Introduction

Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) was launched by the leaders of the underground ANC and SACP, with Nelson Mandela as Commander in Chief, dedicated to a strategy of sabotaging targets of economic and political importance. Post offices, telephone booths, pass offices and electricity pylons were bombed.

Sebatana ha se bokwe ka diatla!
(The attacks of the wild beast cannot be averted with only bare hands).

THE END OF AN ERA

By the end of 1960, popular resistance seemed to be crushed. The flames of the burning passes had been quenched by the bullets of Sharpeville and Langa. The week long stayaway called for the 19 April failed to raise the spirit of a dejected people. Those of the leadership who escaped the massive state clampdown slipped out of the country to begin reorganising resistance from abroad. For Mandela, this was the turning point. "If the government reaction is to crush by naked force our non-violent struggle," he told a gathering of local and foreign press in a safe house, "we will have to reconsider our tactics. In my mind we are closing a chapter on this question of a non-violent policy." (258)

Moses Kotane disagreed. At the Working Committee meeting in June 1961 where Mandela presented his proposal for a military wing, Kotane argued that: "There is still room for the old methods if we are imaginative and determined enough." (259) Eventually, however, Kotane agreed to the matter being raised with the National Executive. The National Executive met in Durban. Like all ANC meetings it met in secret and at night in order to avoid the police. Mandela anticipated difficulties. There was no doubt that the timing was poor. At the Treason Trial, the ANC had contended that non-violence was an inviolate principle of the movement, not simply a tactic. He knew, furthermore, that Chief Luthuli's commitment to non-violence was deeply moral and feared his opposition. However, Luthuli was ultimately persuaded. "If anyone thinks I am a pacifist", he said, "let him try to take my chickens, and he will know how wrong he is!"

His suggestion was that the military movement should be a separate and independent organ, linked and under the overall control of the ANC but fundamentally autonomous. (260). In this way the legality of the unbanned allies would not be jeopardised. The NEC agreed. The following night, the joint executive met in Durban: the Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions and the Congress of Democrats. Chief Luthuli opened the meeting by saying that even though the ANC had endorsed the decision on violence, "it is a matter of such gravity, I would like my colleagues here tonight to consider the issue afresh'. (261)

For Mandela, this was a sign that the chief was not fully reconciled with the new course. When the session opened at 8pm, Mandela presented his arguments once more. Yusuf Cachalia and Dr Naicker pleaded with the ANC not to embark on this course, arguing that the state would slaughter the whole liberation movement. "Non-violence has not failed us, we have failed non-violence", pleaded JN Singh:'. "We argued the entire night", recalled Mandela. But then suddenly MD Naidoo, a member of the South African Indian Congress, burst forth and said to his Indian colleagues: "Ah, you are afraid of going to jail, that is all!" Towards dawn, Mandela had his authority. He was mandated to form a new military organisation, separate from the ANC.

The policy of the ANC would still be that of non-violence. He was authorised to join with whomever he wanted or needed to create this organisation and would not be under the direct control of the mother organisation. The name of the new organisation would be Umkhonto weSizwe, Zulu and Xhosa for the Spear of the Nation. Its short name would be MK.

PLANNING FOR THE FIRST PHASE

The first phase of armed action was to be the December 1961 sabotage campaign against government installations. Instructions were issued to avoid attacks that would lead to injury or loss of life. Wrote Joe Slovo: "No one believed that the tactic of sabotage could, on its own, lead to the collapse of the racist state. It would be the first phase of 'controlled violence' designed to serve a number of purposes. It would be a graphic pointer to the need for carefully planned action rather than spontaneous or terrorist acts of retaliation which were already in evidence … And it would demonstrate that the responsibility for the slide towards bloody civil war lay squarely with the regime" (152).

In the six or so months between the final decision and the first round of sabotage, the high command set up regional MK commands in the main centres, chosen for their membership of Congress Alliance organisations or necessary technical or military skills (Barrell 9). Curnick Dlovu led the Natal region. Looksmart Ngudle, who died in security police detention in 1963, and Fred Carneson were the senior men in the Western Cape. Washington Bongco, hanged for MK activities in August 1963, was Border regional commander. Vuyisile Mini was one of the key figures in the Eastern Cape command and went singing to the gallows in 1964. Ronnie Kasrils recalls his recruitment to the newly formed MK: "During July 1961, MP Naicker took me for a walk along the [Durban] beach front … 'I have been asked to approach you,' he said, above the roar of the surf smashing against the rocks, ' to sound you out. Are you willing to get involved?' (38) "Theory apart" wrote Slovo, "this venture into a new era of struggle found us ill-equipped at many levels. Among the lot of us we did not have a single pistol. No one we knew had ever engaged in urban sabotage with home made explosives …" (153)

It was Jack Hodgson, appointed to the Johannesburg military command of MK, who showed them the ropes. A veteran of the Abyssinian campaign and a 'desert rat' during the early stages of the North African war, Jack Hodgson taught them the rudiments: "Sacks of permanganate of potash were brought", wrote Slovo, "and we spent days with pestles and mortars grinding this substance to a fine powder". Kasrils continues: "He placed a chemical mixture with icing sugar into a spoon and carefully added a drop of acid with an eye dropper. The powder burst into flame and we were as impressed as pupils in a science class. The problem, of course, was how to achieve the result without directly applying the acid. For that one required a timing device." "With a huge grin he produced a condom". First he placed a teaspoon of the chemical mixture into the condom. Next he produced a small, gelatine capsule … Opening the capsule, he added a few drops of acid, carefully put the cap back on the capsule and dropped it into the condom. He told us that it normally took up to 50 minutes for the acid to eat through the capsule … ( 39).

MK IS LAUNCHED!

The date for the MK launch was to be 16 December 1961. Popularly called Dingaans Day and later renamed the Day of the Covenant, it commemorated the Battle of Blood River where, in 1838, the Boers had defeated King Dingaan's Zulu impis. MK soldiers were instructed by the National High Command to attack government offices and reminded to avoid loss of life. Night after night they ground chemicals. "It took 20 kilograms of Jack's mixture", recalls Kasrils, "to make four bombs". (41) "By 15 December we were ready. We neatly wrapped each bomb in Christmas paper and delivered them to different combat units…" (42)

On the morning of 16 December, posters appeared in the city streets: "The time comes in the life of any people when there remain two choices: to submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We will not submit but will fight back with all means at our disposal in defence of our rights, our people and our freedom." Joe Slovo target was the Johannesburg Drill Hall which had housed the preparatory examination of the Treason Trial. But when the moment came, he found that the military authorities had decided to have their monthly spring clean. He entered the hall and found 50 black cleaners at work. Seeking for somewhere else to plant the bomb, he found an old cupboard, turned the acid bottle upside down (which activated the device) and turned to face a military official who asked if he could help him.

Although Slovo had his story ready, he was aware he had only 15 minutes before the bomb exploded. Fortunately, he had time to get back and turn the bottle upright before it exploded. (153-4) Later, he recalled, he felt "somewhat redeemed" when he, Jack Hodgson, Rusty Bernstein and others dealt successfully with a manhole on the Johannesburg/Pretoria road which housed the telephone cables between the two cities (154).