE, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

From 1959-1961 I had my own business as welder and plumber and during that time Dennis Stafunus worked for me as a welder and I do not know whether he was Greek or Portuguese or where he lived. I also stayed at Lampfopolis Flats while I had my business and later stayed with Mr Pretorius and then with Mr Cilliers after I escaped from prison and thence to Durban. When I spoke to the police guard at Libertas I often saw a black Dodge car driving past Libertas. There were always three men in the car and one of them was Dennis Stefanus? I do not know the name of the police guard.

In November 1964 at midday while walking in the road about 100 ft. from Libertas the same car with three men sitting in the front stopped next to me. One of the men was Dennis Stefanus who introduced me to the other men and he asked me if I work in the area. One of the other men spoke to Dennis Stefanus in an unknown language which was not Greek or Portuguese with which I am familiar. Dennis Stefanus asked me whether I had access to government departmental houses and I replied that a permit from the Dept. of Public Works was only given to employees, otherwise the premises were out of bounds. I was then asked to help them gain entry as they had seen that I was friendly with the police guard but I told them this was impossible. On the rear seat of the car I noticed a camera with a long attachment in front.

Approximately 3 or 4 days later when I returned to my boarding house sometime between 5 and 6 pm I saw the same parked in the road outside. When I went inside I saw the same three men sitting on a couch in the back porch which was behind my room. They greeted me and then followed me when I entered my room and talked for a while with Dennis Stephanus acting as interpreter and I was asked to help them and that it was not hard work and I would be well paid. One of them then opened a black leather attaché case and took out a sketch pad, asking me to draw a plan of the late Dr. Verwoerd's house and also the house of the Minister of Justice. They again said that they would pay me very well and took out a roll of banknotes which they would give me immediately with more to come once I had given them the plans.

I refused because I thought they were up to no good and were trying to entice me into a trap. I asked them to leave my room after which there was an argument and while I accompanied them to the car Dennis Stephanus attacked me and stabbed me in my face, left arm and also in my back. I do not know who actually stabbed me because it was dark. Mr Cilliers, the landlord then phoned the police, the three men drove away. I was taken to the

hospital by the Sunnyside police but I did not want to lay a charge because I was an escaped prisoner and did not want to be identified. I recently heard that Mr Cilliers had died in a police cell in Pretoria. When I returned to the boarding house and was walking to my room I noticed something lying on the ground where the fighting had taken place. I picked it up and when I got to my room I saw that it was photos of Chinese or Asiatics which I could also tell from the writing on the back of the photos. My wife has them and will give them to the police.

In February 1965 I moved from Pretoria to Durban where I lived with Mr Botha in Umbilo, Durban. I was known to the Bothas as Eddie van Malen. Two months after I arrived in Durban I met Dennis Stefanus and Demetry Tsafendas (sic) and accompanied them to their room in a private hotel near to the Durban Railway Station. I have seen photos of Tsafendas (after the assassination of the late Dr. Verwoerd and recognised him as the man introduced to me by Dennis Stefanus in Pretoria and also as one of the men in the black car. A month after I had told them where I lived, Tsafendas approached Mr Botha who agreed to let a room to him for two nights. Tsafendas again spoke about the plans but I ignored him. I moved to another place, but when I subsequently saw Mr Botha he told me that Tsafendas and other strangers often returned to search for me and asked where I was but he never disclosed my whereabouts to them.

PATRICK O'RYAN⁶¹⁹³

9 Westminster Road, Lansdown. Teacher at Bishop Lavis High School.

Yesterday K/S/S Gray, stationed at Epping who was stationed at Epping, was with him and told me that he was often in personal contact with Tsafendas. Tsafendas stayed with him from November 1965 to February 1966. He stayed with him for free, as he was broke. He was still a letting agent in 1965. Tsafendas asked him for a room. Tsafendas always behaved like a normal person, except that his interpretations of the Bible differed from his. He believed implicitly that he was a Christian but could not understand that Jesus was first in Heaven and afterwards came to Earth through Maria. He believed that he had a worm in his stomach. He often ate a great deal and also often just lay in bed all day. He also often used the Lord's name in vain unnecessarily and then I told him that a Christian does not do that.

⁶¹⁹³ Patrick O' Ryan statement to the COE, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Sometimes he went to church with them on Sundays and participated in the services. He never gave a proper spiritual interpretation of the scriptures. Nobody ever visited him there. Letters were delivered to him there. There was one from the Meat Board in which they asked him to interpret at a conference. That was about 3 months ago. He did not go.

He also worked at the City Tramways but his probation time there was not approved. He worked at Diamond Marine Corp. He said that the person who should have trained him did not do so and he became very angry. He called the person a "bastard." He said this to everyone born in South Africa like that. He apparently nearly lost his life on one occasion when on the boat taking them to the "Barge" and this frightened him and he asked me to pray with him. When he prayed he burst into tears. After that he was normal again. He also recounted that while he was somewhere in a Portuguese prison that he had been hit on his head and how someone else was also hit like that until he died. He never wanted to repeat that story in front of other people. He said that he had stayed at two places in Observatory. They took him to a place in Devon Street in Woodstock where he then stayed. He also apparently lived in Mouille Point and Vredehoek, and also at a hotel, which name I cannot remember. He applied to the French Consulate for work. They must have his references. He said that his mother was non-white. He received a letter from a John Machletos from overseas which had been forwarded to him from Marine Diamond. He did not smoke or drink to his knowledge.

THE MULDER CASE

Hendrik Johannes Mulder had given a statement to the police on October 5. He had testified that he was offered £20,000 by three men to eliminate Dr. Verwoerd but he refused. The offer was renewed twice by telephone, where they called and said they had a fool-proof method of killing Dr. Verwoerd – by arranging a job for him in the Houses of Parliament. At another time, he had said a customer at a garage where he worked asked him to kill Dr. Verwoerd. Mulder also said two different men offered him a large sum to blow up the *Die Burger* newspaper building and that on another occasion he was blindfolded and taken to a meeting in a block of flats. Mulder was not able to describe any of these contacts with any precision. On October 14, Mulder and two policemen who were involved in his case – Laubser and van

Wyk – gave evidence to the Commission. Mulder's testimony was similar to the one he gave to the police.

HENDRIK JOHANNES MULDER'S TESTIMONY TO THE COE⁶¹⁹⁴

Declaration under oath.

Examined by Mr. Terblanche and Judge van Wyk:

TERBLANCHE: Mr Mulder where do you live?

MULDER: I live in Heathfield, Galway Road.

TERBLANCHE: And where do you work?

MULDER: For a firm called Decoza Knitting Mills in Cape Town

TERBLANCHE: And what is the nature of your work?

MULDER: Costing Accountant.

TERBLANCHE: Are you a South African citizen, were you born in this country?

MULDER: Yes

TERBLANCHE: Where do you come from?

MULDER: From Uitenhage, sir

TERBLANCHE: Have you been overseas?

MULDER: Yes, I was in Venezuela, South America for 7 years

TERBLANCHE: What did you do there, Mr Mulder?

MULDER: I worked for Sekoni Mobil Oil as a career diver

TERBLANCHE: And did you encounter firearms in your work?

MULDER: Well, not actually firearms, but I learned a lot about explosives. We often had to open areas with explosives, with fuses, know how to cut certain lengths, because when one is under water, at a certain depth, there must be enough time to get away before the explosion.

⁶¹⁹⁴ Hendrik Johannes Mulder testimony in the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

TERBLANCHE: What kind of firm was it?

MULDER: An oil company – many of our oil mines were beneath the water of Lake Maracibo

TERBLANCHE: Did you also learn self-defence?

MULDER: Yes, I am an expert in Kung-fu which is the Chinese version of Karate.

TERBLANCHE: Where did you learn this, Mr Mulder?

MULDER: In Maracibo. I encountered it in one of the JoJo's of clubs where this art was practised. I am the only man in the Republic who can slice two bricks in half.

TERBLANCHE: How do you do this?

MULDER: It can be done with the heel of the hand or with the side of the hand. Like this

TERBLANCHE: Would you describe yourself as an expert in dangerous explosives?

MULDER: Not exactly an expert, but "I can make any gimmick" to explode things. On one occasion I wanted to add something to my petrol tank, but someone had put sand in my engine. One of the security police told me to walk away from the situation, and not meddle with explosives – so I walked away from the situation.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you want to put sand in again to blow up the car?

MULDER: No I just wanted to give him a fright.

JUDGE VAN WYK: There was a report about this in the Burger newspaper not so?

MULDER: Yes, I gave a shooting demonstration to the Burger.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Are you a good shot?

MULDER: Yes I would always be successful in shooting someone.

TERBLANCHE: What kind of weapon do you use?

MULDER: My favourite is the American M.1911-45, which is an automatic pistol.

TERBLANCHE: Are you better with a pistol than with a shotgun? Or vice-versa?

MULDER: Well, I am handier with a pistol than with other firearms. I am accurate with all firearms, but am more comfortable with a pistol, certainly as regards speed.

TERBLANCHE: Special holsters are made especially for them, but you probably don't wear them, like the cowboys, do you?

MULDER: No, they are worn under one's shoulder, with a strap over the back of the shoulder and the holster is totally open, but there is a spin which holds it in place. This is so that one does not have to lift up the pistol, one can just pull the trigger by taking hold of the jacket with a fingertip, then take hold of the handle, pull it forward and the point of the holster is fastened to part of the pants so that the holster cannot move out of place with the pistol.

TERBLANCHE: Are your pistols specially prepared for you?

MULDER: No, not at all.

TERBLANCHE: Are they just the normal types?

MULDER: Yes they are normal but the one I previously mentioned is not obtainable in the Republic anymore today.

TERBLANCHE: While you were in South America did you also visit Argentina?

MULDER: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: What happened to you while you were there?

MULDER: At that time in Argentina someone shot Evuart (sic) Peron and several of us were held in prison on suspicion that we were responsible for shooting him and while in prison one of the others made it look as if he had hung himself and when the guards came in to investigate, we overcame them and managed to escape from jail.

TERBLANCHE: So you escaped, and how did you get away from there?

MULDER: With the boat of one of the Argentinians called a gunboat which is very fast.

TERBLANCHE: Did they find you?

MULDER: No, they could not find us, because we then returned to Venezuela, from which we could not be extradited.

TERBLANCHE: How did you get to Venezuela?

MULDER: We returned with one of the gunboats.

TERBLANCHE: Did you go there with one of the gunboats?

MULDER: No we went by aeroplane, but returned using the gunboat because we were trying to escape detection at all the airports, and rail connections because they would all have been alerted about us.

TERBLANCHE: How did you get to the gunboat?

MULDER: We knew from our tour through Buenos Aires that the gunboats were at anchor there.

TERBLANCHE: So you stole one?

MULDER: Yes we did steal one.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Were you detained although you were innocent?

MULDER: Yes, we were detained while we were entirely innocent. We were just strangers, and they just grabbed onto the nearest person, as often happens.

TERBLANCHE: You said you spent 7 years there?

MULDER: Yes. 7 years.

TERBLANCHE: Which years were those?

MULDER: Not exactly 7 years – from 1944-1950.

TERBLANCHE: When did you return to South Africa?

MULDER: I returned in January 1951.

TERBLANCHE: Where did you live after your return?

MULDER: I went to Port Elizabeth.

TERBLANCHE: How long did you live there?

MULDER: I lived there to 1955 or '56.

TERBLANCHE: Did you then go to Cape Town?

MULDER: Yes, I went to Cape Town.

TERBLANCHE: Have you been in Cape Town ever since then?

MULDER: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: Were you not away from there at all?

MULDER: No, never left Cape Town.

TERBLANCHE: Which year was it that the article in the Burger referred to by the Judge appeared in print?

MULDER: I really cannot recall – I am not a collector and I do not keep these things.

TERBLANCHE: Give us the approximate year.

MULDER: Around August 1960.

TERBLANCHE: Please tell the Commission the gist of the article please.

MULDER: The article was about my method of shooting, the method of carrying my pistol and my accuracy – such as being able to shoot a penny from between someone's fingers; and also my method of throwing a knife and ability to fight with a knife.

TERBLANCHE: Did photos of you appear in the article?

MULDER: Yes, there were a few photos of me.

TERBLANCHE: After the publication of this article did anything happen because of it?

MULDER: Yes, one evening while I was practising my Kung-fu in the garage, someone knocked first at the front door where my wife directed them to the garage at the back of the house. They did not want to enter into the house, but went around the back and knocked on my garage door but did not want to enter it. They called me to go outside and congratulated me on the fact that I am such a wonderful shot and so on.

TERBLANCHE: You 'they' – how many people were there?

MULDER: Three people.

TERBLANCHE: Did you know them?

MULDER: No, I had never seen them before.

TERBLANCHE: And what language did they speak?

MULDER: They spoke English, but one of them spoke Afrikaans remarkably well, the few times that he did speak.

TERBLANCHE: Were they white people?

MULDER: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: You say they congratulated you?

MULDER: Yes, they congratulated me on being such a good shot and asked me where I had learned to shoot and so on. I thought that perhaps they were interested in a demonstration or something like that.

TERBLANCHE: Do you know how they got there?

MULDER: They had a motor car there which was parked on the corner and they walked a short distance to the house. When they left I did not want to go with them as I was wearing exercise clothes, but I saw them walk around towards the Main road and get into a car. I remember it was one of the 1956-57 Dodge cars, a green colour but I could not see the registration number or any other details as it was already dark.

TERBLANCHE: What did you talk about?

MULDER: They asked me if I like money.

TERBLANCHE: Can you tell us about the conversation in the same language in which it was conducted?

MULDER: The man asked me: "Do you like money?" So I said to him: "Well, who doesn't". Then he said: "Would you like to earn some money?" To which I answered: "It all depends". He then said: "Well, you can earn quite a substantial amount". Then I said to him: "But what's the job?" He then said to me: "Oh, it's a very easy job, and it's not so easy. It all depends on how you are going to go about it". Then I was naturally totally confused and he next said to me: "We want to get this bastard Verwoerd out of this world. Do you think you can eliminate him?" Then I said: "What are you talking about? I don't know what the hell you're talking about". He then said: "Look, we're offering you an amount of 20,000 pounds to eliminate him". I said: "By what method?" So he said: "Well, you're a good shot. Shoot him". He said: "We will pay you the amount of 10,000 pounds now, and you sign a contract to the effect that you will shoot him. Once you have completed the job, we will pay you, or your wife and children, a further 10,000 pounds".

At this point, following a short interruption after the arrival of the Speaker, Terblanche continued with the questioning.

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Mulder, we got to where you told us about the offer which the three people made to you, please tell us what your answer was to them?

MULDER: My first answer was: "Don't you think the amount of 20,000 pounds is a little money for such a big man?" That was my first answer. Then I also said to him: "Look here, I am a married man". At that time I only had one child, a little boy, and then I said: "I am not interested in your offer."

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did it not shock you that people wanted to do such a thing?

MULDER: I do not know how you would feel, but I did not feel good about the whole idea. I wanted to deceive them, to put it bluntly, by accepting the first 10,000 pounds, but they wanted me to sign a contract and obviously they did not want to disclose in the contract what the organisation was or to whom I was responsible.

JUDGE VAN WYK: How did you want to do this?

MULDER: I tried to get hold of the first ten thousand pounds by saying to him: "Alright, I'll sign the contract--(and so- and- so) (sic) "but who am I responsible to?" Then they said, "No, never mind. You just sign the contract. We'll give you the ten thousand pounds".

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did they have the contract with them?

MULDER: Yes, they had the contract with them and they wanted me to sign it.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Was it a typed document or handwritten?

MULDER: No, they would not show it to me. I again asked him: "Who am I responsible to?" but they would not answer my question.

TERBLANCHE: And when you told them.

MULDER: When I told them that I was not interested, they left.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Where did the conversation take place?

MULDER: At my home, at the back next to my garage.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Can you describe the men? How old would you say they were?

MULDER: I cannot remember now. The one man I shall be able to recognise easily if I saw him today. He was short, I estimate about five foot six. He was well set. He had a large face, but it was not fat and he spoke fluent Afrikaans. He had curly hair, light curly hair, not exactly blonde, but light curly hair and this is the one I can remember very well.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Light curly hair?

MULDER: Light curly hair. The other one was a rather tall man – almost as tall as Detective van Wyk.

JUDGE VAN WYK: We do not know what he looks like!

MULDER: He was tall but he was wearing a hat. I could not see him very well. He was very slim. I cannot recall the third person anymore. The Security police took the descriptions from me at that time.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but I want to know about the tall man with a hat. Did he have a dark or a light complexion?

MULDER: I really cannot say – as I said before, it was dark and they would not go into the garage where the light was on – everything was done outside.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But the other man which you could see?

MULDER: The other man I saw half-and-half, because the garage light fell on him at one stage.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And what were they wearing?

MULDER: The one person whom I can remember – I cannot remember at all what he was wearing. The other one I know was wearing a hat and a suit. And one was wearing sports clothes.

JUDGE VAN WYK: When they left did you not think: “Good Heavens, I must report these men to the Police?”

MULDER: Yes, I did think so, and I did it the next day – I immediately phoned the Security Police and told them what had happened.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, and then?

MULDER: The following day the Security Police came to see me and I made a statement in that regard.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And were the footprints of the men still visible?

MULDER: No, my back yard is completely tarred.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And where their car had been parked?

MULDER: The spot where their car had been parked was also tarred and there were no footprints either.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did any of the men smoke?

MULDER: No, none of them smoked while we were standing there.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And did you ask them how they would pay you? Cash, or whatever?

MULDER: No, I did not ask the, as I was so shocked about the offer. I never thought that the little article in *Die Burger* would land me in such a situation.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Which Police came to see you? Can you remember?

MULDER: To the best of my memory, I may be wrong, but I remember the names Erasmus, van Wyk and Conradie. I cannot recall accurately.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did they come to see you the next day?

MULDER: Yes they came to see me the next day. I had telephoned them immediately to inform them.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And you say it was in 1960?

MULDER: Yes it was in 1960 – I think in November.

JUDGE VAN WYK: When was the first attempt on Dr. Verwoerd's life?

MULDER: I think it was in April, 1961, not so?

TERBLANCHE: Yes, the Rand Easter Show in 1961 in April I think.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Could one then say that it was 5 months later that he was shot?

TERBLANCHE: What about a member of the Security Police, Erasmus?

MULDER: I think I met Erasmus recently when was working in Main Road as an instructor in self-defence for the Police, and he came in and tried to smash my bricks in half. He then asked me if I was committed, because he wanted me to join him where he was then working, but he did not tell me what it was that he was doing at that time.

TERBLANCHE: Where were you living at that time? At the same address?

MULDER: Yes at the same address.

TERBLANCHE: Is that the address which you gave us?

MULDER: Yes.

TERBLANCHE: How long have you been living there?

MULDER: About six years.

TERBLANCHE: Did those men again try to contact you?

MULDER: I do not know whether the Police followed it up.

TERBLANCHE: You do not know? These people?

MULDER: Yes, they phoned several times at work at that time

TERBLANCHE: How long after this incident? After this first incident which you have just told the Commission about?

MULDER: It was about a year later that they called me again. Eight months or a year later they phoned me again asked whether I had not yet considered their offer.

TERBLANCHE: At your place of work?

MULDER: Yes, at work.

TERBLANCHE: And then, what did you say?

MULDER: I just told them: "Look, I told you that I am not interested", and I put down the phone.

TERBLANCHE: Did you report that incident to the Police?

MULDER: Yes, I did report it.

JUDGE VAN WYK: How did they know where you worked? How did they find out?

MULDER: I cannot remember. Someone probably asked me where I worked that night –but they had my home address – they got that from *Die Burger*. They told me that. I could in all probability have told them where I work. I really cannot remember. It was such a long time ago. I can imagine that one of them had asked me where I worked should they want to contact me again. I would have told them but also added that they should not do so, as I was not interested.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But if you had the plan to deceive them in order to get hold of the ten thousand pounds, then you must have been a little bit interested, not so?

MULDER: The thing is that one gets such a fright in that instant, about that sort of offer; I mean, murder is not a thing that one normally contemplates.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But if you were thinking about the ten thousand pounds?

MULDER: I did think about the money and that I would trick them, but I did not much want...

JUDGE VAN WYK: But if they were prepared to give you the ten thousand pounds, then you could easily afterwards say to them that you knew nothing of ten thousand pounds! They could not after all sue you!

MULDER: Yes, but I also thought that if I did that, then could afterwards come after my wife and child.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you tell your wife about this that night?

MULDER: My wife knows about it.

JUDGE VAN WYK: What did she say?

MULDER: She said I should stay away from such things.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Is your wife a South African?

MULDER: Yes, she is a Boer. She comes from Worcester.

TERBLANCHE: And were these the only two occasions that these people or any other person got in touch with you?

MULDER: No, someone phoned me about a year ago.

TERBLANCHE: Where were you when this person called you?

I was then working at Stewarts & Lloyds and I have no idea how they knew I was there.

TERBLANCHE: Yes?

MULDER: They asked me if I had reconsidered the offer. Then I said to them: "Look chaps, I have told you once before, I am not interested".

JUDGE VAN WYK: What did they say?

MULDER: They said to me: "We have a fool proof method by which you can actually eliminate Dr. Verwoerd. Then I said to him: "How" Then he said to me "We can arrange it

that you get a job in the House of Parliament.” Then they said to me that in that instance I would be close to Dr. Verwoerd on many occasions.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And then?

MULDER: My answer was short and to the point. I just said: “No dice” and I threw down the phone.

JUDGE VAN WYK: “No dice?”

MULDER: Yes, “No dice”! and then I threw down the phone – it is a slang word.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but did you not then think: “But I must get the man to come to me, then I can set it up so that the police can catch him while he is with me”, for instance?

MULDER: Your Honour, I have given certain information to the Police. We will come to one instance later. When they phoned me at Stewarts & Lloyds, I phoned the Security Police and told them about it.

JUDGE VAN WYK: That is the matter about which you have just told us?

MULDER: Yes, I told them, and I think in that instance I spoke to a Captain Rossouw at the Security Police in the city.

TERBLANCHE: You spoke telephonically?

MULDER: Yes, telephonically. I called them with the purpose that they could possibly take a declaration from me, or that we could possibly make a plan by which if they should phone me again, we could ‘trap’ them by tracing the phone from which they were speaking.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but why did you not then do so when he made the offer again?

MULDER: Yes, but the whole office was full of people.

JUDGE VAN WYK: So then you did nothing further – did you just talk?

MULDER: No, then I phoned him

JUDGE VAN WYK: You phoned him to tell him about?

MULDER: I phoned him and told him that I want to tell him about it and I said to him: “This is what the offer was about and the next attack on Dr. Verwoerd’s life will take place in the Parliamentary building.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Was it Rossouw to whom you said this?

MULDER: Yes, I think so.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And so?

MULDER: His response was: "Mr Mulder, you do not have to worry. Our Prime Minister is very well protected. We cannot do anymore."

TERBLANCHE: Did you suggest to him that you would help to catch those people?

MULDER: Yes, I wanted to work with the Security Police to catch them when they come to me again.

TERBLANCHE: But did you say this to the person with whom you spoke when you phoned him?

MULDER: No, no, I did not speak to them about at all again – I was very short and to the point with them.

TERBLANCHE: No, no, no! When you spoke to the Police?

MULDER: Oh with the Police?

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, when you phoned Mr. Rossouw?

MULDER: Well, when he answered me in that way I thought oh well, they are not interested. I am not either. I am just making a fool of myself.

JUDGE VAN WYK: You just said that you think it was Captain Rossouw?

MULDER: Yes, I think is Capt. Rossouw.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Can you not say so with certainty?

MULDER: I cannot say so with certainty, but a while ago someone phoned him, just after Dr. Verwoerd was murdered and then it was mentioned to him. Then he said yes, he could remember such an incident. He said he is also not certain.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Who called him?

MULDER: A friend called Nagel.

JUDGE VAN WYK: A friend of yours?

MULDER: I do not want to involve him here.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but we would really want to know this. Nagel phoned Rossouw?

MULDER: Yes, he phoned Rossouw and said to him: “You see what happened? Mulder warned you.” Then Capt. Rossouw said to him: “Yes, I know Mulder – I can remember something like that.”

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you also tell Nagel about this?

MULDER: Just after I had made the declaration and after I had called Capt. Rossouw, I told Nagel about the incident and I said: “They are not at all interested. Now they must just do whatever they want to do.”

TERBLANCHE: Did he work with you at that time?

MULDER: No, he was just a friend. He is now in Port Elizabeth or one of those places. I do not know exactly where he is. He was here a while ago when he came to say goodbye and that he was going away.

TERBLANCHE: What did he do here in the Cape?

MULDER: He worked at a newspaper or something like that, if I am not mistaken. I had met him at one of the “clubs”.

TERBLANCHE: Which club was that?

MULDER: One of our practice clubs. I was also an Instructor at the Technical College.

TERBLANCHE: So it was at the Technical College that you met him?

MULDER: I am not sure where I had met him.

JUDGE VAN WYK: How long after the conversation where people had told you that Dr. Verwoerd would be murdered in the Parliamentary building did you tell this information to Nagel?

MULDER: I think it was within a week of the incident – the murder of Dr. Verwoerd.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you see him again after that?

MULDER: No, I did not see him again after that, but just after Dr. Verwoerd's murder he called me again.

JUDGE VAN WYK: From which place did he call you?

MULDER: He called me from here in the city. He was here in the city.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And what did he say to you?

MULDER: He said: "Hennie, your prophecy came true". But at that time I did not actually even know what had happened.

JUDGE VAN WYK: So you did not know what he was talking about?

MULDER: That is correct – I did not know what he was referring to, so I asked him: "What do you mean?" And then he said: "Dr. Verwoerd was murdered this morning"

JUDGE VAN WYK: Where were you when he called you?

MULDER: I was in the office where I am now working.

JUDGE VAN WYK: How long have you been working there?

MULDER: For about 4 months.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But how did he know that you work here if he has been away for such a long time?

MULDER: I wrote to him from time to time and his father probably gave my letters to him, but I had not heard from him for a long time.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And where did you write to him – what address?

MULDER: I addressed the letters to the National Printers. His father worked there – but I do not know if he is still there.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Does he not now have his own printers firm?

MULDER: I have no idea. He had problems with his wife and then he began drinking and so forth and moved on.

JUDGE VAN WYK: So he phoned you and said to you?

MULDER: "Your prophecy has come true".

TERBLANCHE: Did he say anything else when he phoned you?

MULDER: I cannot remember.

TERBLANCHE: Did he call you again after that?

MULDER: No, he did not call me again, but someone else did call me one day.

TERBLANCHE: I am asking you this because you said that he had talked to Capt. Rossouw.

MULDER: Yes, he apparently had talked to Capt. Rossouw.

TERBLANCHE: Then I want to know how you know that?

MULDER: He said so to me. He said that he had phoned Capt. Rossouw.

TERBLANCHE: In the same conversation?

MULDER: In the same conversation and asked him if he remembered if he knew me. Then Capt. Rossouw said to him: "yes, we know Mulder." Then he said: "Now I remember that he had warned you a year ago about an attack on Dr. Verwoerd in the Parliamentary building. Then Capt. Rossouw said yes he could remember something like that. He just was not absolutely sure, because so much water has flowed under the bridge.

TERBLANCHE: You also wanted to say something about 14 days ago?

MULDER: No, quite a while ago someone phoned me just after Dr. Verwoerd's death. I just do not know how they knew where to get hold of me.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Where did you get the phone call?

MULDER: They called me at work.

JUDGE VAN WYK: An English or Afrikaans-speaking person?

MULDER: English – the same voice as before.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And what did he say?

MULDER: "You see, Mulder, we had no need for you anymore. Somebody else did the job for us. And I can predict now that Advocate Vorster won't last another six months". Whether someone was playing the fool or not, I don't know, but that is what happened.

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Mulder, when you saw in the press that the Commission had been established, did you then put yourself forward to make a declaration?

MULDER: These declarations had already been made by me to the Police.

TERBLANCHE: Yes, but did you do so again?

MULDER: Yes, I made a declaration again.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Tell me, when did the three people contact you for the first time?

MULDER: It was in 1960.

JUDGE VAN WYK: So, in 1960, apart from your wife and the Police, did you tell anyone else?

MULDER: No, I never told anyone else. I never told anyone else, because I just felt it was none of their business and they might think I was playing the fool.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But did you not feel a little bit insulted that those people had thought that you would have been prepared to commit such a deed?

MULDER: Well, to tell the truth, I did not feel insulted immediately, but I was shocked. I was shocked that people could come to me with such an offer. After all, a married man with a wife and a child – to come to a man with such an offer just because he is a good shot and can fight well – this is just ridiculous. To tell the truth, I regard the incident as a farce. I thought they were playing the fool.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But after all they were strangers, so why would they play the fool with you?

MULDER: Yes, but I thought maybe they were just trying to test me, or something like that, because my name had appeared in the newspaper. Many people who come to see me say: “You are the bloke I saw in the paper who smashes bricks. Can you smash a brick?” I say, “Of course I can”. Then they go outside and pick up bricks and say: “Smash this brick for me”. And I say: “Alright, for five pounds I’ll do it for you.” It is unbelievable. They just do not believe it and many people do it just for a joke.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But have other people not also approached you to commit other murders? You know, to use your skills for other occasions – your firearm and so on?

MULDER: No, people like detectives have come to me. Quite a number of detectives and policemen that I have trained in Kung-fu – that is a deadly method of self-defence – all that kind of thing is what I do naturally.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Are there not people who are your enemies?

MULDER: Well, I think I have enemies – for instance quite a number of my family-in-law, who I have assaulted a number of times, but I do not think that I actually have enemies who want to land me in trouble.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Do you think that there are people who are opposed to you and perhaps have sent these people to you to get you into trouble?

MULDER: Possibly, quite possibly.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Have you ever felt that you are being watched or that people are following you?

MULDER: No, I have not felt that.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Possibly you feel that you have enemies and that they will do anything to get you into trouble?

MULDER: No, I have never had such a feeling.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And not in this instance, when the people came to you, did you not think that perhaps they wanted to get you into trouble?

MULDER: No, I have never had such an idea.

JUDGE VAN WYK: You did think it was a case of people “playing the fool”?

MULDER: I actually thought it could have been a prank.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But to be safe did you not think to protect yourself?

MULDER: For safety, to cover myself, in case anything happened, I always called the Security Police. I felt revulsion and very hurt the morning that I found out that Dr. Verwoerd had been murdered in Parliament, because I had already given them the warning a year earlier.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Apart from this Nagel, who else did you tell that Dr. Verwoerd – about the people who told you that Dr. Verwoerd would be murdered?

MULDER: No, I never told anyone else.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But did you not say?

MULDER: I can tell you that after that incident a year ago when I phoned Capt. Rossouw, that I simply felt that I would be making a fool of myself to disclose these things. I just felt that they had not taken any steps, and so I would be making a fool of myself. I thought, leave it alone, what will be, will be and I shall not get myself involved in such things.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but you did then tell Nagel a week later?

MULDER: Yes, I did tell him about the little incident.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but why just Nagel and not your wife as well?

MULDER: He was a very good friend and he is the kind of person who would keep it to himself. He is not the sort of person who would go to others and say Hennie said so and so.

JUDGE VAN WYK: So, it was only him?

MULDER: Yes, I only told him.

JUDGE VAN WYK: When did he leave the Cape?

MULDER: Well, I do not know – about ten or fourteen days after Dr. Verwoerd after he phoned me – it was the same day that Dr. Verwoerd was murdered, not afterwards. Then he left again.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you see each other again?

MULDER: No, I did not see him at all, but I was only in touch with him telephonically.

JUDGE VAN WYK: So what did he come here for?

MULDER: I have no idea, Your Honour, I have no idea at the moment what Basil does, or where he works, or whether he works for himself. He talked about starting his own business for a long time, but he does not want to work in the Cape, he wants to get away from the Cape. So I think he just took to the road. But I think there is a Nagel in the Cape who worked at the Commercial printers and who had his own business. Perhaps it is his father.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Where does his father live?

MULDER: No, I do not know. His father did live in the city for a while, but I do not know as I never went to his house.

JUDGE VAN WYK: You just met him at the Club?

MULDER: This fellow Nagel I met at the Club. He told me he worked at the Commercial Printers.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But he was actually a good friend?

MULDER: He was a good friend of mine – in the sense that he was very interested in self-defence and so on and in physical exercise.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But you also have good friends amongst the Police too?

MULDER: Yes, I have several friends in the Police. For example Sybrand Hitchcock.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But why did you not tell them “What is wrong with the men that they do not want to negotiate?”

MULDER: Yes, but at that time when this incident happened, there were not any of the police with me in the Club.

JUDGE VAN WYK: I see. When did you start with them?

MULDER: Sybrand Hitchcock has only been with me for the last six or seven months. There were a few other police officers, like Odendaal and so on, who came to the club, but they could not deal with the hard physical exercise, so they soon left.

JUDGE VAN WYK: When did you get the call that Dr. Verwoerd would be murdered in the House of Assembly? When was that?

MULDER: Just a short while before he was murdered. After his murder, someone called me about Advocate Vorster.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but did you then tell Hitchcock about it?

Yes, I did tell him about it.

JUDGE VAN WYK: You told Hitchcock about Advocate Vorster?

MULDER: Yes, I told him and then he said: “Why do you not go to the Security Police?” So I said: “No look, I did so a year ago when I warned about Dr. Verwoerd and I just made a fool of myself”.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And when was it that you warned them about Dr. Verwoerd?

MULDER: Around November 1960 – I may be wrong as the dates are no longer so clear for me.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But when did you warn them?

MULDER: I warned them the same day that the people came to see me.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but when you warned them that Dr. Verwoerd would be murdered in the House of Assembly?

MULDER: That was a year ago.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Yes, but when exactly?

MULDER: Around August of last year. The people who had come to see me originally said that there was a new movement starting up which is financed from England and that is called "The South African Freedom Army". And I gave the police this information about two months before they became aware of it.

JUDGE VAN WYK: When did you give them this information?

MULDER: No, I cannot remember that anymore.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Did you give that information to the Police?

MULDER: Yes, to the police.

JUDGE VAN WYK: The Security Police?

MULDER: I told them that there is in the Republic a movement which is financed in England and the name is The South African Freedom Army and I believe that they dispersed those people.

JUDGE VAN WYK: When did you give the information to them? Can you remember?

MULDER: No, Your Honour, I cannot remember anymore.

JUDGE VAN WYK: When did you get the information about the South African Freedom Army? When did you get it?

MULDER: No, I cannot remember. The Police have all the records of the information which I gave them, but I remember that two months.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But did the same people come to you more than once?

MULDER: No they were only at my house on one occasion.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Then that must have been the occasion when they told you about the Freedom Army or was it when they phoned you?

MULDER: No these people told me about the SA Freedom Army at that time.

JUDGE VAN WYK: The same people?

MULDER: The same people told me that at that same time. Yes it was at the same time that they told me about the Freedom Army and then I told them – the Security Police. The same time that I made the declaration about the offer.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Oh?

MULDER: And two months after that there was a press report about a movement called the South African Freedom Army. I think the morning that I spoke to Sergeant van Wyk and then I asked him whether he had seen the press report and whether he remembered that I had told him about it a short while previously. Then I referred him to my declaration.

JUDGE VAN WYK: And what did he say?

MULDER: I cannot recall what Sgt. van Wyk had said – just that he had seen it.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Why should he know about it? Was he one of the policemen whom you had told about the incident?

MULDER: Yes, Sgt. van Wyk was one of the men attached to the Security Police of that time and who came to me and who took a number of declaration/statements from me.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS-WITNESS DISMISSED

JOHANNES PETRUS FRANCOIS VAN WYK'S TESTIMONY TO THE COE⁶¹⁹⁵

Declared under Oath.

Examined by Mr. Terblanche and Judge van Wyk:

TERBLANCHE: Mr. van Wyk, are you a Detective-Sergeant attached to the Security Section of the SA Police?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: I am.

TERBLANCHE: Do you know the previous witness, Hendrik Mulder, who has just testified?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: He is known to me.

TERBLANCHE: When did you meet him for the first time?

⁶¹⁹⁵ Johannes Francois Petrus van Wyk's testimony in the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: It was in 1961. I cannot remember the precise date.

TERBLANCHE: Were you with someone or were you alone?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: I was with the retired Detective-Sergeant Loubser (sic), also attached to the Security Police of that period.

TERBLANCHE: Why did you go to see him?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Because he had on a previous occasion provided information to us about an intended sabotage action.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Which sabotage incident was this?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: He had stated that a proposition had been made to him about a fantastic amount of money which would be given to him if he was prepared to blow up the offices of "*Die Burger*" newspaper in Keerom St. in Cape Town.

TERBLANCHE: And that was the reason for your visit to him?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: That is correct.

TERBLANCHE: What did he tell you about that proposition which had been made to him?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Well, he said that one evening two Jews went to his home and said that they had seen an article in "*Die Burger*"⁶¹⁹⁶ newspaper the supplement section – which dealt with his expertise with firearms.

TERBLANCHE: Yes?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: They apparently said to him that if he was prepared to blow up the offices of Die Burger newspaper in Keerom St. they would pay him a fantastic amount of money.

TERBLANCHE: Did he mention the amount?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: I recall the amount of R20,000.00. It could have been either Rands or Pounds, but I do know that the amount was "twenty thousand".

TERBLANCHE: Did he mention how they wanted him to do it?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: They told him that it would be easy for him to gain entry to the offices by just going there and telling the Editor that he had another story to give them about

⁶¹⁹⁶ Incorrectly spelled as "*Bruger*" throughout this testimony.

his expertise with firearms, and that he should take along a parcel containing a time bomb. He should then leave the parcel in the offices and walk out. People who would later come across the parcel would simply assume that someone had forgotten it and leave it untouched.

TERBLANCHE: Mr. van Wyk, did the two of you question Mr. Mulder about this statement?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: I questioned him very thoroughly about his statement to us. He was very vague. He could not give a description about the two people, except that they looked like Jews. He said that they had arrived in a motor car, but could not provide the make, or colour or the registration number of the car, but emphasised that he definitely could identify them if he saw them again.

TERBLANCHE: Did you at that time make any arrangements with Mr. Mulder?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: We arranged that when the people visited him again he would notify us immediately.

TERBLANCHE: From what he had said did you think that those people would visit him again?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: He said that he had told them that he would help them, but that he needed time to think it over. His excuse was that he would want to be able to have the time to report the incident to us. According to him they said that they would return in two or three days. That was why we asked him to contact us immediately when they did so.

TERBLANCHE: Apart from that arrangement with him did you do anything else?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Without saying anything to him we did actually keep the house under observation to see whether any people did indeed visit him. For almost ten days nobody visited him while we were there. So, we went to see him again, when he told us that the same two people had visited him again. That was during the time that we put his house under observation.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Why did he not inform you?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: He only claimed that he had been too busy. I then remarked that this was strange because we had not observed the car at his house. His immediate reaction was to claim that the car had parked at the bottom of the road and that he had only seen the red lights as they drove away. I then repeated that it was strange that we had not seen the people enter

the house, to which he replied that they had approached his house from behind the bushes which were behind the house.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Could he describe the people?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: He could never give a description apart from adding that one of them was starting to go grey just above his ears. That was the only description he could give.

TERBLANCHE: Did you approach him again?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: We asked him to stay in touch with us on a regular basis, and a while later I went to see him again to enquire why he had not been in touch with us. By that time he had again changed employment and we had difficulty in tracing him. He then told us that the men had again visited him when he was alone at home, and that they persuaded him to get into a large car with them and then they had driven to Sea Point where they all went into a block of flats and entered a flat on the 5th floor where 7 people were assembled. I questioned him thoroughly about this incident but he could not give a description of the car which I said to him was strange, but his reply was that when they entered his house they blindfolded him, led him to the car and forced him into the back of the car while the two men sat in the front. Then I asked him how he knew it was a large car and he replied that he could feel that it was large car and therefore assumed that it was large.

I asked him to try to get the number of the car, or the names of the people and also while he did not peep out of the blindfold while he was sitting in the back of the car. He then immediately responded that he had peeped, by moving the blindfold while he was bending down to fasten his shoelace, but that he still could not see anything because he found that there were two black curtains on the inside of the car windows.

I then asked him how he knew they were in Sea Point if he was blindfolded and his reply was that the roads were very steep and thus he made that assumption. When I asked him how he knew that the flat was on the 5th floor, he said that he felt the movement of the lift which took a little while to reach the next stage and so he knew that it was block of flats and not a house. When I asked him how he knew it was the 5th floor, he said that the one person had said to the other that he should press the button for the 5th floor.

Once again he could not identify them because he was blindfolded and when I asked him how he knew that there were 7 people, he said because he could distinguish 7 voices, and then he added that he suddenly remembered, whilst he was talking to me, that while in the flat, he

once again moved his blindfold a fraction and noticed that the one person had red hair and that was the only description he could give of all the 7 people. This story sounded altogether too fantastic and we thought it was entirely implausible.

TERBLANCHE: Mr. van Wyk, did he ever report to you that people approached him to murder Dr. Verwoerd?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Never. While he reported other things to me, he never mentioned an attack on Dr. Verwoerd.

TERBLANCHE: Have you ever spoken to his wife?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: No, we never saw her and I never saw her.

TERBLANCHE: Do you know a person by the name of Nagel?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Well, I know several different people with that name.

JUDGE VAN WYK: He said it is a person who worked at the National Press to whom he had said that he had received a message about the murder on Dr. Verwoerd?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: No your Honour, I do not know that Nagel. The Nagels that I know are all criminals. They have no connection with this Mulder.

TERBLANCHE: He said that he had in 1960 also told the two of you about the "South African Freedom Army" which is based in England and operates here.

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: The only time that the "Freedom Army" was heard about was in 1963 when it was actually known as "The African Resistance Movement."

TERBLANCHE: No, he says the name was The South African Freedom Army and that it is financed in England and that it was after he had told the Police about his information that people had asked him to murder Dr. Verwoerd and also that after he had told the Police about the South African Freedom Army that 2 months later the newspapers first reported about these rumours and that he had then said that to you remember? Did he tell you about the South African Freedom Army?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: No he never reported this to me. He also never gave us any information about this subject and if he had given it to other members of the police force I would have heard about in the course of my work because it is those kind of files that I deal with personally all the time.

TERBLANCHE: Do you know a detective called Erasmus?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Yes, that is Captain Erasmus of the Diamond Section.

TERBLANCHE: Was he based here in the Cape?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: He was here from the 1st of January until the 31st of March 1963, with the Security Section of the Police.

TERBLANCHE: And after that? Where did he go?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Afterwards he served with the Diamond Section of the Police in different places.

TERBLANCHE: He told us that in 1960 he was offered R20,000.00 to murder Dr. Verwoerd. Have you any knowledge of this?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: No, your Honour. If he had given such information I should also have known about it.

TERBLANCHE: He said that they wanted to give 10,000.00 Pounds in advance and that then 10,000.00 Pounds after he had done it, but that he had to sign a document?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: No the first information from him was that which I have just given to you.

TERBLANCHE: Which information is this?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: About the sabotage at *Die Burger* offices.

TERBLANCHE: When he informed the Police?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Yes, he did give other information about other people in 1963.

TERBLANCHE: What was the information that he gave in 1963?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: It was information that he gave to me personally, about the investigation about Alexander and others, who worked in the High Court in Cape Town. It involved a man called "Enval Marnie". A typewriter that Dr. Alexander used for the typing of his documents was hidden by "Enval Marnie" who worked at 'Cape Oil Products' and Mr. Mulder worked at the same place and after it became known that Enval Marnie had given testimony in the case he reported to me that Enval Marnie held Communist meetings daily at his workplace and this was investigated and found to be false.

TERBLANCHE: Also found to be false?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Found to be totally false.

TERBLANCHE: And did he come to you with that information?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: Soon after the man had testified and this was reported in the papers I bumped into him and he said to me by the way you probably know Enval Marnie and after I confirmed this he gave me the above statement.

TERBLANCHE: He has also told us that he is an Instructor at Wynberg and that he trains the Police in "Kung-fu"?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: I have no knowledge of this.

TERBLANCHE: He told us here that he has been working at the same place since about 1960. Do you know that he had worked at other places?

DT. SGT. VAN WYK: I know that at one time he worked at a place in Lower Main Road in Observatory. Unfortunately I am not now in a position to give the name of the firm. Afterwards he worked at a shop on the corner of Essik Street and Victoria Road in Woodstock. Then he worked for a while at Cape Oil Products in Maitland. Afterwards he worked at an engineering firm and now he is at another firm in Garfield Road in Claremont. He continually moves from one workplace to another. He makes a statement to us and then by the time we go to investigate it he has already moved to another workplace.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS-WITNESS EXCUSED

PETRUS GERHARDUS LAUBSER TESTIMONY TO THE COE⁶¹⁹⁷

Declared under Oath.

Examined by Mr. Terblanche and Judge van Wyk:

TERBLANCHE: Mr. Laubser, you were attached to the Security Dept. of the SA Police from September 1961 until 1963?

LAUBSER: Yes I was.

TERBLANCHE: During that period did you come into contact with a certain Hendrik Mulder?

LAUBSER: Yes I did.

TERBLANCHE: I assume that you saw him here this morning?

LAUBSER: Yes, I saw him.

TERBLANCHE: How did it happen that you came into contact with him?

LAUBSER: It was during 1962, when one day I received an assignment from Major van der Westhuizen to speak to him concerning certain information, so Detective-Sergeant van Wyk and I went to see him and when we got to his house he told us that three white men had gone to his house the previous night and made a certain proposition to him, but he could not give us a description of the three men –

JUDGE VAN WYK: What was the proposition?

LAUBSER: He said that the three men had apparently read an article on him in the "*Klein Burger*" (so called at that time) – about his expertise with firearms and Karate and that sort of thing, and the men made the proposition that he should return to the *Burger* as he knew people there, and that they would give him a time bomb which he should leave there to blow up the building – and at a later stage –

JUDGE VAN WYK: Would they have paid him to do this?

LAUBSER: Yes, they would have paid him a certain amount to do this.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Can you remember what the amount was?

⁶¹⁹⁷ Petrus Gerhardus Loubser testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

LAUBSER: No, I cannot remember anymore, but it was a large amount. Well. He then said that he would think about it and that they should visit him again, and then on a later occasion he also said to me that the three men had made a proposition to him, in that they wanted him to act as an instructor to 20,000 volunteers which he had already recruited. The training would take place at a camp which was to be established and he was wanted because of his expertise with firearms.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But the three men never returned to him.

LAUBSER: We placed him under observation on various evenings to see whether the alleged car returned to his house. I spoke to him on another occasion at the end of 1962. This took place at a shop in Main Road, Woodstock where he then worked at a men's outfitter.

The subject of motor cars came up and he then told me that around the time that Dr. Verwoerd had just come into power, around 1959, when he was working as a motor mechanic at a certain garage in District Six which was owned by a Jew, that he and a client argued about the outrageously high price of the repairs. This person then made a proposition to him about shooting Dr. Verwoerd, but he declined, saying he was not interested. Think about this: the proposition was made to him in 1959 and it was only in 1962 that he first reported the incident to us.

TERBLANCHE: Did you question him about this man?

LAUBSER: Yes I did. He said the man is no longer there. The garage is closed. He could not provide the man's name, he could not give the name of the garage, he could not remember anything!

TERBLANCHE: Could he give you any definitive description of these people?

LAUBSER: No he could not although we asked him repeated occasions. He just said that he thought they were three Jews. He could not give a description of the car and he could not describe the number or anything – nothing!

JUDGE VAN WYK: Do you know anything about a message that he had sent about someone calling him on the telephone?

LAUBSER: Yes from time to time he said that people were allegedly calling him repeatedly. The strange thing about all this is that at the time that he gave us the information he was unemployed and had been without work for months. But then as soon as he allegedly started

working somewhere then these people would call – and how they knew about his workplace so quickly is beyond strange.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But he let you know about these calls made to him on more than one occasion?

LAUBSER: I do not know about that. I only went to him on that one occasion on Major van der Westhuizen's instruction.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But then how did he come to tell you about the many places where calls had been made to him?

LAUBSER: He told that to me after I had seen him again that the people had been calling him repeatedly.

JUDGE VAN WYK: I see.

LAUBSER: But he does not know – he never knows – I still do not believe that he knows who these people are or where they can be found.

JUDGE VAN WYK: But did he not ever tell you that he had received a call telling him that Dr. Verwoerd would be murdered in Parliament?

LAUBSER: No, I know nothing of that – he never told me about anything like that.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Have you ever heard that he had made that statement?

LAUBSER: No.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Have you heard it now?

LAUBSER: No, nothing yet.

JUDGE VAN WYK: He has just told us that he had called Captain Rossouw to give his this information.

LAUBSER: I see him quite often and I do not remember him telling me about this.

JUDGE VAN WYK: Where do you see him regularly?

LAUBSER: I have seen him on a number of occasions in Woodstock when he has walked past me and greeted me and although he knows that I am connected with the Security Police, he never reported this to me.

JUDGE VAN WYK: He has just said that he again had a call from someone who said that Advocate Vorster would only last six months now that they have dealt with Dr. Verwoerd?

LAUBSER: No your Honour, I do not know anything about this. I think the man has a fantastic imagination. That is my opinion of him.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS-WITNESS DISMISSED

CONCLUSION

Detective van Wyk testified that in 1962 Mulder claimed that two men offered him 20,000 Rand or pounds to blow up the offices of *Die Burger* newspaper by leaving a time-bomb in the building in Cape Town. Mulder could not describe the men or their car. After Mulder reported the alleged offer to blow up the *Die Burger* newspaper building, the police secretly observed his house. Mulder later told him the two men had returned during this period, but the police watchers said no-one visited. Later again, Mulder claimed he was blindfolded and taken to a meeting on the 5th floor of a block of flats, a story which the police considered “altogether too fantastic and entirely implausible.”

Dt. Sgt. van Wyk said Mulder also claimed a man at his workplace held Communist meetings, an allegation which the police found to be false. As for the blindfolded visit to a block of flats, van Wyk said the police considered it “altogether too fantastic and entirely implausible.” Mulder also told Dt. Sgt. van Wyk in 1962 that three years earlier a man had asked him to assassinate Dr Verwoerd. The detective naturally stated that “the proposition was made to him in 1959 and it was only in 1962 that he first reported the incident to us.”

Laubser testified that he interviewed Mulder after he told police he had been offered a large sum of money to blow up the *Die Burger* newspaper by planting a time bomb, but he could not describe the men who made the offer. On another occasion, he said he was working as a mechanic at a garage when a customer tried to persuade him to shoot Dr. Verwoerd. He said he could not describe the customer and the garage itself was by now closed. Laubser concluded that Mulder “has a fantastic imagination.”

Mulder's story is far-fetched, full of inconsistencies and lies, as both policemen correctly noted. As to his connection with Tsafendas, the only remote connection was when

Mulder claimed his contacts told him they could arrange access to Dr Verwoerd by securing a position in Parliament. That Tsafendas had reached Dr. Verwoerd by just such a method, as a Parliamentary messenger, had been all over the newspapers for more than a month. It is well within the bounds of possibility that an evident fantasist such as Mulder could have made up such a claim retrospectively to strengthen his story. The Commission quite rightly shared the two policemen's opinion regarding Mulder's testimony, and would not mention his case in its Report.

SYNOPSIS OF OTHER TESTIMONIES

The following are synopsis of testimonies or statement given to the Commission. They were found in the archives but have nothing or very little to say about Tsafendas and are of no importance:

THELMA BERYL SUDDER

Sudder was Rowley Israel Arenstein's secretary and was questioned by the police after they learned that Tsafendas often visited Arenstein's office in Durban. She testified on 22nd October that, "I was shown a police file containing several newspaper photographs of Tsafendas. I have never seen him in my office or with Mr. Arenstein. If Tsafendas did call to see Mr. Arenstein, I was the most likely person to attend to him. There was a rumour that Tsafendas had worked at the Court in Durban as an interpreter. Our offices are situated opposite the Court buildings (Supreme Court and Magistrate's Court). I had already discussed this fact before Capt. Broodryk had interviewed me, and I am therefor positive, as far as I am concerned, that he has never called at our office. To the best of my knowledge I have never seen him."⁶¹⁹⁸

⁶¹⁹⁸ Thelma Beryl Sudder statement to the COE, 22 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

NICOLAI ROMANOFF (Crown Prince)⁶¹⁹⁹

This appears to be the statement of person who calls himself the ‘Crown Prince.’ He testified that Tsafendas was a hired assassin hired by someone called John Pascilly in Tangier where he was “given full training then given a one-year living, then sent out on a job. He was hired by Col. Nasser who paid R100,000 for the assassination. The object being to destroy the PMs conference held in England at that time.” He then went on to say that Tsafendas was also hired to assassinate Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, on 21 September 1966, and then 5,000 guerrillas who were stationed in Zambia were going to invade the country.⁶²⁰⁰ The rest of the statement contains information along the same lines, some of it even more absurd which suggests that Romanoff’s statement cannot be taken seriously. The Commission and the police also did not appear to treat his statement seriously.

PETER CECIL VISSER

Visser was the assistant manager at the Mount Nelson Hotel, Cape Town, where it was rumoured that Tsafendas had applied for a job. Visser testified that “Tsafendas did not apply to our hotel for a position.”⁶²⁰¹

ANATOLE URBANIAK

Urbaniak was manager of the Grand Hotel in Cape Town and a member of the hotel Board. He testified that Tsafendas had made a job application to the hotel Board in Pretoria, which was turned down, but he had not applied to the Grand Hotel in Cape Town. He had no personal knowledge of him.⁶²⁰²

HENDRIK KLOPPER

Klopper was the Speaker of the National Assembly and was in charge of Parliament and its staff, including messengers and cleaners. Klopper’s testimony is sixteen pages long and involves discussion between him and the Commission on ways to improve security and

⁶¹⁹⁹ No date is given in this statement.

⁶²⁰⁰ Nikolai Romanoff statement to the COE, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²⁰¹ Peter Cecil Visser statement to the COE, 3 November 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²⁰² Anatole Urbaniak statement to the COE, 3 November 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

which measures would work if implemented. None of it relates to Tsafendas or the assassination.⁶²⁰³

SAREL JOHANNES VENTER

He was a major in the South African police, attached to the staff of the Divisional Commissioner in Cape Town. His testimony concerns discussions he had in the past regarding security in the House of Assembly. It includes nothing about Tsafendas.⁶²⁰⁴

ROBERT JOHN MCFARLANE⁶²⁰⁵

⁶²⁰³ Hendrik Klopper testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol.: 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁶²⁰⁴ Sarel Johannes Venter's statement, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁶²⁰⁵ Robert John McFarlane testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA; Robert John McFarlane testimony to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

McFarlane, Secretary to the House of Assembly, gave evidence twice to the Commission, but there is nothing in his statements relevant to Tsafendas, who is not even mentioned. His first testimony mainly concerned internal security arrangements such as the duties of police, reception of parcels and vetting procedures. McFarlane testified for a second time on October 25, 1966, answering questions from the Commission about security arrangements in the House. These ranged over the quality and availability of messengers, screening practices and the question of previous convictions. McFarlane said the current system had operated without fault since 1910 and the House had employed many thousands of messengers.⁶²⁰⁶

⁶²⁰⁶ Robert John McFarlane testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA; Robert John McFarlane testimony to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

LETTERS AND MEMORANDA

The following are important letters⁶²⁰⁷ and memoranda sent to the Commission. Several others were found but they did not contain anything significant or that has not been said already.

GENERAL HENDRIK J. VAN DEN BERGH'S MEMORANDUM TO THE COE⁶²⁰⁸

Memorandum

Testimony of Major-General H. J. Den Bergh - Commentary by Lieutenant General J.M. Keevy, Commissioner of the South African police.

1. *The circumstances surrounding the finding of S.A. Police file WD. 10/10/4102 are set out completely in the memorandum C. 8/66/4/1 of 14 October 1966 addressed to me by my Head Office, Pretoria, the original of which has already been submitted to the COE.*
2. *Paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of the same memorandum deals with SA Police Headquarters file C. 6/835/3697 (C. 6/1835/3697 is the correct reference number).*
3. *As a result of inquiries made by my Head Office, the indications are that this file was destroyed in 1963 when the Security Police moved from Wachthuis to Kompol building.*
4. *Destruction of files are maintained by the Archives Law 6/1962 which came into force on 14 May 1962 (see Proc. R103 of 1962) and the regulations issued thereunder (see Government Notice No. 1380 of 1963, published in Extraordinary Gazette 595 of 06/09/63). In addition to this the departmental instructions contained in Special Order 14A of 1961 (Annexure A) as read with Standing Order 340 (Annexure B) also applies.*
5. *In summary, the S.A. Police policy could be set out as follows:*
 - a) *General correspondence files from Head Office to division offices are kept under the Archives Law 6/1962 and regulations as they appear in Government Notice 1380 of 1963 published in Extraordinary Gazette 595 of 06/09/1963 and standing order 340 as amended. No correspondence files in the latter offices are thus destroyed unless proper authorization from the Director of Archives is obtained. Secret and confidential files are included. Of such files which are destroyed, proper record with archive authorisation affixed thereto, is kept.*

⁶²⁰⁷ Witnesses who, for whatever reason, were unable to testify physically to the Commission, sent their statements by post.

⁶²⁰⁸ General H. J. Den Bergh memorandum to the COE, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File VDSO 17-64, NASA.

b) *Standing destruction authorisation was obtained from the Director of Archives for the annual destruction of correspondence files in district and Station Commanders' offices, personal files, registers, forms, dockets, etc. in all offices, and it is in terms of the provisions of Order 340 and Special Order (A) 14A / 1961. This policy was also applicable for the year 1963.*

6. *Files at Headquarters, Pretoria, as well as Division Offices, of the nature of the missing Tsafendas file C. 6/1835/3697 (not C. 6/835/3697 as Home Affairs has it) should, according to existing orders be strictly treated by the provisions of the Archive Law and regulations. This means that a record must be kept of each file that was destroyed or transferred to an archive repository.*

7. *The S.A. Police maintains a uniform filing system, which however for obvious reasons cannot be used with the Security Police.*

8. *Concerning the reservation list of illegal immigrants, a list gets sent to Security Head Office, Pretoria, and all border posts which control the entering of persons in the RSA. This aspect has already been dealt with by way of a comprehensive memorandum submitted to the commission.*

9. *A list on which Tsafendas's name appears has been in the possession of the Security Police since 1965. The question whether they should not have established on 06.09.66 if his name appears on that list before unequivocally declaring that the police knew nothing of him, is an open one. The list covers persons prohibited from entering the country and as such the police accept that a person whose name appears on it, is not in the country.*

10. *Regarding the lack of safety measures at the Assembly, I want to explain that the whole matter is currently under consideration and review by all the parties concerned.*

11. *Finally, I refer to the desirability or otherwise that the names of the mentally deranged who could possibly be a threat to the country's rulers and the like, be given to the SA Police by the doctors who treat them. It could serve a useful purpose if their names are kept on file as applications from people who want to be employed in positions of security interest can be selected with greater thoroughness.*

Signed by J.M. Keevy. Commissioner of the South African police.

Cape Town 18 October 1966.

GORDON TOBIN'S MEMORANDUM TO THE COE⁶²⁰⁹

20 October 1966.

Subject: Vallie article in POST.

Sirs, I was present in the Cape Town offices of POST on September 24 1966, when Mr. M. "Sharkey" Isaacs, (a POST reporter) told Mr. Gordon Winter that he did not want to write an article about Isak Vallie and Demitrio Tsafendas. Mr. Isaacs told Mr. Winter that, according to Isak Vallie, Tsafendas had once been to his father's cafe in Tennant Street, District Six and that Tsafendas had mentioned that he was a Russian and that he had had dealings, swopping food for clothing, with fishermen on Russian fishing vessels off the coast of Walvis Bay, SWA. Mr. Winter asked Mr. Isaacs why he did not want to write the article about this matter. Mr. Isaacs replied that he was scared of being beaten up by the Vallie family because the Vallie family did not want the article published. Mr. Winter then said he would go and interview the Vallie family and get the story. At that stage I left the office.

Signed ... Gordon Tobin.

Witnessed ... (indecipherable name)

A.J. HARRISON'S LETTER⁶²¹⁰

⁶²⁰⁹ Gordon Tobin memorandum to the COE, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12. File: die Post aangeleentheid, NASA.

⁶²¹⁰ A.J. Harrison letter to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File 3. NASA.

The person referred to arrived in the shop at approximately 9.05 a.m. on September 6th, just after I had opened - he was the first customer and no one else entered the shop whilst I was serving him. He wore grey, baggy flannels, a white shirt and a light-coloured jacket. His general appearance gave me the impression that he was either a fisherman or a merchant seaman. He spoke fluent English and asked me for the prices of the sheath knives displayed in the shop window. I showed him two sheath knives and after looking at the first one, he placed it on the counter and then removed the second one from the sheath, asking why the knife was so tight to remove. I explained that it was a metal sheath with a spring clip, which prevented the knife from slipping out.

He then replaced the knife in the sheath and slipped it on the inside of his trousers with the leather top of the sheath facing outwards. He then removed the knife and once more asked the price. He tendered a R10.00 note from his wallet in payment. Whilst I was getting his change, he looked at an advertisement of a pistol and enquired whether one needed to have a licence to purchase same. I informed him in the affirmative. I did not enquire his reason for purchasing the knife and he tendered no reason for doing so. This was the first time I had seen this person and when I was called to the Identification Parade, I was absolutely certain that the person I identified was the person who had purchased the knife from me and now known to our nation as Demitrio Tsafendas.

IN ADDITION:

- On the 15th November, the Liberal Party of South Africa sent a letter informing the Commission that the members of the party had no knowledge of Tsafendas.⁶²¹¹
- A list from the Department of Home Affairs was sent to the Commission with the names on the Stop List of the Ministry. Tsafendas appears as Demitrio Tsafandakis and Demitrio Tsafendas, born in Lourenço Marques or Delogo Bay in 14.1.1918, listed in group G, interior file no/SA Police reference B7771.⁶²¹²

⁶²¹¹ Letter of Mrs. Klugman, secretary of the Liberal Party, to the Commission. 17 October 1966. K150. Vol. 6, File 3. NASA.

⁶²¹² Stop List of the Department of Home Affairs. K150, Vol. 3, File: Policie daraan. NASA.

ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

The resulting Report, thirty single-spaced, double-column pages consisting of eleven chapters and two annexures, purports to give a detailed account of Tsafendas's life. It looks impressively detailed and convincing to someone who is unaware of Tsafendas's life and is reading the Report to find out about him. However, despite the huge input, it is a mishmash of often superficial information, lacking answers to crucial questions, at times evasive and invariably denigratory where Tsafendas is concerned.

Surrendering any pretence to even-handedness, the Report goes into considerable detail when dealing with something that might fit the picture of a schizophrenic or apolitical Tsafendas, but is significantly less forthcoming when facts contradict such an image. In addition, the language used to describe Tsafendas is frequently of a belittling nature, often misrepresenting his character and intentions. What highlights the dishonesty of the document is that the evidence gathered by the Commission is materially very different from that which appears in its Report. The purpose of this section is to examine the errors in the Commission's Report, including its omissions and distortions. Those parts of the Report which are not discussed are free of error or contain nothing relevant. This is the list, with the Report's chapters:

Chapter I: Introduction

Chapter II: The History of Demitrio Tsafendas

Chapter III: Demitrio Tsafendas's Motives

Chapter IV: Were there Accomplices?

Chapter V: The Permit for Temporary Sojourn

Chapter VI: The Permit for Permanent Residence

Chapter VII: The Visa to Visit Rhodesia and Mozambique

Chapter VIII: Demitrio Tsafendas's Return via Durban on 8th March

Chapter IX: The Removal Order

Chapter X: The House of Assembly

Chapter XI: The Police

CHAPTER II: THE HISTORY OF DEMITRIO TSAFENDAS

Chapter II of the Commission's Report deals exclusively with Tsafendas's life, from the day he was born to the summary trial. According to the Commission, Tsafendas's "history has been compiled from information obtained from the sources referred to above. A part is derived from statements which Tsafendas made to policemen and other persons. Where any material fact has been supplied solely by Tsafendas, this is stated explicitly in this report."⁶²¹³ Tsafendas's life story in terms of chronological order and his travels is mostly accurate, but there are some places which he visited that are not mentioned, for example his second visit in London in 1962.

The analysis of the Report is presented in two parts. In the first, we will examine some general topics that are mentioned throughout the Report, such as Tsafendas's employment, his political ideas, his mental state etc. The second part deals with specific incidents mentioned in the Report, for example the vitally important *Eleni*, his fight with Vergos and so on.

⁶²¹³ Chapter II A, Paragraph 1.

PART I: GENERAL SUBJECTS

TSAFENDAS'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND IDEOLOGY

The Report ranges widely over Tsafendas's political activities, giving the impression that he was not as indifferent or "confused" about politics as he was portrayed at the summary trial.

The Report states:

- That Tsafendas was a member of the South African Communist Party from 1937 to 1942.⁶²¹⁴
- That the South African police had four files on him.⁶²¹⁵
- That he was dismissed from a job in Mozambique due to his Communist tendencies.⁶²¹⁶
- That he was suspected of disseminating Communist propaganda in Mozambique in the late 1930s.⁶²¹⁷
- That he was engaged in distributing Communist propaganda in South Africa in the early 1940s.⁶²¹⁸
- That he was on the Stop List of the Government because he was listed as Communist.⁶²¹⁹
- That his nine visa applications for entry to South Africa were all turned down because he was listed as a Communist.⁶²²⁰
- That the Department of Immigration had two files on him.⁶²²¹
- That he was reported by two different men to a South African security officer as a "dangerous Communist" and was also characterised as a "Communist bastard."⁶²²²
- That he expressed himself strongly against the South African Government and in favour of Communism.⁶²²³

⁶²¹⁴ Chapter II A, Paragraph 23.

⁶²¹⁵ Chapter XI, Paragraphs 4 and 5.

⁶²¹⁶ Chapter II A, Paragraph 19.

⁶²¹⁷ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²¹⁸ Chapter II A, Paragraph 26.

⁶²¹⁹ Chapter II B, Paragraphs 29-30. Chapter VI, Paragraphs 19-20.

⁶²²⁰ Chapter VI, Paragraphs 18 and 20.

⁶²²¹ Chapter IV, Paragraph 19; Chapter IV, Paragraph 20.

⁶²²² Chapter II C, Paragraph 29

⁶²²³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 32.

- That he was arrested and imprisoned by the Portuguese Public Security Police accused of making subversive statements.⁶²²⁴
- That he had attended several meetings of the Anti-Colonial Movement and the Anti-Apartheid Movement.⁶²²⁵
- That he tried to recruit people for an uprising in South Africa and Mozambique.⁶²²⁶

All of the above information is true, but every one of the points listed, apart from the last one, was already known to the public through the Press, therefore the Commission could not feasibly omit them. That Tsafendas was a former member of the SACP was something he admitted to the police when interrogated, was well-known to many of his friends and acquaintances and was published by *The Post* on 30th October, 1966 while the Commission was still collecting evidence. That Tsafendas was fired from a job in Mozambique because of his Communist tendencies, that he was placed on the Stop List because of his beliefs and that he was actively engaged in Communist propaganda while in South Africa in the early 1940s were all facts contained in various official documents and quoted by the South African Press.

However, Tsafendas's political activities were significantly more wide-ranging than those outlined by the Commission and extended over many years and many countries. The Commission omitted the majority of these activities while downplaying others. What was easy to ignore was information about Tsafendas given verbally to the police or to the Commission and this is perhaps one reason why so many statements have gone missing. Other important details may have been disregarded because the Commission thought them unimportant. What is likelier, however, is that a vigorous, politically engaged activist as suggested by this evidence was the very opposite of the vapid and pathetic figure the Commission persistently sought to present.

⁶²²⁴ Chapter III C, Paragraph 19.

⁶²²⁵ Chapter II B, Paragraph 32.

⁶²²⁶ Chapter II B, Paragraph 32.

OMISSIONS AND DOWNPLAYING OF TSAFENDAS'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Let us examine what has been said and what has been omitted or downplayed with regard to Tsafendas's political ideas and activities.

TSAFENDAS'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WHILE IN ENGLAND

*While in England, Tsafendas was noticed in the company of leftists. According to Tsafendas, some of these persons expressed the opinion in private discussions that the Prime Minister of South Africa should be shot, but he could not remember who had said so.*⁶²²⁷

According to Tsafendas he attended several political meetings in England, including meetings of the Committee of African Organizations, the Anti-Colonial Movement and the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

*Evidence was submitted to the Commission that Tsafendas had tried to recruit people to take part in an uprising in South Africa. He admits that he did in fact try to recruit people for an uprising, but says that his aim was confined to the Territory of Mozambique.*⁶²²⁸

The Commission here reveals that Tsafendas was politically active while in England. Once again, the information is correct, but the Commission has omitted important facts. The most significant of these concerns Tsafendas's political aims and activities at the time which are relevant to his motive for killing Dr. Verwoerd. Edward Furness, a South African living and working in London at the time, testified to the South African police that Tsafendas was "a regular visitor" to a Labour Party office which was used by members of the anti-apartheid movement, and that he had seen him there "in company of several members" of the movement. Furness testified that Tsafendas told him that he wanted to "create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power."⁶²²⁹

Not only was this testimony in the possession of the Commission, but Furness also gave evidence personally to the Commission. What is important is Tsafendas's reported willingness to do anything that would get the South African regime out of power. The statement demonstrates his eagerness to oppose apartheid a full six years before Dr.

⁶²²⁷ Chapter II B, Paragraph 31.

⁶²²⁸ Chapter II B, Paragraph 32.

⁶²²⁹ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Verwoerd's killing. It makes clear that Tsafendas's ultimate objective was the destruction of apartheid, with the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, if that should be necessary, an assist to that end. This is entirely compatible with what Tsafendas told the police when questioned about his motive (that he was "disgusted" with apartheid and hoped that "a change of policy would take place" after the killing⁶²³⁰) and it was what more than a hundred of witnesses said to the police, to the Commission and to the author. However, it was totally incompatible with the scene in court, where Tsafendas was presented as a man without any political interests, who in fact supported the Government, and who killed Dr. Verwoerd because of a tapeworm he believed lived inside him. Furness's statement could also have been used by the Commission when discussing Tsafendas's motive for killing Dr. Verwoerd, but again it is omitted.

A significant omission is Tsafendas's personal relationships in England. The Report says "*Tsafendas was noticed in the company of leftists,*" but it does not give any names. However, it was known to the Commission that Tsafendas associated while in London with Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt, the secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society and one of the leading figures in the modern anti-slavery movement who had characterised Tsafendas as "very simple-minded and not at all sinister."⁶²³¹ It was also known that he had met and associated with prominent anti-apartheid activists such as David Gardener,⁶²³² the Rev. Canon John Collins and Solly Sachs.⁶²³³

Furness, who testified both to the police and to the Commission, told the police that Tsafendas was "a regular visitor" to the offices of the anti-apartheid movement and that he had seen him "in company of several members of the party, including David Gardener" and that it was "beyond doubt that he associated" with the movement and its members.⁶²³⁴ He also told the police that an "African" man named "Tennison" was there regularly and often gave speeches.⁶²³⁵ Although the police were given only the first name of this "African," it should not have been difficult to deduce that the man was the ANC representative in London, Tennyson Xola Makiwane. He was, after all, a Black African and a prominent activist

⁶²³⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶²³¹ *The Guardian*, 30 September 1966: 10, 'Winding back.'

⁶²³² Edward Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966, K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶²³³ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²³⁴ Edward Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966, K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶²³⁵ Edward Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966, K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

associated with the British anti-apartheid movement.

When the name of Rowley Arenstein, the South African Communist lawyer and anti-apartheid activist, was mentioned by two witnesses during the investigation, the police and the Commission made inquiries about a possible connection, questioning Arenstein, his secretary and Tsafendas himself. It would seem obvious that Tsafendas would be asked about any links in London to prominent anti-apartheid activists. The Commission refers to Tsafendas's response to questions about Arenstein, first that he did not know him, then when faced with the witnesses' statements, that he had only a casual business acquaintanceship with him. The Commission's Report clearly suggests that there was no real connection between Tsafendas and Arenstein (this incident will be discussed later in this chapter). However, what is surprising is that it makes no reference to any of the London activists mentioned above or whether Tsafendas was asked to explain his knowledge of or relationship to any of them. It seems that the Commission did not find it necessary to find out, or, having found out, did not wish to make Tsafendas's anti-apartheid links public knowledge.

What suggests that Tsafendas must indeed have been asked about the London activists is that the Commission went to great lengths to find out about Tsafendas's relationship with people such as John Michaletos (discussed later in this chapter), who were far less important to the apartheid authorities than Sachs, Makiwane and Rev. Collins. Furthermore, the Commission appeared to have examined even the most far-fetched rumours about Tsafendas and his connections, even that he had murdered and raped women all over the world; since it specifically mentions these rumours in its Report (Chapter II B, Paragraph 43).

The absence of the London names is of particular interest in the case of Tennyson Makiwane. Tsafendas was very proud of his association with the anti-apartheid movement in London and his participation in demonstrations and meetings, and he talked widely, about his activities, especially his association with Makiwane. Witnesses who heard him talk of these matters included Fathers Minas Constandinou and Nikola Banovic, Mary Eendracht, Fotini Gavasiadis, Katerina Pnefma, Patrick O'Ryan and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis. As Tsafendas explained it, he did not have any personal relationships with the activists, they were not bosom friends; he had simply met them at anti-apartheid meetings and had volunteered his services as a helper. His association with them was basically running errands and helping out with small jobs required in any organized movement. The fact that Makiwane and Sachs are mentioned by different witnesses confirms Tsafendas's claims, and when Tsafendas returned to South Africa in 1963, his bags contained a large quantity of anti-apartheid literature. He

told witnesses that it was given to him by members of the British anti-apartheid movement, though he did not mention any names.⁶²³⁶

Furness's statement to the Commission was not found in the archives, therefore we cannot know what he said and whether he gave additional information about Tsafendas's activities in London. However, Tsafendas subsequently told Father Minas Constandinou that he was surprised that the police knew so much about what he did at this time and place.⁶²³⁷ It is interesting that in his statement to the police, Tsafendas volunteers information about some of his activities in London, while omitting reference to his political activism elsewhere, for example his 1965 arrest in Beira or his participation in the Greek Civil War. This would clearly suggest that he was specifically asked about his activities during his time in London.

Finally, the Commission has used the English language in such a way as to raise doubts regarding the veracity of Tsafendas's statements. It may not be obvious to non-native English speakers, but the expression "*According to Tsafendas ...*" suggests that it was only Tsafendas who mentioned his activities. That could imply that there was doubt as to the veracity of his statement because he alone was quoted. However, the Commission knew his claims were true because Furness had confirmed them in his statement. The phraseology used by the Commission seemed intended to cast doubt on the truth of Tsafendas's comments. The inescapable conclusion is that the Commission either considered Tsafendas's association with leading members of the anti-apartheid and anti-slavery movements in London to be unimportant, or it suppressed the information in order not to link Tsafendas in any way with the ANC and such well-known activists.

TSAFENDAS'S IMPRISONMENT IN PORTUGAL IN 1949

*Apparently the Portuguese authorities would not accept Tsafendas's refugee passport, nor his claim that he was a Portuguese subject, the result being that he was arrested at the border post Barca d'Alva on 8th February, 1949. It appears that he was afterwards detained for a long time.*⁶²³⁸

The Commission deals with Tsafendas's arrests and imprisonments in Portugal in fewer than fifty words which contain one blatant inaccuracy and lack any semblance of factual detail. As such, the Commission seriously underplays the significance of these events.

⁶²³⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶²³⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶²³⁸ Chapter II B, Paragraph 17.

Tsafendas was indeed arrested at Barca d'Alva but the date was November 8, 1949, not February 8, 1949. He was detained because of doubts about his passport and his claim to Portuguese citizenship. The passport in fact was valid and the Lourenço Marques authorities informed the Portuguese police that Tsafendas was indeed a Portuguese citizen. However, they added that he had been dismissed from a job for "voicing Communist ideas" and that he was suspected of "spreading Communist propaganda" although "nothing was proven."⁶²³⁹ It was because of these two incidents, not the passport, that Tsafendas was detained and interrogated. While he arrested on the passport issue, he was subsequently detained for a lengthy period because of the two incidents.

As for the Commission's vague reference to "a long time in detention," Tsafendas was held at Barca d'Alva for three months, then transferred to the Aljuba Prison for political prisoners in Lisbon, where he remained for several more months.⁶²⁴⁰ The Commission was aware of the reasons for Tsafendas's lengthy detention, but omitted them whilst implying that he was held over a passport problem.

TSAFENDAS'S IMPRISONMENT IN PORTUGAL IN 1952

A more important omission by the Commission, one that was left out altogether, concerned a further term of imprisonment in Portugal. After being denied entry to Mozambique in 1951 and informed that he was now banned from the country, Tsafendas was sent back to Portugal. Upon his return to Lisbon in January 1952, he was detained for the usual reasons - his 1930s Communist and anti-Portuguese activities in Mozambique.⁶²⁴¹ This time he was held in the notorious Cascais (Caxias) Fort.⁶²⁴² That establishment and Aljuba were the two facilities set

⁶²³⁹ PIDE Confidential Report about Demitrio Tsafendas, 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²⁴⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT

⁶²⁴¹ Confidential Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no: 2.077- S.R., 3 May 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; *Diario Popular*, 9 September 1966, 'E conhesido em Lisboa o assassino do Dr. Verwoerd.'

⁶²⁴² PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 5 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; *Diario Popular*, 9 September 1966, 'E conhesido em Lisboa o assassino do Dr. Verwoerd.'

aside for political prisoners. Both were effectively run by the PIDE.⁶²⁴³

Historically, military courts dealt with suspicions of political dissent. Later, this responsibility was handed to the PIDE, whose officers decided who should be arrested -- in practice all those who opposed or might oppose the government -- and how long they should serve. By the time Tsafendas was arrested, many hundreds of political prisoners filled these two gaols and reports were widespread of ill-treatment, including beatings, cigarette burns, tiny damp cells, and permanent darkness. These and more systematic tortures were reported in 1962 by an Amnesty International investigation that confirmed appalling conditions in both prisons.⁶²⁴⁴

Tsafendas himself was tortured in Cascais Fort by the administration of electric shocks aimed at discovering if he supported any active movements for the independence of Mozambique.⁶²⁴⁵ Although he was a political prisoner for almost a year in 1949 and another year in 1952, the Commission omitted this information from its Report. This was despite the fact that Judge van Wyk was well aware of them from PIDE's report, Tsafendas's own statement and Hartford's interview, all of which mentioned both arrests.

Also missing from the Commission's Report are the names of the two prisons, evidently because questions would be asked as to why a person held on a travel issue should be incarcerated in a prison for political offenders. It seems inescapable that the Commission's omissions regarding Tsafendas's second arrest and his incarceration in political prisons were intended to conceal the real extent of Tsafendas's political engagement.

TSAFENDAS'S ARREST IN MOZAMBIQUE IN 1964

On 16th November, 1964, Tsafendas was arrested by the Portuguese Security Police for making subversive statements. These statements show strong feelings against Portugal. On this occasion, according to his statement to the Police, he was under the influence of liquor. During his detention he read books written in Bantu languages, but never the Bible. On 26th

⁶²⁴³ Vincent (*The Spectator*), 12 April 1962: 11, 'The shame of Portugal.' Available at <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/13th-april-1962/11/the-shame-of-portugal>

⁶²⁴⁴ Vincent (*The Spectator*), 12 April 1962: 11, 'The shame of Portugal.' Available at <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/13th-april-1962/11/the-shame-of-portugal>

⁶²⁴⁵ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3, 'Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.'; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

January, 1965, he was released.⁶²⁴⁶

All of the above information is correct. However, very little is vouchsafed about Tsafendas's conduct while his political activity is downgraded or omitted. Importantly, the Commission ignored another arrest, again for subversive propaganda, that took place only a few days after he was released. We will examine this case below.

The details of Tsafendas's November 16 arrest and imprisonment on serious charges, are not given in the Report, which appears to treat the incident as some sort of alcoholic peccadillo. The political ideas and statements Tsafendas made to the police are nowhere to be seen, although they were known to the Commission. In reality, Tsafendas was arrested in Maforga, a small town five miles from Gondola, on November 16, 1964, by the Portuguese Public Security Police, accused of "making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses." He was taken to a police sub-station in Beira for interrogation.⁶²⁴⁷ This was known to the Commission.

When the police discovered that his suitcase contained books that were anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist and pro-Communist, as well as several Bibles, he was accused of pretending to be a missionary spreading Christianity, while actually preaching "under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence..."⁶²⁴⁸ Due to the seriousness of the charges, he was handed over to the Sub-Delegation of PIDE in Beira.⁶²⁴⁹ There, he was interrogated by PIDE's Sub-Inspector, Joaquim Piçara Sabino, Brigade Chief Augusto de Sousa Maia, and agent Virgílio Francisco.⁶²⁵⁰

While in custody, Tsafendas was asked by the police if he had "dedicated himself to preach as a missionary and, under the guise of this same religion, advertised in favour of Mozambique's independence." Tsafendas replied that he was "a Christian who considers himself a representative of God on earth, a missionary that wishes he could preach the

⁶²⁴⁶ Chapter III C, Paragraph 19.

⁶²⁴⁷ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²⁴⁸ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁶²⁴⁹ PIDE report about the Defendant: Demitrio Tsafendas or Dimitrius Tsafendakis. 19 January 1965. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; PIDE report regarding Demitrio Tsafendas or Dimitrius Tsafendakis, 19 January 1965. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas

⁶²⁵⁰ PIDE Record of questions. 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

Christian religion but that he is not allowed to because, on this earth, there is no freedom of expression.” He maintained, however, that he strongly supported the independence of Mozambique, but was not a member of any subversive group.⁶²⁵¹ The information concerning his religious activities and non-subversive support for Mozambican independence support was probably not known to the Commission since PIDE omitted it from the report they gave to the South African police.

Even so, the Commission was certainly in possession of a statement by Inspector Horacio Ferreira, the officer in charge of the police cells where Tsafendas was kept for some fourteen days after his arrest. This statement was found in the Commission's archives in NASA and used in the Report for its reference to Tsafendas reading books in Bantu languages. It was Inspector Ferreira who stated that during his detention, Tsafendas was often seen to read books written in “Bantu languages, but never the Bible.” However, Inspector Ferreira's statement provided information of much greater importance than Tsafendas's choice of reading matter, information which the Commission chose to ignore. Ferreira characterised Tsafendas as “intense anti-white” and someone convinced that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for its non-whites.” He also said he considered Tsafendas to be “normal” and “a very intelligent person.”⁶²⁵² Although Inspector Ferreira was able to observe Tsafendas in detention for fourteen days, the Commission used the least significant of his observations; that is what Tsafendas read while in custody. That he was characterised as “intense anti-white,” “anti-Portuguese” and “a very intelligent person” are omitted.

As for the reference to liquor, the PIDE report held by the Commission said that Tsafendas had confessed to making anti-Portuguese statements but added that “he was under the influence of liquor and also under exultations (excitement).” However, according to the PIDE report, Tsafendas also made it clear to his interrogators that “these words were caused by the ideas which he had about the independence of Mozambique, a Mozambique governed by natives whether white or black, but separate from the mother-country.” The PIDE reported concluded that “although, as above mentioned, Tsafendas is mentally disabled, the truth is

⁶²⁵¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²⁵² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, File 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

you find in him a true spirit of rebellion against the ruling institutions, and a clear adhesion to the independence of Mozambique.”⁶²⁵³

None of the above is mentioned in the Commission's Report, although it was all set out in the PIDE report to the South African police which was in the Commission's possession. Tsafendas's political convictions, especially his support for the independence of Mozambique, are all omitted, while his anti-Portuguese stance is attributed to liquor. Although Tsafendas had made it clear that these words were his ideas, despite the fact that he had been drinking, the Commission conveniently omitted Tsafendas's whole statement and included the comment about the liquor, thus giving a completely different picture of the incident and of Tsafendas.

It is no surprise, therefore, that Tsafendas's most “dangerous” political statement, his carefully considered prescription for a future Mozambique as an independent country “governed by natives whether white or black, but separate from the mother-country,” does not see the light of day. In summary, Tsafendas's political activities and convictions, most importantly his support for an independent Mozambique and his efforts to raise awareness for this cause, are downgraded, omitted or offhandedly attributed to alcohol and thus of little consequence.

TSAFENDAS'S SECOND ARREST BY THE PORTUGUESE SECURITY POLICE IN MOZAMBIQUE

Tsafendas's arrest and imprisonment in Lisbon in 1952 is not the only one omitted from the Report. Soon after his release in January 1965, in the incident discussed just above, Tsafendas was arrested again by the Portuguese police in Mozambique and this arrest is not to be found in the Commission's Report. Newspapers worldwide such as the British *Daily Mirror* and *The Daily News*, *The Herald* of Melbourne, Australia, the *Rhodesia Herald* and the *Herald African News Service*, as well as *The Star* in South Africa, plus many others reported clearly that Tsafendas was twice arrested, detained and questioned about “suspicious activities” while in Mozambique, and not just once as stated by the Commission in its Report.⁶²⁵⁴ The *Dagbreek* had referred to three arrests and had even reported that Tsafendas

⁶²⁵³ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²⁵⁴ *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 8 September 1966: 1, ‘The killer: Five passports and a record of subversion’; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September

had “clashed with the law in the USA and Mozambique, and especially his activities in Mozambique left a huge question mark over and around his name.”⁶²⁵⁵ According to these Press reports, the second arrest, which the Report omitted, was Tsafendas being arrested in Beira “after being seen in cafes with Coloured political suspects.”⁶²⁵⁶

Press reports aside, the South African embassy in Lisbon, on September 7, the day after the assassination, informed the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Cape Town that Tsafendas “has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances, including shouting pro-Communist anti-Portuguese slogans.” It went on to say “if information correct, we suspect Portuguese may play down assassin’s previous political activities and we would suggest full details in this connection be sought.”⁶²⁵⁷ However, the Commission mentions only one arrest in Mozambique, the one in November 16, 1964.

Shortly after his release from PIDE custody on January 26, Tsafendas found a job as an interpreter at the docks in Beira. However, he was dismissed after attempting to organise a strike. The dock owner did not report the incident to the police because he was a friend of Tsafendas’s brother-in-law, Gerry Pnema, and did not want to cause him trouble.⁶²⁵⁸ A few days later, Tsafendas was in a bar with several Mozambicans and Greeks, among them Andreas Babiolakis, Costas Poriadis and Nick Papadakis. At one point, Tsafendas bought beer for everyone, then paraphrasing Mark Anthony in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*, happily called out, “Friends, countrymen, lend me your glasses.” However, when he called on them to drink to a recent attack by FRELIMO rebels, everyone froze and lowered their glasses untouched while Tsafendas downed his beer. The bar owner politely asked Tsafendas to leave and he never returned.⁶²⁵⁹

The next day, Tsafendas was arrested by the Portuguese police because of his comments at the bar and his activities at the docks which the police had learned about by then. However, he was released almost immediately because the police had by now accepted

1966: 1, ‘Assassin said to have been deported from P.E.A. for Communist connections.’ *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, ‘Assassin had five passports.’

⁶²⁵⁵ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas het vir V.V. in Persie gewerk.’

⁶²⁵⁶ *Daily Mirror*, 9 September 1966: 11, ‘The clouded past of an assassin.’

⁶²⁵⁷ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶²⁵⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶²⁵⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

that he was “mentally ill and therefore not chargeable at a juridical or penal level” and there was no point in detaining him any longer.⁶²⁶⁰

It is likely that the Commission was unaware of the details of this arrest. However, since two arrests were reported widely by the South African media, the Commission might have been expected to make inquiries, as it did with other, less important and far-fetched, stories about Tsafendas. The second arrest was well-known within the Greek Community in Beira and Gondola, and Tsafendas gave evidence twice to the Commission and could have answered questions about the issue.

TSAFENDAS'S ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE IN 1951

*In October, 1951, Tsafendas left Portugal for Lourenço Marques where he was not allowed to land, the result being that he was forced to return to Portugal in January, 1952.*⁶²⁶¹

The Commission here omits the reason Tsafendas was “not allowed to land” in Mozambique – that he was listed as Communist and suspected of involvement in subversive activities. PIDE had withheld this information from the reports it gave to the South African police, but Antony Maw, Greece's honorary Consul in Lourenço Marques, revealed to the South African police that the refusal was due to Tsafendas's “suspected Communist tendencies.”⁶²⁶²

Furthermore, Tsafendas deportation was published in the South African Press, with at least three newspapers, *The Daily News*, the *Pretoria News* and *The Star* reporting that Tsafendas was deported from Mozambique because of “Communist activities.”⁶²⁶³ Also absent is Tsafendas's arrest in Lourenço Marques following a refusal to be “allowed to land,” and his subsequent two weeks' imprisonment when he was interrogated by the Portuguese police regarding his past “unclear activities.”⁶²⁶⁴ This information was also omitted by PIDE and not reported by the South African Press of the time.

⁶²⁶⁰ Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁶²⁶¹ Chapter II B, Paragraph 23.

⁶²⁶² Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁶²⁶³ *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, ‘Dimitrio a Red, they alleged’; *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, ‘Assassin had five passports.’

⁶²⁶⁴ PIDE Record of questions. 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; PIDE Confidential Report about Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

Yet another omission is Tsafendas's extraordinary appendicitis deception. When he learned that he would not be allowed off the ship that had taken him to Lourenço Marques, Tsafendas doubled up dramatically, pretending to be in terrible pain from appendicitis. He was rushed to a hospital ashore, from which he calmly walked out, but was apprehended sometime later. The appendicitis trick spread through the entire Greek community in Lourenço Marques, although none of those questioned mentioned it to the police. Antony Maw, in his statement to the police, said only that Tsafendas had "claimed illness,"⁶²⁶⁵ without specifying it, though he was well aware of the appendicitis act.⁶²⁶⁶

TSAFENDAS'S EXILE

The Commission's Report makes no reference at all to the fact that Tsafendas was banned from entering and residing in Mozambique, the country of his birth, and was forced to live in exile from 1951 to 1963.⁶²⁶⁷ Nor is there mention of the fact that he had made at least six applications to be allowed to return in Mozambique since 1939 and all were turned down. PIDE had removed this information from the reports they gave to the South African police, presumably because they would have had to include the reasons for the banning, which were Tsafendas's Communist and anti-colonialist ideas and activities. PIDE's omission was compatible with its director's order to withhold from the South African police "any information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique."⁶²⁶⁸

However, Tsafendas had spoken about his exile when interrogated by the South African police, stating that in August or September, 1963, he "received amnesty" in order to be allowed to return to Mozambique.⁶²⁶⁹ One receives amnesty to return to a country only after being banned from residing there. The issue of the amnesty will be discussed again shortly. Furthermore, the fact that he was forced to live in exile was published not only in the South African Press, but worldwide.⁶²⁷⁰ Therefore, the Commission was aware of it but chose

⁶²⁶⁵ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

⁶²⁶⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶²⁶⁷ Confidential Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no: 2.077- S.R., 03 May 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Letter of a police agent to the Ministry of Interiors regarding Tsafendas's exile. 30 October 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²⁶⁸ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²⁶⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶²⁷⁰ *The Chronicle*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas: Mystery man of parliament'; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man''; *The Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'The killer';

to omit it, either because it felt that Tsafendas being exiled from Mozambique for his Communist and anti-colonial activities was not worth mentioning or it wished to downplay the extent of Tsafendas's political activism.

TSAFENDAS'S AMNESTY IN 1963

*In 1963 he left Portugal for Lourenço Marques where he stayed with an uncle for a short time.*⁶²⁷¹

This single sentence makes no mention of the fact that Tsafendas was given an amnesty by the Portuguese Government and that is why he was allowed to return to Mozambique. That Tsafendas had received an amnesty by the Portuguese Government was known to the South African police as he had told them so when he was interrogated on the 11th of September: "In August or September, 1963, I received amnesty and the Social Services agreed to pay my boat fare to Lourenço Marques. I left immediately on the Princippi Porfeeto and arrived in L.M. during approximately October, 1963."⁶²⁷²

Paragraph 41 provides an obvious opportunity for the Commission to report the amnesty, but it fails to do so. The reason seems obvious: if the Commission had mentioned that Tsafendas received amnesty from the Portuguese Government, the question would have been, "Why did he need an amnesty to return to the country in which he was born and of which he was a citizen?" Amnesties were for people who had been convicted of an offence, so the next question would have been, "what had Tsafendas done?"

It is just possible that the Commission considered the amnesty question not important enough to include in its Report. It is much more likely that the Commission deliberately suppressed the information as it would have demonstrated that Tsafendas was more politically active than was known at the time, which was why he was in exile from Mozambique for all those years. This would be just one omission, a minor one in comparison to the others, by the Commission regarding Tsafendas's political activities and involvement.

Pretoria News, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dimitrio a Red, they alleged'; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin said to have been deported from P.E.A. for Communist connections.'; *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, 'Assassin had five passports.'

⁶²⁷¹ Chapter II B, Paragraph 41.

⁶²⁷² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

TSAFENDAS IN GREECE (Chapter II B, Paragraphs 11-15) AND HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE CIVIL WAR

All the evidence regarding Tsafendas's participation in this war is presented in Chapter Two of this study. To describe Tsafendas's movements while in Greece, the Commission uses mostly information taken from his September 11 statement to the South African police. The fact that he had joined the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), the military wing of the Greek Communist Party, during the Greek Civil War is omitted. At least seven witnesses, Cleanthes Alachiotis, Nikolaos Billis, Elias Constantaras, Nikolas Kambouris, Giorgos Kantas, Grigoris Pouftis and Michalis Vasilakis, had testified to the South African police that Tsafendas told them he had joined the DSE during the Civil War. His participation in the war was also known to some of his close friends, like Babiolakis, Papadakis, Poriadis and Kyriakakis, although they had not testified to the police. Some relatives, including Katerina Pnema and Mary Eendracht, were also aware of it, but had not reported it to the police.

A statement by the *Eleni* seaman, Nicolas Mavronas that was found in the NASA, says Tsafendas told the crew that "he joined the Greek army during the war and that he is an expert shot."⁶²⁷³ The army Mavronas referred to was the DSE, and the war was the Civil War, the most recent war in Greece. The South African policeman who took Mavronas' statement did not specify the war Tsafendas talked about and seemed to assume it was the Second World War. Six seamen who participated in the *Eleni* conversation and were interviewed by the South African Police and by the author said they clearly remembered Tsafendas saying he served with the Allied Navy during the Second World War and with the DSE during the Greek Civil War. They were positive that Tsafendas never said he joined the Greek regular army. None of them doubted him because it was clear that he knew about the DSE and how it was organized and operated.⁶²⁷⁴ The Commission was in possession of Mavronas' statement, but it made no mention of what he said regarding Tsafendas joining the Greek Army and being an expert shot. Ignoring this important information, it went instead into great detail about some far-fetched rumours and information concerning Tsafendas and how it investigated them and found them to be untrue.

⁶²⁷³ Nicolas Mavronas statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

⁶²⁷⁴ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

More rumours were contained in a report submitted to the Commission by the *Die Landstem* newspaper. The Commission examined some of these rumours and declared them to be untrue. However, the telegram also contained some correct references to Tsafendas, for example how he left South Africa by sea during the Second World War and the dates of his entry to some of the countries to which he travelled. The Commission refers to this telegram in Chapter II B, Paragraph 43, where a whole section deals with rumours about Tsafendas:

“At a relatively late stage, the Commission received information from a weekly newspaper that there were rumours that Tsafendas had fled from South Africa, because he was wanted by the police for attempted murder, that he had committed a murder in Mozambique, that he had raped and seriously assaulted a woman in Montreal, that he had raped and assaulted a White Woman in Ontario, that he had blown up a ship with dynamite in Boston, that in New York he was found on his way to the docks with explosives, that in Greece he was suspected of murders and rapes, that in Portugal he had strangled and raped a young girl, that in Germany he was suspected of murders. Tsafendas denies all these allegations. From the information at the Commission's disposal, it appears unlikely that the allegations concerning the reason for his departure from South Africa in 1942 have any foundation. The same applies to the alleged crimes in Canada, the United States of America, Portugal and Mozambique. No evidence of any other alleged crimes came to the knowledge of the Commission. As yet no reply has been received to some of the enquiries that were made, and should any information worthy of mention come to hand after the submission of this report, it will be given in a supplementary report.”

However, *Die Landstem's* telegram also contained the following information:

*“In 1947 he was sent to Greece which was in a bad state after WWII. There was general hunger, food shortages and unemployment among the Greek people. Tsafendas wandered around starving and without shelter until he joined the Greek Communist Party with whom he fought against the Greek Government.”*⁶²⁷⁵

While taking pains to set out a series of wild rumours, and then discount them, the Commission failed to mention Tsafendas's participation with the Communists in the Greek Civil War. This must have sounded far more real than all the other material since Tsafendas had admitted to the South African police and to the Commission that he was a member of the

⁶²⁷⁵ *Die Landstem* telegram. n.d. K150, Vol 5. NASA.

SACP in the late 1930s and early 1940s. More importantly, Tsafendas was indeed in Greece during the Civil War. Even if the Commission had previously been unaware of this fact, it was no aware of the fact and could have researched the matter further.

It seems possible that the Commission dismissed Mavronas' statement in the belief that it was inaccurate since Tsafendas was known not to be in Greece during the Second World War, the war the Commission wrongly assumed Mavronas was referring to. However, on other occasions when a witness gave inaccurate evidence to the Commission, Judge van Wyk pointed it out. For example, in Chapter II B, Paragraph 41, the Report says:

"In 1963 he left Portugal for Lourenço Marques where he stayed with an uncle for a short time. One witness alleged that he saw Tsafendas in Zambia during June, as well as in various other months in 1963. Tsafendas denies that he ever visited that country, and says that he did not leave Portugal until August or September, 1963."

The author is not in position to know whether the missing statements from the *Eleni* crew were suppressed by the Commission or whether they were never given to it. The fact that they were not found in the NASA does not necessarily mean that they were not given to the Commission, since almost seventy statements taken by the Commission itself have now gone missing and clearly these statements were in the hands of the Commission at the time.

The Commission also attempted to locate John Michaletos, the man who recruited Tsafendas to the DSE in 1947. First, the South African police asked Costas Michaletos about John Michaletos, claiming that they had found a letter by him, sent from Greece, in Tsafendas's possession. It was known that Tsafendas corresponded with various people around the world and it is likely that the police found some of these letters at the time of his arrest. Therefore, why would the police ask about someone in Greece corresponding with him? It could have been the contents of the letter (which was not found in the archives), but it could also have been that Tsafendas told the police or the Commission during interrogation that he had joined the DSE during the Greek Civil War and that John Michaletos had recruited him. Costas Michaletos characterised John Michaletos to the South African police as an "active communist" in 1952. This suggests that he was also "active" during the Civil War which had ended only three years earlier. It also suggests that Costas Michaletos was possibly asked specifically about John Michaletos's political ideas.

Inquiries by the police and the Commission about John Michaletos did not stop after the approach to Costas Michaletos. Indeed, the authorities went to great lengths to find out

more about this Communist Michaletos. Apparently they did not see him just as someone who just wrote letters to Tsafendas. On November 7, 1966, the Commission of Enquiry contacted the Portuguese Embassy in Pretoria "requesting any possible information regarding an individual named John Machletos from whom, allegedly, Demitrio Tsafendas, who claims to be a Portuguese citizen, would have received mail from abroad." The Commission's request was passed by the embassy to the Director General of PIDE in Lisbon.⁶²⁷⁶ On November 17, PIDE sent a letter to the Director-General for Political Affairs and Internal Administration in Lisbon stating that "there are no records of John Machletos in the registries of this Police."⁶²⁷⁷

The question is: Would the Commission have gone to these lengths about a simple letter-writer? Tsafendas corresponded regularly with people abroad, like Father Nikola Banovic in Istanbul and George Grispos in Rhodesia, and the Commission made no inquiries about them. That said, it cannot be ruled out that the South African authorities did not become aware of such information.

Since John Michaletos was a Greek and lived in Greece at the time, the first and most logical thing for the Commission to do would have been to contact the Greek authorities. However, it seems that, assuming they were contacted, the Greece authorities were unable to locate Michaletos and the Commission then turned to the Portuguese. The request, made on November 7, came two weeks after Tsafendas's summary trial, suggesting that contacts with the Greeks could have had taken up the intervening period. Given the Greek government's readiness to help the South African police, as already demonstrated by its co-operation over the *Eleni*, it would surely have been willing to help the South Africans with the Michaletos request, too. A possible explanation for the Greeks' failure to locate Michaletos is that his name was misspelled by the Commission. It appeared as *Machletos* in the Commission's request and also in the PIDE letter to the government in Lisbon, therefore it is very possible that it was also misspelled when it was given to the Greek authorities.

There are no records of any of the Commission's requests in the National Archives of South Africa. However, the Portuguese National Archives contain the Commission's request

⁶²⁷⁶ Confidential Letter of the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Director of PIDE requesting information regarding John Machletos. 7 November 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²⁷⁷ Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Mr. Director-General for Political Affairs and Internal Administration regarding John Machletos. 16 November 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

in PIDE's file on Tsafendas. There are no records of Tsafendas in the Greek National Archives and therefore it cannot be ascertained with certainty whether the Greek authorities were indeed contacted by the South Africans. Would the Commission have made enquiries to PIDE about a childhood friend who was just writing to Tsafendas? Although the Commission tried strenuously to locate this man, he is not mentioned in the Report.

TSAFENDAS BEING A COMMUNIST

Within twenty-four hours of Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, all of South Africa knew from the Press and radio that Tsafendas was a Communist who had been deported from Mozambique because of his Communist beliefs and activities.⁶²⁷⁸ Further reports in the ensuing days added details to the sketchy early dispatches.⁶²⁷⁹ Despite this, the word Communism was never heard during his summary trial. On 30th October, while the Commission was still at work, *The Post* newspaper revealed that Tsafendas had been a member of the SACP.⁶²⁸⁰

As with the public, it was the day after the assassination, 7th of September, that the South African authorities themselves learned of Tsafendas's adherence to Communism. On that day, the South African Embassy in Lisbon informed the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Cape Town that Tsafendas "has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances, including shouting pro-Communist anti-Portuguese slogans ... if information correct, we suspect Portuguese may play down assassin's previous political activities and we would suggest full details in this connection be sought."⁶²⁸¹

As we have seen, the Portuguese did exactly what was said in this telegram, but the South African police made no great effort to discover more about these political activities. They appeared simply to accept what was given to them by the Portuguese. As for the Commission, although it included in its Report that Tsafendas was a Communist and a former

⁶²⁷⁸ *Pretoria News*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Dimitrio a Red, they alleged.'

⁶²⁷⁹ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, 'Tsafendas het vir V.V. in Persie gewerk.'; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man''; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 8 September 1966: 1, 'The killer: Five passports and a record of subversion'; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin said to have been deported from P.E.A. for Communist connections'; *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, 'Assassin had five passports.'

⁶²⁸⁰ *The Post*, 30 October 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas: I was a communist.'

⁶²⁸¹ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

member of the SACP, both already known and published facts, it soft-pedalled the extent and the significance of his political activities and involvement with Communism.

TSAFENDAS DESCRIBED AS A COMMUNIST BY WITNESSES WHO KNEW HIM

A number of Tsafendas's acquaintances and workmates testified that Tsafendas was a Communist; Vergos even describing him as "the biggest Communist in the Republic."⁶²⁸² However, only a few of these statements were included in the Report. A detailed account of Tsafendas's Communist activities and statements about his political ideology can be seen in his biography in Chapter Two. More statements can be seen in Chapter Four.

Durban Men's Home

*On 21st June, 1965, he moved into the Durban Men's Home, Durban, where he lived until 24th August, 1965. At this home he expressed himself strongly against the South African Government and in favour of Communism.*⁶²⁸³

This information is correct but again important aspects of the situation are omitted, including Tsafendas's own words. The police and the Commission interviewed two people from Durban's Home and the Report is based on their testimonies. This is what they said:

Robert Smith, the night clerk at Durban Men's Home, told the police that Tsafendas was a "Communist," "a fanatic on politics and seldom spoke of anything else" and had said that "the United Party and National Party officials and members were capitalistic roughs." Tsafendas had also told him that the "South African Government's policy was 'rotten' and often compared conditions in South Africa with those in Russia, stating, 'Look at all the poor people in South Africa, such conditions don't exist in Russia because Russia is a Communistic state.'" Smith also testified that Tsafendas had "a large quantity of literature" but he did not "know the nature thereof."⁶²⁸⁴

Kenneth Ross was the manager in Durban Men's Home. He testified that Tsafendas was "very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in

⁶²⁸² Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²⁸³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 32.

⁶²⁸⁴ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

politics. Tsafendas objected to the Communists being banished to Robin-Island because of their political opinions and actions. In general, Tsafendas opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government, and was definitely pre-Russian. I am aware that Tsafendas possessed a large quantity of literature but did not take note of the names of the books he read.”⁶²⁸⁵

Tsafendas's comments to Smith and Ross vividly reflect the strength of his passion for Communism and his detestation of the South African government and its policies. They stand out in strong contrast to the generalised, fourteen-word statement by the Commission, that “*he expressed himself strongly against the South African Government and in favour of Communism.*” The vigour and intelligence of Tsafendas's condemnations challenge his diagnosis as schizophrenic at his summary trial. In condensing Tsafendas's views into a single sentence of indirect speech, the Commission deprives the reader of any sense of the man's convictions and thus his personality.

On the other hand, another section of the Report reproduces word for word what Tsafendas said to Dr. Sakinofsky about his political ideas. These too were strongly anti-government but they were discounted as the beliefs of a “deluded” person and therefore irrelevant and not to be taken seriously. They were included only to support the idea that Tsafendas was incapable of clear political thought. Thus the Report goes into detail when dealing with something negative about Tsafendas or something that will fit with the schizophrenic picture, but is much less detailed with anything that contradicts such an image. Tsafendas's words to those many witnesses flatly contradicted what he told Dr. Sakinofsky and what was heard about him at the summary trial, but the Commission chose to ignore them and write in vaguely generalised terms instead. In this way, it covered itself: it did not lie since Tsafendas had indeed spoken against the government, but by omitting his actual words, it ensured that the world did not learn the specifics of Tsafendas's beliefs or the truth of his passion. However, manipulative as ever, when it came to his so-called “deluded” comments, the Commission carried them in full.

Among the most important omissions were the description by Smith and Ross of Tsafendas as a “fanatic on politics,” well-versed on politics,” who “seldom spoke of anything

⁶²⁸⁵ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

else” This is what several other witnesses told the police and the author, too, some even describing him as a political animal. No mention of any of these statements is made in the Report. As we will see, even his arrest by the Portuguese in 1964 for political reasons will be attributed by the Commission simply to liquor.

Another omission is that Tsafendas had, according to both these witnesses, “a large quantity of literature” with him. Why would the Commission omit such an innocuous statement? Certainly it was not of major importance that Tsafendas had many books with him. However, it is a positive aspect of his character rather than a negative one and as such is consigned to the dust-bin by the Commission which invariably prefers the negative. What is more, the books reference is not as unimportant as it might seem, since it shows Tsafendas in a positive light, suggesting that, as several other witnesses testified, Tsafendas was well-read, cultured and educated, and not the dumb and hopeless wreck portrayed at the summary trial and by the Commission’s report.

Tsafendas’s political ideas, as mentioned by both witnesses, are lucid, well-grounded and perfectly logical, including, for instance, his stated opposition to the political imprisonment of Communists on Robben Island, but this, like all the others, is omitted in favour of vague generalisations. This evasive tactic by the Commission is a major issue since Tsafendas’s own words could never be considered by a neutral observer to be the words of a deluded schizophrenic who murdered Dr. Verwoerd because of a tapeworm.

Tsafendas and the “Roman Catholic” Priest

Chapter II C, Paragraph 30 deals with the testimony of a Roman Catholic priest who informed J.J. Botha, a factory security officer, that Tsafendas was a Communist. Botha passed this statement to the police. In addition, the Report says Tsafendas told the priest that he had been to Russia and that was where he learned all the languages he could speak. According to the Report, the priest also said that Tsafendas was hostile towards the Roman Catholic Church and the South African government.⁶²⁸⁶ The Commission does not name the priest, referring to him only as “a Roman Catholic priest,” although it knew his identity since he had testified about meeting Tsafendas to the police and to the Commission itself. His name was Hanno Probst.

⁶²⁸⁶ Chapter II C, Paragraph 30.

Although the priest's two statements quoted above are correct, three other elements from his evidence are omitted. First, Father Probst denounced Tsafendas as a Communist to a second security officer, Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren. He described Tsafendas as a "Communist and a dangerous person" and asked van Vuuren to "get rid of him."⁶²⁸⁷ It seems the Commission found this unimportant or wished to avoid the reference to Tsafendas being a dangerous person. The second omission concerned a report of Tsafendas's links to young Blacks in a local reserve. Father Probst testified to the Commission that he suspected Tsafendas of having "*some influence on the inhabitants of the Mangete Reserve. I say this because, during the period Demetrios Tsafendas stayed at Mandini, the youngsters in the Mangete Reserve became unruly and aggressive. This, however, is only suspicion because since the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd everything became quiet again and the youngsters controllable.*"⁶²⁸⁸

The Commission must have seen here the echo of something similar in Tsafendas's past. In Mozambique, Tsafendas had urged workers at a dock and at the Hume Pipe Company to go on strike. He had also toured the rural areas of Beira preaching in favour of Communism, for the independence of Mozambique and against the Portuguese policy of forced cotton. He was arrested and accused of "making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses."⁶²⁸⁹ According to the police he pretended to be a Christian missionary spreading the word about religion, while in reality, he was preaching "under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence..."⁶²⁹⁰ It is not impossible, given Tsafendas's past, that he did the same thing in the Mangete Reserve.

Finally, Father Probst testified that Tsafendas at one point started "swearing at the

⁶²⁸⁷ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²⁸⁸ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²⁸⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶²⁹⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

Mozambique government, saying it did nothing for the black people.”⁶²⁹¹ In thirteen words, Tsafendas demonstrated his antipathy for the colonialist government and his sympathy for the Blacks. It is not a hugely important statement but that it was omitted from the record is yet another example of Tsafendas's political engagement being hidden from the light of day.

TSAFENDAS AND ROWLEY ARENSTEIN

*Here he also made enquiries about the home address of an attorney Arenstein, a well-known communist.*⁶²⁹²

*Mrs. Theron, the wife of an attorney in Durban, gave evidence that on more than one occasion she had seen Tsafendas going to the office of the Arenstein referred to above. Tsafendas could not recollect the name Arenstein, but recognized a photograph of Arenstein as being that of a person resembling the attorney whom he went to consult in connection with a translation bureau which he wished to buy. He also explained in which building the office of the attorney he interviewed was, and this is exactly where Arenstein's office is situated. However, there are also other attorneys in the same building. Mr. Arenstein and his typist deny that Tsafendas ever visited him.*⁶²⁹³

Robert Smith, the night clerk at Durban Men's Home, told the police that Tsafendas had asked him if he knew Arenstein's residential address.⁶²⁹⁴ Esperanza Theron, wife of attorney Daniel B. Theron, testified to the police that the “offices occupied by my husband were situated adjacently the offices occupied by the listed communist, Rowley Arenstein. I was my husband's secretary and was thus always in the office. During 1965 or late 1964, I observed a White or Coloured male whom I have since identified from photographs in the newspapers as Demitrio Tsafendas, frequenting the offices of Rowley Arenstein. Demitrio Tsafendas used to pay visits to Arenstein's office regularly and on occasion he would greet me. I observed Demitrio Tsafendas actually entering the general office of Rowley Arenstein but am unable to state for what purpose he visited Arenstein. I am unable to state the period of time that he used to visit Arenstein, but the visits were very regular. I have also observed

⁶²⁹¹ Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶²⁹² Chapter II C, Paragraph 32.

⁶²⁹³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 33.

⁶²⁹⁴ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Demitrio Tsafendas in the presence of Rowley Arenstein walking down the corridor from Arenstein's office."⁶²⁹⁵

As result of Theron's testimony, Arenstein and Thelma Beryl Suddes, his secretary, were questioned by the police. She testified that "to the best" of her "knowledge" she had never seen Tsafendas in Arenstein's office.⁶²⁹⁶ Arenstein was questioned on September 24, 1966, by Brigadier Baster "at office No. 505, The Grays, Johannesburg, in connection with the assassination of the late Dr. Verwoerd."⁶²⁹⁷

At the time, Arenstein was in police custody accused of "furthering the aims of Communism" and was about to go on trial on such a charge. The last thing he wanted at such a time was to be involved with Tsafendas and the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. Was it remotely possible that he would admit to knowing Tsafendas? The same would apply to his secretary. The logic of their circumstances demanded that both would deny any knowledge of Dr. Verwoerd's alleged assassin. On October 31, 1966, Arenstein was sentenced to four years' imprisonment under the Suppression of Communism Act for furthering the aims of Communism.⁶²⁹⁸

Tsafendas later spoke at length to Father Minas Constandinou about meeting in Durban with a "Jewish Communist lawyer." The priest could not remember the name of the lawyer, but Ronnie Kasrils stated in a personal interview by the author that at the time "Arenstein was the only Jewish Communist lawyer in Durban."⁶²⁹⁹ Tsafendas was probably given his name by someone from the anti-apartheid movement in London.

Tsafendas's statement to the Commission has gone missing and therefore the author cannot know exactly what he said in evidence. According to the Commission's Report, Tsafendas did not remember Arenstein's name, but said he recognized a photograph of him as "a person resembling the attorney he went to consult in connection with a translation bureau which he wished to buy." Tsafendas's reply is very smart. Obviously realising that someone had seen him in Arenstein's office, he made up a story about a translation bureau as

⁶²⁹⁵ Eperanza Theron statement to the police, 24 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²⁹⁶ Thelma Beryl Suddes statement to the COE, 22 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²⁹⁷ Johannes Christoffel Broodryk statement to the COE, 24 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶²⁹⁸ South Africa History Online (n.d) *Rowley Israel Arenstein*.

⁶²⁹⁹ Ronnie Kasrils in a personal interview, 16 May 2016.

an explanation for meeting innocently with Arenstein. This was less risky than a flat denial since he could not be aware of who had testified.

What is surprising is that the Commission seemed to accept Tsafendas's word and Arenstein's denial. The explanation presumably was its readiness to downplay Tsafendas's political associations and activities, especially in connection with prominent Communists and anti-apartheid activists. An earlier example of this was Tsafendas's association with David Gardener, Solly Sachs and Rev. Canon Collins which were omitted completely.

TSAFENDAS'S THREAT AGAINST DR. VERWOERD

On 10th July, 1964, Mr. Vercuiel dismissed Tsafendas from employment with Messrs. F. A. Poole (Pty.), Ltd., because of the untidiness of his work and his constant quarrelling with the other workers. Mr. Vercuiel gave evidence that Tsafendas was most upset about this and uttered the following threat:

"You are just like your bloody Government. I will get you. I will also get your Prime Minister."

Mr. Vercuiel said that at the time he did not report this threat to any person, but when he heard that Tsafendas had stabbed Dr. Verwoerd to death, he immediately recalled the incident. In a statement in writing made in September, 1966, the alleged threat is worded as follows:

"You are just like your bloody Government. I will kill your Prime Minister yet." Mr. Vercuiel made a favourable impression, but the possibility that his memory played him false after such a long time had elapsed cannot be excluded."⁶³⁰⁰

This incident seems to be of no great importance, since Tsafendas's remarks are the sort of thing anyone might say in the heat of the moment. What is surprising is the Commission's attempt to downplay the flare-up by suggesting that Vercuiel might have got things wrong because of the passage of time. In fact, two years had passed since the incident, and the Commission did not offer the same excuse for witnesses' evidence made more than two years ago, for example Antony Maw, who described in detail events from 1951. The fact

⁶³⁰⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 10.

that the wording in the two statements is slightly different does not mean the witness misremembered the incident. The import of the statement is the same.

TSAFENDAS'S CHARACTERISATIONS OF DR. VERWOERD

Apart from reproducing Vercuiel's comment, the Report does not refer to anything Tsafendas said about Dr. Verwoerd, although several witnesses reported comments he freely made. Tsafendas himself spoke about the Prime Minister when questioned by the police. He said that he considered Dr. Verwoerd was not the true representative of South Africa. "I wanted to see a government representing all the South African people. I do not think the Nationalist Government is representative of the people and I wanted to see a different government."⁶³⁰¹ He further told the police that he was "disgusted with his (Dr. Verwoerd's) racial policies" and he said, "I always had a grudge against the South African Government on account of its racial policies and I hated Dr. Verwoerd because he was a foreigner - a Hollander."⁶³⁰² (The issue of foreigner/Hollander is discussed extensively in the previous chapter).

The fact that Tsafendas did not consider Dr. Verwoerd to be properly representative of all the South African people was something that the police and almost certainly the Commission were told by several witnesses. They testified that Tsafendas described Dr. Verwoerd as a dictator and a tyrant who oppressed his people and he regularly characterised him as "Hitler's best student." In addition, Jacobus Bornman, told the police that Tsafendas "often criticised the government, his exact words I don't remember, but it seemed to me that he had a grudge against Dr. Verwoerd."⁶³⁰³ Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas wanted "to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power."⁶³⁰⁴ None of these opinions which so animated Tsafendas finds any mention in the Report.

⁶³⁰¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁰² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁰³ Jacobus Johannes Bornman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³⁰⁴ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

TSAFENDAS'S ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT PEOPLE FOR AN UPRISING IN SOUTH AFRICA

*Evidence was submitted to the Commission that Tsafendas had tried to recruit people to take part in an uprising in South Africa. He admits that he did in fact try to recruit people for an uprising, but says that his aim was confined to the Territory of Mozambique.*⁶³⁰⁵

*He denied that he had ever tried to canvass support in London for an uprising in South Africa. His efforts, he said, were confined to Portuguese territories.*⁶³⁰⁶

The Commission here makes an important revelation: that Tsafendas, while in England, attempted to recruit people for an uprising. According to the Report, Tsafendas denied that he tried to bring about an uprising in South Africa and said it was meant for Mozambique. Whichever country was to be involved, the plan demonstrated Tsafendas's passion and dedication to his goal. That goal was clearly stated by a witness to the Commission, Edward Furness, but was not included in the Report: he wanted "to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power."⁶³⁰⁷ That was in the early 1960s, half a decade before the assassination, a pointer to Tsafendas's commitment to his intention.

The Report said Tsafendas's remarks about the uprisings were disclosed when "evidence was submitted to the Commission." However, no such evidence was found in NASA. This is no great surprise, since a great deal of evidence have gone missing, especially those portraying Tsafendas as a revolutionary. That this evidence is missing is further clear proof that important evidence disappeared from NASA. The Commission has omitted several very important incidents showing Tsafendas as a revolutionary person. In this case it did publish a report reflecting Tsafendas's revolutionary nature, but it would best be described as a "bare-bones" account.

PIDE'S FILE ON TSAFENDAS

PIDE had a file on Tsafendas since 1938 but lied to the South African police that they did not. This was obviously an attempt to withhold any information pointing to Tsafendas as "a

⁶³⁰⁵ Chapter II B, Paragraph 32.

⁶³⁰⁶ Chapter II D, Paragraph 18.

⁶³⁰⁷ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

partisan for the independence of Mozambique.”⁶³⁰⁸ However, just one day after the assassination, the South African embassy in Lisbon, citing “a reliable local source,” revealed that Tsafendas “has a criminal record in Mozambique, where he is said to have been arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances, including shouting pro-Communist anti-Portuguese slogans.” The embassy even warned the South African police that “If information correct, we suspect Portuguese may play down assassin’s previous political activities and we would suggest full details in this connection be sought.”⁶³⁰⁹ The Commission, like the South African police, was aware of the above information. However, it seems that it did not make any further inquiries but simply accepted what was given to it by the Portuguese.

TSAFENDAS’S ARGUMENT WITH A COLLEAGUE ABOUT SALAZAR

*A Portuguese who was also employed by the firm said that Tsafendas had assumed a hostile attitude towards him because he had refused to discuss Dr. Salazar with him.*⁶³¹⁰

The Commission here tells only half of the story. According to Antonio Teixeira Da Silva, the Portuguese colleague in question, Tsafendas first asked him what he did in Mozambique. Da Silva told him that he had served in the Portuguese Army for three years. According to Da Silva, Tsafendas asked what salary he got and whether the army had often had trouble with the natives. Tsafendas then asked him for his opinion of Salazar, which he refused to discuss. Tsafendas then became hostile towards him.⁶³¹¹

Tsafendas strongly supported Mozambique’s independence from Portugal and wanted to see “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the mother nation.”⁶³¹² For this reason, he repeatedly conducted “subversive” propaganda in Mozambique, seeking to raise awareness about Communism and the possible independence of Mozambique. His activities there led to his five arrests by the Portuguese police, imprisonment and torture, the loss of at least three jobs and the creation of

⁶³⁰⁸ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶³⁰⁹ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³¹⁰ Chapter III C, Paragraph 8.

⁶³¹¹ Antonio Teixeira Da Silva statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³¹² PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

a PIDE file (n° 10.415)6313 which got fatter with every passing year, finally reaching around 130 pages. According to Inspector Horacio Ferreira, of the Portuguese Security Police in Mozambique, Tsafendas was “intense anti-White” and told him that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-Whites.”⁶³¹⁴

Peter Pappas, whose café in Durban Tsafendas often visited, said Tsafendas “spoke angrily about the Salazar regime in Portugal and about the Mozambique police.”⁶³¹⁵ While in Cape Town, Tsafendas visited Mr. N.D. Hartford, a reporter with the *Cape Argus*. He described himself as “a rebel from Mozambique,” and asked him if there was any news of the freedom fighters there, saying he was interested in their efforts to overthrow Portuguese rule in Mozambique. Tsafendas refused to serve in the Portuguese Army because, he said, he “did not want to serve a dictatorship.”⁶³¹⁶ Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas’s foreman at F.A. Poole, testified that Tsafendas “was well-built and strong, and bullied the other Portuguese workers.”⁶³¹⁷ Tsafendas did the same in other jobs with Portuguese workers who were supportive of Salazar’s regime.⁶³¹⁸ Thus it seems unlikely that Tsafendas became hostile towards Da Silva simply because he refused to discuss Salazar with him. Far more likely is that Tsafendas was angered that Da Silva had served in the Portuguese Army and perhaps concluded that he supported the Salazar regime.

JACOBUS BORNMAN

*Mr. Bornman, who occupied the same room as Tsafendas, stated that Tsafendas did not show any signs of being mentally abnormal. He was good-natured, but had messy habits. His topics, of conversation were politics and women. He was strongly opposed to the policy of the Government. He read only English-language newspapers and was sometimes upset by what he had read. At times he passed the remark that the Government was doing so much for the Coloureds that it would be better for him to be a Coloured.*⁶³¹⁹

⁶³¹³ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶³¹⁴ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶³¹⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁶³¹⁶ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3. ‘Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.’

⁶³¹⁷ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³¹⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶³¹⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 58.

Bornman was Tsafendas's roommate for six to seven weeks in Mrs. Groves's boarding house. Although the Commission's Report includes some positive comments about Tsafendas made by Bornman, they are few and far between in comparison to his full testimony, while some important comments are missing. Bornman testified that "Tsafendas's conversations were always about women and politics. He never talked about anything else. Tsafendas was dissatisfied with conditions in R.S.A and he has often criticized the government, his exact words I don't remember, but it seemed to me that he had a grudge against Dr. Verwoerd. He stood up a lot for the Coloureds." The Commission admits Bornman's remark that Tsafendas strongly opposed the policy of the government, but omits that Tsafendas "stood up a lot for the Coloureds," a most important statement since Tsafendas was portrayed at the summary trial as "unsympathetic towards the Coloureds."

Also important was Bornman saying Tsafendas seemed to have "a grudge against Dr. Verwoerd." Several other witnesses reported similar, even stronger, remarks by Tsafendas, for instance that he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a dictator and a tyrant, and that he described him as "Hitler's best student." None of the above statements was included in the Report. The Report finally states that Tsafendas told Bornman he would have been better off as a Coloured than a White because the Government was doing "so much for them." Bornman has made no such comment in his statement to the police on October 3, which means that he probably made it to the Commission hearing. Forty-four witnesses who were interviewed by the author said they never heard Tsafendas make any such comment and they could not believe he held such opinions. It is not impossible that Tsafendas was being sarcastic, as he often was, according to several friends the author interviewed. The fact is, however, that the Commission included the disputed statement and omitted the one about standing up for the Coloureds.

Although Bornman's lively, first-person statement was one of the most positive about Tsafendas, the Commission downplayed it significantly by omitting crucial comments and reducing it to five flatly-delivered sentences. Bornman's comments regarding Tsafendas's personality are examined in the section 'Landlords and Flatmates' of this chapter.

SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAYS AND HARBOURS

On one occasion while he was working there, he intimated that to his mind the South African Government was handling its Bantu problems better than Great Britain was dealing with

*problems in connection with the West Indians.*⁶³²⁰

No statement to this effect or any like evidence was found in the archives and none of Tsafendas's colleagues at this job testified to his saying anything of the sort. It is always possible that such a statement was among testimony that has gone missing. In those circumstances, the author cannot know how and when Tsafendas made the remark attributed to him and how faithful the Commission's account is to his words. What is certain is that this is a statement which shows support for the apartheid government and it is not what Tsafendas believed. Working for a governmental enterprise, it would have been very stupid for Tsafendas publicly to attack the government, as he often did with people he knew.

Statements that show Tsafendas's real political ideas are listed earlier in this study and later in this chapter. It is important to mention that once again the Commission has included a statement portraying Tsafendas as a supporter of the apartheid government while omitting several where he condemned the government and affirmed his anti-apartheid, anti-colonialist and Communist beliefs. The statement in question was read to forty-four people who knew Tsafendas well and every single one declared that he could never have meant what he was quoted as saying. For reasons of space, the names of the forty-four will not be listed here; but their testimonies, along with the issue in general, have already been discussed extensively in chapters Four ("Tsafendas Meets His Lawyers") and Five ("Dr. Cooper's Testimony").

TSAFENDAS'S FIVE PASSPORTS

The South African and Portuguese Press reported that on one of his arrests in Mozambique, Tsafendas was found to be in possession of five passports.⁶³²¹ However, the Report makes no mention of this. Even if it believed the reports to be mere rumours, one would have expected the Commission to investigate the issue. After all, it had probed and dismissed other rumours

⁶³²⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 26.

⁶³²¹ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, 'Tsafendas het vir V.V. in Persie gewerk.'; *Daily Mirror*, 9 September 1966: 11, 'The clouded past of an assassin'; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man''; *The Herald* (Melbourne), 8 September 1966: 1, 'The killer: Five passports and a record of subversion'; *The Rhodesia Herald*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin said to have been deported from P.E.A. for Communist connection'; *The Star*, 9 September 1966: 5, 'More uncovered on assassin's history'; *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, 'Assassin had five passports.'

involving conspiracies about the assassination and Tsafendas's past, some of them considerably more far-fetched than this one.

There was certainly nothing sinister about the five passports, which were almost certainly old passports Tsafendas had held onto. PIDE made no mention of them in their reports. Had the passports been forgeries or suspect in any way, this would have been stated by PIDE in its reports. Even if the information had been omitted from PIDE's reports for the South African police, it would certainly have been included in their own secret and confidential reports after the arrest. Furthermore, four witnesses confirmed that Tsafendas did indeed keep some, if not all, of his old passports. Mary Eendracht, Ira Kyriakakis and Andreas Babiolakis told the author that Tsafendas retained his out-dated passports as souvenirs.⁶³²² A Greek man in Mozambique named Manuel Tsokos also told *The Star*, one of the newspapers that published the story of the five passports, that Tsafendas had "several different passports."⁶³²³

The Commission omitted the reference to five passports from its Report for what seem to be obvious reasons: that such information could have fuelled conspiracy theories suggesting that Tsafendas was a hired assassin or part of a Communist plot and was therefore much more than a helpless human being. There was, in fact, a perfectly logical explanation for the passports, but the Commission chose to avoid all mention of the subject, presumably to avoid adding to the rumours.

EVIDENCE REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S POLITICAL IDEAS WHICH HAVE BEEN OMITTED BY THE COMMISSION

The following comments are taken from statements given to the police and the Commission by people who knew Tsafendas. All were in the Commission's possession but were omitted from its Report. On occasion, the Commission referred to some of these witnesses and some of the things they said, but they omitted their political comments:

- Edward Furness, who met him in London, testified that Tsafendas wanted to "create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power." Furthermore, he testified that

⁶³²² Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁶³²³ *The Star*, 10 September 1966: 3, 'Assassin had five passports.'

Tsafendas was a regular visitor to the offices of the British anti-apartheid movement and that he had seen him in the company of members of the movement, including David Gardener. He had also mentioned that Tennyson Makiwane, the ANC representative in London, was regularly present in the offices and often gave speeches there.⁶³²⁴

- Kenneth Ross was Tsafendas's landlord in Durban for two months in 1965. He testified that Tsafendas was "very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in politics. Tsafendas objected to the Communists being banished to Robin Island because of their political opinions and actions. In general, Tsafendas opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government, and was definitely pre-Russian."⁶³²⁵
- Jacobus Bornman testified that Tsafendas "stood up a lot for the Coloureds" and "often criticised the South African government and seemed to have a grudge against Dr. Verwoerd."⁶³²⁶ Bornman is mentioned in the Report but it carries none of these comments. His case is discussed in detail earlier in this section.
- Robert Smith was a night clerk at the Durban Men's Home where Tsafendas stayed for two months in 1965. He testified that Tsafendas was "a Communist," "a fanatic on politics and seldom spoke of anything else" and had described "United Party and National Party officials and members as capitalistic roughs." Tsafendas had told him that the "South African Government's policy was "rotten" and often compared conditions in South Africa with those of Russia, to South Africa's detriment, stating, "Look at all the poor people in South Africa... such conditions don't exist in Russia because Russia is a Communistic state." More importantly, Smith had testified to the police that Tsafendas had told him that when he lived in London he had associated with Rev. Canon John Collins and Solly Sachs, both leading members of the British anti-apartheid movement.⁶³²⁷
- According to Inspector Horacio Ferreira, of the Portuguese Security Police in

⁶³²⁴ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³²⁵ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³²⁶ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³²⁷ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Mozambique, Tsafendas was “intense anti-White” and told him that “the Portuguese Government has never done anything for their non-Whites.”⁶³²⁸

- Patrick O’Ryan told the police that Tsafendas “was against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal” and that he “labelled the apartheid policies as unfair.”⁶³²⁹ O’Ryan is mentioned in the Report but these comments are not. His case is examined earlier in this section.
- Johannes Botha, a security officer, told the police that Nick Vergos characterised Tsafendas in a remark to him as the “biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa.”⁶³³⁰ The Commission refers to Botha and to Vergos, but these comments are omitted. His case is discussed in the “Vergos Case” section of this chapter.
- Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren, a security officer at the Mandini Paper Factory in Zululand, told the police that Nick Vergos said Tsafendas “was not Greek, but a kaffir and a Communist.”⁶³³¹
- Father Hanno Probst reported Tsafendas to a security officer as a “communist and a dangerous person.”⁶³³² He suspected Tsafendas of stirring up disaffection among young non-Whites in the Mangete Reserve. “I say this because during the period Demetrios Tsafendas stayed at Mandini, the youngsters in the Mangete Reserve became unruly and aggressive. This, however, is only suspicion, because since the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd everything became quiet again and the youngsters controllable.”⁶³³³
- Roelof Swiegers testified that Tsafendas “leaned towards the communist side.”⁶³³⁴
- Keith Martincich testified that Tsafendas “on quite a few occasions he had discussed politics with me. He said he did not like the Government and that he was given a hard

⁶³²⁸ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶³²⁹ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶³³⁰ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³³¹ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³³² Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³³³ Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³³⁴ Roelof Erasmus Swiegers statement to the police, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van vorm Z 204. NASA.

time in South Africa. He said the Government won't reign very long."⁶³³⁵ The Commission refers to Martincich, but these comments are omitted.

- Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas's landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, "I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners."⁶³³⁶ The Commission refers to Mrs. Groves, but these comments are omitted. Her case is discussed in the 'Landlords and flatmates' section.
- Antony Maw testified that the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique did not allow Tsafendas to enter the country on grounds of suspected Communist tendencies.⁶³³⁷
- A report from Col. van Wyk of the South African police characterised Tsafendas as being regarded in Mozambique as "intensely anti-white."⁶³³⁸
- Peter Pappas, whose café in Durban Tsafendas often visited, said Tsafendas "spoke angrily about the Salazar regime in Portugal and about the Mozambique police."⁶³³⁹
- Reports from Mozambique which emerged after the assassination said that Tsafendas was "violently anti-Portuguese."⁶³⁴⁰
- Gladstone Dunn testified that Tsafendas expressed the opinion that the South African Government "was not playing fair with the non-Whites. He said that the wages paid to non-Whites was very unsatisfactory, as well as the political situation."⁶³⁴¹

CONCLUSION

Although the Report referenced some of Tsafendas's political activities, it fell far short of describing the full extent of his political involvements. Apart from one particular instance, that Tsafendas urged an uprising against the colonial rulers of Mozambique, all the information the Commission presented was already in the public domain through the media.

⁶³³⁵ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³³⁶ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³³⁷ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA.

⁶³³⁸ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶³³⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.'

⁶³⁴⁰ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 1, '180-day prison for Tsafendas?'

⁶³⁴¹ Gladstone Dunn statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA

Furthermore, the incidents mentioned are frequently downplayed or misinterpreted, in particular in regard to Tsafendas's Communist and anti-apartheid links. The most glaring omissions are that Tsafendas had associated in London with leading anti-apartheid activists such Solly Sachs, Rev. Canon John Collins and David Gardener, some of his prison terms under the Portuguese due to his Communist and anti-Portuguese activities, the fact that he was exiled from Mozambique for twelve years because of these activities and that he fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War.

It is notable that the Commission went to great lengths to locate John Michaletos, a Greek Communist childhood friend of Tsafendas who recruited him in the Democratic Army, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party during the Civil War. Despite the Commission's efforts, no mention of Michaletos is made in the Report. That Tsafendas was described by several witnesses as a Communist and by one as "the biggest Communist in the Republic" are omitted.⁶³⁴² Generally, Tsafendas's Communist activities and statements are downplayed as incompatible with the picture of him crafted from evidence by the Commission and the police.

A very important omission is that PIDE had a file on Tsafendas since 1938. Although PIDE lied to the South African police that they had no such file, South Africa's embassy in Lisbon had informed its superiors in Cape Town of the existence of just such a file. What is more, the embassy warned that the Portuguese would attempt to downplay Tsafendas's political activities, which is exactly what they did. Nevertheless, still the South African police appeared to accept at face value what the Portuguese gave them.

Evidence that Tsafendas was clearly a political animal, an anti-apartheid fanatic, a Communist, and a committed supporter of an independent Mozambique finds no place in the Report. Omitted also are his descriptions of Dr. Verwoerd as a dictator and a tyrant, as well as his oft-repeated characterisation of Dr. Verwoerd as "Hitler's best student."

Not only is Tsafendas's ideology absent, but so are the words he used to describe and explain it to his friends and acquaintances, to the South African police and to PIDE. This is important because it deprived readers of the opportunity to know exactly what Tsafendas believed and to decide how "deluded" he was, or indeed whether he was deluded at all. When someone repeated to the police various specific remarks Tsafendas had made about politics,

⁶³⁴² Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

the Commission would generalise or summarise the statements, instead of using Tsafendas's own words, as related by the witness. An example of this is seen with two witnesses in Durban Men's Home. Tsafendas's exact remarks to them are omitted in favour of a woolly paraphrase by the Commission that Tsafendas "*expressed himself strongly against the South African Government and in favour of Communism.*"⁶³⁴³

It would have been revealing to learn exactly what Tsafendas said when he condemned the government and in what terms he expressed his preference for Communism. However, his words did not sound like the words of a madman and this could well have been why they were not included. On the other hand, the Commission did include Tsafendas's own words to the psychiatrists. The comments which Tsafendas made to Dr. Sakinofsky are also against the South African government, but they are considered "deluded" and apolitical.

The Commission has not included even one of the many statements made by Tsafendas about his political ideas to the South African and Mozambican police or to people who knew him. If this was done, it would have been obvious that Tsafendas said completely different things to his psychiatrists than he did to his friends and acquaintances; what he told his friends and acquaintances were serious and clear political thoughts, also compatible with what he told the police, something that did not fit with the portrayal of Tsafendas at the court.

The following is a short summary of Tsafendas's political activities which were omitted by the Commission:

- The Commission refers to Tsafendas's involvement with the British anti-apartheid movement and that he was noticed "in the company of leftists," but fails to name any of these leftists, when it was known to Judge van Wyk that he had met and associated with prominent members of the movement such as Tennyson Makiwane, Rev. Canon John Collins, David Gardener and Solly Sachs.
- That Tsafendas, while in London, had a friendly association with Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt, the secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society and one of the leading figures in the modern anti-slavery movement.⁶³⁴⁴
- His participation alongside the Communists during the Greek Civil War.
- That he was considered by PIDE to be "a partisan for the independence of Mozambique."

⁶³⁴³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 32.

⁶³⁴⁴ *The Guardian*, 30 September 1966: 10, 'Winding back'; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

- He was accused by PIDE of preaching “under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique’s independence...”
- The true reasons for his imprisonment in Lisbon in 1949.
- His arrest and imprisonment in Lourenço Marques in 1951.
- That he was allowed to enter Mozambique and deported in 1951 because of his Communist and anti-Portuguese activities in the 1930s.
- He was exiled from Mozambique for twelve years and was allowed to return in 1963 only after he received amnesty by the Portuguese government.
- His arrest and imprisonment in Lisbon in 1952.
- The true reasons for his imprisonment in Beira in 1964.
- His arrest in February 1965 in Beira.
- That PIDE had a file on him since 1938, the *Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*. However, this was not known to the Commission as PIDE lied about it to the South African authorities.

Why did the Commission omit the facts that Tsafendas was a passionate Communist who had participated in a military conflict with the Communists and had associated with members of the British anti-apartheid movement in London? Gordon Winter, who worked as a journalist for the *Post* and the *Citizen*, while he was also a BOSS agent and very good friend of H.J. van den Bergh, the man in charge of the Tsafendas police investigation, said that it was because the General wanted to downplay and even omit Tsafendas’s Communist activities and beliefs.⁶³⁴⁵ Why? Winter’s explanation seems more than just logical:

“He [General van den Bergh] didn’t want it in. It’s an embarrassment for him that this man who was a) dangerous, b) mad, c) Coloured, got a job at the House of Assembly, and HJ’s policemen or security... it doesn’t matter about going to work Pelindaba or whatever you call it, for a uranium base or whatever. This is not a Kruger Park ranger job; we’re talking about in the House of Assembly. It’s embarrassing for HJ, the supremo of intelligence, for his mob to allow this lunatic – if he was a lunatic – into the House of Assembly, and he then went in with two daggers. That’s some security! No wonder they wanted to keep it quiet ... if there was a political motive, it’s hardly pro-South Africa. And if it was a political motive, surely wouldn’t the Kremlin get some benefit from that? A nice bit

⁶³⁴⁵ Gordon Winter in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

of propaganda. You don't want that. The reds under the beds in South Africa were the enemy. We don't let them score victories. Think about it. Its common sense."⁶³⁴⁶

Common sense indeed...

⁶³⁴⁶ Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

TSAFENDAS'S CHARACTER ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION

In its determination to prove that Tsafendas was mad, the Commission distorted, manipulated and ignored the evidence of witnesses on a comprehensive scale, manufacturing an unrecognisable caricature to suit its purposes. In what can only be described as character assassination, it employed a series of unfounded characterisations to misrepresent Tsafendas's actions and intentions. Its basic tactic was to omit from its Report anything positive, while including everything negative.

An appraisal of the statistics proves this beyond dispute. Of the two hundred witnesses who were interviewed by the police and the Commission, 44 made positive statements about Tsafendas's character or in some way contradicted the Report's negative picture. Of the rest, 6 made negative comments, while the others had nothing either positive or negative to say about him. In percentage terms, that means 22% of statements were positive, 3% were negative and the remaining 75% were neutral. However, the Commission used only 1 of the 44 positive comments, that is only 2.2%, while at the same time using 100% of the negative. Even the single positive reference, by Bornman, that Tsafendas was "good-natured,"⁶³⁴⁷ is a drop in the ocean in comparison with the totality of Bornman's favourable testimony. This must be more than a coincidence. In short, everything that supported the theory that Tsafendas was mad or as described by the psychiatrists at his summary trial is included, while everything that contradicts it is omitted.

If two hundred people are asked about a particular person, many different opinions will be volunteered. For some, a person like Tsafendas might be a freedom fighter, for others a terrorist. To a university professor, he might appear uneducated while an ill-educated person could conclude he was a professor. Well-bred people might think him rude and boorish, others that he is excessively polite. The safest way to judge someone is generally by his actions, although personal opinions cannot be discounted, especially when the vast majority say exactly same thing. The Commission has described Tsafendas with the following characterizations: maladjusted, rejected, frustrated, feckless rolling-stone, boastful, selfish, unscrupulous and crafty. Let's examine them one by one:

⁶³⁴⁷ Chapter II C, Paragraph 58.

BOASTFUL

Of the two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission, only one testified that Tsafendas was “boastful.” This was Wilhelmina de Vos, the same woman who told the police that she “considered him to be a completely normal person”⁶³⁴⁸ and then told the Commission that he was mad.⁶³⁴⁹ The Commission refers to this incident in Chapter II C, Paragraph 65.

The Commission makes two more references to Tsafendas's alleged boastfulness. One is that he appeared to be boastful while working at City Engineering (Chapter II C, Paragraph 7):

*“On 9th December, 1963, he was employed as a fitter by Messrs. City Engineers and Carron Ltd. He was asked to resign and left the firm on 3rd February, 1964. Here he displayed signs of boastfulness.”*⁶³⁵⁰

Johannes Benade, a colleague at City Engineers and Carron Ltd, said Tsafendas “pretended to be a welder fitter. According to the work he delivered, it was clear that he did not have much knowledge on the subject, and as a result he was dismissed on 03/02/64.”⁶³⁵¹ However, D.G. Gallard, the secretary of the company, in a letter to the Commission of Enquiry, did not mention anything about Tsafendas being dismissed or being asked to resign. The letter simply stated that Tsafendas resigned, without offering an explanation or further detail.⁶³⁵² Neither Benade nor Gallard said anything about Tsafendas being boastful, unless the Commission considered such an attitude to be implicit in Tsafendas's “pretending to be a welder fitter,” in the contemptuous opinion of Benade. The statements by these two witnesses are the only ones found in the archives from employees of this company.

The same applies to the incident described in Chapter IV, Paragraph 3, which states,

“These stories probably owe their origin to the two drafts of R20 each which Tsafendas's brother-in-law sent to him for furniture which had been sold, the payments which Tsafendas received from the Hume Pipe Co., and Tsafendas's statement to the Greek

⁶³⁴⁸ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³⁴⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 65.

⁶³⁵⁰ Chapter III C, Paragraph 7.

⁶³⁵¹ Johannes Tobias Benade statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶³⁵² Report by D.G. Gallard of City Engineering and Carron Limited regarding Demitrio Tsafendas to the Commission of Enquiry, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 3. NASA.

Consul that he had received R5,000 from South Africa ... his statement to the Greek Consul is typical of a boastfulness which he displayed from time to time."

The Greek Consul mentioned is Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Consul in Beira, who had mentioned that Tsafendas received R5.000 from his family, as stated in the same part of the Report. A South African police report said Sanianos told them he had several conversations with Tsafendas, who he regarded as "a very intelligent person."⁶³⁵³ Sanianos made no mention of boastfulness or anything that could be taken as such. His full statement is available in the Investigation chapter. It seems highly unlikely that Sanianos made another statement to the Commission; he was not on the list to give evidence to the Commission and he lived permanently in Beira and the only statements that he or anyone else in Beira made were those given to Lt.-Col. van Wyk. Therefore, there seems to be no foundation for the claim that Tsafendas appeared boastful to the Greek Consul.

The author asked forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas, including several who knew him extremely well and for many years, whether he was boastful. All strongly rejected such a description.

MALADJUSTED

This word is defined by the *Oxford Living Dictionaries* as "failing to cope with the demands of a normal social environment." It is difficult to know in which way the Commission believed Tsafendas to be maladjusted. He grew up a happy child in a loving family environment, coped well and interacted normally with his classmates when sent away to boarding school, and from the age of eighteen looked after himself and forged his own future. He spent several years at sea during World War Two servicing Allied ships, and after the war travelled through at seventeen countries.

Wherever he went, he managed to find work, ranging from welding, which was his trade, to bus conducting, to selling goods on commission or teaching English. He read widely and came to adopt firm political principles, which, when he acted on them, brought him periods in exile and prison. On several occasions, he managed to secure his release by deceiving the authorities. To describe such a person as maladjusted is to misunderstand the

⁶³⁵³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

meaning of the word. Tsafendas coped with the “normal social environment” with ease and aplomb.

REJECTED/FRUSTRATED/OUTCAST

Apart from Dr. Cooper, who spoke at the summary trial of Tsafendas's alleged frustration, there is no evidence that he was frustrated. None of the two hundred witnesses who were interviewed by the Commission and the police or the forty-four who spoke to the author testified that Tsafendas was frustrated. As for being rejected and outcast, these are also inaccurate characterizations and it something that has been discussed extensively in the sections covering his relationships with his family and with the Greek community in this chapter.

FECKLESS ROLLING STONE

Calling Tsafendas a “feckless rolling-stone” is like calling Odysseus the same. Tsafendas never travelled aimlessly or just for the sake of it. Wherever he went was for a purpose. He was banned from South Africa and Mozambique and was prosecuted in Portugal. As result of this, he travelled either to find employment (Sweden, Germany, England), or because he was deported there (Greece and Germany again), or because counties were on the way to his destination (Syria, Lebanon, France, Spain, Denmark, Italy) or simply for a holiday (Bulgaria, Rhodesia, Greece again).

The Commission was aware that Tsafendas was forced to spend the years from 1951 to 1963 in exile since he was banned from Mozambique, the country of his birth, because of his pro-Communist and anti-colonialist activities. It was also aware that at the same period he was also barred from South Africa because he was a “half-caste” and a Communist. In the years up to 1963, Tsafendas made nine applications for permanent residence in South Africa and all were rejected; he made at least six to be allowed to return to Mozambique, all of which were turned down.

Mozambique was then a Province of Portugal and Tsafendas was officially a Portuguese citizen. However, not only was he banned from Mozambique, he was prosecuted and imprisoned in Portugal. The authorities objected to his past political activism in Mozambique and the fact that he was a Communist who opposed the dictatorship of Premier

Antonio Salazar. As for drifting around the world, Mozambique and South Africa were the only countries Tsafendas lived in prior to being banned from them, although as a child, he had also lived for a year in Egypt. While serving the Allied cause as a merchant seaman in World War Two, he was stationed in Canada and in the United States. In 1947, he was deported from America to Greece and it was then that his odyssey began. With Mozambique, Portugal and South Africa inaccessible, he tried to find a place to live.⁶³⁵⁴ All these travels were known to the Commission.

The fact is Tsafendas was travelling because he was not allowed to live where he wished to live, in Mozambique and South Africa. "Forced globe-trotting," he called it.⁶³⁵⁵ If one of his visa applications had been successful, he would have gone there immediately. It is true that Tsafendas travelled much more widely than most people, but an analysis of his journeys and intentions comprehensively disproves the Commission's characterization of Tsafendas as a "feckless rolling-stone." He spent the first twenty-three years of his life in Mozambique, Egypt and South Africa. He lived in those countries because that was where his family was. From 1941 to 1947, he lived in the United States or, during the Second World War, at sea serving in American Liberty Ships. In 1947, and against his will, he was deported to Greece because of his Greek origins, although he wanted to return to Mozambique.

While in Greece, he joined the Democratic Army, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party, and fought with them in the civil war. When it was obvious that the Communists had lost and the war was coming to an end, Tsafendas applied for a visa to return to South Africa. In his application he wrote, "I am here a man without a country, living in strange lands with people who have different ways of living, customs and languages."⁶³⁵⁶ The application was turned down. He decided to try Mozambique, via Portugal. He managed to do this by taking ship from Greece to France, then travelling on foot to Portugal through Spain.⁶³⁵⁷

In Portugal, in November 1949, Tsafendas was arrested because the authorities had

⁶³⁵⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁵⁵ Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶³⁵⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 17. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁶³⁵⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

questions about his identity. It was discovered that he was indeed a Portuguese citizen, but had not served his compulsory term in the military and that he had been dismissed twice from jobs in Mozambique for Communist activities.⁶³⁵⁸ Tsafendas spent the next year in prison but was then released and boarded a ship to Mozambique. He arrived there in October 1951 but was refused entry because he was listed in official files as a Communist and suspected of involvement in subversive activities.⁶³⁵⁹ This refusal led to his next twelve years being spent in exile. In January 1952, he was back in Portugal and was arrested in Lisbon. The police discovered that he was a Communist and an avowed anti-colonialist who was under suspicion of “unclear activities” during his time in Mozambique and put him in jail again.⁶³⁶⁰

Upon his eventual release a few months later, with his chosen destinations South Africa and Mozambique unattainable, he decided to go to Sweden, where he had heard he could get a job as a welder. He travelled there through Denmark, and eventually got a job as a carpenter.⁶³⁶¹ He did not stay in Sweden long as the weather was too cold and the money too little, so he moved to Hamburg, Germany and found work as a welder. Tsafendas remained in Germany from early 1954 to June 1955. During his time there, he sent off applications to be allowed to return to Mozambique and to South Africa. All were rejected and in mid-1955 he returned once more to Portugal and spent the next three years working as a hawker in Lisbon.⁶³⁶²

In 1958, Tsafendas travelled to Brussels to sell embroidery at the international exhibition, Expo 58. From there, he went back to Germany and spent the next year and a half in Frankfurt, working for one and half months at Fries and Son, six months for Anglo-American Fashions and Designers, and then another six months at a US Army printing works.⁶³⁶³ During his time in Germany, he lived on his own but had a relationship with a German girl who was a Communist.⁶³⁶⁴

⁶³⁵⁸ PIDE Confidential Report about Demitrio Tsafendas, 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶³⁵⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁶³⁶⁰ *Diario Popular*, 9 September 1966, ‘E conhesido em Lisboa o assassino do Dr. Verwoerd.’

⁶³⁶¹ Ochsensall Hospital report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub-file: 1/8. NASA.

⁶³⁶² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶³⁶³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁶⁴ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

In May 1959, Tsafendas travelled to Britain, hoping to find a job. He was refused a work permit and took “clandestine” jobs to survive.⁶³⁶⁵ While in London, once again, he applied for permission to enter South Africa, sending a letter and an application form dated August 4, 1959 to the Union’s immigration attaché in London. A note attached to his file at the embassy stated that Tsafendas had sought permanent residence status in South Africa several times without success, that in 1941 he entered illegally and was fined; it said he had Communist leanings and had threatened to enter without permission if he was denied again. The diplomat dealing with the application wrote, “Refusal is suggested!” On September 11, 1959, “Demetrio Tsafandakis, alias Demetrio Tsafendas,” was blacklisted by the South African Department of the Interior, meaning that he could receive no passport or admission facilities without the consent of the Department’s head office.⁶³⁶⁶

In London he also became politically active with anti-apartheid and anti-fascist organisations. He was discovered to be in the country illegally and in December 1959, the British sent him back to Germany, where he spent the next six months working in a tractor factory in Munich.⁶³⁶⁷ In March 1960, he read about the Sharpeville massacre and decided to return to South Africa and “do something” against Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid.⁶³⁶⁸ Convinced by now that he would not be allowed to enter the country legitimately, he decided on an illegal route, “through the African states south to South Africa.” The first stage took him through the Balkan States to Piraeus, Greece, then he took a ferry to Alexandria, Egypt. There his passport expired and he was unable to renew it or replace it, but with the help of the Red Cross, he managed to get to Beirut and Jerusalem.⁶³⁶⁹

With his Africa North-to-South plan blocked, Tsafendas decided to return to Portugal. Travelling through Lebanon and Syria by bus, he crossed the Taurus mountain range and reached Ankara, Turkey in May 1961. A month later, he arrived in Istanbul, where he worked as a teacher of English at the best private language college in Turkey at the time,

⁶³⁶⁵ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶³⁶⁶ Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraphs 28-30. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁶³⁶⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁶⁸ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶³⁶⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

the Limasollu Naci College.⁶³⁷⁰

In December 1961, he left to visit a former comrade from the Greek Civil War who lived in Sofia, Bulgaria. His visit lasted two weeks and then he went to Greece to spend Christmas with his good friend John Michaletos and his family.⁶³⁷¹ In January 1962, he travelled to the island of Crete to meet his relatives and see where his beloved father and his hero great-grandfather were born. From Greece, he travelled to Italy, then took the train to Lisbon, where he arrived in February 1962.⁶³⁷²

Tsafendas worked as a welder in Lisbon until July 1962, when he went back to England and again participated in anti-apartheid and anti-fascist demonstrations. In late 1962, he learned that his father had died and he determined to visit his grave in South Africa. After several more unsuccessful applications for a visa for Mozambique and South Africa, in August or September of 1963, after twelve years of exile, the Portuguese government relented. Convinced by an “act” he put that he was mad but harmless, and “reformed” in terms of his political ideology, the authorities gave him amnesty and permission to return to Mozambique.⁶³⁷³

In October 1963, he arrived in Mozambique and a month later, with the help of his family, he was back in South Africa in Pretoria. He remained in Pretoria until July 1964, working for five months for F.A. Poole Engineering and the rest of the time at his half-sister's café. He crossed into Rhodesia to visit another half-sister he had not seen since 1941, and from there went again to Mozambique. He remained in Beira from October 1964 until November 1964, working for the Hume Pipe Company,⁶³⁷⁴ before being arrested by the Portuguese police for “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”⁶³⁷⁵

⁶³⁷⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁷¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁶³⁷² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁷³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁶³⁷⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 12 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶³⁷⁵ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio

After three months in jail in Beira, he left Mozambique for Durban in March 1965. He remained there until October 1965, working off and on as an interpreter at the Durban Court, as a welder at Fraser and Chalmers for two months and for a month for South African Railways. After receiving a letter from a girl who said she wanted to meet and marry him, he travelled from Durban to Cape Town, where he met her. He remained in Cape Town from October 1965 until September 1966.

None of the above travels can be described as aimless. Tsafendas himself, as already mentioned, characterised them in his affidavit as “forced globetrotting”⁶³⁷⁶ and he was right. Several countries happened to be on the way to his destination, like France, Italy, Spain, Syria, Lebanon, Denmark and Turkey. Naturally, he spent little time there because he was just passing through. This does not apply to Turkey, where he got a teaching job and stayed for seven months. He visited Greece for the second time, Rhodesia and Bulgaria for holidays. For business and work, he travelled England, Belgium and Sweden, while one of the Liberty ships during the Second World War also took him to Canada. Apart from places where he stayed only weeks or a few months, this is his life story:

- Six years in Egypt, all in Alexandria (1919-1925).
- Seventeen years in Mozambique: 16 years in Lourenço Marques and one in Beira (1918-1919, 1925-1939, 1963-1964).
- Five years in South Africa: approximately two years in Pretoria, one in Johannesburg, one in Cape Town and a eight months in Durban (1939-1941, 1963-1966, plus school in Middleburg).
- Six years in the USA in Boston and New York, a lot of this time at sea (1941-1947).
- Two years in Greece, all in Athens (1947-1949).
- Six years in Portugal, all in Lisbon (1951-1953, 1955-1958, 1962-1963).
- Three years in Germany, all in three cities, Munich, Frankfurt and Hamburg (1953-1955, 1958-1959).
- Seven months in Turkey in Istanbul (1961).⁶³⁷⁷

This is not drifting, it is the odyssey of a man who was forced to live in exile from the

Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶³⁷⁶ Demetrios Tsafendakis Affidavit, November 1965. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen, NASA.

⁶³⁷⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

country where he was born (Mozambique) for twelve years, who for sixteen years was not allowed to enter the country where his family lived (South Africa) and who was prosecuted and imprisoned because of his political beliefs in the country of his official nationality and where, after Mozambique, he spent most of his time (Portugal). Wherever he was, he always applied for permission to return to Mozambique and South Africa. Had he been allowed to return to either country or left in peace in Portugal, this vast Baedeker of travel would never have been opened.

Tsafendas travelled through so many countries mainly for two reasons:

- In search of a better place to stay and work
- He needed to cross through many countries to reach his destination.

Tsafendas's desperate efforts to return to Mozambique or South Africa and find a place to live and work without being followed by the police do not constitute being branded as a "feckless rolling-stone." His peregrinations recall those of Odysseus, who travelled for ten years through many different places to reach his destination. All of these travels and the reasons for them were known to the Commission, therefore to characterise Tsafendas as a feckless rolling-stone was a travesty of the truth.

UNSCRUPULOUS AND SELFISH

To characterize Tsafendas as unscrupulous and selfish is arguably the most unpleasant and the least accurate of all of the Commission's negative pen portraits. Tsafendas, voluntarily and without charge, taught English to children on three different occasions in his life: in Lourenço Marques in the 1930s, in Istanbul in 1961 and in Beira in 1964. He did this because he believed strongly that education was a person's greatest asset and the best way to get out of poverty and become a better and more useful person to society. This is hardly what an unscrupulous and selfish man would do.

Peter Pappas, a Greek café proprietor in Durban, said he would "sometimes gave him (Tsafendas) a free meal, but when he started work he paid me." Pappas also said that Tsafendas was friendly with White "down-and-outs" and when he had some money he would give them a few cents.⁶³⁷⁸ This was not the first time Tsafendas helped poor people, though penniless himself. In Cape Town, he aided his young flatmate, Jacobus Bornman, when he

⁶³⁷⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.'

was out of funds, and then declined to take the money back.⁶³⁷⁹ Both of these incidents were known to the Commission, but there was no mention of them in the Report.

Tsafendas regularly bought food, sweets and toys for the family of Patrick O’Ryan, who was hosting him. When Patrick complained that this was embarrassing for him since he was the head of the family, Tsafendas’s told the children that it was he and his father who had made the purchases.⁶³⁸⁰ Tsafendas also helped a colleague in Beira to build a room for his daughter, who was to get married.⁶³⁸¹ He worked voluntarily in his half-sister’s cafe in Pretoria for nine months, refusing to take any money, after she had given him a rent-free apartment.⁶³⁸² He sent a “thank you” card to his uncle in Crete after he had stayed in his house for a few days in January 1961.⁶³⁸³ He urged Greek sailors of the *Eleni* tanker to boycott South Africa’s economy by spending as little money as possible. In order to show them the hardships of apartheid, he took some of these sailors to a township in Cape Town.⁶³⁸⁴ Once again, these are not the actions of an unscrupulous and selfish man.

An unscrupulous and selfish person is by definition someone concerned primarily with his own well-being, no matter how this is achieved. Such a person would never act disinterestedly, in pursuit of what he saw as noble political ends or out of concern for others, sometimes risking life and liberty in the process, as Tsafendas did in the following cases:

- In England, Tsafendas became involved with the anti-fascist and the British anti-apartheid movement and participated in meetings and demonstrations arranged by both movements.⁶³⁸⁵
- He voluntarily joined the Greek Communists in the Greek Civil War to fight for a cause he believed in.⁶³⁸⁶

⁶³⁷⁹ Jacobus Johannes Bornman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Father Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁶³⁸¹ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁶³⁸² Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁶³⁸³ Aris Tsafantakis in a personal interview, 13 April 2016.

⁶³⁸⁴ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 15 February 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶³⁸⁵ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶³⁸⁶ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 15 February 2014; Georgios

- In Mozambique, he protested against Portugal's forced cotton policy and later toured villages preaching about Communism and working for the independence of Mozambique, although he knew he could be arrested. When he was eventually detained and accused of pretending to be a Christian missionary while in reality preaching "under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence,"⁶³⁸⁷ he told the police that what he wanted was "a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother-nation."⁶³⁸⁸

Finally, a selfish and unscrupulous man would never have committed the ultimate act of assassination, knowing that there was no escape for him and that his life would very probably end soon as a result. This is conclusive proof of Tsafendas unselfishness. His conviction that he was doing the right thing and that a "change of policy would take place" after the assassination were enough for him to act as he did.

TSAFENDAS PRESENTED AS A BEGGAR

*Tsafendas was always begging for a place to sleep and for meals. At Beira, for example, he slept at the fire-station for a time.*⁶³⁸⁹

The above statement is one of the clearest indications of the Commission's effort to belittle and humiliate Tsafendas. Although it is true that Tsafendas slept at the fire-station in Beira at one point, the rest of the statement is completely inaccurate. The usage of the word "beg" is completely inaccurate and harsh. The circumstances of Tsafendas when he slept in the fire-station are also not mentioned, although known to the Commission and very important.

Tsafendas was released from prison in Beira, having spent three months there, on January 26, 1965.⁶³⁹⁰ Penniless and without a place to stay, he had two options: to find

Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015. Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶³⁸⁷ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁶³⁸⁸ PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶³⁸⁹ Chapter III C, Paragraph 20.

⁶³⁹⁰ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Chapter II C, Paragraph 19.

himself somewhere to sleep and stay until he stabilize his situation or to ask for help from his friends. Obviously embarrassed to ask his friends' for help, also maybe thinking that he might put them into a difficult and uncomfortable situation since he was just released from prison, he chose to not go to one of them. Instead, he went to the fire-station and asked the fire-fighters if he could sleep in the department's premises and they agreed and eventually spent ten nights there.⁶³⁹¹ No one else told the police and the Commission from the statements found at the archives that Tsafendas "begged" or even asked for a place to sleep. This is the only case, so to use the word "always" is entirely inaccurate. Furthermore, probably a lot of people would have done the same in Tsafendas's condition.

Two more witnesses, George Ananiades and George Liberopoulos, stated to the police something that is compatible with the Commission's report. Lt.-Colonel van Wyk wrote in his report after he had questioned both that Tsafendas "practically forced himself upon them and they treated him and often paid for his meals but further had nothing to do with him. He never spoke about politics with them. They describe him as a normal person with a very high-intelligence."⁶³⁹²

Furthermore, John Verghis, the owner of a café in Beira which Tsafendas often visited, testified to the police that Tsafendas "frequently visited the cafe where he spent time in the company of other Greeks. The subject was quiet and never spoke much and never about politics. It seemed to him that the subject always visited the café to see just if someone would give him something to eat or drink. ... According to him Tsafendas was a normal person."⁶³⁹³ John Galanakis was given by Tsafendas when he later entered his shop the impression that he "was on the scrounge, but realised that he was an intelligent man and that he spoke Greek, Portuguese and Afrikaans fluently."⁶³⁹⁴

All the above statements were given to Lt.-Colonel van Wyk of the South African police when he visited Mozambique. He concluded in his report that Tsafendas "was most of the time without money and took advantage of others." This seems to be in line with what Lt.-Colonel van Wyk was told. However, it is noticeable that these statements and opinions

⁶³⁹¹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁶³⁹² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶³⁹³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶³⁹⁴ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

came only from people who knew Tsafendas in Mozambique and especially in Beira, at a time when he was finding it difficult to make ends meet. A closer look at Tsafendas's problems in Mozambique throws some light on his behaviour and attitudes there. He was arrested twice, he spent three months in police custody and he had difficulty finding work. That he was pressed for cash is evident from the fact that he asked Nick Vlachopoulos, his brother-in-law in Pretoria, to sell some furniture that he had left in storage there.

Vlachopoulos did so and sent the proceeds to Tsafendas in Mozambique. It is unlikely that Tsafendas would have sold his furniture unless he was in a serious financial situation. If he just wanted to get rid of the furniture, he could have sold it himself before he left Pretoria.

In total, the police and the Commission questioned some two hundred witnesses and only the Beira interviewees commented along those lines. None of the witnesses in South Africa or elsewhere in Mozambique and Rhodesia confirmed this picture of Tsafendas; indeed, some, like Bornman and Pappas, testified that Tsafendas was the exact opposite and helped people financially, although he was poor himself. However, even in Beira, things were not exactly like this.

Andreas Babiolakis, Costas Poriassis and Nick Papadakis, who knew Verghis well and often visited his café, disagree with Verghis's assumption that Tsafendas visited the café "just to see if someone would give him something to eat or drink." Certainly, Greeks often offered to buy drinks for Tsafendas and for each other, but this was customary when the Greeks sat together. If a new person arrived and was invited to join their company, someone would buy his drink. According to Andreas Babiolakis and Nick Papadakis who were present in Beira at the time, however, Tsafendas would only accept if he had enough money to buy the next round. Most times, he could not afford to buy everyone a drink, so he would decline their offer, but he would sit in their company and talk and listen.⁶³⁹⁵

Ananiades and Liberopoulos stated to the author that they strongly disagree with van Wyk's interpretation of their words with regards to Tsafendas forcing himself upon them and strongly condemn the use of the word "begging" which they state that it is a lie. Ananiades disagrees with the report's comment that Tsafendas "practically forced himself upon them" and believes it is "inaccurate." He told the author that Tsafendas "was not the kind of man" described by the Commission. He states that if the Commission based the conclusion in

⁶³⁹⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriassis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

question in his statement to the police, that it is mistaken as this is not what he had meant. He told the author:

“No, no, no, no. It was nothing like that. I met him one day in Costa do Sol where we had coffee. We spoke and he said he was leaving the next day for South Africa. That was all. He never asked me to pay anything for him or to give him any money. Nothing. Never. I can't say if he generally was a beggar, but he was not like that with me and did not give me any such impression. He did not look or act like a beggar. It is not true [that Tsafendas forced himself upon him]. I don't know why it is in my statement, but I never said anything like that.”⁶³⁹⁶

Liberopoulos associated often with Tsafendas and considered him to be a very “intelligent and political person.” He does not remember what he told the police, but he too disagrees that Tsafendas “forced himself upon them” which finds to be “not true.” When he first met Tsafendas, he had paid for his dinner because it was Greek tradition for the people who lived there to pay for a visitor's dinner, although Tsafendas was reluctant to allow him to do so. The next day, Liberopoulos attempted to pay again, but Tsafendas refused and paid for both of them. Liberopoulos characterises Tsafendas as a “proud man” and “no beggar.” He told the author:

“He never took advantage of me or of anyone I knew. He would come and sit with us but would never accept a drink if he could not afford to buy you one in return. He would make excuses to avoid accepting the drink, and would never admit that it was because he could not afford the next round.”

Liberopoulos had also tried to distance himself from Tsafendas during the questioning.⁶³⁹⁷

Evidence of egregious omission and distortion by the Commission concerns the case of a twenty-escudos loan. It was known to the Commission that John Emmanuel Marvis lent Tsafendas twenty escudos, which he paid back a few days later.⁶³⁹⁸ This incident is omitted. However, what the Commission does mention, in Chapter II C, Paragraph 21, is that “*on one occasion, he (Tsafendas) was seen with a wad of hundred-escudo notes.*” The person who

⁶³⁹⁶ George Ananiades in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

⁶³⁹⁷ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

⁶³⁹⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

made this statement was Marvis, but what the Commission omitted was that Marvis had seen the money when Tsafendas paid him back. Obviously, to have carried the full Marvis story would have contradicted the Commission's preferred picture of Tsafendas begging for meals and a place to stay. Tsafendas also was given money to sail from Beira to Durban by Costas Poriazis, and Giangos and Andreas Babiolakis, but he paid all of them back about a month later.⁶³⁹⁹

There were several known occasions when Tsafendas acted with generosity towards poor people although he was poor himself. While the Commission mentioned that he was a beggar, it failed to include any of the evidence of his generosity. Jacobus Bornman was Tsafendas's flatmate for two months in Cape Town. When he was broke, Tsafendas voluntarily gave him five cents and when Bornman tried to return the money, Tsafendas refused to take it back.⁶⁴⁰⁰ The Commission's report refers to Bornman but not this statement of his. Peter Pappas, owner of a Greek café in Durban, said when Tsafendas had some money he would give "a few cents to the white down-and-outs of the city." Pappas said also had said, "When his luck was out, I sometimes gave him a free meal, but when he started work he paid me."⁶⁴⁰¹

Furthermore, Richard Poggenpoel testified to the police and the Commission that when Tsafendas stayed in his house for two weeks, he did not pay for lodging because he was unemployed. However, a few weeks later and after he had moved out of his house, Tsafendas visited Poggenpoel and gave him R4. Poggenpoel did not want to take the money, which he had not asked for, but Tsafendas insisted on paying him.⁶⁴⁰² All this was known to the Commission but was left out of its Report, presumably because they were not the things a beggar would do and therefore contradicted such a claim.

The author asked forty-four witnesses whether Tsafendas could be described as a beggar and not one agreed. For reasons of space and since the witnesses' statements about his character are listed in the previous chapter, such statements will not be listed here, but the following are some examples of views as to whether he was a beggar:

⁶³⁹⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁶⁴⁰⁰ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁰¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, 'Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.'

⁶⁴⁰² Richard Poggenpoel statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013.

One evening in August 1966, some of the *Eleni* seamen asked Tsafendas to take them to a Greek restaurant. He did so and despite their protests, he paid the bill for everybody. Tsafendas said the crew were “strangers in his town” and since he was the host, he should pay.⁶⁴⁰³ Patrick O’Ryan and his son Reuben O’Ryan in whose house Tsafendas lived for five months said that he constantly bought food and sweets and toys for their family. When Patrick complained that it was embarrassing for him to be seen that their guest was bringing more food and toys in his house than him, Tsafendas did not stop, but started claiming to the children that it was their dad who had bought it and not him.⁶⁴⁰⁴

Emanuel Tsabouniaris, one of the *Eleni* seamen, told the author that he gave Tsafendas money to buy him a few things ashore and when he returned with them, he told Tsafendas to keep the change. Tsafendas insisted that he take back the change. Tsabouniaris said, “He was always very prompt with our financial dealings.” Tsabouniaris also said that “the only thing I found strange was that his profession of a hawker did not match his character. He was very educated and very polite for a hawker. The thing that impressed me more was that he was very proud. He was doing the job with pride, not like a beggar or trying to make you buy in a sleazy way. He was a true gentleman.”⁶⁴⁰⁵

Father Nikola Banovic became very sad upon hearing that the Commission had presented Tsafendas as a beggar, and found it hard to believe it. He told the author, “Dimitris was a very generous man. If he had two drachmas (Greek currency of the time) in his pocket, he would give them both to someone in need. He was not a beggar, this is libel... I remember he always used to give good tips to waiters and taxi drivers.”⁶⁴⁰⁶

THE MISSING BIBLE

*However, he remained at the hostel until 14th April, 1965, and when he left he took the Bible that was in his room with him.*⁶⁴⁰⁷

The above statement refers to the time when Tsafendas lived at the E.R. Carney Hostel, Clair Wood, while working for the South African Railways and Harbours. The

⁶⁴⁰³ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 15 February 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁴⁰⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁶⁴⁰⁵ Emanuil Tsabouniaris in personal interview with the author, 14 June 2016.

⁶⁴⁰⁶ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁶⁴⁰⁷ Chapter II C, Paragraph 26.

statement is by Casper Andries Willemse, the hostel's housemaster, and it is correct.⁶⁴⁰⁸ But once again a positive comment about Tsafendas is omitted since Willemse, had also characterised Tsafendas as "a sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man."⁶⁴⁰⁹

TSAFENDAS'S CHARACTER ACCORDING TO PEOPLE WHO MET HIM AND TESTIFIED TO THE COE OR TO THE POLICE

Let us now consider what Tsafendas's friends and close acquaintances said about him in the period leading up to the assassination. All of the statements below were in the possession of the Commission and were omitted from its Report. The study includes here only their comments about Tsafendas's character and not his political ideas or his mental state as these are discussed in the relevant sections of this chapter:

1. Kenneth Heugh Ross, Tsafendas's landlord for two months: "Tsafendas was very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in politics. Tsafendas objected to the Communists being banished to Robin Island because of their political opinions and actions. In general, Tsafendas opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government, and was definitely pre-Russian. I am aware that Tsafendas possessed a large quantity of literature but did not take note of the names of the books he read."⁶⁴¹⁰
2. Johannes Aurets, Tsafendas's supervisor at South African Railways, told the police that Tsafendas "was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature. During the time he was employed under my supervision, i.e. for approximately three weeks, I did not see him being cross at any time. He was a good worker."⁶⁴¹¹
3. August Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be "very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German,

⁶⁴⁰⁸ Casper Andries Willemse statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁰⁹ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8, 'Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.'

⁶⁴¹⁰ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴¹¹ Johannes Jaonus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

very courteous and quiet.”⁶⁴¹²

4. Patrick O’Ryan hosted Tsafendas in his home for five months in 1965-1966 and was close to him up to his arrest. Tsafendas was described to him by a preacher of the Christian Church as a “highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages.”⁶⁴¹³ He formed a “deep liking”⁶⁴¹⁴ for Tsafendas and considered him to be an “enlightened person.”⁶⁴¹⁵ He also testified that “I had confidence in him and used to like him. He was a very kindly man. In my experience of him he had a good heart... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind,” or that he “was mentally disturbed.”⁶⁴¹⁶ He also found Tsafendas to be “well-spoken and had good vocabulary.”⁶⁴¹⁷
5. Inspector Horacio Ferreira of the Portuguese Security Police was in charge of the cells where Tsafendas was held in custody in Beira in 1964. His statement to the police said he considered Tsafendas to be “normal and regarded him as a very intelligent person.”⁶⁴¹⁸
6. Ian Boswell, administrative assistant at the Department of Labour in Cape Town. He interviewed Tsafendas three times in 1966 and testified that “he was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being over-talkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality, during his interviews with me.”⁶⁴¹⁹
7. John Bornman lived with Tsafendas for six-seven weeks in April and May of 1966. He found Tsafendas to be “normal, intelligent and friendly. He was neat in his person, but his eating habits were messy.” Jacobus Bornman also testified that when he was broke, Tsafendas lent him five cents and when Bornman tried to return the money, Tsafendas refused to take it back. Furthermore Bornman testified that Tsafendas “stood up a lot for the Coloureds.”⁶⁴²⁰ The Commission’s report refers to Bornman but none of the above is included.

⁶⁴¹² August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁴¹³ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁶⁴¹⁴ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁴¹⁵ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁶⁴¹⁶ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁴¹⁷ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁴¹⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴¹⁹ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁶⁴²⁰ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA

8. Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he “never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers.”⁶⁴²¹
9. Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira “was often in the company of the subject and others had several conversations with him. He considered Tsafendas to be “a normal and very intelligent person.”⁶⁴²²
10. Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban, accepted Tsafendas as a Portuguese and Greek interpreter. Rudolph used him “on several occasions” over six months and “got to know him pretty well.” He said, “I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly.”⁶⁴²³
11. Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas’s landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry: “it was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means.”⁶⁴²⁴
12. Carel van Heerden was senior security officer for the Marine Diamond Corporation and worked with Tsafendas for around three months in 1966. He told the police: “We were transferred from the Marina on a small outboard boat to the Col pontoon. It was terrible, rough seas, so much so that almost all of us old hands got seasick. It struck me that Tsafendas adapted well. He was one of the few who was not seasick. Upon landing, he filled the mess basin on the lower deck with water and started shaving. His calm way struck me that he must know the sea. Tsafendas was employed as a pump, or engineer, operator and did not work under my direct supervision. I introduced myself to him and talked to him. He was friendly, outgoing, and not aloof. I noticed that his eating was messy. Otherwise he was completely normal.”⁶⁴²⁵

⁶⁴²¹ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴²² South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴²³ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴²⁴ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁶⁴²⁵ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

13. Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike's Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966, frequently driving him to the tanker *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town. Of Tsafendas, he told the police that he "never in no way got the impression that he could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers."⁶⁴²⁶
14. Gillian Claire Lieberman was a personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation who was often visited by Tsafendas in her office. She "found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange type of person, a unique character. I got the impression that he was physically different in dress and appearance. He was a big man, with a particularly striking big hat, stainless steel teeth, sloppy, dirty clothing."⁶⁴²⁷
15. Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He testified to the police that Tsafendas was "neatly dressed" and he "never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally."⁶⁴²⁸
16. John Galanakis was given by Tsafendas when the later entered his shop the impression that he "was on the scrounge, but realised that he was an intelligent man and that he spoke Greek, Portuguese and Afrikaans fluently."⁶⁴²⁹
17. Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas's boss at F. A. Poole in Pretoria, said that in the five months he worked with Tsafendas, he found him to be "not a very good worker, but will say that he was an intelligent worker."⁶⁴³⁰ He also testified to the Commission of Enquiry that he considered Tsafendas to be "an intelligent man, just untidy and lazy in rounding off his work." He never got the impression that Mr. Tsafendas was not right in his mind.⁶⁴³¹
18. Helen Grispos knew Tsafendas from birth and grew up with him, while her husband was Tsafendas's best childhood friend. She told the police that Tsafendas was "well-mannered

⁶⁴²⁶ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die '*Eleni*.' NASA.

⁶⁴²⁷ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴²⁸ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁶⁴²⁹ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴³⁰ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁴³¹ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

and intelligent.”⁶⁴³² She also told the author that she never thought Tsafendas was insane. “He never did or said anything to make me or George (her husband) think that he was insane.”⁶⁴³³

19. Reginald Maile, guard on the *Eleni*, testified that Tsafendas was “on very friendly relations with the crew... He was sober, polite and perfectly normal.”⁶⁴³⁴
20. Robert Smith, Tsafendas's landlord for two months: “Tsafendas was in my opinion a fanatic on politics and seldomly spoke of anything else... I am also aware that he has a large quantity of literature but do not know the nature thereof.”⁶⁴³⁵
21. Sydney Wiehand, Tsafendas's colleague at the House of Assembly testified that Tsafendas “was a quiet man. He wasn't the rough type or anything like that. He was quiet, quietly spoken, well-mannered.”⁶⁴³⁶
22. Hendrik van Loggenberg knew Tsafendas and his family well in Pretoria. He told the police that Tsafendas “definitely came across as normal ... he also seemed healthy ...”⁶⁴³⁷
23. John Gianouris, the Greek Vice Consul at Lourenço Marques, described Tsafendas as “a normal and intelligent person.”⁶⁴³⁸
24. Petrus Schuin, the head messenger at the Parliament, was also one of the three men who had interviewed him and appointed him. He told the Commission of Enquiry that “there was nothing out of the ordinary about him. Tsafendas was the same as any other person that had worked there.”⁶⁴³⁹
25. Sydney Wiehand, a messenger who was also on the interview panel in the House of Assembly, said Tsafendas “was a quiet man. He wasn't the rough type or anything like that. He was quiet, quietly spoken, well-mannered.”⁶⁴⁴⁰
26. Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas's landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired

⁶⁴³² Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴³³ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁶⁴³⁴ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die '*Eleni*.' NASA.

⁶⁴³⁵ Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴³⁶ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁶⁴³⁷ Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴³⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴³⁹ Petrus Robert Samuel Schuin testimony to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁶⁴⁴⁰ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

- psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, "I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners."⁶⁴⁴¹
27. John Galanakis, who met Tsafendas in Umtali in 1964, told police that he found Tsafendas to be "an intelligent person."⁶⁴⁴²
28. Lt.-Colonel P.J.B. van Wyk wrote in his report from Mozambique that Tsafendas, "for all purposes, can be seen as a normal, intelligent person."⁶⁴⁴³
29. Jose Lopez Baltazar, a fireman in Beira, testified that "when Tsafendas was in the presence of Whites, he said little or nothing, but was friendly and talkative with the Bantu."⁶⁴⁴⁴
30. Owen Smorenberg, who worked with him for five-six weeks, testified that "Tsafendas was very talkative and gave the impression that he was very friendly. He wanted to talk to everybody and it became known to me that he was able to speak different languages."⁶⁴⁴⁵
31. Keith Martincich who worked with him at the Marine Diamond Corporation testified that Tsafendas "spoke to me every day and I got the impression that he was sociable type."⁶⁴⁴⁶
32. William Mare Volbrecht, Tsafendas's school mate at the English Medium Primary School in Middleburg, testified to the police that he was "never a loner and freely mingled with us."⁶⁴⁴⁷
33. Redvers Quintin Wakfer, who worked with Tsafendas at the Power Station in Cape Town, testified that Tsafendas was "neatly dressed."⁶⁴⁴⁸
34. Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas "was well-dressed and appeared to be

⁶⁴⁴¹ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁴⁴² Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴⁴³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴⁴⁴ Col. van Wyk's report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴⁴⁵ Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

⁶⁴⁴⁶ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁴⁷ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Verklaring deur Majdor Venter. NASA.

⁶⁴⁴⁸ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA; Redvers Quintin Wakfer statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub File: 1/5, Subject Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

wealthy.”⁶⁴⁴⁹

35. Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, testified that Tsafendas “was well-dressed and gave a good appearance” although as far as she could see he had no visible means of support.⁶⁴⁵⁰
36. Garnet Muller, Tsafendas’s supervisor at South African Railways for three weeks, testified that Tsafendas gave him to understand that he took the job on a temporary basis. He “observed Demitrio Tsafendas to possess intelligence above that of the average person who is likely to accept a position with the little responsibility which is attached to that of shed attendant.”⁶⁴⁵¹
37. Kyriakos Skordis who Tsafendas used to visit at his coffee shop in Durban for several months in 1965, testified that he “appeared to be quite normal and was apparently in a poor financial position.”⁶⁴⁵²
38. Richard Poggenpoel lived with him for two weeks and kept on associating up to his arrest, “there was no mention or impression that he was mentally abnormal. He lived a completely normal life.”⁶⁴⁵³
39. George Ananiades met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and described him in his statement to the police “as a normal person with a very high-intelligence.”⁶⁴⁵⁴
40. Helen Daniels told the police: “besides his messy ways, I did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal. His stories about travelling abroad was interesting.”⁶⁴⁵⁵
41. Costas Michaletos,⁶⁴⁵⁶ who knew Tsafendas from birth, stated, “Ever since I knew Dimetrios Tsafantakis, I never, any time observed that he showed any deviations. He also never was an aggressive type person.”⁶⁴⁵⁷

⁶⁴⁴⁹ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁵⁰ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴⁵¹ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁵² Kyriakos Skordis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁵³ Richard Poggenpoel statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁵⁴ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴⁵⁵ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁶⁴⁵⁶ The correct spelling is Michaletos, not Michaeletos. Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁵⁷ Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

42. James Summers, owner of the “Barlings Tea Lounge,” which Tsafendas frequented for four months, testified that Tsafendas “was no nuisance, and appeared to be a quite normal, innocent type. I never had reason to even suspect that he could be mentally unbalanced. He acted quite normal.”⁶⁴⁵⁸
43. George Liberopoulos met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and described him in his statement to the police as “a normal person with a very high-intelligence.”⁶⁴⁵⁹
44. Gideon Cloete, an employee in the Department of Labour, met Tsafendas twice and said he “seemed eager to get employment, was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance.” Cloete said he saw no signs of abnormality, that “he seemed perfectly normal.”⁶⁴⁶⁰

In addition, we should remember statements which people made to newspapers about Tsafendas which were in the Commission's possession:

1. Dr. Samuel Schmahmann, a classmate, recalled Dimitri as “a popular boy and not the least introverted. I particularly remember him singing a Greek song at a school concert,” he said. “He was very funny and had us all in stitches.”⁶⁴⁶¹
2. Guenther Haafe, doorman at the Frankfurt factory where Tsafendas worked for six weeks in 1958. Eight years later, after the assassination, he still remembered the jovial greeting which Tsafendas gave him every morning. “He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come into my locker (room) to say Hi. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met and trust me, in my twelve years as a doorman I have seen thousands and thousands of faces coming in and out; this man was courteous, they do not make them like that anymore.”⁶⁴⁶²
3. Peter Pappas, owner of a Greek café in Durban, said when Tsafendas had some money he would give “a few cents to the white down-and-outs of the city.” Pappas said also had said, “When his luck was out, I sometimes gave him a free meal, but when he started work he paid me.”⁶⁴⁶³
4. Horst Hartmann, Tsafendas's employer in Frankfurt, Germany, at the heavy engineering

⁶⁴⁵⁸ Herbert James Summers statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁵⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁴⁶⁰ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁶⁴⁶¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, September 8, 1966, ‘Boyhood days of Tsafendas.’

⁶⁴⁶² *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, ‘Tsafendas seen as ‘mystery man’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

⁶⁴⁶³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

company Fries and Son, characterised Tsafendas “as extremely nice and friendly ... He looked like a successful business man. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man...he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on...” Tsafendas “left on his own wish,” although Hartmann “would have liked to keep him.”⁶⁴⁶⁴

5. J. Willemse, a former landlord, characterised Tsafendas as a “sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man.”⁶⁴⁶⁵

Do these forty-nine people describe the same man as that set forth by the Commission? All of their comments, were in the possession of the Commission but not one was used in its Report. Tsafendas is described by these men and women as an intelligent, polite, talkative, sociable and friendly person, perfectly able to reason in conversation, well-dressed and courteous. The Commission seemed to base its description of Tsafendas on a figment of Judge van Wyk's imagination, created with only one intention, which is to belittle Tsafendas in the eyes of the public.

CONCLUSION

The Commission's Report is a travesty of the truth, picking and choosing witnesses, using and ignoring their statements to create a Tsafendas who never existed. The statistics tell the story and are worth repeating: Of the two hundred witnesses who were interviewed by the police and the Commission, 44 made positive statements about Tsafendas's character, and 6 negative, with the remainder neutral. Thus, 22% of the statements were positive, 3% were negative and the remaining 75% neutral. However, the Commission used only 1 of the 44 positive statements, thus the 2.2%, in comparison to 100% of the negative ones. Could anything better demonstrate the Commission's bias and aim? The forty-four positive statements about Tsafendas, along with the five more listed above, contradict not only the Commission's caricature of him, but also the picture of him that emerged during the summary trial. Tsafendas was stated there to be withdrawn, isolated, unsociable, unfriendly,

⁶⁴⁶⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'He made a good impression'; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, 'Tsafendas was so friendly ...'; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.'

⁶⁴⁶⁵ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. 'Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.'

unable to function on a reasonable level, unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, a man who suffered from thought-disorder and was unable to speak properly.

Furthermore, the Commission manipulated witnesses' testimonies and other evidence to mispresent Tsafendas and some situations to his disadvantage. It also used negative characterisations of him for which there was no support. It seems obvious that the Commission's intention was not to reveal the real Tsafendas, but to create a distorted version of him, which would arouse the public's contempt and thus ensure that no-one would ever think of him as a hero or attribute a political motive to his act.

TSAFENDAS'S MENTAL STATE

The Report contains some comments made about the mental state of Tsafendas by people who knew him. In this section we will examine what the Commission has included and what it has omitted.

TSAFENDAS'S FAMILY'S OPINION ABOUT HIS MENTAL STATE

*They (the family) realized that he was eccentric, but did not think he was mentally disordered. The half-sister who lives in Rhodesia stated that the family did realize that he was not quite normal after he returned from Portugal. He said nothing to them about his alleged worm.*⁶⁴⁶⁶

The Commission states that Tsafendas's family "realized that he was eccentric, but did not think he was mentally disordered." This is accurate, but the family had made a much stronger statement regarding his mental state. They told the Commission clearly that Tsafendas "was definitely not insane."⁶⁴⁶⁷

The Commission also states that his half-sister in Rhodesia, Katerina Pnefma, stated that "the family did realize that he was not quite normal after he returned from Portugal." Her statement contradicts the view of other family members that "he was definitely not insane." Furthermore, the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali who had interviewed Pnefma when she made this comment, added at the bottom of the report that "At the time of the interview, Mrs. Pnefma was considerably upset and her opinion and facts might be slightly biased and inaccurate."⁶⁴⁶⁸ Clearly the Commission ignored this caveat.

Furthermore, Pnefma stated in a personal interview with the author:

"Of course I was upset! He [Tsafendas] had ruined my life. I knew he had the moment I heard about it [the assassination]. I remember it as if it was yesterday. I was by myself in the house ... no, they [the policemen] didn't have a typing machine; they were keeping notes ... I don't remember saying that he was unbalanced, but he certainly was not ... no it is untrue that we thought he was unbalanced. He was perfectly sane. He was very clever, cleverer than any of us [the family]. I must have meant that he had crazy political ideas. I

⁶⁴⁶⁶ Chapter II C, Paragraph 6.

⁶⁴⁶⁷ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁴⁶⁸ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

don't remember saying that at all... I remember saying that he was talking rubbish! He was always talking rubbish, but I couldn't tell the police what exactly he was saying! He was saying that the South Africans are Nazis, he was calling Dr. Verwoerd Hitler's best student ... that us and most Whites were exploiting the Black Rhodesians ... he was calling the Greeks racists, saying that one day the Rhodesians would kick us all out and take back what we stole from them ... that one day the Blacks in South Africa would throw the Whites into the sea ... He believed Mozambique and South Africa should have a colourful flag, like a rainbow or something in order for each colour to represent each race! Have you heard anything more absurd? He used to say that Jesus Christ was socialist and if he was alive today he would have been a revolutionary fighting apartheid and for the independence of Mozambique! Can you believe it? Well, this is what he was saying, all this kind of nonsense! How could I have told all these things to the police? They would have said 'Why didn't you report him to the police since he had such crazy ideas? Didn't you know he was dangerous?'

You can't imagine how many people had told my poor father to do something with him and his crazy political ideas. You can't imagine how many! Even my poor mother told him to talk to him because he would get us into trouble someday, as he was often doing, but my dad did nothing. It was actually all his fault. He taught him all these things, but my father was a cautious man, he was not like Dimitri; he wouldn't go around saying all these stupidities. His son was the opposite; he couldn't keep his mouth shut ... what about the other thing? He changed his name because he thought it was insulting to be called Tsafantakis since this was the name given to our ancestors by the Turks! Wasn't this nonsense?"⁶⁴⁶⁹

Despite the frailty of the evidence it adduced, the Commission apparently felt it could not omit the opinions of Tsafendas's family about his mental condition since this was something everyone would have wondered about.

⁶⁴⁶⁹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

NEGATIVE STATEMENTS REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S MENTAL STATE IN THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

Let us now examine those parts of the Report where people spoke negatively about Tsafendas's mental state:

Wilhelmina de Vos

*She says that at times his conversation was confused and her impression was that he was mad.*⁶⁴⁷⁰

De Vos was Tsafendas's landlady for about a month. We must assumed that she made this comment above to the Commission, because she gave a completely different statement to the police two weeks before the trial began, saying that she "considered him to be a completely normal person."⁶⁴⁷¹ De Vos's testimony to the Commission has gone missing, so the author cannot know when she gave evidence. It is possible that she did so after or during the summary trial as this could explain her change of opinion. Perhaps influenced by what she heard in the court, she changed her mind; perhaps she felt overawed by those learned psychiatrists who testified that Tsafendas was mad. We do not know whether the Commission asked her why she changed her mind. What we do know is that the Commission ignored the statement she made to the police on October 3 and included her new testimony. Without knowing the background of the new testimony, it would be imprudent for the author to speculate further. However, the fact is that before the trial de Vos gave an entirely different statement to the police saying Tsafendas was a completely normal person.

James Johnston

*Mr. Johnston, a minister of his church, gained the impression that he was slightly unbalanced.*⁶⁴⁷²

This fifteen-word sentence at the end of a short paragraph about Tsafendas's religious practices demonstrates an extraordinary distortion by omission and a very clear attempt by the Commission to manipulate a witness's words to Tsafendas's disadvantage. Johnston was

⁶⁴⁷⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 65.

⁶⁴⁷¹ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁷² Chapter II C, Paragraph 42.

a defence witness and testified in the summary trial. His case was examined there, but we will discuss it again here in the context of the Commission's statement.

Johnston told the police on October 6 that he had "only seen Tsafendas periodically and had no discussions with him ... I do not know Tsafendas very well and the longest discussion I had with him was for about 10 minutes at each occasion."⁶⁴⁷³ Thus the opinion of a man who spoke to Tsafendas twice for a total of twenty minutes is included in the Report while, as we will see, the opinions of people who knew Tsafendas for weeks, months and years are omitted. That Johnston hardly knew Tsafendas is obviously not taken under consideration by the Commission and is not mentioned in the Report.

However, where the Commission glaringly infringes the judicial traditions of neutrality and objectivity is by reporting only part of Johnston's statement. Johnston testified that he had concluded that Tsafendas was "slightly unbalanced and that he seemed to have a mysterious background, but otherwise he appeared to be all right."⁶⁴⁷⁴ The Commission chose to omit the second part of Johnston's sentence but report the first part. A final, blatant act of omission was to come: Johnston also told the police that he had seen Tsafendas the night before the assassination and although he did not speak to him, he "appeared to be perfectly normal."⁶⁴⁷⁵ The Commission omitted this statement, too.

Patrick O'Ryan

*Mr. O'Ryan never gained the impression that there was anything seriously wrong with him. He did tell them, though, about the tapeworm which he was supposed to have. Sometimes he called it a snake, and said that he had to feed it constantly.*⁶⁴⁷⁶

Tsafendas stayed at the O'Ryan household for some five to six months (November 1965-April 1966), and remained close to O'Ryan after he left. The Report has conflated some of O'Ryan's words and omitted others. He did not say that he "never gained the impression that there was anything seriously wrong with him." He said that he believed Tsafendas "was not spiritually or mentally disturbed ... I never got the impression that something was wrong

⁶⁴⁷³ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁷⁴ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁷⁵ James Johnston statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁷⁶ Chapter II C, Paragraph 55.

in his mind.”⁶⁴⁷⁷ Furthermore, he told the court he “never actually doubted his mental state” and that Tsafendas’s mind was similar to the one “the majority of people have.”⁶⁴⁷⁸ There is a significant difference between saying there is nothing seriously wrong and saying there is nothing wrong. The first expression means that while there is nothing seriously wrong, there is *something* wrong; the second means there is absolutely nothing wrong.

The Report mentions Tsafendas’s references to O’Ryan about the tapeworm. This issue has been discussed extensively in the Trial Chapter but it should be mentioned here that O’Ryan spoke of the tapeworm to the Commission, while he had not done so to the police. As already noted, O’Ryan testified to the Commission after he had testified to the police and after he was asked by the lawyer Wilfrid Cooper to mention it to save Tsafendas’s life.⁶⁴⁷⁹

O’Ryan also made several positive statements about Tsafendas’s character, but none of them was included in the Report. For instance, he said that he formed a “deep liking” for Tsafendas and that he “had confidence in him ... he was a very kindly man. In my experience of him he had a good heart... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind,” or that he “was mentally disturbed... he was well-spoken and had good vocabulary.”⁶⁴⁸⁰ O’Ryan’s opinion about Tsafendas is discussed later in this chapter in the “Landlords and Flatmates” section. For his personal relationship with Tsafendas, see his testimony in the Trial Chapter and at Tsafendas’s biography.

Keith Martincich

*At times he heard Tsafendas talking to himself. On one such occasion he heard Tsafendas say that he had dived into the sea from the boat to save people. He clapped his hands and jumped up and down like a child.*⁶⁴⁸¹

These three sentences are excerpted from a lengthy statement by Martincich, who had worked with Tsafendas for three weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation. While the tone of Martincich’s observations is generally hostile, the Commission’s selection of the incidents

⁶⁴⁷⁷ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁴⁷⁸ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁴⁷⁹ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

⁶⁴⁸⁰ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁴⁸¹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 56.

quoted seems designed to question Tsafendas's mental stability. It seems Martincich was the only one of two hundred witnesses questioned by the police and the Commission who noticed Tsafendas talking to himself. The author also asked forty-four people who knew Tsafendas if they ever saw him talk to himself and all said absolutely not. For reasons of space, the study will list here only people who knew Tsafendas very well who never spotted him addressing himself:

- His half-sister Katerina Pnefma;⁶⁴⁸²
- Mary Eendracht, his first cousin, who grew up with him in Egypt and Lourenço Marques and spent a lot of time together in a period of nine months in 1964;
- Fotini Gavasiadis who spent every day with him for nine months in Pretoria in 1963-1964;
- Father Michalis Visvinis who visited him for three-four years in prison (1990-1994),⁶⁴⁸³
- Father Nikola Banovic who lived with him at the same house for four months in 1961 and then lived right next to his house for another three;⁶⁴⁸⁴
- Ira Kyriakakis who grew up with him and spent a lot of time together in 1964 and 1965;⁶⁴⁸⁵
- Fathers Minas Constandinou, Ioannis Tsafaridis and Michalis Visvinis, who very regularly visited him in prison and the hospital during the late 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s;⁶⁴⁸⁶
- Andreas Babiolakis who knew him since they were children, lived with him for two months in 1964 and associated with him for about a year then;⁶⁴⁸⁷
- Thirteen crewmen from the *Eleni* who saw him every day for forty-two days in 1966;⁶⁴⁸⁸
- Elias Constantaras who lived under the same roof for two months in Cape Town in 1966

⁶⁴⁸² Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁴⁸³ Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁶⁴⁸⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁶⁴⁸⁵ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁶⁴⁸⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁶⁴⁸⁷ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁶⁴⁸⁸ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Manolis Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in a personal interview, 19 January 2016; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

and knew him for more than a year;⁶⁴⁸⁹

- Irene Michaletos who knew him very well for more than a year (1964-1965), when he often visited her house in Beira;⁶⁴⁹⁰
- Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's cousins and sons of Artemis Michaletos, Tsafendas's aunt and his father's sister who brought him up in Egypt. They first met Tsafendas in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique.⁶⁴⁹¹
- Alexander Moumbaris who spent three months in a cell next to Tsafendas's in Pretoria Prison. They spoke every day for an hour when they exercised together in the prison yard.⁶⁴⁹²
- Costas Poriазis who met him in 1965 in Beira;⁶⁴⁹³
- Alexandra Vaporidis who knew him for about six months in Istanbul in 1961;⁶⁴⁹⁴
- Nick Papadakis, who knew Tsafendas for two-three months and lived with him for two months in Mozambique in 1964;⁶⁴⁹⁵
- Panagiotis Peroglou, Stratis Vamvarapis, Antonis Nichas and Costas Chagios, who were Tsafendas's friends in Cape Town for more than a year.⁶⁴⁹⁶

It could be argued that everyone talks to himself occasionally, either audibly or inaudibly, and the whole human race is not crazy. As for Tsafendas jumping up and down, this is open to speculation. It appears to be childish, but again many people will do something silly on the spur of the moment. Alternatively, Tsafendas may have had a few drinks then – Martincich testified that Tsafendas “occasionally had a few drinks” - or Martincich might have misunderstood his action. The fact is that of two hundred witnesses who knew Tsafendas, most of them much better than Martincich, none testified to ever seeing such behaviour; the same response came from interviews with forty-four other friends and acquaintances by the author. However, what also needs to be mentioned is that the

⁶⁴⁸⁹ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁶⁴⁹⁰ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁶⁴⁹¹ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁶⁴⁹² Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

⁶⁴⁹³ Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁶⁴⁹⁴ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁶⁴⁹⁵ Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁶⁴⁹⁶ Costas Chagios in a personal interview, 14 July 2015; Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016; Antonis Nichas in a personal interview, 31 March 2016; Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016; Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

Commission omitted from its Report a remark made by Martincich about Tsafendas, namely that he got the impression “there was something mentally wrong with him”⁶⁴⁹⁷ This was his conclusion after seeing Tsafendas mumbling to himself and on one occasion jumping up and down.

Number of the Negative Statements used by the Commission

The Commission has included three of the four negative statements about Tsafendas's mental state from approximately two hundred witnesses who were questioned by the police and the Commission itself. The fourth witness who made a negative statement is Caroline Barbeau who told the police that after speaking to Tsafendas a few times in 1965, she formed the impression that he was “not all there.”⁶⁴⁹⁸ However, the Commission did not include her opinion in the Report, although it was in possession of her testimony. Her statement is examined in the previous two chapters.

POSITIVE STATEMENTS REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S MENTAL STATE INLCUDED IN THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

- *Neither the Chief Messenger nor the two senior messengers had any reason to believe, either during their interview or while Tsafendas was employed at the House of Assembly during August and September, that he was mentally disordered. Nor did the policemen and other messengers who came into contact with him at the House of Assembly notice anything wrong.*⁶⁴⁹⁹
- *During June and July, 1966, he had his meals with Mrs. Scott at No. 42, Chamberlain Street, Woodstock... In her opinion he was normal.*⁶⁵⁰⁰
- *In July, 1966, Tsafendas had a long interview with Mr. Hartford of the Cape Argus. Mr. Hartford's impression was that Tsafendas was normal.*⁶⁵⁰¹

⁶⁴⁹⁷ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁹⁸ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁴⁹⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 73.

⁶⁵⁰⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 67.

⁶⁵⁰¹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 74.

- *According to persons who know the family in Pretoria, they were not exactly taken up with this member of the family. They realized that he was eccentric, but did not think he was mentally disordered.*⁶⁵⁰²
- *Mr. Bornman, who occupied the same room as Tsafendas, stated that Tsafendas did not show any signs of being mentally abnormal.*⁶⁵⁰³
- *On Sunday evening, 4th September, 1966, attended a church service at the home of a certain Mr. Hall in Pinelands. On that occasion he appeared to be normal.*⁶⁵⁰⁴ According to Harry Hall's statement, Tsafendas did not only appear to be normal "on that occasion," but generally. Having knowing him since March 1966 until his arrest, he had testified that he regarded Tsafendas "as a sub-standard intellect, but otherwise found him to be reasonably normal."⁶⁵⁰⁵

The Commission included in its Report the above statements testifying to Tsafendas's mental normality. They come from people who knew him socially or professionally plus his colleagues at the Parliament. The fact that none of his colleagues at the House of Assembly noticed anything wrong with him over the thirty-five days they worked with him is of prime importance. Yet it was not mentioned at the summary trial, where Tsafendas was presented instead as a person who was unable to conduct even his simple duties as a messenger.

POSITIVE STATEMENTS REGARDING TSAFENDAS'S MENTAL STATE OMITTED FROM THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

Although the Commission included the above positive statements about Tsafendas's mental state in its Report, very many more were collected but did not see the light of day, For example:

1. Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he "never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers."⁶⁵⁰⁶

⁶⁵⁰² Chapter II C, Paragraph 6.

⁶⁵⁰³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 58.

⁶⁵⁰⁴ Chapter II C, Paragraph 90.

⁶⁵⁰⁵ Harry Hall statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁰⁶ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

2. Charles Woods, Tsafendas's supervisor at Fraser and Chalmers, characterised him as a "good tradesman,"⁶⁵⁰⁷ "a very good worker, far from being a crank, fairly intelligent, but a violent type."⁶⁵⁰⁸
3. Inspector Horacio Ferreira of the Portuguese Security Police was in charge of the cells where Tsafendas was held in custody in Beira in 1964. His statement to the police said he considered Tsafendas to be "normal and regarded him as a very intelligent person."⁶⁵⁰⁹
4. Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden was senior security officer for the Marine Diamond Corporation and worked with Tsafendas for around three months in 1966. "He was friendly, outgoing, and not aloof. I noticed that his eating was messy. Otherwise he was completely normal."⁶⁵¹⁰
5. Johannes Aurets, Tsafendas's supervisor at the South African Railways, told the police Tsafendas "was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature. During the time he was employed under my supervision, i.e. for approximately three weeks, I did not see him being cross at any time. He was a good worker."⁶⁵¹¹
6. Garnet Muller, Tsafendas's supervisor at South African Railways for three weeks, testified that he "observed Demitrio Tsafendas to possess intelligence above that of the average person who is likely to accept a position with the little responsibility which is attached to that of shed attendant."⁶⁵¹²
7. Hulse, who worked with Tsafendas at Marine Diamond Cooperation from December 1965 to March 12, 1966, stated that Tsafendas "did not appear to be disturbed at any stage."⁶⁵¹³
8. Antonio Teixeira Da Silva, who worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole's engineering works in 1965, testified that Tsafendas "was acting normal and I never

⁶⁵⁰⁷ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁰⁸ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, 'Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.'

⁶⁵⁰⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁵¹⁰ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵¹¹ Johannes Jaonus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵¹² Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵¹³ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

noticed anything wrong with him. I have seen an insane person before but I can state that the accused never behaved as an insane person whilst employed here.”⁶⁵¹⁴

9. Albert Vercueil, Tsafendas's boss at F. A. Poole in Pretoria, said that in the five months he worked with Tsafendas, he found him to be “not a very good worker, but will say that he was an intelligent worker.”⁶⁵¹⁵ He also testified to the Commission of Enquiry that he considered Tsafendas to be “an intelligent man, just untidy and lazy in rounding off his work.” He said “Tsafendas was a very friendly, social and talkative person but he was always looking to quarrel with the white workers. He never got the impression that Mr. Tsafendas wasn't right in his mind.”⁶⁵¹⁶
10. August Karel Oestrich worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole in Pretoria. He found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁶⁵¹⁷
11. Cornelius Rudolph, the head court interpreter on the staff of the Magistrate of Durban testified that Tsafendas “was in the habit of regularly reporting two or three times a week to ask whether there is any interpretation work.” He used him “on several occasions” over a period of six months and “got to know him pretty well. ... I spoke with him several times. He seemed to be a normal person and intelligent.”⁶⁵¹⁸
12. Nikolaas Nel worked with Tsafendas for five months at F.A. Poole and told the police that Tsafendas “seemed normal.”⁶⁵¹⁹
13. Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike's Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966. He testified that he “never in no way got the impression that he could

⁶⁵¹⁴ Antonio Teixeira Da Silva statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵¹⁵ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁵¹⁶ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵¹⁷ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁵¹⁸ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵¹⁹ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers.”⁶⁵²⁰

14. Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen, was Tsafendas's tram instructor in December 1965 and January 1966. He testified that “other than his slow response, I did not at all get the impression that mentally anything was wrong with him. He is mentally normal.”⁶⁵²¹
15. Helen Grispos knew Tsafendas from birth and grew up with him, while her husband was Tsafendas's best childhood friend. She told the police that Tsafendas was “well-mannered and intelligent.”⁶⁵²² She also told the author that she never thought Tsafendas was insane. “He never did or said anything to make me or George (her husband) think that he was insane.”⁶⁵²³
16. Hendrik van Loggenberg knew Tsafendas and his family well in Pretoria. He testified that Tsafendas “definitely came across as normal ... he also seemed healthy ...”⁶⁵²⁴
17. Captain P.A. Sanianos, the Greek Consul in Beira “was often in the company of the subject and others had several conversations with him.” He considered Tsafendas to be “a normal and very intelligent person.”⁶⁵²⁵
18. James Summers, owner of the “Barlings Tea Lounge,” which Tsafendas frequented from July 1966 until the assassination, testified that Tsafendas “was no nuisance, and appeared to be a quite normal, innocent type. I never had reason to even suspect that he could be mentally unbalanced. He acted quite normal.”⁶⁵²⁶
19. John Gianouris, the Greek Vice Consul at Lourenço Marques, described Tsafendas as “a normal and intelligent person.”⁶⁵²⁷
20. Kyriakos Skordis who Tsafendas used to visit at his coffee shop in Durban for several

⁶⁵²⁰ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

⁶⁵²¹ Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵²² Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁵²³ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁶⁵²⁴ Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵²⁵ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁵²⁶ Herbert James Summers statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵²⁷ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

- months in 1965, testified that he “appeared to be quite normal.”⁶⁵²⁸
21. Inspector Horacio Ferreira of the Portuguese Security Police was in charge of the cells where Tsafendas was held in custody in Beira in 1964. He testified that he considered Tsafendas to be “normal and regarded him as a very intelligent person.”⁶⁵²⁹
22. Costas Michaletos,⁶⁵³⁰ who knew Tsafendas from birth, testified that “Ever since I knew Dimetrios Tsafantakis, I never, any time observed that he showed any deviations. He also never was an aggressive type person.”⁶⁵³¹
23. John Galanakis, who met Tsafendas in Umtali in 1964, told police that he found Tsafendas to be “an intelligent person.”⁶⁵³²
24. Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He testified to the police that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed” and he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”⁶⁵³³
25. Gideon Cloete, an employee in the Department of Labour, met Tsafendas twice and said he “seemed eager to get employment, was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance.” Cloete said he saw no signs of abnormality, that “he seemed perfectly normal.”⁶⁵³⁴
26. George Liberopoulos met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963 and described him to the police as a “normal person with a very high intelligence.”⁶⁵³⁵ Liberopoulos also stated to the author that he “never believed that Tsafendas was insane. He was perfectly normal; very clever man.”⁶⁵³⁶
27. Reginald Robert Maile was the guard on the *Eleni* while it was docked in Cape Town

⁶⁵²⁸ Kyriakos Skordis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵²⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁵³⁰ The correct spelling is Michaletos, not Michaeletos. Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵³¹ Costas Michaeletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵³² Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁵³³ Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁶⁵³⁴ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁶⁵³⁵ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁵³⁶ George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2015.

from July 26, 1966 to September 3, 1966. He saw Tsafendas every day and told the police that he “never got the impression that he could be mentally defective. He was sober, polite and perfectly normal.”⁶⁵³⁷

28. George Ananiades met Tsafendas in 1963 and described him to the police as a “normal person with a very high-intelligence.”⁶⁵³⁸ He later told the author that Tsafendas “is impossible to have been insane. He was a very intelligent and educated man. He was definitely able to function on a reasonable level.”⁶⁵³⁹

29. Ian Boswell, administrative assistant at the Department of Labour in Cape Town. He interviewed Tsafendas three times in 1966 and testified that “he was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being over-talkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality, during his interviews with me.”⁶⁵⁴⁰

30. John Verghis, owner of a coffee shop in Beira which Tsafendas visited often for several months, said he considered him to be a “normal person.”⁶⁵⁴¹

31. For two months in 1966 Tsafendas had his meals in Mary Scott's boarding house. She told police that she “never got the impression that he could be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared perfectly normal.”⁶⁵⁴²

32. Lt. Col. P.J.B. van Wyk of the South African police interviewed several people in Rhodesia and in Mozambique, including in Beira and Lourenço Marques, who knew Tsafendas. He stated in his report that Tsafendas, “for all purposes, can be seen as a normal, intelligent person.”⁶⁵⁴³

⁶⁵³⁷ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

⁶⁵³⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁵³⁹ George Ananiades in a personal interview, 21 June 2016.

⁶⁵⁴⁰ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁶⁵⁴¹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁵⁴² Mary Kathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁴³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

33. John Bornman lived with Tsafendas for six-seven weeks in April and May of 1966. He testified to the police that he found Tsafendas to be “normal, intelligent and friendly. He was neat in his person, but his eating habits were messy.”⁶⁵⁴⁴
34. Patrick O’Ryan hosted Tsafendas in his home for five months in 1965-1966 and was close to him up to his arrest. Tsafendas was described to him by a preacher of the Christian Church as a “highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages.”⁶⁵⁴⁵ He formed a “deep liking”⁶⁵⁴⁶ for Tsafendas and considered him to be an “enlightened person.”⁶⁵⁴⁷ He “never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind,” or that he was “mentally disturbed.”⁶⁵⁴⁸
35. Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas’s landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission of Enquiry: “it was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means.”⁶⁵⁴⁹
36. Elizabeth Groves was Tsafendas’s landlady for six or seven weeks and a retired psychiatric nurse. About Tsafendas she said, “I was a nurse and worked in lunatic institutions. He was a normal person to the best of my knowledge.”⁶⁵⁵⁰
37. Alice Mary Theyser was Tsafendas’s landlady from July 1, 1966 to August 30, 1966, just six days before the assassination. She testified that she “never got the impression in any way that he might be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared a quite normal person.”⁶⁵⁵¹

⁶⁵⁴⁴ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁵⁴⁵ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁶⁵⁴⁶ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁵⁴⁷ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁶⁵⁴⁸ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁵⁴⁹ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁶⁵⁵⁰ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁵⁵¹ Alice Mary Theyser statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

38. Helen Daniels lived with Tsafendas in her parents' house for six weeks in 1965 and "did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal."⁶⁵⁵²
39. Richard Poggenpoel lived with him for two weeks in his house and kept on associating up to his arrest, "there was no mention or impression that he was mentally abnormal. He lived a completely normal life."⁶⁵⁵³
40. J. Willemse was Tsafendas's landlord for one month in 1965. He characterised him as a "sophisticated, friendly and well-spoken man."⁶⁵⁵⁴
41. Marika Tsafantakis Tsafendas's stepmother, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁶⁵⁵⁵
42. Victor Tsafandakis, Tsafendas's stepbrother, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁶⁵⁵⁶
43. Mrs. Tsafandakis, wife of Victor Tsafandakis and Tsafendas's sister-in-law, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁶⁵⁵⁷
44. Eleni Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas's stepsister, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁶⁵⁵⁸
45. Evangelia Nissiotis, Tsafendas's stepsister, testified to the Commission that Tsafendas was "definitely not insane."⁶⁵⁵⁹

As we see from the foregoing, there were at least another forty-five statements in the Commission's possession where people had commented positively about Tsafendas's mental state and all were omitted. Some were particularly important because they were from people

⁶⁵⁵² Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁶⁵⁵³ Richard Poggenpoel statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁵⁴ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966: 1, 8. 'Assassin-man with a chip on his shoulder.'

⁶⁵⁵⁵ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁵⁵⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁵⁵⁷ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁵⁵⁸ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁵⁵⁹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

who had lived with him or worked with him and knew him well. Thus the positive statements about Tsafendas's mental state total 51 out of the 200 statements, or 25.5%. Of the remaining statements, 4 were negative, 2%, while the rest of the witnesses made no comment on Tsafendas's mental state, presumably because his conduct as they knew it never suggested there could be anything wrong with him. Out of the 4 negatives, 3 were included. That makes it 3 out of the 4 negative and 6 (since we are not sure about the number of his colleagues in the Parliament the Commission refers to) out of the 51 positive. Thus, the Commission made use of 75% of the negative statements in comparison to 11.7% of the positive ones. It should be also noted that exactly the same thing has happened with other positive and negative statements regarding Tsafendas's personality; all the negative ones are included, while only a very small number of the positives is mentioned.

It is notable that the negative responses came from people who did not know Tsafendas well. The fact that Johnson, who had spoken to Tsafendas for twenty minutes in his entire life, is included, while the words of people who knew him well are omitted is indicative of the Commission's aim.

The author has also interviewed several people who lived, worked and knew Tsafendas, but their statements will not be included here as they were not in possession of the Commission. However, they are included in the Trial Chapter. Finally, one more significant opinion is that of the US Immigration authorities. They dealt with Tsafendas for five years and were aware of his hospitalizations while in the United States. They also knew that he had faked mental illness in 1943 while he was in their custody, discovered when he was taken to a hospital. It was for that reason that they believed "he was unstable though not (not)⁶⁵⁶⁰ insane."⁶⁵⁶¹ The Commission makes no mention at all of their opinion.

CONCLUSION

Only four of two hundred people who were interviewed by the COE and the police testified negatively about Tsafendas's mental state and none of these four could be considered a reliable witness. Johnston had spoken to Tsafendas for twenty minutes all his life, de Vos initially testified to the police that Tsafendas was perfectly normal and then told the Commission that he was mad, while Martincich was the only witness out of two hundred who

⁶⁵⁶⁰ This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second 'not' within brackets.

⁶⁵⁶¹ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

noticed that Tsafendas was talking to himself and assumed he was mad. That leaves only Barbeau, who, like Johnston, was a member of the Christian Church, and clearly tried to distance herself from Tsafendas by belittling him. Even these four “negative” statements did not mention any of the things that were stated in court about Tsafendas, namely that he was unable to function on a reasonable level or follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, that his speech was disjointed, that he suffered from thought-blocking and that he had confused ideas. The fact that the Report contains 75% of the negative statements about Tsafendas's mental state but only 11.7% of the positive ones points to a significant bias by the Commission.

TSAFENDAS'S EMPLOYMENT

In this section, the study deals with Tsafendas's employment record and what his colleagues thought of him. Tsafendas was medically examined for some of these jobs and was found to be perfectly healthy each time. However, the issue of the medical examinations will not be discussed here since it is considered at length in the section Medical Examinations.

The Commission refers to several positions which Tsafendas held, but the study will comment only on those which raise doubts over issues such as the Commission's treatment of witnesses' statements, omissions, repetitions, undue bias and so on. As we will see, the Commission's Report invariably dwells on situations which place Tsafendas in a bad light while passing swiftly over jobs where workers had positive things to say about him. Anything which supports the theory that Tsafendas was mad or as described by the psychiatrists at his summary trial is included, while anything that contradicts the theory is omitted.

IN GERMANY

*It appears that Tsafendas was employed in Germany during 1959 from where he went via France to the United Kingdom in May, 1959. (B.7771.)*⁶⁵⁶²

This sketchy, two-line summary omits a large amount of information, much of it complimentary to Tsafendas, which was well known to the Commission. In September 1958, Tsafendas travelled to West Germany from Belgium and registered at Frankfurt Aliens Office.⁶⁵⁶³ On September 18 he started work as a welder at the heavy engineering company of Fries and Son in a Frankfurt suburb. Mr. Horst Hartmann, Senior Personnel Officer at the company, said,

“He drove up here in a big battered American car. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder. Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous ... a very pleasant man. He looked like a satisfied, successful businessman, and his looks certainly didn't fit the job he wanted. But he spoke good German, so I took him on. We liked him ... always laughing, a good worker.”⁶⁵⁶⁴

⁶⁵⁶² Chapter II B, Paragraph 27.

⁶⁵⁶³ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966 (late edition): 2. ‘Did he live in W. Germany?’

⁶⁵⁶⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘He made a good impression’; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, ‘The assassin’; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas was so friendly ...’; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.’

Six weeks later Tsafendas left Fries and Son voluntarily, with a very good reference in his briefcase. Horst Hartmann said, "He left of his own accord ... we would have liked to keep him."⁶⁵⁶⁵ Tsafendas also made a lasting impression on Guenter Haafe, fifty-seven, the factory gatekeeper, who after the assassination remembered the jovial greeting Tsafendas gave him every morning. He said:

"He was a jolly man, always smiling and friendly. He would almost always come into my locker room to say hi. He was really one of the friendliest workers I have met and trust me, in my twelve years as a doorman I have seen thousands and thousands of faces coming in and out. This man was courteous; they do not make them like that anymore."⁶⁵⁶⁶

Three other workmates said, "He was a nice guy," "He was a good comrade" and "He left me with a good impression."⁶⁵⁶⁷ Tsafendas then worked for six months for Anglo-American Fashions and Designers in Frankfurt, and for about another six months at a US Army printing works in Hochst, a district of Frankfurt.⁶⁵⁶⁸

The Commission was well aware of the above information, but saw fit to exclude it from its Report. It might be argued that a listing of work places was relatively unimportant, but the same cannot be said of the witnesses' comments. Not only were the opinions ventured about Tsafendas positive, they showed him in a completely different light to the way he was pictured at the summary trial. There, Tsafendas was described as a bad worker, dirty, looking neglected, withdrawn, isolated, unsociable, unfriendly and uncommunicative. The contrast with the views of his workmates could hardly be greater.

⁶⁵⁶⁵ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'He made a good impression'; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1966: 2, 'The assassin'; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, 'Tsafendas was so friendly ...'; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.'

⁶⁵⁶⁶ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'He made a good impression'; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, 'Tsafendas was so friendly ...'; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.'

⁶⁵⁶⁷ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'He made a good impression'; *Natal Witness*, 10 September 1966, 'Tsafendas was so friendly ...'; *O Primeiro de Janeiro*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas trabalhou como soldador em Frankforte.'

⁶⁵⁶⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

THE LIMASOLLU NACI COLLEGE IN ISTANBUL

*The next country he visited was Turkey. It appears that he was there during the second half of 1961 and the beginning of 1962. He was employed for two months as a teacher of English.*⁶⁵⁶⁹

Another item on the file contains the following note:

*“Applicant can speak German and a little Afrikaans. English fluently. 1963—Marine Watchman in Lisbon— (Certificate issued by Police in Portugal seen) 1961-1962— Teacher of English at Limasolla Nace College, Turkey.”*⁶⁵⁷⁰

The Commission here reveals something very important: that Tsafendas was employed as a teacher of English while in Turkey. This had already been published by the South African media and Tsafendas had referred to it when he was questioned by the police; however, it was not mentioned during the summary trial. The reference in the Report was not only brief, but incomplete and inaccurate. The name of the school where Tsafendas taught was not given in the first reference to Turkey in Chapter II B of the Report, although it was known to the Commission and was stated in the second reference, in Chapter VI.

The length of time that Tsafendas spent as a teacher is wrong, being closer to six months than two. However, it was Tsafendas who told the police that he had worked for two months.⁶⁵⁷¹ Why he got this wrong is not known to the study, but could be due to confusion under pressure from police questioning or fatigue or a simple miscalculation. The figure of approximately six months was confirmed by Father Nikola Banovic and Alexandra Vaporidis, who met Tsafendas in Istanbul. Tsafendas spent four months living at the home of Father Nikola, who said Tsafendas attended at the college throughout this time. He continued teaching there for another two or three months until he resigned in the middle of December 1961.⁶⁵⁷²

Let us now consider a few things about the college and its owner. Limasollu Naci (1921-1992), who became one of Tsafendas's best friends, was a Turkish-Cypriot who moved from Cyprus to Turkey when he was four. He began his working life as a photographer and in 1940 became the first professional to use cine film in Istanbul. He held

⁶⁵⁶⁹ Chapter II B, Paragraph 37.

⁶⁵⁷⁰ Chapter VI, Paragraph 4.

⁶⁵⁷¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁵⁷² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2014.

his first photo exhibition at the Faculty of Arts in 1947, opened his second in 1948 at the Community Centre in Beyoğlu, and later exhibited his work in Paris and London. He won first prize in an international photography contest in Turin, Italy in 1948.⁶⁵⁷³ Limasollu is widely recognised as pre-eminent in the provision of private foreign language instruction and distance learning in Turkey. He also pioneered the concept of introducing young Turks to foreign languages at summer camps, initially in the coastal regions of Turkey and later in Britain.⁶⁵⁷⁴ He established the Istanbul College that bears his name in 1953; it was the first private language institute in Turkey and widely considered to be the best and most prestigious, with many students from wealthy and powerful families.⁶⁵⁷⁵

Tsafendas's college work flatly contradicts the trial presentation of him, especially with regard to his ability to work and even to function on an everyday basis. In court he was portrayed as unable to function on a reasonable level, unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, talking in a disjointed manner, suffering from thought-disorder and unable to do more than a menial job. Therefore, if his work at the college was known, the natural question would have been: How was it possible that a schizophrenic man with all the aforementioned disabilities managed to secure such a position and keep it for six months?

In addition, Tsafendas used the reference he received from Mr. Limasollu Naci to get his job at Parliament. For this reason if for no other, one would have expected the South African authorities or the Commission to inquire about Tsafendas's time at the Istanbul College. Strangely, while these officials made enquiries all around the world and managed to find information from almost everywhere Tsafendas had been, Turkey came up empty. Tsafendas spent six to seven months in Turkey holding down a job which seemed far beyond the abilities of his emerging picture, yet nothing is said about it. We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that the Commission did indeed discover about Tsafendas's time at the college, but then chose to omit its findings because they would contradict the way he was represented in court.

⁶⁵⁷³ *En so Haber*, 23 May 2012, 'Limasollu Naci kimdir.'

⁶⁵⁷⁴ Akinturk, 2011: 2014

⁶⁵⁷⁵ Durgun, 2013: 2; Advije Vedia Limasollu in a personal interview, 8 January 2016.

F.A. POOLE

On 7th February, 1964, he started work as a fitter with Messrs. F. A. Poole (Pty.), Ltd.

*A foreman employed by the firm gave evidence that once Tsafendas had threatened to stab him with a knife and another person gave evidence that one day Tsafendas had threatened a Bantu with a knife. A Portuguese who was also employed by the firm said that Tsafendas had assumed a hostile attitude towards him because he had refused to discuss Dr. Salazar with him.*⁶⁵⁷⁶

*On 10th July, 1964, Mr. Vercueil dismissed Tsafendas from employment with Messrs. F. A. Poole (Pty.), Ltd., because of the untidiness of his work and his constant quarrelling with the other workers.*⁶⁵⁷⁷

Tsafendas's argument with a colleague about Salazar

This issue is discussed in the "Political Activities and Ideas" section of this chapter.

Tsafendas's Dismissal from F.A. Poole

The Commission stated that Tsafendas was dismissed because of his constant quarrelling with the other workers. This tells only half of the story. What the Commission omitted was that Tsafendas argued only with the White workers and not the non-Whites. Vercueil told the Commission that "Tsafendas was a very friendly, social and talkative person, but he was always looking to quarrel with the white workers." Vercueil "would usually receive complaints from the other (white) foremen, but never from the black workers."⁶⁵⁷⁸

Furthermore, Vercueil had testified to the police that Tsafendas "bullied the other Portuguese workers. He had fights with several white workers."⁶⁵⁷⁹ Nikolaas Nel, another worker, testified that Tsafendas "was certainly unpopular among white workers. Accused adapted more to the non-whites."⁶⁵⁸⁰

⁶⁵⁷⁶ Chapter III C, Paragraph 8.

⁶⁵⁷⁷ Chapter III C, Paragraph 10.

⁶⁵⁷⁸ Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁷⁹ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁵⁸⁰ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

In addition, although Vercueil dismissed Tsafendas for “untidiness in his work,” he had also stated that “he was an intelligent worker, mainly because he quickly grasped when work was entrusted to him. However, I found him very sloppy in his work. I found him to be very friendly, but very opinionated. He would not, for example, work according to the assignment, but as he decides...Personally I would say that he is an intelligent person and completely mentally balanced. I now show some tools and work produced by the accused personally and performed to give you an idea of the degree of initiative he laid to the day ... F.A. Poole moved from their warehouse and Mr. Tsafendas was tasked with organizing the move and he handled it effortlessly.”⁶⁵⁸¹

Colleagues' Opinions about Tsafendas

Vercueil also testified to the Commission that “he never got the impression that Mr. Tsafendas wasn't right in his mind. F.A. Poole moved from their warehouse and Mr. Tsafendas was tasked with organizing the move and he handled it effortlessly.”⁶⁵⁸² These statements are very important because they contradict claims that Tsafendas was a bad worker, unable to do more than a menial job, withdrawn and isolated. The Commission omitted from its Report the assessment of Tsafendas's mental state and character offered by Vercueil (“friendly, sociable, talkative, quarrelsome with whites”), who worked with him for five months, while including the negative opinion of James Johnston, who spoke to Tsafendas for twenty minutes in his entire life. Vercueil testified that after Tsafendas was dismissed, he threatened him and Dr. Verwoerd. This issue is discussed in the section on Tsafendas's political activities and ideas.

Vercueil's comments about Tsafendas's character are not the only ones from employees at F.A. Poole. Three other men gave evidence about Tsafendas, each having worked with him for five months:

⁶⁵⁸¹ Albert Vercueil statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁸² Albert Vercueil statement to the COE, 25 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

- Antonio Teixeira Da Silva testified that Tsafendas “was acting normal and I never noticed anything wrong with him. I have seen an insane person before but I can state that the accused never behaved as an insane person whilst employed here.”⁶⁵⁸³
- Nikolaas Nel testified that Tsafendas “seemed normal,” but also that he had a “messy and dirty appearance.”⁶⁵⁸⁴
- August Karel Oestrich testified that he found him to be “very polite, fairly intelligent, well-spoken in both English and German, very courteous and quiet. I never noticed anything abnormal about him, except that he had a strange look when I looked him straight in the eyes. He never gave me the impression that he was suffering from any mental disease.”⁶⁵⁸⁵

FRASER AND CHALMERS

*His next employers were Messrs. Frazer and Chalmers, at Mandini, Zululand. There he worked as a fitter and turner from 19th April, 1965 to 19th May, ' 1965, when he was dismissed after a fight with a Greek, a certain Nicholas Vergos.*⁶⁵⁸⁶

The Commission deals extensively with the fight, but does not say anything about Tsafendas's work there. The fight is examined in detail at the ‘Vergos incident’ section in this chapter. An important omission here is a statement by Charles Woods, Tsafendas's supervisor at Fraser and Chalmers. Woods characterised Tsafendas as a “good tradesman,”⁶⁵⁸⁷ “a very good worker, far from being a crank, fairly intelligent, but a violent type.”⁶⁵⁸⁸ Woods's statement is yet another contradiction of the claims in court that Tsafendas was a poor worker fit only for menial jobs.

⁶⁵⁸³ Antonio Teixeira Da Silva statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁸⁴ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁸⁵ August Karel Oestrich statement to the police, n.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁵⁸⁶ Chapter II C, Paragraph 28.

⁶⁵⁸⁷ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁸⁸ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, ‘Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.’

CITY TRAMWAYS

On 12th November, 1965, he applied for a position as a bus conductor with City Tramways, Cape Town. Once again he was examined medically and nothing was found to be wrong with him. He stated, inter alia, that he had never had a nervous breakdown. He had to report as a learner-conductor on 24th November, 1965, but he did not do so until 29th December, 1965. The instructor noted the following, inter alia, concerning him: "Trainee is slow and seems lazy too. He won't last long if he passes out. Slow in uptake. Won't last. Mind seems blank at times.

In any case Tsafendas found the work too exacting, and he resigned on 12th January, 1966.⁶⁵⁸⁹

All the above information is taken from a statement by Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen, the Tramways' instructor. He also said: "Other than his slow response, I did not at all get the impression that mentally anything was wrong with him. He is mentally normal. There are many rejected applicants because they are found to be of a bad standard."⁶⁵⁹⁰ Once more, the Commission acts as censor by selection, including what is negative about Tsafendas and omitting what is positive and thus giving a distorted impression of what Oosthuizen actually said.

GROOTE SCHUUR HOSPITAL APPLICATION

In the meantime he applied on 17th November, 1965, to the personnel officer of Groote Schuur Hospital for a position in the reception section. Owing to his lack of qualifications, as well as the poor impression he made on the officer concerned, the application was not successful.⁶⁵⁹¹

The Commission states that Tsafendas made a poor impression on the personnel officer who interviewed him (his name in the statement is indecipherable). However, that is not what the officer said. His words were, "apart from his lack of qualifications, the applicant did not impress me as a person in other respects suitable for appointment as Receptionist

⁶⁵⁸⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 49.

⁶⁵⁹⁰ Johannes Christiaan Oosthuizen statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁹¹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 50.

Officer at this hospital.”⁶⁵⁹² What he is saying is that apart from his lack of formal qualifications, Tsafendas did not have the other attributes necessary to be a receptionist. This had nothing to do with the impression he made personally on the officer. In a new twist to its generally hostile approach, this is not a case of the Commission including yet another negative opinion about Tsafendas, but of inventing one where none exists.

MARINE DIAMOND CORPORATION

The next place where he sought employment was the Marine Diamond Corporation in Cape Town.

*On 13th January, 1966, he was examined by this company's medical officer and nothing was found to be wrong with him. Once again he declared that he had never had any mental or nervous disease.*⁶⁵⁹³

Mr. Martincich, who worked with Tsafendas on the Colponton, told the Commission that Tsafendas occasionally had a few drinks or drank a bottle of light wine and then talked a lot of nonsense. On one occasion Tsafendas told him that the South African Government would not last long. When this witness told him on another occasion that he was talking nonsense, Tsafendas wanted to assault him, but when he saw that the witness was going to use Karate against him, he immediately calmed down and apologized. On another occasion he said that he was expecting a large sum of money, that he was an important businessman and that he really did not know why he was wasting his time on the boat.

*He was often in the company of non-Whites and explained that they were more sympathetic towards him than the Whites. According to this witness, Tsafendas was exceptionally lazy and childish, and his table manners were bad. At times he heard Tsafendas talking to himself. On one such occasion he heard Tsafendas say that he had dived into the sea from the boat to save people. He clapped his hands and jumped up and down like a child.*⁶⁵⁹⁴

The Commission refers to Tsafendas's employment in Marine Diamond Corporation in Chapter II C, Paragraphs 53, 55, 56 and 57. The Commission includes the fact that “he was examined by this company's medical officer and nothing was found to be wrong with him.

⁶⁵⁹² Personnel Officer's statement regarding Tsafendas's application, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10//4102 Dor Stafendas. NASA.

⁶⁵⁹³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 53.

⁶⁵⁹⁴ Chapter II C, Paragraph 56.

Once again he declared that he had never had any mental or nervous disease.” This is something that will be examined later in this chapter, in the section about the Medical Examinations.

Most of the information in the Report about Tsafendas's time with the company is from his colleague, Keith Martincich. Martincich was one of five workmates who testified to the police and the Commission. The other four colleagues evidently knew Tsafendas much better than Martincich, as they had worked with him at least three times longer than Martincich's three weeks, and had given more detailed statements about his behaviour and time in the job. Yet the Commission included almost all of Martincich's testimony while ignoring that of those who knew him better. It is the only time in the Report that the Commission has used so many details from a single witness's statement.

These four other colleagues had all spoke in a positive manner about Tsafendas, but their statements were not used and it was the generally hostile statement by Martincich, which dominated the Commission's Report. The only point which appeared from the other four colleagues' statements was that Tsafendas “expressed his disapproval of the Government's colour policy” to his colleagues. This was significant in view of a reference by the Commission to Tsafendas talking a lot of nonsense when drinking. The Report did not specify the nature of this “nonsense,” although Martincich had spelled it out as follows:

“On various occasions he had said that he was staying with a Coloured or Malay family in Lansdowne. He also said the Coloureds were better than the Europeans. He said they were more friendly and had more sense than the Europeans, and showed more understanding. When I said he was talking nonsense, he got cross and lifted himself as though he wanted to tackle me.”⁶⁵⁹⁵

This statement is precisely the opposite of what was heard at the summary trial, that Tsafendas was unsympathetic towards Coloured people, which may have been why it was left out of the Report. What the reader does not learn is that Tsafendas's “nonsense” talk actually constituted his views on serious political and social matters. Such opinions would certainly not have been considered nonsense by many people if the Commission had explained what the so-called nonsense was.

⁶⁵⁹⁵ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Martincich's testimony that Tsafendas spoke against the government and apartheid is included in the Report, but a positive remark is omitted. This was that Martincich, who spoke to Tsafendas every day, got "the impression that he was a sociable type."⁶⁵⁹⁶ This contradicts evidence at the summary trial from psychiatrists who examined him and diagnosed him as "rather isolated from his surroundings"⁶⁵⁹⁷ and a "withdrawn and isolated individual."⁶⁵⁹⁸ As we have seen, tens of people testified that Tsafendas was a sociable, talkative and friendly person, but none of these statements were included by the Commission. Martincich's comment that Tsafendas was mumbling to himself and on one occasion had jumped up and down has been examined in the "Mental State" section of this chapter.

Let us examine now what the other four colleagues of Tsafendas told the Commission and the police:

- Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden was senior security officer for the Marine Diamond Corporation and worked with Tsafendas for around three months in 1966. He testified that, "We were transferred from the Marina on a small outboard boat to the Col pontoon. It was terrible, rough seas, so much so that almost all of us old hands got seasick. It struck me that Tsafendas adapted well. He was one of the few who were not seasick. Upon landing, he filled the mess basin on the lower deck with water and started shaving. His calm way struck me that he must know the sea. Tsafendas was employed as a pump, or engineer, operator and did not work under my direct supervision. I introduced myself to him and talked to him. He was friendly, outgoing, and not aloof. I noticed that his eating was messy. Otherwise he was completely normal."⁶⁵⁹⁹
- Ralph Lighton, who worked with Tsafendas for nine to ten weeks at the Marine Diamond Corporation, testified to the police that he "never got the slightest impression that he was mentally unsound. He had excellent reasoning powers."⁶⁶⁰⁰

⁶⁵⁹⁶ Keith Terrence Bertram Martincich statement to the police, 4 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁵⁹⁷ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Jacobus Andreas Johannes Erasmus' testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 20 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁵⁹⁸ Reyner van Zyl's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁵⁹⁹ Carel Sebastiaan van Heerden statement to the police, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁶⁰⁰ Ralph Lighton statement to the police, 17 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

- Hulse, who worked with Tsafendas at Marine Diamond Cooperation from December 1965 to March 12, 1966, stated that Tsafendas “did not appear to be disturbed at any stage.”⁶⁶⁰¹
- Gillian Clare Lieberman, personnel secretary at Marine Diamond Corporation, whose office Tsafendas visited testified, “I had various discussions with him. I got quite interested in him as an individual... By his talks he gave me the impression that he does not agree with authority (Governmental or other). I cut him short, saying that in my capacity of my work I do not discuss politics. I found him intelligent, someone apparently able to reason in conversation, but a strange type of person, a unique character. Apart from him being well travelled etc. I got the impression that he was physically different in dress and appearance. He was a big man, with a particularly striking big hat, stainless steel teeth, sloppy dirty clothing.”⁶⁶⁰²

At least three of these four witnesses, Hulse, Lighton and van Heerden, and maybe even Lieberman, too, spent more time with Tsafendas than the three weeks Martincich did. All testified that Tsafendas was perfectly sane and they commented positively about his intelligence. Yet none of their comments was used in the Report. Two praised Tsafendas's verbal skills, saying that he had “excellent reasoning powers” and was “able to reason in conversation.” These two statements are important in that they contradict the psychiatrists' trial evidence, that Tsafendas was “unable to function on a reasonable level,” “unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes” and that he talked in a “disjointed manner.” However, these opinions were omitted from the Report.

Another very important omission is van Heerden's statement describing Tsafendas working in difficult conditions in a calm and confident manner – a sharp contrast to the oft-repeated claims that he could barely manage menial work. An example of the latter is Smorenberg's claim that Tsafendas made childish mistakes at work. This statement was, of course, included. Finally, the Report carried no mention of Tsafendas being characterised as friendly and outgoing, clearly so as not to muddy the picture presented at the trial of a withdrawn, unsociable and isolated individual.

⁶⁶⁰¹ Hulse statement to the police, 28 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁶⁰² Gillian Claire Lieberman statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

MAGISTRATE'S COURT IN DURBAN

*From time to time Tsafendas acted as an interpreter at the Magistrate's Court in Durban, and he acquitted himself fairly well of his task.*⁶⁶⁰³

Tsafendas worked for some five months as a part-time interpreter, providing his services whenever needed. The head interpreter at the Court, Cornelius Johannes Rudolph, said, "It happened that I made use of his services on several occasions. He was in the habit of regularly reporting two or three times a week to ask whether there is any interpretation work. I got to know him pretty well and would have no trouble identifying him. I spoke with him several times, he seemed to be a normal person and intelligent. He spoke English properly."⁶⁶⁰⁴

Although Rudolph does not refer directly to Tsafendas's working abilities, we can assume they must have been acceptable since he used him several times. However, the important thing here is Rudolph's personal opinion of Tsafendas. Having spoken to him several times, he found him to be a normal, intelligent person. However, Rudolph's opinion is omitted from the Commission's Report.

SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAYS

On 16th March, 1965, he was employed by the South African Railways and Harbours as a shed attendant at R90 per month. He was examined medically and nothing was found to be wrong with him. In a written statement in connection with this examination he stated, inter alia, that he had never had any nervous or mental disease. When he was employed by the Railways, he was so poor that the Railway staff collected R2 for him. It was arranged for him to board at a railway hostel. On one occasion while he was working there he intimated that to his mind the South African Government was handling its Bantu problems better than Great Britain was dealing with problems in connection with the West Indians.

On 6th April, 1965, one of his fellow workers gave him a dousing for a joke. The result was that Tsafendas immediately absconded. However, he remained at the hostel until 14th April,

⁶⁶⁰³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 25.

⁶⁶⁰⁴ Cornelius Johannes Rudolph statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

1965, and when he left he took the Bible that was in his room with him.⁶⁶⁰⁵

As usual, the Commission portrays Tsafendas in a negative fashion – he accepts charity, cannot take a joke, walks out on his job (which it describes as absconding) and steals a Bible. The only positive mention is that “nothing was found to be wrong with him” when he was medically examined. This could hardly have been omitted as passing a medical was known to be necessary for a job with the company. The issue of the medical is considered in the Medical Examinations and Hospitalizations section of this chapter.

Then, the Report says:

“On one occasion while he was working there, he intimated that to his mind the South African Government was handling its Bantu problems better than Great Britain was dealing with problems in connection with the West Indians.”

No statement or any other evidence has been found that contains this reported remark, but it could easily have been included in material that has gone missing. Here again the Report carries a statement which appears to show Tsafendas supporting the apartheid government. Omitted are instances, known to the Commission, where he criticised or condemned the government and declared his Communist beliefs.

The author cannot know the circumstances under which Tsafendas made his reported statement about the ‘Bantu problem,’ assuming that he made it at all. The fact is it is not what he really believed. However, working as he did for a government company, he would have been very stupid publicly to criticise the government’s racial policies, as he did to many of his friends and acquaintances. Examples of Tsafendas’s real political beliefs have been listed on several occasions on this study. The statement quoted in the Report was read to forty-four people who knew Tsafendas and every one denied that Tsafendas could have meant what he supposedly said. For reasons of space, their names will not be included here, but this issue has been examined in the Trial Chapter.

It is important to mention here that Garnet Muller, Tsafendas’s supervisor at this job, gave a statement to the police which was in the Commission’s possession. Muller testified that Tsafendas gave him to understand that he took the job on a temporary basis. He said he had “observed Tsafendas to possess intelligence above that of the average person who is likely to accept a position with the little responsibility which is attached to that of shed

⁶⁶⁰⁵ Chapter II C, Paragraph 26.

attendant.”⁶⁶⁰⁶

Johannes Aurets, another of Tsafendas's supervisors at South African Railways, told the police Tsafendas “was a well-mannered and well-spoken person. He associated with those working with him. He was soft-spoken and appeared to be of a good nature. During the time he was employed under my supervision, i.e. for approximately three weeks, I did not see him being cross at any time. He was a good worker.”⁶⁶⁰⁷ The Commission preferred to ignore these two character observations and instead highlight the irrelevant facts that Tsafendas was very poor and someone played a joke on him, which he did not like. The issue of the Bible has been discussed earlier in this chapter.

TABLE BAY POWER STATION

*In Cape Town his first job was that of a fitter and turner at the Table Bay Power Station. He started work there on 13th September, 1965, but his work being unsatisfactory he was given seven days' notice on 25th October of the same year. He then immediately resigned. The foreman under whom he worked found that at times he made childish mistakes.*⁶⁶⁰⁸

The above statement is correct, but again important information is omitted. Two employees from this company were interviewed by the Commission and the police. One was Owen Smorenberg, the foreman mentioned above, who also acted as defence witness in the summary trial, and the other was Redvers Wakfer, who interviewed Tsafendas for the job. It was Smorenberg who testified that Tsafendas made childish mistakes in his work and he had said the same at the summary trial. Since his testimony has been examined there, Chapter Five, the matter will not be discussed here again. What is important here is that the Commission included this negative comment about his working abilities, but omitted most of the many positive statements from colleagues who testified that he was a good worker.

A surprising omission here is Smorenberg's impression that Tsafendas was unsympathetic towards the Coloureds and that he believed that Vorster and Dr. Verwoerd were

⁶⁶⁰⁶ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁶⁰⁷ Johannes Jaonus Uys Aurets statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁶⁰⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 44.

the right men to be in these positions.⁶⁶⁰⁹ This is what Smorenberg told the court and said to the police. This statement has been examined in the Trial Chapter. What is also omitted is what Redvers Wakfer told the police, that Tsafendas “appeared to be quite normal and was neatly dressed.”⁶⁶¹⁰ Just one of many similar positive statements which the Commission ignored.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR

On 7th August, 1965, Tsafendas reported to the Department of Labour in Durban, and asked for work as a “handyman storeman.”⁶⁶¹¹

During April and May, 1966, he applied to the Department of Labour for sick benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act, and in all he received R56. In June of the same year an application for a further amount was refused since he had already received the full amount to which he was entitled.”⁶⁶¹²

On 25th May, 1966, he applied to the Department of Labour's employment officer for light work as a clerk or salesman or, alternatively, as an operator-welder or fitter. He was requested to submit a medical certificate to the effect that he was fit for work, but on 6th June, 1966, he again turned up without the required certificate. On 30th June he was referred to Chrysler (S.A.) Pty. Ltd., Elsie's River, for employment as an operator-welder, but was not employed.⁶⁶¹³

Another example of Tsafendas being portrayed in a bad light while any positives were ignored is his experience at the Department of Labour. Although the Report refers three times to this Department and Tsafendas's visits to it, there is no mention of the comments made by employees who interacted with him there. It is also stated that Tsafendas did not bring a medical certificate, which again tells only half of the story. Let us first see what the workers in this Department said which was omitted from the Report:

- Ian Boswell, administrative assistant at the Department of Labour. He interviewed

⁶⁶⁰⁹ Owen Smorenburg statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Leer W.D. 10/10/ 4102 oor Stafendas. NASA.

⁶⁶¹⁰ Redvers Wakfer statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub File: 1/5, Subject Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁶⁶¹¹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 34.

⁶⁶¹² Chapter II C, Paragraph 59.

⁶⁶¹³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 62.

Tsafendas three times in 1966 and testified to the police that “he was at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute. Aside from being over-talkative, he showed no symptoms of abnormality during his interviews with me.”⁶⁶¹⁴

- Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He told the police that he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”⁶⁶¹⁵
- Gideon Cloete, also at the Department of Labour, interviewed Tsafendas twice. According to Cloete, Tsafendas “had a neat appearance and made a good impression.” He did not notice any “signs of abnormality” and “appeared totally normal” to him.⁶⁶¹⁶

Taken together, these three officers interviewed Tsafendas seven times. All said that he showed no signs of abnormality and Boswell and Cloete testified that he was neatly dressed. These were important statements as they clearly contradicted the State’s portrayal of Tsafendas at his summary trial, as a man of dirty and neglected appearance who suffered from schizophrenia, but they were omitted from the Report.

As for the medical certificate, the Report has manipulated a witness’s evidence on this matter in such a way as to portray Tsafendas in a distinctly negative light. Boswell did indeed state that Tsafendas failed to present such a document despite being asked to do so. However, Boswell also testified that “Tsafendas shortly after produced a certificate to the effect that he had been treated for a nasal complaint at Groote Schuur Hospital. This was accepted as a certificate of fitness and an application for Unemployment Benefits taken by myself.”⁶⁶¹⁷

From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work at Marine Diamond

⁶⁶¹⁴ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁶⁶¹⁵ Pieter Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁶⁶¹⁶ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas’s summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, NASA.

⁶⁶¹⁷ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

Corporation.⁶⁶¹⁸ Since Tsafendas was declared fit to return to work by Dr. Solomon just three weeks ago, naturally this certificate was deemed acceptable by Boswell.

The fact that Tsafendas was in possession of this certificate from May 17 means that he could easily have produced it for Boswell on June 6 and the likelihood is that he simply forgot to bring it. What is important is that the Commission was aware of the existence of the certificate from Dr. Solomon and aware that Tsafendas had given it to Boswell. However, it omitted these two facts, thus grossly misrepresenting the issue of the medical certificate and making it appear as if Tsafendas was unable to produce the document, implying that there was something wrong with his health.

Actually, Tsafendas was in possession of at least two medical certificates proving him fit for any work. These were from the two state doctors, Dr. C. Been⁶⁶¹⁹ and Dr. A.C. McDonald,⁶⁶²⁰ who examined him for his permanent residence application. This also suggests that Tsafendas probably forgot to bring the certificate on that specific occasion. The Commission was well aware of that, too, but did not find it necessary to mention it here or anywhere else in its Report.

MIKE'S OUTFITTERS

*In July, 1966, he entered into an agreement with Michaelis Augustides of Mike's Outfitters, Woodstock, by which he would receive commission on the purchases of crew members whom he brought to the shop. For this purpose, one of the shop assistants accompanied Tsafendas to the ship on a few occasions, and brought some of the crew members to the shop. In this way Tsafendas earned about R12.*⁶⁶²¹

Neville Judson was the shop assistant who accompanied Tsafendas to the ship, which was the *Eleni*. He said of Tsafendas that he "never in no way got the impression that he could

⁶⁶¹⁸ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

⁶⁶¹⁹ Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁶⁶²⁰ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁶⁶²¹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 77.

be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers.”⁶⁶²²
Judson's statement was not used by the Commission.

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

Towards the end of June, or at the beginning of July, 1966, he went to the House of Assembly to enquire about a post as a messenger. He had most probably heard from other unemployed persons at the Department of Labour that he might be able to get a situation there.

On 18th July, 1966, he was summoned by the Chief Messenger, and after an interview with the Chief Messenger and two senior messengers he was notified in writing on 20th July, 1966, to report for duty on 1st August, 1966, at 7.45 a.m. He did so, and worked there until 6th September, 1966.

*Particulars of his engagement and the Commission's findings thereon are dealt with in Chapter X.*⁶⁶²³

*Neither the Chief Messenger nor the two senior messengers had any reason to believe, either during their interview or while Tsafendas was employed at the House of Assembly during August and September, that he was mentally disordered. Nor did the policemen and other messengers who came into contact with him at the House of Assembly notice anything wrong.*⁶⁶²⁴

The Commission has used Tsafendas's statement to the police as the source of how he heard about a possible job at the House of Assembly. However, he had lied. Many years later, in 1987, when he was in Pretoria Central Prison, Tsafendas described to a senior magistrate, Mr. T.I. Potgieter, how he got the job:

“One day I was sitting in front of the Assembly and I bought fish and chips from a Portuguese shop across the road... I sat on a bench and started throwing pieces to the seagulls... While I was doing that, somebody comes and sits next to me on the bench. He was a small man, dark, he says, ‘What are you doing here?’ I say to him, ‘Well, I'm doing nothing.’ He says to me, ‘Are you out of a job?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ He says to me, ‘Look, there is a part-time job here. Don't say I told you. Go there and tell them, inquire if you can get the

⁶⁶²² Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die ‘Eleni.’ NASA.

⁶⁶²³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 73.

⁶⁶²⁴ Chapter II C, Paragraph 74.

job, but don't say I sent you or told you about it.' So, I went there ..."⁶⁶²⁵

A few years later, Tsafendas repeated the story to Father Minas Constandinou, but with crucial detail added. He said that sometime, probably in July, he started observing the Parliament building to explore the possibility of assassinating Dr. Verwoerd. His preference was to kidnap him and exchange him for political prisoners, but he knew that would be impossible on his own. He had hoped that one day the common people would storm the building, as the French revolutionaries had done with the Bastille. He visited the place two or three times in a week but not every day, so as not to be noticed. He would sit on a bench and feed the birds while observing the building. One day, a man came out of the building and started talking to him, while he also fed the birds. They started talking about the birds and then Tsafendas told him he was unemployed. The man told him that he was a messenger and that the Parliament was desperate for messengers and he should apply for the position. He assured him he would be accepted as they were short-staffed. Tsafendas could not believe his luck. He went to the barber, had a haircut and shave, bought a new suit and attended the interview.⁶⁶²⁶ What happened in the interview and thereafter is discussed later in this chapter in the "House of Assembly" section.

HUME PIPE COMPANY

*During September and October, 1964, he worked for the Hume Pipe Company at Gondola, near Beira.*⁶⁶²⁷

*On 9th October, 1964, he re-entered Rhodesia at Umtali. In Umtali he tried to buy a farm, but since it appeared that he had no money, no transaction took place. He also said that the silver fillings in his teeth had been done in Russia. (To the Commission he stated that he had obtained these in Turkey.) Because he had no visa, he was declared an illegal immigrant, and deported to Mozambique on 10th October, 1964.*⁶⁶²⁸

The Commission here is in error as to when Tsafendas worked at the Hume Pipe Company. Lt. Col. van Wyk wrote in his report regarding Tsafendas's activities in Rhodesia

⁶⁶²⁵ Interview by Mr T.I. Potgieter, Senior Magistrate, Pretoria with Mr Demitriou Tsafendas at the Pretoria Central Prison on 20 October 1987. Correctional Services. File 80/0043, A123, Dimitrio Tsafendas, Vol 1. NASA.

⁶⁶²⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶⁶²⁷ Chapter II C, Paragraph 17.

⁶⁶²⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 18.

and Mozambique: "From there he went directly to Gondola near Beira, where he was arrested by the Security Police of Mozambique because of subversive activities on 16.11.64 while he worked at Hume Pipe, Gondola."⁶⁶²⁹ In reality, the two above paragraphs of the Commission's Report would have been correct if they were the other way round, as Tsafendas got the job at Hume Pipe after he returned to Mozambique on October 10. This is evidently an innocent and unimportant mistake on behalf of Judge van Wyk since it makes no difference whether Tsafendas worked a month later or earlier at this company. However, it is indicative of the difficulties the Commission (and the author) faced in order correctly to reconstruct Tsafendas's life story based on thousands of documents and reports.

CONCLUSION

The Commission once again has misrepresented Tsafendas on the issue of employment and his ability properly to do a job. Several important facts are missing, for example the fact that he worked at Limasollu Naci College as a foreign language teacher for six months. This alone contradicted the claim that Tsafendas was unable to do more than a menial job, that he was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, that his speech was disjointed and that he suffered from thought-disorder. Missing also are very positive comments about Tsafendas's character and working abilities. Tsafendas is described by most of his colleagues as a friendly, talkative, polite and intelligent worker, a total contradiction to the way he was described at his trial and by the Commission.

⁶⁶²⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

TSAFENDAS'S LANDLORDS AND FLATMATES

This section examines what the Commission has written about Tsafendas's landlords and flatmates. Their testimony is important because several of them spent a significant amount of time with him. The study examines what the Commission took from their testimonies and what was omitted from them.

TSAFENDAS'S ACCOMMODATION IN PRETORIA IN 1963

*After Tsafendas's arrival in Pretoria from Lourenço Marques, he stayed with his half-brother for a few days and then lived in rooms in various parts of the city.*⁶⁶³⁰

It is correct that Tsafendas stayed at his half-brother's house for a few days, but entirely incorrect that he "lived in rooms in various parts of the city." That claim was taken from Nick Vlachopoulos testimony to the Commission where he stated that Tsafendas "stayed in about 20 places in Pretoria."⁶⁶³¹ However, Tsafendas's step-mother, his two half-sisters and his half-brother, all told the Commission that Tsafendas "always had proper accommodation in Pretoria."⁶⁶³² The Commission itself wrote in its Report after interviewing the above members of Tsafendas's family that "after his stepmother had fetched him, he had stayed with his family for a while and then hired a room."⁶⁶³³ Judge van Wyk ignored the evidence of these witnesses in favour of the remark by Vlachopoulos.

The statement of Tsafendas's family was confirmed to the author by Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, Mary Eendracht, his first cousin who was in Pretoria at the time, and Fotini Gavasiadis, Vlachopoulos's sister. All of these witnesses told the author that after Tsafendas left his half-sister's house, he lived for a few weeks at Gavasiadi's house and for the remainder of the nine months he spent in Pretoria, he lived in a rent-free apartment provided by Nick Vlachopoulos (Gavasiadis's house was also owned by Vlachopoulos). Eendracht, Pnema and Gavasiadis agreed that Tsafendas never stayed anywhere else.⁶⁶³⁴

⁶⁶³⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 5

⁶⁶³¹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁶³² COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁶³³ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁶³⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

TSAFENDAS NOT PAYING PART OF THE RENT

*On 28th August, 1964, he went to stay at a boarding house in Beira, and there he was often seen with a Bible in his hand. On 8th October, 1964, he left Beira without having paid for part of his board and lodging.*⁶⁶³⁵

The above statement is correct, but by telling only half the story, it implies that Tsafendas fled to avoid paying his bill, and this was not the case. Stelios Marangos, the owner of the boarding house, testified to the police that Tsafendas “stayed at his lodgings from 28 August 1964 to 8 October 1964. He was unemployed and had only paid his lodgings for the period 28 August to 28 September. When he left, he said he was going to look for work at the firm that lays the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia.”⁶⁶³⁶ Tsafendas had obviously told Marangos what his plans were and his landlord clearly did not view him as some kind of absconder.

According to Nick Papadakis, who lived in the boarding house, and Tsafendas's childhood friend Andreas Babiolakis, Tsafendas told Marangos that he would leave as soon as his money ran out, but Marangos insisted he should stay. When Tsafendas eventually left, his intention was to get a job on the Beira-Rhodesia pipeline, but instead he found work with the Hume Pipe Company in Gondola.⁶⁶³⁷ However, soon after he started there, he was arrested by the Portuguese Public Security Police and accused of preaching “under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence.”⁶⁶³⁸

Tsafendas was kept in custody for three months before being freed on January 26, 1965.⁶⁶³⁹ He then managed to secure work as an interpreter at Beira docks, but he was

⁶⁶³⁵ Chapter II C, Paragraph 16.

⁶⁶³⁶ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁶³⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁶³⁸ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁶³⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA; Report of the COE. Chapter II C, Paragraph 19. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

dismissed for urging the Mozambican workers to strike in protest at their working conditions.⁶⁶⁴⁰ On March 5, 1965, he left Mozambique for Durban.⁶⁶⁴¹

It is not known to the author whether Tsafendas eventually gave Marangos what he owed him – his travels, incarcerations and periods of unemployment must have made contact difficult - but there is abundant evidence that Tsafendas always paid his debts. Peter Pappas, the owner of a café which Tsafendas frequented in Durban, said, “When his luck was out, I sometimes gave him a free meal, but when he started work he paid me.”⁶⁶⁴² One day, John Emmanuel Marvis, a Greek friend in Beira, lent Tsafendas twenty escudos and Tsafendas repaid him a few days later.⁶⁶⁴³ Some of his friends in Mozambique, including Costas Poriазis and Andreas and Giangos Babiolakis, voluntarily gave him money to travel from Beira to Durban. About a month later, Tsafendas paid back the money, even though they had insisted they did not want it back.⁶⁶⁴⁴

MRS. MANNING

*During October, 1965, he hired a room at No. 7, Prince Street, Vredehoek, from a Mrs. Manning. There his neighbours complained that he would come to fetch water in their kitchen and spill it on the floor, with the result that he was given notice to vacate the room.*⁶⁶⁴⁵

The above statement, made to the Commission by Manning, is correct, but the Report distorts the picture by omitting her opinion of Tsafendas. She testified in full that:

“He rented Room 3 next to the Ferreiras. It was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. I thought him to be a Greek. For a few weeks he attracted no unfavourable attention, until Mrs Ferreira came to me to complain that he was a nuisance. She said he was going into her kitchen to fetch water and that he was spilling water on the floor... During his

⁶⁶⁴⁰ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁶⁴¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁶⁴² *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September 1966, ‘Tsafendas: in the eyes of a friend.’

⁶⁶⁴³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁶⁶⁴⁴ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriазis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

⁶⁶⁴⁵ Chapter II C, Paragraph 45.

stay, I regularly inspected his room. I also spoke to him... From his general appearance, he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means.”⁶⁶⁴⁶

It is clear that Manning was favourably impressed by Tsafendas; he made his own bed though he did not have to, he was well-spoken and dressed well. However all these positive comments are omitted from the Report and once again the only negative reference is recorded.

DURBAN MEN'S HOME

*On 21st June, 1965, he moved into the Durban Men's Home, Durban, where he lived until 24th August, 1965. At this home he expressed himself strongly against the South African Government and in favour of Communism.*⁶⁶⁴⁷

This part is examined in the “Political Activities and Ideology” section.

PATRICK O'RYAN

In Chapter II C, Paragraphs 47, 48, 55 and 56, Tsafendas's time at Patrick O'Ryan's house is mentioned. Tsafendas stayed at his house for about five months (November 1965-April 1966), and remained close to O'Ryan up to his arrest. Tsafendas considered O'Ryan the best person he ever met and the best friend he ever had. Although he stayed there for five months there and was very close to O'Ryan and his family, only limited information is used from his statement.

During his time off he also stayed with Mr. O'Ryan. He never paid the O'Ryans any board.

*Mr. O'Ryan never gained the impression that there was anything seriously wrong with him. He did tell them, though, about the tapeworm which he was supposed to have. Sometimes he called it a snake, and said that he had to feed it constantly.*⁶⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁶⁴⁶ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁶⁶⁴⁷ Chapter II C, Paragraph 32.

⁶⁶⁴⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 55.

*According to Patrick O'Ryan, Tsafendas was strongly opposed to the policies of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal.*⁶⁶⁴⁹

Patrick O'Ryan, who knew Tsafendas better than the other witnesses and considered him to be his best friend, a feeling Tsafendas reciprocated, made several positive statements about his character, but none of them was mentioned in the Report, while the fact that he did not pay any board was included. It is true that Tsafendas did not pay for his board. However, he frequently bought food for the household and toys and sweets for the children. When O'Ryan asked Tsafendas not to do this because he thought it made him look bad, Tsafendas continued to bring food and sweets but told the children they were bought by their dad and himself. Young Reuben O'Ryan, a son of Patrick, said about Tsafendas, "We all loved him ... he was an adorable man ... he was the answer to our prayers. We were poor and he brought food to our house."⁶⁶⁵⁰

Patrick O'Ryan had testified that he had formed a "deep liking" for Tsafendas and that he "had confidence in him... He was a very kindly man. In my experience of him he had a good heart... I never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind," or that he "was mentally disturbed." He also found him to be "well-spoken and had good vocabulary."⁶⁶⁵¹ None of these is included in the Report.

O'Ryan had also testified that Tsafendas "was against the state policy of both South Africa and Portugal" and that he "labelled the apartheid policies as unfair."⁶⁶⁵² He later described Tsafendas as getting "excited" when he talked about politics and saying that Dr. Verwoerd was a tyrant who was oppressing his people, that he was "Hitler's best student" and that if he (Tsafendas) ever get hold of him "he would bash his skull." O'Ryan did not tell the police about Dr. Verwoerd being a tyrant or about bashing his skull as he believed it would be bad for Tsafendas.⁶⁶⁵³ For more about O'Ryan and his relationship with Tsafendas see his testimony at the summary trial chapter. The Report's comment that O'Ryan did not

⁶⁶⁴⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 56.

⁶⁶⁵⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Reuben O' Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁶⁶⁵¹ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁶⁵² Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁶⁵³ Patrick O'Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

think that there was something seriously wrong with Tsafendas is discussed in the 'Mental State' section of this chapter.

MRS. GROVES

*In April, 1966, he moved in as a boarder with Mrs. E. M. Groves at No. 57, Milton Road, Observatory, Cape Town, but because the other boarders were dissatisfied with his behaviour, he was asked to leave the boarding-house.*⁶⁶⁵⁴

The above statement is correct, but it is misleading because once again important information has been omitted. Firstly, it is not revealed that Groves was a former nurse in a psychiatric hospital and therefore experienced with schizophrenics. Tsafendas boarded with her for six to seven weeks and her opinion of him was bound to be scientifically more acceptable than that of the non-medic Johnston who spoke to Tsafendas for all of twenty minutes. His opinion about Tsafendas's mental state is included in the Report, hers is not. Referencing her professional experience, Mrs. Groves said of Tsafendas, "He was completely normal. I was a nurse and worked in lunatic institutions. He was a normal person to the best of my knowledge."⁶⁶⁵⁵

It is true that the other boarders were unhappy with aspects of Tsafendas's behaviour, but the Commission fails to say why. According to Mrs. Groves' statement: "D. Tsafendas was a very good eater. He mastered many languages and behaved properly. Besides his rough table manners, I have nothing against him. He was completely normal. I received complaints that he was argumentative and towards me he said that we Afrikaners are a backward nation. It was clear that he had nothing good towards Afrikaners. For the sake of my other tenants, I asked him to leave my place."⁶⁶⁵⁶

Jacobus Bornman, Tsafendas's roommate at Mrs. Groves's house, testified that "Tsafendas's conversations were always about women and politics. He never talked about anything else. Tsafendas was dissatisfied with conditions in R.S.A and he has often criticized the government, his exact words I don't remember, but it seemed to me that he had a grudge

⁶⁶⁵⁴ Chapter II C, Paragraph 58.

⁶⁶⁵⁵ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁶⁵⁶ Elizabeth Magdalene Groves statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

against Dr. Verwoerd. He stood up a lot for the Coloureds.”⁶⁶⁵⁷ Thus, the dissatisfaction with Tsafendas was apparently due to his argumentativeness and his antipathy towards Afrikaners, something he never hid. However, by not revealing the reason for the boarders’ dissatisfaction, the Commission leaves the reader with the wrong idea, that it was probably because of his mental state or his aggression.

JACOBUS BORNMAN

*Mr. Bornman, who occupied the same room as Tsafendas, stated that Tsafendas did not show any signs of being mentally abnormal. He was good-natured, but had messy habits. His topics, of conversation were politics and women. He was strongly opposed to the policy of the Government. He read only English-language newspapers and was sometimes upset by what he had read. At times he passed the remark that the Government was doing so much for the Coloureds that it would be better for him to be a Coloured.*⁶⁶⁵⁸

Bornman was Tsafendas’s roommate in Mrs. Groves’s house for six to seven weeks. The above comment about Tsafendas being ‘good-natured’ is the only wholly positive statement about Tsafendas in the entire Report. Although the Commission allowed two positive comments from Bornman – that Tsafendas was good natured and showed no signs of mental abnormality – they seem meagre in comparison with what was missing. The most important omission was that Tsafendas voluntarily gave money to Bornman and then refused to take it back. Bornman said about the incident: “on one occasion I had no money and then Tsafendas gave me five cents. I later wanted to return the money to him, but he would not take it.”⁶⁶⁵⁹

This is hardly something a beggar would do, and Tsafendas is described by the Commission as a beggar, always asking for help and money, taking advantage of people and never thanking anyone for what they did for him. The omission is not unexpected. To include this example of his generosity would have raised questions as to whether Tsafendas was really the sort of hopeless person that emerged from the summary trial.

⁶⁶⁵⁷ Jacobus Johannes Bornman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁶⁵⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 58.

⁶⁶⁵⁹ Jacobus Johannes Bornman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Bornman had also characterised Tsafendas as “a friendly and plausible person,” adding that, “during the time I lived with Tsafendas, his behaviour was normal... I regarded him as a normal and very intelligent person... According to my observation, Tsafendas was a gentle person. He was neat on his person, but his eating habits were not up to scratch. He was messy.” That the Commission omitted the comment about Tsafendas’s intelligence is not that important as even the psychiatrists testified to his intelligence at the trial, along with several other witnesses. However, in stating that Tsafendas had “messy habits,” the Commission is guilty of a misleading generalisation. Bornman used the word “messy” to refer to Tsafendas’s eating habits and not to his general appearance and behaviour. In fact he said that Tsafendas was a neat person. This omission is important as Tsafendas was portrayed in the summary trial as a dirty person with dirty clothes; not at all the same as being merely a messy eater.

In its totality, Bornman’s statement was one of the most positive about Tsafendas. However, by its selective evisceration, the Commission managed to downplay it significantly. Bornman’s comments regarding Tsafendas’s ideology are examined in the section ‘Political Activities and Ideology’ of this chapter.

MRS. SCOTT

During June and July, 1966, he had his meals with Mrs. Scott at No. 42, Chamberlain Street, Woodstock. There he acquired the nickname of “The Pig” on account of his bad table manners. In her opinion he was normal. On one occasion he passed the following remarks in Mrs. Scott’s presence when a possible job in South West Africa was mentioned:

I cannot go to South West Africa. I have a job to do here before I go back.

He told one of the boarders that he had obtained a position in South West Africa, but that he would first take a post at the Houses of Parliament for two months.⁶⁶⁶⁰

Mary Cathleen Scott was Greek, married to a White South African. She often cooked Greek food and many Greeks would visit her house to eat.⁶⁶⁶¹ Scott told the police that Tsafendas was “very poorly mannered” and she named him “The Pig,” but she “never got the

⁶⁶⁶⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 67.

⁶⁶⁶¹ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

impression that he could be mentally unbalanced,” indeed she thought that he “appeared to be perfectly normal.”⁶⁶⁶²

Pamela Abrahams, a South African, often visited Scott's house to eat, along with her Greek boyfriend and future husband, Panagiotis Peroglou. She said Tsafendas was very well mannered, especially with women. Neither she nor her boyfriend recalled him having bad manners or being nicknamed “The Pig” by Scott. In fact, according to Abrahams, “Tsafendas was a gentleman. He would always get up from the table to greet you and he always offered you his seat or went to find you a seat... he was certainly very well mannered.”⁶⁶⁶³

Panagiotis Peroglou was a good friend of Scott but he does not remember that she ever complained about Tsafendas's manners or called him a pig. He was very surprised to hear such comments, with which he disagreed. Peroglou remembers Tsafendas as being “very well mannered, especially with women and elderly people...” he was “very talkative and friendly” and “he had a lot of respect for the women. He would bring them a chair or he would offer his chair.” Peroglou said Tsafendas was “well educated, especially about Greece's history and Christianity.”⁶⁶⁶⁴ Peroglou and Abrahams associated with Tsafendas for about three months and Peroglou said they “never got the impression that he might be insane. He never did or said anything to make us think he was insane. He was definitely sane.” The couple do not remember Tsafendas talking politics.⁶⁶⁶⁵ Peroglou was questioned by the police but his statement was not found in the archives. There is no mention of him in the Report.

Elias Constantaras, another Greek who knew Tsafendas very well, was also friendly with Scott and often ate at her house. He was surprised to hear that she called Tsafendas a pig and says she never did so in front of him. He does not remember Tsafendas's eating habits and thinks if they were so bad, he would have remembered. What he did remember was Scott complaining to him two or three times that Tsafendas talked politics persistently at the table in front of her boarders and she suspected him of being a Communist. According to Constantaras, Scott was afraid of Tsafendas talking in that way and she asked him to tell

⁶⁶⁶² Mary Cathleen Scott statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁶⁶³ Pamela Abrahams in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁶⁶⁶⁴ Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

⁶⁶⁶⁵ Pamela Abrahams and Panagiotis Peroglou in a personal interview, 6 June 2016.

Tsafendas to stop. Constantaras did so and though Tsafendas was not happy that Scott did not tell him herself, he complied with her request.⁶⁶⁶⁶

Constantaras remembers Tsafendas discoursing on history. "He knew a lot about Greek and world history." Tsafendas "was anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid; he described Dr. Verwoerd as 'Nazi' and 'Hitler's best student' and the white South Africans as Nazis. He [Tsafendas] believed that Dr. Verwoerd was doing to the Blacks what the Nazis did to the Jews."⁶⁶⁶⁷ Constantaras and Peroglou were questioned by the police but their statement were not found in the archives.

Stratis Vamvarapis, another Greek, lodged with Mrs Scott at the same time as Tsafendas and knew him for about a year. He found Tsafendas to be a "strange man - strange as a character, not mentally strange. He was very argumentative and was getting easily crossed when he disagreed with people." Initially, Tsafendas had little to say, but became more talkative as they grew to know each other, though he never discussed politics with him. Tsafendas never appeared to be schizophrenic or insane and he never heard him mention a tapeworm. He recalls him eating a lot but does not remember if his manners were messy and he never heard Mary Scott call Tsafendas "The Pig."⁶⁶⁶⁸

MRS. THEYSER

*He left Mrs. De Vos's house on 30th June, 1966, and moved into a room with Mrs. Theyser at No. 48, Devon Street, Woodstock. There he was also given notice and left on 30th August, 1966.*⁶⁶⁶⁹

Theyser had also testified that she "never got the impression in any way that he might be mentally unbalanced. To me he appeared a quite normal person."⁶⁶⁷⁰ As usual, the Commission omitted this positive statement.

⁶⁶⁶⁶ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁶⁶⁶⁷ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁶⁶⁶⁸ Stratis Vamvarapis in a personal interview, 31 May 2016.

⁶⁶⁶⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 66.

⁶⁶⁷⁰ Alice Mary Theyser statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

CONCLUSION

Tsafendas is portrayed by the Commission as a bad lodger in many ways. Although some of the issues mentioned are true, the overall portrayal is inaccurate. The Commission omitted all the positive remarks about him, including those about his character and his mental state, but included anything remotely denigratory. The most important omissions are those about Tsafendas's personality, especially the comments made by Bornman and by O'Ryan. Finally, a word on the language the Commission invariably employs when it describes Tsafendas or his activities: this is probably best described as verging on the contemptuous.

TSAFENDAS'S HOSPITALIZATIONS AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS

The Report refers extensively to Tsafendas's hospitalizations and the medical examinations he underwent throughout his life. Let us examine what was included in the Report and what was omitted.

TSAFENDAS'S FIRST HOSPITALIZATION

*While in detention in the United States of America, Tsafendas showed symptoms of mental disorder and was admitted to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital.*⁶⁶⁷¹

This is the first reference to Tsafendas being hospitalized and the first to refer to "mental disorder." What is significant is that his symptoms occurred "while in detention." The experience of mental disorder while incarcerated will recur many times in Tsafendas's story, becoming almost a trademark in his life. Although Tsafendas manages his workaday life perfectly well and no-one notices anything wrong with him, whenever he is arrested, he appears to suffer from mental problems and is quickly released. In later life, Tsafendas declared openly that he faked madness in order to be released, and this claim is validated by the records. For example:

In January 1952, Tsafendas was arrested in Lisbon after security reports from Lourenço Marques advised the Portuguese authorities that he was a half-caste, a Communist and an anti-colonialist under suspicion of "unclear activities" during his time in Mozambique.⁶⁶⁷² "During his interrogations he gave signs of having some sort of mental disability, which was confirmed by the Hospital do Ultramar." He was subsequently released.⁶⁶⁷³

In November 1964, in Mozambique, Tsafendas was arrested by the Portuguese Public Security Police and accused of preaching "under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence..."⁶⁶⁷⁴ He was detained in police cells for fourteen days in the custody of Inspector Horacio Ferreira, who testified to the South African police that

⁶⁶⁷¹ Chapter II B, Paragraph 3

⁶⁶⁷² *Diario Popular*, 9 September 1966, 'E conhesido em Lisboa o assassino do Dr. Verwoerd.'

⁶⁶⁷³ PIDE Report regarding Tsafendas, 5 May 1956. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁶⁷⁴ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

Tsafendas was “normal” and he regarded him “as a very intelligent person.”⁶⁶⁷⁵ After two weeks, due to the seriousness of the charges and because of Tsafendas’s police record, he was handed to the PIDE for further interrogation. He spent the next two and half months in detention, interrogated regularly by PIDE. There, suffering from a harsh regime of imprisonment and interrogation, Tsafendas again showed “symptoms of mental illness” and was released.⁶⁶⁷⁶

Furthermore, each time he is arrested in the United States for contravening the immigration laws, the result is the same. Yet only three of the two hundred witnesses who were interviewed by the Commission and the police about Tsafendas expressed doubts as to his sanity as a free man. Surely this should have rung alarm bells with the Commission.

GRAFTON STATE HOSPITAL REPORT⁶⁶⁷⁷

The Commission includes several extracts from the report of this hospital, including statements which Tsafendas made to the doctors to convince them that he was mad. Most importantly, it repeats the following crucially important reference from the Grafton report:

Tsafendas's faking mental illness

“... he faked mental illness because he was afraid to ship out because of the numerous leakings of ships.”⁶⁶⁷⁸

That Tsafendas had pretended mental illness at least once is a hugely important revelation. Yet it is reproduced in the Report as a run-of-the-mill observation of no particular relevance. Assuming the Commission felt the question of his deceit could not be ignored, it nevertheless offered no comment or elaboration and posed no questions. Did the Commission not ask Tsafendas about the incident?

More important is why this information was not used at the summary trial. The Grafton document must have been given to the State by the police as it was also given to the

⁶⁶⁷⁵ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, File 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁶⁶⁷⁶ Letter of Francisco Bartolomeu da Costa Lontrão to the Subdirector of the PIDE in Lourenço Marques, 19 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Alberto Henriques de Matos Rodrigues conclusion to the Subdirector, 23 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁶⁷⁷ Chapter II B, Paragraph 10.

⁶⁶⁷⁸ Chapter II B, Paragraph 10.

Commission. Surely, the fact that Tsafendas had faked mental illness in the past was worth raising at the trial, where the defence was claiming he was mentally ill and the State was supposedly trying to prove otherwise. Would not such information have been extremely useful to those who examined Tsafendas, had they known of it?

This was not the only time Tsafendas simulated illness to get out of trouble, and the police and presumably the Commission, knew it. At least six witnesses from the *Eleni* tanker testified to the South African police on the 12th of October that Tsafendas had told them he faked mental illness to avoid call-up into the Portuguese army.⁶⁶⁷⁹ Tsafendas had told the same thing to several other witnesses though they were not questioned by the South African police.

However, the fact that Tsafendas was exempted from serving in the Portuguese army was known to the South African police because it was mentioned in PIDE's reports. No reason was given for Tsafendas's exemption, but it would have been very easy for the Commission to find out. Exemption from service in the Portuguese army was granted only to persons with physical or mental defects. Since Tsafendas was not physically defective, the Commission must have deduced that his exemption was due to reasons concerning his mental state. No mention of this incident is made in the Report.

Evidence of a different sort of malingering by Tsafendas came from Antony Maw, the former Honorary Consul for Greece in Lourenço Marques. He told the South African police when he was questioned on the 7th of September that Tsafendas had claimed "illness" when he was not allowed to disembark from a ship on arrival in Lourenço Marques.⁶⁶⁸⁰ Maw's statement was found in the archives and therefore it was known to the Commission, but no mention of this incident appears in its Report. Several witness told the author that on the occasion Maw referred to, Tsafendas pretended to be suffering from appendicitis so as to be taken off the ship to a hospital in Lourenço Marques.

It is clear that Tsafendas had thought this through. It would not have helped him to pretend madness since the probability was that he would be banned from landing. However, with an apparent acute appendicitis, it was likely he would be rushed to a hospital ashore.

⁶⁶⁷⁹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁶⁸⁰ Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA

Although Maw does not specify the illness claimed by Tsafendas, his appendicitis trick was known to almost every Greek in Lourenço Marques and it seems highly unlikely that the Commission and the South African police did not hear about it. No fewer than seven Greeks who were interviewed by the author Andreas Babiolakis, Mary Eendracht, Helen Grispos, Ira Kyriakakis, George Liberopoulos, Nick Papadakis and Katerina Pnema - knew the story and said that most if not all of the city's Greek population knew it, too.⁶⁶⁸¹

The hearing of voices

The Commission's Report also contains extracts from the Grafton Hospital report regarding Tsafendas's diagnosis, including a statement that "he hears voices coming through the radiators." The psychiatrists at the summary trial asked Tsafendas if he heard voices. Tsafendas replied in the negative, knowing full well that hearing voices was often used by people pretending to be crazy. When Tsafendas claimed to hear voices in the radiators it was 1946 and he had little knowledge or experience of hospitals. Years later, he told Father Minas Constandinou that the first times he was hospitalized he pretended to hear religious voices like "Joan of Arc." However, he was found to be lying by the psychiatrists and thereafter adopted something different - the tapeworm. He said "everyone hears voices or pretends to be Napoleon, but who would ever suspect anyone who believes he has a tapeworm?"⁶⁶⁸² He never used the voices trick again.

TSAFENDAS'S HOSPITALIZATION IN HAMBURG

*At the beginning of 1954 he was treated at the Tropen Krankenhaus in Hamburg for a stomach complaint. According to documents received from Germany, he alleged at that time that his trouble was due to a tapeworm. He is said to have claimed that the worm had been troubling him since 1937. No such worm was found and he was discharged.*⁶⁶⁸³

⁶⁶⁸¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 May 2016; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; George Liberopoulos in a personal interview, 6 July 2014; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

All of the above witnesses, apart from Father Minas, were living at the time in Mozambique and heard about it. Father Minas was told about it by Tsafendas himself in the mid-1990s. Henk van Woerden in the *Mouthful of Glass* also describes the same scene (2000: 70), presumably because he was told about it by Tsafendas.

⁶⁶⁸² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶⁶⁸³ Chapter II B, Paragraphs 25.

*On 11th February, 1955, Demitrios Tsafandakis was admitted to the psychiatric section of the Ochsensall Hospital, Germany. The diagnosis was "mixed psychoneurosis psychosis." In the copious notes the hospital made at that time, his allegation that he had a tapeworm was mentioned repeatedly. He is said to have alleged that the worm caused stomach-ache, and that he could hear it at times. During February, 1955, he also attempted suicide by swallowing twenty sleeping-pills. A priest of the sect to which he belonged, an American, visited him at the above-mentioned hospital. This visitor told one of the doctors that Tsafendas had deserted during the war, hardly ever worked, wandered from country to country and that he did not trust him. On 6th June, 1955, he was discharged from the hospital. Apparently the paranoiac ideas had ceased.*⁶⁶⁸⁴

While all the above information is correct, it tells only half the truth. On each occasion, Tsafendas admitted himself to the hospital, including when he allegedly attempted to commit suicide. The issue of the suicide has been examined extensively in the previous chapter, and would not be discussed here again. There is a big difference between someone walking into a hospital complaining that he is ill and seeking admission, and being taken there by others who have detected a health problem. The fact that Tsafendas personally presented himself at these hospitals is not mentioned in the Report, though surely this was something that would arouse curiosity in any investigator.

A further point is that Tsafendas was diagnosed as suffering from, and treated for, depression, not schizophrenia. This, too, goes unmentioned in the Commission's Report. Two concluding diagnoses made at the Hamburg hospital: Dr. Bieser, a senior physician, labelled Tsafendas's condition as "*mixed – pictured phasic psychose*,"⁶⁶⁸⁵ and Dr. Nachtwey, a psychiatrist, diagnosed "*endogenous depression, mixed-picture*."⁶⁶⁸⁶

TSAFENDAS'S MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS FOR HIS PERMANENT RESIDENCE APPLICATION

In his application for permanent residence Tsafendas stated, inter alia, that he had been a sailor during the previous five years, that he had never before applied for permanent residence in South Africa, that he had never been deported from any country, and that he did not suffer from any mental disease. A medical certificate stating, inter alia, that he was not in

⁶⁶⁸⁴ Chapter II B, Paragraphs 26.

⁶⁶⁸⁵ Dr Bieser and Dr Schmidt-Janssen report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁶⁶⁸⁶ Medical Bulletin of Dimitrio Tsafendas, 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

*any way mentally defective was attached to his application.*⁶⁶⁸⁷

The above information is correct, but omits the fact that Tsafendas had been examined by two state doctors and issued with two medical certificates stating that he was perfectly fine, physically and mentally. This was known to the Commission. On November 11, 1963, Tsafendas was seen by Dr. C. Been and was found “not to be mentally or physically defective in any way,” and “generally in a good state of health.”⁶⁶⁸⁸ On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined again in reference to his residence application by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who wrote “a favourable report.” A certificate for permanent residence was subsequently issued based in part on the two doctors’ reports.⁶⁶⁸⁹ If Tsafendas was as described by the medical experts in the summary trial – unable to follow a conversation for more than fifteen minutes, with disjointed speech and blocked thoughts - would not one or both of these two doctors have noticed?

SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAYS AND HARBOURS

On 16th March, 1965, he was employed by the South African Railways and Harbours as a shed attendant at R90 per month. He was examined medically and nothing was found to be wrong with him.

*In a written statement in connection with this examination he stated, inter alia, that he had never had any nervous or mental disease.*⁶⁶⁹⁰

This is one of ten times that Tsafendas was medically examined between November 1963 and September 1966 and found to be perfectly healthy. He withholds the fact that he has been hospitalized several times and that he has a “fixation with a tapeworm.” Obviously, Tsafendas knew he would not get the job if he mentioned anything of the sort. Although only eighteen months into the future Tsafendas would be declared a schizophrenic with serious thought disorder, such a condition was not spotted by the doctor who examined him for the railways position.

⁶⁶⁸⁷ Chapter II C, Paragraph 3.

⁶⁶⁸⁸ Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁶⁶⁸⁹ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁶⁶⁹⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 26.

It is important to mention here that Garnet Muller, Tsafendas's supervisor at this job, had given a statement to the police which was in the Commission's possession. Muller had "observed Tsafendas to possess intelligence above that of the average person who is likely to accept a position with the little responsibility which is attached to that of shed attendant."⁶⁶⁹¹ Once again, a positive statement about Tsafendas is omitted.

DR. KOSSEW'S EXAMINATION

*On 17th June he was examined by Dr. Kossew, the district surgeon, whose finding was that he was suffering from a serious form of schizophrenia.*⁶⁶⁹²

The Report goes into great detail about Tsafendas's other medical examinations, but here simply states that he was diagnosed as suffering from a serious form of schizophrenia. It offers no further information about Dr. Kossew's examination. Once again, the Commission has omitted significant information, most importantly why Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Kossew, a district surgeon, not a psychiatrist. On February 3, 1967, the same question was asked in the House of Assembly by MP J.O.N. Thompson. The Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions replied that "Tsafendas applied for a veteran's pension. As he was under sixty years old, evidence was required in terms of section 3 of the War Veterans' Pension Act, 1962, that he was unable, owing to infirmity of mind or body, to undertake regular work." The Minister said that although Tsafendas was diagnosed as schizophrenic and therefore was eligible for the pension, his application was eventually rejected "on the grounds that he had not rendered war service as defined in the Act."⁶⁶⁹³

This explanation as to why Tsafendas was examined by the district surgeon was important and should not have been omitted from the Report. Tsafendas had to be found unfit to do any work in order to qualify for the pension and that is how he was judged. However, as we have seen, whenever Tsafendas wanted to be found fit to work, he always proved to be so. On at least three occasions in the previous two years (Marine Diamond Corporation, City Tramways and South African Railways), he was examined by doctors and pronounced fit for the work he was seeking. He was also found to be perfectly healthy when examined by Dr.

⁶⁶⁹¹ Garnet Vincent Muller statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁶⁹² Chapter II C, Paragraph 69.

⁶⁶⁹³ House of Assembly, Question No. 17. 3 February 1967. K150, Vol. 12, File: Social Welfare and Pensions, NASA.

Been and Dr. A.C. McDonald for his residence permit.⁶⁶⁹⁴ This must have been spotted by the Commission and is most likely why the information about this examination was omitted. It is possible that the Commission failed to make the connection between the examinations. However the fact that Tsafendas was found perfectly sane and capable of working when he wanted to be so found, but the exact opposite when he wished to be ruled incapable must have struck the Commission as strange, at the least.

The Commission also omits significant information about the actual examination, for example the fact that it lasted only “a little bit longer” than ten minutes, and that Dr. Kossew arrived at his diagnosis simply by accepting what Tsafendas told him.⁶⁶⁹⁵ It also fails to state that Dr. Kossew made the diagnosis of schizophrenia after Tsafendas told him that in the house where he lived people were being killed off by poisoned food, a remark the doctor took for an illusion. However that meant that Tsafendas at the time nurtured two delusions: that he had a tapeworm inside him and people were being murdered by food poisoning. As Professors Alban Burke and Tuviah Zabow and Mr. van Zyl told the author, professional opinion held that it was almost impossible for a person to have two delusions at the same time.⁶⁶⁹⁶ The weaknesses of this diagnosis must have been evident to anyone who had studied the case or followed the summary trial, yet the Commission failed to raise any questions and simply stated the bald facts in its Report.

The reliability of Dr. Kossew's examination is considered in detail in the Summary Trial Chapter and will not be discussed again here. For more about that subject see the comments on Dr. Kossew's testimony in the chapter mentioned above.

⁶⁶⁹⁴ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁶⁶⁹⁵ Dr. Ralph Kossew testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966: 88. K150, Vol. 10, File: Union of S.A. NASA.

⁶⁶⁹⁶ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

OTHER MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF TSAFENDAS INCLUDED IN THE REPORT

*On 16th March, 1965, he was employed by the South African Railways and Harbours as a shed attendant at R90 per month. He was examined medically and nothing was found to be wrong with him. In a written statement in connection with this examination he stated, inter alia, that he had never had any nervous or mental disease.*⁶⁶⁹⁷

*On 12th November, 1965, he applied for a position as a bus conductor with City Tramways, Cape Town. Once again he was examined medically and nothing was found to be wrong with him. He stated, inter alia, that he had never had a nervous breakdown.*⁶⁶⁹⁸

*In February, 1966, he was treated at Groote Schuur Hospital for an obstruction in the nose and for nose bleeding. In April, he had a nose operation. He was in- hospital from 18th to 22nd April, 1966, and on 17th May, 1966, he was declared to be cured.*⁶⁶⁹⁹

*The next place where he sought employment was the Marine Diamond Corporation in Cape Town. On 13th January, 1966, he was examined by this company's medical officer and nothing was found to be wrong with him. Once again he declared that he had never had any mental or nervous disease.*⁶⁷⁰⁰

*Dr. S. Michelson, a specialist physician, examined Tsafendas in the Neurology Department of Groote Schuur Hospital on 3rd June, 1966. Tsafendas told him that he was unable to find any employment, and attributed this to his headaches and the fact that he was a "Jack of all trades." In addition to headaches, he complained of dizziness and a poor memory. The physician found that no serious, organic defect was perceptible in the nervous system, and considered the headaches to be "of migrainous nature."*⁶⁷⁰¹

The Commission has included in its Report some of Tsafendas's medical checks, especially those which took place in connection with his job applications. These examinations could not be ignored since everyone knew that a job-seeker needed to be medically examined and found fit in order to secure employment with those companies. If these examinations had not been mentioned, a major question would have arisen as to how Tsafendas, a schizophrenic, managed to get work and whether he was examined.

⁶⁶⁹⁷ Chapter II C, Paragraph 33.

⁶⁶⁹⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 49.

⁶⁶⁹⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 60.

⁶⁷⁰⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 53.

⁶⁷⁰¹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 64.

Furthermore, the above examinations give birth to the question: How did none of these doctors notice that Tsafendas could not function on a reasonable level, was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, suffered from thought-disorder and spoke in a disjointed manner, as evidence at the trial claimed? It is evident that Tsafendas was found physically and mentally healthy when he needed to be, as with his two medical examinations for permanent residence status. However, those mentioned above were not the only times Tsafendas was medically examined and found to be perfectly healthy.

MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF TSAFENDAS OMITTED FROM THE REPORT

As we have seen, the Commission omitted from its Report the two examinations in connection with Tsafendas's application for permanent residence. It also failed to note the following five medical checks, taking the total of omissions to seven:

- Dr. Been, the doctor who examined him for his permanent residence applications later examined Tsafendas again “for burns on his body whilst employed at Pooles” in 1964. Nothing about his mental state was noted.⁶⁷⁰²
- On September 25, 1965, he was examined by Dr. G.C. Baker and nothing was reported about his mental state.⁶⁷⁰³
- On April 18, 19 and May 3, 1966 Tsafendas was examined by Dr. Goldman, a consultant ear, nose and throat surgeon. He reported nothing about his mental condition.⁶⁷⁰⁴
- From April 19, 1966 to May 15, 1966, Tsafendas was under the medical supervision of Dr. Leon Solomon at Groote Schuur Hospital, suffering from “a deviated nasal septum and epistaxis,” and underwent surgery on his nose. Dr. Solomon during this period did not report any mental disability and found Tsafendas to be fit to return to his work.⁶⁷⁰⁵
- Finally, Dr. Darby, a casualty officer, examined Tsafendas on the evening of the assassination but did not report anything to be wrong about his mental state.⁶⁷⁰⁶

⁶⁷⁰² Dr. Been statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁷⁰³ Dr. G.C. Baker Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. No date. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4, NASA.

⁶⁷⁰⁴ I. Eisenberg Statement. RE: Demitrio Tsafendas. GS.H. 65/014-181. N.d. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁷⁰⁵ Dr. Leon Solomon's medical report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA; Medical certificate issued by Dr. Solomon for the Employment Insurance Act, 1946. 7 June 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: 1/1 Departement van Arbeid. NASA.

⁶⁷⁰⁶ Dr. T.A. Darby. Statement re: Demitrio Tsafendas. G.S.H. NO. 65/014-181, 6 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

Tsafendas's Hospitalization in Beira

Another of Tsafendas's hospitalizations not mentioned in the Report or at the summary trial is that at the Government Hospital in Beira in 1964. The Commission was aware of this development since Tsafendas had mentioned it to the police in his statement of the 19th of September⁶⁷⁰⁷ and Lt.-Colonel P.J.B. van Wyk also noted it in his report. Furthermore, Col. van Wyk had then taken the "necessary steps" and "formally applied" to obtain a copy of Tsafendas's medical report covering this hospitalization.⁶⁷⁰⁸ It must have been a simple formality to obtain the document since the Portuguese authorities had provided all of Tsafendas's medical reports from Portugal, and by then it would have been in the possession of the South African police. However, the author cannot know for a fact whether Lt.-Col van Wyk eventually received the report as no other reference to it was found in the national archives.

This hospitalization was important since it was the last time Tsafendas was admitted for a mental condition before he was arrested. Given that the South African authorities contacted hospitals in the United States for Tsafendas's records during the 1940s and in Europe for details of those in the 1950s, it is natural they contacted Beira, too. It was his most recent hospitalization and it must have been the easiest to contact since it was in Mozambique. The Portuguese authorities had happily shared with the South African police Tsafendas's medical records from his time in Portugal. They would surely have seen no problem providing one from Mozambique.

However, no mention of the hospitalization is made in the Commission's report. A clue might be found in the circumstances surrounding this incident. When the Portuguese Public Security Police arrested Tsafendas he was accused of pretending to be a religious missionary, while in reality preaching "under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique's independence..."⁶⁷⁰⁹ While in custody, Tsafendas was asked by the police if he had

⁶⁷⁰⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁷⁰⁸ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁷⁰⁹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

“dedicated himself to preach as a missionary and, under the guise of this same religion, advertised in favour of Mozambique’s independence.”⁶⁷¹⁰

Since he was apparently involved in a so-called missionary activity and because he carried Bibles and other religious literature as cover of his activities, Tsafendas came up with an idea that neatly fitted the situation. He pretended to be Christ’s apostle, Peter, and quoted the Christian scriptures at length. The trick worked and he was transferred to the Government Hospital in Beira for mental examination. Once again, he had managed to convince the Portuguese that he was mad but harmless, and he was soon released.⁶⁷¹¹

The author does not know for a fact whether the South African police received Tsafendas’s medical file from the Government Hospital in Beira, but it seems highly unlikely that they managed to get his file from every one of his hospitals around the world but this one. Furthermore, Lt.-Col van Wyk had already applied for this report, therefore it must have been in the police’s possession. A number of mostly bureaucratic reasons can be adduced as to why this particular hospitalization was omitted from the Commission’s report. What looms over all, however, is the likelihood that the Commission suppressed the information, not wanting to reveal that, tapeworm apart, Tsafendas, two years before the assassination, while also in custody, also believed he was Saint Peter. If this was revealed, the question would have been, why was such an important issue never brought up at his summary trial?

At the same time, if this information had become known, another major issue would have been raised, certainly by the psychiatrists and psychologists who would have read the Commission’s Report. This is how was it possible that for Tsafendas to believe he had a tapeworm for almost thirty years, then for this to be replaced by the conviction that he was Saint Peter, only for the Apostle to be ousted by his belief that boarders in the house where he was staying were being poisoned to death and finally for the tapeworm to return and take up residence. Professors Alban Burke and Tuviah Zabow and Mr. van Zyl told the author it was highly improbable, effectively impossible, for a person’s delusions to come and go like this

⁶⁷¹⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁷¹¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

or to have multiple delusions at the time.⁶⁷¹² This issue is discussed in detail in the Summary Trial Chapter.

Evidence Regarding Tsafendas's Hospitalizations

The Report lists a series of hospitals where Tsafendas was reported to have been admitted. Some of the names are taken from Tsafendas's statements to the South African police and some from what Tsafendas told the doctors in Grafton State Hospital. No evidence has been found in the archives or elsewhere substantiating that Tsafendas was indeed hospitalised as stated, except for his word. Naturally, Tsafendas had a very good reason to exaggerate his hospitalisations, but this does not mean that he was not hospitalised as he stated. What is surprising is that the Commission accepted his word, apparently without making any effort to double-check Tsafendas's statements.

CONCLUSION

The Commission included in its Report Tsafendas's medical examinations for various job applications, knowing such checks were standard practice by the companies concerned. Seven other examinations are omitted, including two conducted by two state doctors for Tsafendas's permanent residence application. On the other hand, the examination by another state doctor, Dr. Kossew, who found Tsafendas to be a schizophrenic, although he was not a psychiatrist and examined him for a little bit more than ten minutes, is included. Still, none of the ten doctors who examined Tsafendas during the previous two and a half years before the assassination saw any sign of Tsafendas's alleged problems as set out at his summary trial.

Of great importance is the revelation by the Commission that Tsafendas had faked mental illness while in the United States. This is something that no-one mentioned in the court, although it must have been known to the State as the relevant medical report was in the possession of the South African police a month before the trial started. However, another time Tsafendas faked mental illness, in Portugal in order not to serve in the Portuguese army, is omitted, though it is possible that this information was withheld by the police and not given to the Commission.

⁶⁷¹² Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016; Reyner van Zyl in a personal interview, 10 April 2016.

Although the Commission goes into detail with Tsafendas's overseas hospitalizations, the most recent one in Mozambique in late 1964 is omitted. What makes this strange is that this hospitalization was known to the Commission, and the South African police were almost certainly in possession of the Beira hospital's records concerning Tsafendas. Then, why has it been omitted? The author can only speculate, but the fact that Tsafendas had pretended to be Saint Peter while he was in the custody of PIDE before being taken to the hospital suggests that this was the reason for the omission. It would have sounded strange, especially to psychiatrists and psychologists, if it had become known that Tsafendas, apart from allegedly believing he had a tapeworm since 1935, two years before the assassination he also believed he was Saint Peter.

TSAFENDAS AND THE FEMALE SEX

One gains the impression that he was unacceptable to the female sex. Neither the Whites nor the non-Whites would have anything to do with him. In Durban he tried to become more closely acquainted with a woman who belonged to his church, but she would have nothing to do with him.

During May, 1966, he met a non-White, Sybie Barendilla, at one of the church services. He wanted to visit her as well, but she was not agreeable.⁶⁷¹³

The Commission's "impression" of Tsafendas's relations with women is wrong and reads like an attempt to portray him as some kind of unsavoury outcast. The Report refers to only two contacts with females, an unnamed woman in Durban and Sybie Barendilla. The woman in Durban was Helen Struthers. She told the Commission that Tsafendas visited her at her house. She did not know him but she invited him in because, like her, he was a member of the Christian Church. Tsafendas stayed in the house for an hour. Struthers said, "He asked if he could see me again, apparently to promote a personal relationship, but I rejected his request and I also rejected to correspond with him." She never saw him again.⁶⁷¹⁴

As for Sybie Barendilla, this is an extract from her statement:⁶⁷¹⁵

"During about May, 1966, I again met him on a bus when I was returning to work after lunch. He remembered me, spoke to me and said he was on his way to Town to buy a pair of shoes. He enquired how my uncle was in America. I do not know how he came to know that I had an uncle in America and I did not ask him. The next day after this incident he walked past the shop where I was employed. He paused in the door, waved to me and walked on. The following day he came into the shop and bought a chocolate. I got the impression that he wanted to talk to me, but I cut him short and carried on with my work. On a public holiday, I think the 11th of July, 1966, he came to my house and enquired for me. My sister opened the door and spoke to him. He was insistent to see me, but my sister put him off. I heard the conversation and told my sister that I did not want to see him."⁶⁷¹⁶

It is clear from Barendilla's and Struthers's statements that Tsafendas made an

⁶⁷¹³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 41.

⁶⁷¹⁴ Helen Struthers statement to the COE, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁶⁷¹⁵ Her full statement is available at Chapter Six.

⁶⁷¹⁶ Sybie Barendilla statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

approach to them and they were not interested. It should be recalled here that both women were members of the Christian Church and most of the Church's members who were questioned after the assassination sought to belittle and distance themselves from Tsafendas. It is very possible, though there is no evidence to prove it, that Barendilla and Struthers adopted such a stance. Even if Barendilla and Struthers were truly not interested in Tsafendas's advances, that does not make Tsafendas anathema to all women. There cannot be many men who have not been rejected at some time in their lives, which does not mean they are generally "unacceptable to the female sex."

Helen Daniels claimed that she was disappointed when meeting Tsafendas face to face and since he did not make any attempt to establish a relationship with her, it seems clear the disappointment was mutual. However, the fact that Tsafendas was recommended to Helen Daniels by fellow members of their Church is significant. She was a preacher and a highly respected member of the Church and it seems most unlikely that her co-religionists would suggest Tsafendas as a husband and urge her to meet him unless they held him in high esteem. The fact that she went to great lengths to communicate with Tsafendas suggests that what she had heard about him could only have been good.

Apart from the rejections above, there is no evidence that Tsafendas was the sort of person described by the Report as unacceptable to women. Indeed, the report from the Ochsensoll Krankenhaus Hospital in Hamburg in 1955 says that Tsafendas, upon his discharge, was picked up by a female friend who planned to accommodate him.⁶⁷¹⁷ Although it is not stated who this friend was, it is unlikely a woman would meet a man out of hospital and give him accommodation unless they were in a relationship. The Commission makes no reference to this woman when it refers to this hospitalization in Chapter II B, Paragraph 26. Light has been shed on the situation by Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis who met Tsafendas at the time in Hamburg. He said the woman was a young German Communist who did have a relationship with Tsafendas.⁶⁷¹⁸ While the Commission was almost certainly unaware of this information, it knew of the Hamburg hospital report but still made no reference to the woman mentioned.

⁶⁷¹⁷ Ochsensoll Hospital report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas. 6 June 1955. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1, Sub-file: 1/8. NASA.

⁶⁷¹⁸ Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

The Commission was also aware of the fact that Tsafendas had his first sexual encounter in 1936, since it is mentioned in the Grafton State Hospital report which was in the Commission's possession. However, there is no mention of it in the Report.⁶⁷¹⁹ According to Tsafendas's family, Tsafendas had a relationship with a Mozambican girl named Stella, who he saw for more than a year in the mid-1930s. It is very likely she was the one with whom he had his first grown-up sexual experience.⁶⁷²⁰ It is unlikely that the Commission knew anything of Stella, but it certainly knew that a certain female in 1936 found Tsafendas acceptable for a serious sexual encounter and omitted it from the Report.

Although the author is not in position to know Tsafendas's score card, he certainly had at least six serious girlfriends in his life. They were also from a range of ethnic backgrounds. The woman from Mozambique, Stella, was Black; then there was a White Jewish woman around 1940 in South Africa;⁶⁷²¹ a White Greek woman in Greece sometime in the late 1940s,⁶⁷²² a Portuguese woman, probably White, in Portugal in the 1950s,⁶⁷²³ a White Communist woman in Germany, also in the 1950s;⁶⁷²⁴ and a Turkish Muslim woman in Istanbul in 1961. The Turkish woman wanted to marry Tsafendas, but neither was willing to convert to the other's religion, and anyway, Tsafendas wanted to go back to Africa.⁶⁷²⁵

Indeed, according to many who knew him, Tsafendas was far from unacceptable to the female sex. The following views were gathered by the author, and obviously were not known to the Commission. Fotini Gavasiadis, who saw Tsafendas virtually every day for nine months in 1963-4 when they were flatmates, and then neighbours, while they also worked together, told the author: "Dimitris was adorable. He was a very sweet and kind man. He did not have a girlfriend at the time, but that was due to the fact that he was not interested in any particular woman as far as I could tell, not because he was unacceptable. He was tall and

⁶⁷¹⁹ Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

⁶⁷²⁰ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁷²¹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁷²² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; van Woerden, 2000: 139.

⁶⁷²³ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶⁷²⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Efthimios Eleftheriadis in a personal interview, 27 January 2011.

⁶⁷²⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 4 November 2015; van Woerden, 2000: 139.

well-built; he was quite impressive.”⁶⁷²⁶

Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for some seven months in Istanbul in 1961. She said Tsafendas was “not particularly handsome, but I would definitely not call him unacceptable to women. A lot of ladies in the church asked me about him. He then met a Turkish woman and they fell in love. I know some ladies were quite disappointed.”⁶⁷²⁷ Father Nikola Banovic, who knew Tsafendas for seven months in Istanbul in 1961, sharing accommodation with him for four of those months, strongly rejected the claim that Tsafendas was “unacceptable to women.” He told the author:

“There were some ladies, mostly I must say, older ladies, who were interested in him, but he was not interested. I told Dimitris and he said ‘they are too old for me.’ This Turkish lady I told you about fell in love with him, although she was a Muslim and he was a Christian and a Greek! His relationship with her caused quite a stir in the Greek community in Istanbul.”⁶⁷²⁸

Ira Kyriakakis, Helen Grispos and Andreas Babiolakis knew Tsafendas from childhood. Kyriakakis said that her sister Alice was in love with Tsafendas when she was at school, but Tsafendas was then in a relationship with Stella. She described him when he was younger as a “tall, handsome man.” She said, “He put on some weight when he was older, but he was still handsome.”⁶⁷²⁹ Babiolakis said Tsafendas was very popular with girls while a teenager in Mozambique.⁶⁷³⁰

Helen Grispos told the author:

“[Tsafendas] was of a certain type, unique, that made him attractive to women. I used to like him when we were in Mozambique. He was not like the other teenagers of the time. He was very-well-read and seemed sophisticated and different, at least to me! He was not like Alain Delon, but he was not ugly either. He would not stand out in the crowd for his beauty, but he was certainly attractive to women, at least to some women, especially after you get to know him.”⁶⁷³¹

Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, told the author how Tsafendas had courted a Jewish

⁶⁷²⁶ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁶⁷²⁷ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁶⁷²⁸ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁶⁷²⁹ ; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁶⁷³⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁶⁷³¹ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

girl who was their sister's best friend at the time:

“He wrote her several notes and my sister would deliver them. He was shy and wouldn't let us know what he was writing, but the girl would later tell my sister! I can't remember what he was saying, but I think it was just how beautiful she is and things like this! He sent her many notes with my sister as the courier. Eventually, we all went out one day and she fell in love with him and started going out with him.”⁶⁷³²

Pnefma dismissed the Commission's comment as quite wrong. However, she added that Tsafendas's appearance changed markedly after he acquired his metal teeth:

“He did these teeth, and when he came up to my poor brother-in-law's, and when we saw him, I tell you, he looked like a monster. All his mouth was stainless steel or whatever it is. One day I was listening to the wireless, and you know how funny things happen. A woman was talking and she said, after Tsafendas committed the crime, ‘Do you know, he came to the shop...’ he came to her takeaway. And she said, ‘When he came in and he smiled at me, I got such a fright.’ And he went apparently a couple of times, but I think she was afraid of him. The way she talked, she didn't want him near her shop... All our children got such a fright when they first saw his teeth, but then they got used of him and they liked him very much.”⁶⁷³³

Irene Michaletos, who knew him very well for more than a year (1964-1965), when he often visited her house in Beira, also mentioned the issue with the teeth. She told the author:

“To tell you the truth, when I first saw him, I was a little scared of him. He had a frightening face. He was not ugly at all, he just had these metal teeth that were really scary. He was tall and big; he looked like this villain from the James Bond movie [Jaws in *The Spy who Loved Me* and *Moonraker*]. When I saw the movie many years later, he immediately reminded me of Dimitris. But when you got to know him you could see that he was a gentle giant, a very kind-hearted man.”⁶⁷³⁴

Tsafendas's first cousin, Mary Eendracht, who grew up with him in Mozambique and Egypt, told the author that “Dimitris had some conquests, but also some rejections, like happens to most men. Women were not falling to their feet for him, but there were quite a

⁶⁷³² Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁷³³ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁷³⁴ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

few who were interested in him; I don't think he have any particular difficulty finding a girlfriend."⁶⁷³⁵

It is blindingly clear from the above statements that far from being unacceptable to women, Tsafendas had a number of acknowledged, serious relationships, and it is more than likely for a man who travelled far and wide, that there were others. While the Commission was unaware of most of the above information, it only had the evidence of three rejections on which to base its statement that Tsafendas was unacceptable to the female sex. The statement was a matter of opinion and wildly inaccurate. In addition, in the evidence held by the Commission, Daniels testified that Tsafendas was recommended highly to her by her friends, there was a reference in Grafton State Hospital report to Tsafendas having sex with a girl when he was a teenager, while the Ochsenzoll Krankenhaus Hospital report mentions a woman who picked him up from the hospital when he was released to take him to her house.

⁶⁷³⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

PART II: SPECIFIC INCIDENTS AND OTHER ISSUES

THE ELENI

One of the most important elements in the Commission's Report concerns the *Eleni*, a Greek tanker which arrived in Cape Town for repairs on the 24th of July 1966 and remained docked there until the 3rd of September 1966, leaving just three days before Dr. Verwoerd's assassination.⁶⁷³⁶ The Commission discusses the *Eleni* in Chapter II C, Paragraphs 77-87, in greater detail than anything else in its Report. Those eleven paragraphs pay particular attention to claims that Dr. Verwoerd's death had been rumoured at the ship days before it occurred, but they omit signals as to how this might have come about, as well as significant details relating to Tsafendas, his background and his activities.

In the course of his work as a commission agent for a men's clothes outfitter, Tsafendas visited the tanker on a daily basis, often taking his meals there, and quickly became friendly with the crew, most of whom were Greeks. He was comfortable talking to the men because, like him, they were not South Africans; more importantly, some were Communists, with whom he felt very much at home.

Tsafendas testified to the police in his two statements of the 11th and the 19th of September, that he visited the *Eleni* every day that she was docked in Cape Town. The crew's testimonies were therefore important in determining Tsafendas's movements in the days before the assassination. Furthermore, Tsafendas testified that he had bought a gun from two members of the crew and was planning to escape on board the *Eleni*. Of particular interest to the Commission were the Dr. Verwoerd death rumours. Reginald Robert Maile, a South African security guard on the *Eleni*, told the police that three days before the assassination he was asked by Maria Kokkinidou, a woman who often visited the *Eleni*, where her son worked on a temporary basis, "Is Dr. Verwoerd dead?" Edmund George Stollenkamp, the ship's night watchman, was also involved in these exchanges about Dr. Verwoerd being dead. Because of these rumours, the *Eleni* played a prominent role in the police investigation.

According to the Commission's Report, the crew of the *Eleni* were questioned by the South African police on 12th October 1966 in Venice, Italy, where the vessel was then docked. The *Eleni* had a crew of thirty-eight men, thirty-four of them Greek, and almost every one of them was questioned, but as already stated, only four of their statements were

⁶⁷³⁶ Michael N. Fountotos statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

found in NASA. The four were the captain of the *Eleni*, Michael Fountotos, Nicholas Mavronas, Emanuil Mastromanolis and Constandinos Kokkinidis, the temporary hire. Of the four, only Mastromanolis had associated frequently with Tsafendas. A further note was found in the archives referring to Dimitris Zafiriadis, a crew member who had become close to Tsafendas. However, the document was not an official statement, since Zafiriadis had refused to give one, merely a note containing some remarks by him. What happened in this particular round of questioning in Venice, and what the crew told the author are examined in detail in the Investigation Chapter, and will not be discussed again here.

IS DR. VERWOERD DEAD?

Eight paragraphs in the Report, 80-87, deal with Dr. Verwoerd's death being discussed at the tanker three days before the actual assassination. The Commission asked Major Rossouw:

COMMISSION: Another thing is that there is a lot of evidence that on the Friday morning BEFORE the murder people had been running back and forth screaming to one another that Dr. Verwoerd had been murdered – are you aware of this?

MAJOR ROSSOUW: Yes I am aware of that ...⁶⁷³⁷

Although the Commission referred to “a lot of evidence,” its Report contains very little of this evidence and fails to explain what happened. This is the description according to the Commission's Report:

80. Another visitor to the Eleni was a Mrs. Kokkinidou, a widow. Both she and the Captain originally came from Kilimnos, Greece. She was accompanied by Mr. Nicolai Christodoulos, a bachelor who lodges with her. Her son Constantinos Kokkinidou had started work on the Eleni in August, 1966.

On the morning of 3rd September, 1966, the ship had to be moved, and for this reason the gangplank was drawn up. The night watch, Stollenkamp, stood on deck because he was unable to get off the ship, and the morning watch, Maile, stood on the quay. The latter had a copy of the Cape Times with him. Near Mr. Stollenkamp stood Constantinos Kokkinidou. On the quay Mrs. Kokkinidou and Mr. Cristodoulos stood a short distance from Mr. Maile. As there are some discrepancies in the versions of what exactly happened then, the account of each of these five persons is given. Four gave oral evidence and a statement was received from Constantinos

⁶⁷³⁷ Major Daniel Jacobus Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

Kokkinidou.

81. *Mr. Maile said that Mrs. Kokkinidou asked him: "Is Dr. Verwoerd dead?" He says that he then called spontaneously to Stollenkamp and asked whether Dr. Verwoerd was dead.*

82. *Mrs. Kokkinidou says that her son shouted to her from the deck and asked whether she had heard the news that Dr. Verwoerd was dead. When she asked him who had said so, he pointed to Stollenkamp and said that the man with the newspaper—Maile—had said so. She says that she then asked the man with the newspaper whether Dr. Verwoerd was dead, and he explained that Stollenkamp had misunderstood him.*

83. *Mr. Christodoulos confirmed Mrs. Kokkinidou's evidence.*

84. *Constantinos Kokkinidou stated that the night watch said to them "Do you know what? Dr. Verwoerd has been killed." When he asked him who had said so, he (the night watch) pointed to the morning watch. He then told his mother, Mrs. Kokkinidou, that Dr. Verwoerd had been killed. His mother was upset, and he asked the night watch how Dr. Verwoerd had been killed. The night watch in turn asked the morning watch, and when the latter had replied, the night watch told Constantinos that he (the night watch) had misunderstood the morning watch. He then conveyed this to his mother. Mrs. Kokkinidou understands a little English and apparently no Afrikaans. The two watchmen had spoken Afrikaans to each other, while the Kokkinidous had spoken in Greek!*

85. *Stollenkamp says that Maile told him that Dr. Verwoerd was dead. He gave him to understand that it was in the newspaper. He then asked the young man standing next to him (it must have been Constantinos) whether he had heard that Dr. Verwoerd was dead. The young man then spoke to his mother, and then Maile told her that Dr. Verwoerd was not dead.*

86. *It is impossible to establish with any certainty exactly what was said. However, there is no doubt that Dr. Verwoerd's death was mentioned on that morning three days before his death. What makes these incidents more than a coincidence is the fact that this was said at the ship which was visited daily for almost 40 days by the man who killed Dr. Verwoerd, where he bought a pistol and tried to buy a knife which he wanted to use—according to at least one statement made by him subsequently—to kill Dr. Verwoerd.*

The fact that Dr. Verwoerd's death was mentioned at that ship was probably more than pure coincidence.

87. *The Commission must emphasize, however, that none of the five persons who took part in the conversation that took place that morning is suspected of any complicity. As has already been stated, the Commission had the opportunity of questioning four of them in person. The police report on Mrs. Kokkinidou and Mr. Christodoulou is favourable. What could have happened is that the discontented crew of the Eleni might, on the numerous occasions when they condemned the State's colour policy, have wished for Dr. Verwoerd's end. Something of this kind could have had a profound effect on the feelings of resentment Tsafendas already had. It might also have been that Tsafendas had on some occasion or other intimated that it was his intention to murder Dr. Verwoerd, and that for obvious reasons those who heard this do not now wish to make any admission in this regard.*

The Commission fails to shed any light on these apparently confused exchanges and the conclusions in its Report are entirely speculative. It does not clarify how the rumour started, it simply guesses that the disgruntled *Eleni* crew wished Dr. Verwoerd dead and that Tsafendas was somehow sparked into action as a result. Crucially, while the witnesses' version of events is represented perfectly accurately, what is missing is what was said by the seamen, who are not named in the Report.

The Commission states that the mention of Dr. Verwoerd's death was "*probably more than pure coincidence,*" but its whole treatment of the case is superficial to say the least. If it was more than a coincidence, this suggests that there were people prior to the assassination who were expecting it. However it appears that the Commission failed to investigate this important matter any further. The most astonishing thing is that the South African police were well aware of what happened and what was said on the *Eleni*, but none of this is mentioned in the Report.

A further puzzling point about the Commission's handling of the issue is that Tsafendas's opinion about how Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed is not mentioned. Although it seems that he is asked to explain about the gun, no reference is made to what he said, if he said anything, to the Commission about such an important issue. It seems that the Commission, which interviewed him twice, either did not ask him to explain or simply suppressed his answer. It seems inconceivable that the Commission would not ask Tsafendas such an important question, especially since he was the person most likely to have an

explanation of what happened. If Tsafendas was asked, his most likely reaction would have been to tell the truth, as he had done with the police regarding his motive for and planning of the assassination. This was that he had characterised a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as morally justifiable because he was a dictator who was oppressing his people. Thus, the Commission would have had a good reason to hide his answers. However, we are not in position to know for certain whether the Commission asked Tsafendas such a question, It simply seems surprising that his side of the story is not heard, although he gave evidence twice to Judge van Wyk.

One of the four statements by the *Eleni* crew which were found in the National Archives of South Africa was that of Constandinos Kokkinidis⁶⁷³⁸ (his correct name, not Kokkindou as in the Report). The Report gives the impression that no-one else from the crew was asked about the incident. However, nine of the twelve seamen who were interviewed by the author and were questioned by the police in Venice, clearly remember being asked whether Tsafendas had mentioned anything about killing Dr. Verwoerd. Five of them, Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas and Vasilakis, stated to the author that they had told the police that Tsafendas had spoken of a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. He had characterised such an act as morally justifiable because Dr. Verwoerd was a dictator and a tyrant.⁶⁷³⁹

However, Tsafendas never said that he intended to kill the Prime Minister himself. A sixth seaman, Grigoris Pouftis, was present at this conversation, but he is unsure whether he told the police about it.⁶⁷⁴⁰ Mastromanolis, whose statement was one of the four found in the archives, was asked about it, but there is no mention of his answer in the statement. However, he had no knowledge of the conversation at the dockside and had told the police so, which is probably why there is no mention of it in his statement.⁶⁷⁴¹

The six seamen mentioned above freely explained to the police the circumstances of the conversation about a hypothetical assassination, at which they were all present. They said Tsafendas had spent the evening before the *Eleni* weighed anchor on board the vessel as he often did with some of his friends in the crew, among them Billis, Kantas, Alachiotis, Kambouris, Vasilakis, Pouftis, Xexenis and Zafiriadis. Xexenis asked Tsafendas if, during his

⁶⁷³⁸ His statement is available in Chapter Five.

⁶⁷³⁹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁶⁷⁴⁰ Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009.

⁶⁷⁴¹ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

wanderings in Africa, he had met Ioannis (Jean) Karageorgis, a Greek man who, on October 13, 1961, assassinated Prince Rwagasore, the first elected President of independent Burundi. Xexenis was from the same village as Karageorgis, but he had never met him. The other crew members were unaware of this event, so Tsafendas and the seaman told them what had happened. Tsafendas fiercely condemned the assassination, stating that Karageorgis was hired by the Belgian colonialists and was rightly executed because Rwagasore had been popularly elected.⁶⁷⁴²

A discussion about assassination ensued and the conversation extended to assassinations such as John F. Kennedy's in 1963 and that of King George I of Greece in 1913. Tsafendas argued that if Karageorgis had assassinated Dr. Verwoerd, it would have been justifiable, a tyrannicide, because South Africa's Prime Minister was a tyrant and a dictator who was oppressing his people. This, he said, did not apply to Prince Rwagasore, who was democratically elected.⁶⁷⁴³

Some thirty years after the assassination, Tsafendas repeated to Fathers Ioannis Tsaftaridis, Minas Constandinou and Spiros Randos his belief that assassinating Dr. Verwoerd was justified because he was a tyrant and a dictator.⁶⁷⁴⁴ This was exactly what he told the seamen three days before the assassination. Tsafendas had also characterised Dr. Verwoerd as a tyrant, dictator and "Hitler's best student" to some of the sailors and to several other witnesses prior to the assassination. All of this confirms the sailors' testimony that they heard Tsafendas using such words.

Billis, Kantas, Alachiotis, Kambouris and Vasilakis are positive that they told the police about this conversation. Pouftis, although present at the conversation, cannot remember whether he told the police about it, but he assumes that he did.⁶⁷⁴⁵ Mastromanolis, Tsabouniaris, Speis and Perselis all remember being asked whether Tsafendas said anything

⁶⁷⁴² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁷⁴³ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁷⁴⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁶⁷⁴⁵ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

about killing Dr. Verwoerd and replied ‘no’ since they were not aware of the conversation.⁶⁷⁴⁶ The question posed by the police was a perfectly natural one since they knew Dr. Verwoerd’s death was discussed on board the tanker. However, there is no mention in the Report of Tsafendas’s discussion of various assassinations nor that he had characterised a possible assassination of Tsafendas as tyrannicide and morally justifiable.

The author cannot know for certain how the dockside exchanges as described in the Report started. The crewmen suggested to the author that Kokkinidis may have been at the table when the assassination discussion took place, or more likely nearby, since he did not fraternise with Tsafendas nor with the men there at the time. It is possible that Kokkinidis overheard snippets of the discussion and misunderstood them, passing them on a few hours later at the dockside. The men who spoke to the author all believe this is the likeliest explanation.

All of the thirteen sailors interviewed by the author and met Tsafendas in Cape Town stated emphatically that he never indicated that he intended to kill Dr. Verwoerd and that none of the men ever “wished for Dr. Verwoerd’s end,” as the Report proposed. These facts render the Commission’s conclusion entirely wrong. Those who participated in the discussion about “justifiable assassinations” maintain that this was the only time that a conversation close to that described in the Report took place, indeed the only time that Dr. Verwoerd’s “death” was discussed. What adds strength to the argument that the assassination discussion started the rumours is that it took place a few hours before the dockside exchanges involving Kokkinidis and his mother, her lodger and the security guards. Although there cannot be 100 per cent certainty that the “death” rumours started in the way suggested above, it is a much more plausible hypothesis than that suggested by the Commission, involving crewmen’s discontent somehow pervading Tsafendas’s psyche.

Nevertheless, the main issue here is not how the rumours began but the fact that at least five witnesses testified to the police that Tsafendas had characterised a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as justifiable and as tyrannicide, just three days before the actual assassination, and of this the Report makes no mention at all. The Commission was right that it was more than a coincidence that Dr. Verwoerd’s death was discussed before he

⁶⁷⁴⁶ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; Emanuil Tsabouniaris in personal interview with the author, 14 June 2016.

died. There could be no other explanation. However, the Commission failed to report accurately on the incident and how it occurred and instead attempted superficially to reconstruct the events and present a feasible scenario while admitting that it was “impossible to establish with any certainty exactly what was said.” This should not have been the case as the police had all the evidence about what happened and what was said on the *Eleni*.

The author is not in position to know whether Judge van Wyk suppressed the seamen’s evidence about the “justifiable assassination” discussion or whether the police withheld that information from the Commission. The fact is that this crucial development is missing from the Report. It would have contradicted what was heard at the summary trial and presented an entirely different picture of Tsafendas and his motive.

THE PURCHASE OF THE GUN

One Nicholas Mavros, a galley boy on the Eleni, alleges in a statement made on 12th October, 1966, in Venice on or about 26th or 27th August, 1966, that Tsafendas told some of the crew on board the Eleni that he wished to buy a pistol or knife, that he could obtain a position at a hotel at £2,000 and that he needed such a weapon for his protection. They regarded him as “foolish” and decided to play a trick on him by selling him a small pistol which they looked upon as a toy.

Subsequently they did sell it to him for 30 dollars. Of this, Mavros received 20 dollars and one Emanuel Mastromanolus, the boatswain, ten. The latter confirmed this statement. This transaction must have taken place on or after 1st September, 1966, since, according to a statement made by a bank, Tsafendas bought 80 dollars on that date. On 3rd September, the day on which the Eleni sailed, Tsafendas came to claim his money back because the pistol was not in working order. (It was in fact a gas pistol.) They refused, however, to pay anything back. Tsafendas complained that he was a poor man and that he had had to work a whole week for the 30 dollars.

Michael N. Fontatis, the Captain of the Eleni, says in a statement that Tsafendas came to him on 3rd September, 1966, to complain about this, but that he refused to have anything to do with the matter. He considered Tsafendas (childish, mentioning as an example Tsafendas’s offer to find an engineer to repair the ship—a job which cost £30,000.⁶⁷⁴⁷

The first point to make is that the name of the person who sold the gun to Tsafendas

⁶⁷⁴⁷ Chapter II C, Paragraph 78.

was Mavronas, not Mavros; the Commission misspelled it. It was Mavronas who stated to the police that “we regarded him as foolish and decided to joke with him.” That was his statement alone, not an opinion shared by other crew members. According to thirteen sailors who were interviewed by the author and who knew Tsafendas well, no-one considered him to be foolish; on the contrary, all spoke highly of him. Their statements can be found in the *Eleni* section in the Investigation Chapter.

Vasilis Perselis, the steward on the *Eleni* and a good friend of Mavronas, stated to the author that Tsafendas told them he was working at a hotel and needed a firearm for protection and to “scare people off” because he was living in a rough area. Michalis Vasilakis, a stoker, confirmed Perselis’s statement. Nikolas Kambouris and Emanuil Mastromanolis stated to the study that they do not remember Tsafendas saying anything about a hotel, but they remember him saying he needed a gun to “scare people off” because he was living in a rough area; he never said he was looking for a real one.⁶⁷⁴⁸

In interviews with the author, seven seamen, Nikolaos Billis, Georgios Kantas, Ilias Kokkinos, Vasilakis, Kambouris, Mastromanolis and Perselis, declared that Mavronas’s claim that they “decided to joke” with Tsafendas was untrue. In fact, initially they all thought that Mavronas’s weapon was real, since this is what he told them. They said Mavronas, who was only seventeen years old at the time, was showing off his gun unaware himself that it was just a gas pistol. Many of the crew were also fooled, as the pistol looked real.⁶⁷⁴⁹ Kambouris was the first to discover that the gun was not authentic. He believed Mavronas was fooled by the person who sold the gun to him.⁶⁷⁵⁰ Mastromanolis claimed that he only realised the weapon was fake when he suggested that Mavronas should sell it to Tsafendas for a quick profit. Mavronas then admitted that the gun was not real, after he had been told by Kambouris, but he still offered to sell it to Tsafendas on grounds that it would be “good enough to scare people off.”⁶⁷⁵¹

The rest of the Report’s account is accurate: Tsafendas went back to the ship and asked Mavronas and Mastromanolis for his money back, but they said that they had charged

⁶⁷⁴⁸ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁶⁷⁴⁹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁶⁷⁵⁰ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

⁶⁷⁵¹ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

him only thirty dollars instead of the original eighty because the pistol was just a gas gun.

CREW'S "DISSATISFACTION" WITH THE COLOUR POLICY

*Reginald Robert Maile was a morning watch on the Eleni while it was in Cape Town harbour. He says the crew were most dissatisfied about the colour policy of the Government. They wanted to bring Coloured women on board, but were not allowed to do so.*⁶⁷⁵²

Thirteen men who were with the *Eleni* in Cape Town all deny that any of the crew were dissatisfied because they were not allowed to bring Coloured women on board. They dismiss Maile's claim out of hand, describing it as ridiculous and stating that whoever wished to have sex with non-White women simply went ashore and did so; no-one was the least bothered about the Act, it was simply ignored. After all, the men had easy access to White women in Cape Town and being seamen and travellers, they did not view sex with non-White women as a unique or an especially sought-after experience.⁶⁷⁵³

None of the sailors remembers discussing the issue with Maile, but they accept that they might have said something about the Act because Maile was constantly warning them that sex with Coloured women was illegal. Tsafendas had given them the same caution but two of the men, Vasilakis and Kambouris, said that Maile reminded them whenever they went ashore to "stay away from non-White women," indeed from non-White people. The men did not trust Maile because he was South African and it is possible that they complained about the Act to cover up the fact that they were having sex with non-White women anyway.⁶⁷⁵⁴

The crew were not "dissatisfied" about apartheid, they were angry, and this was not due to the proscription against Coloured women, but to their discovery of how non-Whites were treated. According to the seamen, Tsafendas had asked them spend as little money as possible in South Africa in order not to contribute to the apartheid economy and to show them what apartheid was really like, he took a group to a township in Cape Town. The sailors

⁶⁷⁵² Chapter II C, Paragraph 79.

⁶⁷⁵³ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; D. Lallis in a personal interview, 19 June 2015; E. Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; V. Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; I. Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015; D. Stavrianos in a personal interview, 18 January 2015; E. Tsabouniaris in a personal interview with the author, 14 June 2016; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁶⁷⁵⁴ Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

were shocked at the conditions they witnessed. It was then that some of the crew made the comment mentioned by Tsafendas in his statement to the police, that the South Africans “should be taught a lesson,” and which prompted Mastromanolis to state repeatedly that they “need a good whipping.”⁶⁷⁵⁵

OMISSIONS REGARDING THE ELENI FROM THE REPORT

Tsafendas’s talk about justifiable assassination is not the only incident involving the seamen that is omitted.

Tsafendas’s being a Communist and his participation in the Greek Civil War

That Tsafendas was a Communist was stated to the South African police by at least six men - Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas, Pouftis and Vasilakis. Some of the crew often joined him in singing Greek Communist songs on board, but they did not mention this to the police, as they did not want to reveal themselves as Communists too.⁶⁷⁵⁶ The most important thing the six men told the police was that Tsafendas had participated in the Greek Civil War on the side of the Democratic Army of Greece, the military wing of the Greek Communist Party.⁶⁷⁵⁷ As we have seen in the Investigation Chapter, Mavronas also testified to this, but he was probably misunderstood by the policeman who questioned him. However, there is no mention in the Report of Tsafendas joining in the war. Tsafendas’s role in the Greek Civil War is examined in detail in the “political activities and ideology” section of this Chapter and in his Biography.

⁶⁷⁵⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁷⁵⁶ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁷⁵⁷ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

The Visit to a Township in Cape Town

This important event goes unmentioned in the Commission's Report. The visit was disclosed to the police in Venice by at least five men –Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas and Vasilakis.⁶⁷⁵⁸ Two more, Mastromanolis and Pouftis, do not remember if they told the police about it, but believe they probably did.⁶⁷⁵⁹ Ilias Aspras was not interviewed by the author, but he was among those who visited the township and the men believe that he must have also testified to that effect. Dimitris Zafiriadis was in Tsafendas's party, but he refused to give the police any statement.⁶⁷⁶⁰

The seamen spoke about their onshore visit because they believed the police would have found out about it anyway. What they concealed was Tsafendas's purpose – to show them the living conditions of Black South Africans, and the fact that he urged them to not spend their money in South Africa because of apartheid. They told the police they behaved simply as tourists. There is no hint in the seamen's statements that Tsafendas organised the visit for political reasons, but even as it was, the visit did not see the light of day in the Commission's Report.

Spitting Gesture

On one occasion, Michalis Vasilakis brought a local newspaper on board which had Dr. Verwoerd's photograph on one page. When Vasilakis pointed to the picture, Tsafendas directed a spitting gesture at the floor, a classical Greek demonstration of contempt. Vasilakis, Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris and Pouftis all said they told the police about this incident. Kantas and Perselis remember the incident but are not sure if they told the police.⁶⁷⁶¹ However, no mention of this small, but significant demonstration of Tsafendas's opinions is made in the Report. Some thirty years later, when Tsafendas was in hospital,

⁶⁷⁵⁸ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁷⁵⁹ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009.

⁶⁷⁶⁰ Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁷⁶¹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; V. Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

Father Minas Constandinou showed him a newspaper photograph of Dr. Verwoerd, and Tsafendas repeated the spitting gesture.⁶⁷⁶²

Tsafendas and the Portuguese Army

As we have seen, a politically significant event in Tsafendas's life, which was given to the police by the crew, was Tsafendas saying he had "played the fool" in order to avoid service in the Portuguese Army. At least six men testified to this: Alachiotis, Billis, Kambouris, Kantas, Pouftis and Vasilakis, while it is very likely Perselis and Aspras did so, too.⁶⁷⁶³ This was very important information since the Commission was aware that Tsafendas had also faked mental illness while in the USA. Knowing he had done it for a second time would have certainly raised eyebrows about whether Tsafendas was faking mental illness again, for a third time. However, the account of his act was suppressed.

Tsafendas's Plan of Escape

Tsafendas told the police that his initial plan was to hide in the *Eleni* after shooting Dr. Verwoerd, then sail away in the tanker the next day. That is why initially he planned to carry out the assassination on the evening of September 2, only a few hours before the *Eleni*'s scheduled departure.⁶⁷⁶⁴ This was highly significant information because it demonstrated that the assassination was carefully planned and not an impulsive act. Not only did the Commission ignore the escape plan, it omitted the reasons that Tsafendas went then ahead with the assassination, knowing that he had no chance of escape. This issue is discussed in the "assassination" section of this chapter.

TSAFENDAS AS DESCRIBED BY THE CREW AND OTHERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE *ELENI*

Although Tsafendas visited the *Eleni* every day for forty-two days up to three days before the assassination, none of the seamen's opinions or those of others connected to the *Eleni* are

⁶⁷⁶² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶⁷⁶³ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; V. Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁷⁶⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

mentioned in the Report. The Commission included comments about Tsafendas's character by people who scarcely knew him, such as James Johnston who had spent a total of twenty minutes talking to him, but omitted the words of many who knew him far longer. Of particular value must have been the views of crewmen who chatted with Tsafendas shortly before the assassination, yet they are not included. The following are comments made to the police by non-crew members who knew Tsafendas at the *Eleni*:

- Neville Judson worked with Tsafendas for Mike's Outfitters for forty-two days in July and August 1966, frequently driving him to the *Eleni*. He told the police that he "never in no way got the impression that he (Tsafendas) could be mentally deranged. He appeared to be a normal man with normal reasoning powers" and "a very friendly way of talking."⁶⁷⁶⁵ His comments were omitted from the Report.
- Reginald Robert Maile, a security guard on the *Eleni*, who testified about the "Is Dr. Verwoerd dead?" issue, also told the police that he saw Tsafendas every day for forty-two days and he "never got the impression that he could be mentally defective. He was sober, polite and perfectly normal" and "on very friendly relations with the crew."⁶⁷⁶⁶ His comments were omitted from the Report.
- Peter Protoulis was a supplier of foodstuffs to the *Eleni*. He claims that he testified to the police and to the Commission, but only his statement to the police was found. However, his name was found in the schedule list for interviews of the Commission and he was listed to give evidence on October 12. Protoulis told the author that he never heard Tsafendas say anything to suggest he was less than sane. He is certain that he was sane. Furthermore, he was "very impressed by the way he was dressed. He always wore a suit and very often a tie and a hat. I never show him wearing the same clothes two days in a row."⁶⁷⁶⁷

Below are extracts from the statements of the eleven seamen who told the author that they were questioned in Venice and whose statements were not found in the archives. This is how they remember Tsafendas and is approximately what they believe they told the police. Their full interviews with the author are available in the Investigation Chapter.

⁶⁷⁶⁵ Neville Judson statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

⁶⁷⁶⁶ Reginald Robert Maile statement to the police, 27 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: Die 'Eleni.' NASA.

⁶⁷⁶⁷ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 3 August 2016.

Cleanthes Alachiotis remembers telling the police the “truth and everything that had happened,” apart from singing Communist songs and the fact that Tsafendas had asked them to spend as little money as possible in South Africa. He did mention the visit to the township. When asked if Tsafendas had said anything about the Prime Minister, Alachiotis replied that Tsafendas “did not like him much and called him ‘Hitler’s best student.’” Alachiotis was ready to mention the “Hitler” remark because he believed, as they all did, that the police must have known about it since Tsafendas used the expression so often and so widely.

Alachiotis clearly remembers being asked if Tsafendas had said anything about killing Dr. Verwoerd. He assumed that the policeman was referring to the conversation on the *Eleni*’s last night in Cape Town when Tsafendas argued that it would be justifiable to kill Dr. Verwoerd because he was a tyrant, while the murder of Prince Rwagasore was to be condemned because he was a democratically elected President. Therefore, Alachiotis told the whole story to the policeman, who showed great interest in it. Asked for his opinion about Tsafendas, Alachiotis could not remember exactly what he told the police, but believes that he must have told them he was a “harmless man, good-hearted, a quiet man ... very polite and well-mannered ... he seemed 100 per cent normal” as this is the way he remembered him. He also told the police that Tsafendas had told the crew that “he had played the fool with the Portuguese army in order not to serve his military duty... that he had joined the Communist army in the Civil War.”⁶⁷⁶⁸

Panteleimon Aspiotis does not remember the details of what he told the police, but presumes he told them most of what he remembered about Tsafendas. What he did not mention was fishing for lobster because Tsafendas had told them “not to tell anyone because it was illegal.” He remembers the issue about the gun, but he had nothing to do with it. Aspiotis maintains that Tsafendas “was perfectly fine” and this is what he told the police when asked about his character, that, “He was like any other person. He was definitely not insane. Him? Insane? No, definitely not! I wasn’t expecting such a question because the man was not mad.”⁶⁷⁶⁹

Nikolaos Billis remembers “everything ... I told them everything I knew. I was terrified. This was a serious case. You couldn’t mess around with it.” He mentioned Tsafendas’s mad act to avoid service in the Portuguese army and explained to the policeman

⁶⁷⁶⁸ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010.

⁶⁷⁶⁹ Panteleimon Aspiotis in a personal interview, 6 June 2015.

that it was “common in Greece.” He also told the police that Tsafendas was a Communist and against apartheid, though he does not remember the details of what he said. He said Tsafendas frequently talked about politics, but he did not understand him since he had no knowledge or interest in the subject.

Billis also mentioned the trip to the township and claimed they had gone there for touristic reasons, to see where the Black people lived. He also remembers being asked if they discussed politics with Tsafendas and what his impression of him was. He does not remember being asked whether Tsafendas had served in any army, but he definitely told them about his mad act with the Portuguese. He also told the police that Tsafendas had told them that he had fought in the Greek Civil War with the Communists. Billis also told the police about their discussion regarding justifiable assassinations after he was asked whether Tsafendas had mentioned anything about killing Dr. Verwoerd.⁶⁷⁷⁰

Nikolas Kambouris remembers that “the only thing I did not say was that we sang Communist songs ... I told them that he spat towards the Prime Minister’s picture ... yes, I certainly mentioned the ‘Hitler’s best student’ comment - this is something almost every one of the crew had heard.” Kambouris was asked to explain what Tsafendas meant with the remark about Hitler and Dr. Verwoerd but did not know what to say. He eventually said perhaps Tsafendas meant that Dr. Verwoerd had studied in Germany and Hitler was his tutor, avoiding any further supposition.

When the policeman asked if Tsafendas had said anything about killing the Prime Minister, Kambouris assumed, like the rest of the crew, that he was referring to Tsafendas’s claim that killing Dr. Verwoerd would be tyrannicide. Kambouris had to explain in detail to the policeman what tyrannicide was and Tsafendas’s theories about it. “I had to explain the whole thing and how it was in ancient Greece ... the policeman was very interested in this. I told him though that Tsafendas did not say he was going to kill the Prime Minister; just that it would have been justifiable if someone does.”

Kambouris also said about Tsafendas, “he did not look mad to me and certainly did not act like a madman. He never said or did anything to make me think he was a madman, he seemed perfectly fine.” He believes that he must also have told the police that Tsafendas had expressed his wish to go and live in Cuba. He described how Tsafendas told them he had

⁶⁷⁷⁰ Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011.

fought in the Greek Civil War with the Communists. What he did not mention was Tsafendas urging them to avoid spending money in South Africa, that Tsafendas had given him a book, ‘*Ten Days That Shook the World*,’⁶⁷⁷¹ which was banned in South Africa, that they fished for lobster and sang Communist songs.⁶⁷⁷²

George Kantas remembers “Tsafendas calling White South Africans Nazis. I told him everything I knew. We all told them everything, everything. We couldn’t take a chance and hide something. We did not tell them we were singing Communist songs together because it was only five or six of us and no-one else knew about it... I did not tell him that Tsafendas asked us to boycott South Africa and not spend any money there. Was I crazy to say it?”

Kantas does not remember what exactly he said about Tsafendas’s personality, but he remembers him as a “very well-read and well-mannered man who knew a lot about politics and history,” and he presumes this is what he told the police. When the policeman asked Kantas if he thought Tsafendas was “normal,” he replied, “Yes, perfectly normal.” He remembers going to the township and assumes he told the police but he cannot be certain. He remembers Tsafendas saying he wanted to live in “socialist Cuba,” but he doesn’t remember if he mentioned this to the police. He is certain that he mentioned Tsafendas’s mad act to dodge the Portuguese Army, and that he had joined the DSE during the Greek Civil War.

Like everyone else, Kantas was asked if Tsafendas had said anything about killing the Prime Minister. He is sure he said that Tsafendas called Dr. Verwoerd “Hitler’s best student,” and that he believed it would be justifiable for someone to kill him because he was a tyrant. He does not remember telling the policeman about the spitting incident, which he had forgotten until it was mentioned to him by the author, but he presumes that he did.⁶⁷⁷³

Vasilis Perselis remembers the interview very well, “I was asked about the gun and told them he asked me for a pistol for self-protection because he lived in a rough area, so I referred him to Manolis (Mastromanolis) and to Nikolakis (Mavronas). I had nothing else to do with the gun issue after that.”

Perselis says he was asked if he thought “there was something wrong with him

⁶⁷⁷¹ John Reed’s book ‘*Ten Days that Shook the World*,’ published in 1919, is a first-hand account of the 1917 October Revolution in Russia.

⁶⁷⁷² Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014.

⁶⁷⁷³ Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012.

(Tsafendas).” He does not recall his exact answer, but he remembers Tsafendas as being “a very clever man, not mad at all, one hundred per cent normal.” He remembers Tsafendas telling him that he had got a job which was not paying him well and he had to wear a uniform. Perselis thought that it was in a hotel, not in the Parliament. Tsafendas had told him that he wanted to save money to go and live the rest of his life in Cuba, though he does not remember if he told the police this. He remembers Tsafendas being a Communist and considered him to be well-informed about Greek and world politics and history.⁶⁷⁷⁴

Grigoris Pouftis is certain that he told the policeman about his mad act with the Portuguese Army and that Tsafendas served in the DSE during the Greek Civil War. Pouftis also told the policeman that Tsafendas was a Communist who despised the South African Prime Minister and mentioned both the spitting gesture and the remark that Dr. Verwoerd was ‘Hitler’s best student.’ What he did not reveal for sure was that they had sung Communist songs together.

Pouftis remembers being asked if Tsafendas said anything about killing the Prime Minister. “I told him ‘God no; he never said anything like this.’” As for the “justifiable killing” conversation, he remembers it vaguely but cannot remember whether or not he told the policeman. Also, he remembers going to the township, but doesn’t remember if he told the police. Pouftis does not remember being asked about Tsafendas’s mental state, but his own memory is of “an ordinary man, soft-spoken, knowledgeable and passionate about politics.” He remembers Tsafendas telling him he wanted to go and live in Cuba, but he doesn’t remember if he said that to the police.⁶⁷⁷⁵

Ioannis Speis did not associate much with Tsafendas but he spoke to him from time to time and saw him every day on the *Eleni*. He does not remember everything he was asked but he recalls being questioned about Tsafendas’s character and asked his opinion of him. He believes that he told the police approximately the following: “I never noticed anything wrong with him; he was very talkative and friendly.” Speis considered Tsafendas to be “a proper gentleman.” He was familiar with hawkers selling their wares on ships but thought Tsafendas “did not look like other hawkers.” He saw him as “a proud, intelligent man with lots of dignity. He never asked for anything from the crew and was always prompt with our financial dealings.” Speis knew that Tsafendas had taken some of his crewmates to a township, but he

⁶⁷⁷⁴ Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015.

⁶⁷⁷⁵ Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009.

had not gone along. However, he was one of those to whom Tsafendas demonstrated how to fish for lobster, but he did not reveal that to the police.⁶⁷⁷⁶

Dimitrios Stavrianos does not remember exactly what he was asked and what he told the police. He remembers Tsafendas, but he did not associate with him very much and therefore thinks he could not have told the police a lot about him. He remembers Tsafendas as a “normal man; very well-dressed and well-mannered” who “did not show any signs of being mentally disturbed. He never behaved like a mad man or said anything to suggest that something might be wrong with him. None of us ever thought that he could be mad.”⁶⁷⁷⁷

Emanuil Tsabouniaris remembers the questioning very well. He was asked whether Tsafendas asked him for a gun or a knife. He replied that, “Tsafendas had seen I had a knife and asked me to sell it to him. I did not do so because I liked it and it was a souvenir.” The policeman then asked, “Do you still have it?” and he replied, “Yes.” Tsabouniaris said it was in his suitcase and offered to bring it for him, but the policeman replied, “No, that won’t be necessary.”

Although he does not remember exactly what he said, he presumes he told the police what he remembers about Tsafendas to this day:

“[Tsafendas was] a very funny and good hearted man, a very friendly, talkative and polite person, a true gentleman. Always very well-dressed and always very courteous. Everyone liked him. He was certainly perfectly fine, impossible to have been insane. Impossible! This man was definitely not insane. I could swear to God that he was not insane... He was always very prompt with our financial dealings, not like other hawkers who I or the other guys had met. He was completely different; he talked more like a teacher than a hawker. He used nice words and had excellent command of the vocabulary. He seemed like a very well-educated and knowledgeable man; a sophisticated man...

... The only thing I found strange was that his profession of a hawker did not match his character. He was very educated and very polite for a hawker. I always believed that something must be going on with this man, that he couldn’t be just a hawker. I am sure he could have found a much better job. I thought that perhaps he could have a reason for doing this job; as a cover for something else, so he could walk freely around the harbour and aboard

⁶⁷⁷⁶ Ioannis Speis in a personal interview, 12 July 2015.

⁶⁷⁷⁷ Dimitris Stavrianos in a personal interview, 18 January 2015.

the ships. We discussed this with some of the guys and they also thought that there must be something happening with him. The thing that impressed me more was that he was very proud. He was doing the job with pride, not like a beggar or trying to make you buy in a sleazy way. He was a true gentleman.”⁶⁷⁷⁸

Michalis Vasilakis remembers telling “pretty much everything” he knew about Tsafendas. “The only things I remember not telling him for sure is that he sang partisan songs with us and he gave me this anti-apartheid book. None of us mentioned these things, not even those who had not participated in the singing but just knew about it.” He remembers telling the police that Tsafendas took them to the township but not whether that they had tea in a Black family’s house. He told them that Tsafendas was a Communist who had also fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War and he is pretty certain that he also told the policeman and that he had “played the fool” so as not to serve in the Portuguese army.

He remembers mentioning that Tsafendas had spat at Dr. Verwoerd’s photograph – it was Vasilakis who showed him the picture - and called the prime minister “Hitler’s best student.” The most difficult part of the interview was when he had to explain to the policeman what tyrannicide was after telling him about Tsafendas’s belief that Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination would be justifiable because he was a tyrant. The interview lasted about thirty minutes and he spent at least half of it explaining the philosophy of tyrannicide as understood by the ancient Greeks.

He said that Tsafendas had “a very distinctive way of talking. It was slow, but very intelligent and sophisticated ... He was talking like a professor. It was more likely for us to not be able to follow him than him to follow us. We spent hours talking about politics and he was leading the conversation; none of us knew anything about apartheid at the time.” He does not remember being asked about Tsafendas’s mental state, but his own opinion is that he was “surely one hundred and ten per cent sane. There is absolutely no way Dimitri to have been mad. He definitely played mad to not be executed.”⁶⁷⁷⁹

Emanuil Mastromanolis’s statement was found in the archives but he stated to the author that he told the police much more than appeared in his statement. As we have seen from his statement, the police interview with Mastromanolis appeared to focus solely on the gun, but he told the author that discussion of the pistol lasted only about five minutes and the

⁶⁷⁷⁸ Emanuil Tsabouniaris in personal interview with the author, 14 June 2016.

⁶⁷⁷⁹ Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

rest of the time was spent answering questions about Tsafendas's character and activities.

Mastromanolis acknowledged that his statement found in the archives is accurate and was what he told the policeman. He claims, however, that he lied in saying he thought the gun was a toy, because he was actually "under the impression that Mavronas's pistol was a real one." He had heard from Perselis that Mavronas had just bought a gun while in Cape Town and he was given the impression that it was real since Perselis also assumed it was real. Mavronas, who was only seventeen, had boasted about buying the gun and believed it was authentic. He was very surprised when the crew told him that it was just a gas pistol because it looked and felt authentic.⁶⁷⁸⁰

Mastromanolis thought that Mavronas might be willing to sell it to Tsafendas for a quick profit and only found out that the gun was fake when he suggested this to the boy. Mavronas proposed selling the gun to Tsafendas anyway, since Tsafendas had told everyone he needed a pistol to "scare people off," not to kill anyone, and it could do such a job. Mastromanolis agreed reluctantly, considering it would meet Tsafendas's requirement for a weapon just "to scare people off". Mastromanolis claims that he couldn't have told the police he was willing to sell Tsafendas a real firearm, which was why he called it a toy while hiding his impression that it was real.⁶⁷⁸¹

After the *Eleni* left Cape Town for Kuwait, according to Mastromanolis and Perselis, they and Mavronas discussed the issue of the gun's sale to Tsafendas. Their initial thought was that if they were asked, they would tell the police that they believed Tsafendas was looking for a fake gun, since he had told them that he only wanted to "scare people off." Eventually, they decided to say they intended to play a joke on Tsafendas as they believed he would not be able to tell whether or not the gun was real.⁶⁷⁸²

Mastromanolis was surprised and relieved when he realised that the policemen were less interested in the gun than in Tsafendas's activities and character. He said talk about the gun lasted no more than five minutes while the rest of the time was spent discussing Tsafendas. Very early in the questioning, he was asked about a comment which Tsafendas attributed to him in his statement, that "the South Africans need a good whipping." Mastromanolis was surprised and concluded that Tsafendas must have talked extensively to

⁶⁷⁸⁰ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

⁶⁷⁸¹ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

⁶⁷⁸² Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016; Vasilis Perselis in a personal interview, 14 January 2015.

the police since this was something he had said after Tsafendas took him and some of the seamen to a township in Cape Town. He denied to the policeman making such a remark, but he admitted to the author that Tsafendas had told the truth to the police and that he did make such a statement after they left the township. Mastromanolis does not remember if he was asked or if he told the police about the visit to the township.⁶⁷⁸³

Mastromanolis does not remember everything he told the police, but he described Tsafendas as being a “normal, intelligent person.” He remembered Tsafendas as “a kind man, very much into politics and very well-informed about what was happening around the world. I’ve met many men, all around the world, and some of them were mad. I can say for sure that this man was not insane. There was nothing ever to make me believe that he might be insane. It was impossible for him to have been insane,” and he believes this is what he told the police. He clearly remembers the police asking if Tsafendas had said anything about killing Dr. Verwoerd. He had replied, “No, never. If he had said such thing, I would have gone to the police.”⁶⁷⁸⁴

THE MISSING STATEMENTS FROM THE *ELENI*

As we have seen, it is indisputable that witnesses’ statements have gone missing from the Commission’s record at the National Archives of South Africa. However, the crew of the *Eleni* gave vital information to the police about Tsafendas, and their missing statements are of great importance. This is what the police found out from the *Eleni* men:

- Tsafendas despised Dr. Verwoerd. He spat at a picture of him and denounced him as “Hitler’s best student” because of the similarities between his national policies and those of Adolf Hitler.
- Three days before it happened, Tsafendas told the men that if Dr. Verwoerd were to be assassinated, such an act would be morally justifiable because Dr. Verwoerd was a tyrant and a dictator.
- Tsafendas was a passionate Communist and fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War.

⁶⁷⁸³ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

⁶⁷⁸⁴ Emanuil Mastromanolis in a personal interview, 29 February 2016.

- Tsafendas constantly spoke about politics and strongly opposed apartheid.
- Tsafendas took some seamen to a black township in Cape Town to show them the hardships and injustices of apartheid.
- The crew of the *Eleni*, to a man, believed Tsafendas was perfectly sane; none had noticed anything wrong with him.

All of the above information was important to the Commission, especially Tsafendas's remark about justifiable homicide. This was of particular relevance, given that the Commission was trying to establish how Dr. Verwoerd's death came to be discussed three days before the assassination. However, none of this information is included in the Report. The information was also important to explain Tsafendas's motive, but it was not used for that purpose either.

The author cannot know whether these statements were suppressed by the Commission or were never given to the Commission by the police. Both withheld information in this case, so either alternative is possible. What makes the police the likelier culprit is that the Commission only used information for its Report from some of the four statements found in the archives and there is no mention at all of anything from the other statements. This suggests that the Commission was probably not in possession of any other statements. However, if this was so, did the Commission not wonder what happened to the rest of the crew's statements?

Surely the Commission did not believe that the South African police went all the way to Venice to interview three sailors about the sale of the gun and one about rumours of Dr. Verwoerd's death. The Commission was aware that there were thirty-eight men in the tanker crew and any one of them could have had important evidence about Tsafendas or about why Dr. Verwoerd's death was being discussed. The Commission must have been aware of how thorough the police had been in their investigation, even questioning people who had not seen Tsafendas for many years or who had a very brief acquaintance with him, such as James Johnston.

The Commission must have wondered whether the sailors were asked if Tsafendas had said anything about murdering Dr. Verwoerd, or what they knew, if anything, about the prime minister's death being discussed at the tanker. These were crucial matters but only one of the thirty-eight-man crew seems to have been questioned about them. This must have

seemed unthinkable to the legal mind of the Commission, yet it seems it made no move to seek answers. An independent conclusion must be that the Commission either accepted without question what it was given by the police, or that it received the missing statements and suppressed them, as it did with much other evidence. Whether the police or the Commission were to blame is less important than the effect of the blackout, namely that the Commission presented a totally distorted picture of how the conversation regarding Dr. Verwoerd's death probably began, leaving hanging questions to which the *Eleni* crew had provided mostly plausible answers. At the same time, the Commission's Report also does not contain some other very important information taken from the crew, such as the township visit, Tsafendas's participation in the Greek Civil War and his spitting gesture. The issue of the missing evidence from the archives and the Commission's Report is discussed in the section "missing evidence and the role of General van den Bergh" of this chapter.

CONCLUSION

The Commission's description of events surrounding the *Eleni* is inaccurate, tendentious, lacking evidence in many crucial aspects and in parts wildly speculative; it is notable more for what it omits than for what it contains. The Report, as written, supported the proceedings of the summary trial and doubtless met with the approval of the government in its determination to have Tsafendas proved insane and without a political motive. The Report lacked reference to the testimony of several *Eleni* crew members. Twelve men testified to the author that they and the rest of their colleagues who knew Tsafendas were all questioned by the police in Venice, yet only four statements from the thirty-eight-men crew were found in the national archives. Two other seamen who were not questioned by the South African police but were present when the questioning took place in Venice, confirmed this. However, there is no mention of what these people said in the Report.

The Report deals at length with the fact that rumours of Dr. Verwoerd's death were discussed on the *Eleni*. It is the most intriguing element of the Report. However, the Commission fails to give a solid answer or even a plausible explanation as to why this was so, speculating about the crew's discontent when hard evidence was available as to how the issue almost certainly arose. Several sailors had testified to the police that Tsafendas spoke of a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd being morally justified since he was a tyrant and a dictator. This happened only hours before the dockside rumours about his death. The

link was obvious. Yet the assassination talk is not mentioned by the Commission. Clearly talk of a morally justifiable assassination would contradict what was heard at the summary trial and was not what the authorities wanted the people to know.

Also omitted were the facts that Tsafendas had participated in the Greek Civil War with the Communists, that he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator and Hitler's best student, that he spat in contempt upon seeing a photograph of Dr. Verwoerd and that he took some of the sailors to a poor, black township in Cape Town. Again, none of these things fitted with the portrayal of Tsafendas in the summary trial or the one that the Commission was trying to build.

The missing statements also contained important information about Tsafendas's character. Many of the sailors had spent time with him on every one of the forty-two days that he visited the ship, up to three days before the assassination. Tsafendas felt comfortable with the crew, partly because some of them were fellow Communists but also because they were not South Africans and were only in the country temporarily. None of the positive comments about Tsafendas contained in the men's statement are mentioned in the Report.

The author is not in position to know whether or how much information was available to the Commission. However, it is not of major importance whether it was the police of the Commission itself which withheld the information. What is important is that evidence was suppressed and therefore the Report does not give an accurate account of what happened on the *Eleni* in the days preceding Dr. Verwoerd's assassination. The *Eleni* issue stands out as proof that important information was suppressed throughout the case against Tsafendas in order to depict him in an erroneous and disadvantageous light and to mislead the public regarding important aspects of the assassination.

THE VERGOS INCIDENT

Paragraphs 28 and 29 of Chapter II C deal with Tsafendas's physical fight with Nick Vergos. Vergos was described by the Commission as a key witness. On 12th October 1966, the front page of the *Daily Dispatch* announced "KEY WITNESS FOUND,"⁶⁷⁸⁵ while *The Cape Times* front-paged "IMPORTANT WITNESS TRACED."⁶⁷⁸⁶ The Commission had appealed to the media for help in locating the fifty-four-year-old (or sixty-one-year old according to other reports) Greek-born Vergos, who was thought to have "vital information" regarding Tsafendas. Six hours after the appeal was issued, Vergos walked into the office of the *Rand Daily Mail* in Johannesburg.⁶⁷⁸⁷ However, this important witness with "vital information" about Tsafendas, someone the Commission had spent much effort to locate, was not asked to testify at Tsafendas's summary trial. This is the Commission's Report of events involving Vergos:

His next employers were Messrs. Frazer and Chalmers, at Mandini, Zululand. There he worked as a fitter and turner from 19th April, 1965 to 19th May, ' 1965, when he was dismissed after a fight with a Greek, a certain Nicholas Vergos. In the fight Tsafendas sustained cuts on the arm and stomach, and he laid a charge of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm against Vergos.

On 12th May, 1965, the trial took place. Vergos testified that, since Tsafendas had knocked him down without any provocation, he had defended himself with his razor when Tsafendas attempted to assault him again. Vergos was found not guilty since the magistrate held the view that Tsafendas had been the assailant. Tsafendas was most dissatisfied with the verdict (Tsafendas was the interpreter).⁶⁷⁸⁸

After this fight Vergos told Mr. J. J. Botha, the Security Officer of the S.A. Pulp and Paper Industries, that Tsafendas was a dangerous communist. Mr. Botha says that he conveyed this information to the South African Police at Nyoni, but not one of the policemen who were serving there at that time has any recollection of this. Sergeant Fourie of Nyoni admits that Vergos told him that Tsafendas was a "communist bastard," but he regarded this as an insult and not as an accusation, and consequently made no report on the matter. Vergos confirmed

⁶⁷⁸⁵ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 October 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd: Key witness found.'

⁶⁷⁸⁶ *The Cape Times*, 12 October 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Important witness traced.'

⁶⁷⁸⁷ *The Cape Times*, 12 October 1966: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd Inquiry: Important witness traced.'

⁶⁷⁸⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 28.

*that he had made this allegation, but could not really give any sound reason for his imputation. He said that he had based it mainly on the fact that Tsafendas could speak so many languages.*⁶⁷⁸⁹

The Report gives Vergos's version of events and not Tsafendas's. However, it is evident from the statements taken by the police and the Commission that Vergos had not been entirely honest with the police nor in court about the incident. According to Christoffel van Vuuren, a security officer at the paper factory, Vergos was known to his fellow workers as "Nicky the Greek, with a razor."⁶⁷⁹⁰ Tsafendas said Vergos often played idly with a razor. Tsafendas also said Vergos was a fascist, a racist and a bully, especially towards the African workers. He would often order the Africans to run personal errands for him, such as fetching cigarettes. Tsafendas told Vergos to stop using them as his personal servants. For his part, Vergos told Tsafendas to stop talking to the workers about Communism and against apartheid; he said Tsafendas would get them all dismissed or arrested. However, Tsafendas ignored him and they often argued.⁶⁷⁹¹

What was the reason for the fight? Tsafendas heard that Vergos had hired two African employees to do some work for him in his house, then refused to pay them, claiming that they had not done a good job. When they protested, he threatened them with the loss of their jobs and since the work they had done was illegal, they could not complain to the police or the company.⁶⁷⁹² One day in the company canteen, Tsafendas told Vergos he should pay the two men. Vergos refused and swore at Tsafendas, who then slapped Vergos twice in the face; Vergos fell to the floor and the fight stopped and both men left the canteen.⁶⁷⁹³ Tsafendas went to his room, where Vergos appeared soon afterwards with a knife in his hand. Tsafendas told him "to get out," but Vergos slashed at him with the knife. Tsafendas said in his statement to the police, "He gave me one stab in my hand which was trying to ward off the

⁶⁷⁸⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 29.

⁶⁷⁹⁰ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁷⁹¹ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁷⁹² Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁷⁹³ Demetrio Tsafendas's statement in the court regarding the incident, 14 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

blow, then aimed another blow at my stomach. I jumped away and he only scratched me. I then pushed him away.”⁶⁷⁹⁴

In his testimony to the police, Vergos failed to explain why the dispute arose, saying Tsafendas attacked him out of the blue and for no reason and that he did not know him until then.⁶⁷⁹⁵ This was clearly a lie as Charles Edwin Woods, the men’s supervisor, testified that even before the fight, Vergos had asked him to get rid of Tsafendas because he was a “Communist.” Tsafendas, after the fight, told Woods that their argument was over politics,⁶⁷⁹⁶ something he often argued about with Vergos. Although Woods testified that the cause of the fight was a political argument, the Commission omitted this information.

It was also before their physical fight that Vergos characterised Tsafendas as a “Communist bastard” to Jan Fourie, a sergeant of the South African police.⁶⁷⁹⁷ This comment, plus the one Vergos made to Woods, contradict Vergos’s claim that he did not know Tsafendas before the fight. It also tends to confirm Tsafendas’s assertion that their arguments were about politics and the fact that he was a Communist. If these two men had no relationship or arguments before their physical fight, why would Vergos ask their supervisor to fire Tsafendas because he was a Communist or denounce him to the police as a “Communist bastard?”

Furthermore, according to Christoffel van Vuuren’s statement to the police, Tsafendas told him that he had an argument with Vergos and they got into a brawl, but he could not remember the specific reason for the fight. Van Vuuren then called Vergos out of the recreation club and on the way to his office “Vergos admitted that he assaulted Demetrios with a razor, because the latter tried to assault him with a knife.”⁶⁷⁹⁸ This is incompatible with the version Vergos gave to the police at the time. In that statement, which was found in the archives and therefore was in the Commission’s possession, he stated that Tsafendas had

⁶⁷⁹⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas’s statement to the police regarding the incident, 7 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

⁶⁷⁹⁵ Nikolas Vergos’ statement in the court regarding the incident, 14 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

⁶⁷⁹⁶ Charles Edwin Woods statement to the police, 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁷⁹⁷ Jan Johannes Albertus Fourie statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁷⁹⁸ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

punched him three times in the face. He made no mention of a knife. Van Vuuren also told the police that Vergos said Tsafendas “was not Greek, but a Kaffir and a Communist.”⁶⁷⁹⁹

Nothing from van Vuuren’s statement is mentioned in the Report. Vergos also claimed in his statement that the razor he employed against Tsafendas was “sometimes used to sharpen a pencil or so.” Vergos further claimed that he passed in front of Tsafendas’s room and the door was open. Tsafendas saw him and asked him to come inside. Vergos went in and Tsafendas attacked him again, and it was then he produced the razor and slashed Tsafendas.⁶⁸⁰⁰

Tsafendas’s version in his statement to the police also fell short of the whole truth. He said, “Vergos entered the canteen swearing.” Tsafendas asked him to “behave himself” and then they fought.⁶⁸⁰¹ Vergos could not give the cause of the fight because he had used two African workers illegally, and Tsafendas did not refer to this because the Africans would have been fired or even worse for doing illegal work.⁶⁸⁰² In Tsafendas’s version to the police, Vergos and another man entered his room. Tsafendas asked them to get out and it was then that Vergos attacked him.⁶⁸⁰³

The author is not in position to know exactly what happened, but it matters a little. What is important is that Vergos had reported Tsafendas to the South African police as Communist before they fought, and that he characterised him as “the biggest Communist in the Republic,” and both statements were omitted from the Report. The Report states that Vergos told J. J. Botha, a security officer for S.A. Pulp and Paper Industries, that Tsafendas was a “dangerous Communist.” However, Botha also told the police that Vergos described Tsafendas as “the biggest Communist in the Republic of South Africa,”⁶⁸⁰⁴ however, this comment was omitted. Also missing is a statement by Mike Josias Germishuys, a sergeant in

⁶⁷⁹⁹ Christoffel Johannes van Vuuren statement to the police, 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸⁰⁰ Nicholas Vergos statement to the police regarding the incident, 7 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

⁶⁸⁰¹ Demetrio Tsafendas’s statement in the court regarding the incident, 14 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

⁶⁸⁰² None of the witnesses remembers what the two African workers had exactly done for Vergos.

⁶⁸⁰³ Demetrio Tsafendas’s statement to the police regarding the incident, 7 May 1965. K150, Vol. 3, File: Afskrif van saak dossier Nyoni R.A.A. 14 May 1965. NASA.

⁶⁸⁰⁴ Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

the South African Police at Mandini, that Vergos was “under the influence of alcohol at the time of the arrest,” i.e. after the fight.⁶⁸⁰⁵

Although the reason for the fight was not given by either Tsafendas or Vergos, it must have been known to the Commission, because, according to *The Cape Times*, the police on 9th September questioned several workers at the canteen where the fight took place.⁶⁸⁰⁶ It seems unlikely that the workers failed to explain the situation to the police, however much some of them might have wanted to protect Vergos, who was still working there.

One absurd element in the Vergos/Tsafendas situation is the reason Vergos gave for concluding that Tsafendas was a Communist - that he spoke many languages, an explanation the Commission treated with sufficient seriousness to include in its Report. Were all multi-linguists Communists? The only significance attachable to Vergos’s comment is that if he knew Tsafendas could speak several languages, then he must have known him before they fought.

In later life, Tsafendas would proudly display the scar caused by “fascist and racist” Vergos’s razor and a second one on his hand which he said he received during a confrontation in London in the early 1960s with members of Oswald Mosley’s fascist Union Movement. He considered both scars to be badges of honour.⁶⁸⁰⁷

⁶⁸⁰⁵ Mike Josias Germishuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸⁰⁶ *The Cape Times*, 9 September 1966: 15, ‘Tsafendas in brawl in canteen.’

⁶⁸⁰⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

TSAFENDAS'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GREEK COMMUNITY

*The Greek community did not accept him as one of them.*⁶⁸⁰⁸

This is a correct statement, but it is not explained and so gives a wrong impression, although the Commission was probably not sure exactly why the Greek community did not accept Tsafendas. Far from being a blot on his character, the fact that Tsafendas was not accepted by the Greek community was in his eyes a mark of honour. Most Greeks in South Africa co-operated enthusiastically with, or at least supported, the apartheid regime, usually for commercial reasons; some even contributed financially to the National Party.⁶⁸⁰⁹ The prominent human rights Advocate George Bizos, opposed apartheid and as a result was cold-shouldered by his compatriots and seen as an embarrassment and a traitor to the community.⁶⁸¹⁰ Tsafendas was viewed in exactly the same way, or even worse. In Mozambique, too, the majority of Greeks supported the Portuguese colonialists because it was financially beneficial to them to do so.

After the assassination, the Greek communities in South Africa and Mozambique tried frantically to distance themselves from Tsafendas as far as possible. People who had never met Tsafendas and knew nothing about him speculated that he must have been insane and many declared that he was not even Greek.⁶⁸¹¹ Georgios Manidis, President of the Greek Community in Bloemfontein and a supporter of apartheid, said Tsafendas, though he had never met him, “must be insane. He does not represent the feelings of the Greeks of South Africa. Most of the Greeks in South Africa are supporters of Dr. Verwoerd.”⁶⁸¹² The Greek community in Pretoria was the first publicly to distance itself from this “infamous and reprehensible assassination.” A spokesman hastily declared that “the criminal was in no way attached to any religious or social Greek organisation and he was not recognized as a Greek.”⁶⁸¹³

Tsafendas was well-known to the Greek community in Pretoria because of his family, but mostly because of an incident in a Greek Orthodox Church in Pretoria during a service. The Greek priest praised South Africa and its apartheid policy and attacked Communism and those opposing apartheid, enraging Tsafendas. His half-brother, Victor Tsafantakis, stopped

⁶⁸⁰⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 6.

⁶⁸⁰⁹ Advocate George Bizos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007.

⁶⁸¹⁰ *To Vima*, 13 June 2010, 'Γιώργος Μπίζος: «Υποφέρουμε όπως εσείς στους Ολυμπιακούς».'

⁶⁸¹¹ *Eleftherotipia*, 4 July 2010, 'Οι Έλληνες φίλοι του απαρχάιντ.'

⁶⁸¹² *Kathimerini*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Θλίψις εις την Ελληνικήν παροικίαν του Γιοχάνεσμπουργκ.'

⁶⁸¹³ *Noticias*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Proseguem as investigacoes.'

him from interrupting the priest. However, when the time came for Communion, Tsafendas refused to take the sacrament or to kiss the priest's hands, as was customary. Instead, he argued quietly with the priest, saying he should be ashamed for praising apartheid. The priest politely replied that Greeks should not bite the hand that fed them in South Africa. Tsafendas said the Whites exploited the non-Whites, but life for the majority of people was far from rosy. Members of the congregation then began protesting on behalf of the priest and denouncing Tsafendas. Tsafendas remained calm and finally his family managed to pull him away.⁶⁸¹⁴

In Cape Town, a delegation of Greek leaders called on the John Vorster and assured him that Tsafendas was not of Greek origin and was not connected in any way with the Greek community in South Africa.⁶⁸¹⁵ The leader of the Greek community in Johannesburg, Peter Paizes, said he was a personal friend and admirer of Dr. Verwoerd;⁶⁸¹⁶ he spoke of his "tremendous grief" and expressed "indescribable consternation" that the assassin apparently was partly of Greek extraction.⁶⁸¹⁷

An unnamed person described as a "leading South Coast Greek businessman" gave an interview to *The Daily News* which represented the generally sycophantic attitude of local Greeks towards South Africa. He said, "When I arrived in South Africa some 15 years ago, I had holes in my shoes. With the help of the Government I was able to find employment, and within a matter of six years I had my own business and two cars. I am sure that I speak for all Greeks in South Africa when I say we never had it so good... we as Greeks have always had the highest regard for Dr. Verwoerd. He had done a great deal for us, allowed and given us every reason to want to be South Africans and succeed in business."⁶⁸¹⁸

Tsafendas never hid his political preferences; he was a Communist and an outspoken critic of colonialism and of apartheid. He frequently and publicly accused Greeks in South Africa and Mozambique of exploiting Black people and of being fascist and racist. He was known by the Greek community in Lourenço Marques as "The Red," and he was arrested five times by the Portuguese because of his political ideas and activities.

⁶⁸¹⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁸¹⁵ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1966, 'Vorster gives Greeks assurance.'

⁶⁸¹⁶ *To Vima*, 7 September 1966: 1, 'Η δολοφονία του Φέρβειρντ: Ελληνικής καταγωγής ο δράστης.'

⁶⁸¹⁷ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, 'Grief expressed by leader of Greeks in Johannesburg.'

⁶⁸¹⁸ *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 9, 'S.A. Greeks had high regard for Dr. Verwoerd.'

Tsafendas usually avoided Greeks in the diaspora but he was happy to make friends with those who obviously did not share the obsequious Greek viewpoint, such as Fotini Gavasiadis, Irene Michaletos, Ira Kyriakakis, Elias Constantaras, George Grispos and Nick Papadakis. For more about Tsafendas's interaction with the Greek community in Mozambique and South Africa see Chapter Two.

HELEN DANIELS

While in Durban he received an offer of marriage in writing from Cape Town from Miss Helen Daniels, a Coloured missionary of his church. She had received his photograph from a certain Arendse in Benoni. After further correspondence he decided to go to Cape Town. A motorist took him as far as Port Elizabeth from where he travelled to Cape Town by train, arriving there on 28th August, 1965.⁶⁸¹⁹

He immediately moved in with the Daniels family (Mr. and Mrs. Daniels and their daughter Helen).⁶⁸²⁰

Miss Daniels testified how he arrived at their home with a big hole in his jersey, and dressed untidily. Her brother fetched his luggage from the station. This consisted of a suitcase containing mainly dirty washing and another suitcase containing tools, pots and pans. She immediately lost all interest in him, and he never showed any interest in her either.

Miss Daniels testified further that he often complained of a headache, and that he could not understand why he was unable to find employment. At times he said incomprehensible things. At church services, particularly, no one could understand what he was saying. Sometime he bragged about the things he wanted to do. He told her about the court case against Vergos. His account to her was that he had knocked Vergos down and that Vergos came back with four Bantu and attacked and cut him with a razor.⁶⁸²¹

DANIELS'S APPROACH TO TSAFENDAS

The Report describes Helen Daniels's relationship with Tsafendas as it was and not as her brother presented it at the summary trial and in the Press. It makes clear that it was Helen who approached Tsafendas and not the other way around, as the brother claimed, confirming that he had lied to the court. Helen Daniels had testified freely to that effect in her statement to the police on September 15, but the Attorney-General in the summary trial did not use her statement to challenge her brother's blatantly untruthful court testimony. Nevertheless, as so often, the Commission omitted from its Report details from Daniels's statement which set out

⁶⁸¹⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 36.

⁶⁸²⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 37.

⁶⁸²¹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 38.

events in a faithful light. These are extracts from her statement, while her full statement is available at Chapter Four.

“During April 1965 I was visiting friends in Boksburg. There I learned of Demitrio Tsafendas. It was told to me that they would want me to meet him, he’s a nice man. I never met him and later returned to Cape Town. When I was in Cape Town, I thought to correspond with him and wrote to my friends to find out his address... Other friends of mine went on holiday to Durban and I then wrote a letter to Tsafendas and asked my friends to give this to him. Our preacher is in Durban and I hoped to trace Tsafendas through the church.

... I wrote my letter during the June holidays in 1965 and received a reply from him on July 10, 1965. I wrote in my letter that I would like to meet and wanted to marry him. His answer was that he wanted to meet me first before giving me a positive answer. I wrote to him again - four letters – all of which he answered. I sent him a picture, but he did not send me one in return. He sent word that he would come to Cape Town for our church conference - it would be in November 1965. I lived with my parents and on August 28, 1965 - he arrived at my parents’ house ... We had a spare room and gave him lodging.”⁶⁸²²

Helen Daniels was a highly respected minister in her Church and the way she heard about Tsafendas suggests that he, too, was highly thought of by their fellow church members. Patrick O’Ryan said that Tsafendas was described to him by a fellow church-goer as a “highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages.”⁶⁸²³ It is clear that the members of the Church admired and respected Tsafendas before the assassination. The fact that Daniels went to considerable trouble to contact him, seeking his address, dispatching a letter with a friend, then sending him four more letters and a picture of herself, implies that she expected to meet a good man who had been warmly recommended by her friends.

TSAFENDAS’S DIRTY CLOTHES

The Report states that Tsafendas was dressed untidily, that his jersey had a hole in it and that he had dirty clothes in one of his suitcases. Helen Daniels’s brother, her sister-in-law and three other witnesses made similar statements at the summary trial. Nickolas Nel, who had an

⁶⁸²² Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁶⁸²³ Patrick O’ Ryan in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

argument with Tsafendas when they worked at F.A. Poole Engineering, testified that he “had a messy and dirty appearance,”⁶⁸²⁴ landlady Wilhelmina de Vos described Tsafendas as “dirty,”⁶⁸²⁵ and Gillian Clare Lieberman, personnel secretary at the Marine Diamond Corporation, told the police that Tsafendas had “dirty, sloppy clothes,”⁶⁸²⁶ although she had only seen Tsafendas at work, where rough clothes would be normal. On the other hand, most of the many witnesses questioned by the police and the Commission said Tsafendas was neat, clean and well-dressed. However, none of their statements made it into the Report. Those commenting on the issue included:

1. South African Police Col. van Wyk, who questioned people in Rhodesia and Mozambique who knew Tsafendas. He wrote in his report that Tsafendas “was always neatly dressed.”⁶⁸²⁷
2. Violet Irene Manning was Tsafendas’s landlady for almost two months in 1965. She told the Commission about Tsafendas: “It was a serviced room but I found him making his own bed. When he came to me he was well-dressed, well-spoken, and gave a good impression. From his general appearance he appeared to be a businessman. When he paid me, he had a bundle of notes and I took him to be a man of means.”⁶⁸²⁸
3. Ian Boswell testified that Tsafendas was “at all times neatly dressed and never gave the impression of being destitute.”⁶⁸²⁹
4. Gideon Cloete, an official at the Department of Labour, testified that Tsafendas “was neatly dressed and had a clean appearance.”⁶⁸³⁰
5. Jacobus Bornman, Tsafendas’s flatmate for six-seven weeks, stated that “according to my observation, Tsafendas was a gentle person. He was neat in his person, but his eating

⁶⁸²⁴ Nikolaas Jacobus Nel statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸²⁵ Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸²⁶ Gillian Claire Liebermann statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸²⁷ Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁸²⁸ Violet Irene Manning statement to the COE, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, File: 1/5. Subject: Suid Afrikaanse polisie. NASA.

⁶⁸²⁹ Ian James Murdock Boswell statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64. NASA.

⁶⁸³⁰ Gideon Jacobus Cloete testimony at Tsafendas’s summary trial, 19 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10. NASA.

habits were not up to scratch.”⁶⁸³¹

6. Pieter Benjamin Geldenhuys, employment officer at the Department of Labour in Cape Town, interviewed Tsafendas twice. He told the police that Tsafendas was “neatly dressed” and he “never got the impression that there was mentally anything wrong with him or that he acted abnormally.”⁶⁸³²
7. Redvers Quintin Wakfer worked with Tsafendas at the Power Station in Cape Town and testified that he was “neatly dressed.”⁶⁸³³
8. Edward Furness testified that Tsafendas “was well-dressed and appeared to be wealthy.”⁶⁸³⁴
9. Katerina Pnema, his half-sister, testified that Tsafendas “was well dressed and gave a good appearance,” although as far as she could see, he had no visible means of support.⁶⁸³⁵ She later stated that Tsafendas was always well dressed and she never saw him wearing dirty clothes except when he was coming back from work.⁶⁸³⁶
10. Sidney Wiehand, a senior messenger at the House of Assembly was one of three messengers who interviewed and appointed Tsafendas. He said that in order to be hired, a messenger “must always be neat,” indicating that Tsafendas fitted that description.⁶⁸³⁷

In Europe, Horst Hartmann, senior personnel officer at the heavy engineering company Fries & Son in Frankfurt, where Tsafendas worked as a welder, said in a newspaper interview that was published by the South African press and was in the Commission’s possession, “He drove up here in a big, battered American car. He looked like a successful businessman. I thought he was more likely to apply for an executive job than as a welder.

⁶⁸³¹ Jacobus Johannes Borman statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸³² Pieter Geldenhuys statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, Sub File: 1/1, Department of Labour. NASA.

⁶⁸³³ Redvers Wakfer statement to the police, 6 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub File: 1/5, Subject Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

⁶⁸³⁴ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸³⁵ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁸³⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁸³⁷ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

Well-dressed and well-mannered, he was extremely courteous, a very pleasant man...he made a good impression and he spoke good German, so I took him on.”⁶⁸³⁸

Furthermore, according to the testimony at the summary trial of Merle Daniels, Helen’s sister-in-law, the day Tsafendas arrived at their house, he immediately asked her to wash his clothes, which suggests that he was aware of their condition and was not habitually a dirty person. She also testified that Tsafendas’s clothes were always clean after that first day.⁶⁸³⁹ Joyce Dick, one of Helen Daniels’s best friends at the time, stated to the author that whenever she saw Tsafendas, “he was always very neatly dressed.”⁶⁸⁴⁰ Reuben O’Ryan lived with Tsafendas in the same house for five months and kept in touch with him for another year and he also knew Helen Daniels well. He told the author Tsafendas “was always very clean and well-dressed, apart from when he was coming home from work. That was the only time I saw him wearing dirty clothes. He always wore nice clothes; he was a clean person and always shaved.”⁶⁸⁴¹ Stanley O’Ryan, Reuben’s brother also remembers Tsafendas as “clean and well-dressed person.”⁶⁸⁴²

The author asked forty-four witnesses who knew Tsafendas well about the way he was dressed. Only two of them, Andreas Babiolakis and Costas Poriadis, said that they once saw Tsafendas looking neglected and wearing a torn shirt. However, that was on the day he was released from jail in Beira in February 1965. Having just spent several days in a prison cell, wearing the same clothes every day and being beaten up, he could hardly have appeared otherwise. Both witnesses said this was the only time they saw Tsafendas looking less than perfectly dressed.⁶⁸⁴³ None of the rest said Tsafendas was of a dirty or neglected appearance. Indeed, the vast majority remembered him as dressing well and looking like a gentleman. It is not possible to reproduce here more than a hundred statements, but the following are representative of those who knew Tsafendas well:

1. Father Nikola Banovic in 1961, lived in the same house as Tsafendas for four months and in a house next door for another two or three months. He saw Tsafendas virtually every day and says he was “always a very clean person and well-dressed, wearing a different

⁶⁸³⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, ‘Assassination a one man’s job – says Vorster.’

⁶⁸³⁹ Marle Daniels’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁸⁴⁰ Joyce Dick in a personal interview, 6 August 2016.

⁶⁸⁴¹ Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016.

⁶⁸⁴² Stanley O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 9 April 2015.

⁶⁸⁴³ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Costas Poriadis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

hat each day.”⁶⁸⁴⁴

2. Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas’s first cousin, knew him since he was five years old, grew together in Mozambique and she spent a lot of time with him in Pretoria in 1963-4. She insists that Tsafendas was always well-dressed and clean. She was impressed by his suits and Tsafendas told her that most of them were bought in Europe. “He was always well-dressed, very often wearing a hat, and was a very clean person. “He was very fussy with clean hands when he was a child, and I think he was also like this when he grew up, but I can’t remember for sure.” ⁶⁸⁴⁵
3. Fotini Gavasiadis saw Tsafendas virtually every day for nine months in 1963-4. She told the author that it is “nonsense” to say Tsafendas was not well-dressed or dirty, that in fact he always very well dressed and clean. “Sometimes it took him longer than it took me to get ready, trying to find a more suitable hat or tie. He adored hats and ties. He never wore the same clothes for two days in a row and when it was hot he would even change twice per day. He adored hats and ties.”⁶⁸⁴⁶
4. Ira Kyriakakis, who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques and remained a lifelong friend, described as “absolutely absurd” claims that Tsafendas was not well-dressed and clean. “He was always very well dressed; since he was a child. He looked like a gentleman. He used to wear hats he had bought from all over the world. He loved hats and he must have had tens of them. He came back to Lourenço Marques in the 1960s and brought me a hat for a present from Lisbon.” ⁶⁸⁴⁷
5. Helen Grispos was another who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques, and her mother was the best friend of Tsafendas’s step-mother. “He was always very well dressed, even as a child; his step-mother always looked after him. When he visited us in the 1960s, I remember he wore a big hat he said he had bought somewhere in Europe. I don’t remember what he was wearing, but I remember the hat. It was very distinctive. He was certainly well-dressed.”⁶⁸⁴⁸
6. Irene Michaletos met Tsafendas in 1964 in Beira and saw him often until 1965. She remembers him being “always well-dressed and clean.”⁶⁸⁴⁹
7. Antony and John Michaletos, Tsafendas’s cousins and sons of Artemis Michaletos,

⁶⁸⁴⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

⁶⁸⁴⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁶⁸⁴⁶ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

⁶⁸⁴⁷ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁶⁸⁴⁸ Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁶⁸⁴⁹ Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

- Tsafendas's aunt and his father's sister who brought him up in Egypt. They first met Tsafendas in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique. They both remember Tsafendas being "always well-dressed and clean."⁶⁸⁵⁰
8. Andreas Babiolakis knew Tsafendas since they were children and had lived in the same house as him in Beira for about two-three months. He finds the thought that he had a dirty and neglected appearance as "absurd." He recalls that Tsafendas "had a shower every morning when he woke and in the evening when he returned from work. He believed that he sweated in the night, so he had one in the morning."⁶⁸⁵¹
 9. Costas Chagios, a Cape Town café owner, knew Tsafendas for more than a year as a frequent patron of his café. He remembers Tsafendas as being "always well dressed and clean."⁶⁸⁵²
 10. Alexandra Vaporidis knew Tsafendas for about six months in Istanbul. She was impressed by his many hats and remembers that a lot of people commented about how neatly Tsafendas dressed. "I remember him coming to the church always wearing a tie."⁶⁸⁵³
 11. Peter Protoulis was a supplier of foodstuffs to the tanker Eleni. He met Tsafendas on board and says, "I was very impressed by the way he was dressed. He always wore a suit and very often a tie and a hat. I never show him wearing the same clothes two days in a row."⁶⁸⁵⁴
 12. Elias Constantaras met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town and knew him up to his arrest. He recalls Tsafendas being well dressed and clean, often wearing suits and hats.⁶⁸⁵⁵
 13. Peter Peroglou and his wife Pamela Abrahams ate at the same place as Tsafendas for two or three months in 1966 and they remember him as always well dressed and very courteous.
 14. Nick Augustides is the son of the owner of Mike's Outfitters in Cape Town, for whom Tsafendas worked on commission for about two months in 1966. He knew Tsafendas for three-four months and remembers him as "a well-dressed man."⁶⁸⁵⁶
 15. Miltiades Kaldis knew Tsafendas for about a year, having met him in 1965 in Cape

⁶⁸⁵⁰ Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁶⁸⁵¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁶⁸⁵² Costas Hagios in a personal interview, 24 March 2015.

⁶⁸⁵³ Alexandra Vaporidis in a personal interview, 23 August 2015.

⁶⁸⁵⁴ Peter Protoulis in a personal interview, 3 August 2016.

⁶⁸⁵⁵ Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015.

⁶⁸⁵⁶ Nick Augustides in a personal interview, 19 February 2016.

Town. He remembers him “looking clean and well-dressed.”⁶⁸⁵⁷

16. The thirteen *Eleni* crewmen were impressed with the way Tsafendas dressed. He told some of them that most of his suits were bought in Europe a few years ago and that he had not bought any new clothes since he returned to South Africa.⁶⁸⁵⁸

Personal appearance is a subjective matter. What is sloppy and dirty to one person may be casual and comfortable to another. It is germane that Tsafendas was a poor man, who often lived in basic lodgings, possibly without the facilities to wash his clothes, while the kind of jobs he did, welder and fitter, would require rough working attire. The fact is only the four people – Helen Daniels, Nel, de Vos and Lieberman - out of the two hundred the police and the Commission interviewed and another forty-four interviewed by the author, testified that Tsafendas wore dirty clothes. The vast majority not only disagreed, but stated that Tsafendas was neatly dressed, but the Commission omitted their statements.

TSAFENDAS'S STATE OF MIND

The Report contains several matters which were not mentioned by Daniels in her statement to the police, suggesting that they must have been from her testimony to the Commission, which was not found in the archives. One must assume that it was there that she spoke of Tsafendas saying incomprehensible things, talking about the Vergos fight and boasting about his future plans. Certainly, she did not mention anything like that in her statement to the police. On the contrary, she testified that: “besides his messy ways, I did not notice anything abnormal about him. There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal. His stories about travelling abroad were interesting.”⁶⁸⁵⁹

Although the Report does not say that Daniels thought there was something wrong with Tsafendas's mind, it also does not carry her statement saying the direct opposite (“There was never any indication that he was mentally abnormal”). Indeed it seems to hint at something wrong with Tsafendas by including the reference to his saying “incomprehensible

⁶⁸⁵⁷ Miltiades Kaldis in a personal interview, 12 March 2016.

⁶⁸⁵⁸ Kleanthis Alahiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁸⁵⁹ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

things” and baffling fellow believers by the way he talked in church. Since Daniels said nothing like this to the police, she presumably made these remarks to the Commission.

The question is what were the “incomprehensible things” Tsafendas spoke about. Patrick O’Ryan said in his statement to the police that Tsafendas spoke against apartheid, but he “did not encourage him, because we advocate the Biblical idea of subservience to a Government ...” He said Tsafendas’s “spiritual view seemed confused, but he was not spiritually or mentally disturbed.”⁶⁸⁶⁰ Far from subservient, Tsafendas believed that the Church should be revolutionary, help the people and fight against injustice; it should not support the powerful and the rich. He argued that the first Christians had rebelled against the Roman Empire and that the Church in South Africa and in Mozambique, because it had much power, should help in the people’s fight against apartheid and for the independence of Mozambique.⁶⁸⁶¹

Some members of the Christian Church were not happy with Tsafendas’s ideas, because they adhered to the idea of subservience to Government. The Commission was in possession of O’Ryan’s statement but nowhere in its Report does it mention Tsafendas’s “conflict” with the Christian Church, nor explain the matter of the “incomprehensible things.” Once again, the Report has included all that is negative about Tsafendas while omitting the positive. The Commission ignored Daniels’s statement about Tsafendas’s mental state. This testimony was important as it directly contradicted that of her brother and sister-in-law at the summary trial. The omission resulted in a skewed perspective of Tsafendas.

⁶⁸⁶⁰ Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁸⁶¹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

TSAFENDAS IN THE USA

Chapter II B of the Report (paragraphs 1-12) starts with Tsafendas in the USA. Mostly, it deals with his hospitalizations and his violations of immigration laws there. Almost all of this information is taken from a file on Tsafendas held by the US Immigration authorities which was given to the South Africans on September 16, by the American embassy in Cape Town. This file also contained the Grafton State Hospital report, which has been used extensively to reconstruct Tsafendas's movements while in the USA.⁶⁸⁶²

An important issue here is that vital information has been omitted from the Commission's Report. On September 9, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Cape Town received a secret telegram from the South African embassy in Washington, DC. It stated that a "very reliable source with first-hand knowledge" informed the embassy that the US Immigration authorities had a file on Tsafendas. That Tsafendas's file contained "full particulars" of his time in the United States, including the Grafton State Hospital report. The telegram stated that Tsafendas "is understood to have shown under psychiatric treatment that he was unstable though not (not)⁶⁸⁶³ insane, but type of man who would easily be used as instrument of Communist or hostile organizations. Impression of US Immigration people at the time was that he had been manipulated and was under influence of someone or some organization. He was subsequently deported to Europe."⁶⁸⁶⁴

It is indisputable that the Commission was in possession of this telegram, since it was found in the Commission's files deposited at the national archives, yet the Commission ignored it. Here is a prime example of the Commission picking and choosing evidence to suit its purpose. The Report goes into detail concerning the unlikeliest rumours attached to Tsafendas – for example that he was wanted for murders and assaults in various countries –⁶⁸⁶⁵ but it makes no mention of a crucial belief regarding Tsafendas's mental state held by the US Immigration authorities. This was no rumour, but the considered opinion of American governmental officials who had dealt with Tsafendas for five years. The US Immigration authorities knew that Tsafendas had been hospitalized and that he had faked mental illness. Their opinion must have been taken after due consideration and must surely have been worth

⁶⁸⁶² Letter of the USA Embassy in Cape Town to the South African Security Branch, 3 October 1966. Correctional Service. Subject: Demitrio Tsafendas. File: 80/0043 A123 Vol. 1. NASA.

⁶⁸⁶³ This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second 'not' within brackets.

⁶⁸⁶⁴ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

⁶⁸⁶⁵ Chapter II B, Paragraph 43.

examining by the Commission if only because those authorities had dealt with Tsafendas for several years, longer than any other official body connected with him.

Furthermore, in Chapter IV, Paragraph 4, the Commission says:

“There were also speculations that Tsafendas might have undergone brainwashing overseas in the process of which he was instructed to murder Dr. Verwoerd. The Commission could find no evidence to justify such a finding.”

The Commission then goes on to explain why this could not have happened; the explanations are perfectly logical and the study agrees with this part of the Report, which will be examined in detail later. What is surprising is that the Report refers vaguely to “speculations” about brainwashing while ignoring the opinion of the US Immigration authorities that Tsafendas was the “type of man who could easily be used as instrument of Communist or hostile organizations” and that “he had been manipulated and was under influence of someone or some organization.”⁶⁸⁶⁶ This certainly suggested at least a possibility of brainwashing.

The fact that this information did not come from just anybody, but from the South African embassy in the United States and that it quotes the US Immigration authorities is certainly worth stating and investigating. That is especially so when, as we will see, the Commission is happy to investigate numerous rumours about Tsafendas which are patently fictitious. However, to introduce a diplomatic telegram containing an official US opinion into open debate would have strengthened rumours that Tsafendas might not have been schizophrenic, after all, that he might even have been part of a Communist plot. Clearly such speculation was not in the interests of the Commission or the State.

⁶⁸⁶⁶ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 09/09/1966. COE, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

TSAFENDAS IN PORTUGAL IN 1949

In 1949, Tsafendas arrived in Portugal for the first time and was promptly arrested. The Report states: *“Apparently the Portuguese authorities would not accept Tsafendas’s refugee passport, nor his claim that he was a Portuguese subject, the result being that he was arrested at the border post Barca d’Alva on 8th February, 1949. It appears that he was afterwards detained for a long time.”*⁶⁸⁶⁷

The issue of this arrest and detention has been discussed earlier in this chapter.

TSAFENDAS AND THE PORTUGUESE ARMY

In Chapter II B, Paragraph 19, shortly after the incident mentioned above, the Report says:

“After it had been ascertained that Tsafendas was a Portuguese subject, he appeared on 6th February, 1950, before the Military Board of Inspection in Portugal and was granted exemption from military service.”

The above information, also taken by the Commission from a PIDE report given to the South African police,⁶⁸⁶⁸ is a drastically telescoped version of what happened in regard to Tsafendas and military service. According to a PIDE report that was not given to the South African police, it was while Tsafendas was held in Aljuba Prison that the Portuguese authorities discovered that he had not completed compulsory military service in the Portuguese Army. He was taken to Machine-Gun Regiment 1 in Lisbon,⁶⁸⁶⁹ where he was brought before the Military Board of Inspection. Tsafendas stated that he had been rejected by a recruiting board in Mozambique because his mother was a Coloured woman. Investigators replied that there was no racial discrimination in Portuguese East Africa, that everyone must serve and therefore he must complete his service.⁶⁸⁷⁰

The Portuguese authorities contacted the colonial administration in Lourenço Marques and were told that Tsafendas was not a deserter, that he had attended his interview

⁶⁸⁶⁷ Chapter II B, Paragraph 17.

⁶⁸⁶⁸ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966.

⁶⁸⁶⁹ Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 November 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁸⁷⁰ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

for military service and had indeed been rejected because his mother was Coloured.⁶⁸⁷¹ However, the law had changed since then and now every male Portuguese citizen was required to serve in the military. Thus, even if he was not a deserter, he was required to complete military service.⁶⁸⁷² Tsafendas “did not want to serve a dictatorship”⁶⁸⁷³ and with no avenue of escape, he pretended to be mad. Psychiatrists who examined him were convinced that he was mad and he was officially exempted from military service.⁶⁸⁷⁴ He was required to pay military taxes for exemption in the sum of 1,200 Portuguese escudos and his situation in Portugal was legalized.⁶⁸⁷⁵

The detailed explanation of the military service issue was omitted from the two PIDE reports given to the South Africans. However, the fact that Tsafendas had pretended to be mad in order not to serve in the Portuguese army was known to the South African police since at least six people had so testified when they were questioned.⁶⁸⁷⁶

⁶⁸⁷¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT

⁶⁸⁷² Letter of Tsafendas to the Ministro do Ultramar, 27 October 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁸⁷³ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966: 3. ‘Brainwashed in jail held man told *Argus*.’

⁶⁸⁷⁴ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁶⁸⁷⁵ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁸⁷⁶ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

TSAFENDAS AND HIS FAMILY

*His relatives in South Africa and Rhodesia are regarded as good, law-abiding citizens. The stepmother, a brother, a sister-in-law and a brother-in-law gave evidence before the Commission. All of them made a favourable impression. According to persons who know the family in Pretoria, they were not exactly taken up with this member of the family.*⁶⁸⁷⁷

*... the fact that his family did not really accept him...*⁶⁸⁷⁸

The Commission here suggests that Tsafendas was not popular with his family and later in Chapter III while discussing his motive it claims that he was “not really accepted” by them. Both statements are inaccurate and the Commission was in possession of considerable evidence to the contrary. Admittedly, the Commission held five statements that supported its claim. The first was from Katerina Pnema who had testified that she had “very little or nothing to do with him during her lifetime” and that she considered him to be “a disgrace to the family.”⁶⁸⁷⁹ Hendrik van Loggenberg, a friend of the family, told the police that Tsafendas “was not welcome among his own people and they cast him out.”⁶⁸⁸⁰ Gladstone Dunn said in court that Tsafendas had told him that “he could not get on with his family and that they did not want to have anything to do with him.”⁶⁸⁸¹ Caroline Barbeau had testified that Tsafendas “liked to pity himself, saying that his family did not want him, but at the same time he never thanked one for any kindness shown him.”⁶⁸⁸² Interviewed by the police, John Marvis said Tsafendas had told him that his family did not want anything to do with him because his mother was Coloured.⁶⁸⁸³

It is not true that Pnema had very little to do with Tsafendas in her lifetime and she admitted to the author that she tried to distance herself as much as possible from him when questioned by the police. In fact, she had corresponded regularly with Tsafendas since he left South Africa in 1942. She travelled from Rhodesia to Pretoria at Christmas 1963 along with

⁶⁸⁷⁷ Chapter II C, Paragraph 6.

⁶⁸⁷⁸ Chapter III, Paragraph 3.

⁶⁸⁷⁹ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁸⁸⁰ Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸⁸¹ Gladstone Dunn statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸⁸² Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Dimitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸⁸³ South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

her two little children so that she could meet him after not seeing him for twenty-two years. She then invited him to Rhodesia to meet her husband whom he did not know and she found him a job in Beira in 1964.⁶⁸⁸⁴ Clearly Pnema had considerably more to do with her half-brother than she told the police.

It is true though that Pnema considered him to be “a disgrace to the family,” which she still believes. However, this was because of his political activities, his arrests and bannings, which became widely known among her fellow Greeks. She felt directly insulted as a family member when Tsafendas criticised a boss who had employed him at the personal request of Pnema’s husband. The Commission was not aware of any of these things and thus considered her statement to the police as valid.

Dunn’s statement is partly accurate. Tsafendas’s family was not very happy with his behaviour after he came back from Europe. They had helped him enter South Africa illegally only to discover that he had brought with him banned anti-apartheid and Communist literature. The incident in the church where he argued with the priest angered and embarrassed family members. That public row in a church, along with his refusal to throw away the banned literature and his noisy voicing of his political opinions caused friction between Tsafendas and his stepmother and half-brother.

As for Marvis’s comment, this might have been made by Tsafendas out of frustration or on the spur of the moment. It was not mentioned by any of the scores of witnesses interviewed by the police and the author. The forty-four witnesses interviewed by the author all denied any suggestion that Tsafendas felt rejected by his family because of his Coloured. They insisted that the only tension between Tsafendas and members of the family stemmed from his political ideas and activities.

In the case of Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg, he had testified that he occasionally ate at Marika’s house while Tsafendas ate there too, also that Tsafendas sometimes was a guest at his house.⁶⁸⁸⁵ The fact that Tsafendas was welcomed to the table at his family’s house and that he was also invited to van Loggenberg’s home suggests that Tsafendas’s relationship with the family could not have been exactly as van Loggenberg suggested. It is quite possible that van Loggenberg, being a good friend of Marika, might have tried to

⁶⁸⁸⁴ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁸⁸⁵ Hendrik Johannes van Loggenberg statement to the police, 8 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

provide additional evidence distancing the family from Tsafendas, knowing that this was what they had done.

However, apart from the above statements, no other evidence in the Commission's possession supported its claim regarding Tsafendas's relationship with his family. On the contrary, there was considerable contradictory evidence. First and most important, the Commission was aware that Tsafendas's stepmother, half-brother and his wife, and his brother-in-law travelled by car from Pretoria to Lourenço Marques to meet him and then took him back to South Africa. This was a generous, indeed a courageous gesture, given that Tsafendas was a Communist and banned from entering South Africa, and they knew this. What is more, Vlachopoulos bribed J.J. van den Berg, the passport official at the South African embassy in Lourenço Marques, to turn a blind eye to the fact that his brother-in-law was on the South African government Stop List and issue him with a visa.⁶⁸⁸⁶ Although the bribery was probably not known to the Commission, such an act is not something a family would risk for someone they did not care about.

Marika Tsafantakis told the Commission that "Tsafendas was favoured over the other children and sent to Middelburg because Portuguese children could only receive a proper education either there or in Swaziland."⁶⁸⁸⁷ The fact that Tsafendas was favoured over the other children and was sent to study in South Africa was confirmed to this study by his cousin Mary Eendracht and his half-sister Katerina Pnema. They said Tsafendas's father was adamant that Dimitris should be the one to go and study as he was his first child and he could not afford to send the others, too. Marika had not objected.⁶⁸⁸⁸ This is hardly something a family will do for a child they do not accept.

Marika also told the Commission that Tsafendas "had grown up as one of her children."⁶⁸⁸⁹ Her statement is confirmed by several witnesses and their testimonies were all in the Commission's possession. Katerina Pnema, his half-sister had also made a similar statement to the police; she said that growing up with Tsafendas "to all intents and purposes it

⁶⁸⁸⁶ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁸⁸⁷ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁸⁸⁸ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁸⁸⁹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

was understood” by “her and her brother and sisters” that “he was a member of the family... his complexion was such – as also his manner – that he passed as a European.”⁶⁸⁹⁰

Guglielmo Conte, a friend and business partner of Tsafendas’s father, who also knew Tsafendas from the day he was born, explicitly denied in an interview with the *Rand Daily Mail* that was in the Commission’s possession, that Dimitri was estranged from his family.⁶⁸⁹¹ Costas Michaletos, who knew Tsafendas from infancy and was his father’s best friend, told the police that “Dimetrios Tsafantakis grew up with his half-brothers and sisters and was always treated as part of the family.”⁶⁸⁹² A Confidential Report from the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali said shortly after the assassination and after having questioned people who knew Tsafendas: “It is also reliably reported that the Tsafandakis family hold a good reputation among the Greek community and there are suggestions that Michael Tsafandakis made a big mistake in attempting to raise his illegitimate son as a full member of his family.”⁶⁸⁹³

In addition to this evidence, the Commission was aware that Tsafendas upon his return to Pretoria had stayed for a few days at his half-sister’s house and that her husband Charles Nissiotis hired him to work at their café-shop.⁶⁸⁹⁴ Although this was not known to the Commission, Charles Nissiotis took Tsafendas on at his café so that he could show he was employed and domiciled on his application for permanent residence while he even gave him a letter stating that he was his “guarantor” and would be financially responsible for him while in South Africa.⁶⁸⁹⁵

After he moved out of his half-sister’s house, Vlachopoulos, his brother-in-law offered him a rent-free apartment he owned, but which was not immediately available. Then, Fotini Gavasiadis, Vlachopoulos’s twenty-five year old sister, and her husband Markos invited Tsafendas to stay with them until the apartment became available. Thus, Tsafendas

⁶⁸⁹⁰ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁸⁹¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 September 1966, Tsafendas timid and puny as a boy.’

⁶⁸⁹² Costas Michaletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁸⁹³ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁸⁹⁴ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁸⁹⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

spent the next few weeks at their house. When Vlachopoulos's apartment became available, Tsafendas duly moved in. Tsafendas remained in this apartment for eight months. Nick Vlachopoulos also offered work to Tsafendas at his café-shop. Tsafendas worked there, but did it for free as a return because he was given the rent-free apartment by him. When Tsafendas was in Mozambique, he asked Vlachopoulos to help him sell some of his furniture. When the furniture was sold, Vlachopoulos gave the money to Marika and she sent them to him.⁶⁸⁹⁶ All these are hardly the things a person would do for someone who was not exactly taken up by his family. Indeed they are things one would do when one cares and wants to help someone.

Others who told the author that the Commission's conclusion was inaccurate included such members of Tsafendas's family as his half-sister Katerina Pnefma, his cousins Antony and John Michaletos, Irene Michaletos, John's wife, his first cousin Mary Eendracht and Nick Vlachopoulos's sister, Fotini Gavasiadis.⁶⁸⁹⁷ People who were very close to Tsafendas, like Ira Kyriakakis, Andreas Babiolakis, Helen Grispos, and Nick Papadakis also stated to this study that the Commission's statement is inaccurate.⁶⁸⁹⁸

On a point of fact, the Commission stated that Tsafendas's "stepmother, a brother, a sister-in-law and a brother-in-law gave evidence before the Commission." This is true only up to a point because Tsafendas's two half-sisters, Eleni Vlachopoulos and Evangelia Nissiotis, also gave evidence to the Commission. According to the Commission's interview transcript with "Tsafendas's family," both women gave evidence along with the rest of the family on the 21st of October. Their names in the transcript of their testimony appear as Mrs. Nissiotis and Mrs. Vlachopoulos.⁶⁸⁹⁹

It is true that Tsafendas was not very close to his half-brother Victor or his half-sister Evangelia, largely because of his politics. However he was close to Katerina, and very close to his half-sister Eleni and to his stepmother Marika. Above all, he worshipped and was

⁶⁸⁹⁶ Nick Vlachopoulos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁸⁹⁷ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John and Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁸⁹⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

⁶⁸⁹⁹ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

adored by his father.⁶⁹⁰⁰ Family relationships are often like this and we should also remember that Tsafendas had not seen his family for twenty-two years although he regularly corresponded with all of them. He sent postcards, letters and even presents on a regular basis to all the family, especially to his father, stepmother and Eleni. He wrote to his father every month and often telephoned him.⁶⁹⁰¹

Therefore, to say that the whole family was cool to him is a huge exaggeration. It is true that after the assassination Tsafendas's family distanced themselves from him and from his political ideas and activities, claiming they knew nothing of them. This was natural under the circumstances, but no family member ever said did not accept him, as the Commission claimed. It is noteworthy that the Commission omitted most of the evidence which contradicted the claim in its Report.

TSAFENDAS'S EMPLOYMENT WITH HIS FAMILY

*One of his brothers-in-law said in evidence that shortly after Tsafendas's return, he employed him to assist his wife (Tsafendas's half-sister) in their cafe. After two days, however, she dismissed him because he was too lazy.*⁶⁹⁰²

The person who gave this evidence was Charles Nissiotis, who was married to Evangelia, Tsafendas's half-sister. Tsafendas was indeed employed for a very short time at Nissiotis's café shop, but the reason he was dismissed was entirely different to the one mentioned here, though this was probably not known to the Commission. Shortly after he arrived in Pretoria, Tsafendas began working at his brother-in-law's café.⁶⁹⁰³ A couple of days later, a Sunday, Tsafendas, along with everyone from his family, attended a Greek Orthodox Church service. At the end of the service, the Greek priest spoke briefly. He welcomed a family newly arrived from Greece and went on to praise South Africa and its policy of apartheid for the opportunities they gave to people to come and work there, offering them a better life than anywhere else in the world. He then attacked Communists and other

⁶⁹⁰⁰ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁶⁹⁰¹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹⁰² Chapter II C, Paragraph 6.

⁶⁹⁰³ Charles Nissiotis statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

“enemies” of the country.⁶⁹⁰⁴

Tsafendas was enraged and only his half-brother Victor stopped him from interrupting the priest. However, when the time came for Communion, Tsafendas refused to take the sacrament or to kiss the priest’s hands, as was customary. Instead, and despite the efforts of Nick Vlachopoulos and Victor Tsafantakis, he started arguing quietly with the priest. He said a priest should not get involved in politics and that he should be ashamed for praising apartheid. The priest was polite and replied that Greeks should be grateful for South Africa’s hospitality and that they should not bite the hand that fed them. Tsafendas said the Whites found things easy in South Africa because they exploited the non-Whites, but life for the majority of people was far from rosy. By this time, other members of the congregation had come forward to see what was happening and began protesting on behalf of the priest and denouncing Tsafendas. However, Tsafendas remained calm throughout, supporting his views. Finally, his family managed to pull him away from the priest.⁶⁹⁰⁵

Returning home, Tsafendas was rounded upon by his family for speaking out in public. Marika complained that he had embarrassed them all in front of everyone in the church and the whole Greek community would now hear about it. Tsafendas apologised for putting them into a difficult position and promised to keep his mouth shut from now on. However, Evangelia, fearing that they would lose their Greek customers over the church incident or that Tsafendas might start arguing with their customers, asked him to stop working at their café.⁶⁹⁰⁶

The Commission’s biggest omission is that Tsafendas had worked for nine months at the Proclamation Café of Nick Vlachopoulos, his other brother-in-law. Tsafendas worked voluntarily at the café because Vlachopoulos had given him a rent-free apartment. Tsafendas was so good at the job that Vlachopoulos offered him a permanent position with good wages, but Tsafendas refused. He did not want to take any money after accepting the free apartment. He worked full-time at the café when he was unemployed and part-time when he was at F.A. Poole Engineering.⁶⁹⁰⁷ It is possible that the Commission was not aware of this fact.

⁶⁹⁰⁴ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹⁰⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹⁰⁶ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹⁰⁷ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015.

TSAFENDAS'S FAMILY ABOUT THE TAPEWORM

*He (Tsafendas) said nothing to them (the family) about his alleged worm.*⁶⁹⁰⁸

This is a very important statement. It was stated in court during his summary trial that Tsafendas had a tapeworm since he was a small boy, that his step-mother was aware of its existence and was even indirectly responsible for it. Dr. Cooper had testified before the court that Tsafendas had the tapeworm since 1935 or 1936⁶⁹⁰⁹ while Dr. Muller and van Zyl testified for 1936,⁶⁹¹⁰ a time when Tsafendas lived with his parents. Louise O’Ryan, one of the witnesses for the defence, testified as follows: “... he told me that a while back, when he was a little boy, about six feet of it came down. The doctor gave him something and six feet of it came down. He was sitting on a bucket. And then he fainted on the bucket, and his mother removed it and she destroyed it, and since then nothing has ever come down.”⁶⁹¹¹ The above testimony was not challenged in court by the Attorney-General despite the obvious contradiction as Tsafendas was eighteen or seventeen when he first found out about the tapeworm according to the doctors, and a little boy according to Louise O’Ryan. As already clarified, O’Ryan was referring to Tsafendas’s stepmother, not his mother, from whom he was separated when he was a few months old.⁶⁹¹²

Tsafendas lived constantly with his family until July 17, 1937,⁶⁹¹³ but according to the Commission, Tsafendas never mentioned anything about a tapeworm to the family during all those years. It seems highly unlikely that a young boy could believe he had a tapeworm inside him but not ask his parents for help. More importantly, Tsafendas’s stepmother denied that the incident described by Louisa O’Ryan ever took place. The Commission’s transcript from the evidence given by the stepmother Marika and the other family members says:

*“Tsafendas never talked to the family about his tapeworm. According to them, he was definitely not insane.”*⁶⁹¹⁴

⁶⁹⁰⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 6

⁶⁹⁰⁹ Dr. Harold Cooper’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA

⁶⁹¹⁰ Dr. Hendrik Muller’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Reyner van Zyl’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁹¹¹ Louise O’ Ryan’s testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁹¹² See Louisa O’Ryan’s testimony in Chapter Five.

⁶⁹¹³ Report of the COE. Chapter II A, Paragraph 17. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

⁶⁹¹⁴ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

Tsafendas's half-sister Katerina Pnefma and first cousin Mary Eendracht, who lived under the same roof as Tsafendas at the time, both told the author that the incident involving Marika never took place and that Tsafendas would have certainly told his parents if he believed he had a tapeworm. Marika insisted until she died that Tsafendas was perfectly sane and that he had invented the tapeworm story so as not to be executed. Every member of his family said the same thing; no-one believed that Tsafendas really thought he had a tapeworm.⁶⁹¹⁵

The Commission's Report does not mention that Marika denied what was stated in court. Certainly it was not the Commission's responsibility to deal with what happened at the summary trial, but the obvious fact that Tsafendas had lied about the origins of the tapeworm should surely have been mentioned.

TSAFENDAS'S VISIT TO HIS HALF-SISTER IN UMTALI

*During this period he also visited his half-sister at Marandellas. He asked her for money, but she would have nothing to do with him and refused to help him.*⁶⁹¹⁶

In a personal interview with the author, Katerina Pnefma, the half-sister in question, described the Commission's statement as inaccurate, but she acknowledged that it was what she had told the police. The Commission cannot therefore be blamed for accepting her words. Pnefma did not have a very close relationship with Tsafendas; they had completely different personalities and often argued over politics, but nevertheless they both cared for each other.

When Tsafendas visited Pnefma and her husband Gerry, it became quickly obvious to them that he was as dedicated as ever to Communism and to the fight against colonialism. An argument arose when Tsafendas denounced Greeks and other Whites in Rhodesia for taking advantage of Blacks. Pnefma clearly remembers her half-brother saying he was "disgusted" by what he had seen and by the way the indigenous people were treated. As for money, Pnefma said Tsafendas did not ask her for cash or any other assistance. She does not recall exactly what she told the police, but she admits that she may have said he asked for money and she spurned him in order to distance herself from him as far as possible and to demonstrate that they were not close. She insists that Tsafendas never asked her, and as far as she knew, anyone else in the family, for money. "He asked me a couple of times to help him

⁶⁹¹⁵ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹¹⁶ Chapter III C, Paragraph 14.

get a job, but never for money. He was too proud to ask me for money, but he would ask for help to get a job.”⁶⁹¹⁷

Although Tsafendas did not ask for assistance in Rhodesia, presumably because he did not need it, he did so just a few months later. Shortly after he was released from the prison in Beira where he was detained for conducting subversive propaganda for the independence of Mozambique, Tsafendas contacted Katerina and her husband. He was unemployed and asked if they could help him get a job in Mozambique. Tsafendas thus demonstrated that he was close enough to his half-sister to ask for a favour despite their political disagreements. Katerina, although unaware of his latest imprisonment, showed that she cared for her half-brother by helping to get work for him. Gerry Pnefma was friendly with the manager of a dock in Beira and persuaded him to hire his brother-in-law as an interpreter.⁶⁹¹⁸

However, Tsafendas lasted only a few days before being dismissed for urging the Mozambican workers to strike because of their working conditions. Tsafendas also denounced the manager and the company as “capitalists exploiting the workers.” The manager told Gerry Pnefma that the “only reason he did not call the police was that he did not want to cause his family problems.” He urged his friend not to help Tsafendas again because he was a dangerous Communist who could get him into trouble. Katerina Pnefma did not reveal this episode in her statement to the police and the Commission was probably unaware of it.⁶⁹¹⁹

TSAFENDAS AND HIS HALF-SISTER KATERINA PNEFMA

*On another occasion Tsafendas was most upset because, he said, he had received a letter from his sister in Rhodesia telling him that she was going to Beira for a wedding, but that she did not wish to see him at all since he was a disgrace to the family.*⁶⁹²⁰

This part is accurate, but other incidents in Tsafendas’s life of which the Commission was probably unaware provide necessary clarification. Pnefma remembers the wedding in question and confirmed in an interview with the author that she told Tsafendas she did not want to see him because he was an embarrassment to the family. This was after Tsafendas

⁶⁹¹⁷ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹¹⁸ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹¹⁹ Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹²⁰ Chapter II C, Paragraph 22.

was dismissed from the job at the dock in Beira that she and her husband had helped him obtain. Furthermore, Pnema had learned in the interim of Tsafendas's arrests by the Portuguese Security Police and that he had spent three months in prison. Pnema considered Tsafendas as an embarrassment throughout her whole life, which she believes he then ruined by the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd.⁶⁹²¹

⁶⁹²¹ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

TSAFENDAS BEFORE THE COMMISSION**TSAFENDAS'S FIRST APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION**

On 25th October, Tsafendas gave evidence before the Commission. The Commission was aware that he was quite knowledgeable about mental disorders—he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him—and therefore adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.

The Commission was able to form only a lay opinion on his mental condition, and that was—after two hours' questioning—that he was not mentally normal. He was certainly not the practically normal person described by Mr. Hartford, but apparently more normal than he was when some of the psychiatrists interviewed him.

He answered all the questions freely. At times, especially at the beginning, he stuttered slightly, sometimes he was vague, incoherent, and evasive, but otherwise his answers were logical and well formulated.

He explained that he wished to buy the pistol and knives for self-protection. He tried to relate how four Bantu had attempted to rob him on a bus one day, and that he had seen a "skolly" stab another with a knife. This evidence was given laboriously. However, he stated of his own accord that he had not yet told the Police this, and explained that he had only just remembered it. He also said that he had not deliberately planned to kill Dr. Verwoerd, but that he had been taken by a sudden impulse to do so. When he was told that he must have had the impulse when he had hidden the knives on his person, his reply was that this had been done only five minutes before the assault. To the question whether he was sorry for himself, he replied fairly promptly in the affirmative; but when he was asked whether he in any way regretted what he had done, he evaded the question by saying that the whole affair was like a dream and that he was the centre round which everything revolved. He showed no signs of remorse. When he was asked whether he was against apartheid, he replied that he was in favour of separate development, but that he was against the laws prohibiting sexual intercourse between the various groups. He utterly denied ever having been in Russia. He said that the only occasion on which he had communicated with a Russian Embassy was when he had made enquiries about permission to go to Berlin.

He denied that he had told Mr. Vercuiel that he would murder Dr. Verwoerd. He explained that Vercuiel had persecuted him. Vercuiel dismissed practically all English-speaking persons and that was the reason why he was dismissed.

He denied that he had ever tried to canvass support in London for an uprising in South Africa. His efforts, he said, were confined to Portuguese territories.

As far as the ladies with whom he had boarded and by whom he had been given notice are concerned, he explained that they were disappointed because he was not interested in them and then started a campaign against him. He stated that he sometimes took liquor, especially a buchu brandy, because it calmed down his worm or serpent for a few days. Extracts from his evidence were submitted to Dr. Wolpowitz of the Stikland Hospital as well as to Dr. A. B. van der Merwe of Stellenbosch, and both found indications of schizophrenia in the evidence.⁶⁹²²

Tsafendas gave evidence to the Commission for the first time on 25th October, 1966, five days after Judge Beyers found him unfit to stand trial. At this time, he was waiting for Vorster's decision as to his future, since he was now considered to be the State President's patient. Before we examine Tsafendas's evidence, it must be noted that his statement, not only the typed version of his remarks, but also the Dictaphone recording, are missing from the National Archives. Exactly same thing happened with the account of his second appearance before the Commission on 11th November, 1966. Therefore the author is not in position to know precisely what Tsafendas told the Commission and can only rely on what is in its Report. It should also be noted again that Tsafendas's original statement to the police and to General van den Bergh on the night of the assassination has also gone missing.

The Report starts its account of Tsafendas's evidence to the Commission with a very significant statement in which it accepts that Tsafendas is capable of pretending to be mad:

“The Commission was aware that he was quite knowledgeable about mental disorders—he also admitted to the Commission that he had read fairly extensively on the subject in order to determine what was wrong with him—and therefore adopted a somewhat sceptical attitude towards him. It is clear that his word cannot be relied upon, and that he is sufficiently intelligent to put on a fairly good act.”

The Commission then simply describes what Tsafendas said in his evidence without

⁶⁹²² Chapter II D, Paragraph 18.

using Tsafendas's own words. It is germane to recall that in outlining his movements prior to the assassination, the Commission had used large excerpts from Tsafendas's statement, thus providing an obviously more authentic perspective. The Commission, conceding that its viewpoint was not an expert one, found Tsafendas to be "more normal" than he was when examined by the psychiatrists, but still not a "practically normal person." Tsafendas gave evidence for two hours, during which time the Commission found his answers to be logical and well formulated. This contradicts Dr. Cooper's diagnosis that Tsafendas was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, as well as Dr. Aubrey Zabow's opinion that he suffered from thought-disorder.

The Commission here does not write anything about Tsafendas's motive, although he must have been asked about it. After all, this was arguably the most crucial, question of all: why he killed Dr. Verwoerd. However, the Commission makes no reference to it. Although the Commission devotes an entire chapter to this question – Chapter III: Demitrio Tsafendas's Motives – even there, no clear motivation is elucidated.

Nevertheless, the Commission has mentioned here something very important, namely that Tsafendas did not show any remorse for killing Dr. Verwoerd. The conclusion must be that the Commission avoided asking the obvious question about motive or that it suppressed the answer because it contradicted the summary trial's conclusion, that Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd because of a tapeworm. After all, Tsafendas had already told the police his motive – that killing Dr. Verwoerd might lead to a change in the policy of apartheid. It is very possible that Tsafendas even repeated his statement, as he did often thirty years later, and the Commission killed it as it did with the statement to the police when dealing with the motive issue in the relevant chapter. Three decades later, Tsafendas still felt no remorse about the assassination. When asked by Fathers Ioannis Tsafaridis and Minas Constandinou if he ever regretted his action, he replied, "No, no, no, not even for a moment, never, never. I did the right thing. He was a dictator, he created apartheid..." Indeed, he said he would have regretted not doing it. He said he believed apartheid would soon collapse with Dr. Verwoerd out of the way and he did not expect it to last so long without him. Nevertheless, he maintained that he did not regret his action.⁶⁹²³

The fact that Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed at the *Eleni* three days before the

⁶⁹²³ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

assassination is not mentioned at all. As we will see later in this chapter, although the Commission has dedicated a substantial amount of space to the issue, it makes no reference at all to Tsafendas's version of how come the issue of Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed then. Did the Commission not ask Tsafendas if he had any idea how Dr. Verwoerd's death came to be discussed on board the tanker? After all, he was the man who laid the plans as to how and when he would kill Dr. Verwoerd. The Commission has speculated about the origins of the incident and after seeing the statements of some of those who were involved in the exchanges, it had the opportunity to ask the most important witness of all about the issue. However it seems that either Tsafendas was never questioned on the matter or his response was suppressed. It is possible that, if asked, Tsafendas would have volunteered a theory as to how Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed three days before he died, namely that his discussion of a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd which he had with some of the crew on board the *Eleni* was overheard by someone, misunderstood and passed on as a fact.

Another issue that goes unmentioned is that of the references which helped Tsafendas get the job in Parliament. Tsafendas's access to Dr. Verwoerd was a huge security lapse and the Commission had gone to great lengths to find out what went wrong. Sydney Wiehand, one of the messengers who appointed Tsafendas, told the Commission that Tsafendas had supplied references but he could not recall the specifics. Did the Commission not press him as to who provided the references? The messenger referred to "a school." A little further investigation would surely have disclosed that one reference came from Limasollu Naci, the most prestigious private college in Istanbul, where Tsafendas taught English for six months. However, such a revelation would have been incompatible with the Court's portrayal of Tsafendas.

The Commission did, however, permit reference to one instance of political activity by Tsafendas. It stated that he denied "that he ever tried to canvass support in London for an uprising in South Africa. His efforts, he said, were confined to Portuguese territories." Of course, Tsafendas would not have admitted that he tried to rally support for South Africa as he was still hoping to be transferred to a hospital, thus he could not deviate from what was said about him in the court.

The Report concludes that Tsafendas's statement to the Commission was given to two doctors and both found signs of schizophrenia in the evidence. Since the statement is not in the author's possession, it cannot comment authoritatively about it. However, it is very

possible that Tsafendas deliberately included some “delusional” thoughts in his evidence so as to maintain his act. Neither of Tsafendas’s statements to the police contain any sign of schizophrenia, as Professors Alban Burke and Tuviah Zabow confirmed.⁶⁹²⁴

Professor John Dugard said about the first and main statement that it “completely confirms the view that Tsafendas was not insane. It reads like a very normal story of a politically informed person, angry with apartheid and Dr. Verwoerd, determined to make a change, with nothing to lose personally. Really an incredible statement which was carefully concealed.”⁶⁹²⁵ Although the Report mentions nothing else of significance, it seems unlikely that this is all that was discussed with Tsafendas over a period of two hours.

TSAFENDAS’S SECOND APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMISSION

*On 11th November, 1966, the Commission interviewed Tsafendas again. His condition was appreciably better than on the previous occasion. He understood everything well, and gave his answers fairly promptly, which, with one or two exceptions, were logical and to the point.*⁶⁹²⁶

The Commission Report devotes only forty words to Tsafendas’s second appearance, the forty words set out above, which contain not a single reference to what Tsafendas said. His own account of his appearance has also gone missing, therefore the author is not in position to know what was discussed.

CONCLUSION

Although Tsafendas gave evidence twice to the Commission, the Report contains very little of what he said and this not in Tsafendas’s words but in those of the Commission. The most important issue, why he killed Dr. Verwoerd, remained unanswered. It seems highly unlikely that the Commission failed to ask Tsafendas why he killed Dr. Verwoerd, but still nothing is mentioned about it. Either the Commission did not ask the most important question of all, or it asked and did not like the answer and so made sure it did not see the light of day. The

⁶⁹²⁴ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016; Professor Tuviah Zabow in a personal interview, 11 April 2016.

⁶⁹²⁵ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁶⁹²⁶ Chapter II D, Paragraph 19.

Commission does not mention the tapeworm, clearly distancing itself from it. However, if Tsafendas did mention it, the Commission would surely have included it in the Report in line with its generally negative approach to Tsafendas's character and actions.

The motive is not the only issue to go unexamined. The Dr. Verwoerd death discussion on the *Eleni* is ignored, as is the question of Tsafendas's job references. Any unbiased Commission of Inquiry would have attempted to find answers to these fundamental questions, especially since the person most likely to have the answers, Tsafendas himself, was available. The outstanding questions were:

- What was Tsafendas's motive? Why did he kill Dr. Verwoerd?
- What happened on the *Eleni*? How did it come about that Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed three days before he died?
- Which reference did Tsafendas use to get the job in the House of Assembly?

If Tsafendas was asked about these issues and gave an explanation suitable to the Commission, van Wyk would almost certainly have included his answers, as it did with the issues of his appointment to the Parliament and Vercueil. That there are no comments from Tsafendas suggests that he was either not asked, or that his answers were suppressed by the Commission. As we have seen, the Commission certainly suppressed the evidence Tsafendas gave to the police as well as important evidence given about him by witnesses, so it cannot be ruled out that Tsafendas's answers, too, were simply made to disappear.

THE ASSASSINATION**EXPERT STABBER**

*The doctor who carried out the post-mortem examination informed the Commission that there were no grounds for the rumour that the wounds had been inflicted by an expert stabber. He described them as quite ordinary. The Commission had the opportunity of inspecting all the photographs showing the position and extent of the wounds and is in agreement with this opinion.*⁶⁹²⁷

Dr. E.L. Fisher, a psychiatrist and a United Party MP, the first doctor to treat Dr. Verwoerd after Tsafendas's attack in Parliament, told *Die Vaderland* the day after the assassination that "it was clear that the assassin must have received training in the art of handling knife. Each time the knife slipped through the ribs showing that it was not handled haphazardly as a usual stabbing would be carried out."⁶⁹²⁸ Furthermore, the *Dagbreek*, the newspaper on which Dr. Verwoerd was chairman, reported on September 11 that, "Medical doctors have also maintained that the way in which the stabbing was done attest to the attacker being an expert in using a dagger. The first thrust of the dagger was to the neck, in order to force the victim to raise his arms, and so open access to the heart. The second blow used the flat part of the dagger pushed between the ribs into the heart and twisted inside. The third and fourth blows were pushed into the lungs with the same precision."⁶⁹²⁹

The author agrees here with the post-mortem and the Commission. Firstly, Dr. Fisher was a psychiatrist, not an expert on knife wounds. It seems highly unlikely that he was able to determine the path of the knife and the damage it caused purely by observing the visible wounds. Secondly, Dr. Verwoerd's injuries could be seen for only a few minutes when his shirt was torn open and his torso partly bared before his body was removed. Further, most of the doctors' efforts during this period were aimed at reviving the Prime Minister by mouth-to-mouth and artificial respiration. As far as the author can establish, Dr. Fisher mentioned expertise in knifing handling only to *Die Vaderland* and not to any of the other newspapers he spoke to. As for the unnamed doctors who were quoted by *Dagbreek*, on which Dr. Verwoerd was chairman, it seems that they were able to form such an opinion by simply reading at the description of the stabbing and it seems highly unlikely to have been present.

⁶⁹²⁷ Chapter II D, Paragraph 12.

⁶⁹²⁸ Crowd and Revo, 1967: 20.

⁶⁹²⁹ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, 'Tsafendas het vir V.V. in Persie gewerk.'

Even if they were present at the stabbing, they could not have been any of the doctors who treated Dr. Verwoerd as none of them made such statement apart from Dr. Fisher.

As for Tsafendas stabbing Dr. Verwoerd first in the neck, this was the natural thing to do. Dr. Verwoerd was seated at his desk and with his hands in front of him, a posture which made impossible for anyone to aim at the heart. Thus, for anyone approaching from the front, the neck was the most obvious and accessible target. A serious wound in the neck and throat area, however, could well prove fatal. Tsafendas's second target was the heart. Verwoerd by now had opened his arms, exposing a target area for Tsafendas. In terms purely of physical efficiency, Tsafendas's actions were normal.

Tsafendas could not be considered an "expert stabber," whatever that is, but he was certainly familiar with knives. His father would often hand-craft knives when he worked at Iscor Iron and Steel Works while one of Tsafendas's favourite possessions was a bayonet, which was given to him by his grandmother Katerina.⁶⁹³⁰ More importantly, all or most partisans of the DSE during the Greek Civil War possessed bayonets or at least knives. Tsafendas had received some basic training in guerrilla warfare from his comrades, so it is possible that he had learned how to use a bayonet or a knife, though he never said anything to that effect.

TSAFENDAS'S STATEMENT TO MAJOR ROSSOUW ON SEPTEMBER 11

The whole of Paragraph 15 in Chapter II D is taken from Tsafendas's statement to Major Rossouw on the 11th of September. It is used to describe how Tsafendas applied for the job in the House of Assembly and how he planned and carried out the assassination. The inclusion of his statement here shows that Tsafendas was perfectly able to describe the assassination and what happened before it. In court, Dr. Cooper, Dr. Sakinofsky and Dr. Zabow had testified that Tsafendas was unable to tell them what happened before and during the assassination.

⁶⁹³⁰ Mike Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

TSAFENDAS ABOUT GETTING AWAY AFTER THE ASSASSINATION

*I deny that I am a Communist. I am a Christian and I believe in the Bible. I did not think I would get away after murdering the Prime Minister. I did not care what happened to me.*⁶⁹³¹

The issue of Tsafendas denying being a Communist has been discussed in the Investigation Chapter so it will not be considered again. As to his other comments, the Commission mentioned his statement that he “did not care what happened to me,” but omitted what came next, a declaration of his motive. Tsafendas made the comment in the statement used by the Commission. He told Major Rossouw on 11th September:

*“I did not care about the consequences for what would happen to me afterwards. I was so disgusted with the racial policy that I went through with my plans to kill the Prime Minister.”*⁶⁹³²

Then on 19th September, Tsafendas said to Major Rossouw:

*“I never thought about hiding if I had to do the job with a knife. I didn’t have much of a chance of getting away when using a knife. I didn’t care much and didn’t give it a second thought that I would be caught. I just happened to do it that way. I always had a grudge against the South African Government on account of its racial policies and I hated Dr. Verwoerd because he was a foreigner - a Hollander.”*⁶⁹³³

These statements reflect Tsafendas deep political convictions and determination, something that it is not evident in the Commission’s Report. By reducing his passionate explanation to the bald, eight-word phrase, “I did not care what happened to me,” the Commission manages to suggest the assassination was almost a whim by a man without a motive and unaware of the consequences.

TSAFENDAS’S ESCAPE PLAN?

Tsafendas did not have an escape plan for the assassination, but this was only because the weapon he decided to use would almost certainly make flight impossible. He had definitely planned to get away when he worked out his initial assassination strategy, to shoot Dr.

⁶⁹³¹ Chapter II D, Paragraph 15.

⁶⁹³² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁹³³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Verwoerd. He aborted this plan when he was not able to get a pistol and decided to use a knife instead. He told Major Rossouw regarding his escape plan:

TSAFENDAS: I was going to find refuge on the tanker, the *Eleni*, which I knew was sailing to South America. My plans were, however, upset when I could not get the right pistol. The boat sailed on the Saturday before the Tuesday on which I stabbed the Prime Minister.

MAJ. ROSSOUW: Did you know that the *Eleni* had sailed before you attacked, the Prime Minister? If so, what were your plans to get away?

TSAFENDAS: Yes, I knew the ship had already left. I never thought about hiding if I had to do the job with a knife. I didn't have much of a chance of getting away when using a knife. I didn't care much and didn't give it a second thought that I would be caught...⁶⁹³⁴

Tsafendas's initial plan to shoot Dr. Verwoerd and escape on the *Eleni*, was also mentioned at his summary trial.⁶⁹³⁵ His intention had been to shoot Dr. Verwoerd during a function at Parliament organized by the Parliamentary correspondents.⁶⁹³⁶ He was listed to work as a waiter at the event, which Dr. Verwoerd was scheduled to attend. The function was set for Friday, September 2, the evening before the *Eleni's* scheduled departure. In the event, Dr. Verwoerd did not attend the party,⁶⁹³⁷ but Tsafendas had already aborted his plan because of his inability to find a pistol.⁶⁹³⁸ This issue is also discussed under 'Escape Plan' in "*The Eleni*" section.

⁶⁹³⁴ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁹³⁵ Dr. Harold Cooper's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 17 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁹³⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶⁹³⁷ Fred Peinauer statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁹³⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

TSAFENDAS'S RECLASSIFICATION

*On 30th August, 1965, he applied as Demetrio Tsafendas to the Regional Representative of the Department of the Interior to be reclassified as a Coloured person. He gave the reason that he regarded himself as a Coloured and that he wished to marry a Coloured. On 1st September, 1965, he made a sworn statement in support of his application.*⁶⁹³⁹

The above statement, although almost certainly correct, is a direct contradiction of a memorandum written on 3rd of October by Attorney-General van den Berg, who led the case for the State at Tsafendas's summary trial. The following is an extract from it:

*"According to a statement in my possession, there was never any question of a marriage between him and the Coloured woman, Helen Daniels, from Belleville South. Information from Home Affairs files indicates that he applied for reclassification as a Coloured because he wanted to apply for a business licence in a Coloured area."*⁶⁹⁴⁰

The Home Affairs files which van den Berg referred to were not found in the archives nor was anything discovered relating to Tsafendas's application regarding his reclassification. The only information about this matter comes from witnesses' statements, including that of Tsafendas. All agree with the Commission and disagree with the Attorney-General. What is important here, however, is not the reclassification or Tsafendas's motive behind it, but that the Attorney-General was not in possession of all the evidence gathered by the South African police. It is obvious that the Attorney-General and the Commission gave contradictory statements on the same issue and the most likely reason for this was that not all the evidence gathered by the police was given to them.

In addition: After the assassination there were rumours that Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd because he was barred from marrying a Coloured girl because of the Immorality Act. Years later, Father Minas Constandinou asked Tsafendas if these rumours were true. Tsafendas smiled and dismissed the stories. He said that if he wanted to marry a Coloured girl he could have taken her to Mozambique where it was legal to marry her, or to Cuba, where he was planning to move and live the rest of his life.⁶⁹⁴¹

⁶⁹³⁹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 39.

⁶⁹⁴⁰ Detailed information for a Memorandum regarding Demetrio Tsafendas by Attorney-General W.M. van den Berg, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, Subject: Beweerde Omkoperij. NASA.

⁶⁹⁴¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

TSAFENDAS'S SUMMARY TRIAL (Chapter II D, Paragraph 17)

The Commission dedicates a paragraph to the summary trial, but gets an important fact wrong. It states that Patrick O’Ryan and his wife, among others, testified to Tsafendas’s “peculiar behaviour.” In fact, O’Ryan, when asked about Tsafendas, told the court that he “never got the impression that something was wrong in his mind,” or that he was “mentally disturbed.”⁶⁹⁴²

The Commission then refers to four psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas and testified at the trial: Dr. Cooper, Dr. Zabow, Prof. van Wyk and Dr. Macgregor. Surprisingly, Dr. Sakinofsky is omitted. The Report then states that Dr. Muller, a specialist physician, also examined Tsafendas and found that he had no tapeworm. However, Dr. Muller only spoke to Tsafendas, he did not physically examine him.

⁶⁹⁴² Patrick O’ Ryan testimony on Tsafendas’s summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

TSAFENDAS'S MOTHER

*According to information supplied to the South African Consul-General in Lourenço Marques, his mother is still alive and is living in the Bantu quarter of Lourenço Marques.*⁶⁹⁴³

No such evidence was found in the archives. However, the Portuguese press and later the South African reported this claim about Tsafendas's mother as a fact.⁶⁹⁴⁴ Tsafendas always maintained, as is also stated in the Report, that his mother died when he was a boy. That is what he was told by his father and by members of his mother's tribe,⁶⁹⁴⁵ while he had also obtained her death certificate which stated that she had died on January 12, 1927.⁶⁹⁴⁶ The author has not been able to resolve this contradiction or to discover anything further about Tsafendas's mother, but it seems rather unlikely that someone in the Registrar of Births and Deaths in Lourenço Marques would have produced a fake death certificate and that all these people lied.

⁶⁹⁴³ Chapter II A, Paragraph 6.

⁶⁹⁴⁴ *Dagbreek*, 11 September 1966, 'Kleurlingmoeder in haglike omstandighede.'; *Diario de Lisboa*, 8 September 1966, 'A mae de Dimitrio ainda vive nos arredores de Lourenço Marques'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 September 1966, 'Tsafendas' Mother still alive'; *Diario de Lisboa*, 13 September 1966, 'Localizada a Mae de Tsafendas.'

⁶⁹⁴⁵ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹⁴⁶ *The history of the person who inflicted the fatal wounds to the late Dr. Verwoerd* drafted by Col. McIntyre, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Subject: Leer W.D. 10/10/4102 der Stafendas. NASA

TSAFENDAS'S NAME

Both Tsafendas's name and surname underwent changes from time to time in the course of his life, besides which he was known to some people by the nicknames of MIMIS and MIEMIE. The other first names and surnames which he used from time to time are as follows:

First names: DEMETRIO, DIMITRIO, DIMITRO, DEMETRIOS, DEMITRIUS and JAMES.

Surnames: TSAFANDAKIS, TSAFENDAKIS, TSAFANTAKIS, TSAFENDOS, TSAFENDIS, TSAFANTAKIS and WILLIAMS.⁶⁹⁴⁷

Although Tsafendas's father, Michalis, used the surname Tsafantakis, the family's original name was Tsafendas and Dimitri was aware of this from a very young age. A change in nomenclature had occurred more than a hundred years earlier when Crete was under Ottoman occupation.⁶⁹⁴⁸ The rebellious activities by the Cretans were causing the empire much trouble, so the Ottoman overlords ordered that "akis," a suffix indicating smallness, as in a child, should be added to every Cretan name. It is customary in Greece for a boy named Nicholas to become Nicholakis to his family and friends; Georgios would be Georgakis and Dimitri-Dimitrakis. However, the Ottomans' intention was to humiliate and mock the rebellious Cretans by suggesting they were little people of no account. The Cretans were furious and opposed the change, but the rule of the occupiers prevailed.⁶⁹⁴⁹

Hearing this story, Dimitri asked his father to change the family name back to Tsafendas. Michalis sympathised but said that would be difficult since everyone knew him as Tsafantakis and that was how his name appeared in official documents.⁶⁹⁵⁰ A few years later, however, Dimitri went ahead and changed his own surname to Tsafendas. The date of the change is uncertain. In all available official documents up to the 1950s, he appears as Tsafantakis.

Finally, Tsafendas often deliberately registered himself with a slightly different name so that his past would not be traced, using such spellings as Stafendas, Tsascadeskis, Tsafedis etc. This was not difficult as he was in possession of a birth certificate written in Greek. Whenever he produced it to someone, he would just replace one or few letters from the certificate but would still make it look like his proper name. For example, the name was

⁶⁹⁴⁷ Chapter II A, Paragraph 4

⁶⁹⁴⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹⁴⁹ Apostolakis, 2009.

⁶⁹⁵⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

written as “*Τσαφαντακης*,” so he would keep the Greek letters that are similar to English letter like T, a, t, k but substitute some of the others with false letters, for example, Tcamafakus etc.⁶⁹⁵¹ Tsafendas sometimes gave James as his Christian name. This is an anglicised form of Dimitri often used by Greek people outside of their home country. Dimitri can also become Jimmy or Jim. An Italian friend of Tsafendas in Beira always called him Jimmy.⁶⁹⁵²

⁶⁹⁵¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁶⁹⁵² Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

TSAFENDAS SEXUALLY ASSAULTED

*Tsafendas alleges that in 1927 he was violated by a member of his family. He says that he did not tell anyone of this, and it is not possible, therefore, to check this allegation.*⁶⁹⁵³

Despite exhaustive research, the author has not been able to establish whether or not such an incident took place. In 1946, in Grafton State Hospital, Tsafendas spoke about his sexual life and past sexual “traumas,” all of which he invented, but he did not mention being raped or assaulted. Tsafendas brought the rape story up with Dr. Cooper when the psychiatrist examined him for the defence at the summary trial, but he also spoke of it to the police in his statement of September 12, 1966, claiming that his step-mother persuaded her brother to rape him when he was a boy in Lourenço Marques. It is not possible to know what, if anything, occurred on this occasion. What is almost impossible to believe is that his step-mother asked her brother to violate her stepson and that Tsafendas really believed such a thing happened. He did speak negatively about his relationship with his step-mother to various psychiatrists, but never to anyone else. On the contrary, he often described how loving she was and how she treated him as her own child. What is more, Tsafendas never spoke about the alleged rape to anyone else, though the embarrassment attaching to such a story might have been a restraining factor.

A key to the conundrum might lie in a statement Tsafendas made in later in life, that two claims were necessary to make an “insane act” look real and convince someone you are mad:

- a. To have a family history of insanity and
- b. To have a childhood trauma.⁶⁹⁵⁴

This could explain why Tsafendas said negative things about his step-mother to the psychiatrists, but not to the police, since at the time, he was not trying to prove he was insane. It is very possible that Tsafendas spoke of the alleged rape to the police because he knew he might need to pretend madness to avoid torture or worse as a consequence of killing Dr. Verwoerd. If a mad act became necessary, having a childhood trauma in his past would add authenticity.

⁶⁹⁵³ Chapter II A, Paragraph 9.

⁶⁹⁵⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

TSAFENDAS IN ISTANBUL

*The next country he visited was Turkey. It appears that he was there during the second half of 1961 and the beginning of 1962. He was employed for two months as a teacher of English.*⁶⁹⁵⁵

The Commission statement that Tsafendas was employed as a teacher of English in Turkey was well known, having been reported by South African newspapers within two days of the assassination.⁶⁹⁵⁶ The Commission merely touches on the fact, gives no details, fails to mention the name of the school, although it was aware of it, and shortens the length of Tsafendas's stay. Tsafendas did not work for two months, but for about five-six months. The Commission wishes to sidestep the question that would have been raised if it was known that Tsafendas worked for five-six months as a teacher at the best private language college in Turkey, namely, how could a schizophrenic unable to follow a conversation for more than fifteen minutes, with thought-disorder and a disjointed way of speaking manage to secure a job of this sort and keep it for so long? This is a very important part of the Report and it is examined in the section 'The Limasollu Naci' of this chapter in the 'Employment' section.

⁶⁹⁵⁵ Chapter II B, Paragraph 37.

⁶⁹⁵⁶ *The Cape Times*, 8 September 1966, 'Tsafendas taught Turks English'; *Daily Dispatch*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'Tsafendas taught English in Turkey'; *The Daily News*, 8 September 1966: 17, 'Tsafendas seen as 'mystery man.'"

TSAFENDAS IN RUSSIA?

If Tsafendas ever visited Russia, it must have been during the years 1961 or 1962. As will appear from this report, there are witnesses who allege that he intimated on certain occasions that he had in fact been to Russia and that he could speak Russian. Tsafendas denies that he has any knowledge of this language, or that he has ever visited Russia. The evidence in this connection is not strong, and it is not possible to base any definite finding on it.⁶⁹⁵⁷

The author has not been able to establish whether Tsafendas ever visited Russia since the evidence is contradictory and not conclusive for either option. However, it seems more likely that he did not go there. However, if he did visit Russia, it could certainly not have been in 1961 and was highly unlikely to have been in 1962.

Tsafendas often sent postcards from abroad and sometimes photographs of himself in a foreign town or city. His half-sister, Katerina Pnema, told the author that she thinks she received letter from Tsafendas from Russia, but she is not 100 per cent sure. She is quite certain, however, that it came from the Eastern Bloc and could have been from Bulgaria. It was certainly letter and not photograph or postcard, she said, as she would have remembered it. She also does not recall Tsafendas ever telling her that he visited Russia.⁶⁹⁵⁸

Tsafendas's other half-sister, Eleni Vlachopoulos, stated in *Live and Let Live* that Tsafendas had visited Russia, but she did not say how she knew this.⁶⁹⁵⁹ Pnema suggested that it may have been because of correspondence she received or from talks they had afterwards among the family. She said it also possible that her sister confused Russia with Bulgaria. Furthermore, Tsafendas once sent his father a gift of a miniature Katyusha rocket, the weapon used widely by the Soviets during the Second World War. However, this was certainly in the 1950s when his father was still living with Tsafendas's step-mother and before they separated.⁶⁹⁶⁰ It is also obvious that Tsafendas could have acquired the toy rocket anywhere in Europe. Finally, Gordon Winter claimed that General van den Bergh had evidence that Tsafendas visited Russia, but he withheld this information from the

⁶⁹⁵⁷ Chapter II B, Paragraph 38.

⁶⁹⁵⁸ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁶⁹⁵⁹ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007.

⁶⁹⁶⁰ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

Commission and from his report on Tsafendas.⁶⁹⁶¹ However, he did not specify what his evidence was.

Tsafendas always talked about the countries he visited and none of the sixty-nine witnesses interviewed by the author recalled him saying he had been to Russia. Such was his talkative character, they said that if he had been, he would at least have told the people close to him. However, some of these witnesses did not rule out that Tsafendas might have told them and they forgot. Tsafendas spoke at length over a period of more than ten years to the priests who visited him in prison and in hospital. He told them about his life from the day he was born, including several confidential information such as the truth about the tapeworm. However, none of the priests remembers Tsafendas telling them he had been to Russia.⁶⁹⁶² It seems unlikely that Tsafendas would talk in detail about his life and journeying and omit Russia. His close first cousin, Mary Eendracht, who got numerous letters and postcards from him is certain that she never received any from Russia and that he never told her he had been there.⁶⁹⁶³

As far as the author can establish for certain, the only country in the then Communist Eastern Bloc which Tsafendas visited was Bulgaria. The probability is that he was never in Russia, but if he was, it was certainly not in 1961 and was probably not in 1962, when his movements are fully accounted for. He was in Jerusalem on January 20, 1961⁶⁹⁶⁴ and spent the next five months in the area before travelling through Lebanon and Syria by bus; he crossed the Taurus mountain range and reached Ankara in May 1961 and stayed there for a month.⁶⁹⁶⁵

Around June 1961, Tsafendas arrived in Istanbul and remained there until December 1961. He then went to Bulgaria and spent Christmas and New Year's Eve in Greece. In January 1962 he visited Crete and at the end of the same month arrived in Brindisi, southern

⁶⁹⁶¹ Gordon Winter's correspondence with David Beresford, 8 September 1998. Liza Key's personal collection.

⁶⁹⁶² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁶⁹⁶³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁶⁹⁶⁴ Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, proc. 518/15/55. Co. 334. 6 April 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁹⁶⁵ Confidential Report of the Ministerio Dos Negocios Estrangeiros regarding Dimtri Tsafendas, proc. 518/15/55. Co. 367. 20 October 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

Italy.⁶⁹⁶⁶ He arrived in Rome on February 8, 1962⁶⁹⁶⁷ and by the end of the month he was in Lisbon, having travelled by train.⁶⁹⁶⁸ Sometime in June or July 1962, Tsafendas was in London. It is unknown how long he stayed in Britain but he was certainly back in Lisbon in October 1962.⁶⁹⁶⁹ He then remained in Portugal until October 1963 when he returned to Mozambique.⁶⁹⁷⁰

All of this makes it extremely difficult for Tsafendas to have gone to Russia during the two years mentioned by the Commission, 1961 and 1962. The only possible window was between February 1962 and October 1963, when he was in Portugal. However, Tsafendas spent the first few months in Lisbon in the Albergue da Mitra (Hostel Mitra) before visiting London in June or July 1962. He was back in Lisbon probably in July or in August, and on October 27, 1962, he visited a police station in Lisbon in an attempt to have his exile from Mozambique ended.⁶⁹⁷¹ He did not succeed and in November, 1962, he made yet another application for entry to South Africa, which he submitted to that country's embassy in Lisbon.⁶⁹⁷² Therefore the only possible time that Tsafendas could have visited the Soviet Union in 1962 is between September-October. However, Tsafendas was informed about his adored father's death sometime in August or September 1962 and became desperate to get back to South Africa to visit his grave. Thus, it seems rather unlikely that he would travel to Russia when he was trying desperately to get back to South Africa.

In addition, PIDE, who kept a close eye on Tsafendas while he was in Portugal and was aware of his travels as he was using a Portuguese passport, makes no mention of any such travel to the Soviet Union. In those years, the Iron Curtain was impenetrable. Tsafendas could not just slip over the border as he did in South Africa, thus he would have needed a visa. These were extremely difficult to get and if issued, usually took a long time. Tsafendas never told any of the witnesses he met in 1963 and were interviewed by the author that he had visited Russia the year before, while he did however state openly that he had been to

⁶⁹⁶⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁹⁶⁷ Seccao Consular Report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 10 February 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁹⁶⁸ Confidential PIDE report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas, No: 3.699-G.U, 13 November 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁹⁶⁹ Eleni Vlachopoulos in Manolis Dimelas's *Live and Let Live*, 2007.

⁶⁹⁷⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁹⁷¹ Letter of a police agent to the Ministry of Interiors regarding Tsafendas's exile. 30 October 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁶⁹⁷² Report of the COE. Chapter II B, Paragraph 40. December 1966. R.P. 16/1967. Pretoria.

Bulgaria. If he was happy to mention Communist Bulgaria, he would presumably have felt no constraint about speaking of the Soviet Union. Tsafendas invariably travelled by train or by boat as he was afraid of flying, and anyway he could not afford plane tickets. This suggests that if he travelled to the Soviet Union it would probably have been by train, an extremely long voyage and one he was most unlikely to have undertaken in 1962 due to lack of time.

That Tsafendas visited Russia cannot be ruled out, but if he did so, this may have happened sometime between 1954 and 1959 when he was travelling in West Germany, Sweden and Denmark, countries which were physically closer to the Soviet Union. That, however, is supposition and there is not any evidence that Tsafendas entered Russia during this period.

As for Tsafendas being able to speak Russian, this depends on one's definition of speaking a language. According to his half-sister, Katerina Pnema, Tsafendas picked up some Russian from Soviet sailors in Lourenço Marques in the 1930s and by reading a Russian dictionary. As far as the author can establish, he knew enough words and phrases to enable him to communicate on a basic level with the occasional Russian he came across, but he could not hold a fluent conversation in the language. Finally, although Tsafendas was an accomplished linguist, he never listed Russian as one of his languages.

TSAFENDAS'S TEETH

On 9th October 1964, he re-entered Rhodesia at Umtali. In Umtali he tried to buy a farm, but since it appeared that he had no money, no transaction took place. He also said that the silver fillings in his teeth had been done in Russia (To the Commission he stated that he had obtained these in Turkey).⁶⁹⁷³

The statement regarding Tsafendas's teeth is inaccurate. Several witnesses said Tsafendas told them that the dental work had been done in Bulgaria.⁶⁹⁷⁴ None of the witnesses interviewed by the author stated that the teeth were made in Russia or in Turkey. Most of them did not know which country was involved, but those who mentioned a country, mentioned Bulgaria. Father Nikola Banovic also stated that when Tsafendas left Turkey for Bulgaria he did not have new silver-type teeth. What is more, Tsafendas went to Sofia, Bulgaria, to visit his DSE comrade from the Greek Civil War who happened to be a dentist. All these strands of information strongly suggest that Tsafendas had his teeth fixed in Bulgaria, very likely by his dentist comrade. Since Tsafendas did not have the silver teeth while in Turkey up to December 1961, obviously he had them made sometime afterwards. It is highly unlikely that Tsafendas visited Russia between December 1961 and October 1963 when he returned to Mozambique as his movements throughout this period are accountable through PIDEs reports. This again, makes Bulgaria and very likely his dentist comrade as the most likely answers.

However, the Commission's reference to Russia is not unjustified, since two people had mentioned Russia in this context. Spiros Raftopoulos, whose shop in Umtali was twice visited by Tsafendas, said in a statement to the police that "Tsafendas told him that he had them done while he was staying in Russia."⁶⁹⁷⁵ And *The Umtali Post* reported on September 9, that Tsafendas visited a café in Umtali in about October 1964. The lady owner was curious about his teeth and she quoted Tsafendas as saying they were false teeth which were made for him when he visited Russia.⁶⁹⁷⁶

⁶⁹⁷³ Chapter II C, Paragraph 18.

⁶⁹⁷⁴ For example, Andreas Babioulakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015 and several others.

⁶⁹⁷⁵ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁶⁹⁷⁶ *The Umtali Post*, 9 September 1966: 1, 'Assassin was seen in Umtali.'

It is highly unlikely that Tsafendas would lie or be confused as to where his teeth were fixed. The probability is that both Raftopoulos and the café lady confused Bulgaria with Russia. Andreas Babiolakis said that for most people in Africa, especially old people, “Bulgaria and Russia were like the same, as it was for every country in the Eastern Bloc. If you were saying Bulgaria it was like saying Russia!”⁶⁹⁷⁷ As for why Tsafendas told the Commission that he had the teeth done in Turkey, a plausible theory is that he did not want to reveal that he had been in the Eastern Bloc nor expose his connection with his dentist comrade.

⁶⁹⁷⁷ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

TSAFENDAS'S CAPE ARGUS INTERVIEW

In July 1966, Tsafendas had a long interview with Mr. Hartford of the Cape Argus. They had already met at the beginning of the year when Tsafendas came to enquire whether there was any news of the so-called freedom fighters of Mozambique. He described himself as a rebel from Mozambique. Mr. Hartford thought that he might be able to provide material for a magazine article and asked him to return later for an interview. This interview was postponed a few times until it took place sometime in July. It lasted about 75 minutes. Tsafendas recounted inter alia, how he had entered the Union illegally in 1936. He made no secret of his strong anti-Portuguese feelings, but did not utter a word against the South African Government. He complained, inter alia, that he still suffered from headaches as a result of the treatment he had been given by the Portuguese in Lisbon after the war. Mr. Hartford's impression was that Tsafendas was normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective. This witness had listened to the evidence in the Supreme Court on Tsafendas's condition after the death of Dr. Verwoerd, and his impression was that his condition must have deteriorated since the interview for, when he interviewed Tsafendas, the latter spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation. He added, however, that after he had heard the evidence, it occurred to him that Tsafendas had in fact sometimes evaded his questions, but not to such an extent as to arouse his suspicions about his mental condition.⁶⁹⁷⁸

Hartford's statement to the Commission was not discovered in the archives, but his name was found among those listed to give evidence on the 4th of November. Hartford spent seventy-five minutes with Tsafendas for his interview and got the impression that Tsafendas was "normal; he had no reason to believe that he was mentally defective... he spoke fluently without any noticeable gaps in the conversation." This contradicts Dr. Cooper's evidence that Tsafendas was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes and that he spoke in a disjointed manner.

The Commission states that Hartford, after hearing what was said at the summary trial about Tsafendas, formed the impression that "his condition must have deteriorated since the interview." He also concluded that Tsafendas had evaded questions during the interview. The Commission does not seem to have pursued the suspected evasions, perhaps because it was obvious that Tsafendas would choose what to answer when discussing such sensitive political

⁶⁹⁷⁸ Chapter II C, Paragraph 75.

matters as Portuguese rebels and Mozambique's independence, with their security implications. The author cannot know exactly what questions were raised in the interview, but certainly Tsafendas would not have been able to give answers to many and naturally evaded them. Suppose he had been asked on what grounds he received amnesty and was allowed back to Mozambique after twelve years in exile? He could hardly have replied, "I pretended to be mad!" Then, if Hartford asked how he avoided service in the Portuguese military, could he possibly have given the same answer?

TSAFENDAS AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

*Tsafendas often attended services of his church at private homes in Durban. Some of the members of the same faith testified that he saw himself as an outcast, that he was always pitying himself, but that he never showed any gratitude for anything that was done for him.*⁶⁹⁷⁹

*At church services, particularly, no one could understand what he was saying.*⁶⁹⁸⁰

The Report refers to “some” church members criticising Tsafendas, but only one such statement was found in the Commission’s archives. This does not mean it was the only one, since other similar statements might have gone missing. However, this statement, by Caroline Barbeau, contained all the references quoted by the Report. She said of Tsafendas that “he liked to pity himself saying that his family did not want him, but at the same time he never thanked one for any kindness shown him.”⁶⁹⁸¹ It seems evident that in referring to “some members,” the Commission was actually referring only to Caroline Barbeau. Her testimony has been examined in the Investigation Chapter.

Barbeau’s was the only statement from the two hundred people who were interviewed by the police and the Commission and whose statements were found in the archives which described Tsafendas in negative terms. It seems extraordinary that none of the other two hundred expressed similar views if Tsafendas behaved as Barbeau claimed. None of the forty-four witnesses who were interviewed by the author agreed with Barbeau’s characterisation of Tsafendas; in fact, all denied that Tsafendas was as she portrayed. It is noteworthy that the Christian Church, of which Barbeau was a member, sought to distance itself from Tsafendas and discount its links with him after the assassination.⁶⁹⁸² Many of the Church’s members were questioned by the police⁶⁹⁸³ and the negative attention this brought them, along with the fact that Tsafendas was a member of the sect, made them feel deeply embarrassed. They felt it reflected badly on their Church and like the Greek Community in

⁶⁹⁷⁹ Chopater II C, Paragraph 35.

⁶⁹⁸⁰ Chpater II C, Paragraph 38.

⁶⁹⁸¹ Caroline Barbeau statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁶⁹⁸² Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013; Reuben O’ Ryan in a personal interview, 15 April 2016; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁶⁹⁸³ *The Observer*, 18 September 1966: 2, ‘Police question S. African sect.’; *Sunday Times*, 18 September 1966: 18: 5, ‘Tsafendas’s brothers are quizzed.’

South Africa, tried to distance themselves and the Church from Tsafendas.⁶⁹⁸⁴

Merle Daniels, also a member of the Church, admitted during Tsafendas's summary trial that she "would like to protect the name of the Christian Church."⁶⁹⁸⁵ When Peter and Helen Daniels (the woman who asked Tsafendas to marry her), were interviewed by *Post* journalist Gordon Winter, they asked him not to mention that Helen was a preacher for the Christian Church because it "would bring disgrace" on the Church.⁶⁹⁸⁶ Like most local Greeks, some members of the sect sought to disown Tsafendas in order to protect their reputation. It is more than coincidence that Barbeau and James Johnston, both members of the Church, were the two of the three witnesses of the two hundred questioned by the police and the Commission to speak negatively about Tsafendas.

At least some of the Church's members, before the assassination, had a very high opinion of Tsafendas. Patrick O'Ryan said that Tsafendas was described to him by a fellow member of the Church as a "highly cultured gentleman, a very refined gentleman who speaks seven languages."⁶⁹⁸⁷ Others spoke well of Tsafendas to Helen Daniels and recommended him as her husband. This was significant because Helen, as a preacher, was highly respected by the Church. Her co-religionists would have never recommended someone who was as described by Barbeau.

The second derogatory reference by the Commission - that no-one could understand Tsafendas at church services - was probably taken from Helen Daniels's testimony which sought to show Tsafendas as an outsider. It is likely that what the church people could not understand was Tsafendas's viewpoint concerning the role of the Church in modern society. Tsafendas had clashed with the Church leaders because they advocated "the Biblical idea of subservience to a Government," including to the governing National Party and its policy of apartheid, a stance which he hotly disputed.⁶⁹⁸⁸ The only member of the Christian Church to reveal this to the police was Patrick O'Ryan.⁶⁹⁸⁹

⁶⁹⁸⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁶⁹⁸⁵ Marle Daniels testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁹⁸⁶ Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes; Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

⁶⁹⁸⁷ Patrick O' Ryan in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997. This part is available in the rushes.

⁶⁹⁸⁸ Richard Poggenpoel in a personal interview, 30 July 2013; Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

⁶⁹⁸⁹ Patrick O' Ryan testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA.

CHAPTER III: DEMITRIO TSAFENDAS'S MOTIVES

Chapter III of the Commission's Report deals exclusively with Tsafendas's alleged motives.

The following is the whole chapter:

1. *In determining Tsafendas's motives, we must bear in mind that we are not dealing with a normal person.*

2. *The finding that he was mentally disordered at the time of the examination by the Supreme Court, Cape Town, in October 1966, is accepted without any reservation.*

It is probable that at all material times he was not mentally normal, but there may be some difference of opinion as to the degree of disorder.

3. *His unhappy childhood, his discovery that he was an illegitimate child and that he was not White, the fact that his family did not really accept him, as well as that to all intents and purposes he knew no fatherland, that practically no country would have him, and all the other knocks and blows referred to in his history, undoubtedly inflicted severe psychological damage.*

4. *Whatever the causes were, there can be no doubt that he was a maladjusted, rejected, frustrated, feckless rolling-stone. He is boastful, selfish, unscrupulous and crafty.*

5. *Although there were exceptions, he almost invariably displayed strong feelings against the present South African; Government. During the Second World War, he was a member of the Communist Party in South Africa; in England, he made contact with extreme leftists, and even tried to find support for an uprising against the present Government in South Africa. It is probable that while he was working in the House of Assembly his interest in politics and his condemnation of the present Government became more intense.*

The discontent of the crew of the Eleni about the Immorality Act probably had a profound effect on his already receptive mind.

6. *It may be that the idea of murdering Dr. Verwoerd had already occurred to him when he realized that he might secure a post in the House of Assembly, but it is probable that the idea obtruded itself more strongly in his mind only when he started working in the House of Assembly and realized that it was within his power to, commit such a deed. It is unlikely that it already existed when he had the interview with Hartford in July 1966, for, if he had had*

such intentions then, he would not have divulged the facts about himself, including the fact that he was a rebel from Mozambique.

7. *In the clouded mind of this outcast, who was a complete failure, whose life meant practically nothing to him, was born a cunning plan to make use of his power to destroy the head of a Government which he hated.*

8. *When he bought the pistol on the Eleni, the plan to kill Dr. Verwoerd must already have existed.*

His explanation to the Commission that he had bought the pistol and knives for self-defence is unacceptable.

His statement to the Commission that the assault was not planned, but that he had experienced a sudden impulse immediately before the assault was made, does not tally with the facts.

9. *Even if he was mentally disordered on 6th September, 1966, it is clear that when he bought the knives that morning he knew what he was doing, and knew what he was planning to do.*

He concealed the knives carefully and had enough self-control to wait his chance. Unaided, without a false move, with cunning timing and with unerring purpose he executed his plan.

ANALYSIS OF THE CHAPTER

Chapter III of the Report purports to explain why Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd and is thus of critical importance to the Commission's designated task, as outlined in its terms of reference, namely "*to enquire into and submit a report on all aspects relating to the death of the late Dr. the Honourable Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd which the said commission deems to be in the public interest.*" Yet what is arguably the most significant of these aspects, Tsafendas's motivation, is dealt with in one of the Report's shortest chapters, a mere nine paragraphs, most of which are devoted to a negative and largely inaccurate portrayal of Tsafendas's character. Only two obscurely worded paragraphs, both of them suppositional, address the question of motivation. Anyone reading this chapter might conclude that Tsafendas had no real motive for his action, since only hatred for the Government is mentioned, along with some vague speculation as to what might have triggered his hand. The greater part of the chapter is used to denigrate Tsafendas with a series of negative and unfounded characterisations, as well as to note the "severe psychological damage" it alleged he had suffered.

The Report sounds convincing in presenting Tsafendas as someone without a clear motive. Ellison Kahn, Professor of Law at the University of the Witwatersrand, wrote in 1968, just two years after the Report's publication, that "the van Wyk Commission had searched in vain for an indisputable motive."⁶⁹⁹⁰ Professor Kahn's observation seems correct based on the contents of the Report, as this is the impression that the Commission wanted to give. However, in reality it is wrong, as Tsafendas had given perfectly clear and logical political reasons for the killing; the Commission, although very well aware of this, simply omitted them. Therefore, it was natural that someone, just like Professor Kahn, who was not aware of Tsafendas's statements, would have been given the wrong impression by the Report.

Paragraph 5 of the Commission's Report says:

"[Tsafendas] almost invariably displayed strong feelings against the present South African Government... it is probable that while he was working in the House of Assembly his interest in politics and his condemnation of the present Government became more intense. The discontent of the crew of the Eleni about the Immorality Act probably had a profound effect on his already receptive mind."

⁶⁹⁹⁰ Kahn, 1968: 163.

Paragraph 7 says:

“In the clouded mind of this outcast, who was a complete failure, whose life meant practically nothing to him, was born a cunning plan to make use of his power to destroy the head of a Government which he hated.”

The tentative nature of the Commission's conclusions is reflected in the use of the words “probable” and “probably” in the first quoted paragraph, and in the entirely subjective nature of the second, which claims to read Tsafendas's mind as to his intentions and their causes.

What cannot be ignored is that Tsafendas had made it perfectly clear why he killed Dr. Verwoerd in statements he gave to the police and that these statements were in the possession of the Commission. He told the police that he killed the Prime Minister because he was “disgusted with his racial policies” and hoped that by killing him “a change of policy would take place.”⁶⁹⁹¹ There could hardly be a clearer exposition of the fundamental political reason – to secure a change of policy – which prompted him to act as he did. Committing an act which aims for political change is the perfect definition of a political act. In addition, in his first statement to the police, Tsafendas declared that he “wanted to see a government representing all the South African people.” He said, “I do not think the Nationalist Government is representative of the people and I wanted to see a different government.”⁶⁹⁹² In his second statement, he testified that “I always had a grudge against the South African government on account of its racial policies and I hated Dr. Verwoerd because he was a foreigner – a Hollander.”⁶⁹⁹³ His reference to Dr. Verwoerd being a foreigner has already been discussed and was one of the many misrepresentations at the summary trial.

The Commission's cherry-picking approach to written and oral evidence to suit its purposes goes beyond turning a blind eye to the above-mentioned aspects of Tsafendas's statements. In the Report's Chapter II D, Paragraph 15, the Commission has no hesitation in making extensive use of Tsafendas's account from his statement to the police of his movements prior to the killing and of the killing itself. However, the Commission does not

⁶⁹⁹¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁹⁹² Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁹⁹³ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

use Tsafendas's own words from the same account to explain his motive. Is there a better way of explaining a person's motive than by using his own words and his own explanation? That the Commission did not do this is clearly because Tsafendas's words did not sound like the words of a madman. More importantly, they flatly contradicted what was heard in the court about his motive and they did not fit with the picture of him that emerged from the summary trial.

Furthermore, no mention is made of more significant statements where at least five witnesses, Cleanthes Alachiotis, Nikolaos Billis, Nikolas Kambouris, Georgios Kantas and Michalis Vasilakis, testified to the South African police that Tsafendas had characterised any assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as justifiable because he was a tyrant and a dictator; and this was just three days before the assassination.⁶⁹⁹⁴ Another witness, Edward Furness, told the police that Tsafendas was willing to do "anything that would get the South African regime out of power."⁶⁹⁹⁵ Neither of these statements was referred to in the Commission's Report.

Although Tsafendas appeared twice before the Commission, no mention is made of the most obvious question of all: Why did he kill Dr. Verwoerd? He must surely have been asked by the Commission, and if he was (it is impossible to know for certain because accounts of his testimony have disappeared), his reply is not recorded. Therefore, what did Tsafendas say when called twice before the Commission?

Significantly, the Report makes no reference to the tapeworm, which was adduced at the summary trial as the reason Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd. Had Tsafendas mentioned the tapeworm in his evidence to the Commission, Judge van Wyk, probably ought to have mentioned it; after all, he was ready to include other negative or absurd references to Tsafendas while omitting all the positive ones. The conclusion must be that, as with the police, Tsafendas made no mention of the tapeworm when he testified to the Commission.

Tsafendas also seemed to be aware that his act would have a positive impact to some people in South Africa. Major Rossouw, in evidence to the Commission, said: "When I originally questioned him, I accused him of being a horrible murderer. To which he answered, 'That is what you think but the world thinks differently!'" At a later stage, I asked

⁶⁹⁹⁴ Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 16 January 2016.

⁶⁹⁹⁵ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

him whether he regretted his deed yet and he answered that he did feel remorse and that he was very sorry about what he had done.”⁶⁹⁹⁶

Tsafendas's initial reaction seems to reflect his belief that many in South Africa would have applauded the assassination. As for feeling remorse at a later stage, the likelihood is that this remark was a gesture of appeasement to the police who had been torturing and beating him systematically since his apprehension. Statements by Tsafendas at the time and over subsequent years demonstrate that he never regretted killing Dr. Verwoerd. Thirteen days after the assassination, he told the police he “thought it was the right thing to do,”⁶⁹⁹⁷ and the Commission reported that “he showed no signs of remorse” during its deliberations.⁶⁹⁹⁸

Several witnesses who knew Tsafendas very well like Ira Kyriakakis, Father Nikolas Banovic, Katerina Pnema, Helen Grispos, Fotini Gavasiadis, Nick Papadakis, Mary Eendracht, John and Antony Michaletos, Nick Augustides and Andreas Babiolakis stated to the author that Tsafendas was a passionate Communist who considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a tyrant, a dictator, and “Hitler's best student.”⁶⁹⁹⁹ Tsafendas kept characterising Dr. Verwoerd with those words as long as thirty years after the assassination.⁷⁰⁰⁰ Describing Verwoerd as “Hitler's best student” was a trademark characterisation of South Africa's Prime Minister by Tsafendas and one which he used constantly. Tsafendas also constantly employed two particular words to describe Verwoerd: “tyrant” and “dictator.” He considered that Verwoerd was a “tyrant” because he was oppressing South Africa's non-Whites, and a “dictator” because he was elected by the Whites only; since the country's majority non-Whites did not have the vote, Verwoerd was not democratically elected in Tsafendas's view, and was in essence a dictator.⁷⁰⁰¹

⁶⁹⁹⁶ Major Daniel Rossouw testimony to the COE, 14 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁶⁹⁹⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. COE, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁶⁹⁹⁸ Chapter II D, Paragraph 18.

⁶⁹⁹⁹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁷⁰⁰⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁷⁰⁰¹ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Elias Constantaras in a personal interview, 11 April 2015; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Nikolas Kambouris in a

Andreas Babiolakis told the author that Tsafendas never made an attempt to hide his detestation for colonialism and apartheid. Tsafendas told Babiolakis one day that “Verwoerd and [Portuguese Prime Minister] Salazar are fascist dictators and should be executed like Mussolini.”⁷⁰⁰² Six years after the assassination, Tsafendas proudly told anti-apartheid activist and Umkhonto we Sizwe fighter Alexander Moumbaris, a fellow prisoner in Pretoria Maximum Security Prison, “I got τον Νταή τους” (“their tough guy” or “their champion,” but in a pejorative sense).⁷⁰⁰³

Sometime in 1994, when Tsafendas was in Pretoria Prison hospital and apartheid had collapsed, Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis asked him, “Why did you do it, Mr. Tsafendas [kill Verwoerd]?” Tsafendas told the priest that he considered Verwoerd to be “a dictator and a tyrant” and that because he was the “brains behind apartheid,” he hoped his death would lead to the collapse of that racist policy. He knew everything would not be transformed overnight, but he hoped Verwoerd’s “removal” would be a stepping stone towards the end of apartheid.⁷⁰⁰⁴

Tsafendas denounced the slain Prime Minister as a “monster” and an “evil person,” and set out in detail the steps Verwoerd had taken to establish his iron rule and earn his title, “the architect of apartheid.” Tsafendas told Bishop Ioannis that “Verwoerd was a dictator and a tyrant who oppressed his people. People were like slaves. He created apartheid... Even if you had lived here, you would not have been able to tell of its real extent [of apartheid] unless you had lived with Coloureds and Blacks. People were like slaves, they were only living to serve the Whites. Verwoerd did that. He was a monster, almost as bad as Hitler. I call him ‘Hitler’s best student’ because he copied some of Hitler’s Nurnberg Laws and applied them to the Blacks here... Verwoerd would have done to the Blacks what Hitler did to the Jews if he did not need them to serve the Whites.”⁷⁰⁰⁵

personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

⁷⁰⁰² Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

⁷⁰⁰³ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

⁷⁰⁰⁴ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁷⁰⁰⁵ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Tsafendas then argued that his act was morally justifiable because Verwoerd was a tyrant and a dictator. He said that since he had the opportunity to rid the world of such monster, it was his “duty,” his “social responsibility” to do so, a “tyrannicide.” Tsafendas also argued that if he had not acted, his guilt would have equalled that of Verwoerd, because any person who is aware of a crime and does not intervene, or worse allows it to continue when he has the power to end it, is as guilty as the criminal himself. Father Minas disagreed with all this and reminded him that he had killed a man and that was unacceptable and a mortal sin, no matter who the person was and what he had done. Tsafendas then put this question to Bishop Ioannis and Father Minas,

“Every day, you see a man you know committing a very serious crime for which millions of people suffer. You cannot take him to court or report him to the police, because he is the law in the country. Would you remain silent and let him continue with his crime, or would you do something to stop him?”⁷⁰⁰⁶

Both priests replied that they would have wanted to stop the crime but they would not have killed a person to stop it. Tsafendas said, “Then you would have been as guilty as Dr. Verwoerd.” The debate went on and on, but Tsafendas refused to accept that he was wrong, producing arguments and counter-arguments to support his contention. He even used examples from history where tyrants and dictators were executed by the people. He characterised the lynching of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and the killing by partisans of Reinhard Heydrich, Gestapo chief and one of the architects of the Holocaust, as justifiable and as tyrannicides.⁷⁰⁰⁷

Sometimes, Tsafendas, in the presence of the priests, would proudly make a stabbing gesture and denounce Dr. Verwoerd yet again as “Hitler’s best student.” He told them that at first, he intended to kidnap the Prime Minister and offer to exchange him for political prisoners. When he realised that this was not possible, he considered placing a bomb in Parliament to kill all the MPs. However, he dismissed this idea because journalists and other innocent people and the only “good” MP, Helen Suzman, could also have died.⁷⁰⁰⁸ Tsafendas always referred to his killing of Dr. Verwoerd as “the execution.” He refused to use the word

⁷⁰⁰⁶ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁷⁰⁰⁷ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁷⁰⁰⁸ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

assassination. When the priests referred to “the assassination,” Tsafendas would invariably correct them, saying, “the execution!”⁷⁰⁰⁹ Tsafendas also always maintained to Liza Key that he had killed Dr. Verwoerd for political reasons; because he was an “immoral man” and “disagreed with his policies” as he specifically told her.⁷⁰¹⁰

⁷⁰⁰⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁷⁰¹⁰ Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Liza Key in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

Let us now examine the other parts of this chapter.

Paragraphs 1-2: Tsafendas's Mental State

The Commission immediately refers to Tsafendas's mental state, claiming flatly that he is not a normal person and stating that it accepts the Supreme Court's finding of mental disorder. It then lists reasons, which it says "*undoubtedly inflicted severe psychological damage*" on Tsafendas (Paragraph 3).

The Commission heard 105 witnesses and it seems that only Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos questioned Tsafendas's mental state, testifying that "at times his conversation was confused" and her impression was that "he was mad."⁷⁰¹¹ However, she had given a completely different statement to the police, saying she "considered him to be a completely normal person."⁷⁰¹² We cannot know why de Vos told the Commission something totally different to what she told the police. Perhaps she was influenced by what she had heard in court. The fact is that no-one else said anything about Tsafendas not being a normal person. On the contrary, whoever commented on his mental state said he was perfectly normal. This is discussed in detail in the section 'Mental State' of this chapter. This was the same with the one hundred and fifty people questioned by the police, all of whose statements were in the Commission's possession. Only three of these witnesses, Barbeau, Martincich and Johnston, testified negatively about Tsafendas's mental state and both their statements and reliability have been discussed extensively in the previous chapter.

Paragraph 3: The "causes" that "undoubtedly inflicted severe psychological damage" on Tsafendas

His unhappy childhood, his discovery that he was an illegitimate child and that he was not White, the fact that his family did not really accept him, as well as that to all intents and purposes he knew no fatherland, that practically no country would have him, and all the other knocks and blows referred to in his history, undoubtedly inflicted severe psychological damage.

⁷⁰¹¹ Chapter II C, Paragraph 65.

⁷⁰¹² Wilhelmina Sophia de Vos statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

The entire paragraph is inaccurate or distorted and clearly part of an attempt to support the idea that Tsafendas was mentally disordered. The Commission did not have a psychiatrist among its ranks but boldly set out factors it claimed affected Tsafendas's mind. More importantly the Commission did not have in its possession, as far as the author could establish based on the documents found in the NASA, any evidence to support such a conclusion. On the contrary, evidence found clearly shows a different Tsafendas.

His Family did not Really Accept him

The Commission claims that Tsafendas's family did not really accept him. That is quite wrong and the Commission held ample evidence suggesting the exact opposite. However, it chose to ignore the many oral and written statements witnessing to the contrary. The issue has been discussed earlier in this chapter, so it will not be examined again.

Unhappy Childhood

It is wholly wrong to claim that Tsafendas had an "unhappy childhood." None of the two hundred or so witnesses who were questioned by the police or the Commission said anything to that effect and no other evidence has been found to justify such a claim. None of those who knew Tsafendas from childhood made any such comment. On the contrary, Dr. Samuel Schmahmann, a classmate in his school at Middleburg, giving his memories shortly after the assassination, recalled Dimitri as "a popular boy and not the least introverted... I particularly remember him singing a Greek song at a school concert," he said. "He was very funny and had us all in stitches."⁷⁰¹³

Another schoolmate, William Mare Volbrecht, a psychologist who was questioned by the South African police at the same time, testified that "At that stage Tsafendas was seen as white and there was never anything that pointed to someone regarding or treating him as a non-white or to him being discriminated against. I cannot remember whether he was ever guilty of misconduct; he was never a loner and mingled freely with us."⁷⁰¹⁴ Tsafendas's

⁷⁰¹³ *Rand Daily Mail*, September 8, 1966, 'Boyhood days of Tsafendas.'

⁷⁰¹⁴ William Mare Volbrecht statement to the police, 3 October 1966. K150, Vol 3, File Verklaring deur Majoor Venter. NASA.

stepmother, Marika, told the police that Dimitri's "association with other children at this stage [in childhood], was good."⁷⁰¹⁵

In addition, Tsafendas was always treated as a full-member of the family and there was never the slightest indication that this was not the case. Marika testified to the Commission that Tsafendas "had grown up as one of her children."⁷⁰¹⁶ Katerina Pnema made a similar statement to the police shortly after the assassination. She said that growing up with Tsafendas "to all intents and purposes it was understood" by "her and her brother and sisters" that "he was a member of the family... his complexion was such – as also his manner – that he passed as a European."⁷⁰¹⁷

The Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali shortly after the assassination questioned several Greeks who knew Tsafendas. It wrote in its confidential report to the South African police, "It is also reliably reported that the Tsafandakis family hold a good reputation among the Greek community and there are suggestions that Michael Tsafandakis made a big mistake in attempting to raise his illegitimate son as a full member of his family."⁷⁰¹⁸

Guglielmo Conte, a very good friend and business partner of Tsafendas's father, who knew Tsafendas from the day he was born, explicitly denied in an interview with the *Rand Daily Mail* that was in possession of the Commission, that Tsafendas was not accepted by his family.⁷⁰¹⁹ Costas Michaletos, who knew Tsafendas from infancy and was his father's best friend, told the police that "Dimetrios Tsafantakis grew up with his half-brothers and sisters and was always treated as part of the family."⁷⁰²⁰ All this information was known to the Commission

Helen Grispos was a near neighbour of Tsafendas and grew up with him in Lourenço Marques. Her mother, was Marika's best friend and her future husband, George, was one of Tsafendas's best boyhood friends. She described Tsafendas to the police as "well-mannered

⁷⁰¹⁵ Marika Tsafantakis statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁷⁰¹⁶ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

⁷⁰¹⁷ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁷⁰¹⁸ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 13 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁷⁰¹⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 September 1966, Tsafendas timid and puny as a boy.'

⁷⁰²⁰ Costas Michaletos statement to the police, 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

and intelligent”⁷⁰²¹ and made no comments about his childhood. However, in a personal interview, she dismissed the claim of an unhappy childhood. She remembers Tsafendas playing every day in front of her house with the other children and sometimes taking her, along with his stepsisters, to the beach in Lourenço Marques to teach her how to swim.⁷⁰²²

First cousin Mary Eendracht told the author that “it is a lie if someone says that Dimitri had an unhappy childhood. A big lie. He was full of life as a child. Very happy, friendly, very lively. He was very, very naughty, but just as some children are, especially boys, but nothing bad.” Eendracht also agrees that Tsafendas mixed freely with children of all races and never had an issue with his colour or identity.⁷⁰²³

Ira Kyriakakis, who grew up with Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques, was asked by the author if Tsafendas had an unhappy childhood and replied, “No, this is a mistake. Dimitri was very happy as a child. I don’t remember ever seeing him being unhappy. He was like all the other children, playing in the street, chasing each other. I remember he liked a lot playing hide and seek. He once hid in the top of a tree, just close to where I was. I never thought of looking up there as it was too high and I did not think that he would have climbed up there. He liked climbing trees.”⁷⁰²⁴ Andreas Babiolakis, another childhood friend, also disagreed about Tsafendas having an unhappy childhood. “That’s nonsense,” he said, “Dimitris was what we say the life of the party. He was full of energy and life. Absolute nonsense that he was unhappy.”⁷⁰²⁵

His younger half-sister, Katerina Pnefma, dismissed the Report’s comment as a “lie.” She told the author:

“Dimitri was a very happy but also a naughty child. He would spend all the time that he was not at school playing around the house. He loved playing. My mother had to go out in the street and scream his name to him to come back to the house when it was getting dark. He would always come home with dirty clothes from playing, but my mother did not mind; next day she would give him clean clothes again ... he loved the sea. He would often go there for swimming. He was an excellent swimmer. He taught all of us and many other children how to

⁷⁰²¹ Confidential Security Report of the Special Branch of the British South African Police in Umtali, Subject: Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. 10 September 1966. K150, Vol. 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

⁷⁰²² Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013.

⁷⁰²³ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁷⁰²⁴ Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

⁷⁰²⁵ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016.

swim, even the little blind boy I told you before ... while there was light, Dimitri would spend his time out of the house, playing with other children. Sometimes, he would come to the house only to eat. Every evening though or when it was dark, he would spend it reading a book. He always read a book before he went to sleep. As far as I can remember he was reading every day... he was like any other child I knew, it is a lie to say that he was unhappy.”⁷⁰²⁶

The facts are that Tsafendas was nurtured lovingly by his family while the one element that would have made him appear separate or different, the knowledge of his parentage, was withheld from him out of consideration for his feelings. The most important witness to his childhood happiness is Tsafendas himself, who always spoke very fondly of his family and his childhood to several witnesses, including Liza Key, David Beresford, and Fathers Nikola Banovic, Minas Constandinou and Michalis Visvinis and Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis.⁷⁰²⁷

Illegitimate Child and not being White

Tsafendas learned that he was illegitimate not as a small boy but when he was seventeen, thus at an age when the discovery would affect him less. That said, he was disturbed to discover that Marika was not his mother. He was unhappy that he never met his real, half-African mother, but he was not concerned, as the Commission claimed, that he was not White. According to the Commission, Marika testified that *“Tsafendas only learned that he had coloured origins when he looked for work at the aircraft factory. He had grown up as one of her children. He was depressed after he had learned about this, but never said anything about it.”*⁷⁰²⁸ Her statement is confirmed by several people who associated with Tsafendas at the time.

Mary Eendracht, Tsafendas's first cousin who had grown up with him in Egypt and Lourenço Marques, knew him extremely well. She was in Lourenço Marques when Tsafendas found out about his parentage. She said, “He was not the least bothered about the

⁷⁰²⁶ Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

⁷⁰²⁷ Dimitri Tsafendas in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Liza Key in a personal interview, 6 April 2015; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015; Father Michalis Visvinis in a personal interview, 11 July 2015.

⁷⁰²⁸ COE report regarding visit to family members of Demitrio Tsafendas, Pretoria, 21 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, Sub file: 5, Subject: Algemeen. NASA.

fact that his real mother was Black, I don't think he cared at all about it, but he was devastated that he did not meet her. That made him very sad, he was really very sad about it."⁷⁰²⁹ His stepsister, Katerina Pnema, and childhood friends Andreas Babiolakis, Helen Grispos and Ira Kyriakakis, who were also around at the time, agree with the above statement. Tsafendas never said anything to them about his mother being Black, but he was devastated that he had not met her.⁷⁰³⁰ Tsafendas sometimes expressed his sadness that he never met her to Father Minas Constandinou who visited him in prison and the hospital for about ten years.⁷⁰³¹

All the above witnesses and everyone interviewed by the author said that Tsafendas never had an issue with colour – other people's or his own. He considered that all people were equal and had equal rights and he freely associated and played with Black and White children. He had a Black girlfriend named Stella when he was a teenager while his best friends were White Greeks, like George Grispos and John Michaletos and Black Mozambicans like Manuel and the blind boy. He later also had both Black, Coloured and White friends, including girlfriends. Tsafendas was certainly saddened that he did not meet his birth mother, as most people would be, and he sometimes expressed his sorrow about it. However, there is no evidence that it inflicted severe psychological damage on him, as the Commission claims.

No fatherland

The Commission claimed that Tsafendas "*knew no fatherland (and) that practically no country would have him,*" and that these factors inflicted severe psychological damage on him. This, too, is wrong. Tsafendas was passionate about the country of his birth, Mozambique, which he considered to be his fatherland. He spent the first twenty years of his life there and then was exiled due to his anti-colonialist and Communist beliefs and activities. He was a passionate and devoted partisan for the independence of Mozambique. Tsafendas, even in exile, was more passionate, active and caring for the cause of Mozambique's independence than many who lived permanently in Mozambique itself. How passionate and

⁷⁰²⁹ Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014.

⁷⁰³⁰ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

⁷⁰³¹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

devoted is evident from a confidential letter which the Chief Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon sent to the Sub-Director of PIDE in Mozambique, just two days after the assassination. The senior officer instructed his subordinate that any “information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of your country should not be transmitted to the South African authorities, despite the relations that exist between your delegation and the South African Police.”⁷⁰³²

Although this letter and the wider extent of Tsafendas's involvement in the fight for Mozambique's independence were not known to the Commission, several significant factors were. They included the following:

- A PIDE report which said that “one finds in him an obvious spirit of rebellion against the Portuguese Administration, and a clear adhesion to the independence of Mozambique.”⁷⁰³³
- That he was “arrested on several occasions after creating public disturbances including shouting pro-Communist and anti-Portuguese slogans.”⁷⁰³⁴
- That he had spent three months in jail in Beira after he was accused of “making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses.”⁷⁰³⁵
- That he wanted to see a “Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother nation.”⁷⁰³⁶
- Tsafendas himself had also admitted to the Commission that he had attempted to recruit people for an uprising in Mozambique.⁷⁰³⁷

As for the Commission's comment that “practically no country would have him,” this is misleading and inaccurate. Tsafendas was banned from entering Mozambique and South Africa due to his politics. Although angered that he was not able to live in these countries,

⁷⁰³² Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁰³³ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁰³⁴ Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁷⁰³⁵ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁰³⁶ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁰³⁷ Chapter II B, Paragraph 32.

where he had family, he considered his banishment as an honour, proud to be an enemy of fascist regimes. Far from being bitter or mentally affected, Tsafendas was happy to take what he saw as an honourable political stance against these two countries.⁷⁰³⁸ Father Nikola Banovic discussed the subject of Tsafendas's exile extensively with him while they lived together in Istanbul. Tsafendas told him, "When your enemies are banning you, that means that you are on a good path/road"⁷⁰³⁹ (a Greek expression, meaning you are doing something good, you are progressing well).

Tsafendas was not banned from any other country. He was deported from the United States, but this was after he had lived there for five years, and this was again because of his Communist beliefs. In Britain, he failed to get a residence permit, but he was able to live and work in other countries, which he did extensively, in Portugal, Germany, Greece and Turkey for example.

Paragraphs 4 and 7: Tsafendas's Character

The Commission devotes two paragraphs (4 and 7) to a series of negative and unfounded characterizations of Tsafendas's personality, omitting most of the positive statements in its possession while using every critical one. The parade of denigration – that he was maladjusted, rejected, frustrated, feckless, boastful, crafty and so on - suggests an attempt to belittle him as much as possible in people's eyes. Every characterization used by the Commission here was examined and dismissed as inaccurate in this chapter, in the 'Tsafendas's character according to the Commission' section. However, even if all of the Commission's negative characterizations of Tsafendas were true, they were irrelevant to his motives. A man could have all the characteristics mentioned yet still hold strong political principles. At the end of the day, Tsafendas volunteered clear political reasons for killing Dr. Verwoerd which were omitted from the Report.

⁷⁰³⁸ Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Mary Eendracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015; Katerina Pnema in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

⁷⁰³⁹ Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

Paragraph 5: Tsafendas's Political Activities and Ideas

Here, the Commission acknowledges some of Tsafendas's political activities and ideas, but the five lines it devotes to them scarcely scratch the surface of his interests. Among the very important facts missing are that he was exiled from Mozambique because of his Communist and anti-colonialist activities, his participation with the Communists in the Greek Civil War, his arrests and imprisonments by the Portuguese because of his anti-colonialist and Communist activities in Mozambique, his association in London with leading anti-apartheid activists such as David Gardener, Solly Sachs and Rev. Canon Collins. That he considered Dr. Verwoerd to be a dictator and a tyrant and had expressed his willingness to do anything to get the South African regime out of power are also omitted.

The Commission then speculates that the "discontent" felt by the crew of the *Eleni* might have affected Tsafendas's mind. The issue of the crew's alleged "discontent" has been discussed and explained in the previous chapter and has clearly been misunderstood by the Commission. The crew, most in their early twenties, had no idea what apartheid was when they arrived in South Africa and it was Tsafendas who "enlightened" them. He asked the men to boycott South Africa's economy by spending as little money as possible and he took some of them to a township in Cape Town to see for themselves the hardships of apartheid. As a result, the crew became upset about the race-based policy of apartheid; Mastromanolis said that the South Africans need "a good whipping" and Zafiriadis commented that the South Africans "should be a taught a lesson." Thus, it was Tsafendas's exposure of apartheid that affected the crew rather than the crew's discontent affecting Tsafendas, as the Commission believed.

As for the claim that the crew's discontent was about the Immorality Act, this too was wrong. All of the thirteen *Eleni* crew who were present in Cape Town and were interviewed by the author dismissed the Commission's claim out of hand, pointing out that whoever wanted to, had sex with non-White women; no-one was bothered about the Act, it was simply ignored. After all, the men had easy access to White women in Cape Town and being seamen and travellers, they did not view sex with non-White women as a unique or sought-after experience.

Paragraph 6: The Idea to Kill Dr. Verwoerd

This paragraph focuses on when Tsafendas decided to kill Dr. Verwoerd. It is entirely speculative, using phrases such as *it may be... it is probable... it is unlikely...* However, Tsafendas had told the police “some days after I started working in the House of Assembly, all kinds of thoughts came to my mind about murdering the Prime Minister. I saw an opportunity of shooting the Prime Minister from the lobby...”⁷⁰⁴⁰

Paragraph 7: A Possible Motive?

This paragraph states in its entirety:

“In the clouded mind of this outcast, who was a complete failure, whose life meant practically nothing to him, was born a cunning plan to make use of his power to destroy the head of a Government which he hated.”

Again, the Commission characterizes Tsafendas in a negative fashion while attempting to explain why he killed Dr. Verwoerd. Although there is no mention of the tapeworm and the Commission admits that Tsafendas hated Dr. Verwoerd, the subject is never elaborated.

As for Tsafendas “the complete failure,” let us examine how much of a failure Tsafendas was. He was a teacher. He gave free English lessons for six months to Greek and Turkish students in Istanbul (1961) and on two different occasions (1935-1939 and 1964) did the same for poor children in Mozambique. He became an active member of the British anti-apartheid and anti-fascist movements, participated in demonstrations and smuggled anti-apartheid literature into South Africa. By standing up for his political beliefs, he was exiled for twelve years from Mozambique, while in Portugal he was prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned and tortured. He actively protested against Portugal’s forced cotton policy and toured villages in Beira trying to raise awareness of the independence cause and for this suffered further imprisonment and torture.⁷⁰⁴¹ He joined the Greek Communist Party and fought with its military wing, the DSE, during the Greek Civil War.⁷⁰⁴²

⁷⁰⁴⁰ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁷⁰⁴¹ PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁰⁴² Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014.

He developed a list of political objectives and worked tirelessly at a hands-on level to achieve his goals of independence for Mozambique and political change in South Africa. He wanted “to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience and anything that would get the South African regime out of power.”⁷⁰⁴³ He smuggled anti-apartheid literature into the country, urged visitors not to spend money which would boost the apartheid economy and finally killing the man he believed had “created apartheid” and was “the brains behind apartheid”⁷⁰⁴⁴ in the hope that this would bring about a change of policy.⁷⁰⁴⁵

Tsafendas fearlessly told PIDE agents who interrogated him that he wanted to see “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother-nation,” adding that he was strongly in favour of the independence of Mozambique.⁷⁰⁴⁶ The fact that the Director-General of PIDE in Portugal instructed the Sub-Director of PIDE in Mozambique that “information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of your country should not be transmitted to the South African authorities,”⁷⁰⁴⁷ implies that Tsafendas was politically significant and no useless failure. That PIDE deliberately hid his detailed file from the South African authorities implies that he was far from just a “daydreamer” or a failure and all these were the actions of a practical man with practical aims who had achieved much in his life.

As for being an outcast, this is also untrue. His relationship with his family and the Greek community is discussed in the relevant sections of this chapter. His contribution and interaction with society at large is also well documented in his biography and throughout the whole study. For example, an outcast is unlikely to volunteer to teach children without remuneration, as Tsafendas did in Mozambique and Turkey.

⁷⁰⁴³ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁷⁰⁴⁴ Father Minas Constantinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

⁷⁰⁴⁵ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁷⁰⁴⁶ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁰⁴⁷ Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

Paragraph 8: The Assassination Plan

This paragraph concerns Tsafendas's reported answers to the Commission's questions regarding the pistol and the assassination plan which the Commission describes as unacceptable and where Tsafendas seems to have lied. However, Tsafendas had given accurate and perfectly reasonable explanations of these issues to the police on at least two occasions and the Commission was aware of this. For example, the Commission says that "*His explanation to the Commission that he had bought the pistol and knives for self-defence is unacceptable.*" However, Tsafendas had told the police that he bought the pistol in order to shoot Dr. Verwoerd.⁷⁰⁴⁸

The Commission itself had written in Chapter II D, Paragraph 1, that "*According to a statement made by Tsafendas, he wished to buy the pistol in order to shoot Dr. Verwoerd. When he was unable to obtain a pistol, he decided to use a knife.*" Thus, even if Tsafendas gave the answers he did to the Commission, was he not questioned about his previous statement to the police? Obviously, Tsafendas's statement to the police made more sense than his answer before the Commission and had all the appearances of truth. The Commission was in position to know that as it had his police statement in its possession.

More importantly, the Commission accepted Tsafendas's account to the police regarding his movements prior to the assassination and the sale of the pistol when dealing with his movements before the assassination and the killing itself. That is why it used a lengthy extract from Tsafendas's statement to the police to describe the events. However, when it comes to the issue of motive, the Commission uses the false statement Tsafendas gave to the Commission and not the truthful one he gave to the police. It seems that the Commission preferred to use the lie rather than the truth in order to discredit Tsafendas.

Paragraph 9: The Assassination

The final paragraph of the Chapter deals with the assassination and no reference to motive is made.

⁷⁰⁴⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

CONCLUSION

Although this chapter is headed "Demetrio Tsafendas's Motives," very little is adduced as to why Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd. The greater part of the nine-paragraph chapter is dedicated to presenting Tsafendas in a wholly negative way, with unfounded and tendentious characterizations clearly intended to discredit and belittle him. Some paragraphs speculate about what might have triggered Tsafendas's act, when Tsafendas had already explained to the police in detail his reasons for the killing.

Despite the Report's efforts to present Tsafendas as mentally disordered, there is no mention of the tapeworm, whereas at the summary trial the tapeworm was said to have played a major part in the assassination. However, Tsafendas had never mentioned the tapeworm to the police, nor apparently did he mention it to the Commission, thus making it impossible for Judge van Wyk to include such a reference in his Report.

The main conclusion of the chapter is that Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd because he hated the government. While it is true that Tsafendas hated the government, the specific reasons for his action, although known to the Commission, were not mentioned, namely that he believed Dr. Verwoerd to be a dictator and not the real representative of all the South Africans, and that he hoped a change of policy would take place after the assassination. These were the reasons he gave to the police and, as many as thirty years later, to three separate witnesses, Fathers Spiros, Ioannis and Minas. Although known to the Commission, the reasons were not included in the Report because they were incompatible with what was heard about him in court.

In omitting Tsafendas's own words, the Commission misrepresented his motives, obviously because his lucid, three-point explanation did not sound like the words of a madman, as the Commission wished to represent him. This chapter offers one of the clearest indications that the Commission did not want to give the real answers to the questions it posed but like so many other commissions of inquiry during apartheid, sought simply to present a picture that was convenient for and favoured by the government.

CHAPTER IV: WERE THERE ACCOMPLICES?

*The Commission could find no evidence which could justify a finding that there were accomplices. The probability is that it was the act of Demitrio Tsafendas and of no one else.*⁷⁰⁴⁹

The study agrees with the Commission and its analysis of all the issues mentioned in this chapter. However, some aspects need to be enlarged upon.

TSAFENDAS RECEIVING LARGE SUMS OF MONEY (Paragraph 3)

The Commission's conclusion – that there was no confirmation Tsafendas received large sums of money – is correct. Clearly, if Tsafendas possessed a great deal of money or was a paid assassin, he could have bought the gun from the *Eleni* crew as soon as he wished, without waiting until he was paid at the end of the month. Its price, 80 US Dollars, was not a huge sum for the average working South African, but it was a lot for a relatively poor man like Tsafendas.

BRAINWASHING (Paragraph 4)

“There were also speculations that Tsafendas might have undergone brainwashing overseas in the process of which he was instructed to murder Dr. Verwoerd. The Commission could find no evidence to justify such a finding. On the contrary, the weight of evidence indicates very strongly that Tsafendas did not come to South Africa with any such purpose...”

Again, the study agrees with the Commission, that there was no evidence Tsafendas was brainwashed to kill Dr. Verwoerd. If a foreign agency or power had done so, they would surely have provided him with a weapon or the money to buy one. Tsafendas had to wait until he was paid at the end of the month so that he could buy a pistol from the *Eleni* crew, having asked them already for a knife. Furthermore, Tsafendas only got the job in the Parliament, and thus access to Dr. Verwoerd, as a result of a chance encounter; it was not planned. As for brainwashing, consideration of Tsafendas's life and political development rules this out. His embrace of Communism and leftist politics in general, especially his unconcealed anti-

⁷⁰⁴⁹ Chapter IV, Paragraph 2.

colonialist stance in Mozambique, go back to the late 1930s. His abhorrence of South African apartheid and its architect, Dr. Verwoerd, emerged in the early-mid-1950s when he became eager to take up arms against apartheid in a meaningful way. Since 1959, he had made clear that he would do “anything that would get the South African regime out of power.”⁷⁰⁵⁰

It seems highly unlikely that some mysterious power “programmed” Tsafendas in 1959 or sometime before he returned to South Africa to kill Dr. Verwoerd and that he waited so many years to do it. Had he been so programmed, he would probably have made his move soon after he returned to South Africa in 1963. He lived for nine months in Pretoria when Dr. Verwoerd was also there, but Tsafendas made no move against him. In fact, he left after nine months for Mozambique, intending to live the rest of his life there. What thwarted this dream was being twice arrested and imprisoned by the Portuguese police. Seeing only a future of persecution in Mozambique, Tsafendas returned to South Africa in 1964. Finding himself in Cape Town was chance, something that would not have happened had Helen Daniels not written, asking him to marry her.

The Commission received several letters from ordinary citizens offering theories as to how a schizophrenic managed to get a job in the House of Assembly. Some suggested, without evidence of any sort, that Tsafendas was pretending to be insane to avoid the gallows, while others (see below) argued that Tsafendas was brainwashed. All of these letters shared two factors: a) none of the authors knew Tsafendas or anything about him except what they had read in the newspapers, and b) none of them offered even the slightest evidence to support their theories.

ALLAN LOMAS (Paragraph 7)

Lomas’s story sounds very like the scene at the *Eleni* shortly before it sailed from Cape Town, with someone asking about Dr. Verwoerd’s death before the assassination took place. The Commission seems to dismiss the story and it is probably correct to do so. Lomas initially claimed his wife was with him when he was asked about Dr. Verwoerd, but then he did not allow the police to speak to her. More importantly, she later denied knowledge of any such incident or that she was present.

⁷⁰⁵⁰ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

The author interviewed Mr. Lomas but he was unable or unwilling to shed more light on the incident, perhaps in part due to his advanced age. He told the author that the incident was “not like this,” meaning as it was presented in the newspaper, and that it was “a misunderstanding.” When asked what he meant, Lomas simply repeated that it was a “misunderstanding” and did not elaborate further. Lomas declined to discuss the matter further and continued to repeat that it was “a misunderstanding” and that it was “not like this.”⁷⁰⁵¹

⁷⁰⁵¹ Allan Lomas in a personal interview, 12 December 2014.

THE “BRAINWASHING” CONSPIRACY THEORY

How did the brainwashing rumour start? The culprit was the Church of Scientology and its founder, L. Ron Hubbard. Hubbard had opened several offices of his organization, the Hubbard Association of Scientologists International (HASI), in South Africa in the 1960s and had publicly expressed his support for Dr. Verwoerd and his policies.⁷⁰⁵² In 1966, he wrote a letter to Dr. Verwoerd, warning him that “a dangerous situation might exist in his vicinity.” The Prime Minister wrote back and thanked him. However, after the assassination, Hubbard claimed he became “*persona non grata* in South Africa.” This was after Hubbard publicly insinuated that Tsafendas was a Communist spy who had been incited by psychiatrists to assassinate Dr. Verwoerd in order to overthrow the government.⁷⁰⁵³ However, Hubbard produced no evidence for his bizarre theory. The brainwashing theory would come again to prominence after the collapse of apartheid firstly by Dr. Allan Bird. How is discussed in the next section.

Hubbard was not at the time the only member of the Church of Scientology to make such a claim about Tsafendas. John Browning McMaster, a member of the HASI in Durban, sent an affidavit and a memorandum to the Commission of Enquiry on October 12, 1966. His letter began, “I am a South African and support unswervingly the current Policies of this Government of South Africa at this time.” McMaster had a BA degree in Psychology and Political Philosophy and said in his letter he had also studied under the “direct training of L. Ron Hubbard, the Founder.” McMaster then wrote, “In February 1966, I emerged as the first Clear in the World and have since Toured both America and South Africa as such. A Clear is a person free from all reactive dictates of the subconscious mind and a product of the Technologies of Scientology. The fact that I am South African is of pride to me and I wish in all sincerity to have my country benefit from anything and everything that I have learned and can contribute. I have therefore compiled the attached memorandum.”⁷⁰⁵⁴

In his five-page memorandum, McMaster referred to the security measures of his organization, which, he said, were so effective no Communist could penetrate them, and he suggested that the Government should adopt these measures. McMaster presented scientology as an enemy of Communism and said HASI had developed a successful

⁷⁰⁵² Hubbard (1911-1986) was also racist, believing that Africans’ intelligence was very low to become useful members of his organization (Jones, 2012: 159).

⁷⁰⁵³ Jones, 2012: 157-161.

⁷⁰⁵⁴ John Browning McMaster affidavit to the COE. 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4. NASA.

programme for identifying Communists. He claimed that the organization had been using these methods “over the years with increasing success, in order to eliminate any Communistic Element from our organisations. The success and survival of our organisations bears testament to the fact that our Security measures against Communism are very effective. It is with sincere concern for the effects Communism has already generated in our Country, the Republic of South Africa, that the above memorandum is respectfully submitted.”⁷⁰⁵⁵

Claiming that Tsafendas was brainwashed by Communist agents, McMaster wrote that “in a Scientology Organisation, it is very unlikely that such a man would have remained employed for longer than a couple of days.” In urging the Government to adopt scientology’s measures, he noted that they were very “economical.”⁷⁰⁵⁶ However, like his leader, McMaster offered no evidence as to how, where and when Tsafendas was brainwashed.

Scientology’s allegations of a Communist conspiracy involving psychiatrists and brainwashing did not stop with Tsafendas. In 1968, Hubbard stated that the World Federation of Mental Health was “an ideal tool for furthering international Communist causes and is well used for this purpose.” Going further, he claimed that the National Council for Mental Health in South Africa, which belonged to the World Federation of Mental Health, as well as South African psychiatrists, were also part of a conspiracy, not only against the South African government but against scientology, too.⁷⁰⁵⁷ Despite the total lack of proof, Hubbard’s absurd conspiracy claims found support among some people who later reproduced them.⁷⁰⁵⁸

On April 20, 1972, the brainwashing theory resurfaced in the South African press, more specifically through *Die Vaderland*. Dr. Willie Visser, a psychologist from Port Elizabeth, claimed that Tsafendas had assassinated Dr. Verwoerd “quite possibly” under duress from intensive brainwashing and after strong-hypnotic suggestions. Like Hubbard, Dr. Visser did not produce any evidence to prove his contention, although he admitted that this was just a theory about something which might “quite possibly” have taken place.⁷⁰⁵⁹

Three years later, ignoring Dr. Visser’s caution that his argument was purely theoretical, B.M. Schoeman in *Die Sluipmoord op Dr. Verwoerd (The Assassination of Dr.*

⁷⁰⁵⁵ John Browning McMaster memorandum to the COE. 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4. NASA.

⁷⁰⁵⁶ John Browning McMaster memorandum to the COE. 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 6, File: 4. NASA.

⁷⁰⁵⁷ Jones, 2012: 160-162.

⁷⁰⁵⁸ For a detailed account of Hubbard’s theory and the reasons behind it see Tiffany Fawn Jones (2012) *Psychiatry, Mental Institutions, and the Mad in Apartheid South Africa*.

⁷⁰⁵⁹ Schoeman, 1975: 64-67.

Verwoerd) accepted it as fact and asked questions such as where, when and by whom was Tsafendas brainwashed. The publications of Schoeman and Visser brought the brainwashing theory to the surface again and it was promoted eagerly by conspiracy theorists who conveniently overlooked the fact that there was not a single piece of evidence to support such a claim, except proceeded from the two men’s imagination. Then, in 1992, Jaap Marais, a leading adherent to the theory that Tsafendas was sane and part of a wider plot, argued that Dr. Visser’s theory had found a strong response in professional circles.⁷⁰⁶⁰ However, Marais did not provide any evidence to support his claim.

Despite all of the above, there is an important omission by the Commission’s Report which, if it had become known to the conspiracists, would certainly have further fuelled their brainwashing theory. On September 9, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Cape Town received a secret telegram from the South African embassy in Washington, DC. The telegram stated that a “very reliable source with first-hand knowledge” had informed the embassy that the U.S. Immigration authorities had a file on Tsafendas. The file contained “full particulars” of Tsafendas’s time in the United States. The telegram also said about Tsafendas that “He is understood to have shown under psychiatric treatment that he was unstable though not (not)⁷⁰⁶¹ insane, but type of man who would easily be used as instrument of Communist or hostile organizations. Impression of U.S. Immigration people at the time was that he had been manipulated and was under influence of someone or some organization.”⁷⁰⁶²

Presumably, the Commission, although aware of this telegram since it was found in the Commission’s records in the National Archives, omitted it so as not to add fuel to the brainwashing and Communist organizations theories, but also to avoid reference to Tsafendas’s mental health i.e. “not insane.” Just imagine what would have happened if Hubbard, Marais, Schoeman, Visser and company had known of this telegram.

⁷⁰⁶⁰ Marais, 1992: 204.

⁷⁰⁶¹ This is exactly how it appears in the telegram. There is a second ‘not’ within brackets.

⁷⁰⁶² Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Washington to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA.

DR. ALLAN BIRD'S CONSPIRACY THEORY

Some thirty years after the assassination, Dr. Allan Bird, a South African neurologist, also suggested that Tsafendas might have been brainwashed.⁷⁰⁶³ He stated that Tsafendas was hospitalised in Brighton, where Dr. Solly Jacobson, a South African psychiatrist, anti-apartheid activist and member of the SACP, was practising. Dr. Jacobson had treated David Pratt, and Dr. Bird suspected that he might also have treated Tsafendas. Although this was merely a suspicion by Dr. Bird, based on no evidence at all, let us examine his theory.

Dr. Bird is completely misinformed about Tsafendas and gets all the basic facts wrong. He says that Tsafendas was sent to the Valkenberg mental hospital for observation during the judicial proceedings after the assassination.⁷⁰⁶⁴ That is wrong. Tsafendas was never sent to any hospital for observation, as we have seen. Dr. Bird then says that during the trial "corroborative" evidence was provided that he had been detained in mental hospitals in Britain for some years. The last was at Brighton.⁷⁰⁶⁵ No such evidence was produced at the summary trial. The hospitals in Britain mentioned were St. Pancras in London and the Whitecroft on the Isle of Wight. The hospitalizations had lasted a few months and not some years. More importantly, both hospitalizations had taken place in 1959, at which time, according to Dr. Bird himself, Dr. Jacobson was in South Africa and so could not have treated Tsafendas.

Indeed, the dates given by Dr. Bird prove that Tsafendas and Dr. Jacobson never met. According to Dr. Bird, Dr. Jacobson must have arrived in England in September 1963 at the earliest. In August and September of 1963, Tsafendas was in Lisbon, where the Portuguese government gave him amnesty and permission to return to Mozambique.⁷⁰⁶⁶ A few weeks later, in October 1963, he sailed to Mozambique from Portugal.⁷⁰⁶⁷ PIDE, who held a detailed, 130-pages file on him, do not mention anything about a visit by Tsafendas to England in 1963, nor do the British or the South African authorities, and there is no record of Tsafendas himself mentioning such a visit to anyone. Furthermore, Tsafendas was in such a poor financial situation at that time that the Portuguese government's social services paid the

⁷⁰⁶³ Bird, 1992: 210-220.

⁷⁰⁶⁴ Bird, 1992: 213.

⁷⁰⁶⁵ Bird, 1992: 213.

⁷⁰⁶⁶ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁷⁰⁶⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

fare for his voyage to Mozambique.⁷⁰⁶⁸ This makes it highly unlikely that he had the money to buy a ticket to England. In the highly unlikely event that he did return to England he could hardly have undergone a brainwashing programme from Dr. Jacobson in the few days before he sailed to Mozambique.

On the basis of dates and his information alone, Dr. Bird's theory is untenable. Nevertheless, let us examine some other aspects. Both PIDE and South African police reports, along with British official reports and Tsafendas's own statements to the police, say that he was admitted to two hospitals in Britain, the Saint Pancras in London and the Whitecroft on the Isle of Wight, both in 1959. All these reports say the same thing and none of them mentions Brighton. According to the medical records, none of the doctors who treated Tsafendas in these hospitals was named Jacobson. None of the above sources mentions Tsafendas being in Brighton, while Tsafendas never spoke of being anywhere in England other than London and the Isle of Wight. It seems highly unlikely that the British authorities would have missed a hospital where Tsafendas was admitted in England. It seems equally unlikely that Tsafendas would remember all of the hospitals where he was admitted apart from the one in Brighton. Dr. Bird's theory contains several other inaccuracies that are not worth examining further, since his fundamental claim is palpably wrong.

The brainwashing claims become even more dubious with the knowledge that Tsafendas had contemplated other actions against apartheid which did not involve killing Verwoerd. Two of these were bombing the House of Assembly or sabotaging the pipeline that transported oil from South Africa to Rhodesia. In later life and after apartheid had continued for many years, Tsafendas wondered whether he could have delivered a greater strike against racial politics by blowing up the pipeline instead of killing Verwoerd, since that would have damaged the economies of both racist regimes. He believed he could have pulled off the job easily because he knew how to make bombs and, since he had worked on the pipeline, where to place them. He was confident he could have got away because he was intimately familiar with the area. However, when he was presented with "an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity" to rid South Africa of Verwoerd, he knew he could not ignore it.⁷⁰⁶⁹

⁷⁰⁶⁸ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁷⁰⁶⁹ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

Finally, as stated earlier, Tsafendas found himself in Cape Town by chance and this would not have happened had Helen Daniels not written, asking him to marry her.

LOMAS INCIDENT AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Soon after the Lomas incident became known and even before the Commission had published its report, several people took it as proof that Tsafendas was not insane but a committed Communist and the assassination was a plot by his co-conspirators. For example, in October 1966, the *Rhodesia and World Report* wrote that the Lomas affair was proof that the assassination was “in preparation and expected;” it said, “this is not the action of a mad man, but that of a dangerous conspiracy; and we can guess who are the people and forces behind it.”⁷⁰⁷⁰

The Commission’s Report failed to convince everyone that Lomas was an unreliable witness and that he probably invented the incident. Instead, a range of doubters saw the Commission’s explanation as inadequate, even suspicious. Some openly questioned the handling of the incident and its dismissal, while others saw it as a sign that unknown parties were involved in the assassination. J.J.J. Scholtz, in 1967, was one of the first who wrote a book about the assassination, *Die Moord op Dr. Verwoerd (The Murder of Dr. Verwoerd)*. He referred to the incident but was one of the few who chose not to criticise the Commission.⁷⁰⁷¹ B. M. Schoeman, in 1975, in *Die Sluipmoord op Dr. Verwoerd*, did not appear convinced by the Commission’s explanations and characterised the incident as “odd.”⁷⁰⁷²

The greatest sceptic was Jaap Marais, who openly criticised the Commission’s explanation and expressed doubts about its conclusion. Marais referred at length to the Lomas incident on two occasions, in his 1992 book *Die Era van Verwoerd (The Era of Verwoerd)*⁷⁰⁷³ and his 1994 pamphlet *The Founders of South Africa*. In 1994, he wrote:

“So, also in Europe (or Britain) there was some indication of an anticipated assassination of Dr Verwoerd. The Commissioner, instead of dealing properly with this as a most extraordinary event, gave a superficial account of enquiries made by someone (unnamed) at the SA Embassy in London. The Commissioner left the million dollar question

⁷⁰⁷⁰ Sheldon (*Rhodesia and World Report*), September/October 1966, Vol. 1, No. 5: 3, ‘The pattern of assassination. The continuing pattern.’

⁷⁰⁷¹ Scholtz, 1967: 120-123.

⁷⁰⁷² Schoeman, 1975: 58-60.

⁷⁰⁷³ Marais, 1992: 203-204.

unanswered: how is it possible that such a newspaper report could have been published on the day of the assassination if there had not been some prior anticipation that an attempt on Dr Verwoerd's life would be made? The Commissioner instead took it on him to discredit the man who gave the information to the newspaper merely on the evidence of an unnamed official who had described this person as someone who 'did not make a good impression', which is completely irrelevant to the matter of how the man concerned could have raised the question of assassination of Dr Verwoerd four days before the actual assassination. These two apparently unrelated occurrences (author's note: here he refers to the *Eleni* and the "is Verwoerd dead incident") shortly before the assassination irresistibly suggest a widely-planned action, about which some information had been leaked, either accidentally or intentionally."⁷⁰⁷⁴

The remainder of this chapter does not require further scrutiny and the study agrees with the Commission's conclusions.

⁷⁰⁷⁴ Marais, 1994: 14-16.

CHAPTER V: THE PERMIT FOR TEMPORARY SOJOURN

This chapter of the Report deals at length with the fact that J. J. van den Berg, passport control officer at the South African embassy in Lourenço Marques, issued a permit for temporary sojourn to Tsafendas despite Tsafendas's name appearing on the Department of the Interior's Stop List. Van den Berg claimed that he had checked the list under 'S' and not 'T', which the Commission found "unacceptable" as an excuse. It concluded that this was "a clear case of neglect of duty." What the Commission did not know was that van den Berg was bribed by Nick Vlachopoulos, Tsafendas's brother-in-law, and John Michaletos, Tsafendas's uncle who knew van den Berg personally. For a detailed account of the case and what happened to van den Berg see Chapter Four of this study.

CHAPTER VI: THE PERMIT FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE

THE PERMIT

The Commission deals here with Tsafendas's permit for permanent residence in South Africa. It focusses mainly on procedural matters and how once again the fact that Tsafendas was on the Stop List went unnoticed. The permit issue is also discussed in Chapter II C, paragraphs 1-5. There it is stated:

“In his application for permanent residence, Tsafendas stated, inter alia, that he had been a sailor during the previous five years, that he had never before applied for permanent residence in South Africa, that he had never been deported from any country, and that he did not suffer from any mental disease... A medical certificate stating, inter alia, that he was not in any way mentally defective was attached to his application.”

Everything in Report's Chapter VI and the reference in Chapter II C regarding the procedure to get the permit appears to be accurate, but there are two very important omissions. The first is that Tsafendas attended three interviews with three different officers of the Department of Immigration and made a very favourable impression on all of them. That is why he was granted the permit.⁷⁰⁷⁵ This is significant in view of the evidence by the psychiatrists at the summary trial that Tsafendas was unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, that his speech was disjointed, he was unable to function on a reasonable level, and he suffered from thought-blocking and thought disorder. If Tsafendas was really like this, how did he manage to convince three different civil servants that he was perfectly fine?

Even if it is objected that these three men were not doctors of medicine, the response is that Tsafendas was also examined by two state doctors for the permit and they, too, found him to be perfectly healthy. The following covers the second omission by the Commission: although the Report refers to a medical certificate stating that Tsafendas was not mentally defective, there were in fact two certificates, both issued by the state doctors after they examined him. On November 11, 1963, Tsafendas was examined by Dr. C. Been for his permanent residence application and was found “not to be mentally or physically defective in

⁷⁰⁷⁵ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

any way,” and “generally in a good state of health.”⁷⁰⁷⁶ Dr. Been would later examine Tsafendas again “for burns on his body whilst employed at Pooles.” Again, nothing about his mental state was noted.⁷⁰⁷⁷ On November 14, 1963, Tsafendas was examined again in reference to his residence application, this time by Dr. A.C. McDonald, who wrote “a favourable report.” A certificate for permanent residence was subsequently issued.⁷⁰⁷⁸ If Tsafendas was as described by the doctors in the summary trial, would one of these two doctors not have noticed something, such as his alleged inability to follow a conversation or his thought-blocking?

This chapter goes into great detail concerning the permit process, but in omitting Tsafendas’s examination by two state doctors, the Commission once again ignores facts which contradict or raise questions concerning evidence heard at the summary trial. Surely the fact that two state doctors found Tsafendas not to be mentally defective was too important a matter to be eschewed, despite the Commission’s evident wish to present Tsafendas in the opposite light.

LIMASOLLU NACI

An important factor in this chapter is the publication of the name of the college where Tsafendas worked in Istanbul, the Limasollu Naci, although it is misspelled here as Limasolla Nace College. The name appears to be written on a note, presumably by the official in the Department of the Interior who interviewed Tsafendas. The fact that the College’s name is given proves that it was known to the Commission and to the authorities. However, it appears that no enquiries were made about it.

⁷⁰⁷⁶ Demitrio Tsafendas medical certificate issued by Dr. Been for the Aliens Act, 1937. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

⁷⁰⁷⁷ Dr. Been statement to the police, 30 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁷⁰⁷⁸ Memorandum about the application for permanent residence in terms of the Aliens Act from Demetrio Tsafendas, drawn up by the Secretary for Immigration, n.d. K150, Vol. 4, File: 1/7, Departement van immigrasie. NASA.

CHAPTER X: THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

This chapter deals at great length with the way Tsafendas was appointed as a messenger in the House of Assembly. Five of Tsafendas's colleagues were interviewed by the Commission and the police and none of them said anything negative about Tsafendas or his mental state; he was described as an ordinary, normal man. Three of the employees interviewed Tsafendas for the position of messenger and all five worked with him for more than one month.

The Report states in Paragraph 12,

“The Commission is satisfied that the interview these three persons had with Tsafendas did not differ materially from other interviews they and their predecessors had with applicants over the years. The Commission is also satisfied that there was nothing in Tsafendas's behaviour from which it could be inferred that he was mentally disordered, or that there was any indication that he might become dangerous.”

The Commission deals extensively with the interview and how Tsafendas was appointed, but there is no reference to his work as a messenger. It was claimed at the summary trial that his work was unsatisfactory and that he was unable to do even a menial job like the messenger's. However, none of Tsafendas's five colleagues in the Parliament had anything negative to say about him or his mental state or his work abilities; on the contrary, he was described as a normal person, just like any other working there.

The most important omission from Chapter X concerns the references which Tsafendas used in order to get the job. The Commission specifically asked Sydney Wiehand, one of the senior messengers who interviewed Tsafendas, about references. This is the exchange between the Commission and Wiehand:

COMMISSION: And did he have any references?

WIEHAND: He had some references. There was one —

COMMISSION: What were these references?

WIEHAND: They were from different firms -

COMMISSION: Pardon?

WIEHAND: From different firms. One or two of them. I just can't remember how many, Sir-

COMMISSION: One or two?

WIEHAND: Yes, and then he had one - I think it was from a school — where he went to school, somewhere in Natal or the Transvaal. I can't remember, Sir. There's such a lot that I see.⁷⁰⁷⁹

Tsafendas later said that he had used the reference from the Limasollu Naci College in Istanbul in order to get the job.⁷⁰⁸⁰ Although the language college reference was not specifically named by the messengers, it seems highly unlikely that it was not found by the police among Tsafendas's belongings. It also seems an obvious question for the Commission to ask Tsafendas what references he used to get the job, especially since the messengers did not remember. However, it cannot be excluded that the Istanbul reference was never found by the police or seen by the Commission.

If it was found, however, would it have been mentioned? Many awkward questions would have followed: What was this college? How did Tsafendas get an outstanding reference from the best language college in Istanbul? How did he get a job as a teacher of English there? How did he keep the job for six months? All of this when he is supposed be a hopeless, certifiable schizophrenic without a hope of cure.

⁷⁰⁷⁹ Sydney William Wiehand testimony to the COE, 5 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Uittreksels uit Getuienis. NASA.

⁷⁰⁸⁰ Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

CHAPTER XI: THE POLICE

This chapter deals mostly with the files on Tsafendas and General van den Bergh's and Vorster's initial claim that the police had no file on Tsafendas. It turned out that the police had four files on Tsafendas and the general was initially misinformed or deliberately lied. Naturally, the Report attributes the police "mistake" to an innocent misunderstanding.

A SHORT SYNOPSIS OF OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE REPORT

The Commission, in addition to investigating Tsafendas's life and movement, also inquired into matters of travel documentation and Parliamentary security, criticised certain procedures and individuals and issued a series of recommendations.

Regarding travel, it highlighted two failures. The first was that Tsafendas, a Portuguese, was allowed to enter South Africa, initially on temporary terms but thereafter for permanent residence, despite the fact that his name appeared on an official Stop List. The second concerned a delay of many months in processing an order for Tsafendas's deportation, something the Commission said could have been done in an hour.

The Report criticised officials in the Department of the Interior and on the Immigrants Selection Board for not noticing that Tsafendas had been named on the Stop List when in July 1964, he applied for a travel visa and when he returned nine months later. As for the deportation issue, it pointed out that on December 14, 1965, a high official of the Department of the Interior recommended that the Minister of the Interior should consider deporting Tsafendas, and that the Minister signed the necessary warrant on August 9, 1966.⁷⁰⁸¹

On September 1, 1966, the Ministry typed a letter to the police requesting service of the warrant but by September 6, the day Tsafendas assassinated Dr. Verwoerd, it had not been sent off. The Commission stated: "Under all these circumstances, it is clear that the delay from 14th December 1965 to 6th September 1966 is indefensible... one senior clerk would not have required longer than an hour to draw up all these documents."⁷⁰⁸² Subsequently in departmental disciplinary proceedings, two officials were found guilty of negligence in carrying out official duties, the one being reprimanded and the other admonished.

The Commission made three recommendations:

- A work-study be carried out into the organization and methods of the Department of the Interior;
- A list be compiled of anyone who had received treatment for mental disorders, such as Tsafendas, because "it is probable that a large number of assassinations, if not the

⁷⁰⁸¹ Chapter IX, Paragraph 7.

⁷⁰⁸² Chapter IX, Paragraph 7.

majority, are committed by mentally disordered persons;”

- Consideration be given to whether medical practitioners should be obliged to submit to the Commissioner of Mental Health the names of patients who might become a danger to others.⁷⁰⁸³

As for Parliamentary security, the Commission dismissed the system for hiring temporary messengers as “hopelessly wrong.” This responsibility devolved upon the Chief Messenger, assisted by senior messengers, with reference to the Sergeant-at-Arms if doubts were raised as to an applicant.⁷⁰⁸⁴ The system created unnecessary risk, the Report said.⁷⁰⁸⁵ However, it acknowledged that since the assassination, there had been drastic changes in security measures. These were the best possible and had been adopted by the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.

⁷⁰⁸³ Chapter X, Paragraphs 18, 19, 20.

⁷⁰⁸⁴ Chapter X, Paragraph 12.

⁷⁰⁸⁵ Chapter X, Paragraph 17.

MISSING EVIDENCE AND THE ROLE OF GENERAL VAN DEN BERGH

As stated at the beginning of this chapter and was discussed extensively in chapter Four, it is indisputable that several statements by witnesses who testified to the Commission and to the police, along with other evidential items, are missing from the National Archives of South Africa. The missing evidence includes material collected by both the Commission and the police. The Commission had access to its own evidence when it was sitting, so obviously it went missing afterwards. As for the police evidence, the author cannot know whether or not this was given to the Commission and therefore exactly when it went astray.

Sixty-four of the 105 statements given directly by witnesses to the Commission cannot be traced. Among statements given to the police which are missing are those by Patrick O’Ryan and the crew of the *Eleni*. These were supposedly in the Commission’s possession during the proceedings. Furthermore, the Commission stated that:

*“Evidence was submitted to the Commission that Tsafendas had tried to recruit people to take part in an uprising in South Africa. He admits that he did in fact try to recruit people for an uprising, but says that his aim was confined to the Territory of Mozambique.”*⁷⁰⁸⁶

However, no such evidence was found in the archives. It seems inconceivable that the Commission would invent such a statement. After all, it was the Commission which suppressed knowledge of Tsafendas’s political activities. It would hardly then make up a story testifying to Tsafendas’s political activities.

While we must accept that the statements of those who testified before the Commission disappeared after the proceedings ended, we cannot be certain that all the evidence collected by the police was given to the Commission. There is no mention in the Commission’s Report of the statements collected by police from the *Eleni* seamen, except for the four whose statements were found in the archives. Therefore, it is very possible that their statements were never given to the Commission. However, it is also perfectly possible that the statements were supplied to the Commission, which simply suppressed them. After all, the Commission had suppressed important evidence that was certainly in its possession. The author is therefore not in a position to know with certainty which party suppressed the evidence. However, what is more important than the answer to this question is the fact that evidence was suppressed in order to misrepresent Tsafendas and his reasons for the

⁷⁰⁸⁶ Chapter II B, Paragraph 32.

assassination.

The following incidents supports the theory that the Commission was responsible for a few, but not all, of the omissions from its Report, while the police also withheld some evidence. On 30th October 1966, *The Post* revealed that Tsafendas had joined the South African Communist Party in 1938. The article was written by Gordon Winter, a journalist of *The Post* but also an agent of the Security Police and a good friend of van den Bergh. Van den Bergh was not at all happy about the revelation and asked Winter to downplay it. Winter said about the incident: “HJ (van den Bergh) was unhappy about that aspect. He enjoyed the rest of the story, but that one aspect he was unhappy about, and that’s why he called me to Pretoria and said, ‘Do a deflation job here. Knock it down. He was an ineffective Red. He was just a procession man. They just used him to pad the numbers in the demos. Okay, Gordon?’ I said, ‘Yes, fine.’”⁷⁰⁸⁷

This incident is indicative of how van den Bergh operated and demonstrates how anxious he was to conceal or dismiss Tsafendas’s Communist activities. The SACP reference was not the only one. When Winter gave evidence to the Commission that Tsafendas had been in contact with some Russian seamen off Walvis Bay, this did not appear in the Commission’s Report, apparently because of van den Bergh’s intervention. Winter said about the incident:

“Another good example of how they closed up, closed ranks, and wiped out all trace of any suggestion that Tsafendas had been a successful communist or a keen communist was that I investigated a story in which I satisfied myself that Demetrios Tsafendas was in contact with Russian seamen on boats off Walvis Bay. There is no doubt about this whatsoever. And I gave evidence to the Commission of Enquiry, run by Judge van Wyk, into the reason and cause of death of Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd. I gave evidence to that commission, and my evidence was – quite easily for me to prove – that Tsafendas *had* been in contact with Russian seamen off Walvis Bay. It’s not a big story today. It’s not important whether he was or not. It’s not important that he could speak Russian with those people, whether haltingly or not... So I satisfied myself that Tsafendas had been in contact with Russian seamen. That doesn’t mean anything. But in the ‘reds under the bed’ scared atmosphere of South Africa, that’s a big story. I thought it was a great story...

⁷⁰⁸⁷ Gordon Winter in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*, 1997; Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

Now, all this is a long histoire; it's nonsense; it's not important whether it's true or not. Whether Tsafendas was in contact with Russian seamen – who gives a stuff? My question to you is to ask the commission why that story didn't appear in the report issued by Judge van Wyk. No mention. I later found out why. HJ [General van den Bergh] told me he didn't want it in the report. 'No connection with red seamen, no way, we don't want that. He's a madman. No connection. No connection.'"⁷⁰⁸⁸

Winter's evidence before the Commission was supported by statements made by two of his colleagues on *The Post*, Mogamet Isaacs and Gordon Tobin. This evidence can be seen earlier in this chapter. No mention of it is made in the Commission's Report.

In 1976, van den Bergh asked Winter to visit Tsafendas in prison and write a propaganda article knocking down claims by *The Observer* newspaper in London that Tsafendas was being tortured in jail.⁷⁰⁸⁹ Winter agreed and visited Tsafendas several times, developing a good relationship with him, which was not surprising since he was Tsafendas's only visitor, apart from David Bloomberg who visited him twice in ten years. Winter repeated that Tsafendas was a one-time member of the South African Communist Party, although this had been revealed ten years earlier and the Commission had even written about it. Winter thought it was old news and water under the bridge, but again van den Bergh was unhappy that it was mentioned. Winter told David Beresford of the *Guardian* in 1998 about the incident:

"I believe Pretoria did not want there to be any suggestion whatsoever that Tsafendas was clever, or programmed, or politically affiliated in any way. As I explained to Liza and Sylvia when they filmed me in London, H J van den Bergh was horrified when I wrote that story in *The Citizen* stating that Tsafendas had joined the South African Communist Party in Johannesburg in 1939 which HJ van den Bergh then told me to 'water down' by writing a follow-up article in which he [van den Bergh] described Tsafendas as being an ineffective Red, and was just used as a crowd fodder in marches etc. All HJ wanted the public to believe was that Tsafendas was totally mad and that if he managed to get out of Death Row he would definitely kill again."⁷⁰⁹⁰

This is how van den Bergh described Tsafendas in the article:

⁷⁰⁸⁸ Gordon Winter in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

⁷⁰⁸⁹ The incident is examined in Chapter Six.

⁷⁰⁹⁰ Gordon Winter's correspondence with David Beresford, 8 September 1998. Liza Key's personal collection.

“It is true that Tsafendas joined the CPSA in the late 1930s, but he was completely ineffective as a member of the Party because he never really appreciated what communism was all about. He was totally incapable of converting other people to the communist cause and that is why they merely used him to fill the ranks whenever a street procession was mounted. I can tell you that no person in South African history has ever been interrogated as much as Tsafendas.”⁷⁰⁹¹

As for the concealment of evidence, it would not have been the first time General van den Bergh and the South African police had withheld important evidence from the judicial process. In March 21, 1960, after the Sharpeville massacre, a police unit including van den Bergh, then a captain, swooped on the hospitals where wounded demonstrators were taken and removed any corpses which showed evidence of injuries caused by illegal dum-dum bullets. Evidence concerning the use of such bullets and the ammunition rounds issued was conveniently “lost” or “misplaced” by the police. The police lied, hid and fabricated evidence to cover up their use of the dum-dums,⁷⁰⁹² which, under van den Bergh’s supervision and orders, proved quite effective.⁷⁰⁹³

After the massacre, van den Bergh was sent to the Baragwanath hospital, where policemen under his command dragged wounded people from their beds, manacled them and transported them to Boksburg Prison. There they were stripped naked, sprayed with water and ordered to dress again in their same, often blood-stained clothes. They were forced to wear unwashed for months afterwards to demonstrate what happened to “agitators.”⁷⁰⁹⁴ Judge Wessels, the sole member of the Commission of Inquiry into the Sharpeville Massacre, appointed van den Bergh to determine who shouted “shoot” and who fired the first shots that wounded peaceful demonstrators. Naturally, van den Bergh “failed” to discover the guilty parties.⁷⁰⁹⁵

Since van den Bergh and other police officers were able to lie, hide and fabricate evidence in 1960, they were certainly capable of doing so again six years later, especially since the Commission could not know what evidence the police had gathered. It was certainly

⁷⁰⁹¹ *The Citizen*, 26 October 1976.

⁷⁰⁹² Martin, 2007: 13.

⁷⁰⁹³ Frankel, 2001: 147-8; 154-6.

⁷⁰⁹⁴ Frankel, 2001: 194-195.

⁷⁰⁹⁵ Report of the Commission Appointed to Investigate and Report on the Occurrences in the Districts of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, Province of the Transvaal, on 21st March 1960, 1960: 154; Roux, 1972: 408.

easier to suppress paper documents than remove corpses and wounded casualties from a hospital. Since van den Bergh was keen to discount Tsafendas's adherence to Communism, it is natural to assume that he would also want to conceal the fact that Tsafendas had fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War and that he had once characterised a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as justifiable, both political acts of greater importance than simply being a Communist Party member. Clearly, it was very easy to withhold evidence when the witnesses concerned did not give evidence to the Commission, and van den Bergh had all the statements in his possession. That would also explain why the statements from the *Eleni* went missing.

Playing fast and loose with unwelcome evidence was made much easier for van den Bergh just three years later, in 1969, when he and Prime Minister Vorster dreamed up the General Law Amendment Bill, whose notorious Clause 29 authorised the Prime Minister or his nominee (van den Bergh, of course) to prohibit oral or written testimony before any court or statutory body if they considered such evidence or document would be "prejudicial to the interests of the state or public security." This meant that the police and the security forces could conceal or ensure the unavailability of any document or evidence which might threaten their interest.⁷⁰⁹⁶ Thus, if Tsafendas's case had taken place in 1969, van den Bergh would have been in his rights to block unwelcome evidence. Not that it stopped him from doing so earlier, as, for instance, in the Sharpeville Inquiry.⁷⁰⁹⁷

The case of James Lenkoe, a Lesotho national living in Johannesburg, can also be used to demonstrate how section 29 may be employed in the interests of the authorities. Mr. Lenkoe, thirty-five, was arrested on the night of March 5, 1969, and was dead five days later. Warders at the inquest said he was found hanging by a belt from the window of his cell in Pretoria Local Prison. His wife could not identify the belt; she said he was not wearing one when arrested and he had left his only belt at home. Major J.T. Swanepoel denied that detainees were ever given electric shock treatment, but Dr. Alan Richards Moritz, a noted American pathologist, testified that a lesion on Mr. Lenkoe's toe was an electrical burn.⁷⁰⁹⁸

Mrs. Lenkoe announced her intention to sue the Prime Minister, the Minister of Police and Major Swanepoel for damages arising out of her husband's death. However, since section

⁷⁰⁹⁶ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1975a: 11.

⁷⁰⁹⁷ International Defence and Aid Fund, 1969a: 7-8.

⁷⁰⁹⁸ Bernstein, 1972: 30-31; International Defence and Aid Fund, 1969b: 7-8.

29 prohibits the giving of evidence “prejudicial to the interests of the State or public security,” either of the Ministers can issue a certificate preventing evidence of Lenkoe’s interrogation or discussion of the cause of his death. Such a procedure may also be used to stop civil actions seeking damages from the police for alleged assault. A factor affecting government thinking may be the rise in such actions, from 76 in 1966 to 117 in 1968. Section 29 will prove particularly useful to the State in the case of inquests into the deaths of persons in detention, and in circumstances where detainees have been charged and wish to claim that confessions were extracted from them under torture.???

Furthermore, in 1971, a security police agent and State witness against the Anglican Dean of Johannesburg in charges under the Terrorism Act was accused by Sydney Kentridge, the defence counsel, that he distorted and exaggerated his reports on the Dean.⁷⁰⁹⁹ Van den Bergh’s readiness to interfere with evidence was demonstrated again in 1976, this time in his personal interest, when he instructed officials in the Ministry of Information to destroy all “unnecessary documentation” that would have disclosed his involvement in the “information scandal.”⁷¹⁰⁰

Gordon Winter claimed that it was General van den Bergh who omitted evidence from the Commission and downplayed Tsafendas’s political activities, especially anything that had to do with Communism. Why? Winter’s explanation seems entirely logical:

“It’s an embarrassment for him [van den Bergh] that this man who was a) dangerous, b) mad, c) Coloured, got a job at the House of Assembly, and HJ’s policemen or security... it doesn’t matter about going to work Pelindaba or whatever you call it, for a uranium base or whatever. This is not a Kruger Park ranger job; we’re talking about in the House of Assembly. It’s embarrassing for HJ, the supremo of intelligence, for his mob to allow this lunatic – if he was a lunatic – into the House of Assembly, and he then went in with two daggers. That’s some security. No wonder they wanted to keep it quiet ... if there was a political motive, it’s hardly pro-South Africa. And if it was a political motive, surely wouldn’t the Kremlin get some benefit from that? A nice bit of propaganda. You don’t want that. The reds under the beds in South Africa were the enemy. We don’t let them score victories. Think about it. Its common sense.”⁷¹⁰¹

⁷⁰⁹⁹ Uys (*The Guardian*), 4 August 1971: 3, ‘Agent accused of distorting reports.’

⁷¹⁰⁰ Sanders, 1999: 62.

⁷¹⁰¹ Gordon Winter in Liza Key’s *A Question of Madness*. 1997.

It is also indisputable that documents from a number of important cases during apartheid have gone missing from the National Archives of South Africa. They include some 600 pages from Ahmed Timol's original inquest records.⁷¹⁰² It is logical to assume in such cases that evidence was removed by or on behalf of persons who wished to conceal their involvement and possible misconduct. In Tsafendas's case, it is not surprise that the statements which went missing were those he made which would have contradicted the Commission's findings. In fact, it is surprising that two statements which contradicted both the Court's and the Commission's conclusions were found in the Archives. It seems that whoever removed the other evidence missed these two documents. That is hardly surprising when the total of relevant documents exceeded 10,000.

Professor John Dugard is not surprised at all by the fact that the State concealed and manipulated evidence in order to mis-portray Tsafendas and his motive:

“Many South Africans suspected that there was a political cover-up in the Tsafendas case. The apartheid regime had two reasons for portraying Tsafendas to be insane. First, the regime wished to suggest that no one in his right mind could kill such a wonderful leader as Hendrik Verwoerd. Secondly, there was the security aspect. The security apparatus, led by the Minister of Justice and Police, John Vorster, wished to avoid accountability for allowing a political revolutionary to be employed in a position close to the Prime Minister. So it was that the media and the legal proceedings were manipulated to present Tsafendas as a mentally deranged person dictated to by a tapeworm.”⁷¹⁰³

⁷¹⁰² Nicolson (*Daily Maverick*), 12 October 2017, ‘Timol Inquest: He was murdered but culprits are dead, court rules.’

⁷¹⁰³ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 8 September 2016.

PUBLICATION OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

The report of the Commission was tabled in Parliament and published as a Blue Book (R.P. 16/1967) on 24th January 1967.⁷¹⁰⁴ Immediately upon publication, the government bureaucracy came in for serious criticism, particularly the departments of Immigration and Interior, along with the police. An MP for the opposition United Party, Grant Hughes, accused the Minister of the Interior, Senator Johannes de Klerk,⁷¹⁰⁵ of incompetence and bungling, stating that in any other country he would be pressed to resign. Hughes said that of the three departments under fire, the Interior was most to blame. De Klerk conceded that there had been negligence on the part of certain officials in his department, but his response was not accepted by the Leader of the Opposition, Sir De Villers Graaff. He argued that de Klerk had tried to play down the seriousness of his department's negligence.⁷¹⁰⁶

Another UP Member, J.O.N Thompson, asked what happened to the medical report on Tsafendas written by District Surgeon Dr. Kossew after he examined him on June 17. It was at this examination that Dr. Kossew diagnosed Tsafendas as schizophrenic. Thompson said, "Less than a fortnight later he was able to come into employment in this House. The Commission's Report did not reveal what happened to the report of the district surgeon."⁷¹⁰⁷ In essence, the Report achieved its main goal, which was to back the court's verdict and to assure nervous South Africans that the assassination was the act of a schizophrenic without any political motive who acted entirely alone. It also presented Tsafendas in such an unattractive light as to ensure that he would find no sympathy from the public.

⁷¹⁰⁴ Kahn, 1966: 3.

⁷¹⁰⁵ Father of F.W. de Klerk, the last apartheid President.

⁷¹⁰⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 January 1967: 2, 'Seriousness of negligence being 'played down.'

⁷¹⁰⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 January 1967: 2, 'Report is missing.'

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MENTALLY DERANGED PERSONS AND RELATED MATTERS

The issues arising from the van Wyk Commission and the Tsafendas case led to the appointment of a further Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Judge Frans Rumpff, to look at the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill, and to make recommendations in the public interest. Its remit included investigating the effectiveness of current regulations on the judging of criminal cases involving the mentally ill; methods for preventing such persons from committing acts dangerous to others; and the extent to which such persons could be judged responsible for their actions.

In 1967, the Commission issued its report, which recommended, among other things, that the doctrine of “irresistible impulse” in criminal responsibility should be abolished in favour of a criterion involving inability to act in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of an act. Eventually, ten years later, this recommendation was adopted in the Criminal Procedure Act.⁷¹⁰⁸

⁷¹⁰⁸ Strauss, 1996: 292; van Rooyen et al, 1976: 4.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Dr. Bird's, Dr. Visser's and Hubbard's brainwashing theories mentioned earlier were not the only conspiracy theories regarding Verwoerd's assassination. As with John F. Kennedy's assassination and the publication of the Warren Commission which named Harvey Lee Oswald as the sole assassin, Verwoerd's assassination and the subsequent Commission of Enquiry gave rise to a number of conspiracy theories. Despite Judge van Wyk's best efforts, not all South Africans were convinced that Tsafendas was a schizophrenic who killed Dr. Verwoerd because of a tapeworm. Some opponents espoused alternatives which were merely far-fetched, others which verged on the farther shores of lunacy.

In 2007, Mr. Petrus Cornelius Swanepoel, a former BOSS agent, wrote accurately that "the sad thing about Dr. Verwoerd's assassination is that it created the setting for irresponsible people to construct conspiracy stories, with this murder as the central theme."⁷¹⁰⁹ The purpose of examining some of these theories below, though it might appear a pointless exercise since none adduces any real evidence for their claims, is to put an end to all these theories, however obvious their general idiocy must be from the study anyway.

Setting aside the theories brainwashing, Dr. Bird and Hubbard, examined earlier in this chapter, one of the first published rejections of the official version of Dr. Verwoerd's assassination came in 1967 from Noel Crowd and Count Revo, in their book *The Pattern of Assassination*. The authors, clearly right-wing extremist Christians and anti-Semites, argued that Tsafendas was a trained assassin and part of a wider plot against South Africa. The only evidence they offered to support this claim was Dr. Fisher's opinion, and those of the unnamed doctors quoted by *Dagbreek*, that the wounds were inflicted by an expert knife handler. The authors appeared completely unaware of Tsafendas's statements to the police, of his political ideas or of his past political activism. Most of their book consisted of praise for Dr. Verwoerd and an anti-Semite tirade.

In order better to understand Revo's and Crowd's claim, it is important to know something about them, as well as the company which published their book. The authors were anti-Semite, anti-Communist, right-wing Christians who "specialised" during the 1960s in advancing "conspiracy theories" and authoring anti-Semitic hate books. Revo's titles included *Chance or Conspiracy* (1965) regarding Kennedy's assassination and a Jewish

⁷¹⁰⁹ Swanepoel, 2007: 66.

conspiracy, *Internationalism* (1965) about another alleged Jewish conspiracy, and *Senator Kennedy: Sinister or Sincere* (1968) yet one more anti-Semitic conspiracy. Crowd wrote the *Pseudo-Liberals Strategy of War* in 1964 and in 1965 the *Persecution of South Africa*, both anti-Semitic and anti-Communist tirades allegedly exposing alleged Jewish and Communist plots against South Africa.⁷¹¹⁰

All of Revo's and Crowd's books, including *The Pattern of Assassination*, were published by Boomerang Publications, a publishing house in Pretoria which specialised in anti-Semitic hate literature with titles such as *Hard Facts about the South African Jewish Times* (1960) and *South Africa - Heart & Soul: The Start of a Breakthrough* (1965). Boomerang Publications propounded the belief that South Africa had been targeted by an international Jewish conspiracy whose ultimate aim was world domination. The company billed itself as the publishing representative of the Patriots Society for Race Friendship, which aimed to counter the alleged Jewish plan by study of the conspiracy.⁷¹¹¹ Crowd's and Revo's Jewish and "Red" theories found a significant measure of acceptance in South Africa at the time and even today some South Africans refer to their books to support their argument for a Jewish conspiracy.

It should be noted that *The Pattern of Assassination* was not the only book in 1967 which dealt with Verwoerd's assassination. Also in 1967, J.J.J. Stoltz, who was also Verwoerd's biographer, published *Die Moord op Dr. Verwoerd*, in which he seemed to accept most, if not all, of the Commission's findings and conclusions. Stoltz made reference to the brainwashing theory, as well as the Lomas issue and the "Is Verwoerd dead?" question at the *Eleni*. More than simply reporting the Commission's observations without challenging them, Stoltz sought to confirm the Commission's findings with his own analysis.

In subsequent years, books such as B.M. Schoeman's 1975 work, *Die Sluipmoord op Dr. Verwoerd*, and Jaap Marais's 1992 volume, *Die Era van Verwoerd*, questioned the claimed insanity of Tsafendas and the Commission's findings. Both books referred to incidents which they felt were "odd" or inadequately explained by the Commission, like Lomas and the *Eleni*. Marais wondered how the conversation about Verwoerd's death started in the *Eleni* since he found the Commission's explanation inadequate. However, Marais was unaware that the Commission, or the police, had suppressed the evidence about how the

⁷¹¹⁰ Blog Rare Books.co.uk.

⁷¹¹¹ Shimoni, 2003: 72.

conversation started. Finally, both books also referred to the brainwashing theory and both authors, especially Schoeman, presented it as a real possibility.

Schoeman also claimed that Tsafendas was part of a wider Communist plot. He claimed that there was irrefutable evidence that Tsafendas was a member of M-Apparat, a secret Communist organization of seamen and officials of seamen's unions affiliated with the Russian Navy spy service. Schoeman claimed that this information was made available to him in 1969, three years after Verwoerd's assassination, by Patrick Walsh, research director of Canadian Intelligence Publications (CIP), who visited South Africa that year. Schoeman also claimed that the US Congress and the Committee on Un-American Activities had investigated the M-Apparat in 1963 (This was known as the Albany investigation).

Schoeman's book offered purported background on M-Apparat, highlighting the fact that some prominent members, like Tony Ambatelios and George Scordas, were Greek. He claimed that Tsafendas was a close friend of Constantine Poulos, another Greek and allegedly a leader of M-Apparat in Canada. He claimed that in the Canadian Intelligence Publications office in Ontario there was a complete file with extensive information about Tsafendas, including details of his "operations" in the United States, as well as articles from American and Canadian newspapers proving that Tsafendas was linked to M-Apparat. Finally, Schoeman speculated as to how M-Apparat members might have assisted Tsafendas in the United States and elsewhere.

Let us examine Schoeman's claims. Firstly, the author of this study examined every single copy of two of the biggest Canadian newspapers of the time, *The Globe and Mail* of Toronto and the *Vancouver Sun*, between September 6, 1966 and October 30, 1966. None of the information mentioned by Schoeman appears in either of these two newspapers. It could be argued that the information was published on another date or by another newspaper. However, the Canadian print media gave very little space to Tsafendas and there were no reports about him from three or four days after the assassination until his summary trial. What's more, if such a report had appeared in another paper, it would almost certainly have been picked up by the two biggest newspapers. Using services which provide access to the world press, the author examined *everything* that had been written about M-Apparat and Tsafendas and ascertained that not a single newspaper published any of the claims made by Schoeman. In fact, there is not a single mention in the available literature or on the internet of the M-Apparat being an active organization after 1935.

A cursory study reveals that Schoeman is wrong about some of his “facts,” which should have been easy to check. For example, the hearings of the Committee on Un-American Activities (the Albany investigation) took place in 1953 and not in 1963 as he claimed.⁷¹¹² Schoeman also wrote that three Greeks, Constantine Poulos, George Scordas and Tony Ambatielos,⁷¹¹³ were named during the Committee’s hearings as members of the organization. The fact is only Scordas was mentioned, named by Patrick Walsh. Importantly, several other members of the organization were named by Walsh, along with Communists who were active in the past in the USA. Tsafendas was not named. It seems unlikely, though not impossible, that Walsh forgot to mention Tsafendas, despite, according to Schoeman, filling a prominent role.

Let us now examine the man who claimed to have information about Tsafendas and M-Apparat. Patrick Walsh, a fanatical anti-Communist, was born in Quebec City, Canada, on March 17, 1916. In 1934, he spent a year in the novitiate of the Catholic order of missionaries, the White Fathers of Africa. During the Second World War, he served with the Canadian armed forces and participated in the Normandy landings in 1944. After the war, he spent four years “sailing on deep-sea ships all over the world.” Upon his return to Canada, he worked as undercover agent for the Special Branch (later renamed Security and Intelligence) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). According to Walsh, it was at “this stage that he began to realize the extent of Communist penetration in the trade-union movement” and he co-operated with the Provincial Police and the RCMP in “thwarting Communist violence in the Rouyn-Noranda area.” Walsh held positions in a large number of organisations, including President of the United Veterans Branch of the Canadian Legion, Provincial Command Officer of the Canadian Legion in Quebec, Research Director of the Canadian League of Rights and National Secretary of the Canadian Friends of Rhodesia. In

⁷¹¹² The full text of the hearings is available here:

https://archive.org/stream/investigationofc0102unit/investigationofc0102unit_djvu.txt

⁷¹¹³ Tony Ambatielos was a Greek seaman who emigrated to Great Britain in the 1930s and founded the Communist Federation of Greek Maritime Unions. After WWII, he returned to Greece, which was soon devastated by the Civil War. He was arrested in October 1947 and sentenced to death for his Communist and trade union activities, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He spent the next seventeen years in prison before being released in 1964, only to be re-arrested three years later by the military dictatorship in Greece (Aaronovitch, 2016: 123-125). He could not have been active with M-Apparat or any similar organization while in prison because conditions for political prisoners in Greece were very harsh. Detainees were closely watched and allowed minimal outside contact, making it virtually impossible for them to participate in any form of political activity.

1967, he stated that he had “spent thirty years of his life fighting the Communist conspiracy.”⁷¹¹⁴

Regarding these organisations, the Canadian Friends of Rhodesia does not need explanation since the title says it all. The Canadian League of Rights was one of the most far-right, anti-Semitic and anti-Communist organizations in Canada, led by an infamous fascist and anti-Semite, Ron Gostick, who was also founder of Canadian Intelligence Publications.⁷¹¹⁵ Walsh’s membership of these two organizations pointed clearly to his political opinions.

Walsh’s written and spoken words make it clear that he was a dyed-in-the-wool anti-Communist who believed that Communism was conspiring to rule the world. In 1967, using Canadian Intelligence Publications and the Canadian Anti-Communist Secretariat, he published a pamphlet entitled *RCMP Security and Intelligence Against Communism in Canada*. The pamphlet is dedicated by Walsh “To Mrs. Anne Neill⁷¹¹⁶ of Australia, and Mr. Gerald Ludi of South Africa, former undercover agents who risked their lives in the line of duty in order to expose the International Communist Conspiracy.”⁷¹¹⁷

Ludi was an agent of the South African secret service who managed to infiltrate the South African Communist Party and secure the arrests of many anti-apartheid activists. His cover was blown when he was required to testify in the trial of Bram Fisher as a state witness. Ludi testified to his meetings and chats with Fisher, thus contributing to the latter’s conviction.⁷¹¹⁸ Walsh claimed that his pamphlet exposed the infiltration of Communists in the Canadian public sector.⁷¹¹⁹

The pamphlet concluded with a section headed “Postscript to the Australian Edition” in which Walsh wrote:

⁷¹¹⁴ Walsh, 1967: 2.

⁷¹¹⁵ In 1954 Godstick wrote *The Architects Behind the World Communist Conspiracy* and argued that there was, as the title suggests, a Communist conspiracy to take over the world.

⁷¹¹⁶ Neill was an Australian widow who was a member of the Liberal and Country League and of the Women’s Peace Council. She was later recruited by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to infiltrate the South Australian Peace Council and the Communist party of Australia. She was successful and even attended the Peace Congress in Vienna and visited Moscow (Horner (*The Guardian*), 7 October 2014, ‘Anne Neill: Australia’s first secret agent invited behind the iron curtain.’)

⁷¹¹⁷ Walsh, 1967: n.p.

⁷¹¹⁸ Clingman, 2013: 319-323, 371.

⁷¹¹⁹ Walsh, 1967: 1-8.

“The truth will out some day and when that day comes, some of you Aussies will recall the pamphlet SPOTLIGHT ON RED SPY RINGS and we in Canada will recall another pamphlet, THE ARCHITECTS BEHIND THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY, that DARED to tell the truth BEHIND the Soviet spy rings while most of the communications media ranted about ‘McCarthyism’ instead of telling the facts to their readers.”⁷¹²⁰

In the event, none of Walsh’s many conspiracy theories or prophecies came true because they were largely guesswork, supposition, wishful thinking or figments of his imagination.

As for Schoeman’s claims regarding M-Apparat, Walsh indeed spoke about this organization to the Committee of Un-American Activities. He described it as a “worldwide international organization of top Communist agitators aboard ships and among the dock workers.”⁷¹²¹ However, as far as the author can establish, M-Apparat was nothing like this. According to three eminent historians, Timothy S. Brown, Assistant Professor of History at Northeastern University, Boston, Mass., Eve Rosenhaft, Professor of German Historical Studies at the University of Liverpool, and James J. Ward, Professor of History at the Cedar Crest College, Allentown, Pennsylvania, the M[ilitary]-Apparat was formed by the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in 1920 as part of an extensive illegal organization established after the Second Comintern Congress held that year. It was the KPD’s illegal, para-military wing set up to defend Communists from the violence of paramilitary organizations in Germany, but also to prepare its members for a possible armed uprising. Technical assistance from Moscow gave M-Apparat additional muscle but the organisation was cut back in 1923. In 1928-1929 the name was changed to A[nti]-M[ilitary]-Apparat, and it was dissolved in 1935.⁷¹²²

Schoeman in his book offers a completely different account of the M-Apparat, about how it was created, how it operated and its aims and goals. None of the three historians named above mentions anything like this, suggesting that Schoeman got his facts wrong or knew things the historians missed. The author has researched this subject extensively and has not been able to find any reference to M-Apparat being active since 1935, apart from Walsh’s

⁷¹²⁰ Walsh, 1967: 1-8.

⁷¹²¹ https://archive.org/stream/investigationofc0102unit/investigationofc0102unit_djvu.txt

⁷¹²² Brown, 2016; Rosenhaft, 2009; Ward, 1984: 257-297.

theory. Professor James J. Ward told the author, “I think it unlikely that the *Apparat* would have been reconstituted during WW II, although a handful of former members may have participated in the establishment of the SED in the Soviet occupation zone in the first post-war years.”⁷¹²³ It seems rather unlikely that the organization was indeed active but only Walsh knew about it. Consideration of his other theories and far-fetched claims suggest this to be a very unlikely possibility.

As for Tsafendas, even if the organization did exist during WWII and in the 1960s, that does not mean he was a member. Tsafendas spoke at length and in great detail about his life to the Orthodox priests who visited him regularly in prison and in hospital. He had no problem telling them about joining the Communists of the DSE during the Greek Civil War and even spying on their behalf. Thus, it seems most unlikely that he revealed these and many other unknown aspects of his life but kept membership of M-Apparat secret. The author asked all the Communist sailors of the *Eleni* whether they were members of the M-Apparat or any Communist organization and they all strongly denied it. None of them had heard the name M-Apparat and could not even pronounce it. They pointed out that Communism and the Communist Party were illegal at the time in Greece and it was a serious offence to be a member of any Communist organization.

What makes Schoeman’s claim regarding Tsafendas and the M-Apparat almost impossible of belief is Walsh himself and Canadian Intelligence Publications. Both seem to contradict Schoeman’s claim that the company had a complete file on Tsafendas with his activities in the United States and Canada. Walsh wrote, co-wrote, or contributed forewords to several books about Communist conspiracies, all published by the Canadian Intelligence Publications, where he was the research director.

The publishing house did in Canada what Boomerang Publications did in South Africa. It published and distributed far-right, right-wing-Christian, anti-Semitic and anti-Communist hate literature, much of which warned of a Jewish-Communist conspiracy to take over the world. The company’s titles included *The Architects Behind the World Communist Conspiracy*; *The Red Fog Over America*; *Hidden Government*; *No Wonder We Are Losing*; *The Yalta Betrayal*; *Zion’s Fifth Column*; *The Real Communist Menace: The Canadian Royal Commission’s Report on Espionage and Other Communist Activities in Canada*; *Student Power Movement & What is Behind it World Wide*; *The Battle for Canada*; *Canada’s*

⁷¹²³ Professor James J. Ward in a personal interview, 6 November 2017.

Watergate: The Story of Treason in Ottawa; The Moment of Truth; The World Council of Churches: - A Soviet-Marxist Catspaw in Africa?; Harvest of Fear, A Diary of Terrorist Atrocities in Rhodesia. However, in none of these books is there any mention of Tsafendas. If the company really had a file on him, it would almost certainly have published it to support its claims of the Communist conspiracy since Tsafendas was indeed a Communist and had just assassinated South Africa's Prime Minister.

The briefest glance at some of the conspiracy theories in these books is enough to convince the serious reader that they cannot be taken seriously. For example, in *The Moment of Truth, The World Council of Churches: A Soviet-Marxist Catspaw in Africa?* Ron Gostick repeated his claim of a Communist conspiracy to enslave the world. What was different about this pamphlet was Gostick's discovery of a new enemy, the World Council of Churches, which he claimed was a tool in the hands of the Soviets. He described the WCC as "little more than the ecclesiastical arm of the International Communist Conspiracy," which wanted to make all of Africa Communist. After Africa, it would be the turn of the rest of the world.⁷¹²⁴

Gostick claimed that the WCC supported and funded "the most barbaric guerrilla-terrorist activities in Southern Africa, which have caused untold suffering and the death of thousands — mostly Blacks — including many children and our own Christian missionaries. This anti-Christian action of the WCC has become so outrageous that it is offensive to some of its own more fundamentalist or evangelical members. Yet, only last month, in addition to the \$85,000 the WCC recently gave the Red-controlled guerrillas attacking Rhodesia, a further \$125,000 was allocated to SWAPO terrorists operating as the Soviets' catspaw in South West Africa." He warned that "until Canadians in general, and the Christian Laity in particular, wake up and face the reality of this incredible betrayal, this policy of *national suicide* will continue. Therefore, this little booklet is a most timely addition to the Freedom arsenal."⁷¹²⁵

At the end of *The Architects Behind the World Communist Conspiracy*, Gostick wrote:

"Nothing less than a Christian reawakening and a return to Moral Law can lay the basis of sound action to overcome this Anti-Ghrist onslaught upon Christendom. We of the

⁷¹²⁴ Gostick, 1978: 1-8.

⁷¹²⁵ Gostick, 1978: 1-2.

West must begin to face up to the Truth, ugly though it may be. Anything less will spell disaster. May Almighty God, through His Holy Spirit, awaken, guide and direct His people in the salvaging and revitalizing of Christian Civilization. International Marxism is a Conspiracy. The quickest way to defeat a Conspiracy is to expose it to the light.”

Gostick then pleaded “after you have read this revelation of treason and subversion, send copies to friends, public officials and influential citizens throughout your community and province. Don’t break the chain – keep the revelation growing.”⁷¹²⁶

It is obvious from the above and from other publications by the same company that their aim was to spread the word about this alleged Communist conspiracy. Tsafendas, a Communist who assassinated a powerful world leader and who was allegedly a member of M-Apparat, would clearly have been an ideal figurehead for such a campaign. Yet Tsafendas receives no mention from the Canadian Intelligence Publications that according to Schoeman the company had a detailed file on him in its offices. It appears almost impossible that the company had a large file on Tsafendas and kept it to itself. Furthermore, if it did have such information, Walsh and the CIP would surely have alerted the South African authorities. After all, it was clear from Walsh’s dedication to Ludi and his membership of the Canadian Friends of Rhodesia group that he supported apartheid. Thus, if he had such information, it seems unlikely that he kept it to himself and Schoeman.

Despite the many egregious inaccuracies in Schoeman’s book, there are always people eager to believe in conspiracy theories and one, in this case, was Jaap A. Marais. In his book in 1992, Marais referred to the rumour about Tsafendas and M-Apparat.⁷¹²⁷ Without checking, Marais lifted the claim directly from Schoeman and almost copy-pasted it into his own book. That is evident from the fact that he makes exactly the same mistake as Schoeman in claiming that the Albany Investigation took place in 1963, when in reality, it was in 1953. Finally, in his 1980 book *Die Geldmag. SA se Onsigbare Regering*, Schoeman returned with another conspiracy theory and claimed that Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination, by the “Communist Tsafendas” was a key moment in the planning of the great internal and external financial powers to gain control of the South African economy.⁷¹²⁸

⁷¹²⁶ Gostick, 1954: 16.

⁷¹²⁷ Marais, 1992: 200-212.

⁷¹²⁸ Schoeman, 1980: 46.

It is worthy of note that in 1974, although he did not mention anything about Tsafendas, British journalist and political analyst Douglas Reed wrote in *The Siege of Southern Africa* that Poqo had sent out “an organized group” to kill Dr. Verwoerd, Vorster and Dongses. Reed claimed that the plan failed when the group was intercepted by the police.⁷¹²⁹ Significantly, Reed was also a well-known conspiracist and a fanatical anti-Semite who also believed the Jews were planning to take over the world.⁷¹³⁰

In later years, with the arrival of the internet, more conspiracy theories came to light, one being that Tsafendas was a hired assassin, another that he was trained by MI6, while the Jewish, the Communist and the brainwashing theories remained prominent. A conspiracy theory which surprisingly found some appeal among white South Africans was put forward by Advocate P.J. Pretorius in his 1996 book *Volksverraad: Die Geskiedenis agter die Geskiedenis* (self-published in English the following year as *Sell-Out: The Truth Behind the History of South African Politics*). It carries the following blurb:

“For the first time, the White South Africans heard the truth about how they had been manipulated and brainwashed into giving their country to black Communist rulers. The handing over of the government to black rule had been carefully planned over many decades with the help of traitors among the Afrikaners. These traitors had been working hard behind the scenes, telling their people one thing, but doing and planning quite another. In this shocking book, Advocate P J Pretorius unmasks them all, calls them by their names and tells of their crimes against the unsuspecting Afrikaner nation. He names their accomplices among the CIA, as well as those in the NIS [National Intelligence Service] of South Africa. He leaves no stone unturned to get at the damning truth.”⁷¹³¹

Advocate Pretorius, a self-professed former NIS agent, claimed that the Verwoerd assassination was orchestrated by the Illuminati and Anton Rupert, while Happy Oppenheimer is described as the Illuminatie’s “kingpin” in South Africa.⁷¹³² Pretorius also claimed that Tsafendas was trained by Britain’s MI6 to assassinate Dr. Verwoerd and that he was paid R5,000 in cash. The inaccuracies in Pretorius’s book are so many and so obvious, it is difficult to know where to begin, therefore we will examine only some of those errors which pertain to Tsafendas.

⁷¹²⁹ Reed, 1974: 111.

⁷¹³⁰ Thurlow, 1984: 23-34.

⁷¹³¹ Pretorius, 1997: back cover.

⁷¹³² Pretorius, 1997: 133, 170-175.

According to Pretorius:

“Tsafendas in May 1960 told workers at Anton Rupert’s cigarette factory at Brits, Rothmans International, that he would kill Dr. Verwoerd should such an occasion arise. Tsafendas’ statement was relayed to Dr. Rupert shortly afterwards. Tsafendas was employed at Rothmans International in June 1960, and his employment was terminated formally in January 1962. Rupert never spoke to Tsafendas face to face. From February 1962, Tsafendas was unemployed but was paid from Rupert’s financial sources. It is said that the idea to murder Dr. Verwoerd first took shape in March 1963 in the vicinity of Birmingham. Rupert called a meeting with four other persons, among them members of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), CIA and MI6. At that meeting it was resolved that Dr. Verwoerd was to be killed by an assassin, and Tsafendas was called in to do the deed. It was decided that Tsafendas would be trained by MI6, and that they would pay him once the deed was done...

Tsafendas’s training by MI6 was done in two stages. The first stage was conducted in the vicinity of Kerkira in Greece, and rested mainly on hypnotic brainwashing. The spear was used as symbol to activate the murder. A drop of blood signified the time factor. When and where the second stage was conducted is not known. The emphasis during this stage was on the handling of weapons. In Cape Town on 9 June 1965 at about 21h30 Tsafendas was paid about R 5,000 in cash to murder Dr. Verwoerd. He was paid by an unidentified MI6 agent. As far as is known, he was transported in Rupert’s car. Rupert himself was not present, but his chauffeur was. The chauffeur was not aware of the nature of the event.”⁷¹³³ Pretorius concluded that, “Although Rupert was the driving force behind Dr. Verwoerd’s murder, the architect was the foreign Monetary Power.”⁷¹³⁴

Pretorius does not name sources for any of the above claims; instead, he asks the reader to take his word for granted, as he states at the beginning of his book: “I, the writer, stand by the contents of this book. I will only go back on my word if those who allege that this information is false, are willing to prove it through a serum test.”⁷¹³⁵

Let us examine some of the claims involving Tsafendas. Firstly, Tsafendas never worked for Rothmans. There is no such information in the PIDE file, in the COE’s report, nor in the evidence collected by the South African police, including that provided by the British

⁷¹³³ Pretorius, 1997: 170-174.

⁷¹³⁴ Pretorius, 1997: 175.

⁷¹³⁵ Pretorius, 1997: n.p.

authorities regarding Tsafendas's time in England. Tsafendas himself never told anyone that he had worked for Rothmans and it is worth mentioning that he personally abhorred smoking and would move away from cigarette smokers to avoid the fumes.⁷¹³⁶

What is incontestable is that in June 1960, Tsafendas was working, not for Rothmans in England, but at a tractor factory in Munich, Germany. Tsafendas stated as much in his statement to the South African police after his arrest and the PIDE file on him confirmed it, noting that on May 25, 1960, he was issued a temporary Portuguese passport in Munich. On June 30, according to several PIDE documents, according to Tsafendas himself and according to the Commission of Enquiry, Tsafendas began travelling through the Balkans to Egypt in an attempt to reach Mozambique by land. In Egypt, his passport expired and the Portuguese Consulate refused to renew it. However, he managed to obtain a refugee passport from the Red Cross and travelled to Beirut, Lebanon.⁷¹³⁷

On January 20, 1961, Tsafendas presented himself at the Consulate-General of Spain in Jerusalem, requesting a visa for Israel as a refugee.⁷¹³⁸ In June/July 1961, he found himself in Istanbul, where he remained until December 1961. Unless, PIDE, the Commission of Enquiry, the South African press, Tsafendas himself in his statements to the police and his friends, Father Nikola Banovic and Alexandra Vaporidis are all mistaken, these were Tsafendas's whereabouts, rendering Pretorius's statements false. Tsafendas lived for some seven months in Istanbul, four of them in Father Banovic's house where the two were in touch on a daily basis. Another witness, Alexandra Vaporidis, whose husband Father Agathagelos Vaporidis also associated with Tsafendas at the time, confirmed to the author that Tsafendas was in Istanbul at the time. Even the South African press had become aware that Tsafendas was in Istanbul in 1961 teaching English at a private college

As for Tsafendas's whereabouts in January 1962, these were also known to PIDE and to the South African authorities. According to Tsafendas's statement to the police, but also to PIDE's file, he was at that time in Crete. He then took a ferry to Piraeus, travelled by bus and ferry to Corfu, then boarded a seagoing ferry to Brindisi in southern Italy.⁷¹³⁹ He arrived in

⁷¹³⁶ Fotini Gavasiadis in a personal interview, 6 May 2015; Irene Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

⁷¹³⁷ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁷¹³⁸ Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, proc. 518/15/55. Co. 334. 6 April 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷¹³⁹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Brindisi, on January 31, 1962 and travelled to Rome, where on February 8, 1962, he called at the Portuguese Embassy. The embassy gave him an allowance of 6,000 lire and a Rome-Lisbon train ticket costing 26,000 lire to help him return to Portugal.⁷¹⁴⁰ It is surely not possible that all these sources, especially PIDE's official documents from the Portuguese mission in Italy, could be mistaken about Tsafendas's whereabouts while Pretorius is correct, without providing a single piece of evidence to support his claim.

As for Tsafendas receiving a payment on June 9, 1965 in Cape Town, this could not have happened because Tsafendas was in Durban at the time. On May 7, 1965, Tsafendas was embroiled in a fight with Vergos in Mandini, a town about a hundred kilometres north of Durban.⁷¹⁴¹ Father Hanno Probst testified to the police that sometime in June he saw Tsafendas in Mandini with his hand bandaged from the fight with Vergos.⁷¹⁴² That must have been early June, as later that month Tsafendas moved back to Durban and from June 21, 1965 to August 24, 1965, he lived at the Durban Men's Home at 160 Queen Street. Two staff members of the Home, Kenneth Heugh Ross and Robert Harpur Smith, testified to the police after they checked their records that Tsafendas was there at the time.⁷¹⁴³ It was also in June 1965, while he was in Durban, that Tsafendas received the first letter from Helen Daniels in Cape Town. They subsequently exchanged more letters.⁷¹⁴⁴ According to Tsafendas himself, to Helen Daniels's statement to the police and to her brother Peter Daniels's testimony at Tsafendas's summary trial, Tsafendas arrived in Cape Town from Durban on August 28, 1965, travelling partly by train and partly hitch-hiking.⁷¹⁴⁵

It seems highly unlikely that these three people are mistaken about the date of Tsafendas's arrival while Pretorius is correct, again without evidence. It is not impossible that

⁷¹⁴⁰ Seccao Consular Report regarding Dimitri Tsafendas, 10 February 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷¹⁴¹ Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File Verklarings. NASA.

⁷¹⁴² Father Hanno Probst statement to the police, 9 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Father Hanno Probst statement to the COE, 13 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁷¹⁴³ Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966, K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA; Robert Harpur Smith statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

⁷¹⁴⁴ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA.

⁷¹⁴⁵ Helen Dorothy Daniels statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: VDSO 17/64, NASA; Peter Daniels's testimony on Tsafendas's summary trial, 18 October 1966. K150, Vol. 10, File: Trial, NASA; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

Tsafendas could have travelled for one day from Durban to Cape Town, received the money from the MI6 agent and then returned to Durban. In such a case, however, why would he not stay in Cape Town to do the job? A final point: Tsafendas's financial situation was so bad at the time that he hitch-hiked free to Cape Town. Why would he go to all that trouble when he had in his possession the money the agent supposedly gave him?

Pretorius's book contains several other unfounded claims both about Tsafendas and historical events in South Africa, but the author feels it is not necessary to examine them since it is clear that they have no basis in truth and are not worth taking seriously. Petrus Cornelius Swanepoel referred explicitly to Pretorius as being one of those "irresponsible people" who constructed conspiracy theories. He wrote that his claims "are completely unfounded. His nameless sources are non-existent and the entire book, which refers to the 'Illuminati' on just about every page, is constructed on a falsehood. He claims the proof of the existence of the 'Illuminati' is to be found in Professor Carroll Quigley's book *Tragedy and Hope*. The truth, of course, is that the word 'Illuminati' appears nowhere in that book."⁷¹⁴⁶

Conspiracy theories as to Verwoerd's assassination continued to appear in later years, especially on the world wide web when that became available, but also occasionally in books. The most popular theory, as always, was of a Jewish and/or Communist conspiracy. What may have added to this belief was the fact that four members of Tsafendas's defence team were Jewish (Bloomberg, Kossev, Sakinofsky and Zabow) as was Dr Jacobson, a fact highlighted by Dr. Bird's theory. Many of the theories developed in later years took elements from the older ones or simply re-presented them as facts because Schoeman or Marais wrote about them. It is pointless to continue analysing these writings since none of them provides any supporting evidence. Worse, the authors prove not to have even the most basic knowledge of Tsafendas's life, political ideas or political actions before the assassination.

Ironically, none of the conspiracy advocates seemed to be aware that Tsafendas's great-grandmother was Jewish, although this would doubtless have been seen as further evidence of a complicated Judaic plot. Many similar theories purporting to explain the "truth" behind Verwoerd's assassination can be found on the internet, including several based on Dr. Bird's theory or on *Dagbreek's* report from the unnamed doctors. None of them is worthy of serious examination since they provide no credible proof for their claims. They either

⁷¹⁴⁶ Swanepoel, 2007: 67.

speculate endlessly about what possibly happened, or they refer to “events” and present them as facts, while no names or references are adduced as to the source of their “information.” Finally, none of the authors demonstrates even the slightest knowledge of Tsafendas’s life, character, political beliefs and activities apart from the information published in the van Wyk Commission’s report.

It can be no coincidence that most of the conspiracy theories regarding Tsafendas were developed by people with the same political obsessions and characteristics, being racists, fascists, anti-Semites and anti-Communists. All claim that there was a Jewish-Communist conspiracy against Dr. Verwoerd and South Africa. Where they differ is with the assassin, some claiming Tsafendas was brainwashed, others that he was a member of a secret Communist organization, still others that he was a hired hand. Something else they have in common, and the most important, is that none of them presents any evidence to support his theory and sources are never specified. As for the Jews being blamed, that is hardly surprising. As Jean-Paul Sartre said, “If the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him.”⁷¹⁴⁷

⁷¹⁴⁷ Sartre, J.P. (1946) *Anti-Semite and Jew*.

SUMMARY OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

The report of the Commission played a very important role in creating the false picture of Tsafendas that persists until today. The stated duty of the Commission was "to enquire into and submit a report on all aspects relating to the death of the Prime Minister which were deemed to be in the public interest." Anyone reading the Commission's Report without specialist knowledge would probably consider it lucid, informative and even-handed. On most issues, it is also in accordance with what was heard during Tsafendas's summary trial.

However, anyone cognisant of the evidence which the police and the Commission had in their possession, would conclude that van Wyk's Report was no better, no fairer and no more accurate than Sharpeville or the other Inquiries discussed at the beginning of this chapter. In truth, it was worse because of the sheer amount of information it suppressed in order to portray Tsafendas's personality and intentions in a negative light. As with several judicial inquiries, the van Wyk Commission concealed more than it revealed. Although the picture of Tsafendas contained in the Report was certainly more accurate than the one which emerged from his trial, it was nevertheless a travesty of the truth.

The Commission seemed to believe that apart from the stated official reasons of its existence, it also had the following duties:

- To confirm that Tsafendas had acted alone.
- To strengthen and confirm the notion that Tsafendas was mad and devoid of political motive.
- To belittle Tsafendas in such a way that the public would agree with the portrayal it had engineered.
- To absolve the police and the security forces of blame for letting Tsafendas get close to Dr. Verwoerd.

To achieve these aims, the Commission covered up any contrary evidence.

TSAFENDAS'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND IDEOLOGY

The Commission appears to be open and objective in disclosing some of Tsafendas's political activities. It reports that he was a one-time member of the SACP, that he was engaged in Communist propaganda in Mozambique and South Africa and that he had strong feelings

against the Portuguese colonial rulers and the South African government. All this is correct, but merely skims the surface of Tsafendas's political involvements.

The Commission omits major facts, such as his association in London with leading anti-apartheid activists, the fact that he fought with the Communists in the Greek Civil War, his opinion about Dr. Verwoerd, and several of his arrests and prison sentences by the Portuguese because of his political activities. Furthermore, the Commission offers no new revelations since most of Tsafendas's political activities, for example that he was a former member of the SACP, had already been reported by the Press. Some revelations could probably not have remained hidden, e.g. that the police held four files on Tsafendas and not just one as originally stated, while others come across as attempts to show some objectivity so as to conceal more important facts.

It is noticeable that evidence available to the Commission revealing Tsafendas to be a politically involved person, a devoted and passionate Communist with a fully developed ideology is not the evidence which the Commission presents. The Commission downplays his political ideas and omits details of his activities. The extent of Tsafendas's desire to effect a change in South Africa's race policy is suppressed. Crucially missing, for instance, are that he wanted "to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa and mentioned civil disobedience" and his willingness to do "anything that would get the South African regime out of power,"⁷¹⁴⁸ and that he wanted to see a "Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the Mother nation."⁷¹⁴⁹ Most importantly, the Commission avoided using Tsafendas's own words to describe his political ideology, apparently because, honest, persuasive and coherent as they were, they did not fit with the idea of a madman.

TSAFENDAS'S PERSONALITY

The Commission's determinedly negative portrayal of Tsafendas could be fairly described as character assassination. It ignores any positive evidence about him, apart from one, whilst embracing everything it can find to his detriment. Some 200 witnesses were interviewed by

⁷¹⁴⁸ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁷¹⁴⁹ Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

the police and the Commission, of whom 44 made positive statements about Tsafendas's character, 6 made negative statements and the remainder said nothing negative or positive. Thus, 22% of the statements were positive, 3% were negative and the remaining 75% neutral. However, the Commission used only 1 of the 44 positive comments, that is only 2.2% of the positive comments but 100% of the negative. It also presented some incidents in such a way as to give the wrong idea about the incident and about Tsafendas.

Judge van Wyk used a series of unfounded characterisations to portray Tsafendas which were incompatible with the evidence collected by the Commission and the police. It did this by suppressing and misrepresenting evidence in order to reduce Tsafendas to a shambling caricature of the person he truly was. If van Wyk were alive today, he would have great difficulty defending himself against a charge of defamation.

TSAFENDAS'S MOTIVE

A glaring loophole in the Commission's work is its failure to provide an explanation for Tsafendas's motive for the assassination. Although Tsafendas had made it perfectly clear to the police in his two statements that he killed Dr. Verwoerd because he considered him to be a dictator and hoped his death would change national policy, these comments about motivation are omitted. Instead, the Commission speculates fruitlessly about Tsafendas's reasoning and what might have triggered his hand.

More importantly, in the chapter of the Report titled "Demetrio Tsafendas's Motives," the Commission dedicates most of the space to presenting Tsafendas as a rejected, frustrated, psychologically damaged product of an unhappy childhood, employing a series of wholly unfounded descriptions of him that were irrelevant to the question of motive. One area where the Commission distanced itself from the summary trial was in making no reference to the tapeworm story when discussing motives for the assassination. Once again, the Commission avoided using Tsafendas's own words to describe his motive, clearly because such an explanation did not fit with the idea of a madman.

TSAFENDAS'S MENTAL STATE

The Report seems to suggest that the Commission has some doubts as to the extent of Tsafendas's alleged insanity. It concedes that he was not as mad as portrayed at his trial and

that he was clever enough to put on a good act. Still, it goes to great pains to press its case for insanity. For instance, only 4 witnesses out of a total of about 200 questioned by the police and the Commission thought there was something mentally wrong with Tsafendas; that is 2% of the total. Using 3 of these 4 means the Commission used 75% of the negative statements. On the other hand, 51 witnesses out of the 200, this is the 25.5%, had commented that Tsafendas was perfectly normal, while the rest made no comment, obviously because Tsafendas seemed perfectly normal to them. However, the Commission only used 6 out of the 51 positive statements, thus only 11.7% of them. This is something that happened with every issue dealt by the Commission. All, or the vast majority of negative statements, are used, while the positive ones are ignored.

TSAFENDAS FAKING MENTAL ILLNESS

One very important revelation made by the Commission is that Tsafendas had faked mental illness while in the United States. This was a genuine disclosure since it was not brought up at the trial and had not been mentioned elsewhere. However, the incident is treated superficially and no elaboration is offered, while the Commission suppressed the fact that there was at least one other time when Tsafendas faked mental illness - when he pretended to be mad in order to not serve in the Portuguese army.

THE ELENI

One of the most intriguing parts of the Report concerned what happened on board the tanker *Eleni* and how it was that Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed there three days before he actually died. The Commission dedicated more space to this than to any other issue but failed to find an answer and in the end only speculated about what might have happened. Judge van Wyk could have saved himself much effort by using the evidence painstakingly collected by the South African police in Venice. They showed precisely what happened and the circumstances in which Dr. Verwoerd's death was discussed when Tsafendas characterised a hypothetical assassination of his as justifiable because he was a tyrant who was oppressing his people. This was not the only important omission concerning the *Eleni*. Also suppressed were the fact that Tsafendas took some of the crew to visit a township, and the details of his

initial assassination plan, to shoot Dr. Verwoerd and escape by hiding and then sailing away on the *Eleni*.

CONCLUSION

Austin T. Turk, Professor of Criminology at the University of California, said about South Africa during apartheid that it may well have had “the world’s most elaborate legal structure for the repression of political resistance of all kinds.”⁷¹⁵⁰ The van Wyk Commission and how it operated, as well as Tsafendas’s summary trial, are perfect examples of how right he was. As with so many Commissions of Inquiry during apartheid, the van Wyk inquiry concealed more than it revealed; it suppressed all the evidence which contradicted the verdict at Tsafendas’s summary trial and the picture of him which was presented to the court. Crucially, it sat on key evidence showing Tsafendas as a politically motivated person who killed Dr. Verwoerd because he considered him to be exactly what he was, a tyrant and a dictator and the brains behind apartheid, and further hoped that by killing him a change of policy would take place.

The primary aim of the Report was to dispel any suggestion that the assassination might have been part of a wider plot and that there might be serious political opposition to the apartheid regime, and it did this by presenting Tsafendas as a wandering lunatic who killed Dr. Verwoerd for no reason. By suppressing a great deal of evidence and massaging some that was presented, the Commission reassured the public and ensure there ensured and there would be no sympathy for Tsafendas and therefore no unfortunate reactions to his fate.

The Attorney-General at Tsafendas’s summary trial might not have had access to all the evidence gathered by the police and Judge Beyers himself was not even aware of it, but the same cannot be said about Judge van Wyk. He was in possession of a wealth of evidence making clear that Tsafendas was not as described at the summary trial. Nevertheless, he deliberately omitted much of it to present the distorted picture of Tsafendas that he required.

Professor John Dugard told the author about the portrayal of Tsafendas by van Wyk: “van Wyk was politically very much in favour of the government, so it would not surprise me

⁷¹⁵⁰ Turk, 1982: 146.

at all that van Wyk decided either under pressure, but I suspect not under pressure, probably he just felt... and he was in touch with all the top National Party people, socially. He would probably have got the message that it was better, as far as the government was concerned, that Tsafendas be found to be insane. Politically, it was obviously better for the government to portray Tsafendas as someone who was insane, because they wished to be able to argue that no sane person could kill Dr. Verwoerd – that anyone who killed Dr. Verwoerd must have been insane. So that was why I suspect that Judge van Wyk interpreted the evidence the way he did.”⁷¹⁵¹

Furthermore, Professor Dugard believes it is inconceivable that van Wyk would have contradicted Judge Beyers' verdict under any circumstances, even if he had evidence pointing in an opposite direction. It would have been impossible for him to present Tsafendas and the assassination in a way that did not suit the government. That is exactly why he was chosen in the first place. On the subject of Commissions of Inquiry during the apartheid years, Professor Dugard said, “One of the most disgraceful things about South Africa during this period was the way in which judicial commissions were manipulated, and also the way in which inquest inquiries were conducted and the magistrates just ignored the evidence. (The judges) knew how to make a finding that would help the government. That was very clear.”⁷¹⁵² The way the Commission of Enquiry into Dr. Verwoerd's death was conducted is a perfect example of Professor Dugard's argument. It takes its place of dishonour alongside Sharpeville, Soweto, Langa and other disgraced apartheid Commissions.

⁷¹⁵¹ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁷¹⁵² Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DAVID PRATT

INTRODUCTION

The aims of this chapter are to examine David Pratt's assault⁷¹⁵³ on Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd in 1960 and to bring to light important new information. Pratt's case is not examined in the same detail as that of Tsafendas, but by presenting the new evidence and considering similarities in the two cases, an argument is offered for a thorough reconsideration of Pratt's case. To examine Pratt's background, personality and beliefs in the context of his attack on Dr. Verwoerd and to support his case, the author used an extensive range of sources, including all relevant documents from the South African National Archives, interviews with people who knew Pratt, the archives of the National Liberal Club in London of which Pratt was a member for more than thirty years, Guy Spiller's film documentary about Pratt, *The Liberal and the Pirate*, Pratt's personal correspondence after the assault, and leading South African, European and American newspapers of the time. Examination of these sources brought to light several hitherto unknown but significant facts about Pratt, which suggest that a detailed re-evaluation of his case is necessary.

⁷¹⁵³ The study uses the word *assault* because Pratt said he wanted to injure Verwoerd, not to kill him.

DAVID PRATT'S BIOGRAPHY⁷¹⁵⁴

David Beresford Pratt seemed born to succeed, defying life-long epileptic seizures to excel in the academic world, in sports and in business, earning in the process a reputation as a kindly and principled man. He was described by fellow members of the National Liberal Club in London as “a gentleman in every way.”⁷¹⁵⁵ Pratt had a comfortable start in life, born October 1, 1909 in the “stockbroker belt” of Croydon, Surrey, outside London, to Arthur and Georgina Pratt. His father was a stockbroker and a wealthy businessman in his own right as the owner of several companies. He was also a committed Liberal and a prominent member of the Liberal Party of Great Britain. The family moved to South Africa when David was four and he grew up in Johannesburg.⁷¹⁵⁶ At the age of eight, he became subject to epileptic seizures and these affected him for the rest of his life.⁷¹⁵⁷

Pratt was not tall - five feet eight inches (1.73m) – but he was of solid build⁷¹⁵⁸ and was described by people who knew him as “gentle” and “kind.” Indeed, friends and acquaintances overflowed with compliments: he was “cultivated,” “courteous,” “amiable,” “good-looking,” “charming,” “very good-hearted,” “the perfect gentleman with perfect manners,” and “a man of principle” whose personality made him stand out in any gathering. “Friendly” and “compassionate,” he helped those in need, both white and non-white, as well as old people whether they were English- or Afrikaans-speaking.⁷¹⁵⁹

Like his father before him, Pratt became a member of the Witwatersrand Agricultural Society; that was in 1925 and he remained a member until his arrest for the assault on Dr. Verwoerd. His father donated the Arthur Pratt Memorial Trophy to the Society, whose

⁷¹⁵⁴ Pratt's biography is quite brief, but more about his life will be revealed later in this chapter.

⁷¹⁵⁵ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.'

⁷¹⁵⁶ Arthur Pratt's letter to the secretary of the National Liberal Club, 17 August 1927. National Liberal Club Archives (hereafter cited as NLCA); *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, 'no title'; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.'

⁷¹⁵⁷ Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷¹⁵⁸ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.'

⁷¹⁵⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 13 April 1960: 1, 'The estranged Mrs. Pratt.'; *Daily Express*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'The gunman'; *News Chronicle*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'Would-be assassin: gunman without a cause'; Guy Spiller's '*The Liberal and the Pirate*.' 1999.; *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960, 'Strange whims of man held after the shooting.'; *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960, 'Pratt described as 'generous.'; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.' *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'The enigma that is Pratt'; *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 30, 'The lesson of South Africa.'; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'Pratt confided worries to Rector, who respects trust'; *TIME*, 18 April 1966: 24, 'The assassin of Milner Park.'

members once declared that “all the Englishness of the Society was emphasized in the person of (David) Pratt.”⁷¹⁶⁰

Despite his epilepsy, Pratt excelled academically at the King Edward VII School in Johannesburg. He also proved himself a marksman on the shooting range.⁷¹⁶¹ In 1927, he returned to England and studied at Phillip Hope's establishment Craighurst, Southwold, Suffolk. He was then accepted at Caius College, Cambridge University.⁷¹⁶² There, he demonstrated an extraordinary intellectual range by graduating with a Bachelor's degree in Arts (Hons.), then qualifying as a chartered accountant. He became a Cambridge Blue, extending his sporting prowess to rowing as a member of the university team.⁷¹⁶³

On October 1, 1927, the day he turned eighteen, Pratt applied for membership of the National Liberal Club (NLC) in London. Anyone seeking membership of the NLC was assumed to be interested in politics and of a liberal persuasion. In his application, Pratt declared that he was “a Liberal in politics.”⁷¹⁶⁴ His father, who had been a prominent member of the Club for many years, addressed a letter to the Club Secretary supporting his son's application. He wrote that “although his political views are not at the moment very strongly developed, he shows every indication of following in his father's footsteps and will, I am sure, make a very staunch Liberal.”⁷¹⁶⁵ Pratt's application for membership was supported by W. T. Lambourn, a member of the Club since 1898, and he was duly accepted as a member.⁷¹⁶⁶ The young Pratt thus added his name to a roll of members which included such historic figures as Winston Churchill, David Lloyd George, G.K. Chesterton, George Bernard Shaw, Bram Stoker, Dylan Thomas and H.G. Wells.⁷¹⁶⁷ Whenever he was in England, Pratt would use the storied NLC as his second home.⁷¹⁶⁸

⁷¹⁶⁰ Gutsche, 1970: 156, 201; *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 April 1960: 2, ‘Pratt was seen near the Premier.’

⁷¹⁶¹ *Die Vaderland*, 11 April 1960: 4, ‘Pratt was soms gesellig, soms neuroties en onvriendelik’; *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘The enigma that is Pratt’; Guy Spiller, 1999, *The Liberal and the Pirate; The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 2, ‘Psychiatrist says Pratt was ‘danger’ to himself and others’; Verster (*Die Vaderland*), 11 April 1960: 4, ‘Pratt se plaas: So lyk dit.’

⁷¹⁶² Arthur Pratt's letter to the secretary of the National Liberal Club, 17 August 1927. NLCA.

⁷¹⁶³ *Die Vaderland*, 11 April 1960: 4, ‘Pratt was soms gesellig, soms neuroties en onvriendelik’; *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘The enigma that is Pratt’; Guy Spiller, 1999, *The Liberal and the Pirate; The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 2, ‘Psychiatrist says Pratt was ‘danger’ to himself and others’; Verster (*Die Vaderland*), 11 April 1960: 4, ‘Pratt se plaas: So lyk dit.’

⁷¹⁶⁴ David Pratt's application for membership at the National Liberal Club, 1 October 1927. NLCA.

⁷¹⁶⁵ Arthur Pratt's letter to the secretary of the National Liberal Club, 17 August 1927. NLCA.

⁷¹⁶⁶ W. T. Lambourn's letter to the secretary of the National Liberal Club, 28 September 1927. NLCA.

⁷¹⁶⁷ <http://www.nlc.org.uk/>

⁷¹⁶⁸ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, ‘Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.’

Returning to South Africa, Pratt took up farming and assembled the finest herd of Ayrshire cattle in Transvaal. He also diversified, buying a number of businesses, including a confectionery factory in Johannesburg, while owning the largest trout hatchery in South Africa.⁷¹⁶⁹ Thousands of trout were bred in the hatchery from eggs imported from Switzerland and fish worth R300,00 were delivered to Johannesburg every day.⁷¹⁷⁰ Pratt was also part-owner, along with his businesswoman friend, Noel Spiller, of the Crayfish Inn, on Natal's southern coast, which was famous for its seafood. Prominent in the hotel's décor was a gift from Pratt which some diners may have thought strange - the figurehead and the side of a tumbril used to transport lords and ladies to the guillotine during the French Revolution.⁷¹⁷¹ Pratt, like Tsafendas, nurtured the hope that one day a revolution, similar to the one in France, would erupt in South Africa and overthrow apartheid, while those responsible for the system would taste a fate similar to that of the aristocrats in France.⁷¹⁷²

Noel Spiller compared Pratt's reserve and good manners favourably with the behaviour of many of the inn's customers. She said, "I had a lot of the Johannesburg *nouveau riche*, who used to come into the bar and spend hours talking, bragging – wealthy people. But David used to keep pretty aloof, quiet, dignified. He was a very quiet man, very well-dressed. I don't think David would ever come to dinner without a tie or a scarf (cravat)." Pratt and his first wife would later divorce but he would often bring their small daughter Susan, to the inn. It was Susan, Spiller said, who "years and years afterwards, during the trial, stuck by him to the very end."⁷¹⁷³

Pratt lived in a twenty-five room mansion on a farm some thirty miles from Johannesburg known as Maloney's Eye.⁷¹⁷⁴ On the wall of one of his three studies hung an original Renoir.⁷¹⁷⁵ Pratt loved his farm and called it "a possession, not unlike a mistress, on whom I can shower gifts."⁷¹⁷⁶ The name – Maloney's Eye – was ascribed to the "eye" or origin of the local Magalies River, whose millions of gallons were used for the trout nursery

⁷¹⁶⁹ *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, 'Man of wealth and whims'; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.'

⁷¹⁷⁰ Verster (*Die Vaderland*), 11 April 1960: 4, 'Pratt se plaas: So lyk dit'; Verster (*Die Vaderland*), 11 April 1960: 5, 'Pratt se woning.'

⁷¹⁷¹ Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷¹⁷² Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷¹⁷³ Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷¹⁷⁴ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt'; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, 'Dr. Verwoerd moved to Pretoria'; Verster (*Die Vaderland*), 11 April 1960: 4, 'Pratt se plaas: So lyk dit.'

⁷¹⁷⁵ Verster (*Die Vaderland*), 11 April 1960: 5, 'Pratt se woning.'

⁷¹⁷⁶ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 3, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

and to supply the small number of inhabitants in the Magaliesburg area, as well as the local railway station.⁷¹⁷⁷

Concerned for the welfare of his Black workers, Pratt had spacious, modern apartment houses built for them on his farm. The homes were of such quality that after Pratt's death, they were rented out to tourists. Pratt also built a school on the farm for the Black workers' children, the Maloney's Eye Farm Primary School. Like Tsafendas, he believed education was extremely important, especially for poor people as a means of climbing out of their poverty. Pratt paid for the construction and maintenance of the school and met the wages of the teachers. The school was so sought after that the children of Africans not employed at the farm turned up for lessons. Pratt simply hired more teachers. The teaching and facilities were so good that some of the children of friends and relatives of his workers came looking for jobs or even a place to stay. Pratt found it difficult to turn them away, invariably finding a way to help them. When he discovered that some of the apartments were illegally occupied by friends and relatives of his labourers, he declined to turn them out, simply ensured they had enough food.⁷¹⁷⁸

Pratt frequently gave bonuses to his workers and sometimes joined them to eat food which had been cooked by his chef. He forbade them to address him as "sir" or "master" or "baas" (boss) which was normal at the time. Pratt's treatment of his workforce was almost heroically generous in comparison with the accepted practices of the time. Commenting on this, his personal assistant, Elizabeth Radsma, who worked closely with him for three and a half years, said Pratt was "a child of a different time, really." She added, "He tried to show it in actions and helping people. But, of course, the government didn't appreciate it."⁷¹⁷⁹ The school still stands today and bears the same name, but there is no indication anywhere of how it came to be built or of the person who made it happen.

Pratt did not restrict his generosity to his Black workers and their children's education. He provided funds that enabled the sons of several of his less wealthy friends, both Black and White, to complete their education, and he made⁷¹⁸⁰ regular donations to poor people⁷¹⁸¹ and to a large number of charities. By faith, he was an Anglican and regularly

⁷¹⁷⁷ Verster (*Die Vaderland*), 11 April 1960: 4, 'Pratt se plaas: So lyk dit.'

⁷¹⁷⁸ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷¹⁷⁹ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷¹⁸⁰ *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960, 'Strange whims of man held after the shooting.'

⁷¹⁸¹ *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, no title.'

attended St. Peter's Church, Krugersdorp,⁷¹⁸² but later he became Roman Catholic,⁷¹⁸³ probably under the influence of his second wife, Patricia, a devout Catholic. When he was detained in the prison hospital, Pratt's reading was almost entirely composed of works by Catholic saints and theologians.⁷¹⁸⁴

In South Africa in 1935, Pratt, aged twenty-six, married Mary Lindsay Hatrick and they had two children: Susan, born in 1937, and David John, born in 1940.⁷¹⁸⁵ David John died of asthma five years later, a loss that grieved Pratt for the rest of his life. He became depressed and tended to isolate.⁷¹⁸⁶ One year after his son's death and after eleven years of marriage, Mary divorced Pratt and was given sole custody of Susan from the ages of fourteen to twenty-one.⁷¹⁸⁷

Upon the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, Pratt volunteered for the South African Air Force, but because of his epilepsy, he was declared unfit for flying duties. He was given a desk job where his accounting knowledge was employed in a clerical capacity. He was released in October 1943.⁷¹⁸⁸ With the war over in 1945, Pratt travelled to Boston in the United States the following year in search of a cure for his epilepsy. He did not find one.⁷¹⁸⁹

In 1948, Pratt met twenty-one-year-old Doreen Billson. He suggested a date at the cinema, but pretended to be a poor farmer and asked her to buy the tickets. Doreen liked the joke and despite the difference in their ages – Pratt was then thirty-nine – they formed a deep relationship. According to Billson, after three years together they were talking of marriage, but in 1951, Pratt met twenty-seven-year-old Patricia van Heyningen,⁷¹⁹⁰ fell in love and married her instead. However, he stayed in contact with Billson and in 1959 she moved into

⁷¹⁸² *The Star*, 11 April 1966: 1, 'Pratt confided worries to Rector-who respects trust.'

⁷¹⁸³ *The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 6, 'Pratt's friend tells court of receiving suicide notes.'

⁷¹⁸⁴ Gray, 1993: 12.

⁷¹⁸⁵ Petition of Mary Lindsey Cumming, 16 February 1953. Opposed application. *Mary Lindsay Cumming versus David Beresford Pratt*. 877/1953. NASA.

⁷¹⁸⁶ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷¹⁸⁷ Petition of Mary Lindsey Cumming, 16 February 1953. Opposed application. *Mary Lindsay Cumming versus David Beresford Pratt*. 877/1953. NASA; *The Times* (London), 3 September 1960: 6, 'Mental health of Pratt.'

⁷¹⁸⁸ Psychiatric Report on Pratt by Prof. Lamont. Accused reactions to information gleaned from documents, friends, relatives and employees in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷¹⁸⁹ Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷¹⁹⁰ Reuter, IS1154. 2 September 1960. Attempted Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. DO 35/10569. BNA.

the guest house on Pratt's farm. Billson said life with Pratt was wonderful, except for one unsettling habit: "He was very much the fun-loving and cheerful type. A gentle, kindly man, his only failing, as far as I was concerned, was his dreadful habit of changing his mind. This made outsiders regard him as a moody, morose character ... he was a wonderful, but very unhappy man."⁷¹⁹¹ Pratt proposed marriage to her five times and on each occasion, he later changed his mind. Yet, such was his charisma and kindness, that Billson loved him to the end of his life.⁷¹⁹²

A serious side-effect of epilepsy is depression,⁷¹⁹³ which dogged Pratt year in and year out, despite treatment in South Africa, England and the United States.⁷¹⁹⁴ Sometime in the early 1950s, Pratt visited Dr. Werner E. J. Leigh, a senior lecturer in the Pharmacology Department at the University of the Witwatersrand, commonly known as Wits, who became a personal friend. Dr. Leigh started Pratt on a drug which caused him to feel euphoric and experience "strange visions." Dr. Leigh assured Pratt that these were known side-effects but that the drug which would reduce the epileptic attacks. Pratt's seizures were indeed markedly reduced, but he never escaped bouts of depression.⁷¹⁹⁵

In the mid-1950s, Pratt met Sir Paul Dukes,⁷¹⁹⁶ a former MI6 agent, author and one of those responsible for introducing yoga to the western world and South Africa. Dukes had given a series of yoga lectures at the Langham Hotel in Johannesburg which Pratt joined. Afterwards, he declared that he "derived considerable benefit" from them. He became friendly with Dukes, who became "a frequent visitor" to Pratt's house. Dukes' philosophy, character and teaching had a tremendous appeal to Pratt and he described him as his "strong pillar." Pratt was deeply disappointed when Dukes left South Africa in October 1957, although the two remained close by corresponding regularly.⁷¹⁹⁷

⁷¹⁹¹ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷¹⁹² *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt's secret romance.'

⁷¹⁹³ Epilepsy.org.uk. Retrieved from <https://www.epilepsy.org.uk/info/depression>

⁷¹⁹⁴ Prof. Hurst's testimony at the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Dr. Chesler's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷¹⁹⁵ Gordon Winter's correspondence with David Beresford, 8 September 1998. Liza Key's personal collection.

⁷¹⁹⁶ Dukes, known as the "man of a hundred faces," was a legend for his espionage exploits and was knighted for his success by King George V in 1920.

⁷¹⁹⁷ David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

Pratt's second wife, Patricia van Heyningen, was a Dutch architect from The Hague. She and Pratt had two children, Georgina, born in 1953, and Charles David, born in 1956.⁷¹⁹⁸ In 1954, Pratt's father died, leaving his son a legacy worth some \$750,000.⁷¹⁹⁹ Also in 1954, Pratt began receiving treatment for his epilepsy from a new practitioner, Dr. Benjamin Chesler. He remained under his care until 1958 and during this period he was admitted to the Tara Hospital and the private Sanatoria Nursing Home.⁷²⁰⁰

Around the mid-1950s, Patricia proposed that the family move to Europe.⁷²⁰¹ She said she was not happy in South Africa, which she considered to be a racist nation, and she had never envisaged it as a permanent home. She believed Holland was a better place to bring up children.⁷²⁰² Pratt was reluctant, partly because of his business obligations but also because he loved life in South Africa. Eventually, sometime in the mid-1950s, the family made the move to Europe.⁷²⁰³

Pratt soon discovered that he could not live away from South Africa and so returned, expecting his family to follow soon. Instead, Patricia insisted that he should return to Holland and live permanently there. In an attempt to convince him, she booked tickets for the famous Rotterdam Horse Show and for a music festival in Schevening; she even arranged for him to meet Prince Bernhard and present him with a gift of smoked trout from his farm. Pratt complied with all these plans but remained unimpressed. He still wanted to get back to South Africa with his family.⁷²⁰⁴

Patricia did not give up on her efforts and tried to interest her husband in a Catholic way of life, and even took him to Lourdes, in France, one of the Church's holiest shrines, in a desperate attempt to find a cure for his epilepsy. The Virgin Mary was said to have appeared several times at Lourdes in 1858 to a peasant girl, Bernadette. Pilgrims bathed in a spring which emerged where the Virgin appeared, in the hope that they would be cured of their

⁷¹⁹⁸ *Die Vaderland*, 11 April 1960: 4, 'Pratt was soms gesellig, soms neuroties en onvriendelik'; *Die Vaderland*, 12 April 1960: 3, 'Vriende het mev. Pratt vertel'; *The Times* (London), 3 September 1960: 6, 'Mental health of Pratt.'

⁷¹⁹⁹ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt'; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, 'Dr. Verwoerd moved to Pretoria.'

⁷²⁰⁰ Dr. Chesler's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²⁰¹ David Pratt's testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²⁰² Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷²⁰³ David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷²⁰⁴ David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

diseases. Pratt was not convinced and instead of bathing in the holy waters, he went to a bullfight. What is more, the lure of Africa could not be denied and in 1957, Pratt returned to South Africa, leaving his family in Holland with an understanding that they would re-join him soon. However, Patricia wrote soon after to say she would not be returning to South Africa on "psychological advice." Pratt was distraught.⁷²⁰⁵

Determined to do whatever was necessary to bring his family back to South Africa, he bought a farm in Cape Town for them, but again Patricia refused.⁷²⁰⁶ Pratt returned to Holland in October or November 1957 hoping that a face-to-face meeting would persuade his wife to relocate. However, Patricia remained adamant and when Pratt returned to South Africa in mid-November of that year, he was deeply depressed.⁷²⁰⁷ Apart from her distaste for South Africa, Patricia had grown increasingly frustrated with her husband's almost constant depression, his epilepsy and his mood swings. She considered that it would be better for their children if they were not constantly in contact with their father and his problems.⁷²⁰⁸

Pratt was mortified that Patricia thought this way, but he knew she had a point. Determined to stay close to his family, he then suggested they spend half the year in South Africa and half in Holland. Once again Patricia refused and for the first time suggested that they should split up temporarily, with herself and the children in Holland and her husband in South Africa. She proposed that they would not get a formal separation or a divorce and would meet three or four times a year until the children were a little older or Pratt's health improved. Pratt was not happy but agreed to go along with this arrangement for the time being.⁷²⁰⁹

However, his desire to reunite the family remained strong and began to take extreme, sometimes eccentric, dimensions. In early 1958, he persuaded Robert Charter, his business partner in the trout hatchery, to fly to Holland to try to change Patricia's mind. When Charter failed, Pratt decided to try again himself. On February 5, 1958, he flew into Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam, where Patricia was waiting for him. When a firearm was found in his

⁷²⁰⁵ David Pratt's testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²⁰⁶ David Pratt's testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²⁰⁷ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷²⁰⁸ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷²⁰⁹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

suitcase,⁷²¹⁰ a Dutch immigration officer asked why he had a pistol. Pratt joked that “he wanted to shoot his wife.” The officers did not find the joke funny and barred Pratt from the country.⁷²¹¹

Three months later, in May 1958, this time without a gun in his luggage, Pratt returned to Holland and was allowed to enter. On the evening of his arrival, he turned up unexpectedly at his wife's house in Den Haag and asked to see the children. Patricia had been told about the incident with the gun at the airport and was now afraid of her husband. She told him they were sleeping and he agreed to come back the next day. When Pratt returned, Interpol agents were waiting for him. Pratt produced documents proving his paternity, but they refused to give him access to the children. Patricia then instituted proceedings against Pratt's continuing presence in Holland, maintaining that he was “a dangerous man.”⁷²¹²

The judge however, rejected her petition and said in his judgement, “Mr. Pratt appears to be a gentleman in every sense. I see no reason why he should not stay in Holland for a week and see his children.” Subsequently Pratt remained in Holland and spent time with his family.⁷²¹³ Relations improved between husband and wife and Patricia accepted that Pratt was only joking about shooting her. She was even persuaded to return to South Africa and the whole family returned there. The get-together did not last long, however, and Patricia and the children left again for Holland.⁷²¹⁴

Pratt then became severely depressed. Parted from his adored children, he worried about his business responsibilities while the epilepsy robbed him of peace of mind. At one point, he decided to sign over his money to his children and to charity, change his name and start a new life in a cottage in England. Half-way through the planning, he changed his

⁷²¹⁰ Robert Roderick Charter's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Elizabeth Radsma's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; David Pratt's testimony in the enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 14 April 1960: 4, 'Gun kept Pratt out of Holland'; *Daily Express*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'The gunman'; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man'; *The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 6, 'Pratt's friend tells court of receiving suicide notes.'

⁷²¹¹ *News Chronicle*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'Would-be assassin: gunman without a cause'; Richards, 1993: 38.

⁷²¹² David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷²¹³ David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷²¹⁴ David Pratt's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

mind.⁷²¹⁵ Later in 1958, Dr. Chesler suggested to Pratt's sister that she appoint a *curator bonis*⁷²¹⁶ for her brother in order to protect his business interests as he thought that Pratt was unable to handle things himself. Pratt's sister dismissed the advice, whereupon Dr. Chesler asked Pratt to see another psychiatrist as he felt that he could not handle his case any longer.⁷²¹⁷ Subsequently, Pratt was treated by Dr. Solly Jacobson, a neurologist and specialist psychiatrist, and his condition improved significantly.⁷²¹⁸

Before the end of 1958, Pratt revisited his wife and children in Holland, and a little later, the whole family went on holiday together at the ski resort of Kitzbuhl in Austria.⁷²¹⁹ In 1959, Pratt was back in Holland and the family again holidayed together, this time at the mountain resort of Klosters, Switzerland.⁷²²⁰ It seems clearly from Patricia's readiness to spend time with Pratt in the intimacy of family vacations that she did not consider him to be "a dangerous man" or that he had planned to shoot her.

The European get-togethers were fine, but Pratt was so desperate to bring his children to South Africa that he dreamed up a scheme to abduct his daughter Georgina and thus force Patricia and their son to return to South Africa and re-join them. Pratt's plan was to use a helicopter to snatch Georgina in Klosters with the help of Mickey Wood, a British ex-commando and stunt man, whose London gym Pratt visited periodically. He persuaded Wood to join him by showing him legal papers proving his custody of his daughter. Eventually Pratt changed his mind and did not proceed with his kidnap plan.⁷²²¹

Pratt's last, futile visit to Holland was in January or February 1960, when Patricia once more refused to return permanently with him to South Africa. This was the last time he saw his two young children. Of her many past refusals, this one appeared to crush Pratt with a

⁷²¹⁵ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷²¹⁶ A *curator bonis* is appointed to manage the affairs of a person judged mentally incapable of doing so himself. (Maisels, 1998: 327).

⁷²¹⁷ Dr. Chesler's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²¹⁸ Dr. Solly Jacobson's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Elizabeth Radsma's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²¹⁹ *Daily Express*, 29 April 1960: 9, 'A gay man.'

⁷²²⁰ King (*Daily Express*), 12 April 1960: 1, 'He came to Britain to plan a kidnap'; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt's secret romance'; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷²²¹ King (*Daily Express*), 12 April 1960: 1, 'He came to Britain to plan a kidnap'; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man'; *The Star*, 12 April 1960, 'Film "stunt man" tells of when Pratt had plan to kidnap daughter.'

devastating finality. Various friends said that when he returned to South Africa on February 18, 1960, he was “a changed man” and “depressed and moody.”⁷²²² For relief, he immersed himself in Yoga and Christian teachings.⁷²²³

Despite his family disappointments and his problems with epilepsy, Pratt maintained a lively interest in South Africa's politics. He was a wealthy man with the privileged status accorded to a White person in a racist society, but he despised the ruling National Party and its policy of apartheid.⁷²²⁴ He often took overseas visitors to the Black townships to show them the harsh reality of apartheid and spoke boldly and openly against it. Elizabeth Radsma said, “He wanted all people to be equal and have equal rights. He had the courage of saying this publicly at the time. He wanted the Black people to be able to vote and participate in the running of the country and he wanted a country where we all can live happily together as equals.”⁷²²⁵

When he heard of the National Party's early plans to introduce laws to impose apartheid, Pratt contemplated suicide. However, after treatment with psychotherapy and anti-depressant drugs, he began thinking more “logically.” Dr. Jacobson, the psychiatrist who replaced Dr. Chesler, pointed out to him that if he committed suicide, he would achieve nothing towards curtailing apartheid.⁷²²⁶

In 1953, Pratt joined the South African Liberal Party and the following year he attempted to negotiate a coalition between Liberals and progressive Afrikaners. He believed this was the only way to defeat the National Party and bring an end to apartheid.⁷²²⁷ Thus, he approached three prominent South Africans: Businessmen Anton Rupert and Harry Oppenheimer, two of the country's wealthiest and most powerful men, and Nicolaas

⁷²²² Elizabeth Radsma's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; David Pratt's testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 14 April 1960: 4, 'Gun kept Pratt out of Holland'; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.'

⁷²²³ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷²²⁴ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 11 April 1960, 'Pratt called impulsive'; *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, no title; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.'; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Press silence on Pratt ordered'; *TIME*, 18 April 1966: 24, 'The assassin of Milner Park.'

⁷²²⁵ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷²²⁶ Bird, 1992: 209.

⁷²²⁷ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The Cape Argus*, 12 September 1960: 2, 'Pratt did not want to kill Dr. Verwoerd District Surgeon says he was told'; *The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 2, 'Psychiatrist says Pratt was 'danger' to himself and others.'

Havenga, a former leader of the Afrikaner Party and a Minister of Finance in the governments of Malan and Hertzog. The first to be approached was Oppenheimer. Pratt telephoned and the two met several times. Pratt "proposed certain things to form a coalition government." Oppenheimer liked the idea and "agreed to co-operate" and said he would talk to other possible participants, including Rupert.⁷²²⁸

Pratt then approached Havenga, who was also positive and agreed to lead the proposed coalition while trying to find additional support. However, Rupert was unenthusiastic and neither Pratt nor Oppenheimer were able to change his mind. Other prominent businessmen and liberal politicians were approached by Pratt or Oppenheimer but most declined to co-operate. Finally, Pratt met in a private room in the House of Assembly with Havenga to discuss the progress of his proposal. Havenga thought they should give up because they did not have the necessary support, while Pratt wanted to keep trying. However, after "a long argument," Pratt realised that his "scheme could not be carried out" and so gave up on it and "resigned" himself "to life under Mr. Strijdom, with Dr. Verwoerd as Minister of Native Affairs. Within forty-eight hours, Pratt had "sunk into a depression."⁷²²⁹

Despite his unhappiness at the failure of his initiative, Pratt did not give up on his fight against apartheid and boldly decided to move his efforts to Britain. The Liberal Party of Great Britain, of which Pratt had been a member since the late 1940s, pursued one of the most energetic anti-apartheid campaigns anywhere in the world and Pratt gave it his enthusiastic support. He became a major financier of the Liberal Party, urging and promoting an ever more aggressive stance against apartheid. Each time he returned to the UK, he gave speeches on behalf of the Party, arguing for a boycott of South African goods and a stronger stance against apartheid. Among Party members with whom he associated was Jeremy Thorpe, who became the leader of the Party in 1967, and David Ennals, Chairman of the British anti-apartheid movement. In addition, he addressed crowds three times at the famous public arena, Speaker's Corner, in London's Hyde Park, and several times helped with fundraising events for the Party.⁷²³⁰

⁷²²⁸ David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow; Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷²²⁹ Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate.* 1999.

⁷²³⁰ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; *Daily Express*, 27 September 1960: 21, 'The sword tattoo'; Psychiatric Report on Pratt by Prof. Lamont. Accused reactions to information gleaned from documents, friends, relatives and employees in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, 'Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered'; *The Times* (London), 27 September 1960: 6, 'Pratt held to be mentally disordered.'

During the 1959 British general election, Pratt canvassed door to door for the Liberals. Cheekily, he carried his campaign to Downing Street itself, where he was photographed with Derek Monsey, Liberal candidate for the City of London and Westminster, knocking on the door of number 10, the Prime Minister's residence. Monsey came third of three candidates in the poll.⁷²³¹ Apart from his Liberal Party activities, Pratt also associated with some far-left political activists, who opposed apartheid.⁷²³² Although he did not sympathize with Communism, Pratt often declared that he would prefer a Communist South Africa to an apartheid South Africa and was willing to co-operate with anyone who could bring an end to apartheid.⁷²³³

A few months before he shot Dr. Verwoerd, Pratt explained his position on apartheid to Bute Hewes, wife of Bruce Hewes a member of the British Liberal Party. He said, "A lot of us (South Africans) don't like what is going on in South Africa, but what is the alternative? It's our country and we can't just run out on it. It's our home. But some of us want to see things put straight out there. Apartheid can't last."⁷²³⁴

⁷²³¹ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, 'The day farmer Pratt called at No. 10'; *Evening Standard*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'Death for gunman?'

⁷²³² Schoeman, 1975: 18.

⁷²³³ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷²³⁴ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.'

THE SHOOTING

BEFORE THE SHOOTING

Pratt returned to South Africa from England for the last time on February 18, 1960.⁷²³⁵ Sometime in the middle of March, he had an epileptic seizure and fell from his horse.⁷²³⁶ That month and April were turbulent ones in South Africa. On March 21, the Sharpeville massacre took place, causing Pratt to fall into another depression.⁷²³⁷ On March 30, the government declared a state of emergency and 11,700 people were rounded up. On April 7, the police re-imposed the hated Pass Laws which had been suspended after Sharpeville.⁷²³⁸ On April 8, the day before Pratt's assault on Dr. Verwoerd, the government banned the ANC and PAC. The emergency regulations were so draconian that a scientific lecture about sex at the Railway Institute, Witbank, by psychologist Dr. Brian Norgard was banned.⁷²³⁹

At some point during that turbulent first week of April 1960, Dr. Verwoerd commented on the turmoil and references to UN intervention in a filmed interview with Britain's Granada TV. He said, "We in South Africa are trying to do our level best for all portions of our population. We have been misunderstood, unfortunately. If people only realized that we are not the barbarians we are supposed to be, that we are Christians ourselves, then an appeal to the Security Council, except for international political reasons, of course, would not even have been conceived." The interview was shown on British TV screens on April 11, two days after Dr. Verwoerd was shot.⁷²⁴⁰

On March 26, 1960, five days after Sharpeville, a rally in favour of South Africa becoming a republic was held in Meyerton, Transvaal. It was the largest political meeting in the history of South Africa, with eighty thousand people gathering to listen to Dr. Verwoerd. According to *Die Burger*, earlier that day, a security officer reportedly showed Dr. Verwoerd

⁷²³⁵ Elizabeth Radsma's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²³⁶ Dr. Jack Friedman's testimony at the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Richard Kumalo's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Elizabeth Radsma's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²³⁷ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷²³⁸ *News Chronicle*, 7 April 1960: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd brings the Pass Laws back.'

⁷²³⁹ *The Sunday Tribune*, 10 April 1960: 1, 'Sex talk banned under emergency rules.'

⁷²⁴⁰ *Corriere Della Sera*, 8 September 1966: 1, 'L'apartheid'; *Daily Mirror*, 12 April: 5, 'Misunderstood says Dr. Verwoerd'; *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 13 April 1960: 3, 'South Africa not yielding on race'; *The Star*, 12 April 1960, 'If people only realised that we are Christians.'

a piece of red paper bearing the words, “Today we kill Dr. Verwoerd.” However, the Prime Minister went ahead and gave his speech.⁷²⁴¹

The story of the note was first published on April 11, two days after Pratt’s assault, in *Die Burger*, a Nationalist newspaper which supported Dr. Verwoerd, and the source was said to be Dr. Verwoerd’s wife.⁷²⁴² As far as the author can establish, the origin and authenticity, indeed the existence of such a note, have never been determined. Prominent South African journalists David Beresford, correspondent for Britain’s liberal daily, the *Guardian*, and Desmond Blow of the South African *Sunday Times*, as well as former BOSS agent Gordon Winter, strongly believe the story was a publicity stunt to increase Dr. Verwoerd’s popularity and give him a heroic status.⁷²⁴³ The report appeared just twenty days after the Sharpeville Massacre when the Prime Minister’s popularity was very low, especially overseas. The story bestowed on Verwoerd a certain heroic status as someone who was aware of threats against him yet dutifully went ahead with his public duties. That he was shot obviously gave some credence to the story. However, it should be mentioned that on June 1, 1961, just over a year after Verwoerd was shot by Pratt, the *New York Times* reported that a guard at the Prime Minister’s residence in Cape Town was shot in the shoulder.⁷²⁴⁴ The circumstances of the shooting were never explained as far as the author can establish.

Noel Spiller, Pratt’s Crayfish Inn partner, said that sometime in early April, she, Pratt and others were discussing the political situation, mainly the issue of passes. Pratt said, “It’s terrible, the way they are all rounded up because they haven’t a *dompas*.” Spiller said, “The discussion was political, as it can be. I can remember somebody saying, ‘Oh, somebody should shoot that man,’ referring to Dr. Verwoerd. And David said, ‘Somebody should. I think it should be me.’”⁷²⁴⁵

A few days later, Pratt passed a pickup van in Johannesburg loaded with prisoners, then saw another van being loaded with women prisoners. The sight had a profound effect on him, initially disgust and depression but later anger. He wondered, “What will happen next?” The following morning, he felt strongly that “someone had to do something,” and decided

⁷²⁴¹ Grobbelaar 1967: 71; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd knew of threats by did not withdraw.’

⁷²⁴² Grobbelaar 1967: 71; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd knew of threats by did not withdraw.’

⁷²⁴³ David Beresford in a personal interview, 11 April 2014; Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Gordon Winter in a personal interview with Dr. James Sanders on behalf of the author, 19 August 2016.

⁷²⁴⁴ The *New York Times*, 2 June 1961: 18, ‘Verwoerd guard is shot.’

⁷²⁴⁵ Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller’s *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

that it was time for him to act.⁷²⁴⁶ Coincidentally, on that same day in London, the Liberal Party asked the British government publicly to denounce the “repressive” policies of the South African government during the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in London, and to enforce an arms embargo on South Africa. Simultaneous demands voiced in the House of Commons and elsewhere asked the government not to invite Dr. Verwoerd to the London conference.⁷²⁴⁷

THE SHOOTING

On Saturday, April 9, 1960, Pratt left his home at around 9.30 a.m. and said that he would be back at 7.30 in the evening.⁷²⁴⁸ Soon afterwards, he Pratt arrived at the old show grounds in Milner Park, Johannesburg, for the Union Exposition (the Rand Easter Show⁷²⁴⁹) of which he was co-sponsor⁷²⁵⁰ and where his cattle had won many prizes.⁷²⁵¹ He was wearing a green tweed suit.⁷²⁵²

Dr. Verwoerd was scheduled to open the show in front of some 30,000 people with a speech marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Union of South Africa.⁷²⁵³ When he took up his position in the President’s box overlooking the arena, Pratt was among the VIPs sitting near him.⁷²⁵⁴ At 2.15 p.m., Dr. Verwoerd began a thirty-minute his speech⁷²⁵⁵ with the following light-hearted comment: “Mr. President, good friends, all of you who are here today, it is with great pleasure that I perform this duty immediately before I forget, and that is to declare this

⁷²⁴⁶ Professor L.A. Hurst’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; David Pratt’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷²⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 10 April 1960, ‘Queen shocked, wished Dr. Verwoerd speedy recovery.’

⁷²⁴⁸ *The Sunday Tribune*, 10 April 1960: 1, ‘Premier’s miraculous escape.’

⁷²⁴⁹ The Rand Show has been reported as the largest consumer exhibition in the world, outside of the United States. Coinciding with Easter festivities, it is both culturally and socially significant show. First held in 1894 by the Witwatersrand Agricultural Society and opened by Paul Kruger at Milner Park in Braamfontein, it still takes place today (Komane, 1 April 2015, ‘Rand Show turns 121.’)

⁷²⁵⁰ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, ‘Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.’

⁷²⁵¹ *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Dr. Verwoerd moved to Pretoria.’

⁷²⁵² Testimony of Jacobus Esterhuizen in the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 20 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, no title.’

⁷²⁵³ *TIME*, 18 April 1966: 24, ‘The assassin of Milner Park.’

⁷²⁵⁴ *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Doctors satisfied with Dr. Verwoerd.’

⁷²⁵⁵ Mulchrone (*Daily Mail*), 3 October 1961: 8, ‘The improbable assassin’; Schoop (*Atlanta Daily World*), 10 April 1960: 1, ‘S. Africa Premier shot after segregation talk’; *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 16 April 1960: 1, ‘S. African Premier shot by farmer’; *Washington Post*, 10 April 1960: 4, ‘White farmer shoots South Africa’s Premier.’

show open. I know it is customary to do this at the end of a speech but I know of gentlemen who have had to rise again to do so after being seated, which I am sure you would not wish me to inflict upon you.”⁷²⁵⁶

He went on to say:

“We are indeed glad that these nations of the western world are showing us what they can produce. Their competition must be our incentive, and not create in us any fear. What they have to sell to us must be a symbol of goodwill, and we are happy to have them in our midst. We wish to congratulate them on all that they have done for their countries and for the world, and we desire only the utmost of good relations with them, because no country in the world today can exist alone, and no country in the world can achieve greater heights for itself by treading on the corpse of a fellow nation. We will not be killed, we will not become anybody’s victim. We will fight for our existence and we will survive ... My faith in the people of South Africa is deep-seated and I believe that all that we inherited by way of intellect and diligence and courage will help us in all spheres represented at this wonderful show to continue building up a grander South Africa in the next fifty years than in the fifty years that are past.”⁷²⁵⁷

After his speech, Dr. Verwoerd and his accompanying VIPs went to inspect the cattle in the arena and then returned to the enclosure for guests of honour.⁷²⁵⁸ It was then that Pratt made his way towards where the prime minister was sitting, moving through a security cordon with a badge identifying him as a member of the Witwatersrand Agricultural Society. He walked fast with long strides.⁷²⁵⁹ Pratt then mounted a photographer’s chair and called out, “Dr. Verwoerd!” Dr. Verwoerd turned, assuming someone wanted to greet him, only to find a Belgian .22 calibre automatic pistol pointed directly at him.⁷²⁶⁰ Pratt fired and a bullet the size of an airgun pellet struck Dr. Verwoerd in the face.⁷²⁶¹ According to eye-witness Alex Gorshel, the Mayor of Johannesburg, Pratt fired once, wearing “a rather strained smile”

⁷²⁵⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 388-9

⁷²⁵⁷ Pelzer, 1966: 393.

⁷²⁵⁸ Grobbelaar 1967: 80.

⁷²⁵⁹ Testimony of Jacobus Esterhuizen in the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 20 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *Atlanta Daily World*, 10 April 1960: 1, ‘S. Africa Premier shot after segregation talk.’

⁷²⁶⁰ *Afro-American*, 16 April 1960: 1, ‘African fight to go underground’; *Atlanta Daily World*, 10 April 1960: 1, ‘S. Africa Premier shot after segregation talk’; *LIFE*, 16 September 1966: 41, ‘A violent end for the apostle of apartheid’; Scholtz, 1974: 152; *Sunday Times*, 10 April 1960: 28, ‘Dr. Verwoerd shot twice.’

⁷²⁶¹ Haigh, 1962: 6.

as he pulled the trigger.⁷²⁶² Then Col. G.M. Harrison, president of the Witwatersrand Agricultural Society, grabbed Pratt's arm and the gun went off again.⁷²⁶³

Dr. Verwoerd fell into the concrete aisle, blood spurting from two wounds. One of the bullets had entered his head next to the right ear, fracturing the lower jaw, breaking the palate and coming to rest in the left side of the neck. The other bullet struck his upper right jawbone below the right eye, shattering the bone into pieces which pierced the sinus.⁷²⁶⁴ His wife flung her arms around him, crying, "What's happened? What's happened?" Dr. Verwoerd's personal bodyguard, Major Carl Richter, was a few feet away and seemed slow to realize what happened; when he did so, he fainted. Charles Laubscher, a former general manager of the Witwatersrand Society who knew Pratt personally, shouted, "Get the gun." Pratt half smiled and said, "Don't worry, I haven't got it now." Guards seized Pratt and hustled him out of the President's box through furious crowds of whites struggling to reach and attack him. At this point, Pratt seemed terrified and was heard to say, "God help me!"⁷²⁶⁵

AFTER THE SHOOTING

DR. VERWOERD

Dr. Verwoerd was carried to an ambulance and a blanket was hastily flung across its back door to stop cameramen from photographing the stricken prime minister. The emergency vehicle then raced to Johannesburg General Hospital.⁷²⁶⁶ Talking later about the shooting, Dr. Verwoerd said he thought immediately that he would die and said he was quite prepared to do so. However, he then realised that he could still think and then, with all the spirit force at his command, he decided to fight to remain alive.⁷²⁶⁷ In fact, he was never in danger of dying from the gunshot wounds he received, but his supporters were at pains to emphasise how

⁷²⁶² Testimony of Alex Gorshel in the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 20 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²⁶³ Dr. Jack Friedman's testimony at the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Testimony of Col. G.M. Harrison in the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 20 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²⁶⁴ *The New York Times*, 17 April 1960: 1, 'Continuing gains reported.'

⁷²⁶⁵ Ingalls, (*The New York Times*), 11 April 1960, 'Calm prevailing in South Africa: Dr. Verwoerd gains'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 July 1960: 9, 'I wanted to change seats with Premier'; *TIME*, 18 April 1966: 24, 'The assassin of Milner Park'; *The New York Times*, 10 April 1960, 'Martial Law Predicted'; *The Times* (London), 21 July 1960: 10, 'Pratt in court in Dr. Verwoerd attack charge.'

⁷²⁶⁶ *Die Vaderland*, 11 April 1960: 5, 'So het alles gebeur.'

⁷²⁶⁷ Scholtz, 1974: 152.

close to death he came. Dr. Joseph Lannon, who attended Dr. Verwoerd at the hospital after the shooting said, “There was no immediate danger to his life, but in terms of time there could quite easily have been.” He said that there was a risk of infection which could have caused meningitis. He gave Dr. Verwoerd a blood transfusion.⁷²⁶⁸

When his situation stabilised, senior politicians demanded that Dr. Verwoerd be transferred from the Johannesburg General Hospital to the Pretoria General Hospital, from an English-speaking ambience to an Afrikaner one.⁷²⁶⁹ He was treated by two well-known doctors H. W. Snyman and S. F. Oosthuizen.⁷²⁷⁰ When Dr. Verwoerd was lying seriously wounded in hospital in Johannesburg, the only person permitted to see him, apart from his wife Bessie, was Piet Meyer, a close friend, chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, and a fanatical Nazi.⁷²⁷¹ On April 12, Paul Oliver Sauer, head of the Nationalist Party in Parliament, took over from Dr. Verwoerd as head of government.⁷²⁷² From his bed, Dr. Verwoerd ordered Eric Louw, a close associate, to represent South Africa at the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in London.⁷²⁷³

Dr. Verwoerd saw himself as a martyr for the cause of apartheid and attributed his recovery to divine intervention, believing God had chosen him to continue piloting apartheid. During a visit to his bedside by opposition leader Sir de Villiers Graaff, Dr. Verwoerd referred to God more than a dozen times, insisting that the deity had chosen him to continue guiding apartheid. In the course of a two-hour conversation, he insisted that his survival was proof of the divine acceptance of his policies.⁷²⁷⁴ When Major Richter visited him in hospital, Dr. Verwoerd depicted himself as an Afrikaner martyr for the apartheid cause. He said he held no grievances against anyone, adding, “I cannot even feel bitter towards Pratt” and described himself as “just one of the martyrs of the Afrikaner nation.”⁷²⁷⁵ At the same time, Dr. Verwoerd told his wife, “I heard the shots and then I realized that I could still think, and I

⁷²⁶⁸ Testimony of Dr. Joseph Lannon in the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 21 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷²⁶⁹ Bird, 1992: 205-6; Botha, 1967: 65.

⁷²⁷⁰ Scholtz, 1974: 152.

⁷²⁷¹ Serfontein, 1978: 87.

⁷²⁷² *Philadelphia Tribune*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Farmer’s motive In Dr. Verwoerd shooting cloaked in mystery.’

⁷²⁷³ Mulchrone (*Daily Mail*), 3 October 1961: 8, ‘The improbable assassin’;

⁷²⁷⁴ Vatcher, 1965: 110.

⁷²⁷⁵ Scholtz, 1974: 153.

knew that I had been spared to complete my life's work."⁷²⁷⁶ Betsie Verwoerd also saw her husband's survival as "a sign to us that we are on the right path and God is with us."⁷²⁷⁷

Dr. Verwoerd's followers fully agreed that Dr. Verwoerd had been saved by God in order to fulfil his "duties" and that God had chosen him as his instrument to lead and forge the South African nation.⁷²⁷⁸ *Die Transvaler* wrote that Dr. Verwoerd was "called by God to a special task." It declared that, "although struck by two bullets, Dr. Verwoerd is still alive and all believing inhabitants of the Union will see the hand of God in this... he who holds the power of life or death has ordained that the attack should fail."⁷²⁷⁹ *Die Burger* wrote two days after the shooting, "In this miraculous escape all the faithful will see the hand of God and thank him that our country, which is already passing through troubled times, had been spared the greater horror of assassination of its head of state."⁷²⁸⁰

The *TIME* magazine wrote that the Afrikaners regarded his recovery as proof that God had chosen Dr. Verwoerd as his divine instrument to forge the South African nation.⁷²⁸¹ In the words of his biographer Jan Botha, Dr. Verwoerd "had suffered grievously in the cause of Afrikanerdom; the onslaught on his life was an onslaught on their cause, and the human sympathy that went out to him became, in the case of many, an enduring love for a hero who so miraculously survived the ordeal to lead them on."⁷²⁸²

On May 7, the two bullets were removed during surgery from Dr. Verwoerd's head.⁷²⁸³ He made a rapid and complete recovery, except for a small scar on his jaw and deafness in his right ear.⁷²⁸⁴ On May 15, he walked from the hospital room to a waiting car and arriving at his home, he climbed the steps unaided. On May 20, Dr. Verwoerd addressed the nation in a radio broadcast and on May 31, fifty-two days after the shooting, he made his first public appearance at the Union Festival in Bloemfontein.⁷²⁸⁵

In his radio broadcast of May 20, his first public speech after the shooting, Dr. Verwoerd said, "I do not intend to dwell upon the attack made upon me. In fact, it does not

⁷²⁷⁶ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, 'South Africa: Death to the architect.'

⁷²⁷⁷ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 18 April 1960: 1, 'South Africans said to consider sealing borders.'

⁷²⁷⁸ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, 'South Africa: Death to the architect.'

⁷²⁷⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Premier called by God to a special task.'

⁷²⁸⁰ Roux, 1972: 411.

⁷²⁸¹ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, 'South Africa: Death to the architect.'

⁷²⁸² Botha, 1967: 67.

⁷²⁸³ Botha, 1967: 65; Pelzer, 1967: 393.

⁷²⁸⁴ *The New York Times*, 7 September 1966: 16, 'Dr. Verwoerd: Relentless advocate of apartheid.'

⁷²⁸⁵ Botha, 1967: 65; Pelzer, 1967: 393.

arouse in me feelings of hatred or revenge. Those who created the atmosphere which made such an act possible have, however, reason to suffer from a guilty conscience. A person who has suffered, and this is also true of a nation, should rather look to the future and press forward. If one is spared, it is in order to fulfil further duties. Similarly, if a nation has been spared for centuries in a land of hardship but also of great promise, it too has a task to fulfil... I trust that I will be permitted to testify to my conviction that the protection of Divine Providence was accorded me with a purpose, a purpose which concerns South Africa too. May it be given to me to fulfil that task faithfully.”⁷²⁸⁶ Dr. Verwoerd later went so far as to tell the Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker that his survival “revealed God’s approval of the cause he had followed.”⁷²⁸⁷

In political terms, Dr. Verwoerd undoubtedly benefited from the attempt on his life. Colin Legum wrote in the London *Observer* that the twenty-day crisis that started at Sharpeville on March 21 and ended with Pratt’s assault on April 9, found the recovered Dr. Verwoerd in a much stronger position than in the aftermath of Sharpeville; forces within the Government which had been plotting Dr. Verwoerd’s overthrow for the last twelve months were forced to do an about-turn and praise him. For the time being, all talk of an alternative Government was irrelevant, Legum wrote, unless Dr. Verwoerd was more seriously injured than stated or unless external pressure brought South Africa’s economy to its knees.⁷²⁸⁸

Dr. Verwoerd’s new support played an important role in securing the votes of most of South Africa’s whites in favour of one of his main goals: to turn South Africa into a Republic. A sardonic limerick celebrated his recovery: “*There was a young man named Pratt,/ Who took a pot-shot at a Nat,/ He said: ‘Had I known/ There’d have been so much bone,/ I’d have bought me a much bigger gat.*”⁷²⁸⁹

Bizarrely, while Dr. Verwoerd was recovering in Pretoria General Hospital, a connection with Pratt himself was revealed. On April 17, the hospital discussed changing its milk supplier after it became known that the milk came from a firm called Maloney’s Eye Dairies, based in Krugersdorp, whose cows were owned by David Pratt. The herd was

⁷²⁸⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 396-397; *The New York Times*, 21 May 1960: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd asserts God saved his life’; *The Sphere*, 4 June 1960: 410, ‘The voice of the Common.’

⁷²⁸⁷ *The Globe and Mail*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Canada regrets death but stand still same’; *The Vancouver Sun*, 6 September 1966: 3, ‘Verwoerd assassination shocks world leaders.’

⁷²⁸⁸ Legum (*The Observer*), 17 April 1960: 16, ‘The world and South Africa.’

⁷²⁸⁹ Hope (*The Independent*), 9 September 2000: 9, ‘The lunatics in charge of the apartheid asylum - Which was madder: the PM who enforced South Africa’s racial fantasies, or the deluded drifter who killed him?’

actually leased to Mr. C.A.S. Bouwer, in the Magaliesburg district, and he was providing the milk to the above firm. Bouwer said Pratt had not been interested in the herd for some time and he had leased his herd to him. However, some consumers in Krugersdorp, learning of the link to Pratt, protested about the milk being supplied to the hospital, while several state institutions also complained. Private consumers, restaurants, tea rooms and hotels threatened to stop buying from the firm, although it was not related with Pratt. Eventually, Maloney's Eye Dairies cancelled its contract with Bouwer on "moral grounds." The hospital and other institutions then affirmed that they would continue buying from the firm since it no longer bought its milk from cows once owned by Pratt.⁷²⁹⁰

Needless to say, this was not enough for one fanatic, who threatened to blow up the milk depot, while several threatening phone-calls were received and some private customers did cancel their milk orders.⁷²⁹¹ In another bizarre connection, while Dr. Verwoerd was recovering at the Pretoria General Hospital, Susan Pratt, David's daughter, was admitted there on April 20 after a car accident. She had swerved to avoid a dog while "fleeing to escape the hounding of the Press."⁷²⁹²

Professor of History Saul Dubow suggested in 2014 that "had Verwoerd died at the hands of David Pratt in 1960 it is unlikely that apartheid would have been pursued with comparable ideological vigour."⁷²⁹³ He added:

"It is not altogether inconceivable that some form of meaningful political process—along the lines of the much talked about 'national convention'—could have been inaugurated between Luthuli and a more flexible successor to Verwoerd (e.g. Donges or Sauer). The overwhelming political crisis and palpable sense of fluidity might just have made this possible, and there were overseas mediators like Dag Hammarskjold who were primed to intervene. But Verwoerd did not die and, in any case, it remains unlikely that Whites were ready to countenance any real loss of power."⁷²⁹⁴

⁷²⁹⁰ *Sunday Times*, 17 April 1960: 1, 'The riddle of Pratt milk supply solved'; *The Sunday Tribune*, 17 April 1960: 1, 'Pratt visited by daughter.'

⁷²⁹¹ *The Star*, 13 April 1960, 'Dairy named after Pratt threatened.'

⁷²⁹² *The Cape Times*, 20 April 1960: 1, 'Pratt's daughter injured'; *The Times*, 20 April 1960: 12, 'David Pratt's daughter injured.'

⁷²⁹³ Dubow, 2014: 300.

⁷²⁹⁴ Dubow, 2014: 88.

PRATT

Immediately after the shooting, the police bundled Pratt into a police car, with his jacket pulled over his head, and drove him to the Marshall Square police station in Johannesburg.⁷²⁹⁵ His whereabouts were not immediately divulged. Col. J.C. Hemmer, Witwatersrand Deputy Commissioner of Police, refused to tell the Press, “for the man’s own safety,” where Pratt had been taken.⁷²⁹⁶ He was held under the Emergency Regulations,⁷²⁹⁷ which allowed the state to hold anyone whose detention was considered desirable in the interest of public order or safety.⁷²⁹⁸

In charge of Pratt’s interrogation at the police station was Colonel Spangler, Chief of the Johannesburg Police, a man with a fearful reputation. British MP John Dugdale once spoke of seeing Spangler and his principal officers at work in the building of the Indian National Congress in Johannesburg. He said, “A tougher lot of men I have never seen since the Gestapo was disbanded.”⁷²⁹⁹

Around 6.45 pm, some three hours after he was brought to Marshall Square police station, Pratt was taken on the orders of Detective Head-Constable P.J. Koekemoer to the Medico-Legal Laboratories in Johannesburg, where he was examined by Dr. Jack Friedman, senior District Surgeon of Johannesburg.⁷³⁰⁰ Dr. Friedman concluded that Pratt had received “quite a beating up,” with “extensive bruising on both cheeks, multiple small abrasions,” all injuries “consistent with blows from fists.” Nevertheless, Pratt was calm and coherent, Dr. Friedman noted and appeared remarkably unconcerned about what happened. His blood pressure was 148 over 88, that is, within normal limits. Dr. Friedman also took a blood sample which contained only .02 alcohol in weight volume. Later, Dr. Friedman visited Pratt

⁷²⁹⁵ Ingalls, (*The New York Times*), 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Calm prevailing in South Africa: Dr. Verwoerd gains’; *The Cape Argus*, 9 April 1966: 1, ‘Dr. Verwoerd wounded on Rand’; *The Star*, 9 April 1966: 1, ‘The Prime Minister is shot.’

⁷²⁹⁶ *The Sunday Tribune*, 10 April 1960: 1, ‘Premier’s miraculous escape.’

⁷²⁹⁷ *Die Vaderland*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Speurhoof se staat kan Pratt enige tyd vervolg’; Gray, 1960: 185; *The Cape Times*, 12 April 1966: 1, ‘Pratt held under emergency’; *The Economist*, 16 April 1966: 230, ‘South Africa: State of siege.’

⁷²⁹⁸ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘And now he must be ‘nameless.’

⁷²⁹⁹ Dugdale (*The Guardian*), 14 April 1960: 12, ‘South African impressions: Ruthless but inefficient.’

⁷³⁰⁰ Dr. Jack Friedman’s testimony at the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Testimony of Petrus Johannes Koekemoer to Pratt’s preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 20 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

several times at Marshall Square police station to ensure he was receiving the medical treatment prescribed for his epilepsy.⁷³⁰¹

Dr. Friedman's examination took about forty-five minutes, whereupon he concluded that "as result of his (Pratt's) unconcern that he displayed and other features in connection with this examination" he needed an expert psychiatric opinion. He asked Professor Lewis A. Hurst, a psychiatrist, of the University of Witwatersrand, to examine Pratt as soon as possible.⁷³⁰² Prof. Hurst's examination lasted nearly two hours, from around 8:10 to 10 p.m. Also present were Dr. Friedman, Detective Head-Constable Koekemoer and another doctor (the author is not in position to know who this doctor was). Pratt remained calm and conversed with Prof. Hurst in a "coherent, lucid manner."⁷³⁰³ Prof. Hurst also examined Pratt physically and found "extensive bruising on both eyes, both sides of the face and front, crepitus of the nose, and bleeding from both ears."⁷³⁰⁴ The issue of Pratt's injuries will be discussed very shortly.

What must be stated here is that Prof. Hurst was a regular customer at Pratt's Crayfish Inn and a good friend of Noel Spiller, Pratt's partner.⁷³⁰⁵ It is not known to the author whether Hurst also knew Pratt or if he had seen him before the examination, but he must surely at least have been aware of who he was when he examined him. The author also does not know why specifically Prof. Hurst was chosen by Dr. Friedman to examine Pratt that evening, which could have been because of the two doctors' friendship or professional relationship. At that time, Pratt was under the care of Dr. Solly Jacobson, but the fact that he was not called by Dr. Friedman may have been because Pratt did not mention him. It should also be noted that both Prof. Hurst and Dr. Jacobson were against apartheid, while the latter was also a Communist.

⁷³⁰¹ Dr. Jack Friedman's testimony at the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA;

⁷³⁰² Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *Daily Dispatch*, 13 September 1960: 1, 'Special inquiry into mental state of Pratt'; *The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 2, 'Psychiatrist says Pratt was 'danger' to himself and others.'

⁷³⁰³ Dr. Jack Friedman's testimony David Pratt's testimony in the Enquiry regarding David Pratt's mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *Daily Dispatch*, 13 September 1960: 1, 'Special inquiry into mental state of Pratt'; *The Cape Argus*, 13 September 1960: 2, 'Psychiatrist says Pratt was 'danger' to himself and others.'

⁷³⁰⁴ Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷³⁰⁵ Gay Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

THE FOLLOWING DAYS

After the medical examinations, Pratt was taken back to Marshall Square police station, where he spent the night. The next day he was visited by his daughter, Susan. She told journalists that her father seemed dazed and unable to understand what he had done, that he appeared “perfectly contented and not at all upset by his situation.”⁷³⁰⁶ A few hours later, Pratt was taken to the Johannesburg Fort Prison where a number of anti-apartheid activists were detained. One of them, Joe Slovo, leader of the South African Communist Party and commander of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, saw Pratt when he was brought in and said he was covered in blood.⁷³⁰⁷ It seems clear Pratt was beaten again by police after his examination by Dr. Friedman and Prof. Hurst and before arriving at the Fort prison. It would have been highly unusual for the doctors to leave Pratt covered in blood from his first beating while they examined him. As for his earlier injuries, it was claimed later in court that it was the crowd which attacked him immediately after the shooting. However, photographs were available of Pratt at that point and no blood or injuries were visible as he was pushed into the police car.

Pratt remained in the Fort Prison for several weeks without charge or access to a lawyer. His personal attorney was not told of his client’s whereabouts so he had no means of communicating with him. Pratt’s detention in the Fort prison was kept secret while newspapers and ordinary South Africans wondered, “Where is Pratt?”⁷³⁰⁸ There was also some speculation that Pratt could be charged with treason, which carried the death penalty.⁷³⁰⁹

A few hours after the shooting, officials announced that Pratt suffered from epilepsy, but nothing was said about his mental state.⁷³¹⁰ The American magazine *Time* and the *Guardian* newspaper in Britain carried stories saying the black Africans of South Africa should be thankful that the man who attacked Dr. Verwoerd was white, because if he was Black, a bloodbath might have followed.⁷³¹¹

⁷³⁰⁶ *Daily Express*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘The gunman’; *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, no title; *Washington Post*, 11 April 1960: A8, ‘S. Africa speeds action on assassin.’

⁷³⁰⁷ Slovo, 1995: 131.

⁷³⁰⁸ *The Star*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘The legal mystery deepens: Where is Pratt?’

⁷³⁰⁹ *Daily Dispatch*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Could be charged with treason’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 11, ‘When murder could be treason’; *Washington Post*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Africa shields assassin’s fate.’

⁷³¹⁰ *The Star*, 9 April 1966: 1, ‘The Prime Minister is shot.’

⁷³¹¹ *The Guardian*, 11 April 1960: 6, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’; *TIME*, 18 April 1966: 24, ‘The assassin of Milner Park.’

The following day, the first claims that Pratt was “mentally unstable” made their appearance in the press.⁷³¹² The police also moved quickly to claim that Pratt was not a member of any political party,⁷³¹³ plainly a falsehood since he was a member of both the South African and the British Liberal Parties. The Deputy Commissioner of Police in the Western Cape, Colonel Terblanche, said in a statement that “the attack on the Prime Minister was not an organised one: it was purely an isolated attack by an individual.”⁷³¹⁴ Six years on, the day after Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination, Minister of Justice and Police John Vorster would make a similar statement, “Present information indicates that it (the assassination) was the deed of one individual, and his actions and movements are being investigated in the finest detail.”⁷³¹⁵

The day after the assassination, Mr. J.C. Pauw, Director of the Union Festival, announced that the Union Exposition would re-open as usual. He said it was the wish of Dr. Verwoerd, his wife and the Government that the programme should continue its normal course.⁷³¹⁶ Two days after the shooting, overseas journalists descended on Marshall Square police station and demanded to know why Pratt had been in the cells for forty-eight hours and had not yet been charged. The Rand chief detective, Col. John Olivier, stated that Pratt was being held under State of Emergency regulations and the State would decide when he would be charged. It was reported that talks were being held between detectives and legal officers about formulating a charge.⁷³¹⁷ Pratt’s visits to his family in Holland were confirmed by a Dutch Justice Ministry spokesman, who said Pratt had been there three times in the last three years. The spokesman also mentioned the time when he was denied entry because he was in possession of a firearm.⁷³¹⁸

Some newspapers predicted that the emergency regulations would now be enforced more strenuously and expressed fears that the shooting would heighten tensions between the National Party’s Dutch-descended Afrikaner supporters and South Africans of British origin.⁷³¹⁹ Indeed, telephone calls were made to two English-language daily newspapers in

⁷³¹² *Daily Express*, 11 April 1960: 5, ‘The man who shot Dr. Verwoerd.’

⁷³¹³ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 11 April 1960, ‘Calm prevailing in South Africa; Dr. Verwoerd gains.’

⁷³¹⁴ *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960, 1, ‘Isolated attack, says police chief’; *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Dr. Verwoerd moved to Pretoria.’

⁷³¹⁵ *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1966 (late edition): 1, ‘Killer was a lone worker.’

⁷³¹⁶ *Daily Representative*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘PM may be away for six weeks’; *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Festival goes on.’

⁷³¹⁷ *Die Vaderland*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Speurhoof se staat kan Pratt enige tyd vervolg.’

⁷³¹⁸ *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 14 April 1960: 4, ‘Gun kept Pratt out of Holland.’

⁷³¹⁹ *Philadelphia Tribune*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Farmer’s motive In Dr. Verwoerd shooting cloaked in mystery.’

Johannesburg, the *Star* and the *Rand Daily Mail*, threatening to blow up their buildings, and police guards were set on the newspapers for two days.⁷³²⁰ Among many rumours was one that Pratt attacked Dr. Verwoerd without an escape plan because he was mortally ill with a brain tumour. Pratt's sister denied the rumour.⁷³²¹ In economic terms, Pratt's action rattled white public confidence already shaken by the Sharpeville massacre and the introduction of a state of emergency. In a five-month period, shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange lost 23% of their value.⁷³²²

The South African police carried out an intensive investigation into the possibility that others were involved with Pratt in the attack. Inquiries were made not only in Johannesburg, but in Cape Town and even within Parliament itself.⁷³²³ However no conspirators were found and on June 11, 1960, the police announced that Pratt had been "absolved of any complicity" in a political plot to kill Dr. Verwoerd and that no other political group or individuals were involved.⁷³²⁴ It should be noted that the transcripts from David Pratt's interrogations by the police, like Tsafendas's, were not found in the National Archives. Therefore we are not in position to know what he told the police.

THE PRESS ON PRATT

THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS

The South African Press mostly used negative language in describing Pratt, employing terms such as "unbalanced," "demented," "moody, with psychological problem," "a man of strange moods," an "epileptic." It was reported that he had displayed neurotic and anti-social tendencies from an early age and erratic behaviour which became more noticeable with the years and that only a few people outside of Pratt's immediate acquaintances knew him intimately.⁷³²⁵ Most newspapers highlighted Pratt's epilepsy, his "strange moods," his two

⁷³²⁰ *The Canberra Times*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd may not recover completely'; *Washington Post*, 11 April 1960: A8, 'S. Africa speeds action on assassin.'

⁷³²¹ *The Canberra Times*, 3 May 1960: 1, 'Denial Dr. Verwoerd affected by bullet wound.'

⁷³²² Stultz, 2016: 95.

⁷³²³ *Die Vaderland*, 4 May 1960: 11, 'Vermetele pogings om Pratt te ontvoer.'

⁷³²⁴ *Sunday Times*, 12 June 1960: 1, 'Pratt is cleared of political plotting – no conspiracy.'

⁷³²⁵ *Die Vaderland*, 11 April 1960: 4, 'Pratt was soms gesellig, soms neuroties en onvriendelik'; *Cleveland Call and Post*, 16 April 1960: 1, 'South African boss survives bullet wounds'; *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1966, 'Arrested farmer said to be epileptic'; *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960, 'Strange whims of man held after the shooting'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 April 1960, 'The enigma that is David Pratt.'

failed marriages and the family problems after the second one. However, as far as the author can establish, there was no mention of his political beliefs or his opposition to apartheid.

An article in the nationalist *Die Vaderland* highlighted Pratt's switches between sociability and reclusiveness. It wrote that "sometimes ... he was the nicest person imaginable. Then again he was a reclusive man who did not want to talk to anyone for weeks on end." The paper said that at times Pratt would double the amount of money people asked to borrow from him, but at other times, "he would not lend a penny to anyone." The article went on: "Sometimes the social life of Johannesburg would draw him and then he would move in those circles in a light-hearted mood, only to seclude himself in his house again for weeks and even months. It also often happened that he would disappear from his house in the night and then return some time later." *Die Vaderland* said Pratt would consult with a doctor when depression overtook him.⁷³²⁶

The *Cape Times* published stories along similar lines, describing Pratt as an enigma who could be charming and friendly when he chose but at other times brusque and morose. It reported that in recent years he had been under treatment at mental institutions for short periods.⁷³²⁷ There were also positive statements about Pratt, how he was a generous man who paid for the sons of several of his friends to complete their education,⁷³²⁸ and that he was kindly and helpful to old people, whether they were English- or Afrikaans-speaking.⁷³²⁹ One description of Pratt was that his personality made him stand out in any gathering.⁷³³⁰ In Holland, Pratt's parents-in-law described him as "an amiable man."⁷³³¹ These positive statements were important in that people were not afraid to speak well of him even though he had just shot South Africa's Prime Minister.

In a God-fearing country, it was quickly reported that he was a regular worshipper at St. Peter's Church, Krugersdorp. Reverend T. Heath, Rector of St. Peter's, said Pratt had confided many problems to him which he could not reveal because of the trust Pratt had placed in him. "Mr. Pratt was very worried lately – his mind was in a state of turmoil," said Rev. Heath. He described Pratt as a "thorough gentleman" and said he never discussed

⁷³²⁶ *Die Vaderland*, 11 April 1960: 4, 'Pratt was soms gesellig, soms neuroties en onvriendelik.'

⁷³²⁷ *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, 'Man of wealth and whims.'

⁷³²⁸ *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960, 'Strange whims of man held after the shooting.'

⁷³²⁹ *The Star*, 11 April 1960, 'Pratt confided worries to Rector, who respects trust.'

⁷³³⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'The enigma that is Pratt.'

⁷³³¹ *Daily Dispatch*, 13 April 1960: 1, 'The estranged Mrs. Pratt.'

politics with him. “He was a very generous man and made donations to a large number of charities.”⁷³³²

Father (later Bishop) Reginald Orsmond, the founder and director of Boys’ Town in South Africa, a Christian mission which Pratt supported and visited regularly, said he gained the impression during those encounters that Pratt was deeply upset and looking for something to restore his self-confidence.⁷³³³ He described him as “always very pleasant and very kind to the people at the mission.”⁷³³⁴ Fr. Orsmond would be one of the defence witnesses in the forthcoming trial.

Six year later, shortly after Tsafendas killed Dr. Verwoerd, Alan Paton wrote about Pratt’s assault, “I can remember well the first attempt at assassination, and the public reaction to it. To many people the news was exciting, to some even pleasing.”⁷³³⁵ Of course, no reports of this kind were published at the time.

THE FOREIGN PRESS

News articles around the world gave a completely different picture of Pratt from the one that appeared in South Africa’s newspapers. Although international reports mentioned that Pratt had some psychological problems due to depression caused by his divorce and his epilepsy, no doubts were cast on his sanity. On the contrary, he was presented as perfectly sane. More importantly, he emerged as a man with strong political convictions who despised Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid, a side to his character that remained unknown to newspaper readers in South Africa. Let’s examine these reports.

In Britain, the London *Evening Standard* of April 11 and the *Daily Mirror* of April 12 reported that Pratt was a member of the Liberal Party of Great Britain. Both newspapers published a photograph of Pratt with Derek Monsey, a Liberal Party candidate for Parliament, during the British general election of October 1959. The photograph showed them knocking on the door of 10 Downing Street, the residence of the prime minister, thereby taking the expression door-to-door canvassing to its extreme! Pratt was described by the newspapers as

⁷³³² *The Star*, 11 April 1966: 1, ‘Pratt confided worries to Rector-who respects trust.’

⁷³³³ *The Cape Times*, 11 April 1960, ‘David Pratt interested in Boys’ Town.’

⁷³³⁴ *Sunday Times*, 10 April 1960: 1, ‘Arrested man a wealthy Transvaal farmer.’

⁷³³⁵ Paton, 1966: 3.

“a man who helped the Liberals a great deal.”⁷³³⁶ It seems unlikely that Monsey would have taken Pratt to the home of the British prime minister if he had any doubts as to his mental stability and unless he knew him as a trusted party member.

Bruce Hewes, formerly vice-chairman of the Westminster Constituency Liberal Party, said, “I think it is wrong to write Mr. Pratt off as a madman. He was not the sort of chap to go around shouting ‘Down with Dr. Verwoerd.’ He would go and do something about it.” Hewes add that Pratt “helped us a great deal with door-to-door canvassing.” He said, “He didn’t talk very much, but he struck me as being perfectly sane.”⁷³³⁷ Bute Hewes, Bruce’s wife, said Pratt told her a few months earlier that “a lot of us don’t like what is going on in South Africa. But what is the alternative? It’s our country and we just can’t run out on it. It’s our home. But some of us want to see things put straight out there. Apartheid can’t last.”⁷³³⁸

The British newspapers were not the only ones to mention Pratt’s political interests. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* covered the case extensively through their South Africa-based correspondents. Pratt was described to these two newspapers by a close acquaintance as “a man who hates Nationalists,” and who described Dr. Verwoerd as “the Number One Nationalist.”⁷³³⁹

In different articles in the two newspapers, Pratt was widely described by his friends in South Africa and Britain as “a critic of apartheid,”⁷³⁴⁰ and a “foe of Dr. Verwoerd’s apartheid and race-segregation policies,”⁷³⁴¹ and nursing a “deep antipathy to the governing National Party and its policies.”⁷³⁴² However, none of Pratt’s friends in South Africa would make such comments to the local papers or later at his trial and none of the foreign news reports of Pratt’s political beliefs and activities were carried by South African newspapers.

However, it was not only Pratt’s political activities and ideology that were blanked because of the ban. Numerous foreign reports of a positive nature were withheld from the South African people. In *TIME* magazine, he was described as a “gentle, kind man who

⁷³³⁶ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘The day farmer Pratt called at No. 10’; *Evening Standard*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Death for gunman?’

⁷³³⁷ *Evening Standard*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Death for gunman?’

⁷³³⁸ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, ‘Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.’

⁷³³⁹ *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, no title; *Washington Post*, 11 April 1960: A8, ‘S. Africa speeds action on assassin.’

⁷³⁴⁰ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, ‘Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.’

⁷³⁴¹ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, ‘Press silence on Pratt ordered’; *Washington Post*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Africa shields assassin’s fate.’

⁷³⁴² Ingalls, (*The New York Times*), 11 April 1960, ‘Calm prevailing in South Africa; Dr. Verwoerd gain.’

collects guns.”⁷³⁴³ The *New York Times* reported that Pratt had made large donations to poor people the previous Christmas,⁷³⁴⁴ while friends and acquaintances described him variously as “rich, good-looking and cultivated,”⁷³⁴⁵ and “quiet and kindly.”⁷³⁴⁶ People who knew him in Holland described him as “a nice, courteous and very generous man.”⁷³⁴⁷ The *TIME* magazine also reported that Pratt “hated Dr. Verwoerd’s National Party.”⁷³⁴⁸

Members of the National Liberal Club in London described him as “a gentleman in every way.” Another member considered he was “a reserved chap, the last sort of fellow you would expect to pull a gun on anyone.” Less warmly, someone else described him as “small and aggressive, with an immense sense of his own importance.”⁷³⁴⁹ The Liberal-supporting Fleet Street newspaper, the *News Chronicle*, quoted a friend of Pratt as saying he was “a very good-hearted gentleman,” who was fond of pistols.⁷³⁵⁰ Another friend said he had some psychological troubles,⁷³⁵¹ while a third described him as “an impulsive man” with some “psychological difficulties.”⁷³⁵² However, no-one questioned Pratt’s sanity.

The *Daily Express*, using the expression in the non-sexual way of the time, published an article entitled, “A Gay Man,” accompanied by four photographs. Pratt was characterised as a “happy man” and a “sunshine man,” whose home entertainment was “something to remember.”⁷³⁵³ The same newspaper wrote that a few months before the assault, Susan Pratt, told one of its reporters, “my father is the sweetest and gentlest man you could meet. He wouldn’t hurt a fly.”⁷³⁵⁴

Much of the British Press, especially the left wing journals, applauded Pratt’s act. According to Sir William Neil Connor, in his widely read *Cassandra* column in the *Daily Mirror*, the majority of Britons were “only disappointed that Pratt did not succeed in killing Dr. Verwoerd.” He wrote that “in fact, such is the bitterness in the minds of the British public

⁷³⁴³ *TIME*, 18 April 1966: 24, ‘The assassin of Milner Park.’

⁷³⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, no title.

⁷³⁴⁵ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, ‘Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.’

⁷³⁴⁶ *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 30, ‘The lesson of South Africa.’

⁷³⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960, ‘Pratt described as ‘generous.’

⁷³⁴⁸ *TIME*, 18 April 1966: 24, ‘The assassin of Milner Park.’

⁷³⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, ‘Enigmatic assassin: David Pratt.’

⁷³⁵⁰ *News Chronicle*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Would be assassin: gunman without a cause.’

⁷³⁵¹ *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960: 3, no title.

⁷³⁵² Ingalls, (*The New York Times*), 11 April 1960, ‘Calm prevailing in South Africa; Dr. Verwoerd gain.’

⁷³⁵³ *Daily Express*, 29 April 1960: 9, ‘A gay man.’

⁷³⁵⁴ *Daily Express*, 14 April 1960: 8, ‘He wouldn’t hurt a fly.’

that when the news came through on Saturday afternoon there were expressions of everything from satisfaction to pleasure - but no regret.”⁷³⁵⁵

The mass-circulation Sunday newspaper, *The People*, denounced Dr. Verwoerd as a tyrant and described the shooting as “retribution” for his racist policies.⁷³⁵⁶ A week later it attacked Dr. Verwoerd again, stating that he was trying to create through apartheid “a class of work-slaves.”⁷³⁵⁷ The *Daily Telegraph* expressed surprise that the assailant was White and not Black, which, it said, “would have been understandable.”⁷³⁵⁸

The *Observer* expressed its sympathy for both Dr. Verwoerd and Pratt, saying, “Personal sympathy for Dr. Verwoerd, who is recovering from an attempt on his life, should be expressed and felt. He carries huge responsibilities and has no doubt done only what he believes to be right. But this should not prevent us from feeling some sympathy for Mr. David Pratt, his would-be assassin, who presumably also did what he believed to be right.” The newspaper went on, “Political assassination is undoubtedly a crime in civilised communities. However, only pacifists have reproached those who made attempts on the lives of Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin and Franco, because these rulers had practised such extravagant injustice and violence themselves... But if he (Dr. Verwoerd) does not treat his governed more fairly, we should not view them and him as without regard to who has been hurting whom. To treat victims and oppressors as morally the same is moral nonsense.”⁷³⁵⁹

The Times called the assault “a dreadful act” and noted that until a few years ago, Pratt was socially prominent in the Johannesburg and Pretoria areas and had the reputation of being an excellent host.⁷³⁶⁰ The left-wing *Tribune* carried a short comment on its back page, indicating that it had no sympathy for Dr. Verwoerd, but considered that “assassination is an ineffective political weapon.” It said it did not hold the view that it was possible to shoot apartheid out of South Africa by shooting Dr. Verwoerd.⁷³⁶¹

Britain’s oldest political weekly, the Conservative *Spectator*, found Pratt’s act understandable and justifiable and said it was surprising it had not happened a long time ago. “No dictatorship can behave in the brutal and bloody way that his [Dr. Verwoerd’s] has been

⁷³⁵⁵ *Daily Mirror*, 11 April 1960: 6.

⁷³⁵⁶ *The People*, 10 April 1960: 1, ‘V day: two shots and 3000 gasped.’

⁷³⁵⁷ *The People*, 17 April 1960: 4, ‘He wants a class of work-slaves.’

⁷³⁵⁸ Richards, 1993: 28.

⁷³⁵⁹ *The Observer*, 17 April 1960: 16, ‘Comment: violence.’

⁷³⁶⁰ *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Dr. Verwoerd moved to Pretoria.’

⁷³⁶¹ Richards, 1993: 29.

doing without eventually leading someone to the conclusion that the simplest way to topple the tyrant is to shoot him dead,” the magazine said. It added that there was a “hideously ironic sense of relief” that the assailant was a white man. “The reaction of the trigger-happy South African authorities against the Black population might, if the shots had been fired by a Black man, have led to a bloodbath beside which Sharpeville would have looked like a Sunday-school picnic.”⁷³⁶²

Vernon Richards, the anarchist editor of *Freedom* magazine headed his editorial “Too bad he missed,” and he wrote: “Millions of people throughout the world, disgusted by the racial policies of the South African government, will have read the news of the attempt on Dr. Verwoerd with disappointment only because the attempt failed. For them, David Pratt did what they had neither the opportunity nor, in the event, the courage, to do.”⁷³⁶³

Richards then described South Africa as a society “in which the majority is denied the most elementary rights by the ruling minority.” This meant it could only be maintained by naked violence. “Throughout its history, the Black African has invariably been the victim. Last Saturday’s news made a pleasant change. And in sending our condolences and solidarity to David Pratt, who for his gesture is to be detained indefinitely under the Emergency Regulations Laws, we express the hope that no dictator, be he Black, White or Coloured, in Africa, Spain, South America or on either side of the curtain of power, will now sleep in peace!”⁷³⁶⁴

Two weeks later, *Freedom* published an article, “In defence of David Pratt.” Richards wrote: “That a white South African, a wealthy man, whose wealth and status might well depend on the successful conclusion of Dr. Verwoerd’s apartheid policies, should have been prepared to risk his life or at least his liberty, to exchange his material comforts (which by all accounts were considerable) for confinement in a prison cell in order to make his protest against Dr. Verwoerd and his policies seems to us so unusual, so praiseworthy, that no one professing to radical ideas could possibly ignore the action even if he disagreed with the *method*... we accept David Pratt’s action as courageous, generous and important to the future of South Africa.” Several readers subsequently sent letters to the magazine, expressing their support for Pratt.⁷³⁶⁵

⁷³⁶² *The Spectator*, 14 April 1960: 4, ‘Murder will out.’

⁷³⁶³ Richards, 1993: 28.

⁷³⁶⁴ Richards, 1993: 28.

⁷³⁶⁵ Richards, 1993: 29-30.

In the United States, all the big African-American newspapers, like the *Atlanta Daily World*, the *Chicago Daily Defender*, the *Philadelphia Tribune* and the *New Journal and Guide*, applauded Pratt. *The New Journal and Guide* carried the banner headline, “Their Hitler Down,”⁷³⁶⁶ while *The Chicago Daily Defender*, the leading African-American newspaper which is still in print today, praised Pratt lavishly, urged that a monument be raised to him and denounced Dr. Verwoerd as a “blood-thirsty monster.” It wrote: “David Pratt, the white farmer, bless his soul, who fired the three shots that wounded the South African Prime Minister, might have been driven by a divine spirit to put an end to the wanton massacre of helpless Africans. The NAACP (the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People) should offer its legal services to this man; and a monument should be erected to his name. Whether his motive was political or racial matters little. It cannot be doubted that he was trying to rid the world of a blood-thirsty monster.”⁷³⁶⁷

The weekly *New York Amsterdam News*, which is also still in existence, published what it called a “Tribute to Pratt.” However, it was also a markedly prophetic piece of writing, the only article in the world Press, as far as the author can establish, which successfully predicted the fate of both Pratt and Dr. Verwoerd. This is what the writer said:

“In memoriam, I offer my sincerest sympathy to anyone who knows and respects David Pratt, the would-be assassin of the hateful South African Prime Minister, Hendrik Dr. Verwoerd. And with all those who have come to feel at least a slight kinship with him since news of his arrest. I, myself rejoice that Pratt was born and lives. He is a great man, and greater still because he was not black. He believed intensely in an idea. But what that idea was, which inspired the will to destroy where destruction and violence has no alternative, we may never know. We can hope, however, that black South Africans will achieve it soon.

It matters not that he didn’t succeed, or that Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd will rise up again to infest the world, or that the nastiest idea since Hell was created, apartheid, will continue. What does matter is that he has shown it can be done. It must be done. It will be done again. But mercy is only an all too human quality and we know that David Pratt may soon die. We will mourn him, but black men everywhere should be comforted by his memory.”⁷³⁶⁸

⁷³⁶⁶ *New Journal and Guide*, 16 April 1960: A1, ‘Their Hitler down, S. African racists step up terrorism.’

⁷³⁶⁷ *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 12 April 1960: 10, ‘Hendrik Dr. Verwoerd: the monster.’

⁷³⁶⁸ *New York Amsterdam News*, 7 May 1960: 10, ‘Tribute to Pratt.’

THE PRESS SILENCED

On April 11, 1960 in South Africa, two days after the shooting, a news conference for foreign journalists was held by three government ministers: Eric Louw (External Affairs), Francois C. Erasmus (Justice) and J.J. Fouché (Defence). Louw stated that “in this country there is complete freedom of the Press.” He then announced that Norman Phillips, the Canadian foreign editor of the *Toronto Daily Star*, would be released from custody as soon as the police had finished questioning him, provided he agreed to leave South Africa immediately. Phillips had arrived in Sharpeville just after the massacre but was prevented from entering the township. He said he had seen police violence in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban.⁷³⁶⁹ He had been detained two days earlier in Durban after writing critical stories about apartheid. The *Toronto Daily Star* reported that Phillips’s dispatches were “uncompromisingly against the Government’s policy of white supremacy.” Justice Minister Erasmus denounced the reports as “absolutely untrue” and ordered his arrest.⁷³⁷⁰ The arrest came shortly after he interviewed Albert Luthuli, who he described as “the only sane man I’ve met since coming here three weeks ago.”⁷³⁷¹ The accusation against Phillips was of writing “reports critical of the government” which could have done serious damage to South African-Canadian relations.⁷³⁷² The Canadian Government protested strongly and demanded Phillips’s immediate release.⁷³⁷³

Only hours after Louw boasted of complete freedom of the Press, the police in Cape Town arrested another foreign journalist, Myrna Mackenzie of the London *Daily Herald* and the *New York Post*, who was writing under the name Myrna Blumberg.⁷³⁷⁴ Myrna Mackenzie

⁷³⁶⁹ CBS Archives, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/sharpeville-massacre-sparks-international-condemnation>; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Journalist to be freed-but must leave’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Canada angry over newsman’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest.’

⁷³⁷⁰ *Daily Express*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Satisfactory’; *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, ‘News girl is seized’; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Journalist to be freed-but must leave’; *The Spectator*, 14 April 1960: 3, ‘Portrait of the week’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 12 April 1960: 12, ‘Dr. Verwoerd still as head of Cabinet.’

⁷³⁷¹ *Washington Post*, 10 April 1960: 4, ‘South Africa jails newsman.’

⁷³⁷² CBS Archives, available at: <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/sharpeville-massacre-sparks-international-condemnation>; *The Cape Argus*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Journalist to be freed-but must leave’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Canada angry over newsman’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest.’

⁷³⁷³ *The New York Times*, 11 April 1960, ‘Dr. Verwoerd aides expect recovery’; *The Star*, 11 April 1960: 3, ‘Canada angry over newsman’s arrest’; *The Times* (London), 11 April 1960: 10, ‘Protest over journalist’s arrest.’

⁷³⁷⁴ Alamy (n.d.) Correspondent of the ‘*Daily Herald*’ Myrna Blumberg is arrested. Available at: <http://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-correspondent-of-the-daily-herald-myrna-blumberg-is-arrested->

was the wife of Ken Mackenzie, manager of *Drum* and the *Post*, and both were both reporting on the ANC's strike campaign.⁷³⁷⁵ At this time, too, the editor of *Africa South* fled the country to avoid arrest.⁷³⁷⁶

On April 12, the day after Louw hailed the freedom of the Press in South Africa, the police banned the media from publishing anything about David Pratt, including his name and photograph, until the end of the Emergency.⁷³⁷⁷ A government official said that this was done "to avoid ill-feeling between the white races,"⁷³⁷⁸ and a police spokesman announced that Pratt "will appear in court at some future date."⁷³⁷⁹ After that, the South African newspapers remained dutifully silent about Pratt until July 7, 1960, the day before he appeared at Pretoria Magistrate's Court.⁷³⁸⁰

Why would the authorities bar the Press from reporting about Pratt? "To avoid ill-feeling between the white races" seems like a lame excuse. It seems more probable that they wanted to prevent the Press and subsequently the public from discovering exactly the sort of man David Pratt was and what political views he held. Reports in the foreign Press contained information about Pratt's life but particularly about his political ideology and political activities, which would certainly not have been welcomed by the South African government. Little of the information published in foreign newspapers was ever reprinted in the South African Press.

CONCLUSION REGARDING THE PRESS

It seems more than likely that the government banned mention of Pratt in South African newspapers because it had seen foreign news reports characterising him positively as highly political and against apartheid and it did not want this picture of him being made available to

69364057.html; *Daily Dispatch*, 13 April 1960: 1, 'Woman detained-Canadian released'; *Daily Express*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Satisfactory'; *News Chronicle*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd men hold woman reporter'; *The Chicago Daily Defender*, 13 April 1960: 3, 'South Africa not yielding on race'; *The Spectator*, 14 April 1960: 3, 'Portrait of the week'; *Washington Post*, 12 April 1960: 6, 'South Africa widens Emergency Rule.'

⁷³⁷⁵ Vigne, 1997: 120-1; *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, 'News girl seized.'

⁷³⁷⁶ *The Spectator*, 14 April 1960: 3, 'Portrait of the week.'

⁷³⁷⁷ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, 'And now he must be called 'nameless''; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Press silence on Pratt ordered'; *The New York Times*, 7 July 1960: 3, 'Rap South Africa for denying 1600 a trial'; *Washington Post*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Africa shields assassin's fate.'

⁷³⁷⁸ *News Chronicle*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'Dr. Verwoerd is whisked away for operation.'

⁷³⁷⁹ *Daily Mirror*, 12 April 1960: 5, 'And now he must be called 'nameless''; *The New York Times*, 12 April 1960, 'Press silence on Pratt ordered'; *The New York Times*, 7 July 1960: 3, 'Rap South Africa for denying 1600 a trial'; *Washington Post*, 12 April 1960: 1, 'Africa shields assassin's fate.'

⁷³⁸⁰ *The New York Times*, 7 July 1960: 3, 'Rap South Africa for denying 1600 a trial.'

South Africans. Knowing that it could not prevent these reports from being picked up by South African newspapers, the government decided to impose a blanket ban on publication.

We should remember that this was 1960, before fax machines and the internet, when newspapers communicated mainly by teleprinter links, telephones and telegrams. The picture of Pratt which emerges from the foreign reports is entirely different to that presented by the South African media, as well as the one which would later emerge from his trial. It seems obvious that the authorities not only wished to suppress the foreign reports but also to prevent South African reporters from making and publishing their own enquiries about Pratt.

Pratt's friends in South Africa told the South African media that Pratt never discussed political issues, but when talking to the foreign press, they told the truth - that he talked about politics like everybody else. It seems unlikely that a man ready to risk his life in an attack on his prime minister would be afraid to express his opinion about the current situation. What seems likelier is that, as in the case of Tsafendas, his friends concealed Pratt's political ideas to protect themselves, while also perhaps thinking this would be safer Pratt, too. Tsafendas's acquaintances who knew about his political ideas, especially his support for Communism, did not mention this to the police because they feared they could be considered sympathizers and asked why they had not reported him to the police as a Communist. It is possible that Pratt's friends thought the same. After all, it cannot be a coincidence that people outside South Africa spoke so freely about Pratt's political ideas and activities, while not a single one did in South Africa.

None of the South African newspapers, as far as the author can ascertain, reported Pratt's political interests or activities, such as his being a member of the South African and British Liberal parties or that he denounced apartheid at party meetings overseas and to his friends in South Africa. Certainly, the photograph of Pratt and a Liberal Party Parliamentary candidate knocking on the door of 10 Downing Street could not have been greater proof of Pratt's political enthusiasms. It also signalled the British party's confidence in Pratt as a known, stable and committed supporter. Such a photograph would have been seized eagerly by any newspaper editor and it must have caused South Africa's news executives much anguish to be told not to touch it under pain of legal sanction.

PRATT'S FRIENDS

One of the most striking aspects of Pratt's case is the way his friends mobilised in his defence and the lengths they went to in order to save his life. Soon after the assault, a friend of Pratt and a member of the Liberal Party in the UK, a certain Mr. Short, visited the Commonwealth Relations Office (C.R.O.) in London several times. A C.R.O. report said he wanted to know if its officers would inquire whether Pratt was receiving a proper trial. He made much of the point that, as he alleged, the United Kingdom Government was prepared to intervene with other governments on behalf of dual nationals where it suited it to do so. The Office told Mr Short that the "matter was *sub judice* and that it was a settled principle that governments did not seek to intervene in matters which were *sub judice*." However, it said the C.R.O. "had no information to show that Mr. Pratt's trial would not be completely fair." The dogged Mr. Short did not give up and said that he might "ask a Member of Parliament to ask a question on this subject."⁷³⁸¹

Mr. R.J. Britten of the C.R.O. contacted the Office of the UK High Commissioner in Pretoria regarding Short's inquiry. On August 11, 1960, E.J. Emery replied that, "We agree, of course, with the line you took with your caller ... about matters which are *sub judice*... considerations of principle apart, Afrikanerdom would react strongly if the United Kingdom Government were to intervene in this particular case."⁷³⁸²

In April, another of Pratt's friends asked the British government for help. Mrs. Olive Roberts from Porthkerry, Barry, south Wales, a member of the British anti-apartheid movement, wrote to her MP, Sir Raymond Gower, "expressing her great anxiety as to the position of her friend, Mr David Pratt, who has been arrested in South Africa." She asked about the conditions where Pratt was held. On April 30, the MP forwarded her letter to the Commonwealth Minister of State, Cuthbert J. McCall Alport.⁷³⁸³

Alport replied on May 5 that "Mr. David Pratt is a citizen of the Union of South Africa and we have, therefore no *locus standi* to make any enquiries about Mr. Pratt from the

⁷³⁸¹ Report of the Commonwealth Relations Office, 24 June 1960. Attempted Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. DO 35/10569. BNA.

⁷³⁸² Letter of E.J. Emery Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Pretoria to R.J. Britten of the C.R.O. 11 August 1960. Attempted Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. DO 35/10569. BNA.

⁷³⁸³ Letter of Raymond Gower to C.J.M. Alport, 30 April 1960. Attempted Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. DO 35/10569. BNA.

Government of the Union of South Africa, even though he may also be a citizen of the United Kingdom. We know that in these circumstances the Union Government will refuse to give any information about him and I am sorry, therefore, that there is no way in which I can provide the assurance for which Mrs. Roberts asks.”⁷³⁸⁴ It is not clear from the correspondence what “assurances,” Ms Roberts had asked for and her letter was not found in the archives.

Meanwhile, members of the UK anti-apartheid movement, the Labour and Liberal parties collected funds for Pratt’s defence.⁷³⁸⁵ It was no more than a symbolic gesture, since Pratt did not need the money. The Liberal Party and the National Liberal Club almost certainly never had a member who shot a prime minister, yet both adopted a supportive stance towards Pratt. It is unlikely that they would have done so if they had any doubts as to his mental stability or the sincerity of his political convictions.⁷³⁸⁶

Pressure for diplomatic intervention was only one aspect of Pratt’s support. As we will later see, some of Pratt’s friends in South Africa would be involved in at least three escape plans, risking their freedom, indeed their lives, on his behalf. Other friends agreed to testify in court in support of an insanity plea orchestrated by the defence and Pratt’s daughter which they knew to be a lie. They exaggerated and manipulated stories to give credence to something they knew was not true, in an effort to save their friend. Such extraordinary loyalty, indeed affection, could never have been extended to someone who was mentally disordered and without political concerns.

PRATT’S DEFENCE TEAM

The firm of attorneys, Dryden⁷³⁸⁷ & Myburgh, which was handling Pratt’s affairs, appointed a well-known advocate, Israel (Isie) Maisels, to defend Pratt. Frank Ninow, his junior, was briefed along with him.⁷³⁸⁸ Dryden & Myburgh, in agreement with Pratt’s family and friends, decided to mount a defence of insanity, believing that this “would give him a more lenient

⁷³⁸⁴ Letter of C.J.M. Alport to Raymond Gower, 5 May 1960. Attempted Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. DO 35/10569. BNA.

⁷³⁸⁵ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

⁷³⁸⁶ Michael Meadowcroft in a personal interview, 2 February 2017.

⁷³⁸⁷ Three years later, Hilton Dryden, one of the partners of the company, was found shot dead in his house with a pistol in his hand (*The New York Times*, 15 November 1963, ‘Dr. Verwoerd’s foe’s lawyer dead’).

⁷³⁸⁸ Maisels, 1998: 102.

punishment.”⁷³⁸⁹ However, before any trial could start, the law required that if a person charged or about to be charged with a crime appeared to be mentally disordered, an enquiry must first be held into his mental condition.⁷³⁹⁰ Pratt himself disagreed with a defence of insanity, protesting that it undermined the seriousness of his action against Dr. Verwoerd. Despite the protests of his daughter, who feared for his life, Pratt was unmoved and unwilling to plead insanity.⁷³⁹¹

ISRAEL MAISELS'S SHORT BIOGRAPHY⁷³⁹²

Israel (Isie) Aaron Maisels QC (1905-1994) was one of the greatest advocates in the history of South Africa. Maisels started practice at the Bar in 1930 and retired from it in 1992, aged eighty-seven. He is best known for the Treason Trial, widely considered to be his greatest triumph. The trial began in 1958 and ran for almost three years. A total of ninety-two prisoners were arraigned, among them Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Ahmed Kathrada and Helen Joseph. Maisels's defence team, which included several distinguished lawyers, secured verdicts of “not guilty” for all the accused.⁷³⁹³ Maisels also represented Bishop Reeves and some dependents at the Sharpeville Commission of Inquiry.⁷³⁹⁴ He was one of the two members of a committee appointed by the Medical Association of South Africa to investigate the medical/ethical issues arising from the death in police detention in 1977 of Steve Biko. Maisels was also active in South Africa's Jewish community, being at different times president of the United Hebrew Congregation, chairman of the South African Zionist Federation, and chairman of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies.⁷³⁹⁵

PRATT IN PRISON

JOHANNESBURG FORT

Pratt was transferred from Marshall Square police station to the Johannesburg Fort prison with the intention that he should remain there, under the Emergency Regulations, until he

⁷³⁸⁹ Susan Pratt in a personal interview, 3 May 2015.

⁷³⁹⁰ Maisels, 1998: 102.

⁷³⁹¹ Guy Spiller in a personal interview, 8 December 2016.

⁷³⁹² For more about Maisels see his biography (1998) *A life at Law*.

⁷³⁹³ South African Law Journal, 1995: 132-135.

⁷³⁹⁴ *The Star*, 12 April 1960: 1, ‘Official inquiry starts: Policemen describe Sharpeville events.’

⁷³⁹⁵ South African Law Journal, 1995: 132-135.

appeared in Pretoria Magistrate's Court.⁷³⁹⁶ The disruption to this plan is explained in the following paragraphs. Pratt was given tablets at two-hourly intervals to ward off the effects of epilepsy.⁷³⁹⁷

ESCAPE PLANS

It seems that Pratt always had an eye towards flight and at least three escape plans or attempts have been recorded. During the last week of April 1960, police uncovered a plan by some of Pratt's friends to engineer his escape from the Fort prison and then fly him out of the country. An airplane stood ready and the friends tried to bribe some of Pratt's guards. When the plot was discovered, Pratt was removed from the Fort under the strictest secrecy to an unknown destination, which in fact was the Pretoria Local Prison.⁷³⁹⁸

The Witwatersrand criminal investigation chief, Colonel John Olivier, did not deny reports of the escape attempt, but declined to comment on them.⁷³⁹⁹ Several months later, as we will see in detail, Pratt would temporarily escape on his own, where again another airplane was waiting for him. Shortly before his trial, a new plot was initiated, also involving an airplane, but Pratt's advocate, Israel Maisels, refused to be part of it.

The author has not been able to establish who was involved in these attempts, but mention might be made of Tommy Griffiths, who lived in Bloemfontein. Griffiths was a friend of Pratt and of his business partner, John Spiller. He was a pilot and owned a small airplane.⁷⁴⁰⁰ It is not possible to state that Griffiths was involved in any escape plan, but it may be germane that all of the proposed escapes involved the use of an airplane to fly Pratt to safety.

The fact that Pratt's friends were willing to risk their freedom, possibly their lives, on Pratt's behalf speaks volumes for the respect and affection in which they held him. Their attitude gives the lie to the State's preferred description of Pratt as someone without any close friends. It is highly unlikely that these men would go to the lengths they did for someone they

⁷³⁹⁶ *Daily Dispatch*, 9 July 1960, 'David Pratt in Pretoria Court.'

⁷³⁹⁷ *Daily Express*, 29 April 1960: 9, 'A gay man.'

⁷³⁹⁸ *Die Vaderland*, 4 May 1960: 11, 'Vermetele pogings om Pratt te ontvoer'; *The Canberra Times*, 6 May 1960: 24, 'Plot to kidnap Pratt alleged.'

⁷³⁹⁹ *The Canberra Times*, 6 May 1960: 24, 'Plot to kidnap Pratt alleged.'

⁷⁴⁰⁰ Guy Spiller in a personal interview, 7 February 2017.

scarcely knew or who they thought might be insane. Nor would they have acted if they believed that he could get away by pleading insanity.

PRETORIA LOCAL PRISON

In Pretoria Local Prison, Pratt was reunited with Joe Slovo and other anti-apartheid activists who had already been moved there. However, he was barred from direct contact with all but one detainee, Reverend Douglas Thompson, also a political detainee. The two played chess once under an arrangement by a compassionate warder.⁷⁴⁰¹

For some time, Pratt was allowed to exercise with other prisoners. He promptly turned the exercise yard into a military parade ground and organised the younger prisoners into a soldierly squad which he marched up and down while barking orders like a sergeant major. The youngsters were quickly dubbed “Pratt’s Army” and seemed to enjoy this break from prison routine. The prison guards looked on, amused. After a while, however, the prison bosses seemed to grow nervous at the sight of an alleged political assassin controlling his own little army and the parade ground drills ended and Pratt was made to exercise on his own. Joe Slovo wrote that one day, “out of desperation for human company or a desire to make a gesture of political unity,” Pratt dashed across the yard into the political prisoners’ section, and he stayed there for a few minutes, shouting greetings, until the warders removed him.⁷⁴⁰²

Slovo and the other “politicals” often made a point to convene their choir when Pratt began his half-hour spell in the exercise yard. This led to a moment Slovo said he would never forget.⁷⁴⁰³

“Pratt’s image is fixed in my memory by a moment during one of our choir practices. We were rehearsing the rather melancholy refrain *Drink to me only with thine eyes*. Pratt, surrounded by warders, stood motionless, as close to our window as they would allow, body slumped, hands in pocket and tears uncontrollably cascading down his cheeks, making not the slightest attempt to hide them or to wipe them off. A few days later he left an exercise

⁷⁴⁰¹ Slovo, 1995: 132.

⁷⁴⁰² Slovo, 1995: 133.

⁷⁴⁰³ Slovo, 1995: 132-133.

book for us in the lavatory complex. It contained very elaborate and fanciful exhortations for joint efforts against racism.”⁷⁴⁰⁴

Pratt was allowed outside his cell for exercise only twice a day for thirty-minute spells. Each time he returned, he collected his sugar ration and on the way back he would spill a little sugar on the ground so that the warders’ footsteps would be clearly heard as they crunched over the grains. This gave him time “to disconnect and hide home-made water heaters from primitive coils or copper wire, dagga, brandy, which was smuggled through in Coca-Cola bottles, and anything else illegal with which the cells abounded.”⁷⁴⁰⁵

A nephew of Pratt, who visited him several times in prison, said his uncle was abused regularly.⁷⁴⁰⁶ On one occasion, he wore an eye-shield to hide a black eye. The official version was that it happened during a fight with an inmate.⁷⁴⁰⁷ The truth was that Pratt was targeted most heavily by warders, who considered him a traitor, while inmates themselves were always ready for a fight. Sometimes, the warders provoked Pratt’s fellow prisoners into attacking him. As with Tsafendas, the prison officers felt it was their duty to punish the man who had attempted to kill their God.⁷⁴⁰⁸ However, unlike Tsafendas, Pratt was not tortured. This may have been because he was a prominent South African with a high-profile defence counsellor in Maisels, who would protest if his client was mistreated, unlike Bloomberg, who failed to intervene on behalf of Tsafendas. Pratt also had regular visitors and his family stood by him, whereas Tsafendas received no outside support.

Nevertheless, Pratt was not angry with the warders and even felt a little sorry for them. In a letter to his friend Desmond Blow he wrote, “The warders’ life was not to be envied. Essentially it was that of the prisoner. His pay was poor, his hours long and the work without satisfaction. As a result, naturally, the more stupid and sadistic section of the community tended to drift towards this work, but there were exceptions.”⁷⁴⁰⁹

One of the exceptions was Sgt. van de Lingen, a twenty-three-year-old head warder who was studying Law. Pratt and van den Lingen shared a careful relationship, with the head warder “opening out” to him a little during his “special solitary exercise periods.” One

⁷⁴⁰⁴ Slovo, 1995: 133.

⁷⁴⁰⁵ David Pratt letter to Desmond Blow, n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷⁴⁰⁶ Maisels, 1998: 327.

⁷⁴⁰⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 October 1961, ‘Pratt’s suicide did not surprise his friends.’

⁷⁴⁰⁸ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁴⁰⁹ David Pratt letter to Desmond Blow, n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

morning when the two were alone in the washrooms, van de Lingen told Pratt, "Every man has his price. If I thought I could get £30,000, I would be quite prepared to serve three years, but not for less." Pratt "looked at him for a few seconds" and then the sergeant's eyes "wandered away." "Did he really think he could hook me with such a gaudy fly?" Pratt wondered, spotting the bait. He thought this was probably a set-up aiming to get him into more trouble and that van de Lingen "had his instructions from higher up." Pratt replied that "£30,000 was chicken feed, and if he really wanted crime he should not think in lesser terms than six figures." He also argued that "the sentences, in any event, were frequently less for stealing a million than a hundred. The public also rather liked the big crook but hated the petty pilferer."⁷⁴¹⁰

One day, van de Lingen confided to Pratt that money belonging to some political detainees which was kept in the prison reception area had been stolen. Pratt already knew about this from the "prisoners' grapevine." When, the warders began questioning the common criminals, i.e. the non-politicals, Pratt told van den Lingen, "What use would convicts have with cash? Look among your own staff; that's more promising ground."⁷⁴¹¹

Pratt made discreet inquiries and discovered which of the political prisoners had lost money. Assuming they needed cash, Pratt left a note offering his help on the top of the latrine where messages were exchanged. The politicals sent messages by return, thanking him for his offer, but assuring him that they were all right for funds at the moment. Eventually, van de Lingen and his superiors followed Pratt's advice and interrogated the prison staff. The delay gave time for the assistant head-warder, Sgt. Roos, who had worked in this prison for thirty-six years, to flee to Europe, taking all the money with him.⁷⁴¹²

PRATT'S LETTER TO DR. VERWOERD

While in prison and still under the Emergency Regulations, Pratt's mind was constantly on political developments in South Africa. At one point, he wrote the following letter to Dr. Verwoerd:

⁷⁴¹⁰ David Pratt letter to Desmond Blow, n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷⁴¹¹ David Pratt letter to Desmond Blow, n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷⁴¹² David Pratt letter to Desmond Blow, n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

Dear Dr. Verwoerd,

By now you will have had time to contemplate on the vast inarticulate majority of South Africans who are bitterly opposed to the policies you have been pursuing with such utter ruthlessness.

It is not my intention to talk politics, but when you stated in the House that force will be met with greater force, I wondered where this would end. Every human being has a basic dignity, and when you attempt to destroy this, you come up against the force of God.

In Europe, I spent much time defending the policies of your government. On my return, however, the deterioration which had taken place during my absence struck me with great force. The hopelessness in faces, the fear to talk, and amongst the weaker ones, liquidation at any price and get out.

The present situation of emergency will not subside unless you take positive steps to ease it. That means being a Christian and swallowing your pride. I don't think you are able to do this. If you can, you are a bigger man than I think.

In any event, as a doctor of philosophy, you will know that it is better for a man to die for a principle than to live in contradiction thereto. Consequently, though you need give no thought to me personally, remember I am just one of this inarticulate mass to which I referred at the beginning of my letter.

*David Pratt*⁷⁴¹³

There is nothing in Pratt's letter to suggest that he is mentally disordered; it contains nothing inaccurate, outlandish or violent. On the contrary, the letter is well-written, makes a series of cogent political arguments and expresses a deep concern for the future of South Africa. Pratt expresses his solidarity with the masses opposed to Dr. Verwoerd, sets out his disappointment at the deterioration of conditions in the country, hints at the desperation he felt on hearing Dr. Verwoerd's determination to meet force with force and affirms his readiness to die in defence of his principles. A sense of sympathy for the nation's oppressed pervades his five paragraphs.

⁷⁴¹³ Guy Spiller's *'The Liberal and the Pirate.'* 1999.

PRATT'S FIRST APPEARANCE IN THE COURT

On July 7, 1960, almost three months after the shooting, Pratt's name reappeared in the South African press for the first time since April 12 when the ban on references to him was imposed. The *Rand Daily Mail* announced that Pratt would be taken to court for the first time on July 20 for a preparatory examination.⁷⁴¹⁴ However, it was actually the next day, July 8, when Pratt made an unexpected and unannounced first appearance at Pretoria Magistrate's Court for a formal remand.⁷⁴¹⁵

The building was surrounded by policemen and Pratt was brought there secretly, handcuffed to a detective. Pratt appeared before the Chief Magistrate of Pretoria, Mr. F.C.A. Wessel, for a preparatory examination of an allegation of attempted murder. The Acting Attorney-General of Transvaal, R.W. Rein, Q.C., requested that the case be postponed until July 20, when a preparatory examination would be held in Pretoria, expected to last two days. Wessel so ruled.⁷⁴¹⁶ Nine days after Pratt's court appearance, his personal driver, Jan Hendricks, a thirty-nine-year-old Coloured man, was punched in the face by a White man on Pratt's farm.⁷⁴¹⁷

THE PREPARATORY EXAMINATION

On July 20, Pratt appeared at Pretoria Magistrate's Court for the agreed preparatory examination. It was the first time in the history of South Africa that a person had appeared in court in connection with the attempted murder of a political figure.⁷⁴¹⁸ Opening the Crown case was Mr. R.W. Rein, Q.C, who was assisted by Mr. K.D.M. Moodie. Israel Maisels was assisted by Mr. F. Ninow, with W.S. McEwan present as *Curator ad litem*.⁷⁴¹⁹ Mr. Rein said

⁷⁴¹⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 July 1960, 'Pratt to come before Court on July 20.'

⁷⁴¹⁵ *Sunday Times*, 10 July 1960: 13, 'Dr. Verwoerd saved from ordeal at the Pratt inquiry'; *The Cape Times*, 20 July 1960: 1, 'Pratt inquiry opens in Pretoria today'; *The New York Times*, 9 July 1960, 'Dr. Verwoerd attacker in Court'; *The Times* (London), 9 July 1960: 4, 'Pratt remanded again'; *The Star*, 9 July 1960: 1, 'Pratt makes quick court appearance.'

⁷⁴¹⁶ *Sunday Times*, 10 July 1960: 13, 'Dr. Verwoerd saved from ordeal at the Pratt inquiry'; *The Cape Times*, 20 July 1960: 1, 'Pratt inquiry opens in Pretoria today'; *The New York Times*, 9 July 1960, 'Dr. Verwoerd attacker in Court'; *The Times* (London), 9 July 1960: 4, 'Pratt remanded again'; *The Star*, 9 July 1960: 1, 'Pratt makes quick court appearance.'

⁷⁴¹⁷ *Sunday Times*, 17 July 1960: 1, 'Pratt's driver is assaulted at farm.'

⁷⁴¹⁸ *The Cape Times*, 20 July 1960: 1, 'Pratt inquiry opens in Pretoria today.'

⁷⁴¹⁹ A *curator ad litem* is the person, usually an advocate, appointed by the court to investigate the mental condition of someone whose mental capability is in question (Maisels, 1998: 327).

that he would proceed with the evidence of eyewitnesses of the shooting, without revealing what evidence the Crown proposed to lead.⁷⁴²⁰

The first two witnesses were Col. Geoffrey Harrison, a consulting architect and president of the Witwatersrand Agricultural Society, and Alec Gorshel, the Mayor of Johannesburg. Both recognised Pratt as Dr. Verwoerd's assailant and described the shooting. Gorshel said Pratt had a "strained smile" on his face as he shot Dr. Verwoerd.⁷⁴²¹

Subsequently, four more witnesses testified for the prosecution; all described the shooting, recognising Pratt as the assailant. They were Mr. J. Esterhuizen, a designer and artist who was sitting near Dr. Verwoerd at the time, Mr. John Mansell Evans, deputy President of the Witwatersrand Agricultural Society, Mr. Charles Hames Laubscher, former general manager of the Witwatersrand Agricultural Society, and Det. Head-Cons. Koekemoer, of Marshall Square Police Station. Pratt smiled from the dock when Koekemoer stated that Pratt was manhandled by members of the public.⁷⁴²²

The examination concluded the following day, July 21, with a session that lasted only eight minutes. Only one witness was called by the Crown, Dr. Joseph Lannon, a surgeon who attended Dr. Verwoerd immediately after the shooting. He described the prime minister's injuries and how he had treated them.⁷⁴²³ When Dr. Lannon's testimony ended, the prosecutor pleaded formally that Pratt be ordered to stand trial on a charge of attempting to murder Dr. Verwoerd. Mr. Wessel, the Magistrate, addressing the prisoner, said, "I want to explain to you, Pratt, that you are not obliged to say anything now. If you do, it may be used in evidence against you." Pratt, looking calm and composed, replied, "Your Worship, at this stage I have decided to say nothing and I reserve my defence." Wessel then told Pratt and that his remarks had been recorded and he replied, "Good." Pratt then accepted "short-service," meaning that he was prepared to stand trial at any time, and signed the indictment with his recorded decision. He was asked whether he wished to be tried by a judge or by a judge and jury since

⁷⁴²⁰ Indictment in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*. Charged: attempted murder. 20 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁴²¹ Testimony of Col. Geoffrey Merchant Harrison in the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 20 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; Testimony of Alec Gorshel in the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 20 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁴²² *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 July 1960: 1, 3, 'Pratt smiled at humour in court'; *The Cape Argus*, 20 July 1960, 'Pratt inquiry evidence'; *The Cape Times*, 21 July 1960: 5, 'Witnesses described shooting of Dr. Verwoerd'; *The Times* (London), 21 July 1960: 10, 'Pratt in court in Dr. Verwoerd attack charge.'

⁷⁴²³ Testimony of Dr. Joseph Lannon in the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 21 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

South African law gave these options to a person accused of a capital offence.⁷⁴²⁴ Pratt would later elect to go for trial by jury.⁷⁴²⁵

AFTER THE PREPARATORY EXAMINATION

On August 22, Patricia Pratt arrived in South Africa from Europe for a ten-day stay⁷⁴²⁶ and met with her husband and his lawyers. When the defence team asked her to testify in court, she agreed, but changed her mind⁷⁴²⁷ when she found out about the insanity plea. She did not believe he was insane and felt that as a devout Catholic, she could not lie on oath. Angered by his defence team's plans for an insanity plea, Pratt also asked her not to support the defence line and she agreed.⁷⁴²⁸ On August 24, she made clear to reporters that she would not attend or testify at Pratt's trial, but would visit her husband in prison and attend to family affairs.⁷⁴²⁹

On September 2, Patricia spoke openly at a news conference about her relationship with Pratt. She said she "wished to dispel any suggestion that there had been any estrangement between me and my husband," and said she was "happy to announce that there is a complete understanding between us." As for their two children, she said they knew nothing about their father's case as she did not feel it would be right to tell them. However, she said, "Someone will have to tell them eventually."⁷⁴³⁰ Mrs Pratt said she planned to return permanently to South Africa soon. Two days later, she flew back to Holland and did not attend the trial.⁷⁴³¹

⁷⁴²⁴ Conclusion of the preparatory examination in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 21 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *Daily Dispatch*, 21 July 1960, 'Pratt committed for trial'; *Daily Express*, 22 July 1960: 2, 'Farmer Pratt for trial'; *Daily Representative*, 21 July 1960: 1, 'David Pratt sent for trial'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 July 1960, 'Relatives see Pratt after hearing'; *The Cape Argus*, 21 July 1960: 1, 'Pratt sent for trial in Dr. Verwoerd shooting'; *The Cape Times*, 22 July 1960: 13, 'Pratt will not be tried till September'; *The Guardian*, 22 July 1960: 11, 'Pratt sent for trial'; *The New York Times*, 22 July 1960, 'South Africa trial set.' *The Star*, 21 July 1960: 1, 'Pratt sent for trial as inquiry ends swiftly.'

⁷⁴²⁵ Dryden and Myburgh letter to the Magistrate informing him of David Pratt's decision for *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 29 July 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁴²⁶ *The Star*, 27 August 1960: 3, 'Mrs. Pratt faces the press'; *The Times* (London), 3 September 1960: 6, 'Mental health of Pratt.'

⁷⁴²⁷ Maisels, 1998: 103-104.

⁷⁴²⁸ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁴²⁹ Letter by E.J. Emery of the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Pretoria to the Commonwealth Relations Office in London. 24 August 1960. Attempted Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. DO 35/10569. BNA.

⁷⁴³⁰ Reuter, IS1154. 2 September 1960. Attempted Assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. DO 35/10569. BNA.

⁷⁴³¹ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1960, 'Mrs. Pratt plans to live in S.A.'; *The Star*, 27 August 1960: 3, 'Mrs. Pratt faces the press'; *The Times* (London), 3 September 1960: 6, 'Mental health of Pratt.'

The trial was set for September 12, 1960. Pratt's daughter Susan, other family members, his friends and his defence team tried assiduously to convince him to go along with an insanity plea, but to no avail. Indeed, their efforts angered Pratt because he considered that a plea of insanity would undermine the integrity of his act, which he committed, he said, for valid and important reasons. He threatened to dismiss his defence team and appoint new ones if they continued to press their case.⁷⁴³² Eventually, Pratt did just that, jettisoning Dryden & Myburgh.⁷⁴³³

PRATT'S LETTER TO DESMOND BLOW

During the court proceedings, Pratt met Desmond Blow, a journalist for the *Sunday Times*, and they took a liking to each other. Later, out of personal interest, Blow visited Pratt several times in the prison and the hospital and they became very close. Blow gained Pratt's confidence and the two spent hours talking together. Blow became "very fond" of Pratt and "admired him very much." He had "high regard" for Pratt's "principles" and found him to be "a sane man" with "a brilliant mind."⁷⁴³⁴

The following is a letter from Pratt to Blow when Pratt was in prison:

"It's what you see with your eyes and hear with your ears that teaches you about criminals," said the assistant head warder, Sgt. Roos, 'not what you read in books or welfare reports. I've been here 36 years and have not yet seen a criminal reform. But he'll always have a story and sometimes he deceives the cleverest judges in the land. Then he comes back with a laugh and says: 'Well, I pulled it off again. Never trust one of them.'

Sgt. Roos pulled on his pipe and leaned back in his chair, 'Thank God we've got rid of these monitors too. Lousy bunch of lazy scroungers. Now they're paying for the brandy they smuggled in. Twenty-one days isolation on bread and water', Roos smiled sadistically but said nothing about the chief offence these monitors were suffering for. Four months ago a portable radio had arrived for Major Langebrink and the monitor in the receiving office just took it to their cell and plugged it into the light with a two-way fitting bought quite openly on

⁷⁴³² Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017; Sue Charter and Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁴³³ Maisels, 1998: 102; Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017; Guy Spiller in a personal interview, 8 December 2016.

⁷⁴³⁴ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Elizabeth Blow in a personal interview, 26 October 2017.

his 'grocery' order. Correspondence and argument with the radio shop had gone on continuously and the major on his periodic rounds had even admired the monitor's radio.

As always happens in jails, information leaked but on this occasion it leaked to the radio shop. It would take the commissioned ranks and the warders quite a while to get over the indignity of an outside shop piercing their inefficiency. As usual, their only solace was to use the big stick.

I was charged with attempted murder and had been messed around for over four months. The trouble was that I had tried to shoot the Prime Minister as the country as a whole certainly didn't want him and there seemed no other way to get rid of him, and nobody now quite knew what to do with me, As a result I had been in isolation cells in three different prisons, and came out for 30 minutes exercise morning and afternoon with the 'prisoners awaiting trial'. Naturally this constituted a ragged flotsam of society that was unable to pay bail. They lay about in ragged pieces of clothing, making plans to smuggle in a bit of dagga, the smoking of which constituted their Utopia and also, in most cases, their crime. Lauson was a type you could recognise the world over. I've seen the typical horsy woman, the goat breeder, the fowl fanatic and the pig producer. More times than not you can guess the occupation, but with Lauson it was a certainty.

Therefore I opened the conversation casually when we met in the latrines during the 30 minute exercise period. 'Were you with Doves or Wilmots', I asked, 'or one of the smaller ones'? 'Wilmots' he answered with pride. 'I was in charge of Port Shepstone. Mind you, I was originally only the mortician, but Mr. Wesaels couldn't find a suitable successor for the office after Keens died, so I agreed to take it all on.'

He was in for fraud involving under £500. The burial societies were now having the coffins stripped before cremation and so saving £10 per funeral. This had been gazetted but Lauson had gone on charging until an insurance company had written him a letter asking why. He had replied saying it was a mistake and enclosing the £10. Then the letters piled in but of course he couldn't return it all. 'Why didn't you pack your bags and go?' I asked. 'Yes', he said, 'I should have done, but there was a lot of work inside the mortuary at the time and I had no one to take over. I wasn't really interested in the office anyway!'

Blackie was a lanky scruffy-haired piece of jetsam whose body was a walking art gallery. He specialised in nude tattoos, varying from a buxom wench on his back stretching from neck to pelvis, to delicate damsels of only a few inches in length lying seductively down

his forearms. His pupils showed the dilations of a typical dagga addict and he was in for knife fighting after the usual smoke.

This pathetic batch of driftwood varied in number from under ten to over twenty, and lay around the high walled exercise yard or scrubbed a bit of tattered clothing on the grey slate by the cold water tap.

The one point on which all agreed was that the warders were a batch of bastards. They behaved towards them with the servility of the Coloureds to the compound police, but underneath lay the same hatred and frustration. The warders' life was not to be envied. Essentially it was that of the prisoner. His pay was poor, his hours long and the work without satisfaction. As a result, naturally, the more stupid and sadistic section of the community tended to drift towards this work, but there were exceptions. Sgt. van de Lingen was only 23 and already a head warder. His interests lay in studying criminal humanity and drawing them, 'Every man has his price', he told me one morning when we were alone in the wash-rooms, 'If I thought I could get £30,000, I would be quite prepared to serve three years, but not for less'. I looked at him for a few seconds and then his eyes wandered away. Did he really think he could hook me with such a gaudy fly? Still, I suppose he had his instructions from higher up, I told him £30,000 was chicken feed, and if he really wanted crime he should not think in lesser terms than six figures. The sentences, in any event, were frequently less for stealing a million than a hundred. The public also rather liked the big crook but hated the petty pilferer. He was studying to be an attorney and intended to specialise in crime. His rapid promotion through his relative intelligence had earned the jealousy of the older warders and he had few friends in the prison. That was probably the reason why he started opening out to me a little when I had special solitary exercise periods.

'There's a revolt in the office over the detainees' cash', he volunteered one morning. This I had already heard along the prisoners' grape vine, for nothing is secret in a prison. The detainees were the more positive free thinking men in S. Africa, who had been arrested at their homes in the early hours following the promulgation of Emergency Regulations by the Nationalist Government, Several were well-to-do men who had brought considerable sums of money with them, all of which was now kept at the prison reception. One or two had been unexpectedly released and on checking out had found their money gone. After this a check had been made with the whole group and the missing cash ran into some hundreds. Now the Colonel was leading the investigation and suspicion, of course, fell on the monitors also.

They were confined to isolation cells on short rations and questioned daily with all the usual tricks, but no results had so far been achieved, 'What use would convicts have with cash?'

I asked van de Lingen, 'Look among your own staff; that's more promising ground'.

'That's the monitors story' he laughed, 'but one used to go on messages to town and could easily have smuggled it out. However, we'll find it, or find who took it, anyway.

Solitary breaks them down sooner or later.'

I collected my sugar ration on the way back and spilt a little over the passage floor of my agreed section, so that when we were locked in the warders' footsteps could be heard more clearly as he crunched over them on cell inspection. This gave time to disconnect and hide home-made water heaters from primitive coils or copper wire, dagga, brandy which was smuggled through in Coca Cola bottles, and anything else illegal with which the cells abounded. Back inside, I made up my bed from the blanket radio and settled down to read quietly. My thoughts, however, kept wandering to the detainees cash and I got up and wrote them a note to leave next day on the top of the latrine we used for exchanging messages.

Within a few days things began to happen. Investigations changed from the monitors to the officials, but the Colonel was not quick enough. Sgt. Roos vanished with enough money to buy a ticket to Europe and start afresh. As he should have said: "It's what you see with your eyes and hear with your ears that teaches you to become a criminal". Though it taught him the principles he didn't have the natural finesse which you can't learn from a book either."

SUSAN PRATT'S APPLICATION REGARDING HER FATHER'S MENTAL CONDITION

On September 2, 1960, with Pratt still unwilling to accept the insanity plea, Susan initiated a desperate attempt to save her father's life. She formally requested the Witwatersrand Supreme Court, in accordance with the terms of the Mental Disorders Act, to order an inquiry into her father's mental condition. Her application said she considered such an order "essential in her father's interests and to avoid a miscarriage of justice."⁷⁴³⁵ She said that for as long as she could remember, her father had serious psychological problems and had

⁷⁴³⁵ Susan Pratt's ex parte application. Susan Diane Pratt, 6000/60. NASA; *Daily Representative*, 3 September 1960: 1, 'Pratt's daughter calls for mental inquiry.'

undergone treatment several times. She argued that her father's wish to withhold evidence of his medical condition from the court indicated that he was unable to appreciate the seriousness of his situation and lacked the judgment necessary to manage his affairs or give proper instructions to his lawyers. She said that when she visited her father, he appeared to be in "a sort of a dream and quite unaware of the allegations against him."⁷⁴³⁶

What Susan said in her application about her father's treatment for psychological issues was true. However, in truth she did not consider him to be mentally disordered. The application was an attempt to force her father to accept the insanity plea or at least to have some doctors examine him. Susan and the defence team believed they had a strong case because of Pratt's epilepsy and periods of depression. Further, they believed doctors who had treated her father were sympathetic towards him and critical of apartheid.⁷⁴³⁷

Annexed to the petition were medical opinions from Dr. Chesler, Dr. Jacobson, Dr. Friedman and Prof. Hurst, all of whom had examined Pratt and concluded that he was not fit to stand trial. Susan was told by her father's legal advisers that they were making no progress in persuading him to have his defence conducted properly. Appearing at Witwatersrand Supreme Court, Susan's counsel said of Pratt, "He is unable to appreciate the seriousness of his situation and lacks the judgments necessary to manage his own affairs." At this, Pratt, appearing cool and calm, looked around the courtroom with a faint smile on his face.⁷⁴³⁸

In a reply to Judge Galgut, who was trying the case, Pratt said he was perfectly capable of handling his own affairs. "It is my intention to place all necessary, relevant psychiatric evidence before the trial judge. If it is the wish of the applicant to have the trial adjourned and that I be admitted for further observation, I would be prepare to submit myself," said Pratt. He also stated that he had seen the text of the application only about a quarter of an hour before and asked that the matter be postponed until he had an opportunity to get legal representation.⁷⁴³⁹

Mr. C. Margo, Q.C., for Susan Pratt, reminded the Court that Pratt's attorney had informed him that he was no longer acting for Pratt and said, "Pratt should be advised that he

⁷⁴³⁶ Susan Pratt's ex parte application. Susan Diane Pratt, 6000/60. NASA; *Sunday Times*, 11 September 1960, 'Susan Pratt: My father is in a sort of dream.'

⁷⁴³⁷ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁴³⁸ *Daily Mail*, 3 September 1960: 6, 'My sick father-by Pratt's daughter'; *The Times* (London), 3 September 1960: 6, 'Mental health of Pratt.'

⁷⁴³⁹ *The Cape Argus*, 3 September 1960: 7, 'Pratt says he can handle his own affairs'; *The Times* (London), 3 September 1960: 6, 'Mental health of Pratt.'

has no attorney. All I ask is that the court appoint a *curator ad litem*.”⁷⁴⁴⁰ He also read a psychiatric report where it was stated that Pratt was “no doubt an epileptic and a megalomaniac which absolved him from criminal responsibility.” The judge refused to hear any anything further about the case and postponed the hearing for three days so that Pratt could read the documents and seek legal representation.⁷⁴⁴¹ Subsequently Pratt appointed another attorney, Benno Tennet, who added another advocate, Leslie Lawrence, S.C., to the team of Maisels and Ninow.⁷⁴⁴²

The following day, September 3, Pratt's second wife, Patricia, who was about to return to Holland, applied to the Witwatersrand Supreme Court, for leave to intervene in Susan Pratt's application and through her counsel asked that if the application were granted, she should be allowed to nominate her attorney as another *curator ad litem*.⁷⁴⁴³ The application was brought to court so urgently that no written petitions had been prepared.⁷⁴⁴⁴

On September 6, 1960, the Supreme Court hearing resumed. Leslie Lawrence told the court that Pratt neither conceded nor opposed his daughter's application for an inquiry into his mental condition. Justice Theron announced that his judgement would be given the following day.⁷⁴⁴⁵ Mr. G. Colman Q.C., for Susan Pratt, told the court that “this is an application made by a daughter in good faith, actuated by the genuine desire to help her father, protect his property, and prevent a miscarriage of justice at the criminal trial... the application was made without the consent or knowledge of Mr. Pratt and it appeared last week against his will. I understand now that objection is not persisted in.” Pratt opposed the appointment of a provisional *curator bonis*, but agreed to the appointment of Mr. W.S. McEwan as *curator ad litem* with limited powers. He was entitled to interview Pratt and report to the court. Patricia supported his decision.⁷⁴⁴⁶ The following day, Justice Theron

⁷⁴⁴⁰ A *curator ad litem* is the person, usually an advocate, appointed by the court to investigate the mental condition of someone whose mental capability is in question (Maisels, 1998: 327).

⁷⁴⁴¹ *The Cape Argus*, 3 September 1960: 7, ‘Pratt says he can handle his own affairs’; *The Times* (London), 3 September 1960: 6, ‘Mental health of Pratt.’

⁷⁴⁴² Maisels, 1998: 102.

⁷⁴⁴³ *The Times* (London), 7 September 1960: 10, ‘Pratt consents to a ‘curator.’

⁷⁴⁴⁴ *The Star*, 3 September 1960: 1, ‘Pratt opposes court bid by daughter.’

⁷⁴⁴⁵ *The Cape Argus*, 6 September 1960: 1, ‘Pratt ‘neutral’ to daughter’s plea.’

⁷⁴⁴⁶ *The Cape Argus*, 6 September 1960: 1, ‘Pratt’s attitude to court application’; *The Times* (London), 7 September 1960: 10, ‘Pratt consents to a ‘curator.’

gave his judgement at the Pretoria Supreme Court and then ruled that it must remain secret until Pratt's trial on September 12.⁷⁴⁴⁷

DEFENCE WITNESSES

Thus finally, after a massive effort, mostly by his daughter Susan, Pratt was persuaded to plead being of unsound mind.⁷⁴⁴⁸ Pratt later wrote, "My daughter engaged very eminent Counsel for me who represented me at the preliminary hearing. When you engage Counsel you must take his advice, and the advice I received was to fight this on a mental basis and be committed to an institution."⁷⁴⁴⁹ Noel Spiller, Pratt's business partner who was a close friend of the Pratt family, was asked by the defence team to testify in support of the insanity plea, but she felt that she could not do so, as she did not consider Pratt to be insane. Shortly before the trial, at about nine o'clock at night, Susan Pratt telephoned her at home and begged her to testify to her father's supposed insanity, "Please, Auntie Noel, please," she said. "Daddy now at last has agreed to plead of unsound mind." Noel Spiller then agreed to testify.⁷⁴⁵⁰

Spiller was in a difficult position. If she averred that Pratt was insane, questions would be asked as to how she was a partner in business with a lunatic. On the other hand, if she said he wasn't crazy, Pratt might go to the gallows and that was the last thing she wanted. The rest of the defence witnesses were in identical situations. They included Elizabeth Radsma, Pratt's personal assistant for three and half years. She was asked by the defence to testify in support of the insanity plea. Like Spiller, she felt this would be a lie because she considered Pratt to be perfectly sane. In the event, she agreed to testify in a way she hoped would help him. She would not say that he was insane, but nor would she state the opposite. She would speak about Pratt's epilepsy and depression, while concealing his political activities and ideas. She described it as a balancing act, exaggerating Pratt's medical situation, but without suggesting that he was mad, which would have been a lie.⁷⁴⁵¹

⁷⁴⁴⁷ Judge Theron's judgement in Susan Pratt's ex parte application, 7 September 1960. Susan Diane Pratt 6000/60. NASA; *Daily Express*, 8 September 1960: 2, 'Pratt judgement stays secret'; *The Cape Argus*, 7 September 1960: 1, 'judge forbids publication of ruling on Pratt.'

⁷⁴⁴⁸ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017; Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁴⁴⁹ David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷⁴⁵⁰ Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁴⁵¹ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017; Sue Charter and Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

ANOTHER ESCAPE PLAN

On September 11, just one day before the trial, Pratt contrived to speak to Maisels alone at the prison. Handing the warder half a crown, Pratt asked him to procure a copy of the *Sunday Times*, and then indicated that Maisels' colleagues should wait outside the interview room. Speaking softly but urgently, he proposed that Maisels should create a diversion during his opening address at the trial, whereupon he Pratt would leap from the dock and escape through an open window. A car would be waiting outside to carry him to Lanseria airport, from where, he said, he had chartered a plane to Swaziland. Maisels declined to participate in the plan⁷⁴⁵² and Pratt abandoned it. However, hare-brained this scheme may sound, it showed that Pratt's friends still hoped to secure his freedom. It also suggests that at least two more people were involved, one with the car and one with the airplane.

⁷⁴⁵² Maisels, 1998: 104.

THE INQUIRY REGARDING PRATT'S MENTAL CONDITION

Justice Franz Rumpff was named to try the case, along with two assessors,⁷⁴⁵³ while R.W. Rein, was prosecuting for the Crown, assisted by Mr. K.D.M. Moodie, of the Attorney-General's office.⁷⁴⁵⁴ According to Nelson Mandela, Justice Rumpff (1912-1992), Judge President of the Transvaal Provincial Division since 1959,⁷⁴⁵⁵ was rumoured to be a member of the Broederbond⁷⁴⁵⁶ and was a known Nazi sympathiser, having defended pro-Nazis during the Second World War.⁷⁴⁵⁷ He had also acted as a judge at two major trials, the Treason Trial in 1956⁷⁴⁵⁸ and the Defiance Trial in 1952.⁷⁴⁵⁹ After the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd in 1966, Justice Rumpff was appointed chairman of a Commission to investigate the question of insanity and criminal responsibility. In 1974, he became Chief Justice of South Africa and kept this position until his retirement in 1982.⁷⁴⁶⁰

Just before the trial started, Maisels informed Rein that he intended to apply to the court to have Pratt declared mentally disordered since he was an epileptic and therefore, according to the Mental Disorder Act of 1916, unfit to stand trial.⁷⁴⁶¹ Rein agreed, then informed Maisels of a rumour that Pratt's wife, Patricia, had a relationship with Dr. Verwoerd. Rein asked Maisels not to raise the issue and he agreed, considering the rumour absurd.⁷⁴⁶² However, as we will see, Rein brought it up himself in an attempt to dismiss it.

⁷⁴⁵³ *The New York Times*, 13 September 1960: 10, 'African trial opens.'

⁷⁴⁵⁴ *The Cape Argus*, 8 September 1960: 1, 'Judge at Pratt trial not yet named.'

⁷⁴⁵⁵ Kahn, 1982: 438-440.

⁷⁴⁵⁶ Mandela, 2013: 29.

⁷⁴⁵⁷ Sachs, 1973: 257.

⁷⁴⁵⁸ Joseph, 1998; Davenport, 1991: 352.

⁷⁴⁵⁹ Buthelezi, 2006: 122.

⁷⁴⁶⁰ Kahn, 1982: 440.

⁷⁴⁶¹ Bird, 1992: 209; Maisels, 1998: 103.

⁷⁴⁶² Maisels, 1998: 103.

DAY 1: SEPTEMBER 12, 1960

The trial started on Monday, September 12, 1960 and Maisels promptly made an application that the court should inquire into Pratt's mental condition in terms of Section 28 of the Mental Disorders Act. He said that evidence he would produce would establish that Pratt fell within Clause 7, Section 3, of the Mentally Disordered Persons Act. This related to an epileptic who was a danger to himself or to others or was incapable of managing himself or his affairs. Maisels then produced medical evidence and a statement by Pratt that he did not intend to kill Dr. Verwoerd but only "to put him out of action for a few weeks." He also said that he had in his possession the report from W.S. McEwen, the *curator ad litem* appointed the previous week by Justice Theron, who was also present at the court that supported his application.⁷⁴⁶³

Prosecutor Rein, despite his agreement with Maisels, touched on the rumour of a Dr. Verwoerd relationship in his opening statement. In an attempt to clarify the issue, he said that, "neither the accused nor his wife, has ever met the Prime Minister, nor has either of them ever had any dealings with the Prime Minister of any nature whatsoever."⁷⁴⁶⁴

⁷⁴⁶³ Israel Maisels' opening address in *Regina vs David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *Daily Dispatch*, 13 September 1960: 1, 'Special inquiry into mental state of Pratt'; *The Cape Argus*, 12 September 1960: 1, 'Inquiry ordered into Pratt's mental state.' *The Times* (London), 13 September 1960: 9, 'Pratt's mental state.'

⁷⁴⁶⁴ R.W. Rein's opening address in *Regina vs David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

THE WITNESSES**DR. JACK FRIEDMAN⁷⁴⁶⁵**

The first defence witness was Dr. Jack Friedman, Senior District Surgeon and Professor of Forensic Medicine at the University of Witwatersrand, who examined Pratt on the night of the shooting. Dr. Friedman testified that he saw Pratt for the first time at 6.40 pm that day. There were physical injuries that were consistent with a beating, but what struck him, he said, was the air of detachment and unconcern that Pratt displayed. Pratt talked about his cattle, but did not appear to be particularly concerned with anything else. Pratt told him that his epilepsy was of no importance because he had been almost completely cured. He said he did not have an epileptic attack on the day of the assault and the last one was about two weeks earlier, when he fell off a horse.

Pratt spoke to Dr. Friedman about the government coalition he tried to form in 1954. He said that the day before the assault, he was passing a prison for women in Kotze Street when he saw female prisoners being taken away. He felt “that things had come to such a pass it was time something was done about it.” Dr. Friedman said this was “an incident that started a certain train” and that Pratt throughout their time together “was harping on political matters all the time.”

Pratt told him that on the day of the assault, he took his pistol with him, but he had not yet formed any definite plan to shoot Dr. Verwoerd. During the show, he was struck by the lack of concern from the public regarding political events; he said that if someone had only done something, even just shouted “boo,” he would have been satisfied. However, no-one did anything and he felt that he should. According to Dr. Friedman, Pratt said that he did not want to kill Dr. Verwoerd but to put him out of action for a few weeks, to give him time to think things over. Pratt told him, “I fired one shot.” When Dr. Friedman asked him how come there was a second bullet, Pratt said the gun fired accidentally when someone grabbed his arm.

Dr. Friedman said he found Pratt to be calm and coherent and remarkably unconcerned about what happened. “When a crime of that magnitude is committed, the

⁷⁴⁶⁵ Dr. Jack Friedman’s testimony at the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

arrested persons are always in a state of tension or nervousness. None of these symptoms were present. I regarded his air of detachment, of unconcern, as abnormal,” Dr. Friedman said. As to Pratt’s physical condition, he said it was obvious he had received “quite a beating up.” His blood pressure was 148 over 88, that is, within normal limits.

The Prosecutor asked Dr. Friedman what conclusion he would have come to if Pratt had not mentioned that he suffered from epilepsy. “You would then have been left with just his injuries, the fact that he was normal in other respects and his unconcernedness.” In that case, the Prosecutor asked, would he still have summoned a psychiatrist to examine Pratt? Dr. Friedman replied yes, “His air of unconcernedness made it imperative for me, as part of my duty in the interest of justice, to have him examined psychiatrically. That is my practice and policy in any major crime.”

The Prosecutor then asked, “After you finished your examination, were you satisfied that he knew that when he shot the Prime Minister he had done something which in the eyes of the law was wrong.” Dr. Friedman replied, “I am not prepared to answer that.” It was purely a psychiatric matter, he said.

It should be mentioned here that Desmond Blow was of the opinion that Pratt wanted to kill Dr. Verwoerd and not “put him out of action for a few weeks.” Pratt never told him as much, it was just Blow’s belief formed from conversations he had with him and from a letter Pratt had written to him. The letter said, “The trouble was that I had tried to shoot the Prime Minister as the country as a whole certainly didn’t want him and there seemed no other way to get rid of him.”⁷⁴⁶⁶ Adding to Blow’s belief was a remark Pratt had made to him. Looking disappointed, Pratt said he felt his act had been for nothing and that he had failed, as Dr. Verwoerd was still alive and he himself was presented as a madman, destined to spend the rest of his life, or most of it, locked up in a hospital.⁷⁴⁶⁷

As to why Pratt claimed that he only wanted to injure Verwoerd, Blow speculated that he was urged to do so by his family and his lawyers to demonstrate that he had no murderous intent and would be judged more leniently. Blow told the author that Pratt told him also that the defence doctors had made up a lot of things, attributed to him things that were not true and exaggerated descriptions of events and situations. Although Pratt did not specify which items the doctors made up, Blow received the impression that one of them was the claim that

⁷⁴⁶⁶ David Pratt Letter to Desmond Blow, n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷⁴⁶⁷ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

he only wanted to injure Verwoerd. He said Pratt had not protested for the sake of his daughter, Susan.⁷⁴⁶⁸

RICHARD KUMALO⁷⁴⁶⁹

The next witness was Richard Kumalo, a watchman at the Orient Manganese Company's mine on Pratt's farm at Magaliesburg. He testified that one day, not long before the assault on Dr. Verwoerd, he came across Pratt, who had been riding a horse, sprawled on the ground "like as if he was dead," with a white substance coming from his mouth. He saw injuries on the side of Pratt's face but also on his arm, as if Pratt had bitten himself. Kumalo said he called for help and an hour and a half later Pratt was back on his feet.

CORNELIUS ZIETSMAN⁷⁴⁷⁰

Zietsman had been employed by Pratt as a farm manager from 1942 to 1957. He said that Pratt had several epileptic seizures between 1942 and 1949, but they declined steadily after 1950. He described an epileptic attack in 1946 or 1947 when foam came from Pratt's mouth and his body became taut, and another seizure in 1957. He testified that Pratt was a very pleasant man when he was normal, but very unpleasant when he was abnormal, that is, when he had his epileptic seizures. Pratt once made verbal threats against someone but Zietsman never saw him attack anyone or show any violent tendencies.

NOEL D. SPILLER⁷⁴⁷¹

Noel Spiller was Pratt's business partner in the Crayfish Inn. Before the trial, she made it clear to Maisels and to Susan Pratt that she could not support their insanity plea, but she agreed to speak about Pratt's "eccentricity." As she approached the bench to testify, she

⁷⁴⁶⁸ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁴⁶⁹ Richard Kumalo's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁴⁷⁰ Cornelius Zietsman's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁴⁷¹ Noel Spiller's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA unless referenced otherwise.

passed in front of Pratt in the dock. Pratt, recognising the difficulty of her situation, said quietly to her, “Just tell the truth, nothing but the truth.”⁷⁴⁷²

Spiller said she had known Pratt for many years and was aware of two epileptic seizures in 1948 and 1950. She said Pratt had stayed at their inn from March 16 to 19 that year with his daughter Susan, and had seemed very worried about the situation in South Africa, as well as about business. She described him at the time as very difficult, tense, troubled, uncertain and inconsistent in his views.

Although she said she did not think Pratt “was really politically minded,” she also said that he was worried that there was no progress in South Africa. “He said things were wonderful overseas and wonderful progress was being made, while there was no progress in South Africa.” She told the court that when business confidence in South Africa plummeted after Sharpeville, Pratt persuaded her to continue with their joint civic centre development in Ramsgate, saying, “One must never stop progress.”

On April 6, three days before the assault, she received a letter from him saying that he had enjoyed his previous stay at the hotel and was coming again later that month. Spiller characterised Pratt as an “extremely generous person” but also “an astute businessman who knew what he wanted and what he was after.”

Rein cross-examined Noel Spiller about Pratt’s visit to the Crayfish Inn with his daughter Susan, two and half weeks before the assault:

REIN: Did he talk coherently about his business?

SPILLER: Yes

REIN: Both of them?

SPILLER: Both of them.

REIN: So in regard to business you saw nothing abnormal?

SPILLER: No

REIN: Is he an astute businessman, in your opinion?

SPILLER: Yes.

⁷⁴⁷² Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller’s *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

REIN: He knows what he wants and he knows what he is after, is that right?

SPILLER: That is right.

REIN: And during those three days, when it came to business, you saw nothing abnormal?

SPILLER: No, nothing. (Hesitatingly).

REIN: You can think again if you have got any doubt.

SPILLER: No, nothing abnormal.

REIN: And you told us that during those three days he was strained and worried in regard to situations in South Africa compared with overseas?

SPILLER: That is right.

REIN: What makes you say that? What did he say to you?

SPILLER: Well, we were contemplating building a chemist's shop, a doctor's consulting room and a hairdresser's salon in Ramsgate, next to the Bottle Store, and Mr. Pratt was going to lend the money for this venture, and it was I who was rather keen to withdraw because of the riots and the situation in the country.

REIN: Which riots?

SPILLER: Well, the riots that had been taking place... I was rather hesitant about it because I thought that things were not right in the country, and I was not keen to be responsible for any more business, and Mr. Pratt did say to me that in spite of everything we must never stop progress... he said it was wonderful overseas to see the prosperity, and to come back to this country and see things as they were compared with overseas, I think it might have been a shock for him.

REIN: Have you heard him ever make violent statements?

SPILLER: No.

REIN: Have you ever heard him pass any adverse criticism of the Government?

SPILLER: No, not at that time. I did not think he was very politically minded, actually.

Spiller was also asked by Maisels to describe some of Pratt's "strange" habits and moments. She then recounted an incident which she said had probably led to an epileptic seizure: One morning when the weather was "very bad, cold and windy," Pratt went swimming against Spiller's advice and nearly drowned.

COMMENTS ON SPILLER'S TESTIMONY

Spiller later admitted that she was in a difficult position because she could not support the defence's insanity plea, but wanted to testify and help Pratt in any possible way. What she did not say in the court, was what she believed, that Pratt was perfectly sane and the "worst" you could say about him was that he was eccentric.

She lied about never hearing Pratt making threats and not being politically minded. Naturally, she did not reveal the *dompas* incident. One day, she, Pratt and others were at their Inn discussing the Pass Law. Pratt said openly, "It's terrible the way they are all rounded up because they haven't a *dompas*." Spiller considered the discussion to be "as political as it can be." When someone in the group said, "Oh, somebody should shoot that man," referring to Dr. Verwoerd, Pratt said, "Somebody should. I think it should be me."⁷⁴⁷³

ELIZABETH RADSMA⁷⁴⁷⁴

Radsma was Pratt's private secretary and personal assistant for three and half years. She was in charge of his business while he was away and he trusted her implicitly. Radsma testified that Pratt once described to her a feeling of euphoria he had experienced. He told her he heard beautiful music, everything seemed to be easy and he felt as if he could move mountains. Radsma was asked about a letter which she said she found among his personal belongings after the shooting. The letter in Pratt's handwriting and addressed to "Dear Elizabeth," said Pratt could "see no light." It said, "Everyone will feel relief in the ease of tension." Pratt said he was sorry he "could not make the grade," adding, "I understand this condition is fairly common among epileptics who become progressively worse." Radsma said she considered the letter to be a suicide note, although Pratt did not commit suicide.

Radsma characterised Pratt as a very kind and calm man. She said he suffered from depression because of his marriage, but this improved dramatically after he began treatment with Dr. Jacobson in November 1958, "He took matters much easier." She also testified that

⁷⁴⁷³ Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁴⁷⁴ Elizabeth Radsma's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

Pratt had an epileptic fit and he had fallen off a horse two or three weeks before he committed the assault.

COMMENTS ON RADSMA'S TESTIMONY

In a personal interview, Radsma said Pratt "hated apartheid and really hated Dr. Verwoerd for what he was doing to the Black people. He really cared about them and the way they were treated." She said she did not mention this in her evidence "because it would have been bad for him with regard to his trial." She said, "I was told by the defence not to mention his political ideas, and how he felt about Dr. Verwoerd. I know that the other witnesses were also asked to not mention anything about his ideas and his feelings."⁷⁴⁷⁵

Radsma also said Pratt was a very sensitive man who cared particularly about the poor and disadvantaged. She believed his sensitivity about certain things led him to depression. He was shocked, extremely depressed and upset by the Sharpeville massacre. He felt ashamed that he was South African and that he lived in South Africa. Referring to the time he saw two vans with Black prisoners just a few days before the shooting, she said this sent him into depression again, but he also became very angry with apartheid.⁷⁴⁷⁶

Radsma said Pratt was particularly kind to the Black South Africans who lived and worked on his farm. She never saw any other White person treating Blacks in that generous way. She said Pratt was always politically aware, hated Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid, and was eager to find a way of changing this situation, but no-one expected that he would go out and shoot Dr. Verwoerd. She said when she first arrived in South Africa, Pratt drove her through Sophiatown and explained to her what had happened there and what apartheid was and this was quite a shock for her.⁷⁴⁷⁷

However, she said that in court she did not refer to Pratt's political ideas or his opinion of Dr. Verwoerd because she knew it would be damaging for him. As for the defence request that she should agree that Pratt was insane, she felt she could not do this because she believed he was not only perfectly sane, but extremely intelligent and able. She knew, however, that his future depended partly on her testimony, so she tried not to reveal anything damaging, not always to give the whole truth and, when it would be in his favour, to

⁷⁴⁷⁵ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁴⁷⁶ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁴⁷⁷ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

exaggerate certain things. What she also did not explain was that Pratt's euphoria was an effect of his medication and not the delusions of a schizophrenic person, although she did not claim that Pratt was schizophrenic either.⁷⁴⁷⁸

In addition, Radsma told the author:

“We were all in a difficult position. We knew that if David was found guilty, he would probably be imprisoned for many years or even hanged, so we wanted to save his life. But it was not so easy to just say that he was mad and make up stories to prove he was mad. But we could not have said the truth either as he would have been found guilty. None of us said anything about his political ideas and that he despised Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid. And fortunately, as far as I remember, none of us was asked anything like this... we all, [the defence witnesses] along with the lawyers, tried to find a way to formulate what we would say in the court so David would get away. It was a balancing act, we did not say that he was not mad, but we also did not say that he was mad. We just highlighted and exaggerated a little some situations about him. It was the only way to save his life.”⁷⁴⁷⁹

According to Radsma, many people who knew Pratt wanted to testify about his character, believing that they would be helping him. However, his lawyers did not want witnesses to Pratt's character, but witnesses who could support their defence line. Radsma is certain that Pratt told the truth when he said he did not have a plan to shoot Dr. Verwoerd that day. He took his pistol with him as he often did in case he was attacked, as he had been two to three weeks ago before the assault.⁷⁴⁸⁰

Radsma is also absolutely certain that Pratt was perfectly sane:

“He was not mad, not at all. He was perfectly all right. The only thing that you could say about his health was that he was an epileptic, that's all, nothing else. I think his depression was caused by his epilepsy but also from the fact that he was very sensitive. He became depressed very easily, easier than anyone I know. He was depressed because he was not able to see his children who he absolutely adored, but also because of apartheid and the situation in South Africa. Every time he read something in the newspaper that was caused by apartheid, he became depressed. Particularly after Sharpeville, he was like I had never seen him before. I was very worried about him because he had taken it too hard. He somehow felt

⁷⁴⁷⁸ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁴⁷⁹ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁴⁸⁰ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

guilty and ashamed because he was a white South African and he had all these comforts while people were suffering and dying.”⁷⁴⁸¹

ROBERT RODERICK CHARTER⁷⁴⁸²

Robert Charter, manager of B. Owen Jones Ltd, knew Pratt “very well” and for thirteen years was his business partner in the trout hatchery at Maloney’s Eye and lived on Pratt’s farm. Charter was aware that Pratt was an epileptic, but he had never seen him having a fit, although he had seen him just after and just before one. In early 1958, Charter went to Holland at Pratt’s request, to try to persuade Pratt’s wife, Patricia, to return with their children to South Africa. However, Charter failed to convince her and Pratt became very unhappy and depressed.

Charter read a letter to the court addressed to him by Pratt:

“Dear Bob, sorry about this, but I honestly think it is the best for everyone. Pat’s fears will now be removed and she will be able to return to South Africa with the kids and build up a home at Old Sillery. Please watch my children and see that they don’t become too foreign. It is impracticable for me to run away and lead another life because I depend so much on drugs and I don’t think Pat would ever feel secure. It is obvious that I am deteriorating, so it is better for all that I go before I become a nuisance.”

Charter said the letter worried him and he went immediately to Pratt’s house. Pratt was not there but he found another letter to him from Pratt. It said among other things:

“I have always been a bit of a fatalist and this time Nico (Charter’s wife) took a hand and turned up, complete with family just a few minutes too soon to make the two letters effective. As a result I have now swung right away from depression and hope to make a new life for myself... If you don’t hear from me for over a year, you can presume death and wind up my affairs accordingly. I am sure I am doing the right thing as the present position is quite untenable.”

Charter discovered that Pratt had gone to Natal, but he gave no further explanation about the letters or what happened to Pratt after that time. Charter did reveal that in 1954 he

⁷⁴⁸¹ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁴⁸² Robert Charter’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

arranged for Pratt to meet a well-known politician, whom he did not name in his testimony, to discuss the possibility of forming a coalition government. However, nothing came of it.

In 1958, Pratt told Charter that he decided that the only way in which he could get peace of mind was to give away everything he possessed. At the same time, Pratt was continually propounding different political theories which he thought could help the people and the world, though Charter found them unrealistic. However, he agreed that Pratt was able to “converse fluently and lucidly about those theories.”

Cross-examined by Rein about Pratt’s political theories, the following exchanges took place:

REIN: There was nothing in his speech or his thoughts which indicated that he was mentally diseased then in your view?

CHARTER: No, in fact it was in many instances quite an intellectual experience. We would enjoy these discussions immensely, even if you did not agree with him at least you could follow his arguments, and he used to expound very clearly.

The Prosecutor then asked Charter about Pratt’s political theories: “Was there nothing in his speech and thought which would give the impression he was mentally diseased?” Charter avoided a direct answer, saying, “It was quite an intellectual experience. We used to enjoy his theories immensely.” Charter concluded by saying that Pratt could not manage his affairs and there had been a change in his attitude and mental state over the years. He added that Pratt was interested in the Liberal Party approach and that he had books about Yoga.

Charter testified that if Pratt stopped changing his mind, he would be a very smart businessman indeed, but he changed his mind too often. He gave examples of how Pratt would change his mind. One Saturday morning, Pratt said he was going to Tara Hospital because he was going insane and needed treatment. However, he did not go to the hospital, he went to his flat instead. Many times, he would make an appointment but then not turn up.

Charter also told the court that Pratt used to get up late at night and start playing the piano. He would start playing a piece by Chopin, but then would play the same bars over and over. Charter said he found this strange. At one point, Charter said Pratt was a member of the United Party when they first met. At this stage Pratt got up and addressed the bench:

PRATT: My lord, may I say first of all categorically that Mr. Charter is making an error, and secondly that I have been listening to a lot of evidence that I think would be much more clarified and much more rapid for the Court if I was allowed to make a personal statement.

JUDGE: I think you should first consult with your legal adviser after the adjournment.

PRATT: Righto, my lord, I will accept what you say on this. I think perhaps it was wrong of me to stand up just when I did. It is a little late in the afternoon. My learned friend can carry on. I will consult with you when we adjourn.

COMMENTS ON CHARTER'S TESTIMONY

Like the other defence witnesses, Charter was uncertain how to handle his court testimony. As with Radsma and Spiller, he could not claim that his business partner was mentally disordered because he did not believe that he was, but he feared that if Pratt was not found insane, he might be hanged or imprisoned for many years. Therefore, he tried to portray Pratt as a strange man by describing and exaggerating some incidents while failing to mention Pratt's strong anti-apartheid beliefs.

FATHER REGINALD JOSEPH ORSMOND⁷⁴⁸³

Father Reginald Orsmond, a Roman Catholic priest, founder and director of Boys' Town, a mission at Magaliesburg, was the last witness on the first day. He testified that he met Pratt when he arrived in Magaliesburg in 1956 and got to know him very well. He believed that Pratt was very much in love with his wife and there was nothing he wanted more than that she should return from Europe, but she refused. After that, it seemed to him that Pratt "had reached a stage at which he felt he had lost all dignity. He considered himself a wash-out, to put it plainly."

Pratt stayed at the Boys' Town guest-house for two or three days some two weeks before the shooting. The priest believed that Pratt came to him for two reasons, "because he was violently upset, he was as far as I could see mentally ill, and he was attempting to find help to alleviate this illness of his. The second reason was that I do believe there was a

⁷⁴⁸³ Father Reginald Orsmond's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

genuine desire to embrace a religion.” At one point Pratt hinted that “the only way out” of his troubles was to take his own life, but Father Orsmond “put him off this.” He said Pratt was “extremely depressed” and changed his mind quite often on certain points.

Father Orsmond also confirmed that Pratt had attempted to form a Coalition Government and stated that there was a rumour that Pratt was a member of the Nationalist Party. The following exchanges took place during cross-examination:

REIN: Did you think he was insane?

FR. ORSMOND: I don’t even think a psychiatrist could give a definite answer to that question. I could not.

REIN: Did you think there was something wrong with him mentally?

FR. ORSMOND: Well, should I put it to you this way: I did think that he was emotionally upset at least.

REIN: Did you think he did not know what he was doing?

FR. ORSMOND: I think he knew what he was doing.

REIN: And did you have many and long talks with him?

FR. ORSMOND: Yes, many talks, some of them long.

REIN: And as a result of those talks you never thought that this man ought to have somebody to look after him, or look after his affairs? Or did you, Father?

FR. ORSMOND: I did think that he needed help badly, but to say that a man cannot look after his own affairs, I don’t think I am one to judge that. He definitely did not strike me as being habitually insane.

REIN: Did you think that he was insane at times?

FR. ORSMOND: I cannot even say that, no.

REIN: All you can say is that he was a very worried and depressed man?

FR. ORSMOND: Correct.

COMMENTS ON FATHER ORSMOND'S TESTIMONY

Father Orsmond said years later to filmmaker Guy Spiller that Pratt was odd, but not mentally disordered. He said,

“I found him a very concerned person, concerned for things of justice, and he had a great mercy for people suffering illness or poverty. I do know that he wasn't an evil man. I do know that he would not have committed a cold-blooded murder just for the sake of cold-blooded murder. I doubt even if he would defend himself if he was personally being attacked by trying to kill the oppressor, the attacker. But in this case there was more than just the life of one man; in this case there were really the lives of thousands and thousands of people, and the future of the country. In some ways he could have seen that, in his conscience, as a noble thing. And if he saw it as a noble thing, he could not be condemned as having a bad conscience, no.”⁷⁴⁸⁴

Father Orsmond recalled in *The Liberal and the Pirate* his own appearance in court:

“At the trial, I was asked by the advocate – who was leading me, of course – did I think that David was completely sane, or was there any chance that he was unbalanced? And I said, “Well, as far as I am concerned, on the whole, if you look at him and you think of him and you are just talking to him, I don't think he... well, you couldn't call him insane.” You couldn't call him, say, schizophrenic or anything like that, but he was odd. I think that's the best word – he was odd.”

Asked by Guy Spiller to describe an “odd encounter” with Pratt, Father Orsmond said: “Well, on one occasion he invited me to dinner at his house. And when I knocked on the door, he opened the door and he said, ‘*Good evening. Can I help you?*’ and then I said ‘Yes, David, I'm here for dinner.’ And, of course, he had forgotten about it. Odd in that way, but certainly not insane.”⁷⁴⁸⁵

⁷⁴⁸⁴ Father Orsmond in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁴⁸⁵ Father Orsmond in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

DAY 2: 13 SEPTEMBER 1960

THE WITNESSES

CHARLES FRIEDMAN⁷⁴⁸⁶

Charles Friedman was an attorney with the Johannesburg firm of solicitors, Hayman, Godfrey and Sanderson, who had acted for Pratt for many years. Friedman described Pratt as “a very intelligent person but a difficult client, moody and at times unpredictable. It needed a great deal of patience and firmness to handle his affairs.” He would change his mind frequently, but “quite clearly” he was able to understand what he was doing. Friedman said Pratt went abroad last May, deeply concerned about his wife but mostly about his children who were overseas; he was anxious to obtain custody of them.

Friedman saw Pratt in November last year in London and found a “remarkable change” in him. “He was easy to get on with,” he said. Friedman knew he had been having treatment. He next saw Pratt on his return to South Africa in February, also in March before he went to Durban. He saw him almost daily in the last week of March and he last saw him on April 1, just eight days before the shooting. Said Friedman:

“He was more difficult than I had ever known him before. He was almost impossible, and there was quite a transformation again from the man that I had seen in London and prior to his departure for Durban. He was extremely tense, moody, and you just could not get at him. He just would not listen to you, or to me I should say, and he was absolutely unpredictable. I had to exercise the greatest patience that I ever have had to exercise and firmness, with him, during that period of one week.”

Friedman testified that Pratt was a “very intelligent man” and had a “sound business sense, but then he would not stick to it, he would vary from it.” In the end his decisions usually proved sound-although Friedman claimed that a lot of them were influenced by him.

⁷⁴⁸⁶ Charles Friedman’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

DR. BENJAMIN CHESLER⁷⁴⁸⁷

Dr. Chesler was a specialist psychiatrist who began treating Pratt on July 4, 1954 at the request of Mrs. Pratt. Pratt was at the Sanatoria Nursing Home because he was “unmanageable at home.” Chesler testified that he found Pratt in “a post-epileptic state of clouded consciousness.” He was suffering from acute mental confusion that apparently followed upon a series of epileptic seizures. During this time Pratt was given electroconvulsive therapy (E.C.T.) and was discharged on July 13, 1954. A subsequent electroencephalograph showed abnormal activity consistent with *grand mal* epilepsy.

Dr. Chesler explained to the court the characteristics of grand mal epilepsy:

“There is an aura, a sensation, which may take the form of sensory or motor sensation - he may feel something in his body lasting about 30 seconds - there is a warning sign. Sometimes they don’t have this aura at all. Some patients most frequently utter a cry and then there is a sudden immediate loss of consciousness. The patient falls down and for about half a minute to a minute he is in a tonic phase, that is extreme rigidity of the body, followed after this by jerky convulsive movements also lasting about 30 seconds to a minute, and then there is a varying period of confusion or unconsciousness after the seizure. Most of them regain their consciousness after a short while, a minute or two, and then go into a sleep for varying periods. They may sleep for half an hour to an hour, but that is the pattern, with variations.”

Dr. Chesler identified a certificate he signed regarding Pratt under the Mental Disorders Act. An extract from the certificate read, “He is extremely confused and has acted in a dangerously aggressive manner.” Dr. Chesler also testified that Pratt told him that “he felt he would like to give away his money to some charitable organisation, that he felt he would be happier.” Dr. Chesler did not elaborate on the subject.

Pratt did not visit Dr. Chesler often and for many months the doctor did not see him. When he did, he found Pratt to be “abnormally impulsive. His behaviour was unpredictable, and he was at times subject to sudden fluctuations in mood.” Asked by Maisels to give examples of this impulsive and unpredictable behaviour, Dr. Chesler remembered two incidents: “Mr. Pratt would have an appointment, and he may fail to keep it, and a month or two later he would come along and say he had gone off to London. On one occasion he had a

⁷⁴⁸⁷ Dr. Chesler’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

rash, we thought it was due to the treatment, we were not certain, it was not responding to treatment from a dermatologist. Without telling me, Mr. Pratt went on a boat trip to Buenos Aires.”

Dr. Chesler said Pratt’s epileptic attacks occurred about once every six weeks. There was a sudden immediate loss of consciousness, there was extreme rigidity and the body was convulsed by jerky movements. On January 17, 1956, Pratt was diagnosed by Dr. Chesler as suffering from severe melancholia. “Pratt became violent and smashed windows and had to be removed and locked up in Sanatoria. There he descended into what he described as “a Miltonian hell, complete with fires, prongs and yells of anguish.”

In addition to shock treatment and because he suffered from depression, Pratt also received psychotherapy. After the psychotherapy, he seemed “capable of leading a normal social life.” Dr. Chesler said Pratt seemed to be capable of managing his own affairs, which was a remarkable improvement. He warned him though not to take alcohol and to be sure to continue with his medication.

In August 1958, Dr. Chesler said, Pratt complained of being overcome by a feeling of despondency and depression, and from a physical examination that was true. There appeared to have been an organic deterioration which impaired his mental faculties to such a degree that he was not capable of managing his affairs. Dr. Chesler diagnosed a “progressive organic deterioration” which he thought had impaired Pratt’s mental faculties to such a degree that “he was incapable of satisfactorily managing his affairs.” He thought there was “an irreversible organic change that had taken place in the brain” and “came to the opinion that there was a general impairment of his intellectual faculties” and felt that his powers of judgment and reasoning were noticeably impaired and that “the emotional liability that he had shown previously had increased, that he was more impulsive, more prone to sudden, unpredictable mood swings, and had become morbidly suspicious.” In addition Pratt was “showing aggressive behaviour.” He assaulted a relative and said he was thinking of going to Holland to abduct his children.

Dr. Chesler said he warned Pratt’s sister, Mrs. Ricketts, of the deterioration in his mental state and advised her to apply for the appointment of a *curator bonis*. She did not take his advice, he said, and he advised Pratt to find another psychiatrist. Pratt then went to Dr. Jacobson.

Under cross-examination by Rein, Dr. Chesler conceded that his diagnosis of irreversible organic deterioration “could have been wrong”:

DR. CHESLER: I was not certain that I was correct. Psychiatry is not a factual science, a lot of it is subjective interpretation. I had known Mr. Pratt for four years. I had got to know him very well. I had seen these subtle changes take place. I was perturbed. Clinically, I felt that the man had deteriorated, there was organic deterioration, but another clinician might not have agreed with me.

REIN: It was just your opinion, doctor, and like most opinions could have been wrong?

DR. CHESLER: That is so.

Dr. Chesler then agreed that “the majority of epileptics never display mental symptoms” and that “those who do show some, the majority of them carry on with their normal occupations throughout their life.” Finally, asked by Maisels whether Pratt fell under the meaning of the Mental Disorders Act, Dr. Chesler replied that he was unable to express an opinion since he was not aware of Pratt’s present condition, not having examined him since 1958.

COMMENTS ON DR. CHESLER’S TESTIMONY

The reasons for which Dr. Chesler asked Pratt’s sister to appoint a *curator bonis* for her brother need further elaboration. Dr. Chesler suggested a *curator bonis* appointment not on grounds that Pratt was mentally ill, but because he was becoming irresponsible with his business. However, Pratt’s sister disagreed with Dr. Chesler’s opinion and did nothing about it.

Pratt’s sister was not the only one close to him who disagreed with Dr. Chesler’s opinion and ignored it. Elizabeth Radsma, Pratt’s personal assistant at the time, characterised the doctor’s diagnosis as “wrong” and told the author that her employer was “perfectly capable” of handling his own affairs and that he was a “shrewd businessman.”⁷⁴⁸⁸ Radsma and Pratt’s sister are not the only ones who disagreed with Dr. Chesler. Noel Spiller, who knew Pratt for twelve years and was a close friend as well as a business partner, also rejected the idea that he was unable to look after his affairs. She described him in her trial testimony

⁷⁴⁸⁸ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview with the author, 9 January 2017.

as an “astute businessman who knew what he wanted and what he was after.”⁷⁴⁸⁹ It seems most unlikely that Pratt would have been unable to look after their business and his business partner would have done nothing. Being his business partner and friend for so many years suggests that her opinion carries some weight. The opinions of these two women, who worked closely with Pratt at different levels of his life for many years, warrant serious consideration.

It seems that Pratt’s employees at his sweet factory also disagreed with Dr. Chesler’s opinion, given that they wanted him to fire van Niekerk, a manager, and run the business himself.⁷⁴⁹⁰ Desmond Blow told the author that Pratt was entirely capable of running a business from his room at the hospital. Deeply impressed by the intelligent way Pratt prepared for the reopening of his trial, Blow had no doubt that his friend was “more than capable” of managing his own affairs. “If he could do it so easily from the hospital, I am sure he could have done it when he was outside,” Blow said.⁷⁴⁹¹

After the inquiry into his mental state and during his confinement in hospital, Pratt made plans for a retrial. Believing that the authorities would not want to re-open his case, he sought to conceal his intentions. Firstly, he would sprinkle sugar in the corridor which led to his room, so that he could hear warders approaching and have time to hide his documents; secondly, he used code names for the prominent anti-apartheid people he wanted to testify on his behalf. Harry Oppenheimer was “Uncle Henry” and Sir Paul Dukes was “Peter the gardener.” As we will see, Pratt had prepared a detailed plan of how to proceed with the re-opening of his case. The preparation of his case and its concealment from the authorities were clearly the works of a man who was more than capable of managing his own affairs.

We should remember that Pratt was a person of extreme sensitivity deeply concerned for his fellow citizens who at this time was undergoing a series of emotional and intellectual pressures. These included his marriage, his separation from his adored children, his epilepsy, his depression and his concerns about the national political situation. Pratt could become depressed very easily, perhaps by seeing someone mistreated or a person begging for food, common features of South Africa at the time.

Given Pratt’s many emotional, business and political pressures, it is understandable

⁷⁴⁸⁹ Noel Spiller’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 12 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁴⁹⁰ David Pratt’s ‘Method for approaching trial.’ n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷⁴⁹¹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

that Pratt would fantasise about getting away from it all and going to live in a little cottage in England far from his troubles. It is the gesture of a person under enormous pressure, not of someone mentally ill. The issue of Pratt wanting to give away his possessions will be discussed in detail in Prof. Hurst's testimony. As we will see, many people have given away their possessions for the same reasons as set out by Pratt, and none of them has been diagnosed as insane.

Dr. Chesler's reference to Pratt's "aggressiveness" was an exaggeration. What transpired between Pratt and the relative was no more than an argument. Pratt said about the incident, "Another occasion concerned the management of my sweet factors by my cousin Stuart Pratt. I was very dissatisfied with the policy he was pursuing and in addition had reason to suspect his honesty. After some difficult sessions at the factory I arranged a meeting at my office in Surrey House where we would be quite private and staff could not overhear. He didn't turn up so I drove to the factory and found him reading a newspaper. I then pulled him out of his chair and had a fight."⁷⁴⁹² Pratt's anger in such a situation seems perfectly reasonable. His cousin was not running the business the way Pratt wanted and then failed to keep an appointment with his boss, preferring to read up on the news.

As for Pratt's plan to abduct his children, that was certainly an irresponsible idea, but more a demonstration of the love and desperation of an adoring father than a sign of insanity. Fathers and mothers around the world abduct their children without the consent of the other parent because they are in similar situations to Pratt's. According to the *Guardian* newspaper, in the United Kingdom in the year 2012 alone, more than 500 children were abducted by one of their parents. None of the abductors was reported to be mentally ill, but some faced problems similar to Pratt's.⁷⁴⁹³ The author does not approve of child abduction or of Pratt's plan, but it must be emphasized that such situations are not a sign of mental illness. Finally, it must not be overlooked, Pratt never did abduct his children.

⁷⁴⁹² David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷⁴⁹³ Hattenstone (*The Guardian*), 21 September 2013, 'My partner abducted my child: the parents left behind.' Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/sep/21/partner-abducted-child-parents-left-behind>

PROFESSOR LEWIS A. HURST⁷⁴⁹⁴**INTRODUCTION**

Prof. Hurst, Professor of Psychological Medicine at the University of the Witwatersrand and Chief Psychiatrist at the Johannesburg and Tara Hospitals. In 1959 he became the first full-time professor of psychiatry at University of the Witwatersrand, indeed the first in South Africa.⁷⁴⁹⁵ As stated earlier, he was a regular guest at Pratt's Crayfish Inn and a good friend of Pratt's business partner there, Noel Spiller,⁷⁴⁹⁶ although the author cannot say if he personally knew Pratt. Surprisingly maybe, none of these links became known during the inquiry. In 1964, Prof. Hurst would be chosen by the defence to examine John Harris, the man who planted a bomb in a Johannesburg train station. He found Harris unfit to stand trial, as he found Pratt. However, the Court would dismiss his opinion and instead accept the diagnosis of Professor van Wyk, the State psychiatrist who would later examine Tsafendas on behalf of the State. Van Wyk diagnosed Harris as perfectly sane and fit to stand trial.⁷⁴⁹⁷

PROF. HURST'S TESTIMONY

Prof. Hurst testified that on April 9, 1960, at around 8 p.m., he was called by Dr. Friedman to examine Pratt. The examination lasted two hours and Dr. Friedman, another doctor and Detective Head Constable P.J. Koekemoer were also present. The author has not been able to identify the unnamed doctor. Neither Friedman nor Hurst mentions his name. Almost certainly, it was not Dr. Jacobson, who was treating Pratt at that time. Jacobson, who testified at the trial, said nothing about being at that examination and his name does not appear in any official document. If he had been present, Attorney-General Rein would almost surely have brought it up in his cross-examination.

According to Prof. Hurst, Pratt conversed with him in a "calm, coherent, lucid manner." On April 12, Hurst completed a psychiatric report on Pratt, which he gave to Dr. Friedman to submit to the police. During the examination, Prof. Hurst said, Pratt told him that his seizures had started at the age of eight and that there were two types. The more severe

⁷⁴⁹⁴ Unless referenced otherwise, all the parts in Prof. Hurst's testimony are taken from his testimony in the Enquiry Regarding the Mental Condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁴⁹⁵ Minde, 1977: 211.

⁷⁴⁹⁶ Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*. 1999.

⁷⁴⁹⁷ *State v. Harris* (Appellate Division), 11 February-1 March 1965: 340-341.

type was one in which he lost consciousness, fell to the ground and on occasion bit his tongue. The second was a milder fit, which, on the basis of medical evidence, he called *le petit mal*. Dr. Lennox of Boston gave it this name after examining Pratt in 1946 when Pratt visited America to seek a cure for his epilepsy.

Prof. Hurst testified that Pratt's memory on the night of the shooting was in general intact, apart from amnesia relating to epileptic seizures, and that he gave an account of shooting Dr. Verwoerd. Pratt said that on the previous day, he saw about a hundred prisoners being bundled into a van and he asked himself: "What the hell will be happening next? This cannot go on. Where can we see any light?" The next morning, he had a very strong feeling that someone had to do something, adding, "and it better bloody well be me, feeling as I do about it." Asked about his reaction to the Prime Minister's speech at the fairground, Pratt told Prof. Hurst that he was "not impressed" and felt increasingly that he must do something. He thought, "What is the country going to do? What is all this leading to?" Then he thought, "I shall not kill the man, but lay him out for a month or so to give him time to think things over."

Asked about Pratt's state of mind and mood on April 9, Prof. Hurst said Pratt told him he was not as sociable as usual and this was due to the knowledge that he had a gun and whether or not he was going to use it. He also had a conviction that somebody had to sacrifice himself. Prof. Hurst also stated that the anti-epileptic medication that Pratt was taking "might have been responsible for some aspects of his mental state."

Prof. Hurst said Pratt spoke angrily against nationalism and said that at one point he had thought of giving away all of his possessions. Pratt talked of his attempt to form a coalition government and how he approached two political leaders. One, Nicolaas Havenga, agreed with him but the second turned him down and he then decided not to approach a third politician he had in mind. Prof. Hurst said Pratt seemed not to be concerned with achieving the rank of a minister with his coalition idea.

The professor concluded that Pratt failed to appreciate that he did not have the qualifications or experience to make a success of his grandiose and megalomaniac ideas. Prof. Hurst said, "His current lack of judgement and insight into his limitations of that time, as well as his currently assumed role of political saviour and martyr, lead me to the conclusion that he is at present suffering from a grandiose delusional trend of all megalomania." At this point of Prof. Hurst's testimony, while he was reading from his report,

Pratt rose from his seat and intervened: "Pardon me interrupting at this stage. I had asked that the medical evidence be given in camera. As it is impossible for that, is it essential that this section of Dr. Hurst's report be read out?" Judge Rumpff replied that it was essential, whereupon Pratt said, "I accept it," and resumed his seat.

Prof. Hurst also said that Pratt told him that in 1954 he heard organ music in his head which continued for several days. He was told this was purely psychological, but such experiences continued, reaching a stage in which he felt disembodied and as if he was looking down on his own body. Pratt described it to Hurst as an "almost Christ-like feeling." Later, Pratt was taken to Tara, but after he became violent and broke some windows, he was transferred to the Sanatoria Nursing Home.

Prof. Hurst then told the court, "there he descended into what he described as 'a Miltonian hell complete with fires, prongs and yells of anguish.' He quoted Pratt as saying, "Then I came up from that" to a state in which the whole world was a play and everybody was acting. This lasted a few days and one electro-convulsive treatment cured it. Then he enunciates a bizarre idea, that as a result of these experiences, he arrived at the conclusion that "epilepsy is a way of life and until I found it, I was depressed."

(At this stage Pratt intervened again) **PRATT:** May I object again, my lord? That is somewhat erroneous. I don't know whether there was a misunderstanding on Dr. Hurst's part, but it was in 1959, when taking treatment in London, when I formed that conclusion that epilepsy is a way of life.

JUDGE RUMPF: Yes, I will note that.

Regarding the shooting of Dr. Verwoerd, Prof. Hurst said, "He clearly recognised that his action was wrong in the eyes of the law, but felt in terms of his beliefs that for the good of the country that this consideration could be, and was, set aside. So he justifies it in terms of his political saviour/ martyr/ grandiose delusion, in my view. His regret, however, is for himself and his business associates. He said to me, 'My life is cleaved across. What the future holds for my associates and business concerns is what troubles me.'"

Prof. Hurst concluded that in his opinion, "there can be no doubt that Pratt is an epileptic. Moreover, his intention to maim the Prime Minister was formed in association with a mental disorder of a megalomaniac/delusional type." Incidentals such as Pratt playing the piano late at night and his suicide letters and other actions confirmed his findings as to Pratt's mental state, the professor said. He stated that he had no doubt that Pratt's case fell within the

meaning of the Mental Disorders Act and the he should be classed as an epileptic under the Act.

Asked by the Prosecutor whether Pratt could have been dazed, could have had concussion or shock at the time of the shooting, Prof. Hurst replied that he had found no evidence of this. He said that from his conversation with Pratt, he realised he was dealing with a political crime, but he did not ask Pratt to which party he belonged because it was obvious that he was in opposition to the Government.

Prof. Hurst recommended that Pratt should be either be made “a Governor-General’s decision patient” or “be committed for observation to a mental disorder hospital, where he might be observed as to behaviour and the occurrence of fits and an electroencephalogram might be performed.”

COMMENTS ON PROF. HURST’S TESTIMONY

Professor Hurst’s testimony was important because he was a psychiatrist. He claimed that his diagnosis was based exclusively on a two-hour examination of Pratt which had taken place only five hours after the shooting. He had no access to any information about Pratt, apart from what he was told by Pratt himself. The issue of the two-hour examination was raised by the public prosecutor.

REIN: Would it not be safer if he were examined and observed for a longer period than the two hours you gave him on the day of the shooting?

PROF. HURST: I did consider that seriously in the recommendation in my report. Although the case seemed so clear, it seemed to me at that stage that a more prolonged period of observation might be necessary. However, from the additional information received from the witnesses, and also the presentation of this E.E.G., with this additional information, I can see no good purpose in further observation.⁷⁴⁹⁸

Thus, for Prof. Hurst, his two-hour examination and what he heard in the court from the witnesses, plus the results of an E.E.G. were enough to make a safe diagnosis about Pratt. However, when he wrote his report on Pratt, which was submitted to the police on April 12, three days after the examination, he had not yet heard any of the witnesses testify in court,

⁷⁴⁹⁸ Prof. Hurst’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

nor had he seen the E.E.G. In fact, he did not have any additional information about Pratt, so his diagnosis was based exclusively on what he was told by him. However, he did mention in his report at the time that further observation was necessary.

Dr. Chesler, who treated Pratt for four years and also saw the E.E.G. and heard the same witnesses, refused to give an opinion about Pratt's current condition because he had not spoken to him for two years. It seems highly unlikely if not impossible that any court today would accept a psychiatrist's diagnosis based entirely on a two-hour examination which took place only hours after the accused shot his victim and without any third-party information.

One of the world's leading forensic psychologists, Professor Kirk Heilbrun, agreed in an interview with the author that such a diagnosis would not have been seen as credible in an American court:

"It [Dr. Cooper's diagnosis] would not be given much credibility in a U.S. court. Many of the points we have discussed [above] would be incorporated into cross-examination to challenge the credibility of the opinions based only on self-report."⁷⁴⁹⁹

MEGALOMANIAC? SAVIOUR/MARTYR?

Prof. Hurst concluded that Pratt's "assumed role of political saviour and martyr" and his attempt to form a coalition to defeat the National Party "were grandiose or megalomaniac owing to his lack of appreciation" of what such an effort involved. This does not stand up to scrutiny. In the 1948 general election, the National Party defeated the United Party by forming a coalition with the Afrikaner Party. The leader of the Afrikaner Party was Nicolaas Havenga, the man David Pratt wanted to approach in order to form his proposed coalition.⁷⁵⁰⁰ The 1948 coalition and the involvement of Havenga suggest that Pratt's idea was perfectly realistic.

Furthermore, the choice of Havenga, who had been the Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister in the Malan Government, seemed to be well-judged. Firstly, Havenga had participated in the 1948 Coalition and therefore had experience of such arrangements. Then, there was another factor which made him a prime candidate for the role Pratt had in mind. In 1951, the Afrikaner Party merged with the National Party, and in

⁷⁴⁹⁹ Professor Kirk Heilbrun in a personal interview, 15 January 2016.

⁷⁵⁰⁰ Dubow, 2014: 2, 35; Vatcher, 1965: 75, 138.

1954,⁷⁵⁰¹ Malan retired as Prime Minister and leader of the National Party. To succeed him as party leader, he chose Havenga. However, the Transvaal nominated its provisional leader, J.G. Strijdom, who subsequently outwitted Havenga and was eventually elected as NP leader. Pratt could have been aware of Havenga's feelings towards Strijdom, who became Prime Minister, although Havenga refrained from airing his bitterness publicly.⁷⁵⁰² These past political developments all made Havenga a logical and sensible choice for Pratt's proposal.

Oppenheimer was an excellent and logical choice by Pratt since he, too, wanted an end to apartheid. In April 1960, shortly after the Sharpeville Massacre, he declared publicly that "something will have to be done - and quickly. The longer we wait, the more difficult it will be." Oppenheimer suggested a series of gradual steps toward African majority rule, with built-in safeguards for the Whites, over the next twenty-five years. Verwoerd, of course, rejected the scheme.⁷⁵⁰³ As for Anton Rupert, he, too, was a logical choice; he was one of the richest and most influential men in South Africa, while it was known that he had a "very stormy relationship" with Dr. Verwoerd and objected to some of his policies.⁷⁵⁰⁴ Rupert allegedly said after the assassination that "the fact that Dr. Verwoerd was no longer Prime Minister, was the best thing that could have happened for South Africa."⁷⁵⁰⁵

Thus, it is clear from Pratt's trio of choices that his proposal for a coalition was both serious and realistic. Were it not for Rupert's negative response, the coalition could have become a reality. Prof. Hurst made clear that Pratt did not seek a Cabinet post or any other position by forming this coalition, evidence surely that his motive was simply a desire to defeat the National Party and end apartheid and not to achieve personal power or recognition.

However, perhaps the best proof that Prof. Hurst was wrong about Pratt is provided by the story of a man who became known colloquially as "Monsieur Jacques."⁷⁵⁰⁶ French millionaire businessman Jean-Yves Ollivier (Monsieur Jacques) visited South Africa for the first time in 1981 and swiftly concluded that the country was in dire trouble. He said that "arriving in South Africa in 1981 felt like visiting another planet. I wondered how the whites

⁷⁵⁰¹ Giliomee 2011: 492.

⁷⁵⁰² Vatcher, 1965: 115, 125.

⁷⁵⁰³ *Newsweek*, 11 April 1960: 55, 'Exploding South Africa.'

⁷⁵⁰⁴ Parker (*Sunday Tribune*), 28 August 1966: 1, "Verwoerd must go' plan: Cape Nats back Anton Rupert.;" Wood et al, 2014: 1363.

⁷⁵⁰⁵ Marais, 1994: 11.

⁷⁵⁰⁶ For a detailed account of Monsieur Jacques' activities see the 2013 documentary by Carlos Agullo and Mandy Jacobson *Plot for Peace*.

did not realize that, unless they changed and accepted to share the country, they were headed for disaster.⁷⁵⁰⁷

Ollivier decided to work alone for an end to apartheid and, using his wealth, status and connections, he acted as mediator and contact man for the ANC and the apartheid government to resolve many dangerous and long-standing issues. Notably, he played a significant role in securing the release of Nelson Mandela and smoothing the path towards an apartheid-free nation. Mandela appointed Ollivier as a Grand Officer of the Order of Good Hope in 1995.⁷⁵⁰⁸

The relevance of this story to Platt is that the two men shared many experiences and qualities. Both were extremely wealthy and successful in business; neither had any party political experience but both cared deeply for justice and wanted to end the people's suffering in South Africa. Now consider: If Ollivier had told Prof. Hurst in 1981 that he was going to try to have Nelson Mandela released and bring apartheid to an end by using his contacts, his influence and his money, is it not very possible that that the professor would have diagnosed him as megalomaniac and a saviour type, too? Did Ollivier not think in 1981 exactly the same thing that Pratt thought in 1954, that he would bring about social change by using his influence and status? Prof. Hurst apart, many South Africans in 1981, hearing Ollivier talk about his plans, might have labelled him a megalomaniac with a saviour complex or even mentally disordered, as decades earlier they considered Pratt.

However, Ollivier, like Pratt, was neither power-mad nor crazy and did not see himself as a saviour. Ollivier was determined to put right something that seemed completely wrong in his eyes and gradually, using his contacts, money, status and relationships, he managed to achieve his goal. Pratt did exactly the same things, but he went to the extremes and he failed to achieve his goal, while Ollivier succeeded. If Pratt had somehow succeeded in ending apartheid, he would never have been accused of megalomania or suffering from a saviour type complex. The crucial difference between Pratt and Ollivier, apart from the assault, is that the latter succeeded in his plan to end apartheid, while the former failed.

Like Pratt, who did not want a cabinet seat or financial, or honorific rewards for his efforts, Ollivier remained for a long time in the shadows, and his role in Mandela's release and the ending of apartheid did not become known until recently. The British *Independent*

⁷⁵⁰⁷ Jean-Yves Ollivier in *Plot for Peace*, 2013.

⁷⁵⁰⁸ Angullo and Jacobson, 2013, *Plot for Peace*.

newspaper characterised him as a “shadowy broker for peace,” and a dazzling array of honours testify to his good works in other parts of the African continent. His titles included “Officier de la Légion d’Honneur” and “Chevalier de l’Ordre Nationale du Mérite” in France, “Commandeur de l’Ordre de Mérite Congolais” in Congo Brazzaville, and “Grand Officier de l’Étoile d’Anjouan” in Comoros.⁷⁵⁰⁹

Though bereft of public honours, Pratt’s activities on behalf of poor non-White South Africans are evidence of his good will. If he had not cared for the under-privileged, he would not have paid for a school for Black children, nor would he have built apartment homes for his farm workers and their families or given shelter on his farm to poor and homeless non-Whites from elsewhere. He would not have spoken publicly in Britain against apartheid and urged a boycott of South African goods.

As for his attempt to form a coalition government, it reflected a genuine desire to effect political change, based on precedent, that being how the National Party came to power in the first place in 1948. Furthermore, to fill an exercise book for Joe Slovo and the other anti-apartheid activists in prison with “very elaborate and fanciful exhortations for joint efforts against racism”⁷⁵¹⁰ is hardly something a megalomaniac seeking power and recognition would do, but it is the sort of thing that someone who cared about racial injustice would do, someone determined to fight apartheid and bring an end to racism.

True, there was a “mega” aspect to Pratt’s ambitions in the size of his plans, but he had the money, the power and the connections to pursue them realistically. After all, he was able to call and arrange personal meetings with Havenga, Rupert and Oppenheimer, three very influential and powerful men, which very few South Africans were in a position to do. Ollivier’s aims were no less ambitious than Pratt’s, indeed more so, but if he had told Prof. Hurst about them in 1981, it is very likely that he, too, would have been diagnosed as a megalomaniac suffering from grandiose delusions and a saviour complex.

That Pratt believed he would be killed one way or another after his assault but still went ahead with his plan does not mean he was mentally disordered or that he saw himself as a martyr. History is full of people committing desperate acts out of political conviction and that does not mean that they suffered from a martyr complex. Pratt held deep political

⁷⁵⁰⁹ Steele (*The Independent*), 13 March 2014, ‘*The mysterious Monsieur Jacques: Behind the scenes of apartheid, French businessman Jean-Yves Ollivier was a shadowy broker for peace.*’

⁷⁵¹⁰ Slovo, 1995: 133.

convictions and was ready to die for them. As he wrote in his letter to Dr. Verwoerd, “It is better for a man to die for a principle than to live in contradiction thereto.” Indeed, only three years later, at the Rivonia Trial, Nelson Mandela expressed his willingness to die for his ideas. Yet, Mandela was never presented as mentally disordered or lampooned as someone who saw himself as a national saviour or martyr. The issue of people willing to die for their ideals is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

There are two other incidents that cast doubt on Prof. Hurst’s diagnosis of a saviour/martyr complex. According to the doctor, Pratt’s delusions and the belief that he had to do something against apartheid started in 1954. However, Pratt was opposed to apartheid long before that. He became a member of the British Liberal Party in the early 1950s and a member of the South African Liberal Party in 1953. Both parties were strongly against apartheid. What is more, he built homes and a school for the Blacks working on his farm and gave shelter to other penniless Blacks in the area, also before 1954. This is the caring man he was, defying apartheid, before 1954 and before the euphoria started. The fact that only a few people knew about Pratt’s generosity seems incompatible with the idea of the delusional, saviour/martyr type portrayed by Prof. Hurst.

We should also remember Dr. Verwoerd believed that he had been chosen by God to lead the Afrikaners and saw himself as a man on a divine mission.⁷⁵¹¹ In addition, after he was shot, Dr. Verwoerd portrayed himself as a self-sacrificial victim, and called himself a “martyr!” He told Major Richter that he was “just one of the martyrs of the Afrikaner people”⁷⁵¹² and then during a visit to his bedside by opposition leader Sir de Villiers Graaff, Dr. Verwoerd referred to God more than a dozen times, insisting that the deity had chosen him to continue piloting apartheid. In the course of a two-hour conversation, he insisted that his survival was proof of the divine acceptance of his policies.⁷⁵¹³ At the same time, Dr. Verwoerd told his wife, “I heard the shots and then I realized that I could still think, and I knew that I had been spared to complete my life’s work.”⁷⁵¹⁴ Betsie Verwoerd also saw her husband’s survival as “a sign to us that we are on the right path and God is with us.”⁷⁵¹⁵

⁷⁵¹¹ Barber, 1999: 161; Bunting, 1986: 147; Sachs, 1965: 7.

⁷⁵¹² Scholtz, 1974: 152-153.

⁷⁵¹³ Vatcher, 1965: 110.

⁷⁵¹⁴ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, ‘South Africa: Death to the architect.’

⁷⁵¹⁵ Ingalls (*The New York Times*), 18 April 1960: 1, ‘South Africans said to consider sealing borders.’

In his radio broadcast of May 20, his first public speech after the shooting, Dr. Verwoerd said, “I trust that I will be permitted to testify to my conviction that the protection of Divine Providence was accorded me with a purpose, a purpose which concerns South Africa too. May it be given to me to fulfil that task faithfully.”⁷⁵¹⁶ Dr. Verwoerd later even told Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker that his survival “revealed God’s approval of the cause he had followed.”⁷⁵¹⁷ Finally, as we have already seen Dr. Verwoerd’s followers fully agreed that he had been saved by God in order to fulfil his “duties” and that God had chosen him as his instrument to lead and forge the South African nation.⁷⁵¹⁸ However, no-one at the time, or even now, characterised Dr. Verwoerd as suffering from a “martyr complex” or thought that he might be insane for believing that his life was spared by God because He approved of his policies and wanted him to continue with them.

No matter how convincing Prof. Hurst’s arguments may have appeared, it is difficult to accept that he really believed Pratt was a megalomaniac or saw himself as a saviour of South Africa. What is easier to believe is that he presented Pratt’s various activities and opinions in such a way as to make him appear irrational, which would lessen the prospect of a long term of imprisonment or even the death sentence. The fact that he examined him only once, for two hours, and formulated his opinions from what Pratt himself said without any third party input, suggests that either he was not very professional or that he wanted to save Pratt’s life.

That Professor Hurst was a regular visitor to Pratt’s inn, a good friend of Noel Spiller, and personally opposed to apartheid add to the feasibility of the second option. Even if the Professor did not know Pratt before the examination, he must have known he was co-owner of the inn, if only through his friendship with Spiller. It is natural to assume that Professor Hurst discussed Pratt’s case with Spiller after his examination. He was within his rights to do so in order to collect third-party information on his patient. In such circumstances he would almost certainly have asked Spiller for her opinion about her business partner and would then have learned that Pratt was nothing like the man he described. As we know, Spiller

⁷⁵¹⁶ Pelzer, 1966: 396; *The New York Times*, 21 May 1960: 11, ‘Dr. Verwoerd asserts God saved his life’; *The Sphere*, 4 June 1960: 410, ‘The voice of the Common.’

⁷⁵¹⁷ *The Globe and Mail*, 7 September 1966: 3, ‘Canada regrets death but stand still same’; *The Vancouver Sun*, 6 September 1966: 3, ‘Verwoerd assassination shocks world leaders.’

⁷⁵¹⁸ *TIME*, 16 September 1966, ‘South Africa: Death to the architect.’

considered Pratt to be perfectly sane, the worst you could say about him being that he was “eccentric” and had even characterised as a “shrewd businessman.”

As for Professor Hurst’s belief in Pratt’s being megalomaniac, Spiller contradicted the theory with the following characterisation of Pratt’s behaviour among Johannesburg’s powerful people: “I had lot of the Johannesburg *nouveau riches*, who used to come into the bar and spend hours talking, bragging – wealthy people. But David used to keep pretty aloof, quiet, dignified. He was a very quiet man...”⁷⁵¹⁹ No megalomania there.

Perhaps the strongest indication that the doctor wanted to save Pratt may be deduced from a not dissimilar situation five years later when he was appointed to examine John Harris by the defence lawyers. Prof. Hurst found that Harris “was suffering from a mental disease which rendered him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong,” and he detected in him “paranoid traits of a nature sufficient to impair his judgment” and therefore render him unfit to stand trial. The court dismissed this diagnosis out of hand and instead accepted the opinion of State psychiatrist Professor van Wyk, who declared Harris to be perfectly sane and fit to stand trial.⁷⁵²⁰

None of those who knew Harris ever said that he was mentally ill or noticed any of the issues mentioned by Prof. Hurst in his diagnosis. It seems that Prof. Hurst either completely misdiagnosed Harris, or more likely, sought to save his life. Admittedly, this is simply theorising and Prof. Hurst might have honestly misdiagnosed both David Pratt and John Harris. That his attitude in these two cases was perhaps more subjective than professional etiquette required cannot be discounted.

Furthermore, two witnesses who knew Pratt well, Elizabeth Radsma and Desmond Blow, both strongly rejected the notion that Pratt was a megalomaniac and saw himself as a martyr/saviour. Radsma, Pratt’s personal assistant, who was very close to him for three and a half years, laughed at the suggestion and characterised Pratt as “a down-to-earth man.” She said, “He was the most humble person I ever met, a true and perfect gentleman. He financially helped a lot of people we did not know about; they only came forward after he died.” As for seeing himself as saviour or martyr, Radsma rejected both characterizations equally strongly.⁷⁵²¹

⁷⁵¹⁹ Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller’s *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵²⁰ *State v. Harris* (Appellate Division), 11 February-1 March 1965: 340-341.

⁷⁵²¹ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

Blow totally rejected the “megalomaniac, saviour/martyr” theory. He maintained that Pratt never said anything to him to suggest that he was any of the things Prof. Hurst mentioned. Blow told the author that he “admired Pratt’s courage,” stating that “he was a brave man ... a very concerned man, genuinely concerned about the social injustice that was taking place in South Africa.” Blow said the idea of Pratt as a “saviour/martyr” was not compatible with the man he knew, who he described as a “brave idealist.”⁷⁵²²

Blow’s admiration for this “remarkable and brave, principled man” prompted him to name his son David after Pratt to “honour him” and to “remember him.” Blow’s wife, Elizabeth, told the author that her husband never described Pratt as a “megalomaniac” who saw himself as a “saviour/martyr,” but as someone he deeply admired for his ethics and principles. Mrs. Blow said her husband would never have given their son Pratt’s first name if he considered him to be the type of person described by Prof. Hurst. She said it was immediately after she became pregnant that her husband proposed naming the child David if he was a boy. “He wanted to have David’s name because he admired him so much,” Mrs. Blow said. He intended it “as a compliment to him (Pratt) ... Des wanted in his own way to remember him and that was one way of remembering him with his son having his name.”⁷⁵²³

DR. SOLLY JACOBSON⁷⁵²⁴

The testimony of Dr. Jacobson, a specialist neurologist and psychiatrist, was extremely short. He stated that he had been treating Pratt since November 22, 1958. He performed an electroencephalogram on Pratt which showed “a grossly abnormal condition” and “idiopathic epilepsy.” He testified that Pratt was in no need of a *curator bonis* while he was under his treatment because he was doing very well. At the same time, he said, Pratt was not a danger to himself or to others, as Dr. Chesler had testified. Finally, he stated that he agreed with Prof. Hurst’s evidence.

⁷⁵²² Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁵²³ Elizabeth Blow in a personal interview, 26 October 2017.

⁷⁵²⁴ Dr. Solly Jacobson’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

DAVID PRATT'S SPEECH⁷⁵²⁵

When Dr. Jacobson finished his testimony, the following exchanges took place:

JUDGE (to Rein): Having heard the evidence, and knowing the history that has been told to you, do you, in your opinion, think that he should be classified under section 5 class 7?

REIN: Yes, that is so.

MAISELS: My lord, that is the evidence I propose placing before the Court on this issue.

At this point, Pratt startled the court by standing up again:

PRATT: My lord, may I make a statement before any verdict is given by you?

JUDGE: Have you considered this with your counsel?

PRATT: I have not discussed it with my counsel, but I just wish to make it without discussion.

MAISELS: My lord, this is an unusual enquiry. Mr. Pratt has a *curator ad litem*, I would suggest he should discuss it with him, first.

JUDGE: Of course, if he wants to make a statement he is perfectly entitled to do so. (To Pratt) You are perfectly entitled to do so, Mr. Pratt, but don't you want to discuss it with either your counsel or the *curator ad litem* first?

PRATT: No.

McEWAN: I may say, my lord, that I am aware of the fact that Mr. Pratt wishes to make a statement, I don't know the contents, but I have no objection.⁷⁵²⁶

Pratt then entered the witness box and was advised of the implications and consequences of making a statement under oath. Pratt then took the oath and spoke at length about the background and motives which led to his shooting Dr. Verwoerd.⁷⁵²⁷ The *Daily Dispatch* reported, "There was complete silence in the court as Pratt spoke and the crowd

⁷⁵²⁵ Pratt's testimony has been taken, unless referenced otherwise, from his testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁵²⁶ David Pratt's testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁵²⁷ David Pratt's testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *Daily Dispatch*, 14 September 1960: 1, 'David Pratt tells his story'; *The Cape Argus*, 14 September 1960: 4, 'Pratt tells of his urge to give message to South Africa'; *The New York Times*, 14 September 1960, 'Assassin committed.'

leaned forward in close attention to catch every word... Pratt spoke at times very softly, with his voice rising with his excitement. At times he smiled and gestured at the public and at times addressed them almost directly without apparently considering the judge or the rows of counsel in front of him.”⁷⁵²⁸

Pratt said:⁷⁵²⁹

“My lord, I have listened during this hearing to arguments on a subject which is very close to my life. It has aroused certain irritations and I wish to apologise to your lordship for this. My first interruption, I think, was on the epilepsy, the way of life. It is because with the realisation that it is a way of life, that in 1959 when I was in England under psychoanalysis, I accepted certain facts which had been in doubt in me for some years, and which were the cause of a lot of interior conflict within myself. Consequently, when they are debated and argued in detail, they cause irritation, which an individual with a normal E.C.T would not appreciate. That is the explanation for most of my interruptions this morning.

In the statement I am going to make – it is a prepared statement - I want to explain a little of what has led up to today, because to my mind, abnormality in E.C.T. does not in itself represent insanity, my lord. There is a pattern in everything that has taken place, and I see the years from 1954 to now, in retrospect, as a pattern. Therefore, I shall take you briefly through this period. My life up to then had been that of an individual suffering from these abnormal E.C.Ts, having regular seizures.

During 1954, the phases which have been referred to this morning actually occurred. The first phase was to me quite understandable. I was driving my car from Magaliesburg to Krugersdorp and it suddenly occurred. It is very difficult to describe, it may be described, perhaps, as a light being turned on in a dark room. I think that is the way I described it to Doctor Hurst, and I did not understand what was happening, nor did I know that it was only a temporary thing. I was quite unprepared for it.

At any rate, it was a wonderful state in which to be, and I carried on as has been described and gone through with, until I returned to my farm that day and settled down

⁷⁵²⁸ *Daily Dispatch*, 14 September 1960: 1, ‘David Pratt tells his story.’

⁷⁵²⁹ Unless referenced otherwise, all the parts in David Pratt’s testimony are taken from his testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

quietly, and in my thoughts there was a question of: "What is this all about? What is happening?" It was during that period of sunset that I received my first intense feeling that it was necessary to go out and give a message.

Well, how could I go out and give a message? I couldn't walk around in the streets, grabbing people by the lapels of their coats and give them a message, nor could I hire Krugersdorp Town Hall - I don't suppose anybody would come - and so I took no notice at the moment. Another day passed and I carried on in the same frame of mind, but the message - the same message - became intensively stronger.

The third day passed and the message was still there. Meanwhile, I fixed everything I had to do and this was beginning to worry me because I had taken no action about it. Then on the fourth day the thing started subsiding again and I returned to normality.

This was a little bit irritating - not irritating, that is the wrong word. It was disappointing because I thought I had got it for ever, and I tried to bring it back again by dieting, and certain exercises, but without success. I then called to see Doctor Geerling and discussed it with him, as been explained in evidence. He asked me to keep in with him whenever it occurred again, because I must appreciate, he said, this was also an illness.

Well, it occurred within a month or six weeks later. It began much the same way except I was not in the car, I was at the farm, and this time it became infinitely more intense, and the message was infinitely stronger than before, and I immediately rang Doctor Geerling and told him it was back, and he asked me to keep in continual touch with him, whenever I needed, at any hour of the day or night.

It was during this episode that the auditory hallucinations referred to occurred, and it was continuous hallucinations, more strong at night than during the day. It was continuous for twenty four hours. The same sense of mission to give South Africa a particular message became stronger and stronger, and I still took no action, and it slowly became higher and higher, and I still took no action. I was busy at the time, I think, reorganising things with my sweet factory and other matters, and tried to keep this in the background, but it remained. And then it rose higher, to a degree where Doctor Hurst refers to feeling disembodied. At that stage Doctor Geerling advised me to come to Tara and injections and Sanitoria followed, as has been explained in detail. Personally, I think the violence etcetera had quite a lot to do with the injections, which were ineffective. That is an opinion.

Then again after my discharge a period elapsed, and then once more the exact same euphoria returned with the identical message to be given to South Africa. And the third time I thought: "This cannot be! Something has got to be done," though I was still without a forum, I was still without any means of conveying it, and no explanation of how to convey it was given. So that was the reason why I decided to try to form a coalition Government, and which you have heard, was not successful. After this ceased, the euphoria also died back to normal and the intense sense of mission also left me at that time.

I then tried to continue in a normal way of life as usual but this I found impossible because I began to lose interest in all those things in which I had been fascinated before, my herd, my work, even my wife and family, and periods of depression became more and more acute. Therefore I came up from the Cape to a Sanatoria and even had an E.C.T. on the occasion of one of the depressions, it was so severe. I then developed an urticarial which I could not cure until I cleared out of South Africa. It then got better within forty eight hours and it never recurred. My wife suggested that we move to Europe but I had too many obligations, and all my interests and my love was in South Africa, which I consider to be the finest country I know. I know of no better.

Well, I sold my herd, which was one of the leading herds in the country, and then we went to Europe. We looked around but there was no country other than South Africa which I wished to live, so I refused to consider the thing. I was however, prepared to consider moving to the Cape, which was still South Africa. I therefore came back and purchased the farm 'Old Sillery' in Constantia.

At this time, I had left my wife and children in Holland. She had also been, obviously, very perturbed over the depression into which I had come, though this was not very much distressed. On my return to Europe to bring them back, there were attempts to introduce me into a Roman Catholic way of life and I was taken to Lourdes, but instead of doing there what I should have done I suppose, I went off to a bull fight instead. Later I returned to South Africa, leaving my wife and family to return in December. To my amazement, I received a telegram just before they should have sailed stating that, on psychological advice, they were staying there, and they have remained there since, apart from a short visit here a little while ago.

It was then following this I felt my depressions growing deeper and deeper, because I had a personal guilt in my mind for everything that was going wrong in South Africa.

Because, I had not given this message as I was meant to give it, these things would not have gone wrong if that message had been taken, and who was I to say the message would not have been taken? I only know that I didn't give it, and the troubles that I felt would follow, did follow, and followed increasingly. The sense of guilt brought my depression to a stage where I felt, periodically that life was no longer worth living, and as you know from certain exhibits here, the basic reason behind the three suicidal attempts -- I think they have been put in -- if I am being truth, I don't know.

(According to the *Daily Dispatch*, at this point Pratt paused and looked round the court, smiling broadly, before going on).⁷⁵³⁰

On each occasion something unexpected occurred at the last moment, just as I was ready to prevent it, and after it had happened three times, the conviction grew in me that I wasn't going to be allowed to commit suicide; that whether I am off to another country, that whether I tried to commit suicide, whatever I tried to do, the sense of guilt would remain until the message I had been told to give was given.

Then I went to Europe last year and returned to South Africa just after Mr. Macmillan left - we passed his boat - and I arrived in Cape Town as Cape Town was still busy discussing his speech. I had left a booming Europe, I had left a progressive Europe, and I had been defending South Africa on the boat coming back and describing to my fellow passengers that a lot of what they were going to see was a lot of 'hooey' and false press publicity.

On my arrival in Cape Town, I was horrified at the disintegration that had taken place in South Africa during the period I had been away, the sense of hopelessness on people's faces, the apathy, or alternatively, selling up, packing up and clearing out, which is no answer. Simultaneously, the Press were full of riots, details of which I need not go into.

I came up to the Transvaal to my farm. If you will all cast your minds back to March of last year, the position was intense and acute to a fantastic degree throughout South Africa. In the area in which I was living, Magaliesburg, was not completely free from isolated incidents, apart from the major quarrels.

I ran away to the South Coast, as Mrs. Spiller has told you. I was down there for a few days, and she was worried about me...I was more worried about South Africa than she was worried about me. Then I returned, for I had difficulties with my manganese company factory

⁷⁵³⁰ *Daily Dispatch*, 14 September 1960: 11, 'Pratt tells his own story.'

and other things, which had to be attended to, for it had been my intention to return to London, not to live, but to continue this psychoanalytic treatment which I had been taking. Unfortunately, I could not get away, partly because of my own business difficulties, but mainly because of the situation in South Africa, and it gripped me internally to a point in which I felt too clear: Now what can be done? It was then also, that I very nearly did my last suicide attempt, which Father Orsmond talked me out of.

Then the Emergency Regulations were passed and I felt - for nearly twelve years or more the vote in South Africa has really meant less and less - at least one could speak and at least one could write, and now that has stopped, and what is there left to stop the bottle bursting? On a Thursday, I am sure it was a Thursday, I passed a pickup van loaded with detained prisoners. Then I saw another van being loaded with women prisoners. When I passed the detainees, I think I was with Mr. Zulman of the Durban Confectionery and the impression upon me became even more intense, coupled with the feeling of guilt for not carrying out what I should have done in 1954.”

(According to the *Daily Dispatch*, at the reference to detainees being loaded into lorries, Susan Pratt bit her lower lip, apparently fighting back tears.⁷⁵³¹)

It is true I had occasion to be carrying a gun during this period because a lot of people were carrying guns. Nevertheless, I had not had a gun with me on Friday, and on Saturday, when I went to the Showgrounds with my manager (two young boys were staying with me, had come up for the weekend) I slipped a revolver in my pocket. I normally took it, always, if I was going to be very late back. There was no definite intention of being back late on the Saturday and I cannot really say why it was slipped then into my pocket except that I certainly had no fixed intention of shooting the Prime Minister. It was only a few hours before I knew he was going to speak, anyway, and, of course, I had been carrying one on odd days. Nevertheless, I felt I had to take my revolver and I took it and I have thought for five months: “Why did you have to take your revolver on Saturday?” and I cannot get an exact answer to that.

At the Showgrounds I left my companions at the cattle exhibit and went along to the ring and watched the jumping. From that section you have heard everything described very vividly and many witnesses have been through it, and I think it is unnecessary for me to go

⁷⁵³¹ *Daily Dispatch*, 14 September 1960: 1, ‘David Pratt tells his story.’

through it again, expect to say that I felt this violent urge to shoot “apartheid,” the stinking monster of apartheid that was gripping the throat of South Africa and preventing South Africa from achieving her rightful place amongst nations. But I did not fully associate that with the Prime Minister.

I got into the cattle ring - they were judging the Gold Cup at the time - to talk to some friends, and while there I remembered an accident that had taken place, years ago, to me, while clipping an animal, in which my whole cheek was smashed in and I was laid up for some time. And the thought that if I hit the Prime Minister on the identical spot and maimed him for the same period of time that I was maimed, it would at least give him an opportunity to reconsider some of the things that had been taking place.

It was sufficient, this feeling, to deaden my anti-assassination feelings against the urge to shoot and on that I went up and shot. And that, really, is all there is to it.

I then stood and waited for something to happen. The seconds, however long they were, seemed like an hour. If it had been my intention to kill him, I could have emptied every bullet in the chamber immediately into his head. There were five or six bullets, I think. The second bullet, which penetrated here (indicating) occurred when my arm was jerked and that, I think, was the more severe of the two injuries.

From the time I was taken away I started feeling an immense feeling of release, and irrespective of what happened to me this afternoon, the bruises meant nothing. The arguments, the discussions were nothing at all. All I was concerned with was there was release from tension that had been building up more, and more, and more heavily from 1954 to 1960.

When eventually I was finished with the police and the psychiatrists and the doctors, when I came to the cell, I had a couple of blankets, not even a mattress on that first night or a pillow, but I had the best night's sleep I had had for six years, a wonderful night! From that period until now, with the break of course for the preliminary examination, the preliminary hearing on July the 20th, for I think, two days, I have spent my time in an isolation cell, in a cell by myself with limited exercise (for me) - half an hour in the morning and a half an in the afternoon. Occasionally, a few months ago, I used to get special times to sit in the sun, but on the whole it has been five months of isolation under conditions which I had never experienced in my life before.

But I can say, as I do - I am under oath - that those last five months have been one hundred times happier than those last five years, irrespective of the travail, the scheme, the what have you, and there is no doubt that the only thing worth having is freedom of mind - the freedom of body doesn't matter a damn! If you live under guilt you are never free. If you know you must do something that you do not do, you are not free, and freedom is the only thing worth fighting for. "Only" is perhaps not the word, but is the first thing of which one must fight. But freedom is a dangerous liquor, very heady, and if drunk in excess leaves complete chaos, and it is because it is worth so much that it is so heady and must be taken in very tiny doses until one gets used to it, until one accustoms oneself to something one has not tasted. It is useless to cry for the moon when you can't even fly up to the first branch of a tree, but these are matters on which I will not philosophise on now. All I know is that from April the 9th to September the 15th has been the most wonderful experience of life and I will not exchange it for anything.

Then the Prime Minister got well. Doctor Snyman's report has not been put in as yet, but I have seen it. And to me, his recovery reads, virtually, as a miracle. I don't know what Doctor Snyman has to say or what the Prime Minister has to say, but he is a very, very lucky man, and I regard his recovery virtually as a miracle. Because it all fits into the pattern that has existed from 1954 until now.

I was told to speak, I was told I could not speak, I answered I cannot speak, I have nowhere to speak from. I was told...I must not say 'I was told.' I mean I felt that I had to do something and I tried, therefore, a coalition Government. That did not succeed. Then I ran from corner to corner trying to evade what was still in my mind, and getting a more and more intense feeling.

Then, after the shooting of the Prime Minister and his recovery I have the box in which I can speak to you, and I can tell you now what I should have told you in 1954. And everything from now, looking back to 1954 in retrospect, to me, fits into a pattern, and though it has taken me years to accept that pattern, today I accept it with deep humility, that I am allowed to say what I myself am convinced is the message for South Africa.

I don't say it of my own accord, and I don't say it as David Pratt, I say it as a message for every South African, Afrikaner, English South African, Coloured, Indian, Bantu, Malay. Every person in South Africa has got to play his part if we are to build the South Africa that I knew can be built. When I say 'I' you will appreciate that it is the 'I' of the 'I feel' that I refer

to. 'South Africa has got to come out of her wilderness' was the first message I felt in 1954. She has got to take her rightful place in the community of nations and in particular the continent of Africa. She is the finest country in this continent and there is no better in the world and she is capable of doing it, and she can do it, and she has a great and glorious future, a glittering future waiting for her as long as she observes the basic laws of God and human dignity, which of course, means, in the words, I think, of Macmillan at the time, 'Rule by merit and not pigment of skin.'"

(At this point, according to the *Rand Daily Mail*, Pratt showed signs of emotion when he threw up his arms and spoke.⁷⁵³²)

South Africa has to throw off the slimy snake apartheid which is gripping its throat. Practical apartheid, obviously, cannot go immediately. The principle of apartheid has to be flung off, and then it is out, and then it is up to the coloured section of the population how rapidly the practical section is put into effect. As I have said, it depends upon their capability of taking very heady alcohol.

Secondly, she has to stop her policy of world isolation which will carry her into the depths of the wilderness and never to the Promised Land. It is time for her to wake and to realise the future that is in front of her, to realise as I now do, after six years of watching the pattern taking place. I realise what can take place in this country and what will take place - of this there is no question - once the simple initial plunge is taken and nationalism is thrown out!

Your future lies before you. If you are worthy of it - this I say to the people of South Africa - you take it. If you are not worthy of it, well, at least I shall never feel guilty again. Thank you, my lord, that is all I have to say this afternoon."

During Pratt's oration, Judge Rumpff had mostly stared at the papers in front of him. When Pratt finished, he turned to the prosecutor and said, "Mr Rein, you don't want to ask any questions, do you?"⁷⁵³³ At the same time, Leslie Lawrence from Pratt's team, looked at

⁷⁵³² Maisels, 1998: 105.

⁷⁵³³ Maisels, 1998: 105-106.

Maisels and his other colleagues and said, "This doesn't appear to be a man who is insane, who could be so eloquent and so clear on his facts."⁷⁵³⁴

Despite Pratt's speech, Maisels then stated that on the strength of the evidence, he wished to apply to have Pratt committed to a mental institution at the Governor-General's pleasure, but he understood that the Crown was going to apply for him to be sent to such an institution for observation. He had no wish to oppose the Crown's application, he said, since it could be in the interests of his client. Judge Rumpff said, "On the information put before me, I have reason to think that the accused may be mentally disordered and if that is so, the application must be granted, and I direct therefore that an inquiry be held in terms of the Act. I feel inclined to send him for observation for a period of, say, 14 days." The judge ordered that Pratt be committed to the Weskoppies mental institution for the period of observation. He then adjourned the hearing until September 26.⁷⁵³⁵

COMMENTS ON PRATT'S SPEECH

Pratt's speech stunned its listeners. His counsel had advised that he should not "speak up for freedom" in court because it could harm his case. Pratt did in fact mention freedom and later said he wished he had said even more.⁷⁵³⁶ The crowded court appeared transfixed as Pratt, supposedly a mentally disordered man, spoke coherently, indeed elegantly, about the national situation and his personal reactions to it. Noel Spiller, though well aware of Pratt's sanity, nevertheless characterised the speech as a "wonderful address."⁷⁵³⁷

However, when Judge Rumpff referred to Pratt's intervention two weeks later, at the conclusion of the trial, he said, "I do not wish to deal in detail with the speech Pratt made when he gave evidence. The manner in which he made his speech, his demeanour and the explanation of his motives for the attack on the prime minister give one the impression that the balance of his mind has been affected."⁷⁵³⁸ Judge Rumpff's statement suggests that either

⁷⁵³⁴ Leslie Lawrence in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵³⁵ Judge Rumpff's Judgement in *Regina vs David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁵³⁶ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Prof. Lamont's psychiatric report on David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁵³⁷ Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵³⁸ Judge Rumpff's Judgement in *Regina vs David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

he had a closed mind with regard to Pratt's arguments or he had no idea what was happening in South Africa at the time.

Pratt's speech, as his advocate Lawrence immediately pointed out, was both eloquent and clear on the facts. On paper, it reads like the political manifesto of a man, who, like Demetrio Tsafendas, has strong political convictions and is determined to bring change to South Africa without consideration of the cost to himself. Speaking boldly but realistically, Pratt is saying that *all* South Africans should play a part in the future of South Africa. He talks about freedom which he clearly longs for and the necessity to end apartheid and nationalism, and he concludes by quoting Harold Macmillan's advice that South Africa should be ruled "by merit and not pigment of skin." Were these the words of a mad man?

Pratt also explains his medical condition and states correctly that being epileptic is not the same as being mentally disordered or abnormal. As for his euphoric phases, these were caused by his medication, something he could have explained better.

It seems clear from Pratt's impassioned delivery that he is a man "deeply concerned about justice and poverty," as Fr. Orsmond characterised him, that he feels guilty about apartheid, cannot pretend it does not exist and feels he must do something about it. He demonstrates his determination to fight the racial system by joining the South African and the British Liberal parties, by trying to form a coalition to defeat the ruling National Party and by publicly urging the British to boycott South African goods. When he concludes that he has not achieved anything really meaningful, his depression and guilt grow stronger.

Pratt said, "If you live under guilt, you are never free. If you know you must do something that you do not do, you are not free, and freedom is the only thing worth fighting for." Could such moral self-awareness come from the mind of a deluded man? Every decent White South African at the time of apartheid who was not fighting it outright would have felt the way Pratt did. It was the natural emotion of a concerned and compassionate man who believed that all men should enjoy justice and equality.

Pratt then talks jubilantly about the months since the shooting being the happiest in his life. Why? Because he got rid of the guilt he suffered through inaction by finally doing something for freedom. It should be noted here that Pratt became something of a hero among some anti-apartheid activists who loved to quote him saying, "If you know you must do

something, and you don't do it, you are not free." His attack on the person he considered "the epitome of apartheid" had evidently set him free.⁷⁵³⁹

The incident he mentioned in his speech, of seeing prisoners, including women, being bundled into police vans, had a profound effect on him, as had the Sharpeville massacre, leading in both cases to depression, but also to anger.⁷⁵⁴⁰ It is fair to assume that a great many men would have been similarly affected by such sights and eager to react. Pratt had the courage to do so.

In his address to the court, Pratt made it plain that it was the sight of those men and women being taken away that convinced him the time had come to act. It was also the conclusion of years of watching deterioration in South African society. As he wrote in his letter to Dr. Verwoerd, he became depressed seeing "the hopelessness in faces, the fear to talk," and the decisions by the weaker ones to leave.⁷⁵⁴¹ This was no delusion or megalomaniac dream; these were the facts that finally persuaded Pratt to act.

As for the "message" he says he received in 1954 and how it constantly recurred, that is something that will be discussed in detail shortly. However, it should be stated here that it was not this vision or hallucination that turned him into an enemy of apartheid. He was already deeply antipathetic to the ruling system. Professor of Psychology Alban Burke stated, "The human brain does not create new information out of nothing." The urge to do something against apartheid pre-existed.⁷⁵⁴²

Pratt's speech is one of the most honest and courageous political statements made in a court in South Africa during the era of apartheid. It should be taught in history lessons in schools around the world. British-South African actor and playwright Sir Antony Sher described Pratt as "a very intelligent, very eloquent and clearly politically motivated man trying to kill Dr. Verwoerd for really clear reasons. At his trial he made an amazing speech, which is heart-rending because he really believed that he was trying to do good for South Africa."⁷⁵⁴³

⁷⁵³⁹ Du Preez, 2008: 167.

⁷⁵⁴⁰ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁵⁴¹ Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate.* 1999.

⁷⁵⁴² Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 4 April 2016.

⁷⁵⁴³ Unsworth (*Sunday Times*), 21 September 2003, 'A play about assassination, a tapeworm and notions of madness.'

COMMENTS ON THE INQUIRY INTO PRATT'S MENTAL HEALTH

None of the defence witnesses testified that Pratt was mad. Dr. Chesler argued that he was unable to look after his affairs, but that was based on a diagnosis two years earlier, and the doctor declined to comment on Pratt's current condition. He even admitted that his diagnosis could have been wrong. Spiller and Radsma, who knew Pratt very well, both rejected Dr. Chesler's opinion as to Pratt's capabilities. Radsma claimed that all the defence witnesses exaggerated Pratt's condition and various incidents involving him in order to help him. The author cannot know whether this applied to Dr. Chesler or any other doctor, as Radsma was talking about Pratt's friends, but it is certainly possible that the doctors did something similar.

Fr. Orsmond, Radsma and Spiller stated flatly after the trial that Pratt was perfectly sane. Radsma and Spiller said many defence witnesses found themselves in a difficult position because they were asked to support the insanity plea, but would have had to lie to do so. According to Radsma, they exaggerated and embroidered some incidents in an effort to support the insanity plea, since they could not bring themselves to lie.

None of the witnesses referred to Pratt's political ideas or his hatred of Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid. Only the fact that he had attempted to form a coalition was mentioned, but this was already known to the doctors who had examined him.

An important issue in Pratt's life which received little serious attention at the inquiry was his euphoria. None of those who mentioned it, including the doctors, explained the episodes sufficiently clearly for a lay listener to understand what was going on, although Prof. Hurst testified that Pratt's medication for the epilepsy "might have been responsible for some aspects of his mental state." Perhaps this avoidance was intentional. However, no-one claimed that Pratt was schizophrenic or psychotic because of the euphoria, probably because they were aware that his condition was a side-effect of his medication.

PRATT'S INTERRUPTIONS IN THE COURT

The following exchange took place between Rein and Prof. Hurst regarding Pratt's interruptions in the Court:

REIN: The interruptions of Mr. Pratt that we have had yesterday and today, were they calm and collected interruptions?

HURST: They were calm. My own opinion is that they showed lack of judgment in not leaving these matters to counsel at the particular time. My knowledge, limited as it is of legal procedure, makes me question his judgment in not leaving his defence to counsel.

REIN: They were calm?

HURST: Yes they were calm.

REIN: Relevant?

HURST: I can't judge that really.

REIN: They were not irrelevant, were they? They had to do with the subject matter that was being discussed at the time?

HURST: For all that, the context strongly suggests that the megalomania of which I had first-hand evidence on that night is still present.

REIN: Do you regard these interruptions as a manifestation of his megalomania?

HURST: I think that is probable.⁷⁵⁴⁴

Pratt's interruptions seem to be the natural reactions of a man who hears things about himself which are not true and is eager to correct them. All of his reactions were relevant to the matters under consideration, demonstrating that he was able to follow the course of the proceedings and comment appropriately. Interrupting court proceedings is certainly not a recommended course of action but it tends to happen when a defendant or witness wishes to correct or explain a statement or situation, and it certainly does not mean that the person concerned is mentally disordered.

Pratt's interventions were controlled and polite, each time in order to set the record straight. As for being manifestations of his megalomania, as Prof. Hurst suggested, this seems seriously overstated. If a man believes himself to be misrepresented and misunderstood, it seems perfectly reasonable that he should step in to clear his name. He may be impulsive and excited but as in Pratt's case, this was a very long way from megalomania. A final point: Pratt was alert and ready to make an intervention because he knew that his lawyers would do nothing about any misrepresentations for fear they contradicted the defence line.

⁷⁵⁴⁴ Prof. Hurst's testimony in the Enquiry regarding the mental condition of David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

PRATT WANTING TO GIVE AWAY HIS POSSESSIONS

Robert Charter and Dr. Chesler testified that Pratt wanted to give away all his possessions so as to find peace of mind. According to Radsma, who, as Pratt's secretary was privy to much of his thinking, that was only half of the story. She said Pratt did not intend to give away everything he owned, he planned to divest himself of his business, his properties and a large amount of his bank deposits. However, he intended to keep enough in the bank so that he could live without having to work. Radsma said Pratt had two reasons for this proposed action. One was that he felt he would have no peace of mind as long as he had so many responsibilities and while he suffered from epilepsy and occasional depression. The other was that he felt enormous guilt that he had all these comforts while so many people were poor and starving.⁷⁵⁴⁵ Doreen Billson, Pratt's former girlfriend, said the same thing as Radsma: that Pratt told her he wanted to get rid of all his businesses and settle in a quiet cottage in England, away from all the responsibilities, so as to find peace of mind.⁷⁵⁴⁶

That Pratt wanted to give away his possessions was not the thinking of a madman, but reflected the scruples of a man of high morals who was sensitive to the sufferings of others. The sanity of the Christian apostles who gave up everything to follow Jesus is not questioned and two thousand years later, the same thing is still happening. There are numerous examples of people surrendering their wealth in order to get away from their responsibilities and find peace of mind. For example, in 2010, Austrian millionaire Karl Rabeder gave away his £3 million fortune when he realised that his riches were making him miserable.⁷⁵⁴⁷ Liu Jingchong, a Chinese multi-millionaire, gave away his fortune and became a monk.⁷⁵⁴⁸ Brian Burnie, a British multi-millionaire, divested himself of his possession in 2014 as his wife was recovering from cancer.⁷⁵⁴⁹

⁷⁵⁴⁵ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁵⁴⁶ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷⁵⁴⁷ Samuel (*The Telegraph*), 8 February 2010, 'Multimillionaire gives away fortune that made him miserable.' Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/austria/7190750/Millionaire-gives-away-fortune-that-made-him-miserable.html>

⁷⁵⁴⁸ Malm (*The Daily Mail*) 10 August 2015, 'Millionaire businessman gives up his possessions to become a Buddhist monk in China after living in isolation for two years.' Retrieved from: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3192464/Millionaire-businessman-gives-possessions-Buddhist-monk-China-living-isolation-two-years.html>

⁷⁵⁴⁹ Aldridge (*The Mirror*), 20 September 2014, 'The multimillionaire who gave away £16M ...' Retrieved from: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/multi-millionaire-who-gave-away-16m-4296584>

In Frank Capra's 1936 movie, *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town*, the hero, Mr. Deeds, begins to give away his fortune to the poor. His relatives and Trust members take him to court to seek a ruling that he is mentally disordered, as any man must be who gives away a fortune. Deeds proves he is perfectly sane and proceeds to dispose of his assets as he wishes. Although fiction, the story carries echoes of Pratt's case, where wanting to give away your possessions is wrongly assumed to be a sign of insanity.

PRATT IN COURT AGAIN

Pratt reappeared in the Supreme Court in Pretoria, on Monday, September 26, 1960. The only witness was the State-appointed psychiatrist, Professor Austin Lamont, Physician Superintendent of Weskoppies Mental State Hospital and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pretoria, who had observed Pratt in the hospital from September 13. The Professor had also scrutinised his medical records and spoken to five people who knew Pratt to hear opinions about him. To get a broader picture, he interviewed people who had different relationships with him. They were: two relatives, a secretary, Pratt's former general practitioner and Fr. Orsmond.⁷⁵⁵⁰ Prof. Lamont stated that in his opinion Pratt was "mentally disordered and an epileptic," as well as a danger to himself and others.⁷⁵⁵¹ At these proceedings, Pratt appeared tense in a way that he did not at previous appearances.⁷⁵⁵²

PROF. LAMONT'S PSYCHIATRIC REPORT ON PRATT⁷⁵⁵³

Professor Lamont observed Pratt from September 13 to 25. He kept a detailed diary of Pratt's activities, responses to his questions and his general behaviour and attitude. He read his report to the court:

PRATT'S BEHAVIOUR

Prof. Lamont said Pratt was "extremely polite and co-operative and his mood was one of euphoria, combined with ecstasy. He appeared to have no anxiety regarding his predicament. He exercised enthusiastically while at Weskoppies and showered afterwards, in a manner not expected of a man of his age (fifty). Pratt answered questions readily, showing no anxiety. He explained his relaxation as marking the completion of what he described as a "six-year pattern." While in this euphoric state, he read passages from a diary kept during the latter part of his time awaiting trial. Pratt admitted to experiencing mood swings during the past six

⁷⁵⁵⁰ Prof. Lamont's report about David Pratt: Accused reaction to information gleaned from documents, friends, relatives and employees in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁵⁵¹ Prof. Lamont's psychiatric report on David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960, *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁵⁵² *Daily Dispatch*, 27 September 1960: 1, 'No trial for David Pratt.'

⁷⁵⁵³ All the parts of Prof. Lamont's testimony are taken from Prof. Lamont's psychiatric report on David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960, *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA, unless referenced otherwise.

years. He ended his first interview with Prof. Lamont in a highly emotional vein, saying, "No hard feelings."

JUDAS

Prof. Lamont read out a reference in Pratt's diary to Dr. Verwoerd's recovery as being analogous to Christ's Resurrection and to seeing himself in the role of his betrayer, Judas Iscariot. Pratt claimed to have a "sneaking regard" for Judas in view of his important contribution to Christianity.

COMMENTS ON PROF. LAMONT'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

Pratt's reference to Judas was an apt one, clearly relevant to his situation. He knew that just as Judas betrayed Christ, he, Pratt, was seen by most white South Africans as betraying his country. His experience in prison and in the hospital left him in no doubt that he was widely seen as a traitor. South Africa's Whites found it difficult to accept that "one of them," especially someone so wealthy and privileged, would shoot the man they worshipped. There was even widespread speculation that Pratt could be charged with treason.⁷⁵⁵⁴

THE EPILEPTIC ATTACK

On September 20, a week into his observation period, a male nurse witnessed Pratt suffering from an attack of *le grand mal*. Prof. Lamont arrived fifteen minutes later and found Pratt still seriously confused. "He could not say where he was and could not say who I was. Twenty minutes later, he remembered my name with difficulty, saying that I was the doctor who was going to operate on him." Pratt was surprised when Prof. Lamont told him later that he had had a fit.

⁷⁵⁵⁴ Prof. Lamont's psychiatric report on David Beresford Pratt in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA; *Daily Dispatch*, 11 April 1960: 1, 'Could be charged with treason'; *Daily Mail*, 27 September 1960: 7, 'Pratt's Daughter Sees Him Sent to Jail.'

COMMENTS ON PROF. LAMONT'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

According to Susan Pratt, the defence team deliberately withheld Pratt's anti-epilepsy medication to prove that he was epileptic and mentally disordered. It was this, she said, which caused him to have that seizure.⁷⁵⁵⁵ Of course that does not mean that Pratt could not have had an epileptic fit anyway, but clearly on this occasion, denying him his medication played a role.

PRATT'S SUSPICION ABOUT THE STAFF

Pratt told Prof. Lamont that he was suspicious of the male nursing staff, who he named "warders." He was peevish and provocative with them and once asked a nurse to taste his tea to see if it was poisoned. Prof. Lamont said:

"He became very sarcastic towards the nurses and myself. The whole day he harangued us, saying 'the whole set-up is phoney from top to bottom.' He was fidgety and interfered with everybody and everything in sight and said his telephone calls were being obstructed as part of a 'frame-up.' He refused to sign for petty cash and grabbed one of the patients he was with in a manner inviting retaliation and seemed oblivious to any danger.

He was seen interfering with another patient who was completely inaccessible (mentally) and ignored warnings. That night, he remained in this provocative mood and the next morning threatened two senior nurses with violence. He said, 'Everybody seems to be pulling my leg. It is a sort of exaggeration of my wife's behaviour from 1957 onwards.' He concluded that his wife had 'some sort of hand in this set-up.'"

Two days later, the Professor found Pratt calm and amenable. He admitted that his wife could have had no possible influence on the hospital staff, but then said impulsively, "My wife needs a good hiding."

COMMENTS ON PROF. LAMONT'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

What is surprising about this part of Prof. Lamont's report is that he makes Pratt's apprehensions appear abnormal, when they were perfectly understandable. Pratt had just shot a Prime Minister who was deified by most White South Africans. He was widely hated and

⁷⁵⁵⁵ Susan Pratt in a personal interview, 2 May 2015.

perceived as a traitor, while the possibility that he might escape hanging had added to the public anger. Pratt had every reason to fear that he might be poisoned or end up “committing suicide,” as he well knew had happened to others who were in custody. Far from being paranoid, his suspicions while in the hands of a brutal regime seem entirely justified. Pratt was also aware that his defence team and the State, for different reasons, wanted to find him mentally disordered. It seems entirely natural that someone in Pratt’s position would have been suspicious of those around him.

PRATT’S TATTOO

Prof. Lamont commented on a tattoo which a fellow prisoner had designed on Pratt’s right forearm while he was awaiting trial. This consisted of crossed swords with the dates 9.4.60 and 12.9.60 above and below and the letters V and P. Pratt explained that the dates spelled out the period of his incarceration, the V stood for Dr. Verwoerd and P for Pratt. According to Prof. Lamont, the emotional tone in which Pratt chatted about his tattoo was out of keeping with what one would expect from an individual of his educational and social background.

OTHER ISSUES

- When the professor noticed blisters on Pratt’s right foot, Pratt explained that they were caused by running in prison shoes without socks. On the second day in Weskoppies, Pratt complained that the hospital clothing hampered his running exercises.
- Pratt expressed resentment at the publicity given to Professor Hurst’s findings about him because he considered they would be detrimental to his family’s welfare.
- Prof. Lamont revealed that Pratt had once written to the Queen of England complaining about a charge of 2s. 6d. for admission to St. George’s Chapel at Windsor Castle.
- The professor also mentioned something that had been reported by the British press, but not in South Africa, that Pratt had become involved in a political campaign in London and had spoken at Hyde Park on behalf of the Liberal Party. However, there was no mention of his anti-apartheid activities while in England, although it is possible that Pratt did not mention them.

Prof. Lamont’s report also said:

“Throughout the whole period of observation, the undercurrent of grandiose delusional trend, exemplified by his saviour/martyr role, remained fixed. He refused even to consider the possibility that euphoria and depression can be abnormal psychic phenomena associated with epilepsy. And he insists that his rationalisations in terms of religious and political topics are real and meaningful. The suspicion, peevishness and egocentricity shown from the second day onwards, are typical of the so-called ‘epileptic temperament.’ These attributes, together with his impulsiveness and moodiness, could lead to unpredictable behaviour, which would strain business and domestic associations because they are, in my opinion, an attempt to cope with his environment at a psychotic level.

During recent years, the history suggests an eccentric preoccupation with religious and political topics. The abnormal electroencephalographic findings give a clue to the underlying brain abnormality, the highest expression of which is the epileptic seizure. In this case, in my opinion, it is not possible to exclude the possibility that the periodic behavioural disturbances are associated with minor exacerbations of brain abnormality. In my opinion, the findings during the period of observation clearly categorise him as mentally disordered and epileptic.”

Prof. Lamont’s conclusion was, “In my opinion, the findings clearly show him as mentally disordered and an epileptic.” He added that Pratt’s indifference to his predicament, his compelling preoccupation with exercise and his behaviour throughout were consistent with the behaviour of a person suffering from epilepsy, and the undercurrent of grandiose delusions further supported this. His tendency to minimise his trouble was an indication he was completely out of touch with reality. Summing up all the evidence, observations and findings of others, Prof. Lamont said that his only finding was that Pratt was mentally disordered and that he was an epileptic within the meaning of the Mental Disorders Act.

ESPECIALLY CHOSEN

Prof. Lamont said that on September 19, Pratt appeared before a medical conference, when he stated that he was “especially chosen to save South Africa.” He said that the shooting of Dr. Verwoerd was the culmination of a pattern which had started in 1954, but he now felt that the statement he had made in the Supreme Court on September 13 was in fact the climax. He said that he had written to Dr. Verwoerd but had no reply, adding that all this publicity could have been avoided if he and Dr. Verwoerd had a chat. Pratt said he fully expected to be killed

or executed, adding that to be sent to a mental hospital for life would be equal to the death sentence.

COMMENTS ON PROF. LAMONT'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

According to Prof. Lamont, Pratt saw himself as the chosen saviour of the country. If this was a delusion, the fact that he despised apartheid and considered that the country needed to be rescued from it was no delusion. He had long thought in those terms, independent of any euphoria or hallucinations. Professor Alban Burke stated that, "the human brain does not create new information out of nothing." In other words, Pratt had long determined to act on his beliefs and if he received or thought he received a "message," that was simply the trigger. Nobody wakes up one day and decides out of the blue that he is going to fight apartheid; the idea already exists in his mind, but some word or action or thought might well trigger the execution of this idea.⁷⁵⁵⁶ We should remember that Pratt's euphoria and delusions were caused by his medication, without which he was perfectly normal.

Some of Pratt's comments at the medical conference do not fit his character and it seems likely that he spoke as he did to support the insanity plea at his daughter's request. According to Elizabeth Radsma, Pratt would never have described himself as the saviour of the country because he was a modest man; if he did make that remark, she believed it was a deliberate lie intended to support the insanity plea which his daughter Susan was begging him to accept.⁷⁵⁵⁷ Desmond Blow told the author that Pratt never saw himself as a "saviour" of South Africa. Rather than a national saviour, Blow saw Pratt as "a brave idealist."⁷⁵⁵⁸ Blow also always maintained that Pratt was "very sane" and that he had a "brilliant mind."⁷⁵⁵⁹

There are two other issues which cast doubt on Prof. Lamont's diagnosis and which support Radsma's claim. According to the doctor, Pratt's delusions and the belief that he had to do something against apartheid started in 1954. However, Pratt was opposed to apartheid long before that. He became a member of the British Liberal Party in the early 1950s and a member of the South African Liberal Party in 1953. Both parties were strongly against apartheid. What is more, he built homes and a school for the Black families working on his

⁷⁵⁵⁶ Professor Alban Burke in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁷⁵⁵⁷ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁵⁵⁸ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁵⁵⁹ Elizabeth Blow, in a personal interview, 26 October 2017; Graham David Blow in a personal interview, 22 October 2017.

farm and gave shelter to other penniless Blacks in the area, also before 1954. This is the caring man he was, defying apartheid, before 1954 and before the euphoria started.

The second issue was Prof Lamont's belief that Pratt considered himself to be chosen by God to save South Africa and that this pointed to his being insane. Let us accept for the sake of argument that Pratt really believed he was "chosen." Wasn't this exactly the same thing Dr. Verwoerd believed of himself? As we have seen, Dr. Verwoerd, and even many of his followers, interpreted his survival as proof that he was chosen by God to fulfil his mission in South Africa. However, no-one ever questioned the sanity of Dr. Verwoerd or his followers, although their claims were exactly the same as Pratt's. Did Prof. Lamont believe that Dr. Verwoerd and his followers were perfectly sane in believing Dr. Verwoerd was called by God, but Pratt was insane for believing the same thing about himself?

Furthermore, it may be added that the evidence that Pratt believed himself to be chosen by God seems insubstantial – a reported remark at a medical conference which may have been intended to support his insanity plea. Elizabeth Radsma and Desmond Blow told the author that Pratt never said anything like this to them nor behaved in such a way and they found it "hard to believe" that their friend really believed such a proposition.⁷⁵⁶⁰

SAVIOUR/MARTYR ROLE

Like Prof. Hurst, Professor Lamont stated that Pratt saw himself in the saviour/martyr role. The diagnosis has been discussed earlier in this chapter in Prof. Hurst's testimony, so it will not be discussed here again as the same arguments apply, but its inaccuracy should be remembered and mentioned again.

THE ASSAULT

Pratt told Prof. Lamont that the shooting resulted in an utter release of tension followed by a sense of complete tranquillity. It marked the culmination of six years of depression and a guilt complex from which he suffered due to "failing to speak up for freedom, regardless of the consequences." Prof. Lamont said Pratt showed no remorse whatsoever about the assault

⁷⁵⁶⁰ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

and told him with “fanatical conviction” that it would have been an even greater crime had he not obeyed “the strong inner feeling to act for freedom.”⁷⁵⁶¹

COMMENTS ON PROF. LAMONT'S ABOVE TESTIMONY

Pratt's comment about his “strong inner feeling to act for freedom” is highly important. It shows that he believed he did the right thing in shooting Dr. Verwoerd and that it was for freedom in South Africa, thus clearly his motive was political. It is generally accepted that people who see something evil happening and fail to act are as guilty as the perpetrators of the act. This explains Pratt's relief at no longer being such a person and his lack of remorse.

PRATT'S SPEECH IN THE COURT

Although Pratt defied his counsel's advice and spoke about freedom in South Africa and the need to end apartheid, Prof. Lamont said Pratt told him afterwards that he regretted not saying more on the subject. This is an important issue, pointing clearly to Pratt's political motivation. Desmond Blow told the author the same thing, that Pratt was unhappy at the hospital and that he had deeply regretted going along with the insanity plea; he felt that he had not defended his act as he wanted in political terms, especially during his speech in court. He told Blow that he had only taken this path for his daughter's sake after tremendous pressure from her. However, he regretted doing so when his act was misrepresented. He felt then that he had achieved nothing and had lost a significant opportunity to make a statement against apartheid. The unpleasant hospital environment only added to his unhappiness.⁷⁵⁶²

PROF. LAMONT'S CONCLUSION

Prof. Lamont conclusion was that, “In my opinion, the findings clearly show him as mentally disordered and an epileptic,” within the meaning of the Mental Disorders Act. He added that Pratt's indifference to his predicament, his compelling preoccupation with exercise and his behaviour throughout were consistent with the behaviour of a person suffering from epilepsy,

⁷⁵⁶¹ Prof. Lamont's report about David Pratt: Accused reaction to information gleaned from documents, friends, relatives and employees in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

Daily Dispatch, 27 September 1960: 3, ‘No trial for Pratt’; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, ‘Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered.’

⁷⁵⁶² Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

and the undercurrent of grandiose delusions further supported this. His tendency to minimise his trouble was an indication that he was completely out of touch with reality.⁷⁵⁶³

JUDGE RUMPF'S VERDICT⁷⁵⁶⁴

Justice Rumpff accepted Prof. Lamont's diagnosis that Pratt was mentally disordered in terms of the Mental Disorders Act and that he was an epileptic in terms of that Act. He found Pratt to be mentally disordered and committed him to the Pretoria prison to "await an indication" of Governor-General⁷⁵⁶⁵ Charles R. Swart's pleasure. He stressed that the court was concerned only with Pratt's mental condition now. "At this stage, no decision on the responsibility or mental state of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime can be made." He then read from the Mental Disorders Act: "Epilepsy is a disease of the mind. A person found to be suffering from epilepsy should not be tried, but regarded as mentally disordered." He then said, "It is not for me to disagree with the legislature."

However, there would be no question of abandoning the charge against Pratt, he pointed out, as Amendments in 1944 to the Criminal Procedure Act provided that the charge would not be deemed abandoned or withdrawn because mental disorders might prove to be temporary. It was in the interests of justice, the judge said, that Pratt be tried when – and if – his mental fitness was restored.

⁷⁵⁶³ Prof. Lamont's report about David Pratt: Accused reaction to information gleaned from documents, friends, relatives and employees in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

Daily Dispatch, 27 September 1960: 3, 'No trial for Pratt'; *The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 2, 'Judge rules Pratt is mentally disordered.'

⁷⁵⁶⁴ Judge Rumpff's Judgement in *Regina vs David Beresford Pratt*, 26 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt*. 712-60. NASA.

⁷⁵⁶⁵ A Governor General's patient is confined in a mental hospital from which he may be released if he has shown no symptoms of mental illness in the last four years of his confinement. It may be recommended to the Governor General that he be granted a conditional or unconditional release. Under a conditional release, the magistrate of the district in which he lives, instructs a district surgeon to examine the patient every quarter and makes a report (*The Cape Argus*, 26 September 1960: 1, 'Pratt will not stand trial: mentally disordered').⁷⁵⁶⁵

PRATT IN HOSPITAL

The Governor-General decided that Pratt should be kept indefinitely at the Old Fort, a mental facility for violent and criminally insane patients, which was part of the Oranje Mental Hospital in Bloemfontein. The elation that Pratt experienced with the removal of his guilt feelings remained with him, at least at the beginning of his time in the facility, and he declared that this was the happiest time of his life since 1954.

In an essay he wrote shortly after the national referendum of October 5, 1960, which made South Africa a Republic, Pratt declared, "Whatever may be the outcome of all this, I know that I have solved my guilt complex. And the last two months, with all their restrictions and isolations, etc., have been the finest and happiest I've spent since 1954." He added, "In conclusion, I believe that every thinking South African suffers from a degree of guilt. My action may be scandalous or un-South African, but South African-ism, as far as I can see, has up until now consisted of useless moaning and apathetic acceptance, or else plans to pack up and leave the country. Naturally, there are exceptions, most of whom are now in jail under the emergency regulations, or else outside the country. What happens to me is completely immaterial in relation to any help I can be to South Africa."⁷⁵⁶⁶

While at the hospital, Pratt was allowed to play bowls on Wednesday afternoons, but the best time of the day for him was between 5 p.m. when he was locked in his barred room, and 9 p.m., when the lights went out. "Then it is quiet and I can read and think," he said. Pratt spent some time playing chess with a German patient who once played the game at a high level in Berlin. Pratt was also active in improving not only his personal space but the wider surroundings. When he arrived at the Fort, there were only two lavatories for twenty-six patients, and he arranged for two additional lavatories to be built.⁷⁵⁶⁷

He also wrote fairy tales for his children back in Holland.⁷⁵⁶⁸ In a letter to Sue Charter on December 12, 1960, Pratt wrote, "I smuggled this pad into my cell tonight, having obtained it to write Georgina a fairy story for her birthday, otherwise all writing is restricted to Saturday afternoons at a communal table, in a windy yard, to the accompaniment of Springbok Radio. After this, I experienced a week of euphoria, during which I must have been a most irritating patient. I need not give any detail, but I spent 24 hours locked in my

⁷⁵⁶⁶ David Pratt's essay while in prison in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁶⁷ Blow (*Sunday Times*), 8 January 1961: 1, 3, 'Pratt: Try me for attempted murder. But Judge President rejects his plea.'

⁷⁵⁶⁸ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 3, 'Pratt wrote fairy tales in hospital.'

cell, without even the comfort of a Bible. However, I was perfectly happy, and I don't think the doctors or staff knew what to do, anyway.

After this, however, they increased my largactil to 150 grams a day, and I am getting a horrible skin irritation, but refuse to reduce. I refuse to take it. And they then inject into muscular by force. The drug drains all vitality from my body and prevents concentration. In order to write this letter tonight, I evaded taking the tablets at 4pm. This however is not easy, for they are constantly watching.”⁷⁵⁶⁹

Pratt received regular visitors, including family, friends and associates. They said Pratt was always courteous and liked offering them tea.⁷⁵⁷⁰ One of them was Doreen Billson, who said that Pratt was dreaming of the day he would be released, whereupon he planned to sail around the world.⁷⁵⁷¹

In March 1961, Pratt wrote to the National Liberal Club in London thanking them “for looking after his personal possessions.” The Club decided that his supernumerary membership should be retained by asking Mrs. Pratt, expected in London at the end of March, to pay the balance of one guinea due on the new rate of subscription. According to Mr. Michael Meadowcroft, a prominent member of the NLC and a former Liberal MP, the Club had taken a supportive view of Pratt's situation, and his membership had become supernumerary “because of his incarceration, which meant that he was not in a position to use the Club facilities.”⁷⁵⁷²

While at the hospital, Pratt received large numbers of supportive letters. They were rationed out to him at the rate of a small bundle a week. All the letters were marked with a purple censor's stamp and some had sections cut out with scissors, removing any political reference that could be construed in his favour. In one of these letters, Mrs. Rita Malan, wrote, “*You are not alone. More than half our country agrees with you. If they hang you, they will be hanging all of us.*”⁷⁵⁷³

However, life for Pratt was not always easy. Dr. Jacobson, his former psychiatrist, who visited him regularly, said Pratt was a cultured and intellectual person who found life at

⁷⁵⁶⁹ David Pratt letter to Nico Charter in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁷⁰ Blow (*Sunday Times*), 8 January 1961: 1, 'Pratt: Try me for Attempted Murder. But Judge President rejects his plea.'

⁷⁵⁷¹ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 3, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷⁵⁷² Michael Meadowcroft in a personal interview, 2 February 2017.

⁷⁵⁷³ Gray, 1993: 12-13.

the hospital depressing. He asked the authorities to release Pratt, but they indicated that he had to spend at least a year in the institution before parole could be considered.⁷⁵⁷⁴

It was not long before Pratt's feelings of elation turned to unhappiness, largely due to a lack of companionship.⁷⁵⁷⁵ Fr. Orsmond, who visited him often, said, "Once they put him inside the mental hospitals, he became a very miserable man. He couldn't take it ... I was appalled to see the way he had disintegrated."⁷⁵⁷⁶ Pratt's wife Patricia visited him from Holland, but said she could not come more often due to the children's schooling. The Commissioner for Mental Health at this stage had not replied to Pratt's plea to be moved to an institution in the Transvaal.⁷⁵⁷⁷ Desmond Blow said that Pratt had lived all his life "like a playboy" and now he had to live in a hospital, following rules and a laid-down schedule. What made his situation worse was the guilt he felt about agreeing to the insanity plea and the disappointment that his act was misunderstood.⁷⁵⁷⁸

Furthermore, some patients and a larger number of hospital employees were supporters of Dr. Verwoerd and made life difficult for Pratt on a daily basis. What particularly angered them was that he was a wealthy White man and therefore in their eyes the worst kind of traitor.⁷⁵⁷⁹ Fr. Orsmond recalled, "He did say that there were people who were against him because he had shot Dr. Verwoerd. In other words, there was even a political element among the patients there, and, of course, among the staff, and to be expected at that time, yes. And so there would be people who would make it very difficult for him."⁷⁵⁸⁰ Pratt was involved in at least two physical fights. In one, with another patient, he suffered bruised ribs, while in the second, with two men, he received a black eye and his false teeth were broken.⁷⁵⁸¹

In a letter to Sue Charter, Pratt referred to his mistreatment by a patient named Diesel, who was apparently angered by Pratt's generosity. He wrote, "My information is that Diesel has been instructed to make life difficult for me. He apparently feels a conflict with me over who is to run this place among the patients. He is the ideal type to run a concentration camp."

⁷⁵⁷⁴ Bird 1992: 208.

⁷⁵⁷⁵ Blow (*Sunday Times*), 8 January 1961: 1, 'Pratt: Try me for Attempted Murder. But Judge President rejects his plea'; *The Guardian*, 3 October 1961: 21, 'Assailant of Dr. Verwoerd dead.'

⁷⁵⁷⁶ Fr. Reginald Orsmond in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁷⁷ Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁷⁸ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁵⁷⁹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Father Reginald Orsmond and Guy Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁸⁰ Fr. Reginald Orsmond in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁸¹ Blow (*Sunday Times*), 22 January 1960: 1, 'Depression caused Pratt's escape bid.'

Pratt concluded, “This letter is not meant to be a moan, but simply a record of what is happening in South Africa through our own apathy.”⁷⁵⁸² Nevertheless, Pratt helped those around him, giving money or buying Coca-Cola, cakes and biscuits for poor patients.⁷⁵⁸³

In a letter to his sister, Pratt listed his hospital routine:

6 a.m. Dress and clean up cell.

7 a.m. Wash.

7.30 a.m. Daily chores.

8.00 a.m. Thomas à Kempis and meditation.

9.00 a.m. Exercise.

9.30 a.m. Read Knox.

10.30 a.m. Letters.

11.30 a.m. Chess.

12.00 noon Lunch and exercise.

1.30 p.m. Read light literature.

2.30 p.m. Chess

3.30 p.m. Read Therese.

5.00 p.m. Thomas à Kempis and thought.

6.00 p.m. Missal.

7.00 p.m. Read Knox.

8.00 p.m. Chess.⁷⁵⁸⁴

Sue Charter, who visited him in the hospital regularly, told Guy Spiller:

“Although that was what the trial had described David as – the criminally insane – and, you know, put him into that position, it (the hospital) was full of people who were very, very different from him. He was still, to all intents and purposes, very much the way he was

⁷⁵⁸² David Pratt letter to Sue Charter in Guy Spiller’s *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁸³ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Guy Spiller’s *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁸⁴ Gray, 1993: 12.

outside. I mean, he appeared very sane and very relaxed, although he did speak of being very depressed, obviously, at times. He was seriously out of place there. The extraordinary thing was that in most ways, of course, the structure there couldn't adapt to somebody like David. He had come from an enormously privileged environment, and he wasn't in any way standardly insane... whereas a number of people there were clearly, yes, criminally insane, and therefore very different.

But the institution, sort of, was, like, monosyllabic and unchanged. And yet, in some way, he always appeared to touch it slightly. You know, that rules would be broken, and apparently he got permission to buy everybody Cokes and biscuits for Saturdays. And, you know, there would be some prisoners who would... who sort of took this largesse, well, happily, and regarded Pratt as a kind of rather heroic figure in their midst. And others who are... like Mr Diesel, who became a friend of my mother, who used to say no, he's not going to take Mr. Pratt's Coca-Cola, and he's not going to take his biscuits."⁷⁵⁸⁵

One of Pratt's more regular visitors was Desmond Blow of the *Sunday Times*, who, during his trial, had become a good friend. From time to time, Blow would write an article about Pratt, but he would always write what he knew the authorities wanted to hear and not what his friend had actually told him. Blow told the author that Pratt was always eager to find out about the current political situation in South Africa and continually asked about it. Blow said that Pratt was "genuinely concerned about the social injustice that was taking place in South Africa." Pratt felt "guilty because he felt privileged" as a wealthy White man, which was why he acted generously towards his non-White workers. Pratt spoke at length about his life and his political ideas and Blow was deeply impressed by his "immense compassion" for his fellow people, especially the oppressed and the poor. Although Pratt was anti-Communist, he repeatedly told Blow that he would have much preferred a Communist regime in South Africa under the ANC or the South African Communist Party than apartheid, even if it cost him his fortune. The more Blow got to know Pratt, the more he admired him.⁷⁵⁸⁶

⁷⁵⁸⁵ Sue Charter in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁵⁸⁶ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

PRATT'S PREPARATIONS TO APPEAL TO HAVE HIS CASE RE-OPENED

As time passed, Pratt's regret over his insanity plea deepened, particularly because his assault on Dr. Verwoerd was portrayed as the act of a madman. He felt that his deed and the motive for it were undermined by the insanity plea and that it had all been for nothing. Even worse, Pratt felt guilty that he had used what he now considered to be an "act of cowardice" as opposed to how a gentleman would have acted. Deeply upset, he determined to defend his act and to "put the record straight," as he told Desmond Blow. In a clearly regretful mood, he wrote in his notes, "My daughter engaged very eminent Counsel for me who represented me at the preliminary hearing. When you engage Counsel you must take his advice, and the advice I received was to fight this on a mental basis and be committed to an institution."⁷⁵⁸⁷ The latter possibility, the prospect of being hospitalised indefinitely, was something Pratt was finding ever more difficult to cope with.

Pratt decided therefore to ask the authorities to re-open his case in an attempt to set the record straight regarding not only his action but also his character. His family and the lawyers tried to dissuade him, arguing that this would make things worse for him and would harm his chances of getting parole soon. However, Pratt was adamant, and began working on his own defence, ready to accept criminal and political responsibility for his action, a process upon which his lawyers declined to co-operate.⁷⁵⁸⁸

One of those who tried to dissuade him was his new good friend, Desmond Blow, who knew that he could then very well be sentenced to death. Pratt had admitted to Blow that he believed he was still alive because he was considered to be insane and that he would probably have been murdered if the authorities thought otherwise. Nevertheless, he was still determined to change his plea. Blow told the author that Pratt was fully aware of what the outcome of a new trial might be, but he was confident that he would avoid a death sentence.⁷⁵⁸⁹

His intention was to turn his trial into a trial of apartheid, where the focus would be the evils of the race policy and not his deed. For this reason, he decided to ask prominent friends who opposed apartheid to testify. Even if he was sentenced to death, he said, he was ready to die for his principles. Most important for him was to tell the truth about his act, his

⁷⁵⁸⁷ David Pratt's 'Method for approaching trial.' n.d. Personal Collection of Desmond Blow.

⁷⁵⁸⁸ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate.* 1999.

⁷⁵⁸⁹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate.* 1999.

political views and his character. He believed that by doing this, he would redeem himself for what he saw as his cowardly stance at the previous trial and thus rid himself of an immense burden of guilt. At the same time, he wanted people to know that he was not insane, but politically motivated. He also told Blow something along the lines of his letter to Dr. Verwoerd, "that it is better for a man to die for a principle than to live in contradiction thereto."⁷⁵⁹⁰

Thus, Pratt began studying law books and listing witnesses to testify in a possible forthcoming trial. Blow assisted him by contacting potential witnesses and providing law books and anything else he wanted. Pratt worked endlessly on his trial preparations but was careful to conceal the scale of his intentions, such as calling new witnesses and attacking apartheid. His cell now was full of papers and scribbled notes, many bearing cryptic words to mislead the authorities if they investigated. He avoided any mention of the real names of the witnesses he planned to call. He referred to Harry Oppenheimer as "Uncle David" and to Sir Paul Dukes as "Peter the gardener." In case of a sudden cell inspection, Pratt repeated the sugar trick that he had used in prison to warn him of an approaching guard. By the time any official appeared, Pratt would have cleared his papers away and would be idly reading a thriller or his Bible.⁷⁵⁹¹

The code words and the sugar ruse showed a man capable not only of managing his own affairs but able to think intelligently and to plan in detail. Pratt's ability to evade warders and people of authority in a situation of confinement which he had never experienced reflect a characteristic that would be a highly unusual, if not impossible, in a person thought to be mentally unstable.

The following document from Desmond Blow's personal collection is a detailed, twenty-four-page plan written by Pratt while in the hospital, which sets out how he aims to have his case re-opened. Blow was assisting Pratt in his preparations and the document was given to him by his friend for his opinion.⁷⁵⁹² Pratt sets out what he will tell the court, names the witnesses he will call and gives some personal details about his life. His intentions are set out lucidly and at some length; they are perfectly logical and quite evidently the work of an intelligent, stable and clear-thinking person.

⁷⁵⁹⁰ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate.* 1999.

⁷⁵⁹¹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015

⁷⁵⁹² Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

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Object will be to show that any person can be pushed to a point where firing at another is not regarded as murder. The classic example, of course, being rape. Naturally the degree of pressure required to reach this state will vary not only with different people but with the same person according to his mental health and outlook on life at various times as affected by exterior circumstances.

We then call witnesses to show the national outlook created by the policy of Verwoerd. I suggest Rupert and Harry Oppenheimer. We then became more personal and call Zulman who can give evidence of his own reactions to the police vans filled with detainees that lie passed in my company on Thursday, and his decision not to proceed with my plan to amalgamate our sweet factories owing to the economic position created by Verwoerd.

We then become completely personal. Friedman can be called to testify our breach of relations on the Friday. The medical team can be lined up to show the relative ease in which a person suffering from a disability such as mine can be pushed into the position when an act such as mine is beyond human control such as discovering his child being attacked. Hurst can give his opinion of Saturday night.

Page 2

John can testify that I was in a transition stage of reorientation to a life without the aid of regular epileptic attacks. Epilepsy is a way of life to which I had become accustomed over the last forty years. After the periods of Euphoria in 1954 my cycle was broken and I descended into a period of acute depression during which I dispersed beautiful Ayrshire herd, suffered acute urticaria and finally caused the breakup of my family as my wife feared my depression might lead to violence. It is necessary to learn the process of readjustment from infancy which we commenced to Loudon and discontinued for a month's break to attend affairs to S. Africa. Though benefit was already being felt complete adjustment to present circumstances would take some years.

I can be the final witness and describe my steadily increasing sense of personal guilt since 1954 over the chaos in S. Africa. My reaction towards my personal affairs with

increasing inability to concentrate on day to day work, vacant periods in my mind coupled with anti-social behaviour, naturally I do not know other people's minds so I cannot say how much of this is normal to mankind and how much is mental sickness. It must be a matter of degree. All I know is that periodically the necessity to take some action to release this unbearable weight, that used to be relieved by an epileptic seizure regularly once a month and more often if necessary, becomes essential.

Page 3

One such occasion was when my wife and children were hiding in Holland and I was prohibited entry into the country because I had tried to go in with a revolver. I obtained a duplicate passport from S. Africa House, hired a car and drove in via Ostend. The result was an attempt by the Dutch police to throw me out and I then insisted upon taking my young son with me. As a result I had to fight an urgent application to Court in Holland in which I told them I had merely come to see my children and would only take the baby away if I was thrown out. I won the case and received permission to stay. However, on every occasion I enter Holland now I am virtually stripped and searched for firearms. To my mind the whole business appears fantastic.

Another occasion concerned the management of my sweet factors by my cousin Stuart Pratt. I was very dissatisfied with the policy he was pursuing and in addition had reason to suspect his honesty. After some difficult sessions at the factory I arranged a meeting at my office in Surrey House where we would be quite private and staff could not overhear. He didn't turn up so I drove to the factory and found him reading a newspaper.

I then pulled him out of his chair and had a fight. I feel the shooting of Verwoerd falls into the same category.

Page 4

Due to the automatic release of nervous tensions by seizures I have never learnt any other way of getting rid of them. Now that seizures have diminished I have got to, or I can't go on living. In fact if it is going to get worse I do not intend to go on living, but I shall battle my best to see it gets better. Since a very young child these forces within me have been kept suppressed with steadily increasing doses of drugs which I feel are detrimental to memory and work; then with almost clockwork regularity they would be dispersed by a seizure. Now

the drugs continue but the seizures have been largely replaced by urges of varying strength, the performance of which releases the internal tensions as effectively as the seizure, I feel that with the right help they can be controlled and directed into the right channels of work when they might be of some use to the community; but I feel more and more certain that this channel is not a business life. The machinations of my staff to enmesh me again in the running of my sweet factory which had to come to a head on the Monday, April 11th, represented a pit to be avoided at all costs. I had given them a new sales staff, new sales control; they had got new vigour and enthusiasm, but they were still not satisfied. They wanted me to fire the new manager, van Niekerk, and give them my whole time and energy.

Page 5

This would have represented a living death but I could not explain that to them for they saw it as a path of roses. This prospect also had a hand in framing my action on the Saturday, but not consciously so at the time.

The help I received in London from Dr. John, and help from Father Macginnis, an R.C. priest, during my confinement awaiting trial have convinced me that certain lines of thought, plus patience, will produce results and my faith is stronger now than ever before.

Therefore I feel the common-sense action for the Court is:

- (a) Extradite me and I will continue treatment and find new work abroad;
- (b) Commit me to an institution where I can receive similar treatment and review the matter later;
- (c) Hang me and be done with it.

There is no personal fear connected with a long term of imprisonment, but I am afraid of the possible effects on other people if I serve it untreated. Irrespective of the quantity of drugs given to me, the environment will be bound to accentuate the forces of resistance, and the results may affect others.

[Pages 6 and 7 are missing]

Page 8

My lord, Gentleman of the Jury, I am fighting this myself because it is not a case for which there is any precedent in S. Africa and because it's one that involves human emotions rather than law. My daughter engaged very eminent Counsel for me who represented me at the preliminary hearing. When you engage Counsel you must take his advice, and the advice I received was to fight this on a mental basis and be committed to an institution. If the motives behind my action warrant that fate, then I feel humanity has had its chips and the sooner an atomic explosion get rid of us the better.

You have heard an account of my difficulties in 1954. What you have not heard is that had we been living before the age of professional psychiatry and there had been no practitioners to advise me, I would unquestionably have followed the inner call I discussed with Dr. Geerling, and say whole life could have been different from that time. I venture to suggest that had Joan of Arc called upon a psychiatrist, the history of France might have been very different and she would have been saved from the stake. I mention her not from any desire to suggest a correlation between my humble urges and her great ones, but simply because Dr. Geerling mentioned her as an accepted medical example of a disturbance of the frontal lobe when we were discussing the music that was constantly playing in my mind during the second euphoric phase ...

Page 9⁷⁵⁹³

You've also heard from Mr. Harry Oppenheimer an account of my interview with him when I tried to form a coalition government under Mr Havanga in my third and last phase of euphoria. But when, after a long argument in a private room in the House of Assembly, I allowed myself to be convinced that the scheme could not be carried out, I resigned myself to the future under Mr Strijdom, with Dr. Verwoerd as Minister of Native Affairs. Within 48 hours, I sank into a depression which has paralysed my activity and ruined my family life for six solid years."⁷⁵⁹⁴

Page 10

⁷⁵⁹³ Page 9 is missing from Desmond Blow's personal collection, but it can be heard at Noel Spiller's *The Liberate and the Pirate*.

⁷⁵⁹⁴ Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*. 1999.

In 1955 I started to disagree strongly with my farm manager, van Wolften Polthe, whom I had brought out from Holland. He had been my best man at my wedding and his wife was my wife's closest friend. The 'Byeways' Ayrshire herd had been my dearest possession and was known throughout the country. I lost interest in it and dispersed it in 1956 by public auction, simultaneously sacking Polthe, leasing my dairy, and moving into ray new house I had built on Moloney's Hill. From here I tried to concentrate on my trout hatchery and my other business interests in the country. However, whatever was inside me would not leave me in peace. I could see the political path we were treading all too clearly, and felt an ever growing sense of personal guilt through my cowardice in not continuing with what I felt meant to do in 1954.

Consequently I developed a severe urticaria on my legs and ankles and had to enter a nursing home for treatment, as you have heard from Dr. Leigh. During this period I corresponded with Sir Paul Dukes who was then living in S. Africa and had given a series of Toga lectures at the Langham Hotel. I joined his school and derived considerable benefit from the instruction, but it was only another hand helping to ease the heavy weight inside me which nothing would disperse.

Page 11

I felt a trip outside the Union might help so I booked on the 'Ruys' for a six week cruise to S. America, within 24 hours of leaving Cape Tom, my urticaria was gone, my heart felt light, and I thoroughly enjoyed the voyage. The urticaria did not return but the weight did on return to the Union, and my wife suggested we should consider living in Europe or England as in any event education would be difficult for the children, who were now two, from Kagaliesburg.

Therefore we went over in October 56, and looked around Switzerland, Austria and England. I obtained a number of houses from Harrods and other agents and we toured England looking at them. But my heart was not in the job for I loved my home, S. Africa, and all my interests were here. By this time, as you must well imagine, my personal family life was deteriorating. I was moody, anti-social and disinterested in life. I refused to move to Europe but compromised on the Cape, and returned alone, leaving the family in Holland. Though I lived alone on the farm, I threw myself much more deeply into Yoga and Paul Dukes became a frequent visitor to my home. The benefit of this practice sustained me during

these months and I purchased 'Old Sellery' in Constantin to move the family into when they returned.

Page 12

My wife's letters were friendly and stimulating and I could see that she was becoming steadily more spiritual, he was urging me to arrive back in Holland in time for a pilgrimage she wished me to make with her to Lourdes, in company with two friends. She had also booked seats for the famous Rotterdam Horse Show and the music festival in Schevening. She wanted me to bring some smoked trout from the farm as a present to Prince Bernhard, and generally quite a session was laid on for my arrival. However it was not a success though we did all the things that were laid on, and she was advised by her friends to be careful as they thought I was going mad and might become dangerous.

Eventually I flew back alone, leaving her and the children to follow by boat in December. On my return in October 57, Paul Dukes had left the country and I had a complete nervous breakdown spending some time recuperating in Sanatoria. In December I received a cable saying she was not returning, followed by a brief letter saying that on medical advice she was staying away a little longer. You can imagine my predicament. Everything was now destroyed. My farm was to be occupied by friends who had moved up to Johannesburg from 'Old Sellery', which was now standing empty awaiting my arrival. My strong pillar Paul Dukes had left the country, and now my wife and children refused to come back.

Page 13

Behind all this the Daily Press was full of the Senate Act and the deprivation of Coloured votes the fault for which I felt was solely mine.

I am not going to take you through the next two years in detail. They are too horrible to recall. Briefly, I first of all ran away to restart life under a new name somewhere quite unknown. However, I returned, for my interests were too wide and too many people were dependent upon me. Then I went over to Holland to find out 'what was what' in the words of Dr. Geerling.

I took with me a revolver chiefly because I was growing as accustomed to carrying one as to carrying a tooth brush, however, I must admit that suicidal thoughts were also in my

mind should I be unable to arrange my domestic life, and depression became unbearable. However, I was most rigidly searched by the Dutch customs police, the revolver found, and I was then refused admission to the country and sent over to London. I then obtained a duplicate passport, hired a car and drove in via Ostend, arriving unexpectedly at the house in Den Haag, where the family were living. Police were waiting for me next morning and I had to fight a court case that night to obtain permission to remain in Holland. This I won, but an atmosphere was left which could be cut with a knife.

[Page 14 is missing]

Page 15

I continued with my work to the best of my very limited ability on my return, and arranged open east Manganese mining on my farm by the Orient Manganese Co.

Early last year I felt I must see the absent family again, so I took a boat across to try and relax at sea. A fellow passenger discussed with me a psycho-analyst who had been of great help to the family, and I took the name and address. Again the visits to Holland were not a success, and I could see we were now growing apart and I must reconcile myself to divorce.

Back in London I called on the psycho-analyst, Dr. John, who offered me daily treatment and reckoned if that could not cure me nothing would, but I must be prepared to give him a couple of years. I lived at my Club and busied myself with electioneering, plus a bit of journalism. I had to defend S. Africa from a variety of attacks, particularly when speaking in Hyde Park.

There was definite benefit from Dr. John's treatment, and when I met my solicitor in London - who was over from Johannesburg for a week - he reckoned he had never seen me so well. Correspondence from S. Africa, however, showed increasing difficulties, particularly with the Manganese operations, and I was compelled to buy a half-interest in a Ramsgate Hotel to protect the other half, the shares of which were bonded to me. Therefore I could see a temporary return was going to be compulsory. In February I returned by Union Castle, as I had my car.

[Pages 16-20 are missing]

Page 21

Zulman will say:

He was negotiating with me for purchase of share in Crispettes. After discussions in Durban he came up on the Thursday and visited the factory with Lampert. We then lunched in Hillbrow.

In the afternoon we drove to town and passed the vans filled with detainees. He will describe the effect they had upon him.

He will then give his views on the position of the country under Verwoerd and his decision not to expand further until he can see a light through the darkness. Consequently negotiations stopped.

Page 22

Oppenheimer will say:

I rang him in 1954 for an interview and proposed certain things to form a coalition government. He agreed to co-operate and I left him to see the others.

He, too, will give his account of the position of the country under Verwoerd and his views on expansion under the circumstances.

Phone him to see if he is agreeable.

Jacobson will say:

He has been treating me for epilepsy since I left Chesler. He will describe the epileptic personality and how it is possible for epileptics to imagine uncontrollable urges and phantasies. The growing conviction of a most strange phantasy received unexpected collaboration from a witness at the hearing. I have not discussed it yet and will not do so until I am sure. Then I will finish my address to the Jury.

[Page 23 is missing]

Page 24

Thousands have tried running way but this is no good. If S. Africa is their country they will carry their guilt with them wherever they may go.

The result of the referendum on Oct. 5th is relatively unimportant against the fact that it is being held at all. This further generation of emotion in these critical days resemble a patient with increasing attacks of blood pressure, because he is unable to relax. Despite Mr. De Kock's announcement that we must exert ourselves to regain the confidence of foreign, investors, we don't seem to be doing an awful lot about it. In fact we, the finest and most developed state on this continent which should not merely be providing the example of statesmanship and true multi-racial government but become the centre of an African Commonwealth of nations with a glorious future as we helped to develop this great continent, instead turn in upon ourselves and create an isolated laager with discipline precariously maintained with ever bigger sticks.

Page 24a

You have listened to a very complete account of how this was done hut no word of why it was done.

COMMENTS ON PRATT'S PLANNING

As one can see, there is nothing in Pratt's scheme to suggest he was insane. The plan for a new trial is clearly set out, potential witnesses are named along with outlines of what each of them will be asked. Pratt also works on his speech. It is impossible to suggest this was anything but the work of an entirely sane and clear-minded person.

Pratt's comments about the historic figure of Joan of Arc were relevant to his case. The music he heard in his euphoric state was caused by his medication; it is impossible to know the cause of the voices and visions of Joan of Arc. However, Pratt is surely right in saying that the French saint would not have escaped the attentions of a psychiatrist had she been examined in 1960.

As in his court appearance, Pratt sets out a clear and logical political statement about the country he loves and his wish to end apartheid, "In fact we, the finest and most developed state on this continent which should not merely be providing the example of statesmanship and true multi-racial government but become the centre of an African Commonwealth of nations with a glorious future as we helped to develop this great continent, instead turn in upon ourselves and create an isolated laager with discipline precariously maintained with

ever bigger sticks.”

ONGOING PREPARATIONS FOR THE APPEAL

As requested by Pratt, Desmond Blow contacted Oppenheimer, Rupert and others. All agreed to testify and Oppenheimer offered to help in any other way he could. Also contacted by Blow at Pratt’s request was Sir Paul Dukes, former MI6 agent and Pratt’s “strong pillar” and yoga instructor who had become his close friend. He was the most difficult to track down of all of Pratt’s witnesses, but he agreed enthusiastically to testify and, like Oppenheimer, volunteered to help in any other way. Pratt was delighted by Dukes’ response and they began corresponding again. Two prominent political figure who volunteered to testify for Pratt was the British Liberal MP, Jeremy Thorpe and David Ennals, Chairman of the British anti-apartheid movement. They both volunteered to appear without being asked after Blow had inquired among Pratt’s friends in the Party as to who might be willing to testify. Other British Liberals, such as Bruce Hewes, were approached by Blow and all agreed to testify.⁷⁵⁹⁵

Pratt was excited by the positive responses he was getting and became convinced that by using the testimony of such notable anti-apartheid personalities, he could turn the trial into an indictment of apartheid. Blow said he had never seen Pratt happier during his time in hospital, not only because of the way his plans were shaping but because he was occupied doing something of great importance to himself.⁷⁵⁹⁶

The apartheid authorities were always worried about Blow’s relationship with Pratt, fearing what he might publish about his friend or that he might be assisting him somehow. While the two were preparing for the re-opening of the case, the police tapped Blow’s telephone and raided his house.⁷⁵⁹⁷ When they discovered evidence that Blow was helping Pratt with his re-trial plans and that witnesses including Dukes, Ennals, Oppenheimer and Thorpe had expressed willingness to testify, they made it more difficult for Blow to visit Pratt. Both men were placed under close observation, making it impossible for Pratt to hand over any new documents or even to talk comfortably, and the authorities rejected several

⁷⁵⁹⁵ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁵⁹⁶ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁵⁹⁷ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; Graham David Blow in a personal interview, 8 October 2017.

requests by Blow to visit his friend. Because of these obstacles, Blow's visits to Pratt became much less frequent, to the disappointment of both.⁷⁵⁹⁸

PRATT'S APPEAL TO HAVE HIS CASE RE-OPENED

Despite this setback, on September 28, 1960, Pratt wrote to the Judge President, asking him to re-open his case and to try him for attempted murder. His letter read as follows:

The Supreme Court,
Pretoria.

Notice of Appeal – Regina v. Pratt

I herewith desire to give notice of appeal against the judgement of Mr Justice Rumpff in the above matter on Monday the 26th inst. on the following grounds:

1. No opportunity was given to me to answer the evidence of Dr Lamont or to cross-examine him.
2. I have reason to believe that there has been collaboration between ... (indecipherable word⁷⁵⁹⁹) which has prevented full facts being laid before the Bench prior to judgment.

It is for the above reasons, plus that of a judgment in terms of the Mental Disorders Act being one of fact rather than law that I am making this appeal in person. I consider it will be of assistance to your lordships in assessing the merits of this appeal.

Your obedient servant,

David B. Pratt.⁷⁶⁰⁰

⁷⁵⁹⁸ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁵⁹⁹ I think the word is "Council" - at least, comparing it with the rest of the writing on the page it seems to begin with "Co" and end in "il," and I can't think of anything else that fits. Possibly a misspelling of "counsel."

⁷⁶⁰⁰ David Pratt's letter to the Pretoria Supreme Court. 28 September 1960. *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt. The State versus David Beresford Pratt.* 712-60. NASA.

Although a crucial word in the letter is indecipherable, Pratt, according to Blow, believed that the psychiatrists who testified on behalf of the defence team had all been instructed by his lawyers to present him as they did in order to “get him off the hook.”⁷⁶⁰¹

On October 3, 1960, Pratt received a reply to his letter from D.J. Joubert, Registrar of the Supreme Court in Pretoria, saying that his appeal was not considered as valid, and that he should discuss the proposed appeal with his *curator ad litem*. He added that, “In regard to his statement that no opportunity was given to him to answer the evidence of Dr. Lamont or to cross-examine him, the record of the enquiry shows the following to have taken place after Dr. Lamont had given evidence:-

BY THE COURT: (To Counsel).

Have you any questions?

Mr. Maisels: No questions.

Mr. McEwan: No questions

Mr. Maisels addresses Court briefly.

Mr. Rein addresses the Court.⁷⁶⁰²

The Registrar was correct insofar as the question pertained to Pratt's defence team. However, Pratt was referring not to his lawyers but to himself as not having been given the chance to refute Dr. Lamont's evidence. Naturally, the defence team did not question Dr. Lamont's evidence because their stance was that Pratt was unfit to stand trial. As for Pratt, he was asked by his team and by his daughter not to make any further interruptions or statements.

Pratt was deeply disappointed by Joubert's response, but was determined to appeal again. However, after learning from his legal advisors that there was a good chance of his release on parole, he agreed to suspend his campaign at least temporarily, and to become a

⁷⁶⁰¹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶⁰² Letter from the D.J. Joubert, the Registrar of the Supreme Court in Pretoria to Pratt, 3 October 1960. *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt. The State versus David Beresford Pratt.* 712-60. NASA.

model patient/prisoner.⁷⁶⁰³ Pratt's next move was to write to the Commissioner for Mental Hygiene for permission to go to England for supposedly psycho-analytical treatment.⁷⁶⁰⁴ Although he did not say as much, Blow believed that Pratt was hoping that his friends in England would help him to escape.⁷⁶⁰⁵

LIFE AT THE HOSPITAL

In early January 1961, Blow visited Pratt as a "friend," but also interviewed him for the *Sunday Times*. It was his first visit in about three months and the first after his home had been raided by the security police. Blow reported that Pratt had lost weight since last September, but he looked well and appeared to be in high spirits and as alert as ever. Blow reported that Pratt's request to Justice Rumpff to have him tried again was turned down as was a request to the Commissioner for Mental Hygiene to go to England for psycho-analytical treatment.⁷⁶⁰⁶

In his article, Blow quoted Pratt as saying, "My pressing need is for companionship. Of the 26 men here, there are hardly any with similar personal interests... I accept being kept in the Fort as a new experience in life. Everything here is a challenge which must be accepted. If you weaken ..." he shrugged his shoulders. Then he added, "That is why it is necessary to keep my mind active."⁷⁶⁰⁷

Pratt's reaction to the rejection of his appeal demonstrates the depth of his misery in the mental hospital. He said, "I asked to be tried for the attempted murder of Dr. Verwoerd. If I were found guilty and given a sentence it would be far better than living here. I would know exactly how long I was to be in prison, but as a patient, I am here indefinitely. It is soul destroying. In prison, I can do some useful job, but here, there is nothing to do except fight the apathy that comes from complete idleness."⁷⁶⁰⁸

Blow told the author that Pratt was very lonely in the hospital and seriously disappointed that his attempt to secure a re-trial had failed, as had his hopes of getting to

⁷⁶⁰³ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶⁰⁴ Blow (*Sunday Times*), 8 January 1961: 1, 3, 'Pratt: Try me for attempted murder. But Judge President rejects his plea.'

⁷⁶⁰⁵ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶⁰⁶ Blow (*Sunday Times*), 8 January 1961: 1, 3, 'Pratt: Try me for attempted murder. But Judge President rejects his plea.'

⁷⁶⁰⁷ Blow (*Sunday Times*), 8 January 1961: 3, 'Pratt: Try me for attempted murder. But Judge President rejects his plea.'

⁷⁶⁰⁸ Blow (*Sunday Times*), 8 January 1961: 3, 'Pratt: Try me for attempted murder. But Judge President rejects his plea.'

England. However, he had not given up on his hopes for parole, having been led to believe by his defence team that this was a real possibility, especially because of his genuine problem with epilepsy. Blow said that Pratt then had become quite pessimistic about a retrial, believing the authorities would never permit this because they wanted to preserve his image as an insane man. They knew that in any new trial he would appear as a sane, wealthy, competent, White South African businessman who opposed apartheid. Any such personification would be damaging to apartheid's image. Despite his lawyers' assurances, Pratt also had doubts whether he would be granted parole for the same reasons, that the authorities would not want him to be seen as sane and stable. Blow would remain a very good friend of Pratt throughout the latter's life. He continued to visit him and the two corresponded regularly until Pratt's death.⁷⁶⁰⁹

ANOTHER ESCAPE ATTEMPT

On January 19, 1961, Pratt was taken in a car with two attendants from the Old Fort, to a dental surgery in Bloemfontein. At about 11 a.m., the dentist gave Pratt an injection. While he was waiting for it to take effect, Pratt jumped from the chair and fled from the surgery on the first floor to the ground floor. Pursued by his two attendants, Pratt dashed into Maitland Street, Bloemfontein's busy main thoroughfare, and ran into a department store. His pursuers managed to corner him there. One held Pratt in a head-lock and they led him back to the surgery.⁷⁶¹⁰

Pratt's escape attempt was not a spur of the moment decision, but part of a well-planned scheme. Friends were waiting near the surgery to pick him up and transport him to an airfield where a plane was ready to fly him out of the country.⁷⁶¹¹ It was a similar scheme to that which was discovered by the police in May 1960, the one in which Maisels refused to co-operate.

Shortly after Pratt's bid for freedom, Desmond Blow visited him again. In an article for the *Sunday Times*, he attributed the escape attempt to depression. He wrote that Pratt was unhappy because:

⁷⁶⁰⁹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶¹⁰ *Daily Dispatch*, 20 January 1961: 1, 'David Pratt tries to escape'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 January 1961: 1, 'Pratt escapes from guards'; *The Star*, 20 January 1961: 5, 'Eye-witnesses laugh as Pratt runaway'; *The Times*, 20 January 1961: 9, 'Mr. Pratt tries to escape.'

⁷⁶¹¹ Guy Spiller in a personal interview, 8 April 2015.

- He lacked companionship.
- The authorities failed to try him again, as he requested.
- He was idle most of the day and had to spend much of his time in a yard thirty feet square.
- He lost interest in reading owing to the constant blare of the commercial radio, which most of the patients wanted.
- He was unable to study astronomy because he was locked in his room at 5 p.m. every day.
- His plea to be transferred from the Fort to a mental hospital in the Transvaal was rejected.
- He was involved in physical fights with other patients.
- His wife was unable to visit him that particular month.⁷⁶¹²

However, Blow told the author that this was only half the truth but he could not reveal everything in the newspaper in order to protect Pratt. Blow said that he exaggerated Pratt's situation in the hospital to mislead the authorities. He also told the author that Pratt attempted to escape simply because he wanted to be free and this had very little to do with depression. Blow felt that the authorities would probably be more lenient if it appeared that Pratt's motive was depression and not his desire for freedom. Blow said that Pratt had always kept the possibility of escape in mind. He also told the author that he never revealed Pratt's political ideas or their political conversations in his newspaper articles because he feared this would be harmful for Pratt. He thought Pratt would be safer if he was generally believed to be insane and apolitical.⁷⁶¹³

PRATT'S DEATH

After his latest escape attempt, life in the hospital got worse for Pratt. The authorities had him watched closely while making it more difficult for his friends to see him and for Pratt to correspond with them. During the last week of September 1961, Pratt was visited by his daughter Susan, who was due to be married at the end of the following month. Pratt wished her well and for a wedding present he gave her his dining room suite and his collection of

⁷⁶¹² Blow (*Sunday Times*), 22 January 1961: 1, 'Depression caused Pratt's escape bid.'

⁷⁶¹³ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

valuable silver. She then flew to London to make preparations for the wedding.⁷⁶¹⁴ Pratt was deeply disappointed that he would not be able to attend the wedding.⁷⁶¹⁵

On Sunday, October 1, 1961, Pratt's 52nd birthday, John Spiller, his business associate, visited Pratt in the hospital, unaware that it was his birthday. He was Pratt's last visitor. Spiller found him in "top form," in a cheerful mood, with a very positive attitude and a good frame of mind, which he said was because it was his birthday. He was even cheeky with the guards. Spiller said about this visit, "I was in Bloemfontein on business at the time. It was only courtesy to go and call in on him and see him if I could, if they would let me see him, which they did. And I met David, and he said, 'Oh, I'm so glad to see you.' He said, 'It's actually my birthday today, and my sister has sent me a cake.' So he told the warders to go and get the cake, and we had tea. And he insisted that the warders bring me white sugar and not the brown government sugar."⁷⁶¹⁶ After Spiller's visit, Pratt spent a lot of time writing letters.⁷⁶¹⁷

Around 9 a.m. the next morning, a nurse entered Pratt's cell to switch off his light.⁷⁶¹⁸ He found him dead with a sheet around his neck. Pratt apparently had strangled himself by tying the ends of his bedsheet to the leg of his bedstead, putting his neck into the loop and twisting over and over until he was asphyxiated.⁷⁶¹⁹ A doctor gave him oxygen for forty-five minutes after he was found, but in vain.⁷⁶²⁰

The nurse who discovered the body found a note nearby.⁷⁶²¹ It said, "As I have received no reply from the Commissioner, I accept that the reply is in the negative. Under the circumstances, I think this is the best possible solution to my problem – for everybody. If possible, please arrange a quiet cremation for me in Johannesburg, and the ashes must be

⁷⁶¹⁴ *Daily Express*, 3 October 1961: 11, 'Man who shot Dr. Verwoerd is dead'; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 2, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

⁷⁶¹⁵ *The Star*, 2 October 1961: 1, 'Ms. Pratt is silent'; *The Times*, 3 October 1961: 8, 'Pratt found dead.'

⁷⁶¹⁶ John Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁶¹⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt died in agony: it's the best way out'; *The Cape Times*, 3 October 1961, 'Pratt's letter before cell suicide.'

⁷⁶¹⁸ *Daily Express*, 3 October 1961: 11, 'Man who shot Dr. Verwoerd is dead'; *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt died in agony: it's the best way out'; *The Cape Times*, 3 October 1961, 'Pratt's letter before cell suicide.'

⁷⁶¹⁹ Botha, 1967: 67.

⁷⁶²⁰ Slovo, 1995: 132; *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt died in agony: it's the best way out'; *The Cape Times*, 3 October 1961, 'Pratt's letter before cell suicide'; *The Guardian*, 3 October 1961: 21, 'Assailant of Dr. Verwoerd dead.'

⁷⁶²¹ *The Guardian*, 3 October 1961: 21, 'Assailant of Dr. Verwoerd dead.'

buried with those of my family at Maloney's Eye. Please avoid all publicity so that my children can simply be told that their father died in hospital."⁷⁶²²

AFTER PRATT'S DEATH

After his death, Pratt's body was removed to the police mortuary in Bloemfontein. The police announced that the body would be transported to Pretoria for a post-mortem examination and that a judicial enquiry would be made into the circumstances of his death.⁷⁶²³ However, no such enquiry ever took place, as far as the author can establish, or if it did, the outcome was never published. Pratt's body was given to his family on October 2, the day he was found dead, or October 3 at the latest, with the expectation that it would be cremated on Thursday, October 5. Delays in the arrival of mourners meant cremation actually took place on Friday, October 6.⁷⁶²⁴ As for an inquiry, the time between Pratt's death and the cremation surely did not allow for a serious forensic examination or the questioning of hospital staff and visitors or the organisation of a properly conducted inquest. Since no such investigation was ever officially mentioned, it is safe to conclude that none ever took place.

Hospital officials claimed that Pratt suffered from a severe epilepsy attack five days before his death and this had left him weak and depressed.⁷⁶²⁵ However, John Spiller, who visited him the day before he died, found him in a cheerful and positive mood. Spiller was stunned when he heard the next day that Pratt had committed suicide. He said, "I was going back to Johannesburg the very next day (after his visit with Pratt), and I put the radio on in my car, and I heard he had hung himself during the night, which was quite a surprise to me because he seemed to be in quite a good frame of mind whilst he was in the prison, especially that particular day."⁷⁶²⁶ Dr. Jacobson, Pratt's personal psychiatrist, who knew him well and visited him often in the hospital, was also taken aback at the report that Pratt had killed himself.⁷⁶²⁷

⁷⁶²² *The Times*, 3 October 1961: 8, 'Pratt found dead.'

⁷⁶²³ *The Cape Times*, 3 October 1961, 'Pratt's letter before cell suicide'; *The Times*, 3 October 1961: 8, 'Pratt found dead.'

⁷⁶²⁴ *The Star*, 3 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt funeral postponed.'

⁷⁶²⁵ *Daily Express*, 3 October 1961: 11, 'Man who shot Dr. Verwoerd is dead'; *The New York Times*, 3 October 1961, 'Dr. Verwoerd attacker takes own life in asylum'; *The Star*, 2 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt hangs himself on his birthday'

⁷⁶²⁶ John Spiller in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁶²⁷ Bird, 1992: 208.

After his death, the *Cape Times*, citing hospital and authority sources, reported that Pratt's stay in the Old Fort hospital was marked by "several unusual events." However, only one was mentioned - that just before Christmas, Pratt attended a party for the hospital's patients and "danced with several partners."⁷⁶²⁸ The newspaper did not explain what was so unusual about dancing with a variety of partners, unless such behaviour was considered strange in South Africa in 1960 and dancers were expected to have only one partner. The report seems more like a crude attempt to support the theory that Pratt was a "strange, unusual" man who committed suicide.

The *Rand Daily Mail* reported that an unnamed friend who visited Pratt was not surprised by his suicide. It quoted him as saying, "He was growing more depressed by the day. He realised there was a slight chance that he should ever leave the mental hospital."⁷⁶²⁹ This assumption was arguable, because, as Isie Maisels pointed out, a decision on parole for Pratt was due to be taken very soon.⁷⁶³⁰ Finally, *Transition* magazine wrote about Pratt shortly after his death that he had "made a sacrifice and a prophecy."⁷⁶³¹

One who was deeply affected by Pratt's death was Desmond Blow. He told the author that he was "devastated" when he heard the news and burst into tears. Indeed Blow wept quietly while talking to the author about Pratt, who he characterised as "a perfect gentleman" and one of the "kindest and bravest men" he ever met.⁷⁶³² Desmond's wife Elizabeth told the author that Pratt's death deeply upset her husband. "He was very upset and he just said he couldn't understand and yet, it really upset him and hurt him because he felt it was unnecessary... he really was, for a long time, he was upset about it. I don't think he fully recovered."⁷⁶³³

FUNERAL

Pratt's funeral was delayed to allow his daughter, Susan, and his second wife, Patricia, to arrive from England and Holland respectively.⁷⁶³⁴ The cremation was attended by family,

⁷⁶²⁸ *The Cape Times*, 3 October 1961, 'Pratt's letter before cell suicide.'

⁷⁶²⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 October 1961, 'Pratt's suicide did not surprise his friends.'

⁷⁶³⁰ Maisels, 1998: 107.

⁷⁶³¹ *Transition*, 1961: 272.

⁷⁶³² Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶³³ Elizabeth Blow in a personal interview, 26 October 2017.

⁷⁶³⁴ *Daily Dispatch*, 3 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt is found hanged-on 52nd birthday'; *The Star*, 3 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt funeral postponed.'

friends, and members of his Maloney's Eye work force on October 6, 1961 at Braamfontein Crematorium.⁷⁶³⁵ A private ceremony was held later when his ashes were scattered at Maloney's Eye, fulfilling his supposed last wish.⁷⁶³⁶

COMMENTS ON PRATT'S DEATH

Although there is no evidence to prove that Pratt did not commit suicide, the circumstances of his death remain shrouded in doubt, with questions ranging from penal precedent to behavioural improbabilities. Firstly, "suicide" or "natural causes" were the causes of death that were frequently announced when persons died in police detention or in prison during the apartheid years. It has been officially admitted that up until 1972, twenty-two persons died in detention. The cause of death in eleven cases was given as suicide, in three as natural causes and in one thrombosis.⁷⁶³⁷

Probably the two best-known cases are those of Ahmed Timol in 1971, whose death was ruled by the magistrate at an inquest to be "suicide,"⁷⁶³⁸ and Steve Biko, whose death was initially declared to be from "natural causes."⁷⁶³⁹ Both cases have been discussed in Chapter Five. It is obvious that we should be sceptical when deaths of many political prisoners during apartheid were attributed to suicide or natural causes. Pratt's death is no exception. The following points concerning Pratt's behaviour and the opinions of people who knew him well must be considered in seeking to assess whether or not his death was suspicious:

- Pratt adored his daughter Susan and was upset that he would not be able to attend her wedding. By committing suicide less than a month before the planned event, he must have known how much this would hurt her and very likely cause a postponement of the wedding. It seems more than logical that if Pratt wanted to commit suicide, he would have waited another three weeks to be sure that it would not spoil his daughter's wedding.
- John Spiller, the last of Pratt's friends to see him alive, only a few hours before his death, said his business partner was in high spirits, joking and even cheeking the warders. When

⁷⁶³⁵ *The Times*, 3 October 1961: 8, 'Pratt found dead.'

⁷⁶³⁶ *The Star*, 7 October 1961: 1, 'Pratt's last wish.'

⁷⁶³⁷ Cook, 1974: 27.

⁷⁶³⁸ Houston and Magubane, 2007: 440-441; Magubane, 2007: 5; World Peace Council, 1972: 4-5.

⁷⁶³⁹ Baxter, 1985: 137-138; SAHO, n.d. 'The Inquest into Biko's death and his funeral.'

he heard of his death he was shocked because Pratt's demeanour did not remotely suggest he was contemplating suicide.

- Desmond Blow did not expect Pratt's death and "couldn't believe it" when he heard. He had visited Pratt just a couple of weeks earlier and got the impression that his mood was much improved and he saw nothing to suggest he was planning suicide. In fact, he found him very excited about his daughter's wedding although saddened that he would not be there. However, Blow concedes that things could have changed during the intervening few weeks.

Blow believes that foul play and suicide are equal possibilities. Pratt was not happy to be in the hospital, but he did not appear so depressed as to end his life. He never gave the slightest hint that he might do so and indeed often spoke about his plans when he was released. Blow said Pratt spoke of suicide on one occasion, saying the circumstances under which he would take his life would be if he had to spend the rest of his life in the hospital. However, at the time of his death there were ongoing efforts by his defence team to have him released on parole and everyone, including Pratt, was optimistic that this would happen soon, or at least within the next few years.

On the other hand, Blow is also well aware of the many doubtful "suicides" among prisoners. He believes it is possible that Pratt was murdered to ensure he was not released or to forestall his efforts for a retrial which would expose apartheid to public criticism. Blow argues that it would have been "very embarrassing" for the government if it had become known that a wealthy White man had shot Verwoerd because he opposed his policies; it would have been "much better" for the regime were Pratt to be declared insane and incarcerated. At the same time, Blow declines to rule out the possibility that Pratt, perhaps in a moment of deep depression, decided to end it all.⁷⁶⁴⁰

- Doreen Billson, Pratt's former partner who remained a friend and visited him often in the hospital, was stunned to hear of his death. She never believed that Pratt committed suicide and insisted that he was murdered. She said he was dreaming of the day he would be released and often told her of his plans to sail around the world.⁷⁶⁴¹

⁷⁶⁴⁰ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶⁴¹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 3, 'I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.'

- Elizabeth Radsma, Pratt's personal assistant, who visited him frequently, strongly believes that Pratt was murdered. "I do not think that he committed suicide, yes, they murdered him. He would not have committed suicide this way, especially just a few weeks before Susan's wedding. Impossible! In those days, you just didn't have a chance if you were against the government." According to Radsma, Pratt never gave her the slightest hint that he planned to commit suicide. On the contrary, he would speak about the future and about what he would do when he was released, since his parole hearing was coming soon.⁷⁶⁴²
- Dr. Solly Jacobson, Pratt's personal psychiatrist, was very surprised by his suicide.
- A frequent visitor, a clergyman, whose name was not given by the *Sunday Times*, but it is Father Macginnis, a Roman Catholic priest, said Pratt had mentioned to him the monotony of life in the institution and indicated that he was unhappy that he could not do any creative work. However, the Father Macginnis said he was surprised to hear that Pratt had died. Afterwards, he dismissed rumours that Pratt's mind had been deteriorating while in the hospital.⁷⁶⁴³
- Pratt's died shortly before his parole was to be discussed with a chance that he might be released.
- The way Pratt apparently chose to die is extraordinary, involving acrobatic physical effort for a middle-aged man, however fit, and resulting in agonising, slow strangulation. A man of his intelligence and determination could surely have found an easier way.
- There was no inquest, although such an inquiry was an automatic procedure in sudden deaths and suicides. This was curious, especially since the police had initially announced there would be one.
- Pratt's suicide note was never examined by a hand-writing expert to determine whether it was indeed his handwriting.
- The police who guarded Dimitri Tsafendas while he was in custody and forced him to undergo mock hangings warned him that he would "end up like David Pratt." Tsafendas

⁷⁶⁴² Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁶⁴³ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015; *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 3, 'Pratt wrote fairy tales in hospital.'

assumed they were telling him that Pratt had not committed suicide, but that they had killed him and made it look like suicide and that this could happen to him, too.

- The authorities had good reasons for wanting Pratt dead. They knew about his plans for a retrial, having found the relevant documents in Blow's house. Thus they were aware that with prominent apartheid opponents such as Sir Paul Dukes, David Ennals, Harry Oppenheimer and Jeremy Thorpe as witnesses, a murder trial could be turned into a trial of apartheid. The propaganda damage to the regime would be immense. It is no coincidence that the authorities made it extremely difficult for Blow to see Pratt after discovering what the pair were up to.

The factors mentioned above are not conclusive but taken together are sufficient to raise suspicions. What is proven is that a number of deaths of prisoners during apartheid which were originally attributed to suicide or to natural causes, were actually murders. This was enough to require a proper investigation into the circumstances of Pratt's death.

DR. ALLAN BIRD'S CONSPIRACY THEORY

In 1992, the South African Dr. Allan Bird, Professor of Neurology at the University of the Witwatersrand and a private practitioner, published his autobiography, *Bird on the Wing*. In it he set out his theory that Dr. Solly Jacobson had plotted with Pratt, his patient at the time, to kill Dr. Verwoerd, after which Pratt would evade punishment by pleading insanity. Dr. Jacobson and Dr. Bird had been partners in a neurology practice in Johannesburg since 1952, but they held opposite views on politics. Bird supported the status quo while Jacobson was passionately anti-apartheid, a dedicated member of the Communist Party and one of Joe Slovo's closest friends.⁷⁶⁴⁴

Dr. Bird wrote how his suspicions were first raised:

“On one fateful occasion, together for some social event such as a birthday and chatting about the ugly turn the country's politics were taking, Solly, obviously under great tension, blurted out: ‘If Dr. Verwoerd goes on like this, HE IS GOING TO GET A BULLET.’ These were the actual words he used, and because of their gravity, fixed themselves in my

⁷⁶⁴⁴ Bird 1992: 203, 218.

*memory. I asked him to explain and he came out with a comment like, 'Dr. Verwoerd is a madman and is dragging the country to ruin.'*⁷⁶⁴⁵

That Dr. Jacobson said Dr. Verwoerd "is going to get a bullet" can hardly be considered as evidence that he planned to kill the prime minister. It is the sort of remark anyone might make in the course of a heated political discussion. Presumably, the fact that Pratt had been Dr. Jacobson's patient played a role in Dr. Bird's subsequent assumption. In reality, however, if Dr. Jacobson was involved in any such plot, he was mostly unlikely to make such a threat in public, especially in front of Dr. Bird, who did not sympathise with his political ideas.

The second reason Bird became suspicious arose out of a telephone call. Bird was asleep in the middle of the night when his phone rang:

"It was Solly Jacobson. He was calling me to tell me that one of his patients, David Pratt, had shot the Prime Minister while he was opening the Rand Easter Agricultural Show at Milner Park that afternoon. The reason he was calling was because he feared that the assailant, who had been taken to the Police Forensic Laboratory for examination, might be undergoing physical torture to extract from him why he had carried out the deed.

Solly wanted me to go to the lab to establish what was happening to Pratt. 'Why should I have to go to the lab? He is not my patient, and I have never even set my eyes on him. If you consider it so important that someone should go and see what is going on, why don't you go yourself? After all, you know him and he is your patient.'

This futile discussion seemed to go on for several minutes and then Solly brought up a new point. 'Isie Maisels is with me and he thinks it would be better that you should go.' Maisels was a leading advocate and had been an acting judge. He was a close associate of Jacobson. When he heard that I was demurring, he came on the line himself and asked me to go to the lab, saying it would be better for all concerned – but I would not budge. Finally we said good night, but there was not much sleep for me that night ...

The next morning, Sunday, found Jacobson and myself back to routine and seeing our hospital patients. Jacobson looked washed out and weary and gave me a wan smile. 'What the hell was going on last night?' I half-jokingly asked him. 'In the end, Isie and I went down

⁷⁶⁴⁵ Bird 1992: 204-205.

to the laboratory.' 'And?' 'There was nothing wrong going on. In fact they were treating Pratt very kindly.'”⁷⁶⁴⁶

The fact that Dr. Jacobson was concerned about Pratt seems perfectly natural since he was his patient. That he had reservations about visiting him and asked Dr. Bird to do so instead also seems logical, given that his anti-government disposition was almost certainly known to the authorities. Indeed, three years later he had to flee the country to avoid arrest.

Interestingly, Maisels does not make any reference in his own autobiography *'A life at Law'* to visiting Pratt that evening. He states simply that he was approached by a firm of lawyers to represent Pratt. He makes no mention of seeing Pratt or being involved in the case before he was appointed by the law firm.

Although Dr. Bird described Maisels as a “close associate” of Jacobson, this description seems dubious in light of Maisels’ description of events in his autobiography. He gives a detailed description of the case, but nowhere does he mention visiting Pratt on the day of the shooting, while he does not refer to Dr. Jacobson at all. It is possible that Maisels was a close associate of Jacobson and did visit Pratt but made no mention of this in his autobiography. However, given the detail he expended on describing the case, this seems unlikely. If Dr. Jacobson was indeed a close associate of Maisels, Maisels presumably would have mentioned his name at least once in his autobiography, even with no connection to the Pratt case

During Pratt’s trial, Dr. Friedman said that he examined Pratt three hours after the shooting and he called Prof. Hurst to examine him, too. The doctors confirmed each other’s stories in court, but neither made any mention of Dr. Jacobson or Maisels being there at any point. Prof. Hurst did state that there was another doctor present who did not participate in the examination. He did not name the doctor. If the unnamed doctor was Jacobson, surely the fact that Pratt had been visited by his personal psychiatrist a few hours after the shooting would have become known, in or outside the court. There is no mention anywhere in the press, in the testimonies of Dr. Friedman or Prof. Hurst or in the trial minutes of Dr. Jacobson visiting Pratt that evening. As the media learned of the presence of Drs. Friedman and Hurst, probably they would have learned of Jacobson, too.

⁷⁶⁴⁶ Bird 1992: 207-208.

What is more, any visit to Pratt at the time would have been secured only through the police, yet there is no mention of it by the police. Such a visit would also have been known to the public prosecutor. However, when Dr. Jacobson testified at the trial, he made no mention of any such visit and the prosecutor did not ask him about one. To ignore such a visit by Pratt's personal psychiatrist, assuming such a visit had taken place, would have been an egregious omission by the prosecutor and the two doctors who had examined Pratt the day of the assault.

Dr. Bird claims that Dr. Jacobson told him the police treated Pratt "very kindly." It takes a feat of the imagination to picture the South African police force, with its reputation for brutality, dealing kindly with a man who had just shot their prime minister. However, imagination apart, Dr. Bird's claim is contradicted by Joe Slovo in his autobiography where he stated that when Pratt was brought to the Johannesburg Fort prison after the shooting, he was covered in blood. This could not have been blood from Pratt's reported beating by the crowd immediately after the attempt. Several hours had passed since then and it is unlikely that Dr. Friedman and Prof. Hurst left Pratt covered in blood after their examinations. None of the photographs taken at the scene of the shooting show Pratt as blood-stained; indeed, he appears normally dressed and unruffled, apart from slightly tousled hair. This again suggests that the beating and injuries he sustained, which the two doctors referred to, were caused by the police.

A point to consider is that Dr. Bird's book was published in 1992 when both Dr. Jacobson and Maisels were still alive and Maisels was living in South Africa. It seems unlikely that Dr. Bird would risk publishing untruths about two men who could challenge his accounts, although it is always possible that his memory played him false about events more than three decades earlier. In addition, his book was self-published, which means that it was not widely available and perhaps neither Jacobson nor Maisels was aware of it.

To conclude, the author cannot know for a fact if Maisels and Dr. Jacobson visited Pratt that day, but even if they did, this could not mean that Dr. Jacobson was involved in a conspiracy to kill Dr. Verwoerd. As Pratt's personal psychiatrist, Dr. Jacobson had every reason to be concerned about his welfare. Therefore, unless Joe Slovo and Isie Maisels lied, and Dr. Jacobson with Maisels managed to visit Pratt in custody and the police did not see them, then Dr. Bird's claim does not seem to be very accurate.

Bird's third suspicious incident related to the period immediately after Pratt's death:

"... Jacobson came to see me at home. He was distraught. Between sobs he told me that Pratt had hanged himself in a toilet at the hospital and he blamed himself for what had happened.

*As I was trying to console Solly, he told me that Pratt's original suicide attempt was brought about by Dr. Verwoerd's plans to introduce laws to impose apartheid through Parliament. But after treatment with psychotherapy and anti-depressant drugs, Pratt began to think more logically. Jacobson pointed out to him that, if he had died from the overdose, he would have achieved nothing towards curtailing apartheid. I gathered that between them they worked out a plan for Pratt to shoot Dr. Verwoerd. As he suffered from epilepsy, according to the Mental Disorders Act of 1916, he was insane and would not have to stand trial."*⁷⁶⁴⁷

What is disconcerting about this excerpt is the absence of a single quotation from Jacobson or Pratt to support Bird's conclusion that the two had engineered a plot to kill Dr. Verwoerd. Nothing could be vaguer than "I gathered that between them they worked out a plan for Pratt to shoot Dr. Verwoerd." Gathered what? Even if Jacobson ventured no more than his excerpt related, Bird seems to have been extraordinarily unresponsive in this situation, especially for a supporter of the regime. It took him four years to report his suspicions to the police. In 1964, he confided his beliefs to General van den Bergh, who, according to Dr. Bird, replied that they were "speculative," though he admitted that Jacobson's "activities aroused suspicion."⁷⁶⁴⁸

As for other aspects of the Jacobson-Bird meeting, it is difficult to perceive a sinister intent in Dr. Jacobson's remark that if Pratt had committed suicide, he would have achieved nothing "*towards curtailing apartheid.*" This is surely often said to mentally fragile patients, that "if you die, you will achieve nothing, but if you live ..." It is a counsel of encouragement, not, as Dr. Bird seemed to think, a reprieve providing a fresh opportunity to kill.

In 1936, Stefan Lux, a Slovak Jewish journalist, committed suicide in the League of Nations building in Geneva to protest against the growing persecution of Jews in Germany and to raise awareness of the oppression. Swiss journalist Léon Savary commented: "People bold enough to fight for justice shouldn't kill themselves, but stay at their position."⁷⁶⁴⁹ In

⁷⁶⁴⁷ Bird, 1992: 209.

⁷⁶⁴⁸ Bird, 1992: 212.

⁷⁶⁴⁹ Levani (*Le Monde Juif*), January-March 1966, 'Il y a trente ans: Stefan Lux.'

1970, Costas Georgakis, a Greek student in Italy, committed suicide by setting himself on fire in the Matteotti square in Genoa as a protest against the dictatorial regime in Greece. He was not insane and no-one asked him to do it. However, there was a widespread feeling that such a determined and intelligent man should have stayed alive to fight the dictatorship. The most convincing argument against committing suicide as a form of political protest is: Remain alive and you will be more useful for the struggle. Even if Dr. Jacobson had encouraged Pratt to remain alive in order to fight apartheid, this does not suggest that he “programmed” him to assassinate Dr. Verwoerd.

With regard to the purported agreement between Pratt and Dr. Jacobson that Pratt would kill Dr. Verwoerd then plead insanity, this is wholly inconsistent with Pratt’s known attitude. He vigorously challenged the attempts by his daughter Susan to have him declared insane. He even forbade his defence team to bring his medical records to the court and this was done only after Susan’s application. Pratt even changed his defence team when they pressed the necessity of his pleading insanity.

A fourth incident strengthened Dr. Bird’s suspicions. That was in 1966 when he heard that Tsafendas was also treated by Dr. Jacobson. However, this was quite wrong, because Dr. Jacobson never treated Tsafendas. This case is discussed in Chapter Six and will not be discussed here again, but let us see what Dr. Bird did regarding his unfounded suspicions. Once again, he felt it was his patriotic duty to inform the police about his suspicions regarding his former partner. This time he spoke to Brigadier Johan Coetzee of the security police. Coetzee agreed to look at the case. Dr. Bird then heard nothing from Coetzee until 1979, when he claimed Coetzee said he had established that Tsafendas was indeed treated by Dr. Jacobson in England shortly or immediately before Tsafendas’s departure for South Africa.⁷⁶⁵⁰

However, according to Dr. Bird, Coetzee said there was not enough evidence to ask for Dr. Jacobson’s extradition from England. Dr. Bird suggested that Coetzee’s unwillingness to pursue the matter further might have to do with the fact that Dr. Jacobson was Jewish and the Brigadier “had an unusually friendly leaning towards the Israelis.”⁷⁶⁵¹ Finally, Desmond Blow and Elizabeth Radsma both dismissed Dr. Bird’s theory out of hand. Radsma

⁷⁶⁵⁰ Bird, 214-215.

⁷⁶⁵¹ Bird, 214-215.

characterised the claim as “ridiculous,”⁷⁶⁵² while Blow bust out laughing when the author mentioned it, although he was aware of the theory. Blow was so dismissive of the theory that he told the author jokingly, “I thought you were a serious researcher!” To this, the author replied, “I *am* a serious researcher, that’s why I want to examine everything that has been written about the case.”⁷⁶⁵³

It is obvious that Dr. Bird’s theory that Jacobson and Pratt colluded to kill Dr. Verwoerd is nonsense and we are left to wonder why he concocted it. The answer may lie in his political beliefs, which point to the type of person he was. Twice he turned voluntarily informant in the service of one of the world’s most brutal and repressive regimes. More importantly the person he offered to sacrifice was a “friend” and former business partner, a married man with children, whose only crime was that he opposed the regime which Dr. Bird served. That his case against Jacobson was somewhere between fragile and non-existent was irrelevant because this was a time when the apartheid police did not need evidence to arrest anyone, but merely a suspicion. It was a time, according to the TRC, on which “torture was the dominant form of violation by the apartheid police.”⁷⁶⁵⁴

A paragraph in his autobiography set out Dr. Bird’s changing attitude towards Jacobson and demonstrates how he felt justified in informing on him to the police. He wrote:

“Both Jacobson and (Nelson) Mandela were camp-followers of the South African Communist Party before its banning. After the Rivonia Trial, when it was established that there was a Communist plot to seize power in South Africa, I began to see Jacobson in a more sinister light – no longer as an altruistic, starry-eyed worker for freedom, but as an international terrorist, aiming with his cohorts, to conquer the world.”⁷⁶⁵⁵

Dr. Bird’s remark needs no comment as it tells us everything we need to know about his character and the way he perceived things. What seems curious about Dr. Bird is that he wrote all this in 1992 without any sign of shame that he had served the by then widely discredited apartheid regime. Obviously he felt proud of his patriotic efforts to save his country from Communist/Jewish terrorists who wanted to conquer the world.

⁷⁶⁵² Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁶⁵³ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶⁵⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 3, 1998: 530.

⁷⁶⁵⁵ Bird, 1992: 212.

COMMENTS ON PRATT'S CHARACTER AND STATE OF MIND

What is perhaps the most impressive aspect of Pratt's life story is the way his friends and acquaintances rallied round to save his life or even just express their solidarity. Their attitude says a lot about his character and the esteem in which he was widely held. Several friends underwent the ordeal of a court appearance during which they withheld incriminating facts about Pratt, such as his hatred for Dr. Verwoerd and apartheid, while exaggerating incidents in a way that would support the insanity plea. A small number were even willing to risk their freedom and perhaps more to help him escape from prison. It seems impossible that all these people, including Oppenheimer, Ennals, Thorpe and Dukes, would have agreed to defend him if they thought he was insane or they did not sympathize with him.

On a wider scale, friends and comrades from the Liberal Party in Britain and the anti-apartheid movement there organized a fund-raising, not because he needed the money, but as a gesture of solidarity. His activities in London demonstrated the trust and acceptance which like-minded Britons extended towards him. That a Liberal Parliamentary candidate took Pratt campaigning with him to, of all places, the 10 Downing Street home of the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, testifies to the admiration and trust extended to this White opponent from the land of apartheid. That members of the Liberal Social Club and MPs of the Liberal Party, like Jeremy Thorpe and Bruce Hewes, were willing to go to court on Pratt's behalf demonstrates the esteem in which he was held. It is impossible to believe they would have acted in this way for someone they believed to be insane.

Pratt's stature in British liberal circles is reflected in the fact that he was a member of the exclusive National Liberal Club, on whose membership rolls were inscribed a wide range of prominent persons, including its founder, William Ewart Gladstone, Sir Winston Churchill and other British prime ministers. More importantly, Pratt was allowed to remain a member despite his arraignment for shooting a prime minister.

None of the people who knew him well is on record as believing Pratt was insane. He suffered from epilepsy and was characterised at times as impulsive, depressed and difficult. Some speculated that he had a psychological problem, almost certainly meaning his depression, but no-one ever claimed that he acted like a lunatic or reported things he said which might suggest he was insane.

Elizabeth Radsma and Noel Spiller, two of the defence's main witnesses, spoke later about their difficult situation at the trial and their efforts to give weight to the insanity plea,

while concealing Pratt's loathing for apartheid. Subsequently, they declared flatly that Pratt was perfectly sane. Fr. Orsmond, who also knew Pratt very well, testified in the same manner as Radsma and Spiller.

Indisputable proof of Pratt's clarity in speech, thought and writing is contained in his own words as presented in this study, during his speech at the trial and in his personal letters and notes. Nothing in them could remotely suggest that he was mentally unstable. On the contrary, everything Pratt says or writes is lucid and to the point throughout. What is also evident is that his writing reflects his state of mind while in prison and hospital. Pratt does not write simple letters, but describes in detail his life in custody. We see not only how he spent his time, but more importantly how he concealed some of his activities. Sprinkling sugar grains on the ground leading to his cell so that he could hear the warders coming was indicative of his intelligent forethought, as was giving code-names to the witnesses he wanted to testify. The logical, detailed planning set out in his "Method for approaching trial," is evidence of a clear head and a lively intelligence, hardly the attributes of a mentally unstable person.

Pratt's political ideas and activities were widely reported in the foreign press, but not in the South African media due to the ban on mentioning his name. Almost certainly, the prohibition was meant to prevent South Africans from learning of Pratt's political activities and beliefs. The ban not only concealed Pratt's attitude to the government but blocked positive information about him carried by the foreign press.

Pratt was a sensitive man who adored his children and cared deeply for the people around him. He built homes and a school for his African workers and gave refuge on his farm to penniless and homeless Blacks from elsewhere. He donated regularly to charities and he paid the school fees for the children of friends less well off than himself.

His love for his children led him to make sometimes desperate attempts to see them. This was not insanity but the mark of a loving father. Right up to the time of his death, he wrote fairy tales for the children who were never far from his mind. The foregoing are just some examples of Pratt's humanity as seen by friends and acquaintances. Let us now consider what they had to say about his mental state:

- Fr. Orsmond said he found Pratt to be "a very concerned person, concerned for things of justice, and he had a great mercy for people suffering illness or poverty. I do know that he wasn't an evil man. I do know that he would not have committed a cold-blooded murder

just for the sake of cold-blooded murder. I doubt even if he would defend himself if he was personally being attacked by trying to kill the oppressor, the attacker. But in this case there was more than just the life of one man; in this case there were really the lives of thousands and thousands of people, and the future of the country. In some ways he could have seen that, in his conscience, as a noble thing. And if he saw it as a noble thing, he could not be condemned as having a bad conscience, no... Well, as far as I am concerned, on the whole, if you look at him and you think of him and you just talking to him, I don't think he... well, you couldn't call him insane. You couldn't call him, say, schizophrenic or anything like that, but he was odd. I think that's the best word – he was odd, but certainly not insane.”⁷⁶⁵⁶

- Bruce Hewes, former vice-chairman of the Westminster Constituent Liberal Party in London, said, “I think it is wrong to write Mr. Pratt off as a madman. He was not the sort of chap to go around shouting ‘Down with Dr. Verwoerd.’ He would go and do something about it. He helped us a great deal with door-to-door canvassing. He didn't talk very much, but he struck me as being perfectly sane.”⁷⁶⁵⁷
- Mr. R. Clark, manager of Pratt's farm, speaking two days after the shooting, said, “Mr. Pratt returned from Europe about six weeks ago and appeared to be entirely normal. He is a temperamental man who is easily upset, but that is all. I did not notice any other change in his behaviour.”⁷⁶⁵⁸
- Elizabeth Radsma spoke at length of a man she knew well as his personal assistant: “David was a very sensitive man. Due to his sensitivity, he often fell into depression. Mostly they were two things that gave him depression -- the fact that he was not unable to be constantly with his two small children who he absolutely adored, and then it was apartheid. He would often get into depression when reading about arrests and violence. He would even get depressed by seeing poor people in the streets. He was definitely not insane, not at all. The only thing wrong with his health was his epilepsy... He was very intelligent and educated. He was a very generous, compassionate and kind man... he hated Dr. Verwoerd for what he was doing to the Black people. He hated apartheid and

⁷⁶⁵⁶ Father Orsmond in Guy Spiller's *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

⁷⁶⁵⁷ *Evening Standard*, 11 April 1960: 1, ‘Death for gunman?’

⁷⁶⁵⁸ Verster (*Die Vaderland*), 11 April 1960: 4, ‘Pratt se plaas: So lyk dit.’

Dr. Verwoerd and wanted to stop both, we all knew that, we just did not expect that he will go and shot Dr. Verwoerd.”⁷⁶⁵⁹

- Doreen Billson, who knew Pratt since 1948, said, “I am positive he was not mentally ill. He did, however, suffer strange visions – a euphoria which is a known side-effect from taking regular doses of a drug which controls epileptic attacks.”⁷⁶⁶⁰
- Desmond Blow, the *Sunday Times* reporter who became close to Pratt, told the author that he was “very fond” of him.⁷⁶⁶¹ Not for a moment did he think that Pratt was insane and considered him to be “very sane.”⁷⁶⁶² On the contrary, Blow found Pratt to be “very alert and intelligent.” He also characterised him as “a gentleman and most likeable.” As for his political ideas, Blow described Pratt as “a very concerned man, genuinely concerned about the social injustice that was taking place in South Africa;” he was “very anti-racist and very much against Verwoerd and apartheid. He wanted apartheid to end and would have done whatever he thought it might take to achieve that.”⁷⁶⁶³ The admiration that Blow felt for Pratt is evident in the fact that he named his son David after him.⁷⁶⁶⁴ It is unthinkable that a serious man would name his son after a “schizophrenic” who suffered from “megalomania” and a “martyr/saviour” complex.
- A clergyman whose name was not given by the *Sunday Times*, but it is Father Macginnis, said that he had always found Pratt, who he knew well, to be logical and reasonable.⁷⁶⁶⁵
- Joe Slovo was impressed by Pratt’s character and his political thinking. He considered him to be “a very brave man” and never got the impression he was a schizophrenic or a megalomaniac.⁷⁶⁶⁶
- Noel Spiller described his speech at the trial as a “wonderful address” and stressed the difficult position she found herself in when asked by the defence to support the insanity plea when she knew Pratt was not insane.⁷⁶⁶⁷

⁷⁶⁵⁹ Elizabeth Radsma in a personal interview, 9 January 2017.

⁷⁶⁶⁰ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 3, ‘I loved David Pratt-wonderful, sad man.’

⁷⁶⁶¹ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶⁶² Graham David Blow in a personal interview, 22 October 2017.

⁷⁶⁶³ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶⁶⁴ Graham David Blow in a personal interview, 8 October 2017.

⁷⁶⁶⁵ *Sunday Express*, 8 October 1961: 3, ‘Pratt wrote fairy tales in hospital.’

⁷⁶⁶⁶ Desmond Blow in a personal interview, 11 May 2015.

⁷⁶⁶⁷ Noel Spiller in Guy Spiller’s *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

- Sue Charter said, “Although that was what the trial had described David as – the criminally insane – and, you know, put him into that position, it (the hospital) was full of people who were very, very different from him. He was still, to all intents and purposes, very much the way he was outside. I mean, he appeared very sane and very relaxed, although he did speak of being very depressed, obviously, at times.”⁷⁶⁶⁸

CONCLUSION

David Pratt was described by one of his best friends, Fr. Orsmond, as “a very concerned person, concerned for things of justice, and he had a great mercy for people suffering illness or poverty.” Pratt was very wealthy, compassionate and extraordinarily generous. A believer in the benefits of education, he paid for poor people’s studies and built and financed a school for Black children on his farm. He contributed to charities and constantly helped people in need, both White and non-White. He was an epileptic from the age of eight years but this did not prevent him from pursuing his many aims and ambitions.

Pratt built modern and comfortable apartment houses on his farm for his Black employees. He was known to be such a good employer that friends and relatives of his labour force would ask to work for him. Even if he had no jobs, he would allow them to stay in his farm. Before long, the apartments housed more than the stipulated single family. Pratt did not object but offered food to everyone who lived there.

The driving force in Pratt’s life was his concern for social justice. As a wealthy White man, he was in a position to gain from the rule of apartheid, but he was strongly opposed to the racist doctrine that governed South Africa and did everything he could to fight it. In 1954, he tried to form a political coalition with Nicolaas Havenga and Harry Oppenheimer as a means of defeating the National Party and ending apartheid. His efforts failed but he did not give up. He joined and contributed generously to the South African Liberal Party, seeking to expand its outreach. In Britain, he joined the Liberal Party and joined enthusiastically in its activities. He spoke at meetings against apartheid and urged Britons to boycott South African goods. He also worked for the party at the 1959 General Election, canvassing on foot for the Liberal candidate in the Westminster constituency.

⁷⁶⁶⁸ Sue Charter in Guy Spiller’s *The Liberal and the Pirate*, 1999.

His vision of a non-racist South Africa and his willingness to die for his principles were widely misunderstood and he was seen instead as a mentally disordered, a megalomaniac, a would-be Messiah who saw himself as some kind of saviour or martyr. This perception may have carried some weight if Pratt had achieved nothing, but here was someone who provided houses for his workers and a school for their children, who travelled to London and urged the British to boycott South African exports, who tried by constitutional means to defeat the racist engineers of the system he hated. If this was megalomania, could not the same be said of the French magnate Jean-Yves Ollivier, who arrived in South Africa and decided he would take on apartheid on his own? Their only difference is that Pratt failed to beat apartheid, while Ollivier, operating in a more positive political climate, succeeded. Had there been more “megalomaniacs” like Pratt, deliverance would have come to South Africa sooner.

As for Pratt’s willingness to die for an idea, is this a sign of mental disorder? History is full of such people. Indeed, only three years later, Nelson Mandela made a similar statement at the Rivonia Trial. Yet he was never presented as mentally disordered or lampooned as someone who saw himself as a national saviour or martyr.

In considering the references to mental instability, Pratt’s epilepsy was clearly a factor. This life-long condition frequently caused him to become depressed, requiring recurring treatment, including almost constant medication. The medication intended to ward off epileptic episodes often had unwanted effects, most notably a state of euphoria which sometimes affected his judgment. Even so, epilepsy is not a mental disease.

However, when it came to apartheid and politics, Pratt was invariably lucid and logical. When he spoke at length in court about his assault on Dr. Verwoerd, he outlined his ideology and addressed his motives in language that was perfectly clear. His address from the dock was a condemnation of apartheid and of Dr. Verwoerd’s policies, without the slightest indication of insanity. His letters and his essays likewise bear no sign of insanity.

One of the extraordinary aspects of the Pratt case is the way so many people rallied to save him. His daughter, friends and work colleagues pressured him to plead insanity and several negotiated uncomfortable appearances in court on his behalf. Other friends, unknown to us, involved themselves in at least three attempts to help him escape, thereby risking their own freedom. Would anyone do such a thing for a man who was insane? In England, anti-apartheid activists and members of the Liberal and Labour parties raised money for Pratt’s

defence. In view of his wealth, the cash was irrelevant, but the gesture reflected their loyalty to a man who had impressed them by his devotion to the anti-apartheid cause. Members of the anti-apartheid movement wrote letters to the Commonwealth Relations Office and to the British Foreign Office in London, urging them to intervene in Pratt's case and ensure that he would get a fair trial.

It is inconceivable that a man portrayed as he was at his trial - a danger to himself and others, unsociable, mentally ill, lacking political interest, seized by a martyr/saviour complex - would have all these people fighting on his side. Had his friends believed Pratt was mentally ill, they would have known he could not be hanged; their mobilization showed that they knew he was sane and considered his execution a real possibility.

An important point needs to be made with regard to medical evidence. This is that with the exception of Dr. Friedman and Prof. Hurst, all the doctors who testified in court or whose reports were handed in, knew Pratt very well, and none of them certified him as being mentally disordered before the trial. In the case of Prof. Hurst, even if he was not acquainted with Pratt, he was a regular guest at the latter's Crayfish Inn and a friend of Pratt's business partner and friend Noel Spiller. From this we can assume he was aware of who Pratt was and almost certainly asked Spiller for her opinion of Pratt after he examined him. As for Dr. Friedman, he found nothing wrong with Pratt, apart from his physical injuries. Dr. Chesler, who thought Pratt was unable to look after his own affairs, admitted under cross-examination, that his diagnosis could have been wrong and other psychiatrists could disagree with it.

We should remember that Pratt left for Joe Slovo and other imprisoned anti-apartheid activists an exercise book which, according to Slovo, contained "very elaborate and fanciful exhortations for joint efforts against racism."⁷⁶⁶⁹ This is not the action of a mentally unstable man or of a megalomaniac; it is something done by a selfless and principled man, who loathed racism and apartheid and cared deeply about South Africa and the people. Although Pratt's plans might have appeared "fanciful" to Slovo, the fact that Pratt went to considerable trouble to work them out demonstrates once again his determination and dedication to fight racism. Finally, we should also remember that Pratt wrote to Dr. Verwoerd that the "vast inarticulate majority of South Africans are bitterly opposed to the policies you have been pursuing with such utter ruthlessness... Every human being has a basic dignity, and when

⁷⁶⁶⁹ Slovo, 1995: 133.

you attempt to destroy this, you come up against the force of God... it is better for a man to die for a principle than to live in contradiction thereto.”⁷⁶⁷⁰

The author believes that David Pratt’s case should be re-examined in detail in all of its aspects but most especially his death. His death, reported as “suicide,” deserves the sort of investigation given to that of Ahmed Timol in 2017. Finally, Pratt’s own words signal the kind of man he was:

“... every South African, Afrikaner, English South African, Coloured, Indian, Bantu, Malay, every person in South Africa has got to play his part if we are to build the South Africa that I know can be built... a glittering future waiting for her as long as she observes the basic laws of God and human dignity, which of course, means, in the words, I think, of Macmillan at the time, ‘Rule by merit and not pigment of skin.’ South Africa has to throw off the slimy snake apartheid which is gripping its throat.”⁷⁶⁷¹

Were these words, or those in his letter to Dr. Verwoerd, the words of an insane man or of a megalomaniac?

⁷⁶⁷⁰ Guy Spiller’s *The Liberal and the Pirate.* 1999.

⁷⁶⁷¹ David Pratt’s testimony in the Enquiry regarding his mental condition in *Regina vs. David Beresford Pratt*, 13 September 1960. *The State versus David Beresford Pratt.* 712-60. NASA.

AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION

AFTERMATH

AMNESTY EFFORTS

Tsafendas remained in prison until 1994 and then spent the final five years of his life in Sterkfontein mental hospital. From 1966 to 1994, the only person who visited him – apart from the priests, a social worker, and the two brief visits by David Bloomberg (discussed earlier) – was one of his Shangaan students, who by the late 1980s had become the chief of his tribe. However, Tsafendas was not allowed to converse with his friend because the warders did not speak Portuguese or Shangaan.⁷⁶⁷²

On November 24, 1994, Mr. Jody Kollapen – then a lawyer with the organization Lawyers for Human Rights, and now a High Court Judge in Pretoria – attempted to secure an amnesty for Tsafendas and have him released from the hospital. He wrote a memorandum to the new democratically elected regional government, stating that:

“Dimitrio Tsafendas has been South Africa’s longest serving prisoner... To our knowledge he was the only State President’s patient who was not held in a mental institution but in a prison and we have no doubts whatsoever that the reasons for that were purely political and were based on inflicting the maximum amount of suffering upon the man who killed the so called architect and grandmaster of apartheid ...

It remains my belief that Mr. Tsafendas should not die a lonely man in an institution but should spend the last years of his life in the company of people he knows and perhaps trusts ... In summation I believe that the man has served his debt to the society (if he owed a debt at all in the first place). His age and disposition certainly do not warrant him being held in an institution and if it was possible to release him either to family or into an old age institution run by the State this might be the best approach to follow at the present time.”⁷⁶⁷³

⁷⁶⁷² Jody Kollapen memorandum regarding Dimitrio Tsafendas. 24 November 1994. Tsafendas’s file in the Lawyers for Human Rights collection (AL3183). SAHA; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

⁷⁶⁷³ Memorandum of Jody Kollapen of Lawyers for Human Rights, 24 November 1994. Tsafendas’s file in the Lawyers for Human Rights collection (AL3183). SAHA.

The ANC government was willing to release Tsafendas, but because he was unable to look after himself, Kollapen attempted to find someone who could look after him after he was released. He personally contacted Tsafendas's family, but they refused, claiming they were too old to look after him. Subsequently, Kollapen contacted the Greek community in Pretoria asking them to place Tsafendas in an old people's home which was owned by the local Greek Orthodox Church. The Greeks refused, claiming that having Tsafendas living in their old people's home would attract negative publicity for the local community and that could harm their business with a possible boycott by White South Africans. Kollapen then even asked the regional government to intervene with his family, suggesting that if the government "were to approach the family their response might well be different."⁷⁶⁷⁴ Despite Kollapen's endless efforts, the release of Tsafendas from the hospital did not materialise due to the fact that no one was willing to care for him.⁷⁶⁷⁵

THE TRC

Jody Kollapen was not the only jurist to take an interest in Tsafendas's case. In late 1996, Mr. Krish Govender, an anti-apartheid activist, human rights lawyer at the time and future Durban State Attorney and co-chairman of the Law Society of South Africa, submitted to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that Tsafendas's case should be "reviewed and investigated." Govender said that the purpose of his submission was to query how Tsafendas as "a State President's patient" could have landed up on Death Row for twenty-eight years. He said in his request that "all decisions, documents and material [regarding Tsafendas's case] must be reviewed and investigated thoroughly. He should be visited by members of the TRC urgently to reassure him that mechanisms for justice or him are taking shape. The public needs to be reassured about his safety, well-being and state of mind, before something happens to him."⁷⁶⁷⁶

It was a natural request since it was well-known how the legal system operated during apartheid. Professor John Dugard told the author that he, like many other South Africans,

⁷⁶⁷⁴ Memorandum of Jody Kollapen of Lawyers for Human Rights, 24 November 1994. Tsafendas's file in the Lawyers for Human Rights collection (AL3183). SAHA.

⁷⁶⁷⁵ Judge Jody Kollapen in a personal interview, 16 April 2015.

⁷⁶⁷⁶ Liza Key letter to Dr. Meryl Vorster, 14 October 1997. Personal Collection of Liza Key.

including jurists, “suspected that there was a political cover-up in the Tsafendas case.”⁷⁶⁷⁷ He also said of the judges in the case:

“I suspect that the government was very careful when it came to appointing judges to hear the Tsafendas case, and so that would explain why both Beyers and van Wyk were involved. They were certainly political persons and they owed their appointments to the government. Van Wyk was politically very much in favour of the government, so it would not surprise me at all that van Wyk decided either under pressure, but I suspect not under pressure, probably he just felt ... and he was in touch with all the top National Party people, socially. He would probably have got the message that it was better, as far as the government was concerned, that Tsafendas be found to be insane.”⁷⁶⁷⁸

However, the then Chief Justice Michael Corbett,⁷⁶⁷⁹ ignorant of the facts about Tsafendas, rejected the suggestion and characterised it as “pointless and absurd,” because of what he considered to be overwhelming evidence presented to the court regarding Tsafendas’s mental health.⁷⁶⁸⁰ Subsequently, as result of Govender’s request, Liza Key, the researcher and filmmaker who had met Tsafendas and made a documentary about him, was asked by Govender and the TRC to make a submission on Tsafendas’s behalf. Key brought some evidence to the TRC about Tsafendas that had not been known at the time, for example his statement to the police where he had given clear political reasons as his motives for killing Dr. Verwoerd. However, also thanks to Corbett, Tsafendas’s case was not investigated further.

It should also be mentioned that Govender’s request was part of a submission he had made to the TRC entitled “Injustice under apartheid judiciary,” asking the Commission to investigate the judiciary’s conduct under apartheid and calling for all judges who had held office prior to 1994 to be held accountable for their conduct before the Commission. It was an eminently reasonable request and something that should have already been done, as it was common knowledge that the South African legal system had been an integral part of the

⁷⁶⁷⁷ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 8 September 2016.

⁷⁶⁷⁸ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

⁷⁶⁷⁹ Justice Michael Corbett (1923-2007) was appointed Chief Justice in late 1988 (Dyzenhaus, 2010: 163). In 1991, Justice Corbett served as co-chairman of the *Convention for a Democratic South Africa* (CODESA), a negotiating forum, which held negotiations between the apartheid government and anti-apartheid organizations such as the ANC and the South African Communist Party (Dyzenhaus, 2010: 40). He was supposed to retire from his position as Chief Justice in 1993, but the Cabinet asked him to stay on for another year; then Nelson Mandela and the Cabinet asked him to remain in his position until the end of 1996 (Kahn, 1997: 209).

⁷⁶⁸⁰ Dyzenhaus, 2003: 37-44.

repressive machinery of the apartheid system.⁷⁶⁸¹ In addition, the TRC itself had revealed and exposed the inaccuracies and bias of some of the death inquests (for example into the Steve Biko case) and the Commissions of Inquiry (for example the Commissions about the Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto uprising).

In previous years, several prominent jurists had also exposed the biased and non-independent nature of the judiciary during apartheid, and how the National Party had appointed judges who supported its policies. The list of prominent jurists and legal experts who have written about and exposed the disgraceful conduct of the South African judiciary during apartheid is endless. For example, Professor John Dugard has expressed “outrage and shame” about the South African legal system during apartheid,⁷⁶⁸² characterising it as “abnormal.” He wrote:

“A legal system that excludes 70% of its population from the franchise, that excludes 70% of its population from owning land in 87% of the country, that arbitrarily deprives 8 million people of their nationality, that has forcibly relocated many millions of people on account of their race, that formally executes some 160 persons per year, that authorizes repression in the name of national security and that permits international aggression, [is] . . . a grossly abnormal one.”⁷⁶⁸³

In 1978, Professor Dugard had also characterised the judiciary during apartheid as an “old-fashioned, inquisitional system modelled upon a code produced by the Spanish Inquisition, one which bears little resemblance to the enlightened codes of procedure found in modern Western European countries.”⁷⁶⁸⁴ On the subject of Commissions of Inquiry during the apartheid years, Professor Dugard said: “One of the most disgraceful things about South Africa during this period was the way in which judicial commissions were manipulated, and also the way in which inquest inquiries were conducted and the magistrates just ignored the evidence. (The judges) knew how to make a finding that would help the government. That was very clear.”⁷⁶⁸⁵

⁷⁶⁸¹ SATIS, 1985: 5.

⁷⁶⁸² Klug, 2000: 660.

⁷⁶⁸³ Klug, 2000: 659-660.

⁷⁶⁸⁴ Dugard, 1978: 273.

⁷⁶⁸⁵ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

In 1986, Nicholas Haysom had exposed the bias and inaccuracy of the Kannemeyer Commission of Enquiry into the Langa shootings.⁷⁶⁸⁶ Sydney Kentridge, QC wrote in 1998: “In South Africa, one after another inquest into deaths in detention found that ‘no one was to blame’ as the security police, the judiciary and district surgeons conspired to keep torture and murder under wraps.”⁷⁶⁸⁷ Ahmed Kathrada wrote on the same issue in 2004, “In later years, inquest after inquest – in the cases of Imam Haron, Ahmed Timol, Neil Aggett, to name but a few – returned verdicts of suicide. I cannot recall a single case among the scores of deaths under 90-day detention in which an inquest magistrate held the security police responsible.”⁷⁶⁸⁸

According to Adam Sitze, Professor of Law (2013), Commissions of Inquiry under apartheid very often hid more than they revealed. A typical example, he wrote, was the Sharpeville inquiry, which transformed itself from a fact-finding device into a “whitewashing machine.”⁷⁶⁸⁹ Austin T. Turk, Professor of Criminology at the University of California, wrote in 1982 that apartheid South Africa may well have had “the world’s most elaborate legal structure for the repression of political resistance of all kinds.”⁷⁶⁹⁰

In addition, Govender’s suggestion was supported by several legal bodies in South Africa, such as the Black Lawyers Association, Lawyers for Human Rights, the Legal Resources Centre and the National Association of Democratic Lawyers. These bodies argued that “lawyers and courts under apartheid, with very few and notable exceptions, had co-operated in servicing and enforcing a diabolically unjust political order ... Judicial independence was a myth that had been exploded in the daily experience of the courts.”⁷⁶⁹¹

Because of Govender’s submission, the TRC invited the legal community, including Chief Justice Corbett, to appear before it in a hearing.⁷⁶⁹² The Commission’s invitation emphasised that the purpose of the hearing involving the legal community was not “to establish guilt or hold individuals responsible ... the hearing is an attempt to understand the role the legal system played in contributing to the violation and/or protection of human rights

⁷⁶⁸⁶ Haysom, N. (1986) “*The Langa Shootings and the Kannemeyer Commission of Enquiry.*”

⁷⁶⁸⁷ Quoted in Bizos, 1998: vii.

⁷⁶⁸⁸ Kathrada, 2004: 384.

⁷⁶⁸⁹ Sitze, 2013: 157, 311.

⁷⁶⁹⁰ Turk, 1982: 146.

⁷⁶⁹¹ Klug, 2000: 658.

⁷⁶⁹² Dyzenhaus, 2003: 37.

and to identify institutional changes required to prevent those abuses which occurred from happening again.”⁷⁶⁹³

In the end, much to the Commission’s dismay, not a single judge or magistrate accepted the invitation. Some judges, including Chief Justice Corbett, responded by sending memorandums. Corbett made it clear in his memorandum that although he was not speaking on behalf of the “judiciary as a whole,” he had distributed his memorandum “among the present members of the Appellate Division” and that it bore “their endorsement.”⁷⁶⁹⁴ In his memorandum, despite all the previously quoted evidence about the judiciary, Corbett staunchly defended its record under apartheid; he praised the judges and said that the record of judicial decisions during apartheid was “generally” good,⁷⁶⁹⁵ while he claimed that “the courts had no option but to apply the law as they found it, however unjust it might appear to be.”⁷⁶⁹⁶ Finally, he “objected on practical and constitutional grounds” to Govender’s suggestion that all judges and magistrates should be brought before the Commission.⁷⁶⁹⁷

The chairman of the TRC, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Minister of Justice and other members of the Commission openly expressed their disappointment in the judges’ and magistrates’ behaviour. Archbishop Tutu said that given the importance of the occasion, the written submissions by some judges were not enough: they should have appeared in front of the Commission in person.⁷⁶⁹⁸ The Commission’s report said that “The failure of the judiciary to appear is all the more to be lamented when the historic significance of the Commission is considered, as well as its envisaged role in the transformation of South African society into a caring, humane and just one.”⁷⁶⁹⁹ Advocate Clifford Mailer commented that “The truth is that few judges on the bench embrace the new culture of human rights and [they] are hostile to change.”⁷⁷⁰⁰

The TRC was very critical of the judiciary for its role during apartheid.⁷⁷⁰¹ It said in its report that: “The Commission has a good deal of understanding for the ‘collegiality’ argument, which says that the non-appearance by those judges willing in principle to appear

⁷⁶⁹³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 4, 1998: 95.

⁷⁶⁹⁴ Dyzenhaus, 2003: 37.

⁷⁶⁹⁵ Dyzenhaus, 2003: 37-53.

⁷⁶⁹⁶ Klug, 2000: 658.

⁷⁶⁹⁷ Dyzenhaus, 2003: 37.

⁷⁶⁹⁸ Currie, 2011: 220.

⁷⁶⁹⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 4, 1998: 107.

⁷⁷⁰⁰ Arnold, 2000: 15.

⁷⁷⁰¹ Currie, 2011: 219-220; Meiring, 1999: 247-251.

will create greater mutual trust among the ‘old order’ and the ‘new order’ judges and so advance the cause of constitutional democracy. However, such benefits, if achieved in this way, are outweighed by the powerful symbolic effect of the judiciary showing themselves publicly and humbly to be accountable. For this is what the hearing was about and what the Constitution demands of a judiciary that is granted the onerous power of constitutional review. It is required that the judiciary display some sense of being able to balance its necessary and justifiable demand for independence with a measure of accountability to the South African nation it serves. The Commission deplores and regrets the almost complete failure of the magistracy to respond to the Commission’s invitation, the more so considering the previous lack of formal independence of magistrates and their dismal record as servants of the apartheid state in the past. They and the country lost an opportunity to examine their role in the transition from oppression to democracy.⁷⁷⁰²

The Commission’s findings regarding the role of the judiciary during apartheid were also very critical:

“Part of the reason for the longevity of apartheid was the superficial adherence to ‘rule by law’ by the National Party (NP), whose leaders craved the aura of legitimacy that ‘the law’ bestowed on their harsh injustice ... In the intervening thirty years, however, the courts and the organised legal profession generally and subconsciously or unwittingly connived in the legislative and executive pursuit of injustice, as was pointed out by a few at the time and acknowledged by so many at the hearing. Perhaps the most common form of subservience can be captured in the maxim *qui tacet consentire* (silence gives consent). There were, nevertheless, many parts of the profession that actively contributed to the entrenchment and defence of apartheid through the courts.”⁷⁷⁰³

The Commission’s report contained some examples of how the judiciary had aided apartheid:

- A. Prosecutors who knew that police interrogators had used brutal means to extract information from suspects, but still protected them from being questioned too closely on their methods.
- B. Attorneys-general who too easily launched prosecutions or granted ‘no-bail’ certificates on flimsy evidence.

⁷⁷⁰² Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 4, 1998: 107-108.

⁷⁷⁰³ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 4, 1998: 101-102.

- C. Magistrates who uncritically granted police search and seizure warrants, and whose inquests conveniently found no one responsible for injuries and deaths in detention.
- D. Attorneys who failed to accept unpopular political persons as clients, perhaps for fear of social ostracism or the loss of lucrative commercial clients.
- E. Advocates who were willing to appear for the government in civil actions in which some of the basic building blocks of apartheid, such as racial classification, influx control or group areas, were being attacked as unreasonable and invalid exercises of executive discretion.
- F. Judges who, in the greatest injustices of all, too easily made sense of the illogical and the unjust in legislative language, and who too quickly accepted the word of the police or official witnesses in preference to that of the accused. Kathleen Satchwell in her submission dealt extensively with the case of her client Linda Mogale, who was assaulted and tortured in detention. Despite evidence to this effect, the judge nevertheless rejected “as impossible” the idea of a process of police violence and system of intimidation.⁷⁷⁰⁴

It seems improbable that Corbett was unaware of what was happening to the judiciary under apartheid, especially regarding the appointments and promotions of judges. Nevertheless, he took such a stance. Rather than being ignorant, it seems more likely that he was trying to protect the reputation of his professional community and of his former colleagues, after seeing how the reputations of other respected professional communities, for example the medical profession, had been shattered by the TRC’s exposure of their disgraceful conduct under apartheid.

Judge Corbett’s conduct during apartheid, when he served as a judge before he became a chief justice, could be characterised as disgraceful on at least two occasions when he disregarded international law and supported the apartheid government’s actions. Two Appellate Division rulings supported by Judge Corbett concerned provision of counsel for indigent accused and a State’s responsibility for its agents. In the first, the court rejected the right to counsel of accused people without assets, ignoring the stance of international and European human rights organisations that indigent accused were entitled to such representation. The second case concerned the abduction of persons from Swaziland by South African security forces. It was common practice at the time for South African security forces and agents to abduct anti-apartheid activists from foreign territory and bring them back to

⁷⁷⁰⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 4, 1998: 102-103.

South Africa for interrogation and torture in detention. However, unbelievably, the court, with the full support of Judge Corbett, ruled that the State bore no responsibility for the unauthorised acts of its agents, a decision which ran counter to international law.⁷⁷⁰⁵

In order to better understand the climate of the time, it should be noted that in 1996 one hundred White judges, including ten of the eleven on the Appeal Court (the exception was Justice Ralph Zulman),⁷⁷⁰⁶ most of them appointed by the apartheid government, came out against the nomination of Justice Ismail Mahomed and attempted to block his appointment as Chief Justice of South Africa, to succeed the retiring Corbett.⁷⁷⁰⁷ Justice Mahomed was the first Black judge to be appointed to the Supreme Court, and a member of the new Constitutional Court, and during his career had defended several leading figures in the anti-apartheid struggle. The White judges instead pushed for the nomination of Hennie van Heerden, a White judge and the most senior member of the Appeal Court. One of the most vocal opponents of Mahomed's appointment was Appeal Court Judge Joos Hefer – who, according to Advocate Clifford Mailer, had been “a champion of apartheid emergency legislation” in the late 1980s. Advocate Mailer accused the White judges of hypocrisy, reminding them that none of them had protested when “Mahomed had to finish his argument in one day at the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein, because if he stayed overnight he would break the Group Areas Act. Not a voice was raised in protest when the same apartheid laws prevented Mr Mahomed lunching with colleagues in the bar dining-room.”⁷⁷⁰⁸

Eventually, the White judges failed in their campaign and Nelson Mandela appointed Justice Mahomed as South Africa's Chief Justice. The *New York Times* characterised his appointment as “a momentous step towards transforming the country's justice system.”⁷⁷⁰⁹ Furthermore, the Pretoria Bar, which refused to admit Black members, only made an apology for its racism in October 1997.⁷⁷¹⁰

If Chief Justice Corbett had not spoken against Govender's suggestion and the TRC had investigated Tsafendas's case in 1996, the Commission would have discovered the plethora of evidence found by the author in the National Archives of South Africa and in Portugal. Just this would have been enough to reveal the truth about Tsafendas and the

⁷⁷⁰⁵ Dugard, 1998a: 118-120.

⁷⁷⁰⁶ Soggot (*Mail and Guardian*), 20 September 1996, ‘Battle lines drawn over chief justice.’

⁷⁷⁰⁷ Braid (*The Independent*), ‘SA old guard blocks black judge.’

⁷⁷⁰⁸ Braid (*The Independent*), ‘SA old guard blocks black judge.’

⁷⁷⁰⁹ Cauvin (*The New York Times*), 19 June 2000, ‘Ismail Mahomed, 68; Led post-apartheid court.’

⁷⁷¹⁰ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 4, 1998: 101.

assassination. In addition, the TRC had the means and the authority to have investigated the case even further by interviewing people who knew Tsafendas. This would have provided additional information about him, since many witnesses who knew him well, and were then still alive, had died by the time the author began its research. Thus, if the case had been investigated by the TRC, the truth about Tsafendas and the assassination would have had come to light then and not twenty-one years later. In addition, Tsafendas would probably have been released from the hospital and would not have spent the last five years of his life alone there.

This author, along with Advocate George Bizos, Professor John Dugard, Mr. Krish Govender, Advocate Dumisa Ntsebeza and Justice Zak Yacoob, strongly believes that the current Minister of Justice should act upon the facts and evidence about Tsafendas's case, rather than ignoring them as Chief Justice Corbett did.

OPINIONS OF SOME PROMINENT ANTI-APARTHEID ACTIVISTS CONCERNING TSAFENDAS

Renowned historian and anti-apartheid activist Lulli Callinicos believes that the apartheid regime would never have revealed that Tsafendas was a committed Communist with a long history of political activism. She also gave the author another reason as to why the State would have wanted to portray Tsafendas as a madman:

“At the time (1966) things were hotting-up. The ANC and the PAC were banned, they had gone into exile, and they had also of course announced the armed struggle. They were actually scores of, in fact hundreds, going into exile to train for armed struggle. I think it was a serious threat if it was announced that a member of the Communist Party and of course a man of Colour [had assassinated Dr. Verwoerd]. [The apartheid authorities feared that] this might actually stimulate and mobilise more Blacks to raise up. That was something that was a very real possibility. So it had well suited them to define him as a crazed individual. It was a far better strategy than to find that he had tried to promote a revolution. That's why he was permanently silenced.”⁷⁷¹¹

Professor Renfrew Christie told the author:

⁷⁷¹¹ Luli Calinicos in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

“I was in my final year of high school when Tsafendas carried out his political assassination of Verwoerd. My own view is that he was perfectly sane, he was, after all, a member of the South African Communist Party. My own interpretation of the events is that this was a fully legitimate, politically motivated part of the armed struggle. Remember, Nelson Mandela had been sentenced for armed struggle just two years before, two or three years and there was a legitimate armed struggle going on against one of the great evils of the Twentieth Century and the greatest architect was Hendrik Verwoerd. So, the person that killed Verwoerd was a member of the Communist Party, the South African Communist Party and, in alliance with the ANC, were in an armed struggle. I think his basic motives are perfectly obvious, he carried out an armed struggle and killed the tyrant and that is, I think, how he should be remembered, as a hero. I think it is very peculiar that the new South Africa has accepted the crooked old South Africa’s interpretation of Tsafendas.

In the time of reconciliation and settlement, I think a lot of the heroism of the armed struggle got whitewashed and papered over and forgotten. There’s a sustained pressure out of Western Europe, and even now, we get people who paint art works about the settlement and about Mandela the ‘peacemaker’ and we get people coming to stress how important was the non-violent struggle in liberating the country. And it sometimes has a Cold War flavour, that the ANC was aligned with the Communist Party and was supported by the Soviets whereas the West were not democrats in South Africa for forty years, the West fought against democracy for forty years. So, there’s an attempt to hide the armed struggle and to play up the side of Nelson Mandela, the ‘peacemaker’ rather than Nelson Mandela, the ‘armed struggler.’ In fact, and in the actual history, there was thirty years of armed struggle. The latter-day attempt to ignore it and to say we would have had a peaceful settlement anyway and capitalism would naturally have reformed, is a continuation of Cold War thinking. The fact remains that the West armed, even after sanctions, secretly armed apartheid and they did it, not only because they were racists, although there was deep racism in places like Brazil and America, they did it because they wanted forced labour for mining gold and diamonds and uranium.”⁷⁷¹²

Anti-apartheid revolutionary Lionel Davis was imprisoned for seven years on Robben Island (1964-1971) and then spent another five years under house arrest (1971-1976). He was in Robben Island prison when Tsafendas was taken there in November 1966. He told the

⁷⁷¹² Professor Renfrew Christie in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

author: “We saw him [Tsafendas] on Robben Island because he was in the main cell block that was opposite where we were. He was in a single cell there and we were in single cells on the other side.” Davis said that Tsafendas was “totally isolated,” in an area where those who were punished were kept. As to how Tsafendas was seen at the time by his fellow prisoners, he told the author, “We all saw him as a hero. He was a hero in our eyes.” Asked whether the ANC members also saw Tsafendas as a hero, Davis said, “All political, orchestrated political persuasions on the island, hailed him as a hero.” Davis also stated that all his former comrades in the anti-apartheid struggle “still hail him as a hero.”⁷⁷¹³

Denis Goldberg told the author that Tsafendas’s statements to the South African police after his arrest, “clearly shows that he was politically motivated [for killing Verwoerd] and not insane ... the man is determined to kill the Prime Minister because of the racism... [Tsafendas] has a clear political opinion about racism.” Goldberg was not in the least surprised when he heard that Tsafendas had been declared to be insane, and always had doubts about the verdict. He thought that it was natural for the Apartheid State to do such a thing so they could claim that “only an insane person would kill this brilliant prime minister.” “They would have never admitted that a Communist did it,” Goldberg told the author.⁷⁷¹⁴

Goldberg also believes that it would have been “very embarrassing” for the authorities and the police if it had become known that Tsafendas was a former member of the South African Communist Party and a committed Communist with a long history of political activism. “They had made a decision, they’re not going to have a proper trial, they want Tsafendas declared insane and unfit to stand and that was their decision. So, we lock him away until the Government says it’s okay to release him or never and the answer was never, until he died.” Asked by the author whether he agreed with Tsafendas’s act, Goldberg said that while he did not condone political assassinations, he could not condemn this one. About Tsafendas, he said, “I have no problem with him.”⁷⁷¹⁵

Krish Govender said that the “society should recognise the heroism of Tsafendas and his place in history should be in the category of a freedom fighter and he should be honoured.”⁷⁷¹⁶ Ronnie Kasrils characterised this study as “incredible” and said of Tsafendas that “the powers of the day sought to portray Tsafendas as a crazy man, and what we now can

⁷⁷¹³ Lionel Davis in a personal interview, 8 April 2015.

⁷⁷¹⁴ Denis Goldberg in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁷⁷¹⁵ Denis Goldberg in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

⁷⁷¹⁶ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 2016: 7, ‘Verwoerd’s killer a freedom fighter?’

see and the country needs to know is that the man was motivated with good intentions and that he was a communist.” Kasrils also said that Tsafendas should have been pardoned back in 1994, but instead “what we have is an invisible man. We have an unmarked grave at Sterkfontein... his name should be on the wall of Freedom Park.”⁷⁷¹⁷

Ahmed Kathrada, asked by the author whether he thought Dr Verwoerd’s assassination changed South Africa’s history and hastened the end of apartheid, said, “there is no doubt about that.” Asked whether he agreed with the assassination, he clarified that although he does not agree with assassinations in general, he cannot condemn this particular one.⁷⁷¹⁸ High Court Judge Jody Kollapen told the author that “the interesting thing is, that if he was found not to be insane then the trial would have to proceed, right. Then, there’s a real risk – given his early arrest for distributing pamphlets etc. – that you’re putting on trial, then, not only Dimitris Tsafendas, you’re putting on trial on the international stage the entire system of apartheid.”⁷⁷¹⁹

John Matshikiza, a prominent South African actor, poet and political activist, wrote shortly after Tsafendas’s funeral in an article in the *Mail and Guardian* that Verwoerd’s assassin was not only an “unsung hero” and South Africa’s “greatest political assassin,” but that he had secured “a place in heaven.” Matshikiza also stressed that Tsafendas never mentioned the tapeworm during his interrogation despite persistent efforts by the police to make him say a tapeworm made him do it. He concluded his article with the following, “Any warrior who would be prepared to strike a blow against it [apartheid] would be entitled to a place in heaven. For 33 years we ignored Tsafendas. He had embarrassed us by getting straight to the point, while we were still justifying our pain. Last Saturday, he was buried quietly in Krugersdorp. Ten people, mostly members of the Greek community were in attendance. The politicians, and the humble victims of apartheid for whom he had struck the most awesome blow in the fight for freedom, chose to stay away.”⁷⁷²⁰

Solly Mapaila, First Deputy General Secretary of the South African Communist Party told the author:

“The majority of our people in the country have relied, not exclusively but in the main, on the information from the apartheid treaty about Tsafendas, which sought to deal

⁷⁷¹⁷ *Sunday Times*, 11 September 2016: 7, ‘Verwoerd’s killer a freedom fighter?’

⁷⁷¹⁸ Ahmed Kathrada in a personal interview, 13 April 2016.

⁷⁷¹⁹ Judge Jody Kollapen in a personal interview, 16 April 2015.

⁷⁷²⁰ Matshikiza (*Mail and Guardian*), October 15 to 21, 1999: 4, ‘Place in heaven for unsung hero.’

away with the discourse that the liberation movement or the political actors at the time, whether on behalf of the liberation movement or on behalf of their own conscience could actually take political action against the apartheid treaty. Which is what Tsafendas did. So, they did not want to create an impression that somebody can respond to the might of oppression and Tsafendas, not only responded to this might, he hit them hard. He hit the main force, the principal force and the principal instigator of the apartheid system.

So, with that he was politically astute and correct in the actual identifying the real problem and he decided to sort it out the best way he could and I think any other Black person who has political conscience with that access could have actually done it, knowing that he will pay the ultimate price for it and I'm quite convinced that Tsafendas had a clear conscience that he will die on the side of the people by his actions and he was brave enough. In fact, I regard him as a hero and a warrior for his bravery to confront the might of apartheid systems, right in its parliament and actually dealt with Verwoerd. So, the apartheid regime created this impression that this was a lunatic, a madman, who one day decided to kill the Prime Minister of the country at the time, not knowing what he was doing because he was a lunatic. Obviously only fools really believe this stupid idea throughout history."

Mapaila concluded that the truth about Tsafendas was "long overdue" and that South Africa and the Communist Party should "recognise the contribution of Dimitri Tsafendas and to accord him, his rightful place amongst heroes of our struggle."⁷⁷²¹

Alexander Moumbaris, who was honoured twice by the South African government (Grand Companion of O.R. Tambo and a Sabotage Campaign medal) for his part in the struggle against apartheid. Moumbaris considers Tsafendas to be the most unfairly treated person in the history of South Africa. He is deeply saddened that Tsafendas suffered a lonely death in a psychiatric hospital. In 2003, he created a web page for Tsafendas headed, "Dimitri Tsafendas. Remembering a Revolutionary. Homage to Dimitri Tsafendas. Hero and Martyr of the Cause of the South African People." Moumbaris concluded his entry with the following: "I regret not having done better for him to get out of there [the hospital where he died]. He deserved a better liberty than the one he got."⁷⁷²² He described Tsafendas to the author as "a brave revolutionary, the bravest man I ever met." He believes that South Africa should at last

⁷⁷²¹ Solly Mapaila in a personal interview, 24 March 2015.

⁷⁷²² <https://archive.is/pYjSu#selection-205.0-205.110>

recognise that Tsafendas was a revolutionary, not an insane person, and that the assassination was a political act and not a mindless one.⁷⁷²³

Helen Suzman, asked by Liza Key if the assassination changed South Africa's history, she replied:

“I do think the assassination of Verwoerd changed the course of history in South Africa, because nobody was quite as sure as he was of the policy of separate development. I mean, he was steeped in it. It was religion to him. But the others all had doubts. I mean there was no doubt that Vorster was determined to maintain white domination, but that was a different thing. It wasn't based in any philosophy the way Verwoerd's was. Nobody had the same certitude that he had. And I am quite sure that the first brick would not have come down in the late seventies with the removal of job reservations and the granting of Trade Union rights to Blacks. Now those were the removal of the first bricks of apartheid. He [Dr. Verwoerd] would have known, and he would have been right from the point of view of his reasoning, that if you start pulling down one or two bricks in the wall of apartheid, the whole structure would eventually come tumbling down as indeed it did.”⁷⁷²⁴

Asked by Liza Key what she thought would have happened if Dr. Verwoerd had not died, Suzman said:

“I think we would have ended up with a civil war. I think South Africa would gone on being a Pariah nation, the other countries would have intensified the economic boycott and sanctions. And eventually, the Black people would have been supplied either by Russia or some other country with sufficient arms to enable them to actually start a civil war which would have been pretty horrific. And not easily, I don't think brought to a victorious conclusion.”⁷⁷²⁵

⁷⁷²³ Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 11 May 2016.

⁷⁷²⁴ Helen Suzman in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

⁷⁷²⁵ Helen Suzman in Liza Key's *A Question of Madness*, 1997.

CONCLUSION

Dimitris Tsafendas was a man of deep political convictions, a passionate Communist from his teenage years, inspired by his anarchist father. He was kind-hearted, generous and selfless. Always poor, he repeatedly gave money to people he felt needed it more than he did, such as his flatmate Jacobus Bornman, paupers in Durban, a poor woman in Istanbul, passengers lacking a bus fare. He devoted hours of his time to teaching children without payment in Mozambique and Turkey. He had a keen eye for injustice. Born in Mozambique, he saw no reason why this African nation should remain in the control of Portugal, a European power, and at great cost to himself, he campaigned persistently for its independence. What he envisaged was “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they white or black, and therefore separated from the mother nation.”⁷⁷²⁶

Tsafendas never made no attempt to disguise his beliefs and for his pains he was dismissed from jobs and forced into exile. The PIDE became aware of Tsafendas’s political activities in 1935, when he was seventeen, when he was dismissed from his work for “voicing Communist ideas.”⁷⁷²⁷ Three years later after he was “suspected of distributing communist propaganda,” PIDE opened a file on him, the *Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis*.⁷⁷²⁸ The file only got bigger over the years and at the time of the assassination, almost thirty years later, it ran to 130 pages.

Injustice for Tsafendas was never more evident than in South Africa, where apartheid ruled. It was a policy which Tsafendas loathed as racist and exploitative, and he was willing to do “anything that would get the South African regime out of power.”⁷⁷²⁹ He joined the South African Communist Party and worked actively on its behalf; in London, he participated in anti-apartheid and anti-colonial demonstrations; he smuggled anti-apartheid literature into South Africa and he urged visitors to spend as little as possible in order not to contribute to the apartheid economy. Finally, he assassinated Dr. Verwoerd, the man he characterised as the brains behind apartheid, hoping that with the guiding hand gone, apartheid would collapse

⁷⁷²⁶ PIDE Record of questions, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁷²⁷ Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁷²⁸ Secret Criminal Record n° 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

⁷⁷²⁹ Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, SANA.

and a more benign national policy would take its place; and that is exactly what he told the police after the assassination.

Tsafendas was held in custody for twenty days before being allowed access to his lawyers. While in the hands of the police, he was systematically beaten, given electric shocks and subjected to mock hangings, a brutal range of physical and psychological tortures commonly practised against political prisoners by the apartheid police. Tsafendas asked to be defended by Advocate George Bizos, whose father he knew well, but his request was ignored. Instead the State chose who would defend him. However, it should be stated that the lawyers in question were quite independent and unconnected with the authorities.

Although Tsafendas had given the police logical and valid political reasons for the killing, twenty days later, when he met his defence team, he changed his tune. He claimed that a tapeworm lived inside him which controlled his life. He repeated this to the doctors who examined him later. After nearly three weeks of systematic brutality and cognisant of the fate of many political prisoners under apartheid, Tsafendas concluded that what lay ahead of him was a dubious and undignified death in a police cell. Determined to avoid such an inglorious end and to stop the torture, Tsafendas resorted to a strategy he had used in the past to get out of trouble, namely, pretending to be mad. It had worked when he was arrested by the American immigration authorities, on two occasions when he was detained by the Portuguese police, once to avoid service in the Portuguese army and once to persuade the Portuguese to give him amnesty to return to Mozambique after twelve years in exile.

Tsafendas's defence team prepared an excellent case, lining up psychiatrists who had examined him and witnesses who had had contact with him. However, the psychiatrists based their findings only on what they were told by Tsafendas himself and were forced to take short-cuts due to the pressure of time. The result was a misdiagnosis of Tsafendas, with the eager co-operation of the accused. The psychiatrists became convinced that Tsafendas was a schizophrenic after examinations whose circumstances would normally raise legal eyebrows. None of the psychiatrists' diagnoses would have been seen as credible in any democratic court today.

As for the witnesses chosen to testify for Tsafendas, most hardly knew him, except for the O'Ryans and, to a certain extent, the Daniels. Meanwhile people who had known him for many years, even a lifetime, were ignored by the defence. A good example was James Johnston, who told the police that he did not know Tsafendas well and had talked to him for

twenty minutes in his whole life. Yet he was called to testify for the defence. That said, the rationale for the defence choices was evident: put on the stand witnesses who could support its chosen line, not necessarily those who knew the accused best. What was surprising was that the credibility of Johnston and the other witnesses was not questioned by the State. The prosecutors could quickly have challenged the right of certain witnesses to testify and broken down their claims, but this did not happen. Peter Daniels clearly lied and gave testimony to the police that flatly contradicted that of his sister. The State could easily have exposed his testimony, but it did not attempt to do so.

The defence's main witness was Patrick O'Ryan, Tsafendas's best friend and someone who knew him extremely well. In normal proceedings, he would have been the only suitable witness to take the stand. O'Ryan spoke at length about the tapeworm, although he had said nothing to the police about such a creature, and had also stated that Tsafendas was perfectly sane. Many years later, O'Ryan confessed that he had lied about the tapeworm at the urging of Wilfrid Cooper, Tsafendas's advocate. He said he knew perfectly well that Tsafendas did not have a tapeworm and that it was an invention from his past to convince the Portuguese police to stop torturing him. In his statements to the police, Tsafendas made no mention of a tapeworm and gave clear political reasons for killing Dr. Verwoerd. However, what Tsafendas told the police was not used in court and the defence's claims of schizophrenia and a tapeworm went unchallenged.

Tsafendas's summary trial was in fact a show trial. The police had enough evidence to destroy the defence's line. Although the author is not in position to know whether this evidence was passed to the Attorney-General, the latter's conduct during the proceedings was strange, to say the least. Suspicions as to his integrity were heightened ten days after the trial when he denied knowing that Tsafendas was a former member of the South African Communist Party. This fact became known to him at least twenty-seven days earlier and, of course, during the summary trial. The defence case looked solid, but it would have been no match for the State if the prosecutor had used all the evidence gathered by the police. None of Tsafendas's political ideas or activities was spoken of in court and the word "Communist" was never heard. Instead, Tsafendas was presented as a schizophrenic, withdrawn, isolated, rude, a drifter, uninterested in politics, a person who lived an aimless life often taking advantage of other people. The considerable evidence suggesting that the truth was the exact opposite did not appear. The conclusion must be that either the Attorney-General chose not to use this evidence or it was not in his possession.

Doctors who examined Tsafendas gave a list of what they said were his schizophrenic symptoms, including being withdrawn, isolated, unable to function on a reasonable level, unable to follow a conversation after fifteen minutes, unable to look after himself, speaking in a disjointed manner, a victim of thought-disorder and confused ideas. The police and the Commission interviewed two hundred people and none of them noticed any of these symptoms in Tsafendas. The author interviewed forty-four people who knew Tsafendas well, some of them since childhood. Not one perceived any of these alleged symptoms and all strongly disagreed that Tsafendas was anything like the doctors' characterisation. Tsafendas's alleged belief that he had a tapeworm is as much a myth as Mamoru Samuragochi's deafness.

Although the author cannot know if the Attorney General had access to the police evidence and chose not to use it or whether the evidence was withheld from him, the same cannot be said for the Commission of Enquiry. The police provided the Commission with most, if not all, of the evidence they had assembled. More importantly, the Commission had conducted its own investigation and had discovered enough evidence to show that Tsafendas was not as portrayed in court. In the event, the Commission concealed very important evidence and presented Tsafendas in almost the same way he was portrayed at the summary trial. Although the Commission was well aware of Tsafendas's real personality, his political activities and the real reasons why he killed Dr. Verwoerd, it deliberately concealed these facts so as not to contradict what was heard in court. It is clear from the way its Report is written that the Commission wanted to belittle Tsafendas so that no-one would feel any sympathy for him, but also so that no-one would ever think that the pathetic man presented in its Report could have had a political motive for assassinating Dr. Verwoerd.

The Commission acted shamelessly and in a scandalous way in concealing many of Tsafendas's political activities, but more importantly for distorting his intentions in killing Dr. Verwoerd. Tsafendas had told the police openly that he killed the prime minister because he considered him not to be the real representative of all South Africans, that he was disgusted by his racial policies and he hoped that by killing him a change of policy would take place. None of these altruistic motives was mentioned by the Commission. Instead it speculated pointlessly about what his motive might have been and what might have triggered his hand.

Furthermore, the Commission dealt extensively with the question of Dr. Verwoerd's death being discussed on board the *Eleni* three days before he actually died. Although at least six witnesses from the *Eleni* had told the police that Tsafendas had spoken of a hypothetical assassination of Dr. Verwoerd as being morally justifiable because he was a tyrant, the Commission concealed this information, too, and again it speculated about what might have happened. In smearing Tsafendas, the Commission used unfounded characterizations and misrepresented some incidents. At the same time, it omitted some 90% of the positive statements about Tsafendas's character and mental state, while including almost every negative one.

PIDE contributed to the misrepresentation of Tsafendas by concealing from the South African police the fact that it had a file on Tsafendas. The file contained, in PIDE's words, "information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of Mozambique." Thus, the South African authorities never learned of the extent of Tsafendas's political activities in Mozambique. Nevertheless, the South African police managed to discover a great deal about Tsafendas's political activities not only in Mozambique but in other nations where he travelled. The most important of these were also concealed from the public.

The South African police, PIDE, the Attorney-General and the Commission each played a role in presenting a distorted picture of Tsafendas by concealing evidence. The Commission's Report, although no more subjective and honest than that of the Sharpeville Commission, was accepted without question because it sounded so convincing. For fifty years it remained unchallenged. The fact is it was a character assassination and a travesty of truth. The same may be said about Tsafendas's summary trial, although the judge was innocent of any malfeasance, being unaware of much important evidence. However, the Attorney-General, the supposed custodian of evidence, failed to present significant testimony and thus another travesty of truth took place.

With regard to Dr. Verwoerd, Professor John Dugard, who has served as a judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), told the author that if he was alive today, he could have been charged by the ICJ with "committing a crime against humanity, namely the propagation of apartheid." "He would have been accused of committing a crime against humanity, because in 1973, the United Nations promoted the UN Convention on the Prohibition of the Crime of Apartheid. So apartheid was defined as a crime against humanity in 1973. And clearly, Dr. Verwoerd, as the main architect of apartheid, would have been

categorised as a criminal. So if he had been brought before the court, he would have been charged with a crime against humanity.” However, the decision to prosecute him would have been political and it is by no means certain that he would ever have been placed in the dock.⁷⁷³⁰

A profound irony concerning the attacks on Dr. Verwoerd is that Tsafendas and Pratt have always been regarded as mad, while Dr. Verwoerd is considered to be sane. Let us examine the achievements and beliefs of these three historic characters in the table below:

VERWOERD	TSAFENDAS	PRATT
He believed that his life was saved by divine intervention, thus proving that God accepted apartheid and wished it to continue. He told Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker that his survival “revealed God’s approval of the cause he had followed.” He also told his wife, “I knew that I had been spared to complete my life’s work.”	He had no such thoughts.	He had no such thoughts.
He believed in minority rule and claimed that this was the only way for the minority to be protected against the majority. He argued that “apartheid is based on the principle that only in this way	He believed in majority rule.	He believed in majority rule.

⁷⁷³⁰ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

<p>can the weak he protected from the strong, and the minority be made to feel safe.”</p>		
<p>He believed that each race should be separate and should “develop” on its own. Such development was difficult for the 79% of the population who had no land rights, were forced to live in designated areas and were forbidden to enter “Whites only” territory. The Whites were 21% of the population but owned 87% of the land, forcing the 79% who were not White onto the remaining 13%.</p>	<p>He believed all people to be equal and that they should have equal rights.</p>	<p>He believed all people to be equal and that they should have equal rights.</p>
<p>He prohibited mixed marriages in order to preserve the White race. “I will not be responsible for the bastardization of the Afrikaner people,” he told his wife.</p>	<p>He believed all races were equal and people should be allowed to marry whoever they wanted. He had, Black, White, Jewish, Muslim and Christian girlfriends.</p>	<p>He believed that all people are the same and should be allowed to marry whoever they wanted.</p>
<p>He believed that only Whites should decide the country’s policies and future, although they were a distinct minority in terms of numbers, because</p>	<p>He believed that all the people of South Africa should decide their policies and future. He wanted “a government representing all</p>	<p>He believed that all people of South Africa should decide their policies and their future. “... Every South African, Afrikaner,</p>

<p>the non-Whites were not civilized, and that he and the other Whites were going to “civilize” them, “protect” them, “help” them and “teach” them “democracy.”</p>	<p>the South African people,” and he did not consider that Dr. Verwoerd represented all the people. He believed that Mozambique should be “governed by the natives of that Province, be they White or Black, and therefore separated from the mother nation.” He cherished the hope that one day the South African people would storm Parliament and throw out the apartheid government.</p>	<p>English South African, Coloured, Indian, Bantu, Malay... every person in South Arica has got to play his part if we are to build the South African that I know can be built...”</p>
<p>He created the Bantu Education Act which was designed to teach the Blacks that they were not the same as Whites, that they would never have equal rights but would be the “labourer in the country.” Most importantly, the Act would prevent them from learning about “European values” such as “freedom” and “equality.”</p>	<p>He believed that education was one of the most important things in life. He voluntarily taught for free English and History to Greek, Mozambican and Turkish children in Mozambique and in Turkey.</p>	<p>He believed that education was one of the most important things in life. He financed and built a modern school on his farm for his Black workers’ children, which still exists today.</p>
<p>He forcibly removed hundreds of thousands of non-Whites so that they could not live among White people, seizing the land thus made</p>	<p>He considered Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa to be “occupied lands,” stolen by force from the indigenous inhabitants and ruled by</p>	<p>He built modern and comfortable apartments in his farm for his Black employees. Their relatives and friends came to live</p>

<p>vacant for occupation by Whites.</p>	<p>colonialists and fascists. He recognised the rights of Whites to live there if they accepted majority rule and did not exploit the non-Whites. He had also lived in houses with Blacks, Coloureds and Whites.</p>	<p>there, too, and were allowed to do so.</p>
<p>He espoused a form of neo-slavery, requiring that non-Whites learn only how to serve the White man, teaching them that they were “not allowed to gaze” at “the green pastures of European society,” and that there was “no place for them in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour.”</p>	<p>He organized strikes and attempted to organize employees in places where he worked to act for their rights.</p>	<p>He was such a good employer that friends and relatives of his Black employees flocked to him, asking for work.</p>
<p>Although Africans lived in South Africa for more than 200,000 years in comparison to the 400 years of the Whites, he believed that South Africa was a white country because Whites developed and “civilized” it. He presented South Africa as a land that had been empty before the Europeans arrived.</p>	<p>He wanted “a Mozambique governed by the natives of that Province, be they White or Black, and therefore separated from the mother-nation.” In South Africa, he wanted “a government representing all the South African people.”</p>	<p>He believed that all people of South Africa should have a say in deciding the future of their country. “... Every South African, Afrikaner, English South African, Coloured, Indian, Bantu, Malay... every person in South Arica has got to play his part if we are to build</p>

		the South African that I know can be built...”
<p>He was pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic. He copied some of the Nuremberg Laws. He supported the Nazis during WWII and was convicted for being a “tool of the Nazis.”</p>	<p>He was anti-Nazi and anti-fascist. He got into physical fights with members of the Ossewabrandwag in South Africa and with Oswald Mosley’s fascists in England. He served on American ships supplying the Allies in WWII. He fought with the Communists against the Royalists in the Greek Civil War.</p>	<p>He was anti-apartheid, anti-fascist and anti-Nazi. He joined the South African army as a volunteer in WWII.</p>
<p>He believed apartheid was God’s will and that He approved it.</p>	<p>He believed that the Churches should be on the side of the people and not with the establishment.</p>	<p>He believed “a glittering future awaited South Africa as long as she observes the basic laws of God and human dignity, which of course, means, in the words, I think, of Macmillan at the time, “Rule by merit and not pigment of skin.”</p>
<p>He believed that Africans should be grateful that the Europeans did not annihilate them when they first arrived in South Africa, as the Europeans did to the Indians in the USA.</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>

<p>He turned South Africa into a police state in order to suppress opposition, using methods ranging from banning and exile to imprisonment and torture.</p>	<p>He tried to end apartheid. He was arrested five times by the Portuguese for anti-colonialist activities. PIDE had a file on him since he was twenty. He participated in anti-apartheid and anti-fascist demonstrations. He urged people to boycott South African goods.</p>	<p>He wanted apartheid to end and Dr. Verwoerd to reconsider his policies. He publicly spoke out in Britain in favour of a boycott of South African imports.</p>
<p>He was racist. He considered Africans to be “lower than animals.” He strongly believed that the Afrikaners were South Africa’s master race, destined for supremacy, while other races were “privileged” to share South Africa with them, but in an inferior position. In a debate in Parliament, apparently amazed, he told an MP “... and you believe a Native instead of my word!”</p>	<p>He was fanatically anti-racist and believed that all people are equal. He was member of the anti-fascist movement, the Yellow Star.</p>	<p>He was a committed anti-racist believing all people to be equal. He helped several non-Whites in South Africa with gifts of money.</p>
<p>He believed that he was always right and that people outside South had misunderstood apartheid. He insisted that apartheid was a “domestic affair” and people</p>	<p>He understood perfectly well what apartheid was and wanted it to end.</p>	<p>He understood perfectly well what apartheid was and wanted it to end.</p>

<p>who did not live in South Africa could not understand its nature and its background.</p>		
<p>He insisted that “a vast number” of non-Whites in South Africa approved his policies, while the rest simply failed to understand that apartheid was really something good and that he was trying to do what was best for them</p>	<p>He understood perfectly well what apartheid was and wanted it to end.</p>	<p>He understood perfectly well what apartheid was and wanted it to end.</p>
<p>He was the “architect of apartheid.”</p>	<p>He considered Dr. Verwoerd to be the brains behind apartheid and hoped that by killing him, a “change of policy would take place.” He joined the British anti-apartheid movement, he was a member of the SACP and he participated in anti-apartheid demonstrations.</p>	<p>He wanted to end apartheid. He tried to form a political coalition with the aim of defeating the National Party at the polls and ending apartheid. He gave financial assistance to the anti-apartheid Liberal Party of Great Britain and often spoke publicly in England against apartheid.</p>

By today’s standards, which of these two men’s opinions and actions would suggest insanity? They were different times, in a nation more God-fearing than most today, but it was the same era and the same nation for both men. It might be germane to add here that another apartheid enthusiast, General van den Bergh also believed, like Dr. Verwoerd, that his life was saved by divine intervention. He declared that “the hand of God was upon me” when a lightning strike killed a nearby African during a storm but left him untouched. However, no-

one seems to have questioned van den Bergh's sanity, apart from the British writer Frederick Forsyth, to whom he told the story.

Professor John Dugard said about the Tsafendas case and this research:

“Many South Africans suspected that there was a political cover-up in the Tsafendas case. The apartheid regime had two reasons for portraying Tsafendas to be insane. First, the regime wished to suggest that no-one in his right mind could kill such a wonderful leader as Hendrik Verwoerd. Secondly, there was the security aspect. The security apparatus, led by the Minister of Justice and Police, John Vorster, wished to avoid accountability for allowing a political revolutionary to be employed in a position close to the Prime Minister. So it was that the media and the legal proceedings were manipulated to present Tsafendas as a mentally deranged person dictated to by a tapeworm.

This research confirms that there was a cover-up. It shows convincingly that Tsafendas was a political revolutionary, whose assassination of Dr. Verwoerd was motivated by a hatred of Dr. Verwoerd and all he stood for. He was not an insane killer but a political assassin determined to rid South Africa of the architect of apartheid. Political assassinations seldom achieve their goal and this was no exception. But at least South African history should know the truth about Tsafendas. Dousemetzis has done South Africa a service by correcting the historical record.”⁷⁷³¹

Justice Zak Yacoob said about the study:

“The historical record shows that comrade Tsafendas killed Verwoerd, that he pleaded in sanity at the trial, his plea was upheld and he was, consequent to his plea confined at the pleasure of the relevant authority. If he had spoken the truth, he would have been sentenced to death, so the tactic was a very good one in the circumstances. History does not record that he pretended to be insane to save his life. This is well brought out in the research. The research shows conclusively that he did a deliberate courageous anti-apartheid act but pretended insanity at the trial understandably so. I think the research speaks for itself.”⁷⁷³²

Bertolt Brecht, one of Tsafendas's favourite authors, wrote something that fits perfectly both with his crime and with Dr Verwoerd's policies: “There are many ways to kill. One can stab a knife into someone's belly, take away one's bread, not heal one from a

⁷⁷³¹ Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 8 September 2016.

⁷⁷³² Justice Zak Yacoob in a personal interview, 18 September 2017.

disease, stick one in a bad apartment, work one to death, drive one to commit suicide, send one off to war, etc. Only a few of these things are forbidden in our country.”⁷⁷³³

Unfortunately for Tsafendas, he chose the only one in the list that was forbidden by the apartheid system; all the rest were the results of Dr Verwoerd’s laws and policies.

⁷⁷³³ Brecht, B. (2016) *Me Ti: Book of Interventions in the Flow of Things*. Originally published in 1967 in German with the title *Me Ti. Buch der Wendungen*.

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Tsafendas's file in the Lawyers for Human Rights Collection (AL3183). South African History Archive.

INTERVIEWS**Witnesses who met Tsafendas**

Pamela Abrahams. She met Tsafendas in 1966 in Cape Town.

Cleanthes Alachiotis. From the *Eleni*, he associated a lot with Tsafendas during the *Eleni*'s stay in Cape Town in July and August 1966.

George Ananiades. He met Tsafendas in 1963 in Lourenço Marques.

Pantelis Aspiotis. From the *Eleni*, he met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1966.

Ilias Aspras. From the *Eleni*, he associated a lot with Tsafendas during the tanker's stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Nick Augustides. Tsafendas's employer in July-September 1966.

Andreas Babiolakis. Grew up with Tsafendas in Mozambique and was a very close friend.

Nicola Banovic. A Greek Orthodox priest who became very close to Tsafendas. They met in Istanbul in 1961. Tsafendas lived in Father Banovic's house for four months and associated with him for another three.

David Beresford. *Guardian* journalist. He met Tsafendas in the mid-1990s in Sterkfontein hospital and wrote about him.

Nikolas Billis. From the *Eleni*, he associated a great deal with Tsafendas during the *Eleni*'s stay in Cape Town in July and August 1966.

David Bloomberg. Tsafendas's attorney in the summary trial.

Willie Burger. Tsafendas's lawyer at his summary trial.

Costas Chagios. He associated with Tsafendas for about two years (1965-66) in Cape Town.

Professor Renfrew Christie. Anti-apartheid activist. He met Tsafendas in Pretoria Prison in 1980-1981, where he was also imprisoned.

Father Minas Constandinou. A Greek Orthodox priest who met Tsafendas in Mozambique in 1963. He later visited him in prison and in the hospital. They were extremely close and Tsafendas confided in him at length about his life.

Elias Constantaras. He associated with Tsafendas in Cape Town for several months in 1966.

Maggie Davey. She met Tsafendas in the mid-1990s in Sterkfontein hospital.

Joyce Dick. Helen Daniels's best friend. She met Tsafendas in 1965 in Cape Town.

Mary Eendracht. Tsafendas's cousin, grew up together in Egypt and Mozambique and were very close.

Efthimios Eleftheriadis. Priest who met Tsafendas in Hamburg in the 1950s.

John Galanakis. He met Tsafendas in Beira in 1964.

Fotini Gavasiadis. One of Tsafendas's closest friends. She met him in Pretoria in 1963-64. She saw Tsafendas virtually every day for nine months in 1963-4, when they were flatmates and then neighbours while they also worked together.

Helen Grispos. She grew up with Tsafendas in Mozambique and met him again in Rhodesia in 1964. Her husband George Grispos was one of Tsafendas's best childhood friends. Her mother Sophia Gavadias was Tsafendas's step-mother's best friend in Lourenço Marques.

Miltiades Kaldis. He met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965-1966.

Nicolas Kambouris. From the *Eleni*, he associated a lot with Tsafendas during the *Eleni*'s stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Georgios Kantas. From the *Eleni*, he consorted regularly with Tsafendas during the *Eleni*'s stay in Cape Town in July and August 1966.

Liza Key. Filmmaker and researcher. She met Tsafendas in Sterkfontein Hospital in 1995 and subsequently visited him on several occasions. She made a documentary about him.

Judge Jody Kollapen. Anti-apartheid activist and High Court Judge in Pretoria. He met Tsafendas in prison in 1994 and tried to grant him an amnesty.

Ira Kyriakakis. She grew up with Tsafendas in Mozambique and was a very close friend.

Dionisis Lallis. From the *Eleni*, he met Tsafendas in July-August 1966.

George Liberopoulos. He met Tsafendas in Lourenço Marques in 1963.

James Mange. He met Tsafendas in prison in the early 1980s.

Manolis Mastromanolis. From the *Eleni*, he associated a lot with Tsafendas during the *Eleni*'s stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Antony Michaletos. Tsafendas's cousin and son of Artemis Michaletos, Tsafendas's aunt and his father's sister who brought him up in Egypt. He first met Tsafendas in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him well between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique.

Irene Michaletos. She very closely associated with Tsafendas in Beira in 1964-1965.

John Michaletos. Tsafendas's cousin and son of Artemis Michaletos, Tsafendas's aunt and his father's sister who brought him up in Egypt. He first met Tsafendas in 1951 in Lourenço Marques and got to know him between 1963 and 1965 in Mozambique.

Alexander Moumbaris. Anti-apartheid revolutionary, MK fighter and fellow prisoner in Pretoria Prison. He met Tsafendas there and later visited him at Sterkfontein Hospital.

Marie-Jose Moumbaris. Anti-apartheid activist. She met Tsafendas in 1996 at Sterkfontein Hospital.

Antonis Nichas. He associated with Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1966.

Jerome O’Ryan. Son of Patrick O’Ryan. He lived under the same roof as Tsafendas for five months in 1965.

Reuben O’Ryan. Son of Patrick O’Ryan. He lived in the same house as Tsafendas for five months in 1965.

Stanley O’Ryan. Son of Patrick O’Ryan. He lived in the same house as Tsafendas for five months in 1965.

Nick Papadakis. He met Tsafendas in 1964 in Beira. They became good friends and they were also flatmates for two months.

George Petrakakis. He met Tsafendas in 1963 in Lourenço Marques.

Panagiotis Peroglou. He associated with Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1965-1966.

Vasilios Perselis. From the *Eleni*, he associated with Tsafendas during the tanker’s stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Richard Poggenpoel. Tsafendas lived in his house in Cape Town in 1965.

Katerina Pnema. Tsafendas’s half-sister.

Michael Pnema. Tsafendas’s nephew. He met him in 1964.

Costas Poriadis. He met Tsafendas in 1965 in Beira.

Grigoris Pouftis. From the *Eleni*, he associated a lot with Tsafendas during the tanker’s stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Peter Protoulis. He met Tsafendas in Cape Town in 1966.

Father Spiros Randos. A Greek Orthodox priest who visited Tsafendas in Pretoria Prison Hospital and in Sterkfontein Hospital and became close to him.

Dr. Isaac Sakinofsky. One of the psychiatrists who examined Tsafendas for the summary trial.

Dimitris Skoularikis. He met Tsafendas in prison in the early 1990s.

Ioannis Speis. From the *Eleni*, he met Tsafendas during the tanker's stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Dimitris Stavrianos. From the *Eleni*, he met Tsafendas during the tanker's stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Emmanuel Tsabouniaris. From the *Eleni*, he associated with Tsafendas during the tanker's stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Bishop Ioannis Tsafaridis. The Bishop of the Greek Orthodox Church in Zambia-Malawi. He visited Tsafendas at Pretoria Prison Hospital and at Sterkfontein Hospital. Tsafendas told him much about his life.

Marina Tsihlakis. She met Tsafendas in Beira in 1964.

Evangelos Tsouroulis. President of the Greek Community in Rhodesia in 1964 and of the Pan-Hellenic Association of Zimbabwe-Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique Greek Communities (PAZZIMMO). He met Tsafendas in Rhodesia in 1964.

Reyner van Zyl. The psychologist who examined Tsafendas for the summary trial.

Stratis Vamvarapis. He met Tsafendas in 1965-1966 in Cape Town.

Alexandra Vaporidis. She met Tsafendas in 1961 in Istanbul. Her husband, Father Agathagos Vaporidis, was very good friend of Tsafendas.

Michalis Vasilakis. From the *Eleni*, he associated a lot with Tsafendas during the tanker's stay in Cape Town in July-August 1966.

Father Michalis Visvinis. A Greek Orthodox priest who very regularly visited Tsafendas in prison for five years (1989-1994). They became very close and Tsafendas spoke extensively to him about his life.

Michael Vlachopoulos. Tsafendas's nephew. He met him in 1963.

Gordon Winter. Former BOSS agent. He met Tsafendas in Pretoria Prison in 1975.

Periklis Zouridis. He met Tsafendas in 1964 in Beira.

Witnesses who did not meet Tsafendas

Akis Apergis. Member of the Greek community in Johannesburg at the time of the assassination.

Terry Bell. Anti-apartheid activist and journalist who co-authored the *Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth*.

Ioannis Bizos. Member of the Greek Community in Johannesburg at the time of the assassination.

Advocate George Bizos. Human rights lawyer and anti-apartheid activist. His mother-in-law was one of the closest friends of Tsafendas's stepmother. Tsafendas requested to be represented by him, but his request was denied.

Desmond Blow. *Rand Daily Mail*, *Sunday Times* and *Sunday Express* journalist. He became very close to David Pratt after the latter's assault on Dr. Verwoerd.

Elizabeth Blow. Desmond's wife. She spoke to the author about her husband's relationship with Pratt.

Graham David Blow. Desmond Blow's son. He spoke to the author about his father's relationship with Pratt. He was named David by his father after Pratt.

Professor Alban Burke. Professor of Psychology and Head of the Psychology Department at the University of Johannesburg.

Stefan Bubenzer. Actor. He played in Will Tunner's play *Tsafendas* when it was performed in London in the 1970s.

Lulli Callinicos. Historian and anti-apartheid activist, present in Johannesburg at the time of the assassination.

Dr. Antonis Chaldeos. Historian, expert on Greek diaspora in Africa.

Gavin Cooper. Son of Wilfrid Cooper, Tsafendas's advocate in his summary trial.

Lionel Davis. Anti-apartheid activist. Imprisoned in Robben Island while Tsafendas was held there.

Achileas Dalamagkas. Psychologist.

Professor John Dugard. Professor of Law and Judge at the International Court of Justice.

Judge Gerald Friedman. Retired Judge.

Dr. Costa Gazidis. Anti-apartheid activist. Cousin of Rika Nikolatos, a social worker who visited Tsafendas in prison and in the hospital.

Janet Gazidis. Wife of Costas Gazidis, who knew Nikolatos very well.

Denis Goldberg. Anti-apartheid activist. Imprisoned in Pretoria Central Prison at the same time as Tsafendas, but he never met him.

Krish Govender. Former Durban State-Attorney and anti-apartheid activist; he made a request in the TRC to examine Tsafendas's case.

Mike Grispos. Son of Helen and George Grispos. George Grispos was Tsafendas's schoolmate and childhood friend.

Maria Kasimatis. She lived in Lourenço Marques at the time of the assassination.

Ronnie Kasrils. Founding member of the Umkhonto we Sizwe and former Minister for Intelligence Services.

Ahmed Kathrada. Anti-apartheid activist. Imprisoned in Robben Island while Tsafendas was held there.

Ayten Kececi. Head of Limasollu Naci, the college in Istanbul where Tsafendas worked in 1960.

Jan-Ake Kjellberg. UN police officer. He handled Tsafendas's file in the TRC.

Elias Kokkinos. From the *Eleni*, he was present in Venice when the crew was questioned.

Dr. Anton Krueger. Academic and playwright. He wrote a play about Tsafendas.

Dr. Peter Lambley. Psychologist and author of *The Psychology of Apartheid*. He knew Reyner van Zyl and Dr. Cooper who examined Tsafendas and referred to his case in the book.

Adviye Vedia Limasollu. Wife of Limasollu Naci, owner of the college of the same name, where Tsafendas worked while in Istanbul.

Tunc Limasollu. Son of Limasollu Naci, owner of the college with the same name where Tsafendas worked while in Istanbul.

Alan Lomas. He was involved with the case in 1966 and the Commission of Enquiry referred to him.

Dr. Evangelos Mantzaris. Academic, expert on trade unions in South Africa and of the Greeks of South Africa.

Solly Mapaila. First Deputy General Secretary of the South African Communist Party.

Judge Robin Marais. Retired Judge.

Costas Maroudas. He lived in Johannesburg at the time of the assassination. Son-in-law of Father Minas Constandinou and grandson of Father Bertolis, the priest who baptised Tsafendas and knew him throughout his life.

Tessa Marwick. Theatre director. She directed the play *Tsafendas* in 1976 in London.

Michael Meadowcroft. British former MP with the Liberal Party and honorary President of the National Liberal Club.

Michalis Michelis. Journalist who extensively researched Tsafendas's case in 1987.

Saul Molobi. South Africa's consul general in Milan. He took an interest in Tsafendas's case in the 1990s.

Abhilash Nair. Law academic.

John Nankin. Director, actor and stage designer. He did some research on Tsafendas in the mid-1970s for William Tanner's play "Tsafendas."

Dumisa Ntsebeza. Advocate who co-authored the *Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth*.

Akis Papageorgiou. President of the Greek Community of Pretoria in the early 1990s.

Emmanuel Perselis. From the *Eleni*, he was present in Venice when the crew was questioned.

Piers Pigou, International Crisis Group's Senior Consultant for Southern Africa and TRC Investigator.

Susan Pratt. David Pratt's daughter.

Elizabeth Radsma. David Pratt's personal assistant and secretary.

Professor Phillip Resnick. Forensic psychiatrist.

Judge Albie Sachs. Retired Judge and anti-apartheid activist.

Professor Robert L. Sadoff, clinical Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Center for Studies in Social-Legal Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, former president of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, as well as the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry.

Dr. James Sanders. Author and researcher, specialising in South Africa.

Emanuel Sakellaridis. *Eleni*'s former captain. He was aware of the questioning of the crew in Venice.

Dr. Aditya Sharma. Consultant psychiatrist.

Renos Spanoudes. Actor and drama teacher. He played Tsafendas in the play *Living in Strange Lands*.

Guy Spiller. Filmmaker. He made a documentary about David Pratt.

Piet Swanepoel. Former BOSS agent.

Dr. Arjun Thampy. Consultant psychiatrist.

Aris Tsafantakis. Tsafendas's cousin, Tsafendas stayed at his parents' house in Crete in 1962.

Maria Tsafantakis. Granddaughter of Costas Kargakis, whose house Tsafendas stayed in while in Crete and who taught him to make bombs.

Michalis Tsafandakis. Tsafendas's nephew and husband of Maria Tsafantakis.

Stelios Tsafantakis. Tsafendas's cousin. He was in Crete when Tsafendas visited the island in 1962.

Judge Zak Yacoob. Retired constitutional judge.

Professor Tuviah Zabow. Former Professor of forensic psychiatry at the University of Cape Town and former head of the forensic psychiatry unit at Valkenberg Hospital.

Dimitris Zitanelis. President of the Greek Community in Cape Town; he lived there at the time of the assassination.

Maria Vasilakis. Member of the Greek community in Johannesburg at the time of the assassination.

Dimitris Vergitsis. Former Greek-Orthodox priest who buried Tsafendas.

James J. Ward, Professor of History at the Cedar Crest College, Allentown, Pennsylvania, USA.

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Dr. James Sanders's personal documents regarding Tsafendas

Gordon Winter's personal documents regarding Tsafendas

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
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
APPENDIX

I: Memorandum of the South African Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal.



Appendix

II: PIDE's Chief Inspector in Lisbon instructing the agency's Sub-Director in Mozambique that "information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of your country should not be transmitted to the South African authorities, despite the relations that exist between your delegation and the South African Police."



Appendix

III: The first item on PIDE's file on Tsafendas opened in 1938. Tsafendas being "suspected of distributing communist propaganda."

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POLÍCIA DE VIGILANCIA E DEFESA DO ESTADO
SECÇÃO POLÍTICA E SOCIAL

CADASTRO SECRETO N.º 10.415

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Nome Demitrios Tsafantakis e Grego

Alcunha _____ Estado _____ Profissão Empregado de escri
torio

Data do nascimento _____ Naturalidade _____

Filiação _____

Residência Quelimane

Sinais particulares _____



BIOGRÆFIA

Esteve empregado em Quelimane na Imperial Airways.- Suspeito de destri
buir propaganda comunista.- Consta que foi para o Transvaal.

