From: The South African Communist Party In Exile 1963 - 1990
The Bram Fischer era
In the aftermath of the Rivonia offensive, coupled with the 90-day detention law, many SACP leaders, together with those from the ANC, were forced to flee the country and go into exile, especially during the period between 1962 and 1964. Yusuf Dadoo, one of the prominent leaders of the SACP and president of the South African Indian Congress, was among the first to leave, making his contribution to the Party's 5th Congress from exile; Moses Kotane, JB Marks, Joe Slovo, Ronnie Kasrils and Duma Nokwe were all among the group that left in 1963, and others such as Ruth First and "Rusty" Bernstein, followed suit in 1964. London and Dar es Salaam subsequently emerged as two important political centres of the exiled movement, with the Party establishing its headquarters in the former, and the ANC settling in the latter. Kotane, Marks and Nokwe settled in Dar es Salaam with the ANC's acting president, Oliver Tambo, and London became a home for other Party leaders, notably Harmel, Slovo and Dadoo. The challenge of keeping the internal Party machinery running was left in the hands of Bram Fischer.
The Party, after almost a decade of underground experience, had developed a more sophisticated structure and recruitment system suitable for the conditions at the time. Party cells, consisting of about three to five members, were the foundation of the underground Party; Area Committees co-ordinated Party structures within their jurisdiction, and in their turn reported to the District Committee which for its part was responsible to the Central Committee. Members could be recruited to a cell on the recommendation of other cell members, but the final decision was referred to a higher authority. This structure and recruitment system was to be taken into exile.
However, in spite of this underground experience, the Party's style of work had not, in many respect, fully adapted to new security conditions. According to one contemporary assessment:
"Partly as a hangover from the long years of legality, and partly because of the failure of police methods between 1950 and 1963 to achieve any major victory, bad habits developed. Our organization up to 1950 and the Congresses up to 1960 worked openly and conducted their affairs without any secrecy. When we were banned certain precautions were taken, but we never really adapted ourselves to illegal conditions".1 It was such complacency, among other things, that made it relatively easy for the apartheid spy, Gerard Ludi, to infiltrate the Party's Johannesburg structures in 1963. Thanks to Ludi's work, the apartheid security forces were able to prepare for an offensive in 1964 which came to be one of the biggest blows to the Party structures.
Bram Fischer, a long-time Party activist and a member of the Central Committee since 1945, gained prominence during the 1956-60 Treason Trial where he served as a member of the defence team, and later led the defence in the Rivonia Trial. Fischer, a well educated Afrikaner with family ties deep into the Afrikaner political elite, was arrested in September 1964 - a year and two months after the police raid on Rivonia - and charged under the Suppression of Communism Act. Fischer was charged together with 13 other Party members including Eli Weinberg, Jean Strachan and Norman Levy. However, in January 1965, Fischer skipped bail and was to go underground for about ten months, leaving his famous letter to be read to the court by his lawyer to explain his decision. Some of his co-accused such as Weinberg, were to be found guilty and spend term in prison until released in 1970. In order to survive in the underground, Fischer retreated to Rustenberg where he changed his disguise before returning to Johannesburg to operate from Waverly and Bramley, using the names "Douglas Black", "C. Thompson" and "Peter West". 2
Between January and November 1965, Fischer became the most wanted person in the country, with a reward of £3000 hanging over his head. Fischer was in contact with an embryonic Secretariat of the external mission of the SACP that was being established in London, from a small office on Goodge Street, around Slovo and Dadoo. Some four months into the underÂground, Fischer recommended to the Secretariat that the leaderÂship of the Party should now shift to the external mission. The Central Committee had met at least twice in exile, first in December 1963 and again in July 1964, but it would appear that the first major Central Committee meeting sat in May 1965 in Prague to deliberate on the reconstruction of the Party in exile against the background of Fischer's recommendation. At the meeting, a Secretariat, to be known as the Central Executive Committee (CEC), was formally established with Headquarters in London, and "given full authority to approach fraternal parties for any assistance it deem necessary". Dadoo was appointed assistant secretary to Kotane "with personal authority to make these approaches on behalf of the CEC". 3
With the Central Committee (or "CC") reconstituted by the Prague meeting to consist of those leaders who were elected at the 5th Congress, its responsibilities were to: (a) give political leadership and exercise all the powers of a central committee provided for in the constitution adopted at the 5 th Congress; (b) work in close liaison and consultation with Party apparatus inside the country; (c) draft and circulate to all members, both in and out of the country, general political directives from time to time, if necessary; (d) build the Party. Principles for operating under me new conditions were also adopted which called for the adoption of "new identities" by members who were known to the security police; those who were known and could not change their idenÂtities "must as soon as possible, be excluded from any contact with any organized segment of the Party". 4
With the general secretary and the chairperson of the Party based in Africa, the meeting had to deliberate on the relationship between the CEC and those CC members based in Dar es Salaam - then known as "Hull" in Party underground correspondence - as well as their role in the reconstruction of the Party in exile: "We must be on the alert to seek out and take every opporÂtunity to have more regular personal contact between Hull and the CEC to exchange information and discuss mutual problems. This may, if necessary, include the sending of representatives under security conditions to Hull when the occasion demands." The meeting was also concerned about the racial composition of the CEC and the leadership of the underground mission in the country. Thus it was decided that CC members in Africa were to "do everything possible to obtain the allocation of leading African comrade to work on the CEC and in Jane [ANC] Office" in London. With regard to underground work in the country, "it is agreed that amongst those to be returned home for the purpose of reconstructing the party must be some drawn from the African membership". Equally important was the relationship with the ANC, and not least because Kotane and Marks were based at ANC headquarters: "To enable the CC to provide adequate political leadership and guidance, the comrades from Hull will keep the CEC informed on the main outline of what Jane is doing both inside and outside the country". 5
Financing the external mission also needed attention. Accordingly, in August 1965 the "London Aid Committee", a charity organisation with Dadoo and Julius First as founding members, was established as a front for the management of Party finances, including opening bank accounts and leasing buildings. Members of the Aid Committee were to change and increase in later years due to changes at the leadership level. An important source of funding for the Party was the Soviet Union's international fund, which was composed of contributions from several socialÂist countries, whose annual allocation to the SACP was to cause difficulties in the 1970s.
The external mission takes over
The decisions of the Prague meeting were communicated to Fischer, referred to as "Noel" in the correspondence; in particular the role of the CC and guidelines for operating in underground conditions, however with the understanding that: "You (the CC man on the spot) and the true beginning of our new structure must, in the spirit of the above [security guidelines], decide what steps are practical at the moment to begin their implementation". 6 Fischer's work in reconstructing the Party and building units in varÂious parts of the country was cut short by his arrest in November, after which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Awarded the Lenin Peace Prize (with the sum of £12 500) in 1967, Fischer became a symbol of the international campaign for the release of political prisoners in South Africa - a campaign which gained momentum until his death from cancer in 1975.
The arrest of Fischer presented the external mission with a new challenge. The CEC, in a report handed to Marks for "Hull", conceded: "With the capture of Bram and then of Fred [unidentified], the Party has ceased to exist as on organized force in SA [South Africa]. We are no longer in touch with any member at home. Many members, including several who served on the CC at one time or another, have broken down under police interrogation. This has resulted in the disclosure of the workings of the Party and the identity of nearly all our members, even many now in exile." As if that was not enough, the CEC was also hampered in its work by problems, including (a) "poor communication with leading comrades in Hull"; (b) little contact with members scattered all over the world, including those in MK camps; and (c) "lack of contact with any leading bodies of the ANC and, in consequence, complete ignorance of the policy and plans of the most vital sector of the liberation movement in which the bulk of our membership is involved". Because of the weaknesses facing the CEC whose work had been reduced to "technical functions" to the extent that many of the Prague decisions could not even be implemented, the Party "failed to arrive at a collective perspective which would be a guide to all our members wherever they are". According to this CEC report, because of these weaknesses, "the absence of collective political guidance of the Party in the most important spheres must reflect itself in ideological gaps in the policy and work of the whole national liberation movement, with negative effects on the struggle we are engaged in". The report, therefore, proposed another CC meeting to address these problems. 7
The CEC was consistent, during the course of 1966, in its effort to resuscitate the CC and the rest of the Party membership. Critical weaknesses were in three areas; (a) the very workings of the CC itself; (b) the relationship between the CC and the Party membership; and (c) the relationship between the Party and the ANC. The CEC proposed an augmented CC meeting for the 30 th November 1966 to include members such as M.P. Naicker, Flag Boshielo, Ray Simons, Chris Hani, Ben Turok, Moses Mabhida, Ruth Matsoane (to be known later as Ruth Mompati) and Dan Thloome. The "basis for this suggestion [for an augmented CC] is that the leadership could well benefit from a certain amount of renewal, replacement (of those on Robben Island) and more direct contact with personnel on key areas and posts". 8 In order to strengthen its efforts for the resuscitation of the Party, the CEC also undertook a road show to meet Party groups based mainly in London, to report on the current crisis and the efforts underway. The report touched largely on the state of the Party and internaÂtional relations without, of course, disclosing details about the workings of the Party for obvious security reasons. 9 Furthermore, the CEC also prepared the Party for participation at the Consultative Conference organised for November by the ANC, as the first formal meeting of Congress alliance partners in exile. One important decision of this meeting was to open ANC membership in exile to non-Africans, and this was to render the exisÂtence of the South African Indian Congress and the Coloured People's Congress as separate organisations redundant.
As for the organisation of the membership, by 1966, only London had an organised Party formation in exile. This was because, on the one hand, of the presence of the CEC and the headquarters in London, and, on the other, the fact that London probably had the largest concentration of South African exiles outside Africa, many of whom were active Party members at home. The main tasks of the London Party groups were identified as (a) solidarity work, especially in the Anti-Apartheid Movement; (b) political and educational work aimed at strengthening the understating of Marxism within the ranks of the liberation movement; (c) work in the organs of the liberation movement, especially the ANC and SACTU; and (d) "technical work for the Party" such as the distribution of propaganda material. These groups, though considered by the CEC as "not a permanent or 'normal' organizational form... [but] as a temporary measure to assist certain aspects of Party work at this stage", were to be coÂordinated by a "London Committee" consisting of two representatives elected by each group. The Committee was not to be "purely an administrative committee to collect dues and supervise the routine functioning of the groups", but was also to have a political function; besides deliberating on political developments and discussing the workings of entities such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Committee was to give political leadership to the groups by setting an agenda for them and ensuring that their meetings had dynamic contact with the issues that were of interest to the Party. 10
International relations were also important. In the past, and as with other European colonies, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union kept in contact with the SACP via the Communist Party of Great Britain. However, from 1960, with the Party and ANC shifting towards armed struggle, it became necessary to establish direct contact with the Soviet Union, and this was initiated by Dadoo in July 1960. The following year in October, Dadoo visited Moscow again, but this time with Kotane who had just arrived in exile. Thanks to these contacts, the Soviet Union initiated the practice of making annual allocations to the Party, beginning with US $30 000 in 1960. Fraternal meetings were also held by the Secretariat with European communist parties, notably those in France, Britain and Italy. And in 1966, the Party twice brought together African like-minded parties based in Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria and Senegal to discuss a socialist agenda for the continent.
The next CC meeting after Prague finally took place in January 1967 in Moscow, but with attendance not augmented as had been suggested by the CEC. The following CC members were present: Kotane, Dadoo, Slovo, Marks, Mark Shope, Brian Bunting and Michael Harmel. The meeting, with a CEC report presented by Slovo (referred to as " "Alex" in the minutes) and a political report by Harmel (entered as "Tony" in the minutes), deliberated on, among other things, the reconstruction of the Party, propaganda work, relations with the ANC, and the workÂings of the CEC. All CC members based in London were to be part of the CEC, now conceived as a structure similar to a workÂing committee or a politburo, but with a Secretariat made up of Slovo, Dadoo and Harmel. Besides decisions taken with regard to communication with the Party membership (to establish an inner-party bulletin) and matters pertaining to propaganda, the meeting was particularly concerned with the outcome of the ANC Consultative Conference of November of the previous year. The Consultative Conference had resulted in the establishment of the Consultative Congress Committee as a mechanism for including minorities in the work of the ANC in exile and co-ordinating work among the Congress alliance partners, but the Party was excluded from the Committee. Thus a resolution was passed reiterating the Party's "policy of support for the ANC in the national liberation struggle", but with the concern that "as an independent organization, with its own established machinery, journal, activiÂties and plans, we feel that our Party too should be included in the proposals for greater co-operation of the liberation movement" in exile. The Party, according to the resolution, was prepared to share its technical facilities and resources; and exchange organisational information concerning its underground work "to avoid working at cross-purposes and needless duplication of efforts".11
It would appear that in communicating this resolution to the ANC, a letter was also written to Tambo to request a meeting with the ANC. A draft of this letter, prepared by the Secretariat and with comments and corrections by Kotane, reflects the differences that existed between London and Kotane on how the Party should be reconstructed in exile. Kotane, based in Dar es Salaam, and Treasurer-General of the ANC, was of the view that the Party should lie low in the liberation movement so as to avoid offending states such as Zambia and Tanzania which felt more comfortable with the politics of the PAC than that of the ANC. For example, Kotane deleted a sentence that refers to "express pride in the contribution made by our [Party] members at every level in the National movement", and signed off: "Please accept this amendment and I shall be happy"12
By the time of the CC meeting of February 1968 - attended by Kotane, Dadoo, Slovo, Rusty Bernstein, Harmel, Shope and Bunting, with apologies from Marks, Ruth First and Joe Mathews - it was clear that the Party was beginning to function as a collective. Not only was the CC beginning to develop an identity as a collective, but also the CEC, as a working committee, was making it possible for decisions to be implemented and the whole Party machinery to begin functioning. In fact, some of the issues discussed at the 1968 CC meeting, such as matters pertaining to propaganda, were referred to the CEC.
The deliberations at the 1968 CC meeting, with a political report by Harmel and the CEC's by Slovo, and as with the previous CC meeting, centered on the reconstruction of the Party and relations with the ANC in particular. Among important decisions regarding the reconstruction of the Party, was to resolve "to organize members into units [in exile] whenever this is not inconsistent with security and the need to preserve the unity of mass organizations"; and to consider co-opting some members into the CC. Equally important, and with the purpose of resuscitating the Party inside the country, a decision was taken to send "one or two of its [Party] personnel for a temporary period to assess on the spot the situation and the possibilities of activity in South Africa". With regard to propaganda, an underground edition of the African Communist was to be prepared for distribution inside the country under innocent covers.
Even though the decision of the 1967 CC to request the ANC to include the Party in the alliance co-ordination mechanism had been implemented as a Party member was invited to sit on the Consultative Congress Committee, relations with the ANC still needed to be strengthened. Thus a decision was taken for "an opportunity [to] be sought for a formal meeting between representatives of the CC and of the ANC leadership for discussion of common problems". In spite of this problem, however, the meeting approved a donation of £5 000 to the ANC. A resolution was also adopted to the effect that "the central aim of our Party at this time is to promote the further unity of the national democratic movement, for the liberation of our country, as a step towards socialism. It recognises that this aim can only be achieved on the basis of close co-operation between our Party and the ANC"; the Party "believes that the strengthening of the socialist outlook in the movement can be a source of strength for the whole movement and for the future of our country in combating racialistic, tribal and other pisive and reactionary influences".13 Of course, this resolution was a reinstatement and elabÂoration of elements of the CST theory as developed in the 1962 programme, but its implementation, as shown later, was not to be without problems.
As part of establishing an effective external mission, a propaÂganda machinery had to be put in place. The Party's main propaganda organs during this period were pamphlets - the first disÂtributed in 1967 in support of the Wankie (see Chapter Three) campaign - and the African Communist - a journal established in the country in 1959, thanks to the efforts of Michael Harmel. One of the important steps to take in this regard, was the decision taken at the 1968 CC meeting to prepare an illegal edition of the African Communist for distribution inside the country (but this was only implemented in 1970), and to establish the journal's headÂquarters in London. The African Communist was to appear in the country under innocent covers such as "The Good Food Guide" and "Landscape Gardening". The journal was headed, for example in 1967, by a six-person editorial board that included Rusty Bernstein, Brian Bunting and Harmel - with the latter as the ediÂtor. Duma Nokwe and another person that the author was unable to identify represented "Hull" on this editorial board.
The 1968 CC meeting laid the basis for the Party's approach not only to the 1970s, but also for participation at the ANC's Morogoro conference of 1969. The 1970s were to witness the reconstruction, in the real sense of the word, of the Party both in exile and in the country.
In spite of the progress achieved in the 1960s, there were, however, a number of questions that still had to be resolved. First, was the fact that some members were unhappy with the style and how the Party was reconstructed during this period, especially with regard to the role of the Secretariat in London. For example, the London Committee was to report to the Secretariat that:
"There have been reports circulating about the liquidationist tendencies that existed in the Party from about 1964 to 1968 or thereabout. It is felt that the historical reasons for this (if accurate) and the way in which it came about should be made known or researched." 14
Secondly, the role of the London Committee, and this was to be the case with other regions as they become established, was still not clearly defined. Key to this question was the role regions should play in the recruitment of cadres and in the establishment of the underground inside the country. The Secretariat had tight control and a monopoly over this issue, and this was to create tensions later in the 1970s.
Finally, the recruitment policy was also unclear. For example, in June 1967, Kotane wrote to Dadoo about a South African in Moscow who wanted to join the Party: "I am not familiar with the correct procedure in these matters having for so many years been dealing with the abstract theoretical side of the organisation". 15 The Secretariat was also unclear, preferring to leave the decision to the discretion of Kotane, but with some advice: "He must of course be prepared to conform to the requirement for new recruits laid down by our last [1967 CC] meeting which as you know demands readiness if called upon and required to do so, to undertake illegal activity within South Africa".16 A recruitment policy was to be in place only in the 1980s, and still not without problems.