The Gold Mining Industry and the African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU)

The two largest groups of African workers, farmers and mine laboures remained unorganised in the growth of trade unionism in the Thirties. The Communists Party (C.P) and Trotskyist groups tried to establish a miners' union but had been unable to solve the problems of organising migrant workers. Recognising it could not launch such a union on its own, the Party changed tactics in April 1941. Prodded by two C.P. members, Gaur Radebe and Edwin Mofutsanyana, respectively Secretary for Mines and Employment in the Transvaal ANC and Minister of Labour in the ANC National Executive (known as the Cabinet), the Transvaal ANC convened a conference in August 1941 to discuss the formation of an African Mine Workers' Union. The 80 delegates from 41 organisations unanimously resolved to organise workers both on the mines and before recruitment in the Reserves. A committee of fifteen was elected to raise funds and "build an African Mine workers' union", with J.B. Marks as President and James Majoro, a leading member of the Witwatersrand Native Mine-Clerks Association as Vice-President 32. This latter connection was important. Proclamation 110 of 1942 excluded "mine labourers" from the statutory of living allowances payable to all industrial employees. The Chamber ruled that its 1,935 African clerks fell within this category and refused them the allowance. Angered by this refusal, the Native Mine Clerks Association affiliated to the AMWU. As the mine compounds to AMWU officials from the union's inception, it was largely through individual contact between the members of the Clerk's Association and the working miners that the union, slowly grew, claiming 25,000 members in 1944 33. From the outset pressed the union pressed wage demands against a deaf Chamber. After a series of stoppages in February 1943 and representations from the AMWU and the African Gas and Power Workers' Union, the government " appointed a commission to investigate the wages and conditions of African miners. The AMU evidence in effect called for an end to cheap migrant labour, with five basic demands: regular wage increases; payment of a cost of living statutory wage minimum and a Wage Board enquiry; the total abolition of the compound system, the tribal division of the workforce and all restrictions on freedom of movement; and finally recognition of the AMU. 34

The report of the Lansdown Commission 35 is a fascinating document. Delving into of African labour on the mines, it examines in detail the arguments of the Chamber of mines, which stressed the industry's dependence cheap migrant labour, claimed wages were adequate" in view of remuneration in kind and Reserve production, and declared the was not in a position to raise wages without effectively shortening its life - with disastrous results for the national economy. The report illuminates the structure of the gold mining industry which is worth examining.

Gold mining is crucial to the South African economy. Developments affecting it have always influenced the delicate political relations between the national and metropolitan fractions of the bourgeoisie. Not only was it the single industry, accounting for the bulk of the 16, 2% which all mining contributed to National Income in 1943, declaring dividends of £15,6m (of which 54% were paid in South Africa), but also contributed massively to state revenue £-27, 3m in 1943. Though the total value of manufacturing output exceeded that of all mining in 1943, foreign exchange earned by Gold exports (nearly 60% of total) largely paid for the imported 50% of all raw material used in industry. The Chamber's needs and demands thus ranked very high in any governments priorities in framing policy.

The profitability constraints and structure of the gold mining industry were critical factors in the development of the racial pattern of power and privilege in South Africa. The Witwatersrand reefs are the largest ever discovered, yet are very deep, dispersed, and of low yield ore. The realisation of profits required immense capital expenditure, which, coupled with the fixed price of gold and the inability to pass increased costs on to the consumer, meant these had to be kept low. Of the two major cost items, stores were subject to market fluctuation and thus labour became the focus of cost minimisation. The mineowners had grouped together to protect their interests in the Chamber of Mines in 1889. Through a standard average maximum wage system, a recruiting monopsony in the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association and the Native Recruiting Corporation, and servile labour measures (most obviously the compound system) the Chamber limited competition over wages, enabling consistently low levels to be maintained almost indefinitely. The basic underground wage for Africans was 2/6d per shift in 1890, 1/8d in 1935, and 2/- in 1942. 37 These low wages were justified by the reserve subsistence argument.

In August 1943, 308,374 Africans were on the Witwatersrand gold mines, "approximately 84% of the full complement of Natives that could be profitably employed", 38 working a six day week. The average wage was 2/1d per shift for surface workers, and 2/3d for underground workers. Piece work earnings were limited by an "average maximum wage system "under penalty" no mine could exceed, thus avoiding "unfair competition". In 1943, 76% of all African workers earned less than the average maximum wage of 2/3 ¾d per shift. Increases were not automatic, paid only after considering a recommendation from the individual African's white ganger. No overtime rates, sick or leave pay were granted. These meagre items were subject to deductions for boots, mattresses and other items, totaling 15% of gross earnings. 39

In its investigation of the wage structure of the industry, the commission examined the supplementary income from the Reserves on which the Chamber's arguments against increases rested. This section of the report offers stark evidence of the decline of productivity, impoverishment, landlessness, severe malnutrition and health problems in the Reserves - a "cause for grave concern" - concluding that for the majority of migrants, "Reserve production is but a myth". Firstly it investigated the in patterns of employment induced by impoverishment. The composition of the workforce showed a rise in first-time recruits as re-recruitment within South Africa declined. Of the labour recruited from the Free State e.g. in 1943, 42,7% were new recruits, with high and increasing percentages for the Transvaal, Natal and Zululand as well. It was further found that "due 'to the deterioration of the Reserve areas", the average stay in the Reserves between contracts, far from the "12 months of idleness" claimed by the Chamber, had declined from 8,1 months in 1931 to 7,6 months in 1942.

Whereas in 1931, 56% of all re-recruits returned to the mines within a year, by 1943 this had risen to 64%, more than half of whom returned in the first five months. By the end of the seventh month, over 50% of re-recruits had returned to the mines, compared with the ninth month in 1931 40. Whilst suggesting that at least the bulk of the recruits from the Transkei and Ciskei (i.e. 40% of the labour force in 1936) were landless, the Commission calculated a series of budgets for a hypothetical family of five with access to land, incorporating wages earned on the mines and cash income from, and the value of own produce consumed in the Reserves. These indicate that even a worker permanently employed on the mines, whose family had access to land, would, in a good year suffer a shortfall between income and expenditure which had rocketed since 1939 from £1.13.08d to £10.04.04d for a surface worker and from £0.0.2d to £9.09.10d for an underground worker. With the exception of clerks and indunas (less than 2% of the workforce), all African miners were obliged to return to the Reserves on completion of their 14 month contract, the actual shortfalls were thus much larger. Table II shows the extent of these over two years lengths of stay in the Reserves and their rise in just four years.

TABLE II

Table II 41

These findings explicitly give the lie to the Chamber's pious claim that their "perfectly adequate" wages, together with reserve production kept a miner's family for his 14 month contract, paid for a further year of "Idleness"," leaving a large margin to purchase stock and improve his standard of living". For the 41,2% of all African miners earning 2/- per shift or less, a stay of more than five months in the Reserves meant a shortfall between income and expenditure over a two year period greater than their annual cash wage. For the further 24% earning 2/1d - 2/3d per shift, after a seven-month absence from the mines. Yet workers earning more than the minimum wage re-employed at the increased rate only if they returned to the mines within six months. 42

The Commission's genteel horror at conditions on the mines highlight the destruction precapitalist relations of production in the Reserves, with a labour force "freed" from the means of production and forced to sell its labour-power in order to subsist in appalling poverty. Though there is no direct evidence on this point, the fall in both re-recruitment from, and the proportion of the workforce originating in South Africa (52,2% in 1936 to 39, 3% 1946), coupled with the Chamber's persistent complaint that higher wages in private industry were depleting its workforce, would suggest that ex-mine employees were selling their labour-power at higher rates in manufacturing, joining the permanent urban proletariat 43.

The Commission's recommendations aimed at improving the position of the lowest paid workers. Given the profitability constraints of the industry, The Commission's recommended the continuation of the migrant system, yet at wages "providing a proper livelihood", and the industry should gear itself for a "full" industrial wage for the landless. Its full recommendations were: a flat cost of living allowance of 3d per shift; a boot allowance with a free repair service; new per shift wage minima of 2/2d for surface and 2/5d for underground workers (over 80% of workers fell below these minima) and; payment of an overtime rate with leave pay for long service employees. This would increase the average annual earnings of surface workers by £10.4.0d and underground workers by £11.14.7d, virtually wiping out the hypothetical shortfalls and adding £2.6m to the annual wage bill. It was argued that the Chamber whose members had declared a combined estimated working profit of nearly £38m for 1943 and paid out £15,3m in dividends plus £27,7m to the state, could well afford the extra cost.

Finally, whilst itself in favour of "some form of collective bargaining" for Africans, the report concluded that African miners "... have not yet reached the stage of development which would enable them safely and usefully to employ trade unionism as a means of promoting their advancement" and "the public interest would, definitely be negative" to recognition of the AMWU. 44

Neither the Chamber nor the government accepted these recommendations in full. Overtime and Sunday pay were granted, and "in lieu of other all recommendations surface wages were increased by 4d per shift and under by 5d. Contrary to recommendation was borne by the taxpayer, to the Chamber of the bulk of the Gold Realisation Charge to pay for these increases. 45

The Report was considered at the annual AMU conference in August 1944. Attended by delegates from every mine, 700 in all, 1300 rank and file members, the President- General of the ANC, at least one member of the NRC, a number of prominent trade unionists, and receiving a telegram of support from the Paramount Chief of Pondoland, the conference spanned the spectrum of African politics. It consistent trend in African unionism during the war - worker militancy being toned down by the leadership. Angry delegates demanded but were eventually dissuaded by an executive anxious not to harm the war effort. In this case the influence of the C.P. was strong. A compromise resolution described the Lansdown recommendations as hopelessly inadequate and unsatisfactory, but urged their full implementation as a step in the right direction, demanded a wage board enquiry, and called on the labour movement to fight the continuous attempts of mining management to victimise-and intimidate active members of the AMWU.

Both the Chamger and the government attempted to stifle the AMWU with action against the leadership and membership. The Chamber persistently pressurised the government to detain Marks and Majoro. In his evidence to the sedition trail following the 1946 strike, the Compound Manager of the New Kleinfontein Mine admitted Africans were allowed to organise and all mines followed Chamber policy to get rid of anybody trying to organise workers. At one mine alone, 102 AMWU members were arrested for intimidation. 47 At the same trial, Senator Basner claimed the Chamber had insinuated a spy into the AMWU Council. Despite harassment, the union grew steadily, claiming 25,000 members in 1944. Following representations from the Chamber War Measure 1425 was promulgated in August 1944, prohibiting gatherings of more than 20 persons on proclaimed mining ground. This was later acknowledged by the AMWU President to be the beginning of its undoing. Meetings had now to be held clandestinely at night under the mine dumps. The enrolment of new members and collection of subscriptions became increasingly difficult, income dropping from £120 to £30 per month. The columns of Inkululeko regularly reported the arrest of AMWU officials for contravention of the ban on meetings. A mass emergency conference of March 1945 demanded the repeal of the measure and the retrospective enforcement of the Lansdown recommendations. In June an AMWU delegation met the Acting Prime Minister and other members of the cabinet, unsuccessfully pressing these claims and a demand for a general wage increase. 48

The Lansdown report highlighted the intense economic pressures on the rural proletariat from whom the miners were recruited. These gradually escalated. South Africa suffered severe food shortages in 1945. Rations were cut on all mines in July and canned beef substituted for fresh meat. The AMWU president wrote that miners' grievances were aggravated by the "quality and the quantity" of the food they get, and described the formation of workers committees to demand better food. Food r broke out on at least ten mines, and a miner-was killed and forty injured when police broke up a protest outside the kitchen at the Modderfontein East Mine.

Clearly an explosion was coming. The 2.000 delegates to the April 1946 AMWU conference drew statement demanding: a minimum daily wage of 10/-; family housing; 2 weeks paid annual leave; a £1,000 gratuity after 15 payment of repatriation fares; and repeal of War Measure 1425, again an implicit demand for an end to migratory labour. The Chamber adopted intransigent attitude. Numerous letters from the AMWU went unanswered, it being Chamber policy to acknowledge neither the existence of the AMWU nor the miners' grievances by the Director of Native Labour from it by the Gold Producers Committee passage "which included reasoned discussion of certain points. The Committee was of the opinion that all requests should be refused categorically" 50. Senator Basner tried without success to get the Chamber with the AMWU. Similar attempts by all seven African parliamentary represent the Prime Minister and Minister unavailing. During the strike itself, the Chamber rejected as "not practicable" a mediation offer by the Bantu Trust, having decided on "the desirability of a display of force". Yet the Chamber had taken its precautions. It had fully briefed the police and been assured would deal with any disturbances. The Joint Committee of /white/ Mining Unions agreed "maintain essential services and generally assist as far as possible with any work not performed by Natives" 51. In June, the annual Conference of CNETU unanimously pledged full support to the AMWU in the event of a strike. The situation reached its climax in August.

According to a police witness, at a special open-air conference on Sunday 4th a resolution to strike was moved from the floor and unanimously adopted by the 1,000 delegates. Marks and other speakers emphatically warned against the use of violence by the strikers. 52

The strike began on the morning of August 12th. Estimates of the number of participants vary. The C.P. paper Inkululeko jubilantly spoke of 1000, while the Johannesburg Star and Die Transvaler put the figure at 50 000. Official labour statistics speak very precisely of 62 091 strikers and the only public Chamber of Mines reference to the strike puts the figure at 76 000 of the Reef's 308 000 African miners 53. Likewise there is some discrepancy in reports of number of mines affected. One Chamber source speaks of "all mines" being affected. Working from the notes of the participants, the Simons claim 12 mines were brought to a standstill and production partially paralysed on 9 others. Reports in the Star and Transvaler conflict. After the strike, both claimed that only 17 of the 45 Reef mines were affected, with production stopped on 5 and a further 12 either partially closed or affected. Yet their daily reports name 19 mines, 9 totally stopped and production partially stopped or affected, an a further 10. Monthly production fell between July and August on 31 of the 45 mines, with total monthly production down by 169, 800 tons to the lowest level since 1937 54. The pattern of participation in the strike is revealing. Whilst precise details are unavailable, the Chamber stated that "the instigators of the trouble appeared, generally speaking to be Basuto and Natives from the Cape Province i.e. the Transkei and Ciskei. It was workers from those areas where rural impoverishment was most acute, where the process of proletarianisation was most advanced, who were in the forefront.55

Official reaction was swift and violent. Prime Minister Smuts declared himself "not unduly concerned" - the strike was the result of agitation, not legitimate grievances, and "appropriate action" was being taken. This consisted of paralysing the leadership whilst police attacked miners with rifles and clubs. "It can now be revealed" confided the Star after the strike, that 1,600 police were put on special duty as reinforcements were rushed to the Rand, compounds sealed off under armed guard and "ringleaders" arrested. An emergency CNETU meeting held on the 13th issued a call for a General Strike in 48 hours. The ANC President-General and the Transvaal and Indian Passive Resistance Councils pledged full support. Police burst into this meeting, arrested J.B. Marks, AMWU President and CNETU Chairman, and raided AMWU offices. On the same day, police fired on strikers at the Sub-Nigel mine, reporting six killed by rifle fire and a further six trampled to death in the ensuing panic. In police action at the West Springs Mine 324 "casualties" were reported, including one policeman "bayonetted" by a miner. The following day, miners staging a sit-down strike underground at the Sub Nigel Mine were baton charged and driven up "stope by stope, level by level" to the surface and back into the compounds. Groups from the City Deep. West Springs, Simmer and Jack, and Robinson Deep mines marching towards Johannesburg to see the Chief Native Commissioner were "dispersed" by police. Much was made of this march, the press claiming a profusion of "weapons" indicated an intention to "attack" the city. Yet at the subsequent sedition trial, the prosecution could establish no other motive than the desire to cover passes lodged with the Commissioner, and return to the Reserves. Police witnesses agreed under cross-examination that at no stage were the miners asked why they were going to Johannesburg, and till charged by the police the crowd had been good-humoured and peaceful. 56

After a series of unprecedented attacks on government policy, the hitherto conservative Native Representative Council (NRC) unanimously resolved on the 14th to suspend sittings of their "toy Telephone" in angry and vehement protest at the Government's refusal to discuss the strike. A CNETU mass meeting to discuss a General Strike was banned by the Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg, and 600 police sent to break it up before it even started. James Phillips, the Chairman of the strike committee, was arrested together with other prominent black trade unionists and radicals of all races. By Friday 16th, 88 people had appeared in court Assemblies and Native Labour Regulations Acts.

At a meeting of the arrest-depleted CNETU strike committee on the 17th, two prominent unionists, Gana Makabeni and Daniel Koza, proposed its dissolution, withdrawing when defeated. The committee adjourned without taking any further decisions and did not meet again. Isolated in that most effective instrument of social control, the compounds, battered by police attacks, cut off from its leadership and disheartened by the lack of visible support, the strike collapsed. The last of the strikers returned to work on the 17th. Though the number of casualties was never made known, at least 12 Africans were reported killed, and over 1, 000 injured. The Chamber never fully on the strike, its 1946 annual report containing six curt lines of statement, and the government refused to appoint a commission of enquiry.

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