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The deadlock was not about principle, but about political power: the power to determine the final constitutional dispensation. It also served to fuel the intense mistrust already festering among parties, and to bring to the fore long-held perceptions and suspicions. Rumours and speculation about the reasons for the deadlock abounded, in the media especially. On 20 May the ANC alleged that someone had tapped its CODESA office telephones.' A professional company appointed by the Management Committee verified the allegation, but the culprits were never caught.
Meanwhile, on 25 May 1992 the ANC and the NP met to find solutions to the deadlock. A day later the ANC, after consulting its constitutional structures, formally withdrew the compromise proposal it had tabled in the closing moments of CODESA II. This was followed by a National Policy Conference the ANC held between 28 and 31 May 1992, which confirmed the agreements reached at CODESA and provided guidelines for its vision of the process. The ANC also decided to embark on a mass action campaign to put pressure on the NP to accept its demands.
A general criticism of CODESA was its lack of transparency. According to Joe Slovo, 'We are perceived as a mysterious cabal... we would like to believe the future of all our people is being discussed. They have a right to know more about how we are going about this process'. It was suggested that all CODESA talks take place in full view of the media. The Management Committee meeting of 15 June confirmed that the negotiations should be more accessible to the press, and agreed to set guidelines for this to take place.
This Management Committee meeting also reflected on the lack of progress in the plenary. Morale was low, and the meeting could not even agree on the size and composition of the new Daily Management Committee. There was equally no progress in the meetings between the ANC and the NP. At the same time, Buthelezi threatened that the exclusion of the King and KwaZulu administration from the CODESA process could lead to violence."
The exchange of memoranda
On the morning of 17 June 1992 more than forty residents of Boipatong were massacred in a systematic attack. The incident sent shock waves throughout the country. The ANC's NEC held an emergency meeting to discuss the implications of the massacre. While it reaffirmed its commitment in principle to negotiation, it decided to break off all talks, both bilaterally with the government and multilaterally in CODESA. The ANC also issued fourteen demands to the government, accusing it of complicity in the violence." In its press statement, the ANC stated:
It [the NP government] pursues a strategy which embraces negotiations, together with systematic covert actions, including murder, involving its security forces and surrogates. ... The Boipatong massacre is one of the most chilling instances of the consequences of the actions of the De Klerk regime.... The ANC reaffirms its commitment to a negotiated resolution of the conflict in our country which would bring about democracy, peace and justice. The refusal of the regime to accept such a settlement compelled the NEC to review the current negotiations process.
The ANC has no option but to break off bilateral and CODESA negotiations. The NEC will be keeping the situation under continuous review. The response and practical steps taken by the De Klerk regime to these demands will play a critical role in determining the direction and speed with which bona fide negotiations can take place.
There was an immediate outcry from the business and international community, and on 28 June senior business leaders from the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) launched a major intervention. The leadership of the European Community also urged all parties to return to the negotiating table, while the chairperson of the OAU and the UN Secretary-General made similar calls. In the meanÂtime, the Management Committee cancelled its meeting scheduled for 29 June 1992 due to the breakdown in negotiations.
What followed was an exchange of memoranda between Mandela and De Klerk detailing their reasons for the breakdown and blaming each other for the violence. In an effort to get the ANC back to the negotiating table, De Klerk significantly softened the NP's demands for minority protection, even dropping its demand to give minority parties m increased representation in the senate. The NP now proposed that each region should have equal representation and seats be allocated to each region in proportion to party support. The NP also dropped its demand that the structure of regions be changed only with a 75 per cent majority. It further proposed that there be a general election should the constitution not be completed within three years. (The ANC was demanding it be six months.)
While these proposals did not entirely meet with the ANC's demands, they provided some basis on which to find agreement. Despite this, Mandela refused to meet De Klerk. The ANC welcomed the proposal but complained that it did not go far enough. In particular, the ANC demanded that the NP abandon any form of minority veto, and accused De Klerk of ignoring the gravity of the ANC's demands.
On 15 July 1992 the ANC and its allies, the SACP and COSATU, declared the month of August a month of 'rolling mass action'. Several hundred thousand people engaged in various forms of mass action throughout the country, and more than 90 per cent of the workforce heeded a national general strike. This was the biggest form of mass mobilization seen in the country since the 1950s, effectively creating a referendum of the black majority in which people 'voted with their feet'. The campaign was an overwhelming success for the ANC, serving to mobilize black people around its demands, particularly for an interim government, which once again became the centre of poliÂtical and popular debate in the country.
The NP government, for its part, met with the governments of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, the IFP, the Solidarity Party, the National People's Party, the Ximoko Progressive Party, and the Dikwankwetla Party on 27 July 1992 to discuss ways of getting negotiations back on track. Early in August, Buthelezi began voicing disquiet about the NP's attempts to get talks with the ANC going again, a move he saw as a softening approach towards the ANC. What seemed to bother Buthelezi was the possible exclusion of the IFP from such talks. He threatened to pull out of all future multi-party talks if this was the case. In a partial attempt to appease the IFP, on 20 August the NP met with both the IFP and the DP. They agreed that CODESA should resume in September even if the ANC were not there. De Klerk argued that while this was not a 'go it alone' strategy, multi-party talks had to continue.
In view of the international community's concerns about the situation, the United Nations Security Council held a special session on 2 August 1992 to deal with the question of violence in South Africa. The UN adopted special resolution 765 calling for a special representative of the Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, to visit South Africa and report back. Later that month, the UN Monitoring Committee under the leadership of Vance arrived in South Africa to monitor the mass action campaign.
One of the first meetings Vance held in South Africa was with Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Vance voiced the UN's concern over the continued incarceration of political prisoners, urging Botha to expedite their release. Botha responded by linking this to the question of a general amnesty, insisting that the ANC first abandon its policy on armed struggle and address the question of MK arms caches and ANC underground units. In his report to the UN Secretary-General, Vance was critical of most institutions of state, but his harshest criticism was reserved for the security forces, which he believed did not have the credibility or legitimacy to assist in the transformation of South Africa. However, he did praise the Goldstone Commission and structures of the National Peace Accord. This intervention by Vance and the United Nations was important, as it seemed to favour joint control over the security forces during the transition.
The 'channel bilateral'
The ANC's National Working Committee, at its meeting of 31 August 1992, agreed to establish a channel of communication between the ANC and the government, with the purpose of maintaining some form of dialogue with the NP. The ANC mandated Cyril Ramaphosa to maintain this channel, while the NP's representative was Roelf Meyer. In their first formal meeting on 2 September, the government indicated that it wanted to discuss its responses to ANC demands in greater detail.
What followed was a series of exchanges to explore ways and means to take the process of negotiations forward in meetings commonly referred to as the 'channel bilateral'. The meetings were tense but soon showed promise. Three kinds of issues were addressed: political and constitutional issues, including an interim government, the constituent assembly, constitutional principles, and issues of political concern such as dangerous weapons and mass action; political prisoners; and problematic hostels.
The first breakthrough came with the NP's agreement that the constituent assembly be bound only by general constitutional principles, be subject to a set time-frame, and have adequate deadlock-breaking mechanisms. On 3 September the ANC published a discusÂsion document containing comprehensive amendments to the South African Constitution. The purpose of the amendments was to facilitate the establishment of an interim government and a constituent assembly. These proposed amendments were referred to as the 'Transition to Democracy Act'.
The proposal suggested the replacement of the legislature with a single 400-member national assembly elected by proportional repreÂsentation. This body would also operate as a constituent assembly. A simple majority from amongst its members would elect the president, and a multi-party cabinet would take decisions by a two-thirds majority. All parties with more than 5 per cent support would have a place in the assembly, and there would be a bill of rights. Decisions on the constiÂtution would require a two-thirds majority, and deadlock-breaking mechanisms were proposed to facilitate decision-making. In this regard, unless parties adopted the constitution within nine months, provision was made for fresh elections to be called. The second constituent assembly would then have a further six months to complete its tasks. The constitution would have to conform to constitutional principles previously negotiated, and a seven-member panel of constitutional experts would assist in the adjudication of disputes.
In the meantime, the NP prepared to reconvene Parliament in a special sitting for the purpose of passing legislation on the agreements reached at CODESA. Unfortunately, early on 29 September several ANC demonstrators protesting in Bisho against the homeland of Ciskei were killed and a large number wounded. This served both to heighten tension and to move the reincorporation of homelands up on the agenda. The tragedy also underscored the demands for visible measures to curb the violence and for joint control over the security forces during the period of transition. There was now urgent pressure on all parties to speed up the process of negotiation. De Klerk's response to the massacre was to call an urgent summit with Mandela.
Mandela, for his part, confirmed that the ANC was eager to restart negotiation in order to 'save the country from disaster'. For this to happen, the government had to honour its previous commitments to the ANC and the UN envoy Cyrus Vance on the issues of hostels, political prisoners, and dangerous weapons. The ANC had shown its willingness to facilitate the process towards a negotiated settlement, and consequently Mandela made an impassioned plea to the governÂment to meet the ANC's concerns, and promised to respond likewise. According to Mandela, the proposed summit was urgent.
This, together with the deteriorating security climate, served to place De Klerk under tremendous pressure. To add to the government's woes, the recently appointed Minister of Finance, Derek Keys, confirmed that the country's economy was in dire straits. The country urgently needed to restore investor confidence, and negotiating a speedy resolution to the conflict would help make that happen.
It was against this background that negotiations to break the deadlock continued with greater vigour. Once again, were it not for the maturity of the negotiators, it would not have been possible to make the breakthroughs required. However, just as it seemed as if complete agreement was in the offing, a row broke out within the NP leadership. Kobie Coetsee linked the agreement on the release of political prisÂoners to a general amnesty, a proposal which the ANC rejected. The NP was forced to settle the matter within its ranks before the negotiations could proceed.
The row was an important indicator of the tension developing within the NP. While it was the first publicly known dispute within the NP regarding the negotiations, it was the second display of the anxiety behind it. The first arose from the submission of a document by Hernus Kriel to Working Group 1 of CODESA. It was becoming evident that there was a body of thought within the leadership of the NP that felt that the party should assume a much more aggressive approach in its negotiations. These tensions soon became a common feature of the negotiation process.
Quite apart from this, the question of political prisoners proved more difficult to resolve than all the other issues in contention. The NP government felt they could not release people they regarded as 'terrorists' without also releasing convicted white right-wingers. The ANC, on the other hand, felt that the victory of a breakthrough would be rather hollow if its supporters continued to languish in jail.
During the last seventy-two hours before the agreement was signed, the dispute around the release of political prisoners centred on three individuals, namely Robert McBride, Mzondeleli Nondula, and Mthetheleli Mncube. All three had been convicted of murder, sentenced to death, and granted a reprieve. The government believed that the release of these prisoners would be unconstitutional, since the President did not have the necessary powers without empowering legislation. Accordingly, these releases could take place only after Parliament reconvened and passed appropriate legislation.
The Record of Understanding
Late on the night of 24 September 1992 both the ANC's National Working Committee and the NP cabinet met with their negotiators to confirm the agreement produced by the 'channel bilateral'. In the ANC's meeting, while the entire extended National Working Committee accepted the agreement, Mandela stunned the leadership of the ANC by disagreeing. He insisted that the three prisoners in question (McBride, Nondula, and Mncube) be released forthwith. For him, the value of all the organization's achievements would be rendered meaningless if the ANC were not able to secure their release. What astonished even the most militant leaders present was the stubbornness of the ANC's President.
Mandela obtained the permission of the National Working Committee to adjourn its meeting to discuss the matter with De Klerk telephonically. Mandela told De Klerk that unless he released the three there would be no summit. De Klerk was taken aback by this demand and promised to give him an answer as soon as he had consulted his cabinet. Mandela had thrown down the gauntlet and challenged De Klerk like never before; the NP leader had to take an immediate decision on an extremely sensitive issue. To add to the tension, it was not only De Klerk who felt challenged; a number of the most senior ANC leaders were just as worried. Despite their attempts to convince Mandela that the agreement was acceptable, he remained adamant. Twenty minutes later De Klerk returned the call acceding to Mandela's demand.
On 26 September 1992 a summit took place between Mandela and De Klerk at which they signed the Record of Understanding. This agreement addressed major deadlock areas and laid the basis for the resumption of multi-party negotiations. Regarding political prisoners, they resolved that 150 prisoners convicted of political offences committed prior to 8 October 1990 be released immediately and a further 250 prisoners be released by 15 November 1992. They also agreed that the public display of dangerous weapons be banned, the Goldstone Commission's recommendations implemented, and various hostels fenced. The agreement represented yet another mileÂstone in the process of negotiations, which De Klerk cogently described in his speech to the Natal NP congress: 'The Government's attitude is that for the sake of reconciliation we want to close the book of the past. We stand here at the cross-roads in our history. We need to turn our back on the past, we need to clean the slate. ... We need to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiation. ... We need to start afresh. My hope is that this will be seen as a deed ensuring that we do not remain locked in the disputes of the past. I hope this will be recognised as a deed done to unlock the future'. The Record of Understanding represented a historic turning point, for it established an agreed course of events and constitutional principles, and also confirmed the process of negotiation as set out in the Harare Declaration.
Right-wing reaction
The agreement also proved to be politically costly for the NP and ruptured its already volatile relationship with Inkatha. Despite strenuous efforts by the government, it failed to placate Buthelezi, and relations remained strained for a long time afterwards.
On 6 October 1992 Buthelezi, Ciskei military leader Oupa Gqozo, Bophuthatswana's Lucas Mangope, the CP, its breakaway faction, the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU), and the Afrikaner Freedom Foundation met in a Conference for Concerned South Africans to respond to the Record of Understanding. The conference demanded that MK be disbanded and that the Record of Understanding be scrapped. This conference gave birth to the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG). The remarkable aspect of COSAG was that it was the first formal alliance in South Africa between black and white right-wing organizations uniting around a common rejection of the Record of Understanding and fear of an ANC majority government.
On 9 January 1993 the NP met COSAG and agreed that a conference be called to plan the resumption of multilateral negotiations. COSAG was opposed to both an interim government and the drafting of the final constitution by an elected constituent assembly. It was even opposed to the title 'CODESA'. An important issue for consideration was the status of agreements previously reached at CODESA. The position of the IFP was that the multi-party conference should re-evaluate all agreements, including the Peace Accord, and the process of negotiations. Those parties who did not participate in CODESA should be able to confirm or reject it as they wished.
Buthelezi's attitude and approach did not enamour the United Nations or its Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali. FurtherÂmore, various attempts made by Boutros Ghali to communicate with Buthelezi were in vain. The isolationist and confrontationist approach adopted by Inkatha intensified in December 1992, when the KwaZulu Legislature provocatively approved a draft constitution that it envisaged as the first step to federal autonomy. Buthelezi was effecÂtively threatening secession.
The ANC's 'Strategic Perspectives'
In October 1992, after the signing of the Record of Understanding, the ANC's most senior leaders met in a lekgotla ('a gathering') to plan and develop a comprehensive strategy for the process that lay ahead. An important debate at this meeting focused on the compromises that the ANC may have to make to produce a negotiated settlement. Once again, the question of 'sunset clauses' was considered, a concept previously floated by Mandela in late December 1991 and again considered by the ANC's National Working Committee in February 1992.
The ANC rose from this meeting to consult various role-players, including the Patriotic Front, civil society, and business leaders. It wanted to get all its allies on board before the formal process of negotiation resumed. To finalize its positions, the ANC's NEC met on 23 November 1992 and endorsed the formal resumption of negotiaÂtions. Gerrit Viljoen and various other NP policy makers openly supported this move.
At this meeting of the NEC, the ANC also adopted a position paper prepared by Joe Slovo entitled 'Strategic perspectives'. This document had as much a strategic impact on the ANC's negotiating strategy as the Harare Declaration, for it represented a further development of the ANC's ideas on the process of negotiation. The document assessed the political balance of forces and provided a perspective on the transformation of South Africa.
The paper argued that a peaceful political settlement had always been the first option of the liberation movement. It was only when the prospect of any peaceful settlement vanished that the ANC adopted armed struggle and the idea of a revolutionary seizure of power. The strategic perspective of the ANC was the attainment of majority rule, which would proceed in various phases. The pursuit of the objectives in each phase, the document cautioned, should not result in defeats later on. Five phases were identified: the establishment of a transitional executive council; the election of a constituent assembly; the estabÂlishment of an interim government of national unity; the drafting and adoption of the new constitution; the phasing in of the new constitution; and the period of consolidation of the new democracy.
The fundamental goal of the national liberation struggle was the transfer of power to the 'people'. In pursuing the policy of negotiation, 'Strategic Perspectives' suggested that unless the liberation movement had the strength and support of the masses it would not be able to achieve its goals at the negotiating table. It was important to ensure that the compromises made did not undermine the new democracy.
The demand for an interim government of national unity was won. This was fundamentally different, however, from the NP's approach to power-sharing, which meant no more than the entrenchment of veto powers for minority parties. Stability during the period of transition to full democracy was crucial, and in this regard, the security forces and the civil service were most important. Accordingly, it was necessary to address the question of job security and retrenchment packages for civil servants as part of a negotiated settlement. The document predicted that while the final negotiated settlement would take the form of multilateral agreements, the ANC and NP would occupy a central position.
Pressure to resume multi-party negotiations
In the meantime, there were several other issues brewing which served to increase pressure for an early resumption of multi-party negotiations and the establishment of an interim government. One of these issues was the ongoing violence plaguing the Natal area. In this regard, the chairperson of the National Peace Accord, John Hall, made various attempts supported by senior business leaders to secure another summit between Mandela and Buthelezi. Then a row broke out when the NP transferred large tracts of land to the self-governing terriÂtories. According to the ANC, there was no logic to this when discussions were in progress for the reincorporation of all homelands into South Africa. It concluded that the NP government was providing favours to regionally based political parties in return for their support during the negotiations. Related to this was the publication of the De Meyer Commission's report, which revealed corruption on a huge scale in the Department of Education and Training and the Lebowa government and excessive spending in KwaNdebele. And soon afterwards the Goldstone Commission, in its report of 16 November 1992, confirmed the existence of a 'third force' that operated under cover of military intelligence in fomenting violence.
These controversies placed De Klerk in an awkward predicament and under unbearable pressure. The editorial in Business Day on 19 November 1992 said:
It is a measure of South Africa's desperation that a way has to be found for unhooking President de Klerk and his Cabinet colleagues from the scandals of corruption, dirty tricks and lack of credibility. De Klerk and his colleagues might be floundering, but if we are to have any hope of negotiating a settlement of our problems, De Klerk has to be able to deliver his constituency when heads have to be counted.
The national predicament has not gone unnoticed by the ANC's leadership. But it has to heed the opinions of its supporters who may not have as pragmatic an understanding of the realities of political power. Forgiveness or letting bygones be bygones is possible, but only if De Klerk and his government can credibly convince their interlocutors that they have no hidden agendas, that they are not party to any more destabilization tricks and that they are determined to halt undemocratic activities by the state.
Preparations for the resumption of multi-party negotiations
To prepare for the resumption of negotiations, the ANC and the NP held a 'bosberaad' between 2 and 5 December 1992. The venue, a nature reserve in the north-west of the country called D'Nyala, was ideal. The meeting dealt with the status of bilateral discussions, multilateral negotiations, time-frames, elections, the independent media commission, interim government, the constitution-making body, the transitional executive council, free political activity, violence, and unilateral restructuring. In this regard, they drafted various formulations for submission to their respective principals for approval. They also accepted that agreements entered into were binding on them alone.
The purpose of this bilateral and the several meetings that followed was to avoid substantial differences between the two major role-players. While this meeting did not conclude any substantive agreeÂments, the real success of the meeting lay in the fact that it allowed the negotiators to strike up a personal rapport with each other. This proved invaluable in allowing them to work with each other through difficult negotiations. In the two years that the ANC was unbanned, this bosberaad was the first opportunity that these negotiators had to interact with each other at a social level and to get to know each other as people rather than as opponents.
News of the December bosberaad only angered the IFP further. But the IFP was not alone, for the impression of a near cosy relationship between the ANC and the NP also appeared to produce new fault lines within the NP leadership. The international community monitored these negotiations closely, and there was considerable concern about the continued isolation of Inkatha. Attempts were made to persuade Buthelezi to take a more positive approach. Exercising quiet diploÂmacy, the United States joined Britain and other European Community states in pressing Buthelezi to lead Inkatha back into the multi-party process.
On the international front, two developments were to make an impact on this process. In the United States, Bill Clinton became President, and according to an official of the new US administration, 'he [Buthelezi] has been left in little doubt that, with a new adminisÂtration soon to take over in Washington, he won't be able to count on the sort of sympathetic hearing he has relied upon in the past'. The British relinquished their presidency of the European Community -another loss of support that Buthelezi had relied on previously. The EC nonetheless pressed Buthelezi to realize the importance of not finding himself isolated when multi-party talks resumed.
The beginning of January 1993 proved to be a good start for the process of negotiations. Early in January the NP met with COSAG to discuss further the resumption of multi-party negotiations and share views on the question of a future regional dispensation. In a surprisingly positive move, the COSAG alliance decided on 10 January to throw in its lot and agreed to the resumption of multi-party talks. Following this meeting there was an extensive bilateral meeting between the NP and Inkatha on 18 January, which helped to bring about a convergence in their perspectives on a regional dispensation. The meeting was however acrimonious, and deadlocked when Inkatha complained about the 'connivance' of the NP with the ANC. The two parties nevertheless managed to patch up their differences before the month was over.
The meetings that followed looked at the resumption of negotiaÂtions, which spurred the ANC on to develop its election campaign. Even the government was preparing for the election as the Minister of Home Affairs, Louis Pienaar, confirmed the identification of about 7 000 sites as possible polling stations at which approximately 21 million voters could cast their votes.
A series of further meetings between the ANC and the NP followed between 20 January and 4 February 1993, with the objective of resolving as many of the outstanding issues between them as possible. These meetings proved fruitful and represented a convergence of thinking, placing the ANC and NP in a good position to jointly drive the negotiations forward. The discussions were assisted by a marked shift at the beginning of February 1993 in the NP's conception of power-sharing, signified by the NP's giving up its idea of a collegiate presidency. This meant agreement on one head of state under which a multi-party cabinet would serve. The term for the government of national unity, representing all parties with more than 5 per cent of the vote, would be at least five years. There would also be no need to hold another election or referendum once the final constitution was adopted. Furthermore, the NP abandoned its demand that the multi-party negotiations should determine the powers, functions, and boundaries of regions, which meant that the constitution-making body would be bound only by the agreed constitutional principles. There was also agreement on the establishment of an independent electoral commission, agreement on the process of appointing an SABC board by 31 March, and resolution that the TBVC states be reincorporated.